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ABSTRACT 
Since its revolution of 1979, Iran has been widely viewed as a threat to regional and 
international security. Partly as a result of this perception of Islamic Iran, there exists a 
large body of research literature focusing on Iran's foreign and security policies in the 
post-1979 era. However, the existing analyses of Iranian state behaviour have paid very 
little attention to the Islamic Republic's actions in the area of arms control diplomacy. 
For the most part, Iran's arms control operations have been considered by scholars as 
insincere attempts to hide, defend, or promote the Islamic Republic's military and 
armament policies and, therefore, as largely irrelevant to real understanding of Iran's 
foreign and security policy behaviour. 
While such observations have contained an element of truth, this study empirically 
demonstrates that arms control diplomacy has actually acted as an important component 
of Iran's foreign policy under the Islamic Republic. Iranian officials have resorted to 
arms control diplomacy in order to address a wide variety of challenges that have 
emanated from the Islamic Republic's external environment. Moreover, an analysis of 
Iran's arms control operations in the course of 1979-2003, the time period under 
consideration in the present work, shows that the Iranians have used arms control 
diplomacy as an instrument to promote a multitude of foreign policy objectives that 
have stemmed from the Islamic Republic's security, power, economic, ideological, and 
prestige interests. 
Although the identification and analysis of such objectives and interests constitute a 
key element of the present work, this study primarily focuses on identifying and 
reconstructing Islamic Iran's diplomatic operations in four individual thematic areas, 
that is, conventional, chemical, biological, and nuclear arms control. Apart from 
discussing the substantive content of, and contextualizing, the Iranian operations in each 
of the four cases, the present work looks at the means by which Iranian authorities have 
tried to realize their arms control objectives. Finally, this study tentatively examines to 
what extent the content, objectives, and means of the Islamic Republic's arms control 
operations - together with the level of diplomatic effort put into those operations - have 
changed during the 1979-2003 period. 
Methodologically, the present work is founded on a broad range of primary sources, 
most of which consist of official statements made by the Iranian government in 
multilateral diplomatic fora dealing with arms control and security matters. This study 
also draws on the records of various international arms control organs and fora, in 
addition to which it makes use of pronouncements made by Iranian officials in other 
contexts, of written material produced by the Iranians - for example, in the form of 
press releases, memoranda, and position papers - as well as of the author's personal 
interchange, interviews and correspondence, with Iranian arms control officials. 
This work constitutes the first comprehensive discussion of Iran's arms control policy 
under the Islamic Republic. As such, it fills a void in contemporary scholarship on Iran 
and lays the foundation for further research on that country's diplomatic operations in 
the area of arms control. 
In memory of Seyyed Hossein Pirseyedi, mYfather and best friend 
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I 
1 INTRODUCTION: THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
1.1 The Broadening Notion of National Security 
The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the bipolar international system 
marked the latest monumental turning point in the history of international relations. Just 
like previous epoch-making transformations of world politics, the end of the Cold War 
forced statesmen and students of international relations alike to reexamine their views 
about the world around them. For statesmen, the primary challenge was to figure out 
what impact the dramatic changes in the international system had on their countries' 
position in that system and on their foreign policy objectives. For the scholars of the 
academic discipline of International Relations (IR), the end of the Cold War amounted 
to a major intellectual test that in many respects problematized the discipline's 
assumptions, findings, and research agenda. ' 
Debate on state or national security has become one of the discourses that has been 
informed by the puzzle of what has changed and stayed the same in international 
relations in the post-Cold War era. 2 For the most part, the debate has centered around 
the types of dangers that are believed to threaten states' core values. Two broad lines of 
thinking have emerged in this context. According to one school, the so-called 
traditionalists, threats to national security in the post-Cold War world continue to 
essentially consist of military ones. Even though the traditionalists have recognized the 
need for modifications in states' security thinking and policy agendas, their calls for 
redefinition have focused on changes in the nature of the use of military force. 
Apart from the sea changes that have taken place in international relations, theoretical deliberations 
within IR have historically been strongly influenced by developments within the philosophy of science 
and the philosophy of social science. For this influence, see Wight (2002) who shows how IR scholars 
have turned to philosophy in order to obtain conceptual tools for empirical research, to legitimate their 
scientific practices, and to develop the self-image of their discipline. For the various schools of thought or 
(general) theories of international relations in IR and their ontological, epistemological, and 
methodological premises, see, for example, the anthology edited by Kegley (1995), the relevant essays in 
the volume edited by Baylis and Smith (2001), and Burchill et al. (2005). Kolodziej (2005) examines how 
well these theories, treated as schools of security thinking, have been able to explain the beginning, the 
evolution, and the end of the Cold War. 
2 The term 'security' is used here to denote a state where there is a "low probability of damage" to an 
object's "acquired values" (Baldwin 1997: 13). Following Buzan (1991: 69-96), states, as "referent 
objects for security, " can be said to have three fundamental values: (a) the idea of the state, establishing 
the state's legitimacy in the minds of its population; (b) the physical base of the state; and (c) the 
institutions of the state, referring both to the state's governmental organs and to the norms, laws, and 
procedures by which those bodies operate. 
2 
Topics such as the so-called revolution in military affairs (RMA) -a term pointing to 
the major advances made in conventional weapons technology and to the associated 
changes that have occurred in military organizations and operational concepts - and the 
notion that war has become virtual or "postmodern" are examples of subjects that have 
occupied the traditionalists' minds (Angstrom 2005: 15-18). 3 Also, the traditionalists 
have paid attention to the problem of intra-state wars. While emphasizing the endurance 
of state-to-state military conflicts in the international system, they have increasingly 
recognized the destructive consequences of armed conflicts occurring within states. In 
addition to causing major suffering in the conflict areas, internal conflicts can have a 
direct impact on neighboring countries' and even distant powers' security interests. 
In the view of the so-called wideners, those calling for a broader notion of national 
security, the traditionalists' emphasis on military issues, even when expanded from the 
conventional state-to-state perspective to internal conflicts, presents only a partial 
picture of reality and, therefore, an inadequate foundation for policy-making and 
analysis. 4 Although acknowledging the existence and relevance of military concerns, the 
wideners stress that there are many non-military issues - in the economic and 
environmental realms, for example - that need to be treated and defined as threats to 
states' core values. Many wideners, especially those from academia, have taken their 
argumentation further by attacking the traditionalists' intellectual identification with the 
school of political realism in IR. According to them, the realist worldview's portrayal of 
international relations as a zero-sum game blurs the fact that states cannot cope with 
serious security threats such as the climate change, the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), or the spread of diseases without extensive international 
cooperation. 5 
Moreover, the wideners have attacked political realism on the grounds that beside 
being analytically flawed, its position as the dominant school of thought among 
decision-makers and IR scholars makes it a significant obstacle to new approaches to 
security. The argumentation of the so-called critical theorists is a good example of 
3 The idea of postmodern war is based on the observation that the wars waged by the technologically 
superior Western powers have become more of a media event than a stirring experience for those 
societies (Angstrom 2005: 16-17). 
4 It needs to be noted, though, that the calls for a broadened notion of security are not uniquely a post- 
Cold War phenomenon. They emanate from the 1970s and the 1980s and were originally linked to the 
rise of economic and environmental agendas in international relations (Buzan et al. 1998: 2). 
5 This is the argument, among others, of the so-called globalists who underscore the complexity and 
interconnectedness of security problems in the post-Cold War world. For the globalist approach, see, for 
example, Baylis (2001: 269-270) and Hakovirta (2002: 57-74). 
3 
theorizing that has challenged traditional security thinking. Relying on the idea that 
knowledge claims are political, that they always reflect certain assumptions and 
interests, critical security theorists have sought to expose the factors that have driven 
traditional security thinking and to reflect on the social and political implications of the 
ruling realist discourse. This method has been viewed by them as a means to proceed 
towards the normative goal of surpassing the theoretical and practical limits set by 
political realism's intellectual hegemony and striving for a better, just world order. For 
critical security theorists, the key normative question is how to replace the predominant 
conception of security, its focus on states' needs and the military component of security, 
with a new approach that takes the individual as the central unit of analysis and 
recognizes the multiple dimensions of security. 6 (Laitinen 1999: 68-78; Devetak 2005 
and Baylis 2001: 266. ) 
Critical theorists' conceptualization of security illustrates, for its part, that 
contemporary debate on security, and particularly its academic offshoot, has broken 
away from the Cold War era security discourse criticized by many as state-centric and 
obsessed with military issues (Baylis and Wirtz 2002: 8-11). Today's security debate 
resembles a marketplace of ideas where multiple 'sellers' of security notions, whether 
politicians or analysts, compete for the attention of the 'buyers' in order to influence 
practical security policies or the ways in which security, as an "autonomous domain of 
human behaviour" (Kolodziej 2005: 2), is being studied. The 'goods' offered in this 
intellectual marketplace revolve around two principal themes: first, around the question 
of the content of security and, secondly, around the question of the most appropriate 
referent object for security analysis. 
As far as the first theme is concerned, the sectoral approach to security put forth by 
Buzan (1991: 116-134) and Buzan et. al (1998) provides an analytical framework that 
illustrates the kinds of factors that have been identified as security threats by the 
participants of the post-Cold War security debate. It discerns five analytically distinct 
sectors of interaction from which threats to a referent object's security may arise: 
military, political, economic, societal, and environmental sectors. As for the second ' 
6 Critical theorists are not the only wideners that have distanced themselves from the concept of national 
security as the point of departure for security analysis. Some, for example, have argued that the nature of 
today's security challenges necessitates an approach that gives priority to "world interests" and "world 
security policy" (Brown 1998: 10-16). 
7 As explained by Buzan et al. (1998: 7): "[... ] the military sector is about relationships of forceful 
coercion; the political sector is about relationships of authority, governing status, and recognition; the 
economic sector is about relationships of trade, production, and finance; the societal sector is about 
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theme, there are five different levels of analysis where referent objects for security can 
be found - that is, the level of international systems, international subsystems, units, 
subunits, and individuals (Buzan et al. 1998: 5-6). 8 
1.2 The Middle East: The Primacy of Military and Political Security 
Despite the unquestionable impact the wideners have had on the way in which 
contemporary practitioners and students of international relations view the issue of 
security, the traditional state-centric approach focusing on military security is strongly 
alive. Indeed, one influential security-related observation of the post-Cold War era, the 
so-called two worlds thesis, suggests that the broadened notion of security has 
significant practical and analytical relevance only in certain regions of the world. 
According to the thesis, the post-Cold War international system is divided into two 
parts. The first part, the so-called zone of peace, consists of advanced industrial 
democracies or the Western world and is characterized by the absence of war within it. 
Mutual interdependence, the two worlds argument posits, has greatly diminished the 
role and importance of military issues in the zone of peace and led to increased 
questioning of the primacy of the state as a referent object for security therein. In the 
other part, the non-Western "zone of conflict, " the situation is dramatically different. 
Comprised mainly of Third World countries, the zone of conflict suffers from poverty, 
dependence on the Western world, and from numerous military conflicts, both intra- 
and inter-state. Relations between the members of the zone of conflict, the two worlds 
argument goes on, are regulated by the rules of power politics, and the survival of the 
state, its military security, is the zone members' overriding concern and objective. 9 
relationships of collective identity; and the environmental sector is about relationships between human 
activity and the planetary biosphere. " 
8 By international systems, Buzan et al. (1998: 5-6) refer to the "largest conglomerates of interacting or 
interdependent units that have no system level above them" and by international subsystems to "groups of 
units within the international system that can be distinguished from the entire system by the particular 
nature or intensity of their interactions with or interdependence on each other. " As an example of 
international subsystems, they refer to inter-governmental organizations, whereas states, nations, and 
transnational firms are given as examples of units and bureaucracies and lobbies as examples of subunits. 
9 For various versions of the two worlds thesis, see Goldgeier and McFaul (1992) who name the 
constituent parts as the "core" and the "periphery, " Dessouki (1993) who speaks of "two zones of 
international relations and two spheres of international security, " and Buzan (1998) who uses the terms 
"zone of peace" and "zone of conflict. " Rothgeb's (1995) characterization of "parallel international 
universes" reflects the same idea, whereas Holsti (1996: 141-149) adds a third category to the model by 
dividing the international system into "zones of war, " "no-war zones, " and "zones of peace. " In 
suggesting that the state of political relations within a specific region determines the nature and purposes 
of arms control activities therein, Daalder's (1992) conceptual distinction between cooperative and 
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That the Middle East is often used as an example of a Third World region belonging 
to the zone of conflict is hardly surprising. For decades, the region has been a theater of 
violent internal, regional, and international conflicts. As observed by Hinnebusch (2003: 
1), "the Middle East is arguably the epicentre of world crisis, chronically war-prone and 
the site of the world's most protracted conflicts. "10 Internally, most Middle Eastern 
countries suffer from a low level of social cohesion, and the legitimacy of the regional 
states and rulers is being constantly challenged from within. These conditions are 
maintained not only by local and international factors, but also by historical legacies of 
the colonial era. The external imposition of the current state order on the region and the 
often arbitrary state boundaries that resulted therefrom, in particular, have hampered the 
process of state formation and consolidation in the Middle East. 11 (Ibid.: 54-58,73-90 
and Ayoob 1991: 267-273) 
Due to the fact that many people in the Middle East find it difficult to identify 
themselves with their states and rulers, and given that many of them are prepared to 
resort to political activism, either violent or non-violent, in order to air their 
dissatisfaction and grievances, the maintenance of domestic security ranks very high on 
local governments' security agendas. This state of affairs inevitably creates and sustains 
competitive approaches to arms control is closely related to the two worlds thesis. According to Daalder, 
a cooperative approach to arms control is applicable to states with largely compatible political and 
security interests, and its focus is on improving the political relations among states. A competitive 
approach to arms control, in turn, is applicable to states with fundamentally different political and security 
interests and it centers around the immediate objective of reducing the risk of war. 
10 Similarly, Halliday (2005: 173) notes that "even if the incidence of inter-state war is taken as the sole 
basis of comparative judgement, of any region of the world, the Middle East had the most conflict-ridden 
record in the second half of the twentieth century. " To Tibi (1998: 42), the Middle East is the "principal 
trouble spot in world politics, " whereas Buzan and Wxver (2003: 187) depict the region as a "perennial 
conflict formation. " However, the conflictual nature of the Middle Eastern regional system and the 
dominance of politico-military considerations in Middle Eastern security thinking does not mean that the 
broad notion of security has remained totally uninfluential in the region. On the contrary, the regional 
decision-makers have increasingly recognized the role of other than military and political threats to their 
countries' national security, and the local intellectuals, politicians, and businessmen identified with the 
line of thought referred to as "Middle Easternism, " for example, have drawn attention to the regional 
states' interdependence and called for the transformation of the regional agenda dominated by political 
and military issues (Sivan 1998: 193). For scholarly discussions that stress the relevance of the broad 
notion of security in the Middle Eastern context, see the volumes edited by Korany et al. (1993), Martin 
(1999) and Jacoby and Sasley (2002). 
11 The two meanings given to the concept of state by Halliday (2005: 46) is illuminating in this 
connection. By "national-territorial state, " Halliday refers to state as a territorial entity, an 
"undifferentiated unit, " whereas his "organisational or institutional" definition of the state points to the 
ruling institutions - the government, ministries and administration - of a country. Based on this 
conceptualization, it can be concluded that, in the Middle East, state legitimacy is being domestically 
questioned in both senses. In other words, the challenges to state legitimacy stem, on the one hand, from 
dissatisfaction with issues that pertain to the national-territorial dimension of the state (such as the 
boundaries and the ethnic composition of the regional states) and, on the other hand, from dissatisfaction 
with the way in which the regional countries are being ruled by the local elites (that is, with the 
institutional aspect of the state). 
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a constellation in which the definitions given to national security by the rulers and the 
ruled frequently clash. Whereas state authorities' definition of national security often 
takes the ruling regimes' political and physical survival as the starting point, thereby 
effectively equating national security with regime security, the opponents of those 
regimes view the governments themselves as the essential security threat. ' 2 
While having their own dynamics, internal conflicts in the Middle East and other 
parts of the Third World frequently contribute to and mesh with regional inter-state 
tensions. Ethnic, religious, and other kinds of interests and identities that cross national 
borders in much of the developing world provide regional states and other actors with 
an easy opportunity to interfere, for whatever reason, in neighbouring countries' internal 
conflicts. Conversely, cross-border interests and loyalties can produce effects that go in 
the opposite direction. Because of the links that defy state boundaries - which, as the 
contemporary history of the Middle East illustrates, do not necessarily have to be based 
on feelings of amity but can stem alone from power-political interests that bind various 
actors -, internal conflicts may drag neighbouring countries into these crises and spark 
inter-state conflicts. In both scenarios, then, there is a direct link between intra-state or 
regime stability and regional security. (Ayoob 1991: 263-264; David 1991: 240-241 
and Maoz 1997: 25) 
As far as other factors that have fuelled inter-state conflicts in the Middle East and 
elsewhere in the developing world are concerned, they have been plentiful and ranged 
from power aspirations and ideological confrontations to territorial disputes and historic 
mistrust. As the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict illustrates, some of these conflicts have 
centered around issues that were inherited unresolved from the colonial period. The 
Arab-Israeli wars of 1948-1949,1956,1967,1973, and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon 
in 1982 also demonstrate how the occurance of war has complicated the resolution of 
original issues of contention by creating new grievancies and disputes between the 
conflicting parties. Furthermore, the conflicting parties' efforts to accumulate military 
tools against each other have generated a momentum of their own and strengthened 
12 Speaking of the developing world in general, Ayoob (1991 and 1995) argues that Third World 
governments' national security problems are mostly domestic and related to regime security. David 
(1991), focusing specifically on Third World countries' alignment behaviour, reaches a similar 
conclusion. According to him, Third World leaders' primary aim is to stay in power. This objective, 
David claims, is not only the most powerful determinant of their alignment behaviour, but presumably 
strongly steers other aspects of their foreign and domestic policies as well. Both Ayoob and David offer 
their findings as important contributions to mainstream IR literature which, in their view, has paid too 
little attention to Third World states as units of analysis. For other scholars noting that mainstream IR 
7 
those parties' already deep mutual suspicions. (Ayoob 1991: 271-276; Hinnebusch 
2003: 9,154-155 and Halliday 2005: 67-68) 
Regional conflicts rarely take place in international isolation but are linked in 
multiple ways to the wider international system. Most Third World states, for example, 
depend for their military capabilities on the assistance they receive from the powerful 
members of the international community. Also, the major powers often have a direct 
interest in the outcomes of regional conflicts and consequently get involved in them. 
While the actual conflicting parties may succeed in playing out such extra-regional 
involvement and the major power competition at the international level to their own 
advantage, outside interference can also critically curtail those parties' political and 
military room of manoeuvre. 
From the perspective of Third World states, then, great power involvement in 
regional conflicts and in regional affairs in general constitutes a major security problem 
in its own right. During the Cold War, for example, the Middle East acted, after Europe 
and Asia, as the "third front" in the superpowers' global rivalry over military, political, 
economic, and ideological preponderance (Buzan and Waever 2003: 197). After the end 
of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Middle Eastern states have 
been worried about the economic, political, and socio-cultural developments associated 
with the process of globalization. For the most part, they have seen globalization as a 
phenomenon that increases their vulnerabilities and dependencies vis-ä-vis extra- 
regional actors and Western countries, in particular. Not infrequently, Middle Eastern 
governments have equated globalization with the military hegemony of the United 
States. (Dodge and Higgott 2002: 15-17 and Halliday 2002: 45-56 and 2005: 132-133, 
314-315) 
The security environment of the Islamic Republic of Iran (hereafter the Islamic 
Republic), a key Middle Eastern power and the subject matter of this study, shares the 
characteristics peculiar to Middle Eastern countries in general. The Islamic Republic's 
interaction with state and non-state actors in regional and international contexts subjects 
it to developments that create threats to its national security. And like many of its 
regional counterparts, the Islamic Republic suffers from domestic security problems 
which occupy a central role on its security policy agenda. The extent to which threats, 
actual or perceived, emanating from Iran's domestic, regional, and international 
research has analytically ignored the Third World or approached it with theories and concepts developed 
in Western contexts, see Neuman (1998: 1-2), Lemke (2002: 3-7) and Jacoby and Sasley (2002: 1-3). 
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environments have preoccupied the authorities of the Islamic Republic is captured by 
Sariolghalam (2003: 73) who observes that "from its birth in 1979 until the present, 
security has remained an obsession for the Islamic Republic. " This Iranian inclination 
lends credence to Ayoob's (1995: 191) conclusion that security considerations dominate 
the domestic as well as the foreign policies of Third World states. 
However, Islamic Iran is not only an object of various kinds of security threats but 
also a state that itself is considered a security problem by a number of domestic, 
regional, and international actors. The view of the Iranian state as a threat is based, first 
and foremost, on the Islamic Republic's self-perception and behaviour as a 
revolutionary state. Following the Iranian revolution of 1979,13 the country's new 
power-holders sharply distanced themselves from the policies of the ousted Pahlavi 
regime and devised a new course for the country in domestic politics and foreign 
relations. Thus, the representatives of the Islamic Republic, a polity formally 
established after a national referendum in March 1979, did not settle for the 
transformation of the Iranian society into a mirror image of their worldview, an effort 
that inevitably generated opposition among some segments of the Iranian population, 
but wanted to correct what they viewed as the ills of the international system as well. 
Born in the middle of the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet 
Union, the Islamic Republic strongly disapproved of the superpowers' hegemony in 
international relations and openly challenged them by adopting a foreign policy 
orientation' 4 that was claimed to be independent and guided by religious principles. In a 
13 The Iranian revolution of 1979 and the question of what caused the fall of the Pahlavi monarchy has 
generated a considerable body of scholarly literature. In a recent study on the topic, Kurzman (2004) 
argues that five main types of explanation for the Iranian revolution can be discerned. The political 
explanations of the revolution have emphasized how the Pahlavi regime's limited liberalization of Iran's 
domestic political arena in the face of internal and international pressure enabled the country's opposition 
forces to successfully challenge the monarchy. According to organizational explanations of the 
revolution, it was the Iranian opposition's ability to mobilize a nationwide movement against the 
government that proved to be decisive in the Shah's fall from power. The cultural explanations of the 
Iranian revolution, in turn, have laid stress on the role of societal - principally religious - norms, 
ideologies, beliefs, and rituals in the revolutionary process, whereas economic explanations of the 1979 
revolution have been founded on the general observation that revolutions occur when economic problems 
get worse, especially after a period of relative prosperity. Finally, those who have adhered to the military 
explanation of the Iranian revolution have referred to the paralysis of the Shah's machinery of violence in 
the middle of internal turmoil as the ultimate reason for the downfall of the Pahlavi regime. Kurzman 
himself, after weighing each of the above explanations, stresses their shortcomings and finds them only 
partially valid. For other discussions of the Iranian revolution, see, for example, Bakhash (1984), 
Arjomand (1988), and Milani (1988). 
" The term 'foreign policy orientation' refers to a country's general orientation towards the rest of the 
world. It encompasses a state's general attitudes and commitments towards its external environment as 
well as its fundamental strategy for accomplishing foreign policy objectives and goals and for coping with 
persistent threats. (Holsti 1977: 109) 
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similar manner, the leaders of the Islamic Republic expressed their dissatisfaction with 
the prevailing conditions in the Middle East and did not hide their interest in subverting 
the regional status quo. Moreover, Iran's leaders declared that their country was willing 
to lend its helping hand to all the "oppressed" of the world and even went so far as 
speaking of a world united and ruled by their idiosyncratic interpretation of Islam. The 
Islamic Republic's assertive and intransigent posture, together with the fact that its 
representatives did not shy away from using violent measures to promote their domestic 
and foreign policies, cemented the image of the post-revolutionary Iranian state as a 
militant and dangerous actor. 
Although ever since the end of the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, itself partially a result 
of Iran's revolutionary foreign policy, 15 and the death in 1989 of Ayatollah Khomeini, 
the architect and chief symbol of the Islamic Republic, Iran has moderated its 
revolutionary temper both domestically and internationally, perceptions of the Islamic 
Republic as a dubious and an untrustworthy actor persist in the post-Cold War era. 
While these perceptions are kept alive by political memories and by the clashes of 
interest between Islamic Iran and other international actors, they are further maintained 
by the fact that Iranian decision-makers have not been willing to rid their country from 
the status of a revolutionary state. As observed by Halliday (1990: 215), as long as 
revolutionary states' internal orders remain intact, they continue to pose challenges to 
other states. 
Even after the end of the Cold War and the ideologically fervent phase of Iranian 
policies, then, Iran continues to be identified with three main phenomena that have 
crucially moulded, legitimately or not, outside threat perceptions of the Islamic 
Republic: radical Islam, terrorism, and WMD. Particularly in the West and the Middle 
East, Iran is viewed as a state sponsor of radical Islamic movements, as an actor that 
itself resorts to and helps others to carry out terrorist activities, and as a regime that 
pursues WMD. That the Islamic Republic continues - by challenging the dominance of 
the West in world affairs and by defining its national security in relation to the actions 
of the great powers - to consider itself a player of global relevance contributes to Iran's 
15 The history of revolutions shows not only that wars have caused revolutions and but also that many 
revolutions have led to wars (Halliday 1990: 219). Walt (1996) sees the Iran-Iraq war as a textbook 
example of a war sparked by a revolution. According to him, the 1980-1988 war was essentially caused 
by two developments set in motion by the Iranian revolution: the alteration of the balance of power 
between Iran and Iraq and the two parties' increasingly malign perceptions about each other's intentions. 
Walt notes that revolutionary regimes are usually overly optimistic about the international attractiveness 
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standing as what Buzan (1991: 299) calls a revisionist state, a country whose actions are 
seen to raise the level of threat in the international system. 
1.3 Islamic Iran and Arms Control: The Research Questions 
Islamic Iran's obsession with security and its reputation as a dangerous actor have 
meant that various dimensions of Iranian state behaviour related to military and political 
security have drawn steady scholarly interest. The existing body of knowledge on 
subjects such as the Islamic Republic's armed forces, military capabilities, and military 
operations contains invaluable data on the Islamic Republic's security-related activities. 
Despite their unquestionable merits, however, the studies available - in addition to 
being in some respects outdated - leave some areas crucial for the understanding of 
Iran's security behaviour uncovered. While the unavailability of necessary sources often 
explains the gaps in the research literature, some important questions have, for one 
reason or another, been simply neglected by Iran scholars. 
The arms control policy of the Islamic Republic is a good example of a neglected 
area of inquiry. Here, the main explanation given for the disregarding of the subject - 
by scholars who have taken the trouble to explain their research choices in the first 
place - seems to be that the issue is not analytically relevant enough to warrant closer 
examination. Chubin (1994 and 1997a), for example, implies that Iran does not have the 
luxury to view arms control as a serious approach to security, and that in the face of its 
military experiences, the Islamic Republic is in fact highly skeptical about the relevance 
and benefits of arms control. Thus, Chubin concludes, Iran is "unconcerned with arms 
control" and merely views it as a means to score propaganda and political points 
internationally. In a similar manner, Cordesman and Hashim (1997: 310) maintain that 
"Iran has already shown that it regards arms control as an extension of conflict and 
rivalry by other means and not as a valid security option. " Still another example of an 
analyst following the same line of argumentation is Saikal (2002: 280) who claims that 
no Middle Eastern state, including Iran, has been really serious, except in propaganda 
terms, in its calls for the elimination of WMD in the region. 
From an analytical point of view, these observations suffer from two major 
shortcomings. First, they are not based on proper empirical accounts of Iran's arms 
of their revolutionary message, whereas other states are prone to assume that revolutionary states are 
internally weak and therefore easy to defeat. 
control policies but, instead, principally rely on examinations of Iran's weapons 
programs. By ignoring the examination of the Islamic Republic's arms control 
activities, thus, the foregoing observers imply a priori, without sufficient evidence, that 
closer inquiries into those activities would not significantly add up to the understanding 
of the Islamic Republic's national security policy. 
Secondly, even though the observation that Iran uses arms control for propaganda and 
political purposes captures some aspects of the goal-setting of the Islamic Republic's 
arms control policies, such a conclusion begs an immediate counter-question: supposed 
that the purposes of Iran's arms control operations were limited to propaganda and 
political posturing, and irrespective of whether such an assumption would be 
analytically legitimate, do these objectives not, in their own right, illustrate that arms 
control has certain roles to play in Islamic Iran's security policy? Hence: should the 
examination of Iran's arms control policy and the explanation of the roles it plays not be 
included in the analysis of Iranian state behaviour? 
The existing, and indeed extremely limited, research literature on the Islamic 
Republic's arms control policy has not been capable of filling the analytical gaps 
referred to. For example, the study by Ali (1996), perhaps the most detailed 
examination of the Islamic Republic's arms control policy to date, captures certain key 
elements of Iran's arms control stances as well as some of the Iranian policies' main 
characteristics, but fails to place them into a proper historical context and to 
demonstrate, among others, how Iran's arms control argumentation has come into being 
and evolved. And although Ali correctly argues that "the Iranian leadership sees Iran's 
participation in arms control as an avenue to achieve multiple political, military, and 
economic goals, " he provides only a limited discussion of them and does not establish a 
clear empirical connection between those goals and the Islamic Republic's arms control 
activities. A further obvious weakness of Ali's study is that it ignores the valuable data 
provided by the primary sources available and relies almost exclusively on secondary 
sources. While Jones' (1998) article on Iran's arms control policy, another noteworthy 
treatment of the subject, gives more weight to primary sources, it nonetheless 
essentially suffers from the same weaknesses as the study by Ali. 
As for other accounts of the Islamic Republic's arms control policies, they do not 
reach the analytical level of Ali's and Jones' work. Arnett (1998a), for example, in 
addition to elaborating on Iranian threat perceptions, merely offers a listing of Iran's 
memberships in various multilateral arms control instruments, whereas the essay by 
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Etemad (1987) serves as an example of a discussion that superficially touches upon a 
limited aspect of the Islamic Republic's arms control policy - in his case, Iran's nuclear 
diplomacy. Finally, the articles by Shahabi (1994) and Sadeghi-Dolatabadi (1995) are 
representative of brief sympathetic Iranian examinations that, though useful as objects 
of analysis, concentrate on legitimizing the Islamic Republic's official positions. 
Resting on the observation that the Islamic Republic's arms control policy constitutes 
a research topic and a phenomenon that has been inadequately accounted for, if not 
completely sidelined, by Iran observers, and based on the claim that knowledge about 
Iran's arms control activities is a prerequisite for comprehensive understanding of the 
Islamic Republic's security behaviour, this study has three principal objectives. In the 
first place, and above all, it aims at identifying and reconstructing Islamic Iran's arms 
control operations in four individual thematic areas: conventional, chemical, biological, 
and nuclear arms control. Trying to present and describe Iranian activities in these fields 
in the time period of 1979-2003, this work discusses the substantive content of those 
actions and the means by which the Iranians have tried to achieve their arms control 
objectives. Furthermore, this study seeks to illustrate how Iran's arms control operations 
have evolved since the time of the 1979 revolution as well as to place them in their 
proper historical context. Thus, the main tasks set for this case study are of descriptive 
nature, a feature that places the present work, in terms of problem framing and 
methodology, among mainstream scholarship in the study of Iranian foreign and 
security policies, national security studies, and area studies (Katzenstein 1996: 509 and 
Bates 1997: 167). 16 
The second principal purpose of this work is to distinguish and discuss the objectives 
that have supposedly steered the Islamic Republic's arms control operations. '7 While 
the study's primary focus will be on the content of Iran's actions, on the substantive or 
thematic aspects of the Islamic Republic's arms control argumentation, it also tries to 
identify the objectives that have presumably guided the Islamic Republic's policy 
choices in the realm of arms control. Even through the present study does not claim to 
provide an exhaustive account of the Iranian objectives, or to explain Iran's operations 
16 For a discussion of various scholarly traditions in Middle Eastern studies, see Halliday (2005: 21-40) 
who discerns five main research traditions: historical analysis, political realism, foreign policy analysis, 
approaches that stress the importance of ideas and values in explaining the behaviour of their research 
objects, and historical and international sociology. 
1' Following Holsti's (1977: 139) definition, the term 'objective' is understood here as an image of a 
future state of affairs and future set of conditions that the Iranian government, through individual policy- 
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in the area of arms control, it nonetheless postulates that the objectives subsequently 
discussed provide us clues about why Iran has acted as it has. Accordingly, they have to 
be taken in consideration in any serious effort to explain the Islamic Republic's arms 
control behaviour. Finally, the third principal objective of this research is to tentatively 
examine to what extent the content, objectives, and means of Iran's arms control 
operations, as well as the level of diplomatic effort put into those operations, have 
changed during 1979-2003, the time-period under consideration. Put briefly, the aim is 
to see whether they have been characterized by continuity or change. 
Given that the purpose of this study is to describe, understand, and interpret Iranian 
security behaviour in a thematically and temporally limited area, and given that this 
behaviour mainly manifests itself in the form of diplomacy, the subsequent discussion 
on the Islamic Republic's arms control policies will share many general characteristics 
with the work carried out by diplomatic historians. Accordingly, while drawing on the 
theoretical insights of IR literature, this study does not aim at either testing theoretical 
hypotheses or, more ambitiously, creating them. Yet, by providing an empirical, 
thoroughly documented account of Iran's arms control operations, it puts analytical 
building blocks at the disposal of scholars who are striving for theoretical or 
comparative research results. ' 8 (Schroeder 1997; Levy 2001 and Halliday 2005: 23-24) 
Of course, as a case-explaining analysis or case study, 19 this work seeks, first and 
foremost, to add to the scholarship on Iran. 20 By shedding light on an overlooked 
dimension of Islamic Iran's security behaviour, it not only hopes to contribute to a 
deeper understanding of the Islamic Republic's foreign and security policies, but it also 
provides an untypical angle to the study of those policies. Whereas existing studies of 
Iran's international relations are often based on approaches that divide the totality of 
such relations into bilateral or regional sub-categories and then proceed to discuss the 
agendas of issues that define the content and nature of Iranian behaviour in bilateral and 
makers, aspires to bring about. The future state of affairs may refer to concrete conditions, to values, or to 
the combination of the two. 
18 The research program on "cross-cultural dimensions of multilateral non-proliferation and arms control 
dialogues, " as outlined by Krause (1999), serves as a good example of a scholarly enterprise that can 
make use of the results of an analysis of Iran's arms control policy. For a general discussion of how area- 
oriented studies, such as the present one, can contribute to theory-oriented scholarship, see Tessler et al. 
(1999). 
19 Levy (2001: 48) draws a distinction between three kinds of case studies: case-explaining case studies, 
hypothesis-testing case studies, and hypothesis-generating case studies. 
20 The research literature on Iran's foreign and security policies consists almost exclusively of historical 
analyses. For recent studies that have approached the subject of Iran's foreign policy from a markedly 
theoretical perspective, see Ehteshami and Hinnebusch (1997); Maloney (2002); and Adib-Moghaddam 
(2005). 
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regional contexts, 21 this research takes a single issue-area as the analytical point of 
departure. 
Apart from generating knowledge about Islamic Iran's security-related activities and 
about a particular sector of its foreign policy, and apart from offering a glimpse into 
Iran's multilateral diplomacy, another topic that has not received the attention of Iran 
scholars, 22 an examination of the Islamic Republic's arms control operations provides 
analytical insights that are of relevance to those making general conclusions about the 
nature and content of Islamic Iran's foreign and security policies. In other words, the 
issue-based in-depth approach adopted here can strengthen or undermine existing views 
about the big picture of Iranian state behaviour. 
1.4 The Sources and Research Procedures 
The term 'arms control policy' can be defined as the regulation and coordination of a 
state's performative operations in the issue area of arms control by specific ends and 
means. Accordingly, the present study focuses on the content of Islamic Iran's arms 
control activities and on the objectives and means that have guided those operations. In 
doing so, it will take into consideration both the articulations and the deeds made by 
Iranian authorities that have bearing on the subject matter of arms control. 23 (Palonen 
2003: 175; Vesa 1987: 213 and Tibi 1998: 48) 
In order to observe and identify Iran's policy statements and concrete policy actions, 
this work relies on a broad selection of primary sources. Most of them are official 
statements made by the Islamic Republic in international fora dealing with international 
security and arms control during the time-period of 1979-2003.24 The core of the 
primary sources consists of the following official documents that contain the Iranian 
21 See, for example, the studies by Chubin and Zabih (1974); Ramazani (1988); and Hunter (1990). 
`" For one expert listing of research topics still unaddressed by the students of the Islamic Republic's 
foreign policy, see Ramazani (2000: 6-7). His suggestion of topics for further research makes no mention 
of either issue-based research questions or of the scholarly vacuum in the analysis of Iran's multilateral 
diplomacy. 
23 As pointed out by Hill (2003: 128), state actions are not composed only of physical, concrete set of 
activities but may also take a purely linguistic form. 
24 Selected documents dating from 1970,1971,1972,1975, and 1978 have also been used. It should be 
noted here that even though this work covers the time period of 1979-2003, the individual chapters of the 
study, as well as the single sections within a chapter, have, because of practical and analytical reasons, 
differing information cut-off dates. Yet, the cut-off dates for individual parts of the work have not been 
randomly chosen. Instead, they are based on the view that further treatment of the subjects at hand would 
not have essentially added up to the knowledge of the key features of the Iranian policies during the rest 
of the 1979-2003 period. 
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statements: the United Nations (UN) General Assembly plenary meeting records, the 
records of the meetings of the General Assembly's First Committee, and the plenary 
meeting records of the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament (CD). 25 
The study also draws on the records of the UN Disarmament Commission, the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and other relevant organs of the UN, in 
addition to which it utilizes official documents pertaining to individual arms control 
instruments and arrangements such as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT). Finally, the present work relies on pronouncements made by the 
representatives of the Islamic Republic outside the aforementioned international fora, 26 
on other written material produced by Iranian authorities - including press releases, 
memoranda, and position papers - as well as on personal interchange, interviews and 
correspondence, with Iranian arms control officials. 27 
As the discussion of the primary sources of the present work implies, the Islamic 
Republic's arms control operations have mainly consisted of diplomatic steps taken in 
the context of relevant international arenas. Given that Islamic Iran has actively taken 
part in different kinds of arms control arrangements and in the work of various 
discussion fora, most of which are linked one way or the other to the UN, diplomacy 
has constituted the principal instrument through which the Islamic Republic has sought 
to attain its arms control objectives. 
25 The archival research concerning these core sources has included detailed examinations of all General 
Assembly, First Committee, and CD plenary meeting records from the 1979-2003 period. It is important 
to note here that a small number of these documents have been summaries and not original versions of the 
Iranian statements. However, most of the summaries have been cross-checked with original Iranian 
versions that have been provided to the author either by the representatives of the Islamic Republic 
themselves or have been obtained from other sources. For this reason, they are treated here as primary 
sources. 
26 The term 'representatives of the Islamic Republic' is used in the present study to refer to Iranian 
officials who serve in various capacities in Islamic Iran's state institutions and, in some cases, to 
apologetic Iranian scholars whose argumentation is identical with that of the Iranian government. The 
term 'arms control officials of the Islamic Republic, ' in turn, refers strictly to the government 
functionaries who are involved in making decisions on, presenting, executing, or commenting the Islamic 
Republic's arms control operations. 
27 It should be noted that the translations of the sources used in this study have almost exclusively been 
made by the representatives of the Islamic Republic or by the relevant international organizations. The 
translations by the latter have usually been based on those provided or approved by the former. As for the 
issue of transliteration, the Persian names and terms referred to in this study are presented according to 
the format of the International Journal of Middle East Studies. However, some names and terms have 
been presented as they commonly appear in the English literature and media reports. The names and 
terms appearing in the bibliography follow the transliteration of the original sources, and the 
transliteration of the names of the people interviewed follows those persons' own spellings. 
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Also, it should be pointed out that Iran's arms control diplomacy has almost 
exclusively occurred at the global or multilateral level. Unilateral Iranian arms control 
declarations have been rare, and with very few exceptions, the Islamic Republic's 
bilateral relations have not included an arms control element, for even though arms 
control-related issues have regularly come up in Iran's bilateral dealings with other 
countries, such interchanges have mostly amounted to mere repetitions of national 
stances already presented in multilateral fora. The same has applied for arms control 
deliberations that have taken place within multilateral institutions that are not part of the 
United Nations' arms control machinery, such as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) 
or the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). While the communiques of the 
meetings of NAM and OIC routinely comment on arms control-related issues, the 
agendas of those gatherings usually cover a wide range of topics, whereby arms control 
seldom receives other than superficial attention. 28 
Since diplomacy has been the primary instrument through which Islamic Iran has 
sought to realize its arms control objectives, the country's foreign ministry has been the 
state institution mainly responsible for the presentation and execution of Iran's arms 
control policy. Accordingly, the primary sources this study draws on consist almost 
exclusively of materials that have been produced by the Iranian foreign ministry. Yet 
the dominance of foreign ministry-generated sources does not mean, in itself, that an 
analysis based on them would result in a deficient or one-sided account of the Islamic 
Republic's arms control policy. 
As will be discussed in chapter 2, the main task of the Iranian foreign ministry in the 
realm of arms control has been to implement decisions that have been made by the 
country's highest decision-makers. Although differences of view have existed between 
those responsible for devising the Iranian approach to arms control, the operations 
executed by the foreign ministry have been representative of the Islamic Republic's 
declared, official line. To the extent that relevant players within Iran's corridors of 
power, such as military authorities, have publicly expressed their dissatisfaction with 
the steps taken by the foreign ministry - that is, the line of action sanctioned by the 
28 Outside diplomatic channels, Iranian representatives have taken part in arms control debates that have 
occurred in academic and non-govern mental circles. Their participation in the meetings of the 
international Pugwash movement has been illustrative of such extra-diplomatic activity. From an 
analytical viewpoint, however, Iranian participation in academic and non-governmental arms control 
debates has been of secondary importance, for extra-diplomatic arms control fora have been viewed by 
the Iranians primarily as channels to further state objectives. Therefore, these extra-diplomatic aspects of 
Iran's arms control policy have been left out of the scope of the present study. 
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Islamic Republic's top leadership - this study has tried to take such dissenting voices 
into account. 
Of course, information about the exchanges of views between the Islamic Republic's 
arms control decision-makers is scarce and for the most part beyond the reach of 
scholars. Even though ever since 1997, when Muhammad Khatami started his eight- 
year term as Iran's president, arms control has increasingly become a topic of public 
debate within the country, security-related matters, including the details of arms control 
decision-making, continue to remain highly sensitive issues in the Islamic Republic. 
Secrecy on security matters is pervasive, and even when they are dealt with in public, 
the debates stay within certain red lines, the crossing of which is not tolerated by state 
authorities. 
In the light of these circumstances, the primary sources used in this work arguably 
provide the only avenue currently available for comprehensive analysis of the Islamic 
Republic's arms control policy. 29 While interviews with Iranian authorities could offer a 
way to circumvent the unavailability of indigenous documentary evidence, they are not 
without their problems. As far as this research is concerned, three particular problems 
need to be mentioned. First - and aside from the fact that, more often than not, key 
Iranian officials are not accessible to scholars -, the officials may not be willing to 
discuss certain issues or events. Secondly, even when they are ready to speak, they may 
not be fully knowledgeable of those issues or events in the first place. 
The third problem, that of deception, concerns not only interviews but documentary 
and other sources as well. In other words, there is always the possibility that what the 
Iranians say actually aims at hiding their genuine intentions. This problem is widely 
recognized by Iran scholars. Speaking of methodological problems pertaining to 
interviews, Byman et al. (2001: 4), for example, note that many of the individuals they 
interviewed for their study on Iran's security policy "almost certainly pushed their own 
agendas and biases. " 
To tackle the possibility of discrepancy between stated and actual policies, this study 
has sought to weigh Iran's arms control rhetoric against its general foreign and security 
policy behaviour under the Islamic Republic. 30 No serious account of Iran's arms 
29 Though it is acknowledged here that subsequent scholarship with an access to indigenous documentary 
sources could challenge many of the conclusions drawn in the present work, such research could not 
legitimately disregard the extensive body of archival material relied on in this study. 
30 By doing so, the study has effectively drawn conclusions about the Islamic Republic's policies on the 
basis of its past behaviour. 
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control policy could ignore, for example, the Islamic Republic's armament activities, 
the quantitative and qualitative features of its weapons arsenal. 3' One purpose of the 
secondary sources used in this work has precisely been to contribute to the task of 
distinguishing between what really has happened and what Iranian officials claim to 
have happened. 
The division between stated and actual policy - in Goldmann's (1988: 9) 
terminology, verbalized and non-verbalized policy32 - serves as an analytical guideline 
not only for the description of Iran's arms control operations but also for the discussion 
of their objectives. 33 In seeking to identify the Iranian objectives, the present study will 
rely, on the one hand, on Iranian officials' own depictions of them. On the other hand, it 
will look at IR literature and Iran scholarship in order to see which theoretically 
assumed and empirically uncovered foreign policy objectives are relevant in the 
analysis of Islamic Iran's arms control behaviour. 34 Thus, as it will transpire, in chapter 
2, the examination of the Iranian objectives will be detached from a narrow security 
perspective and incorporated into a broader discussion of foreign policy objectives. The 
aim is to identify what kind of foreign policy objectives Islamic Iran has tried to achieve 
through arms control and which fundamental or timeless goals of foreign policy those 
objectives have been reflective of. 
The purpose of the discussion on Iran's arms control objectives is not to offer a 
detailed account of the motivations that have supposedly steered Islamic Iran's 
31 Of course, it is far from easy to make unproblematic conclusions about Iran's arms capabilities and 
especially about its activities in the area of WMD. Although quite a lot has been written about Islamic 
Iran's military capabilities, the reliability of the information presented in the literature is in many respects 
questionable. The reports of governmental intelligence agencies, which most scholarly accounts heavily 
draw on, may be coloured by political considerations, in addition to which intelligence agencies are 
careful not to reveal the sources of their information, a problem that makes it very difficult for scholars to 
assess the accuracy of the intelligence data. As far as the information provided by Iranian exiles opposing 
the leadership in Tehran is concerned, it has to treated carefully because of the obvious risk that such data 
is manipulated for political reasons. From all of this follows, as pointed out by Jones (1998: 39), that any 
discussion of Iran's arms control and security policies must be speculative in some degree. 
32 According to Goldmann (1988: 9-10), verbalized policy is a "line of action that an agent declares he is 
following or intends to follow with regard to an object. " The term 'non-verbalized policy, ' in turn, refers 
to a "line of action that is in fact followed by an agent with regard to an object. " Goldmann points out that 
verbalized policy is specified by the agent, whereas non-verbalized policy is identified and presented by 
the observer. 
33 The question of declaratory versus actual objectives notwithstanding, there are a number of other 
problems that make the identification of arms control objectives difficult. These include the possibility 
that governments define their objectives vaguely in order to gain broad domestic support for their 
aspirations. Such vague definitions may also stem from the intention to secure a sufficient room of 
manoeuvre internationally with regard to a particular arms control issue or process. Finally, governments 
themselves may sometimes be uncertain about what their objectives actually are. (Hill 2003: 120 and 
Raymond 1987: 99-100) 
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behaviour at the various phases of its arms control policy during the 25-year period 
covered by this study. Rather, and in contrary to analyses often found in arms control- 
related research literature that focus on single diplomatic events - such as treaty 
negotiations or arms control instruments' review conferences - and seek to elaborate on 
the factors behind national negotiation tactics, 35 this work aims at providing a broad 
sketch of the foreign policy objectives that have guided Iran's operations in the area of 
arms control between 1979-2003. In doing so, the present work focuses on factors that 
are specific to the case of Iran and does not seek to test any theories of foreign policy. 
As for the question of change in Islamic Iran's arms control operations, it is common 
for Iran scholars to divide the history of the Islamic Republic's foreign policy into 
distinct periods. These periodizations, discussed in chapter 2, suggest that Iran's foreign 
policy has undergone clearly identifiable changes during the 25-year period considered 
in the present work. However, if Iran's foreign policy is viewed as a whole consisting of 
diplomatic activities in discernible issue areas or sectors, as it will be subsequently 
done, it is not evident whether the changes that have characterized the Islamic 
Republic's foreign policy in general have evenly affected all these policy sectors, 
including that of arms control. In other words, it could be that Iran's arms control efforts 
have remained immune to the factors that have driven the broad contours of the Islamic 
Republic's foreign policy. 
Therefore, by discussing the historical evolution of the Islamic Republic's arms 
control policy and by adopting a narrative approach, 36 this study will tentatively deal 
with the issue of continuity and change in Iran's arms control policy and also tries to 
preliminarily assess to what extent Iran's arms control operations have been affected by 
the changes that have taken place in the Islamic Republic's general foreign policy 
orientation. Such assessment may produce three basic answers. First of all, it may be 
concluded that the changes in the foreign policy orientation are directly recognizable 
from Iranian arms control actions. Secondly, it may be observed that Iran's arms control 
policy has experienced identifiable changes but that the changes do not corresponded 
with those of the general foreign policy orientation. In that case, as well as in the 
34 A review of relevant IR literature and Iran scholarship will also act as a way of reducing the impact of 
the potential problem of deception. 
3s These tactical objectives often serve the purpose of diplomatic bargaining and do not necessarily tell us 
much about the actual motivations that guide a state's arms control operations in a given thematic area. 
36 Following the definition adopted by Levy (2001: 71), the concept of narrative can be defined as the 
organization of material in a chronologically sequential order, and the focusing of the content into a single 
coherent story, albeit with subplots. 
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tentative theme-specific assessment of change in the Islamic Republic's arms control 
operations, the analytical goal would be to identify the timing, the substance, the 
character or degree, and the sources of the changes peculiar to Iranian arms control 
policy. 
Thirdly, it is possible that the Islamic Republic's arms control policy is characterized 
above all by continuity. If this is the case, the identification of the patterns of continuity 
in Iran's arms control policy would be the logical research objective, and so would the 
identification of the factors that have inhibited change in this area of Iranian state 
activity. 37 Of course, if pursued in new circumstances, an unchanged line of action itself 
may be a sign of policy change. This has been taken into account in the definition of 
policy change adopted here and put forth by Goldmann (1988: 10), according to whom 
change refers "either to a new act in a given type of situation or a given act in a type of 
situation previously associated with a different act. " 
Accordingly, this study resorts to the comparative method only in the sense that it 
makes within-case comparisons in order to identify the aspects of continuity and change 
in Islamic Iran's arms control policy. It does not seek to compare the Islamic Republic's 
arms control policy with that of the pre-revolutionary Iranian regime, and neither does it 
try to assess in what respects Islamic Iran's arms control operations have resembled 
those of other actors, such as NAM and OIC countries. 38 
Furthermore, the present work does not seek to place the analysis of Iran's arms 
control policy into the context of topical - political and scholarly - debates on how 
outside actors should deal with the Islamic Republic's arms control behaviour and 
particularly with its nuclear diplomacy. 39 Similarly, it refrains from linking its results 
with discussions on the prospects of arms control arrangements in the Middle East40 or 
on the security architecture of the Persian Gulf region. 41 Finally, the present study does 
37 It should be noted, however, that the present work's discussion of the factors that have either inhibited 
or caused changes in Islamic Iran's arms control policy is only tentative. Detailed examination of the 
question of continuity and change in Iran's arms control diplomacy and other sectors of the Islamic 
Republic's foreign policy is beyond the scope of this study. 
38 Naturally, a comparative research approach would enrich and deepen the descriptive elements of the 
current study. For a discussion of the benefits of a comparative research approach in foreign policy 
analysis, see Webber (2002: 332). 
39 For recent scholarly discussions of the options the international community has to influence Iran's 
nuclear diplomacy, see, for example, Inbar (2006); Iran: Where Next on the Nuclear Standoff? (2004) and 
the relevant essays in the report edited by Sokolski and Clawson (2004). 
40 See, for example, Kemp (1991) and the relevant essays in the volumes edited by Couloumbis and 
Dokos (1995) and Eisendorf (1995). 
41 For recent treatments of the subject of Gulf security architecture, see, for example, Russell (2005a); 
Pollack (2003) and Rathmell et al. (2003). 
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not try to determine to what extent the Islamic Republic has been able to realize its arms 
control objectives or whether its arms control diplomacy has been a success or failure 
for Iran's foreign and security policies. 42 
At the same time, however, the results of this work contribute to efforts directed 
towards finding answers to all of these questions. First of all, the references made in the 
subsequent empirical chapters to the Pahlavi regime's arms control activities - mainly 
intended to serve narrative purposes - preliminarily suggest that there are many 
common elements between monarchical and Islamic Iran's arms control policies. 43 
Subsequent chapters also illustrate that Islamic Iran shares many arms control positions 
with other NAM and OIC countries, although it is ultimately difficult to determine to 
what extent the authorities of the Islamic Republic have used outside actors' arms 
control argumentation and policies as a model for their own diplomatic operations. It is 
probably not far from the truth to claim that outside influence on Iran was greatest at the 
time when the Islamic Republic started, following the revolution, to create a foreign 
policy identity for itself. Be that as it may, Iran, like most other countries, is in any case 
always heavily influenced by the international arms control debate whose parameters 
are usually defined by the powerful members of the international community. 
Finally, the present work's description of the various aspects of Islamic Iran's 
security thinking and of the ways in which Iranian officials view international relations 
provides ample analytical substance for those occupied with the question of how to 
influence Iranian arms control behaviour, 44 with issues related to Middle East security, 
or with the evaluation of the successes and failures of the Islamic Republic's foreign 
and security policies. 
42 When evaluating foreign policy performance, scholars have normally used the criterion of effectiveness 
as the basis for their analyses. In other words, they have tried to see how effective states have been in 
attaining their declared foreign policy objectives. However, other criteria have been used as well. They 
include the efficiency (the ratio of benefits to costs) and the equity (the distribution of benefits and costs 
in proportion to need) of a particular foreign policy. (Raymond 1987: 98,107 and Haney 1995: 108) 
43 In this sense, one could tentatively concur with Hunter (1990: 2) who concludes that there is a 
significant degree of continuity in the underlying patterns of Iran's pre- and post-revolutionary foreign 
policy. 
" For a discussion of how scholarly analysis can provide important insights into practical diplomacy and 
statecraft, see George (1993) and the anthology edited by Nincic and Lepgold (2000). The essay by 
Jentleson (2000: 142-144) discusses how scholarly knowledge was utilized in the context of the Middle 
East Multilateral Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) negotiations that started in early 1992 and 
broke down three years later in 1995. 
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1.5 The Plan of the Study 
The pages that follow consist of six chapters. Chapter 2 forms the analytical 
framework for this study. It starts by discussing and defining the concept of arms 
control and by placing the phenomenon of arms control in the context of states' national 
security policy. Then, the chapter moves to examine the role of arms control in the 
Islamic Republic's security policy by identifying and discussing the institutional 
diplomatic actors in Iran's arms control policy and by examining the state of arms 
control in the regional Middle Eastern context, the most important arena of operation 
for Iran's foreign and security policies. 
After concluding that arms control has played only a marginal role in the relations 
between the governments of the Middle East, chapter 2 introduces the international 
arms control fora on which the Islamic Republic's arms control operations have taken 
place and which have enabled Middle Eastern states to pursue objectives that have 
pertained both to the regional and the international system. Next, the study proceeds to 
define arms control as a component of foreign policy and to discuss the foreign policy 
objectives states have traditionally sought to achieve by means of arms control. 
Moreover, chapter 2 seeks to present the central characteristics of arms control decision- 
making in Iran and to identify the individuals and institutional actors that have played a 
key role in the country's arms control decision-making during the time period covered 
by this study. Finally, chapter 2 discusses the so-called three-era thesis which divides 
Iran's foreign policy of 1979-2003 into three distinct phases and lays the foundation for 
the subsequent analysis of continuity and change in the Islamic Republic's arms control 
diplomacy. 
Chapter 3, the first empirical chapter of this work, focuses on Iran's arms control 
operations in the area of conventional weapons. It starts with a discussion of Iran's 
foreign, military, armament, and arms control policies under Shah Muhammad Reza 
Pahlavi. The purpose of the discussion of the Shah period is to present the broad 
contours of the diplomatic and military legacy inherited by the leaders of post-Pahlavi 
Iran as well as to demonstrate how the rejection of the Shah's policies formed a starting 
point for post-revolutionary Iran's arms control argumentation. 
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Chapter 3 proceeds by examining post-Pahlavi Iran's initial approach to arms control 
in general and conventional arms control in particular. 45 The examination is followed by 
a discussion of Islamic Iran's conventional arms control operations during the 1980- 
1988 war against Iraq. After that, the chapter focuses on Iran's post-war rearmament 
program which was necessitated by the equipment losses experienced during the eight- 
year conflict and which constitutes an important balancing factor for the analysis of 
Iran's conventional arms control operations. 
The examination of Iran's post-war activities in the area of conventional arms control 
begins with a discussion of the Iranian operations in the time period between the end of 
the Iran-Iraq war and the start of the Gulf conflict of 1990-1991. The discussion is 
divided into two sections. The first one deals with the Islamic Republic's actions that 
pertain to issues and developments in Iran's regional environment. The second section 
concentrates on Iranian diplomatic argumentation on the state of conventional arms 
control at the global level. The Islamic Republic's conventional arms control operations 
in the context of the 1990-1991 Gulf conflict are discussed separately. 
The analysis of the Iranian operations in the post-Gulf conflict period, under the 
presidencies of Ali Akbar Hashimi Rafsanjani and Muhammad Khatami, too, draws a 
distinction between the regional and global aspects of the Islamic Republic's arms 
control diplomacy. The final section of chapter 3, in turn, centers around Iran's 
approach to the question of micro-disarmament. The first part of the section analyzes 
Iran's actions with regard to the issue of anti-personnel mines (APM), whereas the 
second one looks at Iranian operations in the area of small arms control. 
In chapter 4, the focus of the study moves to the realm of WMD, that is, to the 
analysis of the Islamic Republic's chemical and biological arms control operations. 46 As 
far as the treatment of the issue of chemical arms control is concerned, it starts with a 
brief discussion of Iran's chemical diplomacy in the months after the 1979 revolution 
45 In fact, while dealing with the specific issue of conventional arms control, chapter 3 also constitutes a 
frame story for the narratives that follow in chapters 4 and 5. Not only does it elaborate on the Islamic 
Republic's general approach to arms control, but it also discusses the developments in Iran's external 
environment to which Iranian authorities responded by means of arms control. 
46 In terms of the lethality of various weapons categories, then, this work moves from the least dangerous 
to the most destructive class of weaponry. Wirtz (2000: 3) characterizes the differences between the three 
caterogies of weapons of mass destruction as follows: "In general, chemical weapons are the easiest to 
make but are unlikely to produce the cataclysmic devels of destruction that could result from the use of 
biological or nuclear weapons. By contrast, nuclear weapons are most difficult to produce but also the 
most destructive both in lethality and in the speed by which death and destruction could occur. Biological 
weapons share the most frightening aspects of each of the other two: biological weapons can be made 
almost as easily as chemical weapons, yet their destructive potential could approach that of nuclear 
weapons. " 
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and then proceeds to examine the years of the Iran-Iraq war, the period which had a 
dramatic impact not only on post-revolutionary Iran's chemical arms control operations 
but also on its arms control policy as a whole. 47 
The examination of Iran's post-war chemical arms control operations is divided into 
three parts. The first part focuses on the Islamic Republic's chemical diplomacy 
between the end of the Iran-Iraq war and the finalization of the treaty text of the CWC 
which was opened for signature in January 1993. The discussion in the first part, as well 
as in the subsequent sections of chapter 4, is guided by an in-built thematic separation 
between the regional and global aspects of the Iranian diplomacy. The second part, in 
turn, discusses Iran's chemical arms control operations between the period after the 
Islamic Republic's signing of the CWC in January 1993 and its ratification of the treaty 
in July 1997. The third and final part dealing with Iran's post-war chemical arms control 
operations concentrates on Iran's policies following the Islamic Republic's CWC 
ratification. 
As for the analysis of Islamic Iran's biological arms control operations, the discussion 
begins with a brief survey of Iran's biological arms control diplomacy under the Shah's 
regime which signed the BTWC, the key international instrument in the area of 
biological arms control, in April 1972 and ratified the treaty in August 1973. Next, the 
study examines post-revolutionary Iran's biological arms control operations prior to the 
Iran-Iraq war, after which the focus shifts to the Iranian operations in the course of the 
1980-1988 conflict. 
The discussion of post-war Iran's biological arms control policy is divided into three 
sections. The first section deals with the Iranian actions in the period from the end of the 
war until the establishment, in September 1994, of the BTWC Ad Hoc Group (AHG) 
whose task and mandate was to consider appropriate measures and draft proposals for 
the strengthening of the biological treaty. The creation of the AHG was a reflection of 
the renewed international interest in biological arms control in the aftermath of the 
1990-1991 Gulf conflict. On the other hand, during the period under consideration, the 
Islamic Republic's biological arms control diplomacy developed a distinct identity and 
transformed into an important element of Iran's arms control policy. 
47 Maloney (2002: 109) describes the role of the war experience for Iran as follows: "Much as American 
identity and foreign policy were haunted by the ghosts of Vietnam for two decades, the war with Iraq will 
continue to inform the strategic outlook of the Islamic Republic for years -a fact that is vastly 
underappreciated by the rest of the world. " 
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The second section dealing with Islamic Iran's post-war biological arms control 
operations looks at the Iranian activities during the AHG negotiations which started in 
January 1995 and stopped in July 2001, as the United States officially dissociated itself 
from the talks and thereby brought the AHG process to a halt. In the final section of 
chapter 4, the focus is on Iran's biological diplomacy in the aftermath of the AHG's 
demise. The cut-off event for the examination of the Islamic Republic's biological arms 
control operations is the resumed session of the fifth review conference of the BTWC 
which was held in Geneva in November 2002. 
Post-revolutionary Iran's activities in the area of nuclear arms control is the subject of 
chapter 5. The analysis of the Islamic Republic's nuclear arms control operations begins 
with a survey of the Shah government's ambitious nuclear power program which drew 
heavy criticism from the leaders of post-Pahlavi Iran and was halted by the Iranian 
government following the 1979 revolution. The chapter continues by discussing the 
Islamic Republic's eventual decision to restart the Iranian nuclear program and by 
presenting post-Pahlavi Iran's initial diplomatic positions on nuclear arms control both 
in the global and the regional context. The final section dealing with the Iranian 
operations during the Islamic Republic's first decade, in turn, concentrates on Iranian 
diplomacy with regard to nuclear issues that were directly related to the Iran-Iraq war. 
The analysis of the Islamic Republic's post-war nuclear arms control operations starts 
with a discussion of Iranian diplomatic argumentation on three specific topics: complete 
and universal nuclear disarmament, the question of security assurances, and the control 
of fissile materials. Then, chapter 5 concentrates on Iran's diplomacy with regard to the 
issue of nuclear testing and especially in the formal multilateral negotiations on the 
creation of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) which started in early 
1994 and were concluded in the summer of 1996. The discussion of the CTBT 
negotiations is followed by an examination of Iranian views on peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy, on the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and on regional 
nuclear arms control. 
The third part of chapter 5 begins by looking at the Khatami administration's views 
on nuclear arms control and at the Islamic Republic's response to the May 1998 nuclear 
test crisis in South Asia, and then moves to the examination of the Islamic Republic's 
activities in the area of ballistic missile control. Next, the discussion focuses on the 
question of Iran's nuclear program which turned into a major international issue after 
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the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States48 and especially after the 
revelation, made in August 2002, that the Islamic Republic's nuclear program was 
much more advanced than previously believed. The coverage of the diplomatic crisis 
that ensued - and still continues - between the Islamic Republic and the international 
community over the Iranian nuclear program consists of the years 2002 and 2003. 
During this initial stage of the crisis, the officials of the Islamic Republic, in their 
effort to protect their country's ability to pursue a comprehensive nuclear program, 
resorted to a diplomatic course that was characterized by a mix of defiance of and 
acquiescence to the demands of the major powers and the IAEA -a behavioral pattern 
that came to typify Iranian diplomacy in the later stages of the crisis as well. Iran's 
signing of the IAEA additional protocol on 18 December 2003 acts as the cut-off date 
for the examination of the diplomatic arm-wrestling between the Islamic Republic and 
the international community over Iranian nuclear activities. The remaining discussion in 
chapter 5 consists of the examination of Iran's general diplomatic defence of its nuclear 
program, of Iranian responses to what the leaders of the Islamic Republic viewed as the 
diplomatic and military threat posed by the U. S. government of president George W. 
Bush, and of Iran's diplomacy with regard to the issues of WMD terrorism and regional 
nuclear arms control. 
Chapter 6, the concluding chapter of this work, summarizes the findings of the 
previous empirical chapters and incorporates the analysis of the objectives of Iran's 
arms control operations in the four distinct areas of arms control into the discussion. 
The examination of the Iranian objectives includes an identification of the fundamental 
foreign policy goals that have steered the Islamic Republic's arms control objective- 
setting. It also discusses the question of Iran's WMD activities in the chemical, 
biological, and nuclear fields. Finally, chapter 6 tentatively assesses to what extent post- 
revolutionary Iran's arms control operations have been characterized by stability and 
change. 
48 In fact, while focusing on the topic of nuclear arms control, chapter 5 also acts as a frame story for the 
sections of the study that deal with issues and developments pertaining to the post-September 11 period. 
Thus, for example, the issues of chemical and biological terrorism are discussed in connection with that 
chapter. 
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2 ISLAMIC IRAN AND ARMS CONTROL: THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 The Problem of War 
In his classic discussion of the phenomenon of war, Rapoport (1968: 11-17) discerns 
three philosophies of war. The first of them, the political philosophy of war, pictures 
war as a rational tool of national policy. The second, the escatological philosophy of 
war, is founded on the idea that history will bring about a "final war" leading to the 
unfolding of some kind of a divine, natural, or human "grand design. " Finally, to the 
adherents of what Rapoport calls the cataclysmic philosophy of war, war amounts to an 
irrational activity, a catastrophe that befalls humanity. 
The historical record and contemporary manifestations of warfare illustrate that the 
conception of war as a purposeful and beneficial phenomenon strongly influences 
human behaviour. ' In many regions of the world, war, generally defined as large-scale 
organized violence between political units (Levy 1998: 141), continues to be part of 
everyday human life. At the same time, however, history and the present time also 
demonstrate that the political and escatological philosophies of war have always had 
their opponents. Many of them have equated war with a disease, a deviant form of 
human behaviour, and believed that the disease can be cured through human 
intervention. 
Naturally, any effort aimed at preventing the occurance of war has to be based on an 
idea of the factors that cause wars. Scientific study of war has always been a 
multidisciplinary enterprise - currently involving scholars from disciplines such as 
biology, psychology, anthropology, history, and political science - and strongly driven 
by the practical desire of preventing war. 2 Given that the question of war has drawn 
scholars from many different disciplines, it is not surprising that answers to the question 
of what causes war have varied greatly. The highly heterogenous body of knowledge on 
the causes of war has not only been a result of the complex nature of the subject matter 
itself, but also reflected the differences in war scholars' disciplinary emphases. 
Holsti's (1991) study of 177 international wars between 1648-1989 and the issues that motivated 
combatants to resort to the use of armed force in those cases testifies, for its part, to the vitality of the 
political philosophy of war among state and non-state actors. 
Levy (2002: 350) dates the start of scientific study of war to Thucydides' historical treatise on the 
Peloponnesian War over 2,400 years ago. That the academic discipline of IR was established, at the 
beginning of the 20`h century, to address the problem of war, shows how scholarship on war has been 
intimately linked with the goal of finding a solution to the problem of war. 
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Whereas natural scientists, for example, have been interested in the relationship 
between human nature and war, 3 IR scholarship on war has increasingly moved towards 
focusing on the factors that explain variations in war and peace, that is, on the factors 
that explain, as Levy (1989: 212) puts it, "why war occurs at some times under certain 
conditions, rather than at other times under other conditions, or between some states 
rather than other states. " Historians, on the other hand, have by and large rejected the 
mainstream IR scholars' effort to generalize about variations in war and peace by 
arguing that wars, like other social phenomena, are unique events and, therefore, the 
causes of war are as numerous as the number of wars (ibid. and Garnett 2002: 70). 4 
The mixed record of war scholars' work has meant that, on the one hand, they have 
succeeded in making major strides in the description of the incidence, location, and 
costs of war. Yet, on the other hand, the age-old explanatory puzzle of what causes war 
has remained unanswered. The range of explanations among scholars is huge, 5 in 
addition to which some factors are viewed, contradictorily, either as a cause of war or as 
a condition of peace. Within IR, the literature on the causes of war has often been 
categorized according to the so-called levels-of-analysis framework. Broadly speaking, 
this approach traces the sources of war either to the structure of the international system 
within which all states exist, to conditions that are internal to states, or to the beliefs and 
choices of individuals. 6 (Levy 1989: 221-222 and 1998: 142-144 and Holsti 1991: 1-5) 
Nikitin's (2000) typology of the causes of war acts as another example of the way in 
which the sources of war have been identified and categorized by IR scholars. In his 
model, Nikitin draws a distinction between human nature, social nature, and technical or 
man-made nature, and argues that scholars have traditionally traced individual causes of 
wars to one of these explanatory categories. From the perspective of the present work, 
Nikitin's category of man-made nature is of particular interest, for it includes and refers 
to armaments as an independent factor that causes wars. It is this belief that military 
For a discussion of this research orientation, see Brown (1987: 7-21) and Garnett (2002: 75-82). 
4 Students of war can, thus, be divided into three broad groups: those who concentrate on the factors 
without which war could not occur at all, those who focus on the factors that account for variations in war 
and peace, and those interested in the causes of particular wars. 
5 Holsti (1991: 5) comments the situation by lamenting that the range of explanatory variables runs from 
"the genetic to the cosmic. " 
6 For a detailed discussion of systemic-level, societal-level, and individual-level theories of the causes of 
war in IR, see Levy (1989: 223-289 and 1998: 145-159). Within historiography, it is common to divide 
the origins or causes of war into what are generally referred to as underlying and immediate causes of 
war. The former establish the context for individual wars, whereas the latter trigger them. (Levy 1989: 
221 and Garnett 2002: 70-71) 
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means constitute a problem in themselves, a problem that has its own dynamic, that 
underlies the enterprise and realm of state behaviour known as arms control. 
The scholars and policy-makers who have treated armaments as an independent 
source of war have basically viewed weapons either as a constant, a thing without which 
wars would not occur in the first place, or as a factor that explains variations in war and 
peace. The representatives of the latter line of thought have based their argumentation, 
above all, on the claim that arms races, rapid increases or improvements in the military 
arsenals of states that find themselves in adversary relationships, make the occurance of 
war more likely. 7 
Closely related to the argument that fierce competition between adversaries over the 
quantity and quality of their military means constitutes an autonomous process that 
intensifies mutual fears and normally ends in war is the view that certain configurations 
of military balance between adversaries are more war-prone than others. For example, a 
large imbalance of military power between antagonistic states that favours a state 
dissatisfied with the prevailing relationship may result in a war initiated by the 
dissatisfied party. Furthermore, if an equalized military balance is about to be altered by 
one party, the other might launch a preventive attack to neutralize the challenge to the 
existing constellation. An equalized military balance affected by certain kinds of 
military deployments is yet another situation where armaments can increase the 
likelihood of war. Deployments that are carried out in a war-threat situation and serve as 
easy targets to another party's military strikes may tempt that party to launch an attack 
first. (Brown 1987: 102-107) 
The assumption of the causal relationship between armaments and war 
notwithstanding, many scholars and policy-makers have focused on the nexus between 
weapons and war also because of the belief that increases in global arms transfers and 
the proliferation of certain types of weaponry add to the severity and magnitude of wars. 
Understandably, ever since the end of the Second World War, the fear of the destructive 
force of armaments has primarily been linked to nuclear weapons and, to a lesser 
degree, to other WMD. 8 The more these weapons proliferate, the argument has been, the 
7 For a discussion of the concept and phenomenon of arms racing, see Buzan and Herring (1998: 75-82). 
8 As for the question of how the advent of the nuclear era has influenced scholarly debate on the causes of 
war, most scholars have not tried to include the aspect of nuclear weapons in their deliberations. While 
some have claimed that, irrespective of the nuclear factor, the causes of war have fundamentally remained 
the same, those stressing the radical impact of the nuclear revolution have went as far as claiming that 
scholarly conclusions drawn based on the events of the pre-nuclear era are no longer much of analytical 
use. The claim that the existence of nuclear weapons has reduced the likelihood of war between nuclear 
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greater the risk that they will be used either by accident or design. The strong advances 
made in the area of military technology have also brought the relationship between 
conventional weapons and the scale of violence increasingly to the fore. (Brown 1987: 
89; Craft 1999: 1-3 and Buzan and Herring 1998: 201-204) 
Yet, the view that emphasizes the dangers posed by armaments is by no means 
universally accepted. Quite to the contrary, there are many who argue that the 
accumulation of weaponry is a symptom rather than a cause of war. In other words, war 
and insecurity is driven by political conflicts and not by armaments. The representatives 
of this school of thought underscore the security benefits of weapons by maintaining 
that intensive arming may sometimes be the only way for states to deter their 
adversaries from launching an attack against them - and, hence, to avoid war. And 
sometimes, those stressing the importance of armaments further point out, military force 
may have to be used in order to alter existing conditions that maintain insecurity. 
Moreover, some have claimed that arms transfers may also decrease the severity and 
magnitude of wars by enabling the recipients to gain an upper hand in the hostilities and 
bring them to a quick end. In all these cases, then, weapons are considered critical 
guarantees of peace. (Craft 1999: 3,7,17; Buzan and Herring 1998: 76 -77 and Glynn 
1993: 325-326) 
Since no consensus exists on whether armaments basically create or solve security 
problems, it logically follows that there is no agreement on the prescriptive issue of 
whether war can be prevented through measures focusing on military instruments, 
either. Those viewing politics as the ultimate driving force of insecurity point out that if 
armaments are not a cause of war, then the problem of war cannot be ameliorated 
through arms control. The primacy of politics also means that the idea of meaningful 
arms control between adversaries is inevitably flawed. Gray (1993: 334-336 and 1999: 
194) makes this point by referring to what he calls the arms control paradox: the 
suspicion and antagonism that renders arms control relevant in the first place is 
precisely the reason for why arms control cannot work. 
The critics of arms control claim that the history of arms control validates their 
argumentation. In their view, arms control efforts have failed to deliver on what they 
have promised: they have not succeeded in preventing wars and neither have they been 
capable of improving political relations between adversaries. As a consequence, the 
and especially major nuclear powers is perhaps the most widely accepted finding that links nuclear 
weapons to the debate on the causes of war. (Levy 1989: 217-219,289-291) 
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critics maintain, arms control has mainly acted as a tool of state propaganda aiming to 
please domestic audiences and manipulate foreign adversaries. In this sense, 
international arms control negotiations have been seen as processes that may actually 
incite tensions between antagonists instead of reducing them. Most dangerously, the 
critics of arms control argue, arms control may jeopardize national security by lulling 
states into a false sense of security and bringing them to ignore the proper management 
of the balance of power between them and their adversaries. 9 (Buzan and Herring 1998: 
227,246; Baylis 2002: 198-199 and Gray 1993: 344-345) 
Whatever the accuracy of the propositions put forward by those who dismiss arms 
control as a useful and prudent tool of national security, however, the fact remains that, 
throughout history, arms control has been part of states' diplomatic and military 
relations. The practice of arms control is several thousands of years old and has 
regulated the military behaviour of states and their pre-modern equivalents across 
different cultures. 1° Although arms control arrangements have historically responded to 
particular needs and circumstances, they have always rested on the assumption that 
cooperation in the regulation of the quantitative and qualitative aspects of military 
power contributes either to the avoidance of war, the management of crises, or the 
limitation of the damages caused by on-going wars. (Croft 1996: 13,20-21) 
2.2 A Broad Understanding of Arms Control 
The end of the First World War is often mentioned as the starting point for the 
modern practice of arms control. The experience of a disastrous global war, together 
with the wide-spread concern over the ever-increasing destructiveness of weapons 
technology, raised the popularity of the cataclysmic philosophy of war and the role of 
arms control in international politics. While subsequently subject to the ebb and flow of 
political tides, arms control managed, during the 20th century, to consolidate its position 
as an institutionalized area of diplomacy and as a thematically distinct topic on the 
agendas of international organizations. Also, during the 20th century, the body of 
thought stressing the causal connections between weapons and war became more varied. 
9 The critics of arms control also frequently point out that authoritarian regimes often cheat on the 
agreements they adhere to. Therefore, the critics argue, arms control agreements put democracies into a 
disadvantegous position vis-ä-vis the authoritarian parties. (Baylis 2002: 188; Gray 1993: 344-345 and 
Croft 1996: 1) 
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The emergence of a clear distinction between the concepts of disarmament and arms 
control was one of the results of this development. 
2.2.1 The notion of disarmament 
The idea of disarmament as an approach to tackling the problem of war is based on 
the notion that, without military arsenals, states would not be able to use violence as an 
instrument of national policy in international relations. If states recognized that the 
existence of armaments and the use of military force entailed unacceptable risks and 
costs and gave up their military means, the advocates of disarmament argue, states 
would manage to purge inter-state war from the world and pave the way for a peaceful 
international system. ' l 
The implementation in practice of this simple proposition, however, is confronted by 
the fundamental problem of how to create such a degree of trust and harmony of 
interests between states that they are prepared to give up arms and further their security 
and political objectives exclusively by non-military means. The proponents of 
disarmament have identified four main routes through which such a change could be 
brought about. The first route is to simply abandon armaments without any 
preconditions. This approach does not envision any need for a period of transition 
during which states would harmonize their views and then move towards disarmament. 
A decision to disarm in a single stroke would be the preferable solution. (Buzan and 
Herring 1998: 255-256 and Baylis 2002: 186) 
In contrast, the other three disarmament approaches do not believe in the feasibility of 
an abrupt change. They acknowledge that the ultimate goal of disarmament cannot be 
achieved without prior transformations in the international system. One strand of this 
thought speaks of the need for an international political reform realized through the 
removal of fear and suspicion from international relations or through the creation of a 
supra-national authority, a world government. Another strand of thought rejects the idea 
of a world government as unrealistic or undesirable but simultaneously sees the state as 
the ultimate obstacle to disarmament. For the supporters of this approach, a world 
10 For the history of arms control, see the relevant articles in Volume II of the three-volume anthology 
edited by Burns (1993a); Goldblat (1994) and Croft (1996). 
11 The term 'disarmament' has thus three conceptual dimensions. First, it can refer to a school of thought 
that claims to offer a distinctive solution to the problem of war. Secondly, it can refer to the process by 
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without armaments results from transnational non-state cooperation and from steps 
taken within states at the level of local politics. The final strand of thought talking about 
a phased transition towards disarmament sidelines the questions over the roles of world 
government or the state and views the power of the people and the adoption of non- 
violent forms of political activism as factors that are capable of rendering weapons 
irrelevant. (Buzan and Herring 1998: 256-261; Brown 1987: 138 and Baylis 2002: 186) 
These orientations testify to the fact that the idea of disarmament has historically 
been closely associated with various peace ideologies and schemes and with what is 
broadly defined as the idealist or liberal school of thought in IR. Believing that the 
problem of war can be eradicated through collective action, liberal thinkers have 
considered disarmament an essential component of their peace efforts. Indeed, 
diplomatic enthusiasm for disarmament increased dramatically during the final stages of 
and after the First World War, at a time when liberal thought had a strong influence on 
statesmen and policy-makers. The U. S. president Woodrow Wilson's call, in his so- 
called fourteen points speech of January 1918, for the reduction of national armaments 
to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety, and the subsequent disarmament 
efforts by the League of Nations, the international organization established in 1919, 
were among the clearest indications of the prevailing opinion that was favourable to the 
idea of disarmament (Corradini 1993: 1041-1042). 
The ultimate failure of the post-World War I disarmament efforts and the experience 
of the Second World War eventually led to a general disillusionment with disarmament 
both in theoretical and practical terms. Although, after the war, governments continued 
to pay lip service to the idea of general and complete disarmament, their actions 
suggested that they viewed it more or less as a utopian objective. As a consequence, 
ever since the end of the Second World War, the concept of disarmament has been used, 
above all, to refer to partial reduction of military means. During the Cold War years, 
international disarmament efforts focused mainly on WMD, whereas in the post-Cold 
War period disarmament has increasingly been seen also as an avenue to tackle the 
problem of military violence in regional and intra-state contexts. ' 2 
Despite the setbacks it has experienced since the end of the Second World War, 
however, the idea of general and complete disarmament continues to have its 
which military capabilities are reduced or, thirdly, to the end-condition of being disarmed (Buzan and 
Herring 1998: 245). 
12 Among others, disarmament has been an important aspect of international efforts aimed at building 
peace in countries that have experienced civil wars. 
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supporters. For many, comprehensive disarmament still offers the best solution to the 
problem of war. Secondarily, the supporters of general and complete disarmament 
continue to see it as a means to prevent the militarization of societies and to further the 
ideal of global justice and equality. Related to this, many advocates of disarmament also 
argue that reductions in military expenditures brought about by comprehensive 
disarmament would free human and material resources for meeting urgent non-military 
needs both nationally and internationally. (Buzan and Herring 1998: 245-246 and Burns 
1993b: 7) 
2.2.2 The notion of arms control 
In the wake of the general decline of disarmament's popularity following the Second 
World War, another theoretical approach focusing on the relationship between 
armaments and war started to gain ground both intellectually and politically. The rise 
and development of this approach, labelled as arms control, was inseparably linked with 
the advent of nuclear weapons and the theory and practice of nuclear deterrence. 
Worried about the possibility of a nuclear war, the proponents of arms control sought to 
ensure that the deterrence relationship between the Cold War superpowers would not be 
undermined by arms racing and technological innovations. Apart from hoping to ensure 
that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union would succeed in obtaining a nuclear 
first-strike capability - that is, an ability to eliminate the other power's nuclear arsenal 
to the extent that the aggressor would be safe from an unendurable nuclear retaliation - 
and hence potentially use nuclear weapons for military or political purposes, the so- 
called arms controllers also wanted to minimize the risk of an accidental nuclear war 
caused by human or technological error. '3 
Although the term 'arms control' is often associated with the management of the 
major nuclear powers' military balance and with the arms control theorizing that 
occurred between the late 1950s and the late 1960s, however, the intellectual premises 
and the practice of arms control precede the Cold War era. Thus, the basic principles of 
arms control are not exclusively confined to nuclear or WMD balances but are 
applicable to non-WMD military relationships as well. Similarly, the practice of arms 
13 For a discussion of the theory and practice of arms control that defines arms control as an intellectual 
approach and as state behaviour limited to the Cold War context of superpower nuclear confrontation, see 
Sheehan (1988). 
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control is not limited only to states but can be resorted to by non-state actors as well. 
(Croft 1996: 3-4,14-15; Buzan and Herring 1998: 212 and Baylis 2002: 186) 
Whereas the ultimate objective of the proponents of disarmament is to purge weapons 
and war from the world, the goal-setting of arms controllers is more modest. The 
advocates of arms control maintain that because of international anarchy, the absence of 
a central authority with coercive power in the international system, states will continue 
to obtain armaments to secure their national security and political interests. For this 
reason, and because of their skepticism over the prospect of radical international 
political reform, arms controllers do not believe that armaments can be eliminated from 
the international system. 14 (Brown 1987: 141; Sheehan 1988: 6 and Baylis 2002: 185) 
Nonetheless, they do recognize that military means may act as a cause of war. Yet 
their analysis of the relationship between arms and war differs significantly from that of 
disarmament advocates. For arms controllers, the mere existence of weapons does not 
qualify as a cause of war. Instead, it is the nature of a military balance that potentially 
determines whether a rivalry between political actors leads to a war, and should war 
occur, what the consequences of the hostilities turn out to be. The key word in arms 
controllers' vocabulary is stability. A stable military balance is seen as an essential 
mechanism of war prevention. Any alteration in a military balance, whether resulting 
from technological changes or the process of arms racing, arms controllers believe, can 
transform a political rivalry into armed violence. (Cot and Boniface 1991: 812 and 
Brown 1987: 173) 
From the arms control perspective, then, armaments can serve a dual function: they 
can act either as a source of security or insecurity. All depends on whether weapons 
contribute to the maintenance of military balance or whether they alter military balances 
and consequently add to the temptation of using military force. It follows, from this 
analysis, that the main practical task arms controllers set for themselves is to contribute 
to the management of military means and to the maintenance of stable military balances. 
In executing this task, arms control advocates seek to limit the volume and growth of 
military arsenals as well as to control the uses to which existing weapons are put, ' 5 and 
14 Although these theoretical premises testify to the fact that there is a strong link between the idea of 
arms control and the school of political realism in IR, it should also be reminded that some of the hardest 
critics of arms control come from the same realist tradition. 
15 Since arms control usually involves reductions in armaments, arms control measures have sometimes 
been supported by the advocates of general and complete disarmament. Fundamentally, however, the 
worldviews of the two approaches are wide apart from each other. Given the arms controllers' skepticism 
over the possibility of a radical reform of the international system, the advocates of disarmament view 
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if the sustenance of a stable military balance necessitates it, also call for increases in 
military capabilities. 16 (Cot and Boniface 1991: 811-812; Buzan and Herring 1998: 212 
and Baylis 2002: 184) 
Of course, no arms control can take place unless the parties involved believe and 
recognize that regardless of their politico-military rivalry, they share a common interest 
in cooperating militarily in order to avoid the possibility of war. In other words, they 
need to acknowledge that they can pursue their own security interests by relieving their 
adversaries' fears of being attacked. The pursuit of security through arms control can 
focus on the strengthening of crisis stability, arms race stability, or both. Measures 
aimed at enhancing crisis stability seek to reduce incentives for surprise attack and to 
eliminate problems that pertain to the quantitative or qualitative features of the 
adversaries' military forces and are capable of triggering war. Efforts towards arms race 
stability seek to curtail military and technological developments to the point that they do 
not result in destabilizing counter-responses. (Jervis 1993: 240-241; Schear 1993: 427- 
428 and Daalder 1992: 52) 
2.2.3 Arms control as an instrument of national security policy 
Although states continue to regard military force as the ultimate guarantor of their 
security, they also recognize that arms control and disarmament can serve as additional 
means to maintain and enhance national security. In other words, the ideas of arms 
control and disarmament are not seen as alternatives to military strength but as 
complements to it. Whether a state resorts to arms control or disarmament to further its 
security objectives naturally depends on how it defines its security needs at any one 
given time. Therefore, for example, a state may stand out as a strong advocate of arms 
control and disarmament in a certain period of time while dismissing all regulation 
efforts in another. Similarly, a state may support arms control or disarmament in one 
context but act as a fierce opponent of them in another. Whatever approach a state 
arms control, as put by Sheehan (1988: 32), as a "philosophy of despair. " Arms controllers, in turn, 
generally dismiss disarmament as an utopian project and point out that weapons reductions, if 
undermining military balances, can actually increase the risk of war. 
16 The literature on arms control often draws a distinction between two types of arms control: structural 
and operational arms control. The concept of structural arms control refers to measures that address the 
quantity and quality of weapons, whereas operational arms control seeks to contain the behaviour of 
armed forces by preventing military deployments and actions considered to be provocative or war-prone 
(Baylis 2002: 185). 
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adopts in a specific situation, arms control and disarmament always remain as potential 
tools for the maintenance and enhancement of national security. 
For the purposes of this study, arms control is used as a generic term referring to 
efforts by states and other actors to do away with armaments and to regulate the use and 
possession of the instruments of war. Hence, the term covers activities that are 
ideationally based on the school of thought known as arms control and the intellectual 
tradition of disarmament. 17 Nevertheless, when necessary for analytical or illustrative 
purposes, the empirical chapters that follow will make a distinction between activities 
that specifically stem from the notion of arms control and those based on the idea of 
disarmament. 18 But given the contemporary usage of the concept of disarmament, which 
mostly refers to partial abolition of weapons and not to general and complete 
elimination of armaments, currently considered by and large unattainable, it is in this 
limited sense that the concept of disarmament is primarily discussed in this study. 
Furthermore, it is necessary to point out that the generic term arms control, as used in 
the present work, also encompasses articulations and deeds that pertain to the military 
concepts of confidence-building measures (CBM) and non-offensive defence (NOD). 
CBM refer to steps taken by adversaries to exchange information about their military 
postures without regulating the existing level of armaments. The fundamental purpose 
of such exchanges is to assure the parties involved that none of them is about to launch 
a military attack or, in cases where a war has already broken out, to escalate the on- 
going hostilities to a higher level of conflict. The notion of NOD, in turn, rests on a 
conceptual distinction between offensive and defensive military strategies, force 
postures, and political objectives, and on the belief that there is a causal relationship 
between offensive strategies, postures, and objectives and the occurance of war. For the 
advocates of NOD, then, the adoption of defensive strategies, postures, and objectives is 
" This broad understanding of arms control is congruent with that of Croft (1996: 14) who defines arms 
control as a "search for collaborative arrangements between political entities that seeks to set restraints on 
the possession or use of certain forms of arms, whether in complete form or in component parts. " 
18 Note, for example, the titles of the subsequent empirical chapters. They will already indicate whether 
the articulations and deeds made by Iran emphasize the arms control or the disarmament component of 
the umbrella term arms control. It should be noted that in everyday usage, it is disarmament that is 
sometimes being used as a generic term that covers the narrow definitions of arms control and 
disarmament. This is a common practice, for example, within the UN. As far as the terminology 
employed by the officials of the Islamic Republic is concerned, the Iranians have used arms control and 
disarmament as generic terms (see, for example, A/C. 1/50/PV. 28,1995: 9) as well as referred to them as 
separate approaches to the problem of war (see, for example, A/52/PV. 6,1997: 24). 
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the key to war avoidance and national security. 19 (Cot and Boniface 1991: 812; Brown 
1987: 193 and Buzan and Herring 1998: 231) 
There are five main ways in which states have historically put arms control into 
diplomatic practice. The first technique, arms control at the conclusion of conflicts, 
points to instances where states have linked arms control with attempts to end conflicts. 
The purpose of such arrangements, usually made at the end of wars and other major 
conflicts, has been to lay foundations for new post-conflict relations between the parties 
involved. The second technique, arms control to further strategic stability, has been used 
to stabilize the military relations between two or more states. The focus of such 
stabilization measures has been either on crisis or arms race stability, or both. (Croft 
1996: 40-46) 
Diplomatic efforts aimed at creating international norms of behaviour have 
constituted the third principal arms control approach emerging from the history of inter- 
state relations. Such efforts have resulted, among others, in agreements that prohibit the 
use of certain weapons, in rules on the protection of non-combatants during armed 
conflicts, and in arrangements seeking to prevent the occurance of war in particular 
geographic areas. Fourthly, governments have used arms control to contain threats that 
stem from the proliferation of armaments. The purpose of proliferation management has 
been twofold: to prevent potential enemies from strengthening their military arsenals 
and to block the spread of armaments that have been viewed as capable of threatening 
global stability. Finally, governments have integrated arms control into the activities of 
international organizations. This approach, arms control by international organization, 
has focused, above all, on the creation of global arms regulation arrangements, on the 
control of individual states' instruments of war, and on the formulation of security 
guarantees to elicit arms control agreements. 20 (Ibid.: 47-58) 
19 The notion of NOD is not dealt with in greater detail in the present work, for it has not been part of the 
mainstream diplomatic debate on arms control and, as the subsequent chapters will show, certainly not a 
noteworthy component of the Islamic Republic's arms control argumentation. For detailed discussions of 
the NOD approach, see Moller (1998: 3-33) and Buzan and Herring (1998: 231-244). 
20 Burns (1993b: 2-5) offers an alternative categorization of the techniques of arms control. He lists the 
following six general techniques: (a) limitation and reduction of weapons; (b) demilitarization, 
denuclearization, and neutralization (the first two of these techniques refer to measures that remove or 
place restrictions on military forces, weapons, and fortifications within a particular area of land, water, or 
airspace, whereas neutralization is a special international status that guarantees the political independence 
and territorial integrity of a state, provided that it promises to engage in war only for defensive purposes); 
(c) regulation or outlawing of specific weapons; (d) control of arms manufacture and traffic; (e) law of 
war; and (f) stabilization of the international environment (which includes actions to reduce the risk of 
accidental war and to create confidence between adversaries). 
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Most definitions of arms control portray it as a collaborative activity involving two or 
more parties. Indeed, most arms control arrangements have resulted from international 
talks that have taken place in bilateral or multilateral settings. The diplomatic process of 
formal arms control is composed of four individual stages: pre-negotiation, negotiation, 
ratification, and implementation. To be successful, formal arms control must result in 
promises given by the parties involved that they will abide by the terms of the 
negotiated arrangement. Also, it has to result in an agreement on how to ensure that the 
parties will actually keep their promises and on how potential treaty non-compliance 
will be dealt with. Verification, the mechanism by which the parties satisfy themselves 
that their treaty partners are respecting their treaty obligations, has traditionally been 
one of the most contentious issues in the process of formal arms control. The 
verification clauses of an arms control agreement seek not only to ensure that any 
variations from agreed arms limitations can be detected, but also to act as a deterrent to 
treaty violations and to promote public confidence in arms control agreements. 21 
(Gallagher 1998: 20; Chalmers 1997: 282 and Sheehan 1988: 123-124) 
But arms control agreements may also come into being informally, and they do not 
necessarily have to be built on the principle of reciprocity. Thus, for example, arms 
control arrangements may be established through mutual verbal agreements or 
declarations, and arms control steps can be taken unilaterally. In the case of unilateral 
arms control, a state - or some other armed actor - imposes, voluntarily and 
purposefully, restrictions on its own military capabilities. The neglect of the 
maintenance and management of one's military resources qualifies as another, though a 
much more hypothetical, type of unilateral arms control. Finally, of course, arms control 
can be carried out through retributive measures, through the use of military or political 
power. (Burns 1993b: 6; Rattray 1996: 6-8 and Kartchner 1996: 24) 
In order to guarantee the national security of their countries, governments need to 
simultaneously deal with potential and actual threats that emanate from both within and 
without their states. Despite the fact that, historically, the focus of arms control, both in 
21 The actual process of verification is composed of two sets of activities: the collection of data about 
treaty members' behaviour with regard to the treaty in question and the evaluation of the information 
gathered. The data collection methods used in arms control arrangements consist of the following: (a) 
traditional intelligence gathering (which includes diplomatic techniques, media scrunity, and espionage); 
(b) national technical means (which includes satellites, seismic monitoring stations, and ground-based 
radars); and (c) on-site inspections (OSI) which can be further sub-divided into remote OSI (which rely, 
among others, on seismic devices and prepositioned cameras), limited OSI (inspections limited to 
challenge), interval OSI (regular periodic visitations), residential OSI (permanent observation at certain 
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terms of theory and practice, has been on inter-state relations and the regulation of 
states' external security environments, arms control can be used as a tool to maintain 
and further domestic security as well. In addition to criminal violence, which concerns 
all states but relatively seldom poses a serious threat to national security, the core values 
of a state can be undermined by political violence aimed at challenging the existing 
domestic order. Usually, domestic political violence is carried out by local opposition 
groups, but can also involve forces of a foreign government or non-governmental 
political organization. In the worst case, such violence takes the form of full-scale 
armed conflict between the forces defending and questioning the existing domestic 
order. 
Arms control, as a policy instrument dealing with the domestic security environment, 
may be used by a government, for example, to influence the course of hostilities against 
a domestic opponent. Similarly, a government can make use of arms control to reinforce 
a post-conflict political settlement with an opponent. Such a settlement, and the arms 
control measures related to it, may be based on an agreement reached by the parties 
themselves or brokered by foreign actors. Finally, arms control can be resorted to for 
preventive purposes. By impeding domestic actors' access to armaments, arms control 
may contribute to the prevention of intra-state war or at least reduce the scale of 
violence should armed violence nonetheless take place. 22 
States can also use arms control as an instrument to tackle security concerns that arise 
from their regional security environment. For most countries, it is the regional 
environment that plays the main role in their security calculations. This is the context 
within which most states conduct their primary foreign relations and where threats to 
state security exist in immediate proximity to national borders. The factor of 
geographical proximity alone binds regional countries together and contributes to the 
fact that regions have their own security dynamics with idiosyncratic problems as well 
as autonomous patterns of cooperation and conflict. Arms control at the regional level 
offers governments a way to deal, during war or peace, with traditional inter-state 
points by inspectors), and unlimited zonal inspection (unlimited inspection rights in specifically defined 
zones). (Sheehan 1988: 123,132) 
22 The use of arms control as a tool to address the problem of armed violence in domestic settings has 
increased concomitantly with the shift in warfare in the post-Cold War era from inter-state to intra-state 
wars. Generally speaking, the changes in the nature of warfare in the post-Cold War world have included 
three main developments: a shift from the major powers to minor powers, from Europe to other regions, 
and from inter-state warfare to intra-state wars (Levy 2002: 351). 
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relations and with conflict constellations that involve regional non-state actors operating 
transnationally. (Buzan and Waever 2003: 10-12,43 and Lemke 2002: 59,75) 
While most states view their external security environment as primarily consisting of 
the region they are part of, however, regions themselves are incorporated into the global 
states system and, therefore, influenced by the actions of the most powerful members of 
the international system and by developments that are taking place at the system level. 
Great power intervention through local allies into a region and its security dynamic, 
motivated by whatever reason, can prove detrimental to the security interests of at least 
some of the regional states. The security concerns of an individual country may be 
linked to the system level also if the state in question sees a great power as a direct 
threat to its national security. 23 Finally, some policies of one or more great powers, such 
as nuclear arms racing, may threaten the security of all the members of the international 
system. In this and other cases where system-level actors' military instruments pose a 
threat, lesser powers can resort to arms control in order to further the cause of national 
security. 
2.3 Arms Control and Diplomacy: The Case of Islamic Iran 
2.3.1 The diplomatic actors 
Armed forces and diplomacy, understood here as communication between state 
officials aimed at promoting national objectives either by formal agreement or tacit 
adjustment (Berridge 2005: 1), constitute the two principal instruments through which 
states seek to ensure their military and political security. States' security-related 
diplomacy focuses, above all, on threats, perceived or actual, that emanate from their 
external environments. With the help of diplomacy, governments seek to ensure that 
their country will not become a target of military action and, should such action 
nevertheless take place, to gather international support for their defence efforts and their 
calls for the ending of the hostilities (Hakovirta 1981: 53 and Visuri 1997: 250). 
23 Such threat perceptions are common among lesser powers that openly question great power dominance 
of the international system and call for a new international order. In Escude's (1998: 55) terminology, the 
international system is composed of three types of functionally differentiated states: (a) states that 
command (the great powers); (b) states that obey (the majority of the inter-state community); and (c) 
rebel states (certain Third World countries that challenge the right of the great powers to dominate the 
international system). 
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Islamic Iran, in pursuance of the goal of national security, has relied on diplomacy 
both during peace- and wartime. Its efforts to indirectly regulate and limit the quantity 
and quality of other states' military means, as well as the ways in which those resources 
are put to use, have formed an integral part of the Islamic Republic's diplomatic 
activities, especially in the area of multilateral diplomacy. Post-revolutionary Iran's 
activeness in international arms control diplomacy - itself an indication of the 
dominance of security concerns on Iran's national agenda24 - has been recognized by 
outside observers, 25 and Iranian officials themselves have repeatedly underscored the 
importance of arms control in the Islamic Republic's security policy. According to 
Iranian officials, arms control issues are of great significance to their country, and, 
therefore, the Islamic Republic closely follows the international debate on arms control 
(A/C. 1/49/PV. 9,1994: 14). 
Like in other states, the main diplomatic actor in Islamic Iran is the country's foreign 
ministry. And like elsewhere, the Iranian foreign ministry is divided into different 
administrative units according to the tasks it is expected to fulfill. Normally, foreign 
ministries are arranged into various units on the basis of two criteria: they are organized 
either around specific issue areas or regions of the world. In practice, however, the 
ministries often consist of both functional and geographical units. This is also the case 
in the Islamic Republic. The Iranian foreign ministry's current organization is based on 
five main functional units (Legal and International Affairs; Consular and Parliamentary 
Affairs; Educational and Research Affairs; Economic Affairs; and Administrative and 
Financial Affairs) and three main geographical units (Europe and the Americas; Arab 
and African Affairs; and Asia and the Pacific). 26 
The Department for Disarmament and International Security, operating under the unit 
for Legal and International Affairs, is the Iranian foreign ministry's focal point for arms 
control-related matters. 27 Many of the department's staff have served the Islamic 
Republic not only in the ministry in Tehran but also as Iran's representatives in New 
za As observed by Maoz (1997: 5): "The extent to which states are concerned with their security is 
reflected not only in terms of their violent military activity, or in the amount of money they spend on 
defense, but also in the kind of diplomacy they conduct. " 
25 See, for example, Ali (1996: 2) who describes Iran as an "active participant" in international arms 
control processes and Jones (1998: 40) according to whom Iran has played a "very active role" in 
international arms control fora. 
26 For the current organizational chart of the Islamic Republic's foreign ministry, visit the ministry's 
website at <http: //www. mfa. gov. ir>. 
27 In 2002, the Department for Disarmament and International Security was staffed by some ten career 
diplomats (author's interview with an Iranian arms control official [A] who wishes to remain unidentified, 
summer 2002). 
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York, Vienna, Geneva, and The Hague - the centers of multilateral arms control 
diplomacy. These officials have formed a small cadre of Iranian diplomats who have 
specialized in arms control and sought to promote the interests of the Islamic Republic 
in international fora dealing with a broad set of security and arms control questions. 
Apart from the normal job rotation within the foreign ministry, some Iranian arms 
control diplomats have also held expert positions outside the ministry, among others, in 
the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and the President's Office. 
Although the Islamic Republic's arms control diplomacy has been institutionalized 
within Iran's foreign ministry, and even though the officials of the foreign ministry - 
through communication, negotiation, and participation in the work of international fora 
- hold the prime responsibility for presenting and implementing the various elements of 
the Islamic Republic's arms control policy, the foreign ministry is not the sole 
governmental body involved in Iranian arms control diplomacy. The ministry of 
defence, for example, has had a regular representation in Iranian delegations at 
international arms control meetings, in addition to which the ministry has been directly 
in charge of the management of certain national arms control responsibilities, 
particularly in the area of conventional arms control. 
In a similar manner, the AEOI has played a complementary role in the Islamic 
Republic's arms control diplomacy by promoting Iran's views on nuclear questions at 
the meetings of the International Atomic Energy Agency and elsewhere. Moreover, the 
AEOI has acted as an important source of technical and scientific expertise for those 
deciding on and implementing the Islamic Republic's nuclear arms control diplomacy. 
Given the increasingly specialized nature of the enterprise of arms control, the 
knowledge and participation of technical and scientific experts has been crucial for the 
formulation and implementation of Iran's approaches to chemical and biological arms 
control as wel1.28 
But even if not possessing a monopoly on the Islamic Republic's arms control 
diplomacy, in the end, however, it is the Iranian foreign ministry that acts as the 
principal executor of the country's arms control operations and, in consequence, as the 
main unit of analysis of the present study. In addition to the diplomatic activities of 
28 It should be further noted here that irrespective of its role as a key decision-making body on Iran's 
security and foreign policies, the Islamic Republic's Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) has also 
been involved in practical arms control diplomacy by assigning its secretary - in 2003 when the question 
of Iran's nuclear efforts became a central issue on the international agenda - as the chief Iranian 
negotiator on the country's nuclear program (Ruhani 2005: 4). 
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communication, negotiation, and participation in various international settings, Iran's 
foreign ministry carries out functions that are crucial to arms control decision-making in 
the Islamic Republic. Through the collection and analysis of information, and the 
provision of advice on policy options, the foreign ministry is capable of indirectly 
influencing the decision-making process. 29 
Furthermore, and as emphasized by Hill (2003: 77), foreign ministries around the 
world perform an invaluable function of acting as the institutional memory of a state's 
foreign relations. The importance of such memory, and the policy continuity associated 
with it, became startlingly evident in Iran following the country's 1979 revolution. 
During the first years after the revolution, when the new power elite in Iran was 
preoccupied with domestic issues and with the creation and the battle over the 
dominance of the post-monarchical Iranian political system, the country's foreign 
ministry and its remaining bureaucracy succeeded in preventing the total collapse of 
post-revolutionary Iran's diplomatic activities. That the foreign ministry managed, 
despite the resignations and purges that took place in the immediate aftermath of the 
revolution and dramatically affected the ministry, to continue to perform some of its 
functions proved vital for the Islamic Republic, especially after it had become involved 
in a war with Iraq in September 1980.30 
By the end of 1982, largely as a result of the theocratic forces' successful 
consolidation of power in post-revolutionary Iran, the turmoil within the foreign 
ministry had significantly settled down (Menashri 1990: 245). The ministry's staff had 
been reshuffled and restructured to correspond with the needs and aspirations of the 
Islamic Republic's religious powerholders. 31 Yet the inexperience of the new officials 
or what the Iranian president at the time characterized as "the apostles of the revolution" 
(Ramazani 1983: 19-20), together with the fact that ideological credentials had become 
the main recruitment criterion in government, meant that Iran's main body of diplomacy 
had fallen into the hands of initially incompetent officials -a development not untypical 
for Third World countries experiencing a regime change (Dessouki and Korany 1991: 
21-22). 
29 It is also presumable that the foreign ministry itself functions as the ultimate decision-maker in 
diplomatic arms control matters that are of technical or routine nature. 
30 For the organizational problems faced by the Iranian foreign ministry in the aftermath of the 1979 
revolution, see Ramazani (1983: 19-21) and Menashri (1990: 9,97,245). 
31 It should be mentioned that the Iranian foreign ministry's first diplomat recruitment and training 
program under the Islamic Republic was launched in 1982. Some of Iran's current arms control officials 
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2.3.2 Arms control in the Middle East 
While states may use arms control as a tool to respond to security pressures that arise 
both from their domestic and external security environments, most often the arms 
control steps taken by governments aim at influencing the latter. The focus, then, is on 
developments occurring at regional and international levels, and not only on the 
behaviour of other states but transnational actors as well. 32 Just as in an inter-state 
constellation, a competetive relationship between a state and a transnational actor may 
lead to the use of armed force and, consequently, pose a direct threat to the state's 
national security. 33 
For the great majority of states, including Iran, the geographic and functional range of 
concern in activities related to external security is limited first and foremost, and 
irrespective of occasional declarations by some countries to the contrary, to their 
immediate regional environments. This is due, on the one hand, to the fact that only few 
states have the capacity to operate as global powers exerting major influence at the 
international level. On the other hand, and as reminded by Buzan and Waever (2003: 
12), most security threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones. 
According to Tibi (1998: 36), there are three factors that define a region in the 
international system and separate them from one another: geographical continuity, 
regionally interconnecting - socio-economic, political, cultural, and ethnic - structures, 
and a certain density of interaction. Such interaction can take the form of cooperation, 
but may also manifest various patterns of conflict. Indeed, the definitions of the Middle 
Eastern regional system, Iran's primary external security environment, often take the 
conflictual character of the Middle East as their conceptual point of departure. 34 By the 
same token, the conflicts that have taken place in the Middle East are often referred to 
are graduates of the 1982 course. (Author's interview with an Iranian arms control official [B] who 
wishes to remain unidentified, summer 2000) 
32 Transnational actors can be defined as private groups or individuals who, while requiring physical 
facilities inside states, do not need governments in order to conduct international relations. They can be 
divided into three broad classes: territorial, ideologicalcultural, and economic. Territorial transnational 
actors are either using or seeking some territorial base, whereas ideological/cultural actors aim at 
spreading their worldviews and ideas across national borders. The main goal of economic transnational 
actors is to create wealth. (Hill 2003: 195-203) 
33 Of course, a relationship between a state and a transnational actor can also be based on cooperation and 
dialogue or on a situation where the parties do not necessarily need and are not interested in each other 
(ibid.: 203-208). 
34 See, for example. the discussion by Tibi (1998: 43-60) who argues that "it is in fact conflicts that bind 
states into a regional system. " 
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as benchmarks in the history of the region and as important shapers of regional 
identities (Jacoby and Sasley 2002: 3). 
Using Buzan's (1991: 190) conceptualization, the Middle East can be defined as a 
security complex, that is, as a "group of states whose primary security concerns link 
together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be 
considered apart from one another. , 35 From this perspective, then, the Middle East 
comprises an entity with its own security dynamics that makes the region internally 
interdependent and externally distinct from other security regions (Buzan and Waever 
2003: 47_48). 36 What is of particular interest here is to know to what extent and how 
Islamic Iran has utilized arms control to deal with security concerns peculiar to the 
Middle Eastern security complex. 
Generally speaking, arms control has played a very limited role in the Middle Eastern 
states' security policies. Due to the numerous conflicts and rivalries simultaneously at 
play in the region, and because of the popularity of the political philosophy of war 
among Middle Eastern decision-makers, the governments of the region have founded 
their security policies almost exclusively on military instruments. The poor state - and 
in some cases the absence - of diplomatic relations and channels of inter-governmental 
communication have further undermined efforts to find negotiated solutions to the 
region's security problems. Also the fact that the conflicts of the Middle East often 
overlap and involve a complex set of players and military balances has made it highly 
difficult to establish an acceptable basis for regional arms control talks (Steinberg 1993: 
169-170 and Karsh et al. 1996: 43-45). 
Arms control efforts in the Middle East have additionally been marred by foreign 
interference and interventions in regional affairs. Even though, since the beginning of 
the second half of the 20th century, local conflicts and rivalries have to a large extent 
dictated the character and form of the Middle East's security landscape, the policies of 
extra-regional powers vis-a-vis the region have added an extra dimension to it. Whether 
through direct military operations, the use of local allies as proxies, or through arms 
transfers, motivated by the prospect of political and economic profits, extra-regional 
35 For a refinement of the concept of security complex, see Buzan et al. (1998). Lemke's (2002: 71) 
notion of a state's "relevant neighborhood" - the portion of the globe within which a state can operate 
militarily or exert military influence - is another conceptual attempt to divide the international system, in 
security terms, into various regional sub-systems. 
36 Hinnebusch's (2003: 10) observation that, today, there is not a single country in the Middle East that 
has not come to feel a military threat from one or more of its neighbours is indicative of the security 
interdependence among the region's states. 
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powers' pursuit of self-interest in the Middle East has contributed to the militarization 
of a regional system already fraught with instability and fierce quantitative and 
qualitative competition over armaments, both conventional and WMD. (Buzan and 
Waver 2003: 187,201; Ehteshami 2002: 257,264 and Steinberg 1993: 170) 
The characteristics of the Middle Eastern regional system make it thus easy to 
understand why very few attempts at arms control have been made within the region. 
Nevertheless, the Middle East has not been totally immune to arms control 
arrangements. First of all, the region has been the target of numerous arms control 
initiatives made by extra-regional states. Apart from the most recent ones, which are 
discussed in the chapters that follow, the Cold War period produced a number of 
proposals that sought to limit the regional states' access to weapons technology, such as 
the so-called Tripartite Declaration of 1950 and a number of unilateral initiatives put 
forward by the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. 37 
Yet, none of these 'supply-side' efforts ultimately managed to make a real difference 
either because the initiating parties themselves at some point ceased to respect the terms 
of their proposals or because the participation of all relevant arms manufacturers was 
never achieved. 
Secondly, some Middle Eastern countries themselves have managed to agree on 
mutual, though strictly restricted, arms control arrangements. Thus, in the 1970s, 
following the 1973 Yom Kippur War, for example, Egypt and Israel signed a series of 
agreements that sought to prevent armaments concentrations in the Sinai Peninsula and 
the Egyptian-Israeli border areas. The relations between Israel and Syria have included 
corresponding arrangements with regard to Lebanon and the Golan Heights. 38 The 
diplomatic deliberations within the so-called Arms Control and Regional Security 
Working Group - one of the five groups of the multilateral track of the Middle East 
peace process - during the early 1990s, the modest confidence-building measures 
between Iran and the Gulf Arab sheikhdoms during the presidencies of Ali Akbar 
Hashimi Rafsanjani and Muhammad Khatami, together with the regular regional calls 
for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon- or WMD-free zone in the Middle East serve 
as more recent reminders of the fact that arms control is not merely a theoretical option 
for the regional states' security policies. 
3' For the details of these Cold War-period arms control initiatives, see Steinberg (1993: 174-176) and 
Karsh et al. (1996: 34-35). 
38 For the Egyptian-Israeli and Israeli-Syrian agreements, see Tanner (1993: 39-40) and Steinberg (1993: 
176-177). 
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2.3.3 The international issue arenas 
Even though arms control, both bilateral and multilateral, has occupied only a 
marginal place in the Middle Eastern security configuration, the regional states' military 
behaviour is nevertheless partly regulated by certain global arms control agreements - 
provided, of course, that the countries in question have joined them in the first place. On 
the other hand, these global agreements, together with the international bodies and fora 
that deal with arms control questions, concurrently provide the states of the Middle East 
a diplomatic avenue to promote not only their international but their regional security 
interests as well. In other words, the arms control deliberations taking place in 
multilateral diplomatic contexts enable the Middle Eastern states to simultaneously raise 
concerns that are seen as arising from the two spatial components of their external 
security environment: the regional and the international. 
Following the 1979 revolution, Iran's theocratic political forces openly declared their 
suspicious attitude towards international treaties and organizations. Highly critical of 
the state of affairs in world politics, they generally regarded such treaties and 
organizations as manifestations and tools of the major powers' efforts to dominate the 
world. Soon, however, Iran's new powerholders had to reexamine - if not at 
ideological, at practical level at least - their position. This was due, above all, to the 
ramifications of the Iraqi invasion of Iran in September 1980. Under military attack, 
Iran's leaders had no choice but to mobilize the nation's resources and to make use of 
international channels for the sake of the war effort. 39 As a consequence, and not 
unexpectedly, the war also gave a major boost to the Islamic Republic's diplomatic 
activities in the area of arms control and to the Islamic Republic's participation in the 
work of international issue arenas dealing with security and arms control. 
Ever since the start of the Iran-Iraq war, the United Nations and the various fora that 
are part of its so-called arms control machinery have constituted the principal 
diplomatic arena of operation for the Islamic Republic's arms control officials. The UN 
machinery consists, first of all, of the UN General Assembly and its subsidiary organs. 
The arms control-related responsibilities of the General Assembly are mentioned in 
article I1 of the UN Charter which states that the General Assembly "may consider the 
39 The visit by Muhammad All Rajai, the then Iranian prime minister, to New York in October 1980 to 
address the UN Security Council was widely seen at the time as a tacit acknowledgement on the part of 
Iran's theocratic leadership that it was in the Islamic Republic's interest to participate in the work of the 
world organization and in multilateral diplomacy (Sick 1991: 158). 
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general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and 
security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of 
armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the 
Members or to the Security Council or to both. " 
Based on article 11, the General Assembly has, since the establishment of the UN in 
1945,40 adopted numerous arms control resolutions every year. The drafting of these 
resolutions has been the responsibility of the General Assembly's First Committee, the 
subsidiary organ whose annual sessions in New York, usually held between October- 
November, focus on questions pertaining to international security and arms control. The 
task of the UN Disarmament Commission, the other subsidiary organ of the General 
Assembly dealing with arms control, in turn, has been to continue the work of the First 
Committee when the General Assembly is out of session. The Commission - which, 
similarly to the General Assembly and the First Committee, has a universal membership 
- convenes at UN headquarters each spring for four weeks and is mandated to submit 
concrete recommendations on specific arms control matters and to follow up on the 
decisions of the General Assembly's special sessions on disarmament. 41 The 
Commission does not pass draft resolutions, but submits reports of its annual 
deliberations to the General Assembly. 
Whereas the General Assembly, its First Committee, and the UN Disarmament 
Commission are essentially deliberative bodies, the Security Council of the world 
organization has powers to take coercive arms control steps against the members of the 
international community if it concludes that their actions are threatening international 
peace and security. As a result, the arms control-related activities of the Security 
Council have included decisions on the enactment of arms restraints on a number of 
individual countries. 42 Apart from dealing with situations declared as threats to 
international peace and security, the arms control tasks of the Security Council under 
the UN Charter consist of the responsibility to formulate plans for the establishment of a 
system for the regulation of armaments (article 26). Accordingly, the Security Council 
40 Iran became a member state of the United Nations on 24 October 1945. 
41 So far, the General Assembly has held three special sessions on disarmament - in 1978,1982, and 
1988. The special sessions notwithstanding, the General Assembly has two other types of sessions: 
regular annual sessions and emergency special sessions. 
42 The partial disarmament of Iraq following the 1990-1991 Kuwait crisis, discussed later, is a prime 
example of the arms control measures authorized by the Security Council against an individual country. 
For other cases, see Croft (1996: 167-189). 
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has been involved, in a number of ways, in promoting the establishment of global 
controls on armaments. 
Given that the actions of the Security Council have been part and parcel of great 
power politics and ultimately always dependent on the views of its five permanent 
member states equipped with veto powers, it has never been a focal venue for Iran's and 
other lesser powers' arms control diplomacy. As far as the Geneva-based Conference on 
Disarmament is concerned, however, the opposite is true. 43 As the international 
community's only body dedicated to arms control negotiations, the CD constitutes a 
valuable arena for Iranian diplomacy. The fact that the CD operates by consensus offers 
the Iranians the theoretical, if not always the actual, possibility to overrule any decision 
they deem as contrary to their interests. 
Although officially not a UN body, the CD is in many ways linked to the UN and its 
arms control machinery. The budget of the CD, for example, is included in the UN 
budget, the meetings of the CD are held on UN premises and serviced by UN personnel, 
and the CD submits its annual report to the General Assembly. Many of the most 
important international arms control treaties - including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons 
Convention, as well as the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty - have been negotiated in 
the CD. Since the completion of the CTBT, opened for signature in September 1996, 
however, the CD has been in an effective standstill, for it has not been able to agree on 
the commencement of further negotiations. 
While usually not viewed as part of the UN arms control machinery, the IAEA, one 
of the world organization's specialized agencies, carries out tasks that are of direct 
relevance to nuclear arms control. 44 Similarly, the review mechanisms and conferences 
of international arms control treaties, such as the NPT and the BTWC, provide states 
with the opportunity to present and promote their positions in a specific field of arms 
control. The same applies to the international organizations that have been established 
by certain multilateral arms control conventions, such as the CWC, and charged with 
the task of implementing the provisions of those treaties. 
The meetings of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference, even if normally dealing with a wide array of issues, have acted as further 
13 Iran became a member of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, the predecessor of the 
CD, in 1975. The CD itself was established in 1979 following the UN General Assembly's first special 
session on disarmament. 
" Iran became a member of the IAEA in 1958. 
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diplomatic avenues for Islamic Iran's arms control diplomacy. Although Iran had 
supported many of the objectives pursued by the NAM - if not the principle of non- 
alignment per se - already before the revolution (Korany 1986: 12), post-revolutionary 
Iran's interpretation of the role of non-alignment has dramatically differed from that of 
the pre-revolutionary Iranian regime. In contrast to the Shah's government, which had 
combined Iran's support to NAM objectives with a tight alliance with the West and the 
United States, in particular, the leaders of the Islamic Republic have regarded 
independence from dominant global powers as a fundamental tenet of Iranian foreign 
policy. 45 
But due to the inevitable clashes of interest within a grouping with a large and 
heterogeneous membership, and because of the Islamic Republic's unique conception of 
non-alignment, 46 the arms control positions of Iran, one of the most active NAM actors 
in the field of arms control, have not always evoked supportive responses from other 
NAM countries. Similarly, the Islamic Republic's diplomacy at the OIC has been a 
source of occasional controversy among the member states. While currently one of the 
leading OIC players in arms control diplomacy, the Islamic Republic's relations with 
the organization have a history of mutual suspicions, for during the first decade of the 
Islamic Republic, Iranian leaders openly dismissed the Jeddah-based organization as a 
reactionary tool of Western imperialism and the Saudi monarchy (Marschall 2003: 47- 
48). Since the end of the Iran-Iraq war, however, the Islamic Republic has increasingly 
viewed the OIC as an important diplomatic arena for the promotion of its interests 
(Roshandel 2000: 110,116). 
Still, rather than serving as arenas for major diplomatic openings, the meetings of 
both the NAM and the OIC provide Iran and the other member states involved in arms 
control diplomacy a venue for the formulation of common positions and policies to be 
introduced in global arms control fora. In addition, the NAM and the OIC act as 
operative reference groups for the member states within the global arms control fora 
themselves - whether within the arms control machinery of the UN, the CD, the IAEA, 
as Iran declared its commitment to an explicit policy of non-alignment immediately after the 1979 
revolution. As part of this policy, Iran formally applied to join the NAM in June 1979 and its foreign 
minister participated in the movement's Havana summit of September 1979 (Menashri 1990: 96). 
Subsequently, the principle of non-alignment also became enshrined into the Islamic Republic's 
constitution, its article 152. 
46 According to Sadri (1999: 35-36), the Islamic Republic's policy of non-alignment has differed from 
mainstream NAM approach in two main respects. First, it has been more critical of the prevailing 
international order and the policies of the great powers, and, secondly, it has placed more importance on 
the issue of cultural independence. 
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or in connection with individual arms control treaties. In both contexts, the member 
states of the NAM and the OIC can resort to collective action in order to try to gain the 
kind of bargaining power they are incapable of wielding individually. 
The Islamic Republic's deep involvement in multilateral arms control diplomacy has 
not meant that it has uncritically committed itself to whatever arms control 
arrangements agreed upon by other members of the international community. Quite the 
opposite, the Iranian leadership has not hesitated to reject initiatives and agreements that 
it has considered unfavourable to the interests of the Islamic Republic. Yet, at the same 
time, the Iranians have not had access to all the international arms control fora they have 
wanted to operate in. What they have been particularly irritated about is that they have 
not been allowed to take part in the diplomatic discussions of those associations - such 
as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile Technology Control Regime 
(MTCR), and the Australia Group (AG) - that have taken arms control steps against 
their country. As a result of the international arms control measures that have been 
directed at the Islamic Republic since its inception, then, the officials of the Islamic 
Republic have been forced to occasionally perform not only as proponents but, while 
defending their government, as opponents of arms control as well. 
2.3.4 The objectives of arms control: the theoretical spectrum 
The existence of international issue arenas devoted to arms control and the 
institutionalization of arms control as a distinct functional area within state 
bureaucracies demonstrate that arms control diplomacy has become a routine instrument 
for the promotion of states' national security interests. But in spite of the established 
position of arms control as an independent sector of state diplomacy aiming to influence 
the military behaviour of domestic and external actors, in practice, its objectives 
frequently intermingle with those of the other sectors of diplomacy. This may occur, for 
example, when an arms control issue takes on a life of its own and transforms from a 
security matter into a question of national prestige (Legg and Morrison 1991: 60). More 
often, however, states deliberately link arms control with diplomatic issues that do not 
necessarily have anything to do with the goal of security (Schear 1993: 427 and Croft 
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1996: 10). 47 In this way, then, arms control diplomacy exits the domain of security and 
becomes a general instrument of foreign policy. 48 
While the foreign policy objectives states try to achieve by taking part in arms control 
diplomacy are potentially numerous, 49 country-specific, 50 and time-bound, 51 their 
origins are traceable to certain core goals that have been common to states throughout 
history. In other words, the foreign policy objectives of a state can always be viewed as 
serving, and stemming from, one or more of these timeless goals of foreign policy. 52 
Basing his conclusions on a survey of theoretical IR literature, Raymond (1987: 102- 
103) identifies six fundamental goals of foreign policy, each composed of specific 
substantive elements: (a) security (physical survival, territorial integrity, political 
independence); (b) welfare (prosperity, economic development, well-being); (c) prestige 
(recognition, status, respect, honor); (d) ideological self-extension (promotion of values, 
conversion); (e) material self-extension (power, territorial expansion, exclusive access); 
and (f) self-abnegation (peace, rectitude, international solidarity). 53 
47 Note, for example, the episode from September 1998 when Iran reportedly vetoed the admission of 
Ireland to CD membership in order to punish the Irish government for its criticism of Iran's human rights 
situation (Arms Control Today, August/September 1998). Already prior to 1998, the Islamic Republic had 
used the issue of CD membership as a diplomatic trump card against at least Israel and Iraq (CD/PV. 670, 
1994). 
48 As observed by Sheehan (1988: 119), arms control deliberations have become a means through which 
states "attempt to gain traditional foreign policy goals while focusing their manoeuvring in a single 
arena. " In addition to making linkages between arms control and other foreign policy issues, governments 
sometimes make their participation in one arms control process conditional on progress in another. 
49 Generally, states pursue numerous foreign policy objectives simultaneously. Some of them can be in 
conflict with one another, and sometimes the actions taken to achieve one objective contribute to the 
achievement of another. Naturally, states do not place the same value or priority on all of their various 
foreign policy objectives at any one given time. Similarly, they do not attach the same urgency to the 
achievement of their individual objectives. (Hill 2003: 118; Holsti 1992: 113 and Legg and Morrison 
1991: 60-61) 
50 Whatever its nature, a state's foreign policy always reflects and seeks to promote national needs and 
purposes. As purposive, goal-directed action, foreign policy tries to influence, above all, the behaviour of 
other states, and is, at the same time, influenced by those states' own goal-directed behaviour. (Hill 2003: 
285; Richardson 1987: 165 and Holsti 1977: 138,140). Rothgeb (1995: 34) defines the international 
system as the "patterns of interaction that exist among the actors around the world who pursue policies 
designed to further their foreign policy goals and interests. " 
51 As noted by Mansbach and Vasquez (1981: 11), the issues in world politics change in the course of 
time in terms of substance, the patterns of behaviour that characterize them, and the cast of actors that 
interact over them. 
52 For the conceptual distinction between foreign policy goals and objectives, see Hakovirta (1981: 49 and 
2002: 146); Raymond (1987: 100,103) and Legg and Morrison (1991: 59). Though treating arms control 
purely as an instrument of security policy and relying on different terminology, Kartchner's (1996: 19, 
32) discussion of "grand strategy level" and "operational level" arms control objectives captures the idea 
of the goal-objective distinction. In his conceptualization, the broadly stated objectives of grand strategy 
are translated at the operational level "into more specific goals" to guide actual arms control activities. 
53 For other classifications of foreign policy goals that come very close to that of Raymond, see Hakovirta 
(2002: 146-152); Holsti (1992: 83-109) and Legg and Morrison (1991: 62-63). 
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The objectives that states pursue in order to achieve protection from actual and 
perceived security threats naturally constitute the core of their diplomatic activities in 
the area of arms control. The history and practice of arms control shows, however, that 
states view the potential security benefits of arms control diplomacy as going beyond 
the regulation of armed actors' military choices and beyond the traditional objectives of 
lessening the risk of intentional and accidental war and of limiting the consequences of 
war should it nevertheless occur. 54 Resultantly, states have regarded arms control 
processes also as important channels to maintain diplomatic dialogue between 
adversaries. Such communication, even when the arms control deliberations themselves 
are not progressing, has been viewed as potentially contributing to greater 
understanding between the participants and gradually leading to improvements in their 
political relationships (Sheehan 1988: 11-12 and Croft 1996: 14). Furthermore, and 
especially in the post-Cold War period, arms control has often been associated with 
efforts to manage transitions from conflict situations to stable peace in regions where 
the risk of inter- or intra-state wars looms largess 
Of course, there is always the possibility that arms control dialogue between 
adversaries damages rather than improves their relations. The prospect of such 
development increases if the parties conclude that their adversaries use arms control 
purely as a means to gain unilateral advantages. Indeed, states may take part in arms 
control processes with the purpose of obtaining security benefits without actually 
wanting to commit themselves to the limitations under consideration. For example, they 
may try to use arms control diplomacy as a way of obtaining useful intelligence gains. 
By the same token, governments may use arms control arenas to spread false 
information about their armament programs or to buy time for the completion of their 
military build-ups. In such cases, arms control diplomacy is reduced to a tool of 
deception that aims at promoting security by hiding true military intentions. (Taylor 
1996: 42; Sheehan 1988: 118 and Schear 1993: 427) 
Reflective of the fact that arms control diplomacy does not exist in isolation from 
broader considerations of foreign policy, states have used it for other than security- 
related purposes, too. The reduction of military costs has traditionally been considered 
sa These traditional objectives are explicitly mentioned in most definitions of the concept of arms control. 
See, for example, Brown (1987: 173); Laurance (1996: 358) and Chalmers (1997: 280). 
ss As noted by Chalmers (1997: 280-281), the use of arms control as part of conflict prevention and 
resolution efforts has increasingly turned it into an instrument that can potentially prevent states from 
being undermined from within. 
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the second primary rationale of arms control. On the one hand, those who emphasize the 
economic benefits of arms control have argued that high levels of expenditure on 
armaments undermine the growth of national economies. On the other hand, some states 
and those of the developing world, in particular, have alluded to the importance of arms 
control as a means of redirecting resources from military production to international 
development assistance. Finally, states have occasionally taken part in arms control 
agreements in the hope that their participation would be economically rewarded in the 
form of enhanced trade opportunities. (Buzan and Herring 1998: 213; Marlin and 
Brauer 1993: 345-346 and Johnson 1998: 85) 
Even though the argument that military costs hinder economic growth continues to 
play a major role in diplomatic argumentation, the claim itself rests on a shaky 
empirical foundation, for some studies suggest that military expenditures may actually 
stimulate economic growth. Moreover, arms control negotiations may sometimes 
produce agreements which, with the principle of balance in view, in fact legitimate 
increases in armaments, or, alternatively, trigger arms competition in areas still not 
regulated. But whatever the relative strength of the arguments on the economic 
consequences of arms control, 56 the fact remains that, historically, arms control 
agreements have rarely put much weight on economic considerations. And as far as the 
link drawn between arms control and increased international development assistance is 
concerned, it has remained a notion without practical manifestations. (Sheehan 1988: 
64-65,79,81; Marlin and Brauer 1993: 346 and Taylor 1996: 50) 
The arms control objectives stemming from security and economic considerations 
notwithstanding, international arms control talks have also offered states an opportunity 
to promote those foreign policy goals that are referred to in Raymond's inventory as 
prestige, ideological self-extension, material self-extension, and self-abnegation. States 
may try, for example, to use arms control deliberations to gain respect from other 
countries. Similarly, states may use arms control arenas to present and promote their 
ideological premises. Furthermore, arms control diplomacy may sometimes serve states' 
efforts to increase their influence vis-a-vis other countries. Conversely, those countries 
that are unhappy with prevailing power relations, which are often more or less explicitly 
locked into individual arms control treaties, may use arms control diplomacy to express 
56 It should be noted that in addition to those who either support or oppose the claim that military 
spending hinders economic growth, there is a school of thought, a middle position, concluding that the 
economic impact of military spending is unclear or neutral (Marlin and Brauer 1993: 346). 
56 
their dissatisfaction and to try to change the existing circumstances. Finally, the history 
of arms control knows instances where the willingness of statesmen to advance arms 
control has been grounded in the altruistic intention of acting for the good of the 
mankind. (Schear 1993: 426,431-433 and Johnson 1998: 85) 
When arms control diplomacy, principally a security-related realm of state activity, 
merges with a state's general foreign policy, it simultaneously also becomes a potential 
instrument of domestic politics. In other words, like any other area of foreign policy, 
arms control diplomacy can be used to promote governments' and regimes' domestic 
political interests. Consequently, the content of a state's arms control diplomacy, 
whether in a general sense or in connection with talks on a particular treaty or issue, 
may be influenced by the perceived impact of the adopted diplomatic position on 
domestic political competition or electoral prospects. By the same token, state officials 
may resort to provocative arms control diplomacy in the hope that it would divert 
attention away from domestic issues or problems. (Johnson 1998: 85; Burns 1993b: 7 
and Sheehan 1988: 118) 
The potentially multiple functions of arms control diplomacy in the realization of 
national foreign policy objectives explain why states that are uninterested in arms 
control in security terms, either generally or with regard to a specific issue, nevertheless 
often take part in international arms control deliberations. 57 Yet, states often carefully 
weigh the costs and benefits of such participation. Speaking of a specific multilateral 
arms control treaty process, for example, we can differentiate between three kinds of 
calculations that states may make: those determining whether they become interested in 
the issue in the first place; those dictating whether they become involved in actual treaty 
negotiations; and, finally, those that determine whether states commit themselves to the 
final treaty document. If a state views the potential costs of an arms control agreement 
as exceeding the potential benefits, it may take part in the negotiation process but mask 
its disinterest in an agreement by floating one-sided proposals that have no real hope of 
gaining other participants' approval. By taking the initiative, it can claim to have tried 
to reach a deal and place the onus for non-agreement on other states. (Schear 1993: 425 
and Sheehan 1988: 118) 
S' Van Evera (1999: 2) offers an alternative explanation for states' participation in arms control 
diplomacy by stating that "failed peace ideas - for example, disarmament, pacifism, and large reliance on 
international institutions to resolve conflict - remain popular for lack of better alternatives. " 
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Although the various sectors of state diplomacy occasionally overlap each other in 
substantive and functional terms, the activities within each sector normally center 
around a list of specific issues and the relating objectives with which the relevant state 
officials are concerned. Basically, the issues on diplomatic agendas stem from one of 
two sources: either from a state's domestic or its external environment. Sometimes, 
thus, the objectives formulated by national decision-makers are linked to issues that 
have domestic roots and sometimes they are part of national reactions to issues imposed 
by external actors and circumstances. (Hermann 2001: 53; Legg and Morrison 1991: 64 
and Hill 2003: 20-211,26,44) 
If hoping to realize their arms control objectives through diplomacy, governments 
need to get the individual issues they are occupied with placed on the agendas of one or 
more other states. There are four stages through which an issue has to pass in order to 
become recognized as a question that needs to be internationally - either bilaterally or 
multilaterally - attended to. First, the issue needs to be initiated. In other words, state 
representatives need to articulate a grievance and make it public. Secondly, state 
officials have to translate the grievance into diplomatic demands, after which they are 
faced with the task of gathering support for those demands. With enough support, the 
issue ceases to be a subject of initial public discussion and becomes an item on the 
relevant actors' formal agendas. (Mansbach and Vasquez 1981: 92) 
Powerful states obviously play a key role in determining which arms control issues 
reach the formal agenda stage. While their agenda-setting powers are to some extent 
limited by the fact that individual arms control questions may exhibit various patterns of 
authority and dominance, as well as by the initiatives put forward by inter- and non- 
governmental international organizations, 58 they often have the diplomatic capabilities 
to offset those influences and to push through their own arms control agendas. And 
later, when the issues that have reached formal agendas become subject to detailed 
deliberations, the dominant states' agenda-setting powers transform into decision- 
forcing influence. For one thing, dominant states have the capacity to make substantial 
decisions about arms control by themselves or with one another. For another, they can 
confer legitimacy on most of the arms control decisions and arrangements made by the 
58 Generally speaking, the foreign policies of states are constrained by the following external factors: (a) 
other states' foreign policies; (b) the actions of inter-governmental organizations; (c) transnational 
processes, including the activities of international non-governmental organizations; (d) international law; 
and (f) informal norms (Hill 2003: 174 and Webber and Smith 2002: 64-65). 
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members of the international community. (Hill 2003: 166; Karns and Mingst 1987: 460, 
462 and Mansbach and Vasquez 1981: 92,96) 
Because of the central position dominant states play in international arms control 
diplomacy, the success of lesser powers' arms control initiatives frequently depends on 
the major powers' views on them. If the issues raised by lesser powers are in the interest 
of the major powers as well, there is a good chance that they move to the formal 
agendas of the actors whose positions on those questions are crucial - and vice versa. 
On the other hand, even if uninterested in or unfamiliar with them, lesser powers often 
have to respond to the arms control initiatives made by the major powers. Although 
lesser powers' responses to arms control initiatives depend on the salience of those 
initiatives to their own interests, as well as on their estimation of the influence they can 
wield on particular arms control questions internationally, their reactions to the 
proposals made by the major powers are often necessitated by the need to gain major 
power support for questions that are of importance to themselves. And of course, the 
history of arms control knows plenty of cases where major power pressure has been the 
main, if not the sole, reason for a weaker actor to take part in arms control. (Karns and 
Mingst 1987: 461-462 and Mansbach and Vasquez 1981: 96-98) 
2.4 Arms Control Decision-Making in the Islamic Republic 
After having defined arms control not only as an instrument of Islamic Iran's security 
policy, but also as an element of the Islamic Republic's foreign policy, 59 we need to try 
to answer two further analytical questions. First: what do we mean by the Islamic 
Republic in terms of decision-making? Who are the Iranian political actors that decide 
on the Islamic Republic's security and foreign policies? 60 Secondly: what are the 
characteristics of the decision-making process whereby one view of what is good for the 
Islamic Republic becomes dominant over another? 
59 The term 'foreign policy' can be defined as the sum of official external relations conducted by a state in 
international relations (Hill 2003: 3). Iranian arms control operations thus form a part of the totality of 
Iran's external relations, that is, of the Islamic Republic's foreign policy. Foreign policy analysts argue 
that the individual state actions that make up foreign policy are often held together and guided by some 
kind of a 'meta-principle. ' This principle has been referred to in the literature, among others, as "foreign 
policy orientation" (Holsti 1977: 108-109), "foreign policy line" (Hakovirta 1981: 59 and 2002: 178), 
and "foreign policy tradition" (Hill 2003: 248). 
60 As noted by Hermann (2001: 48), there is within any government a person or a set of persons capable 
of committing the resources of the society and the authority to make decisions that cannot be readily 
reversed. Hermann calls this set of national decision-makers "the authoritative decision unit. " 
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Before delving into the issue of arms control decision-making in Islamic Iran, 
however, it is necessary to point out that many aspects of the phenomenon have been 
shrouded in mystery. As a result of the secrecy that surrounds security and foreign 
policy decision-making in the Islamic Republic, we do not know for sure who has 
actually defined the issues that have been placed on the Iranian arms control agenda or 
formulated the associated national objectives. In the same vain, we do not know for sure 
who has actually planned Iran's responses to those arms control questions that have 
been imposed on the Islamic Republic by external actors and circumstances. 
Furthermore, it is unclear who in Iran has determined the means and the targets of the 
Islamic Republic's arms control operations. And finally, in addition to often not 
knowing what the actual contents of Iranian arms control decisions have been, the 
information about the processes through which arms control decisions in the Islamic 
Republic have been reached remains imperfect. 
Despite these obstacles, however, the existing research literature on Islamic Iran's 
security and foreign policy decision-making helps us to identify the types and the cast 
of actors that have supposedly played the main role in the formulation of Iranian arms 
control operations. The information generated by Iran experts also allows us to 
hypothesize about the features of the arms control decision-making process in the 
Islamic Republic. The first research question related to the decision-making process is 
to determine whether the actors with the authority to make arms control decisions for 
Iran have formed what Hermann et al. (1987: 311-313) call a self-contained decision 
unit or whether they have been susceptible to extra-unit domestic influences. 
2.4.1 Extra-elite influences 
The field of political thinking and activity in modern Iran has revolved around four 
principal traditions or models of politics: the monarchical, the liberal nationalist, the 
religious, and the leftist (Kazemi 1995). Historically, the power constellation between 
these forces has been straightforward. The monarchists have controlled the Iranian state, 
whereas the supporters of the other three models, while in competition with each other, 
have sought to challenge and undermine the monarchists' dominance. 
Yet the modem history of Iran also knows a number of momentous occasions when 
the forces critical of the monarchy have set aside their mutual differences and 
cooperated in opposing the monarchist policies. Of course, the Iranian revolution of 
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1979 was the most dramatic manifestation of such cooperation. United by their struggle 
against Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, Iran's opposition forces succeeded in ousting the 
Pahlavi regime and thereby relegating the monarchical model to the margins of 
contemporary Iranian politics. Soon after the revolution, in the matter of months, 
however, the temporary collaboration between Iran's liberal nationalist, religious, and 
leftist forces itself started to break down. And in the end, it was the religious forces - 
more precisely, the religious forces that subscribed to Ayatollah Khomeini's reading of 
Islam - that won the power struggle that ensued in the newly established Islamic 
Republic. 6 
Ever since their monopolization and institutionalization of political power in post- 
Pahlavi Iran, the representatives of the Khomeinian theocratic state - very much alike 
their monarchist predecessors - have done their utmost to ensure that the competing 
models of Iranian politics will not pose a challenge to their dominant position. In spite 
of the authoritarian nature of Iran's theocratic state, however, it would be inaccurate to 
portray the Islamic Republic's political elite as a homogenous group without internal 
divisions. Because of regime fragmentation, 62 Islamic Iran's security and foreign policy 
decision-makers, just like their counterparts in most other countries, have to play what 
Putnam (1988) calls a two-level game: they have to simultaneously cope with pressures 
and constraints stemming from domestic politics as well as with those of the 
international reality. 63 
In theoretical terms, there are at least four basic kinds of domestic actors who may 
want to try to influence a state's arms control decision-making and whose views and 
interests may collide with those of the country's authoritative decision unit. First of all, 
61 While it is the religious class that currently rules Iran, not all Iranian clerics - in fact, presumably the 
majority of them do not - approve direct clerical participation in politics. Moshaver (2005: 175) refers to 
the politically active Iranian clerics who support the country's existing political system as the "regime 
clergy" in order to differentiate them from the representatives of the clerical class who either oppose the 
current system or refrain from politics. For a discussion of these anti-establishment clerics in today's Iran, 
see Buchta (2000: 88-97). 
62 The concept of regime fragmentation, as defined by Hagan (1987: 344), concerns the degree to which a 
government's central political leadership is fragmented by persisting internal divisions. 
3 As pointed out by Putnam (1988: 434), the two-level game is about national decision-makers' attempt 
to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences 
of foreign developments. Placing states' arms control operations in the context of the two-level game, 
Sheehan (1988: 83) characterizes the situation faced by national decision-makers as follows: "Modern 
international arms control is a process involving two sets of parallel negotiations which are both crucial to 
the outcome of attempts by states to enter into arms control security relationships. On the one hand, there 
are the bilateral or multilateral negotiations between the states themselves [... ]. On the other hand, there 
is the debate and bargaining within states both as to the negotiation strategy and tactics to be employed at 
the international talks and that relating to the domestic wheeling and dealing which is required in order to 
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the authoritative decision unit may be challenged by actors belonging to the leadership 
echelon itself. Ideological differences, power struggles, as well as competing 
institutional and bureaucratic interests may divide a state's leadership into various 
groupings with distinct approaches to arms control. Secondly, the members of the 
legislature and other non-executive branches of government may have their own ideas 
of what their country should do in the area of arms control. Thirdly, politically active 
segments of the society, often representing certain interest group concerns, may be 
actively involved in national arms control debates. Finally, the public opinion can play 
an important role in the arms control choices made by national decision-makers. (Hagan 
1987: 342-343) 
As far as the case of Islamic Iran is concerned, however, the input of the Iranian 
public on the Islamic Republic's arms control decisions has been very limited. 
Generally, the regime's military and security policies have not been the subject of 
public debate, and even when they have been dealt with in public, the discussion has 
been kept within carefully defined boundaries. Moreover, the Iranian leaders' readiness 
to use coercive power to silence their critics has led to self-censorship not only among 
the Iranian public but also among the country's media which operate under close state 
control. 
The regime's control over information and propaganda has also meant that the Iranian 
public has been poorly informed of the Islamic Republic's operations in the area of 
arms control. And even when information has been made public by state officials, it has 
often served the regime's manipulative purposes. Like in many other authoritarian Third 
World countries, the state officials in the Islamic Republic have exploited their 
information monopoly to obtain the general public's legitimation and support for the 
regime and its policies. References to real and imagined foreign threats, appeals to 
nationalism and Islam, and depictions of the country's leadership as possessing special 
wisdom that guarantees Iran's national security, foreign policy interests, and 
international status, have been among the methods exploited by the Iranian regime to 
mobilize the country's general public behind it. 64 (Hagan 1995: 129-130) 
produce a majority behind the eventual agreement. It is not always obvious that the international aspect is 
the more important of the two. " 
64 According to Chubin (2006: 58-59), who bases his observation on Iran's nuclear arms control 
diplomacy, the Iranian officials' tendency to manipulate information and to frame issues according to 
their own interests has also led to official statements and claims characterized by what he calls "an 
alarming degree of ignorance or oversimplification. " 
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Yet, in spite of the general public's marginal role in Iranian arms control decision- 
making, the officials of the Islamic Republic have, over the years, regularly alluded to 
the expectations and demands of the Iranian people as a factor that significantly 
influences the content of Iran's arms control policy. That these deliberately inaccurate 
claims have principally stemmed from the Iranian officials' tactical effort to rationalize 
their government's arms control operations in international contexts is further illustrated 
by the fact that arms control has hardly ever been - except perhaps during the final 
stages of the Iran-Iraq war when Iraq's use of chemical weapons intensified and Iraq 
started to target Iranian cities, especially Tehran, with its surface-to-surface missiles 
(SSM) - high on ordinary Iranians personal agendas under the Islamic Republic. 
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The lack of extra-elite input into Iran's arms control decision-making becomes even 
more evident when one takes into account the fact that the country has not had 
independent non-governmental organizations (NGO) focusing on arms control issues, 66 
as well as the fact that the pressure groups that have been close to the regime, such as 
the numerous revolutionary foundations, rarely have had a stake in arms control 
decision-making - unless arms control-related issues have become tied with 
fundamental security and foreign policy questions, such as the nature of the Islamic 
Republic's relations with the outside world. 
During the period under review in the present study, thus, Iran's arms control 
decision-making has pronouncedly been an intra-elite affair. Irrespective of the "golden 
age" of the presidency of Muhammad Khatami (Amuzegar 2004) - that is, the time 
period of 1997-1999 characterized by an unprecedently open societal debate in Iran -, 
issues related to arms control have essentially been insulated from extra-elite domestic 
pressures. Even the reformist members of the Iranian political elite, who have called for 
more freedoms for the Iranian people and for transparent decision-making procedures, 
have by and large shown little willingness to subject issues concerning national security 
to public scrunity (Roshandel 2002: 57). 
65 Even in democratic societies, where the general public has the possibility to influence national foreign 
and security policy decision-making, the great majority of the people are ignorant about or disinterested 
in international affairs, let alone in the narrow and often technical issue area of arms control (Hill 2003: 
262-264 and Morrow 1991: 246-247). 
66 For an opposite claim, made by two representatives of the Iranian foreign ministry, suggesting that 
Iranian NGO - together with the country's press, universities, and the general public - influence the 
Islamic Republic's arms control decisions, see Zarif and Alborzi (1999: 515). It should be noted, 
however, that the few Iranian NGO dealing with arms control - mainly loose groupings whose members 
consist of veterans of the Iran-Iraq war and of Iranian academics and scientists - echo the government's 
argumentation and are often harnessed to support the Islamic Republic's official diplomacy. For a 
discussion of the role of NGO in Middle Eastern countries in general, see Halliday (2005: 235-236). 
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2.4.2 Regime fragmentation: political factionalism 
Though more or less closed from extra-elite domestic influences, Iran's political elite 
itself has been internally divided and its members have constantly competed against 
each other for political power. The division of the Islamic Republic's ruling class into 
various factions has resulted from conflicting interests within the regime clergy and 
from differing views among the elite about the nature of Iran's Islamic state and the 
content of the country's domestic and foreign policies. The political factions in the 
Islamic Republic have consisted of various alliances, often centered around influential 
clerics, that have joined their hands to form larger blocs. To justify and advance their 
positions in intra-elite power struggles, the factions have based their argumentation on 
four main types of ideological sources: the words and actions of Ayatollah Khomeini, 
the Iranian constitution, Islamic jurisprudence, and the views of other Islamic thinkers 
and activists (Moslem 2002: 4-5,96-99). 67 
The factional rivalries between the members of Iran's ruling class have penetrated all 
areas of state decision-making, also the deliberations on the Islamic Republic's foreign 
and security policies - arms control included. 
68 As a result of regime fragmentation 
caused by factional divisions, which have manifested themselves not only in conflicting 
views about the objectives of Iranian state policies but also in disagreements over how 
those objectives should be pursued, Islamic Iran's activities in the area of foreign and 
security policy have not infrequently lacked clarity and consistency and thereby 
67 For studies demonstrating how the ideological debates that have taken place in the Islamic Republic 
within the ruling Islamic discourse have included a component of ideological pluralism, see, for example, 
Schirazi (1997) who exposes the contradictions between what he calls the Iranian constitution's Islamic 
legalist and non-Islamic secular elements and between its democratic and anti-democratic elements, and 
Brumberg (2001) who shows how the oscillating nature of Ayatollah Khomeini's political thinking, 
together with his desire to accommodate the Iranian clergy's competing visions of the Islamic 
government, paved the way for a fierce factional rivalry over Khomeini's ideological legacy after his 
death in 1989. Together, the studies by Schirazi and Brumberg testify to the fact that competing notions 
over the nature and role of the Iranian state have become an established part of the Islamic Republic's 
ideological and political landscape. Moslem (2002: 2) goes so far as arguing that ever since the death of 
Khomeini, the ideological discord among the Islamic Republic's political elite has become the most 
salient feature of Iranian politics. 
68 As recognized by one Iranian arms control official: "There is no doubt that factionalism influences 
arms control decision-making in our country" (author's interview with an Iranian arms control official 
[A] who wishes to remain unidentified, summer 2002). According to Ehteshami (2004: 183), political 
factionalism affects every aspect of public policy in the Islamic Republic and its impact on foreign policy 
cannot be overemphasized. 
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conveyed contradictory messages both to the domestic audience and to the outside 
world. 69 
Because of the centrality of political factionalism in the Islamic Republic's decision- 
making processes, the identification of the factional blocs, their positions on individual 
issues, and the power configuration between them at any one given time has been an 
integral part of the efforts to analyze and understand Iranian state behaviour under the 
Islamic Republic. Yet the fluidity of the factional boundaries has sometimes made such 
efforts a formidable task. For example, there have been many instances where 
individuals from different political factions have adopted identical positions on one 
issue while fiercely opposed each other in connection with another. 70 The substantive 
fluidity apart, the factional boundaries have been blurred by the Iranian elite members' 
eagerness to use factional alignments as a tool in their struggles over political power. 
Resultantly, tactical reasons, not genuine shifts in attitudes or beliefs, have in many 
cases explained their factional affiliations. 
Yet, at the end of the day, there have been enough similarities or differences - 
whether in terms of ideological positions or political, economic, and other interests - 
between the members of the Iranian elite to divide them into various factions and to 
make the identification of such political blocs possible. The first divisions among the 
regime clergy began to surface in the early 1980s, soon after Ayatollah Khomeini and 
his disciples had managed to consolidate their position as Iran's new ruling class by 
suppressing and eliminating their post-revolutionary domestic rivals. 7' Already in 
September 1983, Ali Khamenei, the Islamic Republic's president at the time, publicly 
admitted that ideological conflicts had become a feature of the political interactions 
taking place within the country's ruling elite (Moslem 2002: 67-68). 
69 A factor further contributing to the phenomenon of mixed signals and messages has been the fact that 
Iranian factions have regularly used foreign policy issues to strengthen their domestic power position 
either by discrediting the foreign policy views of their rivals or by referring to the positive bearings of 
their own foreign policy behaviour on Iran. 
70 Note, for example, Kemp's (2001: ix) observation that "some of the staunchest critics of Iran's 
participation in international arms control regimes have moderate reformist perspectives on domestic 
politics. " 
Among those who had to ultimately acknowledge the dominant position of Khomeini and his followers 
in post-Pahlavi Iran were the members of the Iranian clergy who belonged to a religious society known as 
the Hujjatiyya. The members of the Hujjatiya opposed Khomeini's political thinking, above all, by calling 
for a collective leadership of the religious community and for minor clerical involvement in politics. The 
power struggle between the supporters of Khomeini and the Hujjatiya was, in many ways, a precursor to 
the factional fighting that subsequently became one of the hallmarks of the Islamic Republic's political 
life. For a discussion of the Hujjatiya and its disagreements with Khomeini and his disciples, see 
Menashri (1990: 220-225,268-271) and Ehteshami (1995: 8-9). 
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During the reign of Khomeini, the factional disputes in Iran centered to a large extent 
around economic issues. The so-called Islamic leftists among the Iranian elite called for 
a strict state control over the economy and for egalitarian economic policies that would 
focus on and improve the lot of the poor segments of the Iranian population. The so- 
called Islamic traditionalists or conservatives among the regime clergy, in turn, opposed 
such policies by referring to the sanctity of private property and by arguing that the 
Islamic Republic's economic system should be subjected only to minor regulation 
measures by the government. (Ibid.: 47,104-107 and Buchta 2000: 11-12) 
The views of the Islamic leftists and conservatives differed in regard to other issue 
areas as well. As far as social and cultural issues were concerned, the conservatives 
were in support of strict enforcement of the Islamic law in the socio-cultural sphere, 
whereas the leftits called for a more tolerant approach. These respective positions 
reflected the Iranian factions' broader views about the role of Islamic law in the Iranian 
society. In the conservative thinking, the Koran and the words and deeds of Prophet 
Muhammad provided a sufficient legal basis for the Islamic jurists to govern the 
religious community. The conservatives' traditional reading of the Islamic law 
contradicted with the Islamic leftists' dynamic interpretation calling for Islamic 
jurisprudence that takes into account the changing needs of the society and, therefore, 
goes beyond the traditional sources of Islamic law. (Moslem 2002: 47-50 and Behrooz 
1991: 598) 
In the course of the Islamic Republic's first decade, issues related to foreign policy 
largely escaped the factional fighting that was creating divisions among the regime 
clergy. This was the case especially during the period of 1981-1984 when the overtly 
ideological foreign policy pursued by the Islamic Republic was being broadly supported 
by the members of the Iranian elite. Factional fighting in the area of foreign policy was 
further dampened by the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988 which united the ranks of Iran's 
ruling class and dominated the country's foreign policy agenda. (Behrooz 1990: 20-23 
and 1991: 597-598) 
In the end, however, the war experience itself came to contribute to the fact that 
foreign policy became one of the key issues that has divided the regime clergy ever 
since. For one thing, the needs and vicissitudes of war necessitated pragmatic policies 
that strengthened the hand of those within the Iranian elite who had doubts over the 
advantages of a foreign policy line monopolized by ideological considerations. For 
another, and more importantly, the war revealed to Iran's leaders that the survival of the 
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Islamic regime could depend on their willingness to distance themselves from a 
confrontational, ideology-driven approach to foreign affairs. 
The first signs of intra-elite tensions over the degree of ideological militancy in the 
Islamic Republic's foreign policy came to light in the mid-1980s as the Iranian 
leadership sought to respond to war-time setbacks on military and diplomatic fronts by 
moderating its foreign policy. 72 By the end of the decade, disputes over the country's 
foreign policy had become a fixture of intra-elite deliberations and led to the 
reconfiguration of the Islamic Republic's factional map. 
From the viewpoint of the Islamic leftists, the shift towards pragmatism and the 
increased emphasis on Iran's national interest73 in the Islamic Republic's foreign policy 
constituted a blow to the ideals of the revolution. As supporters of an ideological, 
uncompromising foreign policy orientation, the Islamic leftists had opposed the Iranian 
government's decision, announced on 18 July 1988, to accept the UN Security Council 
resolution 598 that established a cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war. Believing that the 
Islamic Republic could and should have continued the war against Iraq, the Islamic 
leftists' post-war argumentation focused on restating their case for a foreign policy line 
that would confront the great powers, particularly the United States, and their 
imperialistic policies, seek to export the Iranian revolution by any means beyond the 
country's borders, and support the victims of what they saw as the great powers' 
hegemonistic policies in the Islamic world and elsewhere. (Behrooz 1991: 610; 
Ehteshami 1995: 8,23 and Moslem 2002: 61,124) 
The representatives of the regime clergy's conservative faction shared a number of 
the Islamic leftists' foreign policy stances. Like their leftist counterparts, for example, 
the conservatives were highly critical of the great powers, and especially the United 
States, were determined to prevent the encroachment of Western influences - whether 
political, economic, or cultural - into Iran, and believed that the Iranians should defend 
and help their brethren in the Islamic world. In addition, some members of the 
conservative faction remained committed to the idea of the export of the revolution. 
(Buchta 2000: 14 and Menashri 2001: 60) 
72 For statements made by Iran's leaders in 1984 to justify a more pragmatic foreign policy course, see 
Behrooz (1990: 23) and Ramazani (1990a: 60). 
73 It is worth noting here that Iran analysts too seldomly point to the fact that official definitions of Iran's 
national interest have always included elements that have been peculiar to the interests of the ruling 
Iranian regime at a given point of time. In the Iranian context, thus, the interests of the regime have hardly 
ever been fully identical with those of the nation, which, following Haas (1986: 726), can be defined as a 
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Still, in the main, the conservative members of the Iranian elite took a cautious 
approach to foreign affairs and preferred pragmatism over foreign policy adventurism. 
Having supported and contributed to the pragmatic shift in the Islamic Republic's 
foreign policy during the war years, the conservatives spoke for the continuation of the 
pragmatic course in the post-war era. Well aware of the national imperative of post-war 
reconstruction, the conservatives recognized that their country had to improve its 
relations with the outside world and allow at least limited foreign economic 
participation in its reconstruction efforts. The safeguarding of the revolution's 
achievements, together with the consolidation of the Islamic regime's domestic 
position, took priority in the conservatives' foreign policy thinking. (Moslem 2002: 108, 
110-111 and Buchta 2000: 12) 
Advocating a pragmatic approach to foreign affairs, Iran's conservatives lent their 
support to the post-war foreign policy efforts of Ali Akbar Hashimi Rafsanjani - who 
was elected president in July 1989 and was in charge of the execution of the 
reconstruction policies - and his allies. Already during the 1980s the conservatives and 
those within the Iranian elite who adhered to Rafsanjani's political views had jointly 
spoken for foreign policy pragmatism and ultimately pushed through the changes in 
Iran's war-time orientation. 74 (Moslem 2002: 48,93) 
By the end of the 1980s, Rafsanjani and his allies had formed an independent 
political faction and came to be known as the moderates or pragmatists of the Iranian 
elite. As the president of the Islamic Republic and the leader of the pragmatists, 
Rafsanjani sought not only to reconstruct the war-torn country but also to strengthen the 
Islamic regime's legitimacy by transforming Iran into a socially and economically 
modern state. In order to realize these goals, he and his pragmatist supporters advocated 
a foreign policy course that would distance itself from ideological objectives and focus 
on Iran's national interests. This policy of expediency, the pragmatists argued, required 
a conciliatory foreign policy approach that would seek to improve Iran's relations with 
the outside world, including governments whom the Islamic Republic had confronted in 
the past. The pragmatists also pointed out that the reintegration of their country into the 
"socially mobilized body of individuals, believing themselves to be united by some set of characteristics 
that differentiate them (in their own minds) from outsiders, striving to create or maintain their own state. " 
74 As far as questions related to domestic affairs were concerned, however, the views of Rafsanjani and 
his allies had often been closer to those of the Islamic leftists than to those of the conservatives. For 
example, Rafsanjani and his allies had objected to the conservatives' calls for strict implementation of 
Islamic law in the socio-cultural sphere and backed many of the Islamic leftists' initiatives that had 
emphasized the state's central role in economic activities. (Behrooz 1991: 607 and Moslem 2002: 48) 
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international community would entail an acceptance of foreign involvement and 
investment in the development and modernization of the Iranian economy. (Buchta 
2000: 16-17; Menashri 2001: 57 and Ehteshami 1995: 138-139,145) 
The election of the Islamic leftist Muhammad Khatami as the Islamic Republic's fifth 
president in May 1997 brought about yet another major change in the factional 
constellation within the Iranian elite. While the earlier division between the Islamic 
leftists, pragmatists, and conservatives continued to capture the fundamental nature of 
the political disagreements within Iran's ruling class, the alignment of the Islamic 
leftists and pragmatists behind the new political movement represented by president 
Khatami gave birth to a new factional coalition known as the reformists. 75 The 
reformists, broadly supported by various segments of the Iranian population, 76 
competed with the regime clergy's conservative faction which itself began to show 
signs of dividing into two sub-factions: the so-called pragmatic conservatives and the 
so-called ideological conservatives (Chubin 2006: 32). 77 
The starting point for the Khatami-led reformists' political argumentation was the 
recognition of the Iranian people's mounting frustration at Iran's poor economic 
situation and at the lack of political and socio-cultural freedoms in the country. In order 
to save the revolution, Khatami and his supporters maintained, the Islamic Republic had 
to review its policies and pursue reforms in all areas of societal life. As far as Iran's 
political system was concerned, the reformists called for political pluralism within the 
Islamic framework, questioned the central role Iran's supreme leader played in the 
75 By the time of Khatami's election as the Iranian president, the Iranian elite's pragmatists were 
generally called the 'modern right' faction. This designation, referring to the pragmatists' approach to 
socio-cultural and economic issues, was used to separate them from the conservatives, comprising what 
now became known as the 'traditional right. ' The changes that occurred in the Iranian society and 
intellectual life in the post-war period, together with the Islamic leftists' political marginalization during 
the Rafsanjani years, and the developments that took place in the international system in the post-Cold 
War era, all fed into the process of major ideological transformation that Iran's Islamic leftists underwent 
during the first half of the 1990s. In spite of the Islamic leftists' disapproval of many of the Rafsanjani 
administration's policies, the dramatic moderation of their political opinions and their dislike of the 
traditional right made them an ally of the modern right whose positions on socio-cultural, economic, and, 
to a lesser degree, foreign policy issues, in turn, had drawn increasing criticism from conservative circles. 
For the changes in Iran's factional landscape in the post-Khomeini period and for the developments 
explaining those changes, see Ansari (2000) and Moslem (2002). 
76 Muhammad Khatami's backers in the 1997 presidential elections included a diverse range of groups 
formed by students, women, pro-democracy activists, human rights advocates, private entrepreneurs, as 
well as people from the poor strata of the Iranian society (Amuzegar 2004). The Iranian people's strong 
support for president Khatami and the reformist movement illustrated, as noted by Chubin (2002: 90), that 
the division between the Islamic Republic's reformists and conservatives was not merely a factional 
configuration but also a reflection of a popular divide within the Iranian society. 
7' Pollack and Takeyh (2005) speak of the conservative bloc as consisting of "conservative realists" and 
"conservative ideologues, " whereas Moslem (2002) treats the latter as an independent, "neo- 
fundamentalist" faction. 
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Islamic Republic's power configuration, and emphasized the importance of popular 
participation in domestic politics. Similarly, the reformists called for more freedoms for 
the people in the socio-cultural sphere and stressed that political reforms, accompanied 
by the rule of law, were a prerequisite for Iran's economic development. 78 
Like his predecessor, president Khatami made a close connection between the Islamic 
Republic's foreign policy and its economic objectives, and argued that only a non- 
confrontational foreign policy course stripped of hostile revolutionary aspirations could 
further Iran's economic interests. In contrary to Rafsanjani, however, Khatami believed 
that Iran's reintegration into the international community would not succeed unless the 
Islamic Republic focused on dealing with the mistrust and misunderstandings that 
continued to overshadow its relations with the outside world. Khatami's concept of 
"dialogue among civilizations" was the crystallization of this premise and a catchword 
for the Khatami administration's foreign policy which aimed to develop good relations 
with all countries, including the United States, and to convince the world of the Islamic 
Republic's peaceful intentions and respect for international norms. (Ehteshami 2002: 
302; Ansari 2000: 116-117 and 130-133 Menashri 2001: 82-83) 
To Iranian conservatives, the reformist agenda posed a direct challenge to their vested 
interests and ideological premises. In the first place, the reformists' calls for tolerance 
and pluralism in the domestic political arena threatened the conservatives' hold on key 
state institutions and conflicted with their conception of the Iranian political system. By 
the same token, the conservatives objected to the reformist goal of socio-cultural 
liberalization by maintaining that increased freedoms would subject the Iranian society 
to Western cultural influences and thereby undermine its Islamic values. The ideological 
conservatives, in particular, were worried about what they regarded as the erosion of 
revolutionary zeal and growing immorality in Iran. (Gasiorowski 2000) 
The conservative opposition to the reformist agenda comprised economic issues as 
well. Iran's pragmatic conservatives saw the reformist plans to develop an industrialized 
national economy based on economic diversification, decentralization, and pluralism as 
a danger not only to their own economic interests but also to those of their political 
supporters, among others, in the country's revolutionary foundations and within the 
78 The priority attached by Khatami and his supporters on political reform thus marked a departure from 
what Ansari (2000: 58) describes as the Rafsanjani administration's effort to "demobilize politics and 
society following the war, and to rationalize them in the service of economic reform. " For detailed 
discussions of the reformists' views on socio-cultural, political, and economic issues, see Ansari (2000) 
and Moslem (2002). 
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bazaari class. The ideological conservatives, on the other hand, objected to the 
reformists' economic programs on the grounds that they ignored the core ideals of the 
revolution - such as austerity and economic justice - and would only widen the gap 
between rich and poor Iranians. (Ansari 2000: 116,168-175 and Moslem 2002: 104- 
107,134-137) 
In the area of foreign policy, the conservative criticism of the reformists centered 
around the argument that the reformist emphasis on pragmatism and national interest 
went too far. Whereas the pragmatic conservatives referred to Iran's role as the defender 
of Islamic values and the world's Muslims, alluded to the perceived threats posed by the 
West, and criticized the reformists' readiness to negotiate and establish diplomatic 
relations with the United States, the ideological conservatives regarded the reformists' 
foreign policy approach as an outright renouncement of the revolution's international 
objectives. According to the ideological conservatives, the self-designated vanguard of 
the Iranian revolution, the Islamic Republic should return to a dogmatic foreign policy 
orientation that would promote its revolutionary message, actively resist the policies of 
the United States and other Western powers, and confront Israel as well as morally 
corrupt Arab regimes. (Menashri 2001: 71,83-84,177 and Pollack and Takeyh 2005) 
2.4.3 Regime fragmentation: bureaucratic pressures 
Without still having tried to actually identify them, our discussion of the Islamic 
Republic's foreign and security policy decision-makers so far has produced two general 
conclusions. First, it has been argued that extra-elite domestic actors have played an 
insignificant role in Iranian arms control decision-making. Secondly, it has been pointed 
out that the unity and coherence of Iran's decision-making elite itself has been 
persistently undermined by political factionalism. 
In order to understand the domestic political pressures under which arms control 
decision-making in Islamic Iran takes place, however, the discussion of the divisions 
among the Islamic Republic's regime clergy have to be complemented with an 
examination of the bureaucratic demands that affect Iranian arms control decisions. 
While simultaneously both victims and indirect participants of the Iranian elite's 
factional competition, the Islamic Republic's bureaucratic operatives have interests that 
are specific to the organizations and agencies they represent and which they seek to 
promote in connection with policy debates on foreign and security affairs. 
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In most cases, the interests of the individual parts of national bureaucracies are 
related to their capacity to fulfill their operational mandates. In other words, government 
agencies seek to advance their own views in order to make sure that a policy problem 
and the decisions regarding it will not limit their ability to perform their organizational 
tasks. Government agencies' positions on individual issues - whether dealing with the 
content, the objectives, or the means of policy, or with all of them - may also stem from 
their effort to increase their influence and prestige within the national bureaucracy. In 
such instances, the personal self-interest of individuals belonging to the bureaucratic 
elite may play an additional role. Finally, government agencies may try to influence 
national decision-makers because they genuinely believe, as expert organizations 
responsible for specific aspects of state affairs, that their view of what is best for the 
country is important and perhaps even the best one available. (Destler 1991: 183,188- 
189 and Hill 2003: 85) 
Due to the nature of arms control as a multi-faceted issue area, there are usually a 
number of government agencies that are involved in the formulation and execution of 
national responses to arms control questions. 79 Given that each of these agencies has the 
tendency to approach such questions from the perspective of their own duties and 
expertise, a conflict of bureaucratic positions on individual issues often takes place. 
This has also been the case in Iran. The country's foreign and defence ministries, for 
example, have held differing views on whether the Islamic Republic should join 
international arms control instruments such as the Chemical Weapons Convention or the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (Partrick 2002: 4). Similarly, the diplomatic 
arm wrestling, since 2002, between Iran and the international community over the 
Islamic Republic's nuclear program has revealed divisions within the Iranian 
bureaucracy. 80 
The diversity of bureaucratic opinion about the content, objectives, and means of 
national arms control operations has meant that bureaucratic politics, bargaining 
79 Normally, national responses to arms control problems do not consist of a single decision, but are 
composed of a string of decisions that involve different parts of the national bureaucracy (Hermann 2001: 
54). 
80 Hasan Ruhani, the Islamic Republic's chief nuclear negotiator between 2003-2005, for example, has 
recollected how, in 2003, the AEOI and the Iranian foreign ministry made conflicting conclusions about 
the seriousness of the diplomatic dispute over Iran's nuclear program. Whereas the former argued that the 
matter could be quickly settled within the IAEA, the latter held a far more pessimistic view and issued a 
strong warning that Iran might not be able to solve the problem that easily. (Ruhani 2005: 3-4) 
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between government agencies on arms control-related issues, 8' has been an intrinsic 
component of arms control decision-making in the Islamic Republic. The main players 
in Iran's arms control-related bureaucratic politics have been the country's foreign 
ministry, defence ministry, armed forces, and the AEOI. As for the foreign ministry, 
Iran's principal diplomatic actor, it has had a vested interest in supporting Iranian 
participation in international arms control talks and arrangements. The shift from 
dogmatism towards increased pragmatism in the Islamic Republic's foreign policy, and 
the concomitant extension of Iran's diplomatic contacts, has strengthened the foreign 
ministry's status in the national bureaucracy and emphasized its role as an agency that is 
uniquely positioned to evaluate the positive and negative implications of Iran's arms 
control operations for its diplomatic relations. 
In a similar manner, the Iranian military authorities' opinions about arms control have 
reflected specific institutional interests. Like their counterparts in most other countries, 
the representatives of the Islamic Republic's military establishment have had strong 
reservations about arms control. 82 In the first place, they have feared that arms control 
weakens their ability to perform their duties. Whereas Iran's regular military has been 
worried about the effects of arms control on national security planning, the assessments 
of arms control by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), the revolutionary 
arm of the Islamic Republic's armed forces, have also included considerations related to 
regime security. 83 
The fear for personnel cutbacks in military organizations and defence industries has 
traditionally been another central concern that has explained skepticism towards arms 
control among those who look after the interests of national military establishments. In 
the Iranian context, it seems clear that the Islamic Republic's defence ministry has tried 
81 Destler (1991: 182) defines bureaucratic politics as "the process by which people inside government 
bargain with one another on complex public policy questions. " 
82 As noted by one Iranian arms control official: "Yes, it is true that our defence forces are not 
enthusiastic about arms control. But this is the case in other countries as well" (author's interview with an 
Iranian arms control official [C] who wishes to remain unidentified, summer 2002). 
83 For a comparison of the Iranian regular military's and the IRGC's respective agendas and roles in the 
context of a set of foreign and defence policy questions, see Byman et al. (2001: 53-97). For a 
comprehensive discussion of the IRGC, which sees itself as the prime defender of the Iranian revolution 
and the country's Islamic regime, see Katzman (1993). There are very few instances where the Iranian 
military leaders' explicit reservations about arms control have come to public attention. The most oft- 
cited example of a leaked statement in recent times has been that of Yahya Rahim-Safavi, the commander 
of the IRGC, who, in April 1998, in a closed-door speech to IRGC officers, reportedly posed the 
following rhetorical questions to his colleagues: "Can we withstand America's threats and domineering 
attitude with a policy of detente? Can we foil dangers coming from America through dialogue of 
civilizations? Will we be able to protect the Islamic Republic from international Zionism by signing 
conventions banning the proliferation of chemical and nuclear weapons? " (cited in Farhi 2001: 35-36). 
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to see to it that Iran's arms control operations do not adversely affect the domestic 
production of conventional weapons, the management of which belongs to the 
ministry's responsibilities. In the same way, it is very likely that the IRCG - which 
oversees the Islamic Republic's missile manufacturing projects as well as, it is widely 
believed, Iran's chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs - has made major 
efforts to ensure that its weapons production activities will not be disturbed by national 
arms control commitments. In addition, and as is often the case within military 
establishments, Iran's armed forces probably view arms control as a threat to their 
prestige in the society and to their internal morale (Sheehan 1988: 94). 
Considerations regarding institutional strength and status have driven the bureaucratic 
behaviour of the AEOI, too, albeit in a limited area of arms control. In addition to 
having sought to defend its role as a central player in the area of nuclear diplomacy, 84 
the AEOI has tried to ensure that the Islamic Republic's arms control decisions do not 
obstruct the execution of Iran's nuclear program. Since 2002, in the course of the 
diplomatic crisis over the Iranian nuclear program, for example, the AEOI has been 
critical of diplomatic initiatives that have envisioned limitations to the roll-out of Iran's 
nuclear plans. AEOI representatives have justified their opposition by referring to the 
financial and time-related costs of such limitations and by pointing out that the slowing 
down or the suspension of Iran's nuclear efforts would have negative implications for 
both the retention and employment of scientific personnel and for the AEOI staff's self- 
esteem (Chubin 2006: 37,40-41). 
Aside from the foreign ministry, the Islamic Republic's military establishment, and 
the AEOI, there have been a number of other government agencies whose 
representatives have taken part in Iranian arms control deliberations, and, thanks to their 
expertise, also acted as members of Iran's diplomatic delegations at international arms 
control meetings. The officials of the Islamic Republic's intelligence ministry, for 
example, have regularly warned Iranian decision-makers of the possibility that foreign 
powers try to use international arms control agreements' verification clauses as a cover 
84 The AEOI has - until the intensification of the crisis over Iran's nuclear program in 2003 at least - 
possessed a great deal of political and technical autonomy in its dealings with the IAEA, both in Vienna, 
where the IAEA headquarters are located, and in connection with IAEA inspections inside Iran. 
Therefore, and naturally also because of its position as the national expert organization in nuclear matters, 
the AEOI has played a central bureaucratic role in the overall planning of the Islamic Republic's 
operations in the area of nuclear arms control. (Ruhani 2005: 3-4 and Balouji 2005: 90) 
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for espionage activities. 85 Intelligence concerns have also characterized the arms control 
argumentation of the representatives of Iran's chemical, pharmaceutical, and 
biotechnology industries. Yet more than worrying about commercial secrets and 
confidential data, the industry representatives seem to have supported the Islamic 
Republic's participation in international arms control agreements, for such participation 
has been viewed as an avenue to gaining access, through treaty clauses that call for 
inter-state cooperation, to latest technological and scientific innovations. As the 
subsequent chapters of this study will demonstrate, corresponding considerations 
pertaining to technological and scientific information have led Iranian health and 
agriculture authorities to support Islamic Iran's participation in international arms 
control arrangements. 
2.4.4 The locus of decision-making power 
Foreign and security policy decision-making in Islamic Iran has often been depicted 
as a complex and even chaotic process that involves a large number of competing actors 
and where decisions are frequently reached informally, outside the formal structures of 
government. 86 Despite the important role that informal networks and non-governmental 
actors play in Iranian decision-making, however, it is still the Islamic Republic's 
official leaders, those members of Iran's political elite who occupy key positions in the 
country's formal power structure, that constitute the central site of actorness when it 
comes to foreign and security policy decision-making. 
This conclusion is supported, first of all, by the fact that the leaders of the Islamic 
Republic have been major players in the informal Iranian networks that have tried to 
influence the country's official policies on the basis of their economic, ideological, and 
social power. 87 Accordingly, state authorities have not merely functioned as channels 
for extra-governmental influence, but also held major leverage over the informal actors 
themselves. Key Iranian officials' centrality in the Islamic Republic's power 
configuration is further highlighted by the eagerness with which influential Iranian 
85 Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), established in 1984, employs some 30,000 people 
and is perhaps the largest intelligence service in the Middle East. For a discussion of the MOIS and the 
Islamic Republic's other intelligence agencies, see Buchta (2000: 164-170). 
86 See, for example, the discussion in Buchta (2000: 6-10); Byman et al. (2001: xii, 21-23) and Samii 
(2006: 64-66). 
87 Note here, for example, that the Islamic Republic's supreme leader is the instance to whom Iran's 
highly powerful revolutionary foundations are answerable. 
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personalities have tried to secure positions in the country's formal decision-making 
system. 88 While in some cases the efforts to obtain official positions have been 
motivated by attempts to institutionalize and legitimize informal power, in the majority 
of cases such striving has been based on the recognition that only a formal insider 
position in the political system can translate into actual decision-making influence, 
especially in such limited areas of state policy as arms control. 
All this means that control over official state institutions, whose tasks and powers are 
outlined in Iran's constitution of 1979, has constituted the main route for influence for 
the Iranian forces - whether political factions, bureaucratic actors, or extra- 
governmental interest groups - hoping to be part of formulating the Islamic Republic's 
foreign and security policies. 89 That the struggle over decision-making influence has 
primarily taken place within the official institutional framework also means that even 
though the involvement of informal actors in foreign and security policy decision- 
making prevents outside observers from fully understanding the mechanisms of the 
Iranian decision-making system, an analysis focusing on top government functionaries 
nevertheless enables us, first, to single out the individuals who have crucially influenced 
the Islamic Republic's arms control decisions during the various stages of the Islamic 
Republic's history, and, secondly, to identify the main characteristics of the Iranian 
decision-making process in the area arms control. 
2.4.4.1 Key decision-makers: the Khomeini years (1979-1989) 
In the aftermath of Iran's 1979 revolution, arms control played a two-fold role on the 
new Iranian regime's political agenda. On the one hand, arms control was among the 
Iranian leaders' immediate priorities. Domestically, the most urgent task was to get hold 
of the weaponry that had found its way into the hands of the Iranian population during 
88 The political aspirations of Ali Akbar Hashimi Rafsanjani, Iran's president from 1989 to 1997, have 
been a case in point. After his two-term presidency, Rafsanjani continued to chair the Islamic Republic's 
Expediency Council, and in 2000 he ran, unsuccessfully, for a seat in the Iranian parliament. In 2005, 
Rafsanjani was defeated by Mahmud Ahmadinizhad in the second round of the Iranian presidential 
election. Yet a year later, in December 2006, Rafsanjani managed to obtain a seat, and the chairmanship, 
of the Islamic Republic's Assembly of Experts, a council of popularly elected clerics that appoints Iran's 
supreme leader. Theoretically at least, the Assembly of Experts also has the power to remove the reigning 
supreme leader from his post should he be found unable to carry out his responsibilities. 
89 It should be noted that the Iranian state organs' competition over the boundaries of authority and the 
Iranian elite members' personal rivalries often get mixed into the overall political battle over institutional 
power. 
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the political turmoil leading to the revolution. 90 In the realm of foreign policy, one of 
the first major steps taken by the new Iranian government, as later discussed in chapter 
three, was to cancel the Shah's orders of sophisticated conventional weapons from 
Western suppliers. 
On the other hand, however, as a distinct area of diplomatic activity, arms control fell 
more or less into oblivion. Given that post-revolutionary Iran's powerholders were fully 
occupied with domestic issues and with questions concerning the broad contours of the 
Islamic Republic's foreign policy, the conduct of Iranian arms control diplomacy and 
supposedly also the decisions on the details of Iran's arms control operations were 
largely left to the bureaucrats of the foreign ministry, a group now including recruits of 
the old and the new Iranian regime. 91 Still, the Iranian arms control officials' freedom of 
diplomatic manoeuvre was strictly limited in the sense that their actions had to be 
consistent with the revolution's ideological dogma which consisted of Islamic, anti- 
Shah, and Third Worldist elements. Only when the revolutionary ideology was of no 
help, did the Iranian officials rely on the other principal - intellectual and practical - 
guidelines: on the stances Iran had adopted during the Pahlavi years and on like-minded 
governments' arms control operations. 
Yet following the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war and the successful monopolization of 
political power in post-Pahlavi Iran by Ayatollah Khomeini and his supporters, the 
transition period in Iran's arms control policy started to come to an end. The Islamic 
Republic's arms control operations began to take their distinctive form and transformed 
from a reactive type of state activity into proactive diplomacy. This period also saw the 
formation of decision-making structures that stayed in place for the Islamic Republic's 
first decade. Put differently, the members of Islamic Iran's political elite who played a 
crucial role in the country's arms control decisions, together with the institutional locus 
of such decisions, started to become identifiable. 
By far the most important decision-maker in the Islamic Republic during its first 
decade was Ayatollah Khomeini. Khomeini's power based, above all, on his status as 
the leader and architect of the Iranian revolution and on his charismatic religious 
90 Following the establishment of the provisional Iranian government on 5 February 1979, Ayatollah 
Khomeini and Mihdi Bazargan, the head of the provisional government, repeatedly appealed to the 
Iranian people to return such arms to the government (Menashri 1990: 78). 
91 Cottam (1990: 9-10) describes the situation as follows: "In the domain of foreign policy strategy, as 
elsewhere, the lack of central direction was apparent. Individual ambassadors and other officials felt free 
on many occasions to act in the name of Iran and often could generate some institutional support for their 
endeavors. " 
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authority. His unrivaled position in Iran was also formally cemented, for as the holder 
of the highest political office in post-revolutionary Iran's political system, itself built on 
Khomeini's theory of Islamic government, 92 he had, and reserved for himself, the last 
word on all important decisions dealing with both domestic and foreign affairs. 93 
While intimately involved in setting the general guidelines for the Islamic Republic's 
foreign and security policies, it is not clear to what extent Khomeini participated in the 
formulation of the steps Iran took in the area of arms control under his rule. 94 What 
seems clear, however, is that major effort was made to ensure that the Islamic 
Republic's arms control operations were consistent with the supreme leader's foreign 
and security policy preferences. 95 When not directly expressed by Khomeini himself, 
the wishes of the supreme leader were relayed to state functionaries by Khomeini's 
private office and by his personal representatives placed in all government agencies, 
including the Islamic Republic's armed forces. The staff of Khomeini's office and the 
supreme leader's representatives also observed that those wishes were actually 
followed. 96 
To perform the tasks of communication and control on his behalf, Khomeini also had 
two representatives, a political and a military figure, in the Supreme Defence Council 
(SDC), the body responsible for the planning and formulation of Iran's military and 
defence policies. It was supposedly the SDC - which directed Iran's war efforts and 
hence acted as the country's "super-cabinet" during the Iran-Iraq conflict (Chubin and 
Tripp 1988: 249)97 - where the critical decisions on the Islamic's Republic's arms 
control operations were also made. In addition to Khomeini's representatives, the SDC 
92 For a discussion of Khomeini's theory of Islamic goverment, which rests on the notion of the rule of 
the jurisprudent or vilayat-ifaqih, see Brumberg (2001: 80-97). 
93 Article 110 of the Iranian constitution of 1979 granted Khomeini, the Islamic Republic's supreme 
leader, the formal power to decide on Iran's general policies and to supervise their execution. 
94 Iran observers' conclusions about Khomeini's focus on the details of Iranian state policies are 
conflicting. Schirazi (1997: 68,83), for example, suggests that Khomeini was closely involved in tactical 
decision-making as well, whereas Katzman (1993: 131) is among those taking the opposite view. 
95 As noted by Schirazi (1997: 62): "There were [... ] cases in which it appeared that Khomeini was not 
the initiator of a particular decision taken by those close to him but only subsequently gave his approval. 
Most of the time, however, these were actions for which Khomeini had long since provided the 
inspiration and concerning which his wishes were perfectly clear to the actual initiators. " 
% Due to their direct link to Khomeini himself, the supreme leader's personal representatives often 
inspired government officials with outright fear (Schirazi 1997: 73). Even after the Khomeini era, the 
personal representatives of the supreme leader have retained their status as highly influential operatives in 
the Iranian political scene. According to Buchta (2000: 48), they are "more powerful than ministers and 
other government functionaries, and they have the authority to intervene in any matter of state. " 
97 The SDC maintained a large secretariat whose staff members were posted to operational area and field 
headquarters of the Iranian armed forces to monitor the senior field commanders' military and political 
loyalty to the civilian leadership. These representatives of the SDC even had the power to overrule some 
of the field commanders' decisions. (Schahgaldian 1987: 30,147) 
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was composed of the following Iranian authorities: the president, the prime minister, the 
minister of defence, the chief of the joint staff of the armed forces, and the commander 
of the IRGC (Schirazi 1997: 13). 98 
Ali Akbar Hashimi Rafsanjani, the speaker of the Iranian parliament and Khomeini's 
political representative in the SDC, is often mentioned as the council's most influential 
member and, as such, as the number two foreign and security policy decision-maker in 
Khomeini's Iran. Rafsanjani played a key role in the planning and execution of the 
Islamic Republic's war policies and even occupied, during the final weeks of the Iran- 
Iraq war, the post of acting commander-in-chief of the Iranian armed forces. 99 In 
addition to his participation in the running of the war, Rafsanjani wielded major 
influence on decisions that concerned other issues with significant foreign and security 
policy ramifications, such as Iran's nuclear program. (Menashri 1990: 382; Ehteshami 
1995: 168-169 and Etemad 1987: 215-216) 
Apart from the supreme leader and Rafsanjani, the core of the Islamic Republic's 
foreign and security policy leadership under Khomeini presumably consisted of Ali 
Khamenei, Iran's president, and Mir-Husain Musavi, the country's prime minister. As 
the acting commander-in-chief of the Iranian armed forces and as the chairman of the 
SDC, president Khamenei exerted major influence on decisions dealing with foreign 
and security affairs. However, Khamenei's relative power was undermined by the 
Islamic Republic's constitution which divided the country's executive branch between 
the president and the prime minister. Resultantly, prime minister Musavi, who was 
engaged in a fierce political battle with Khamenei over the boundaries of executive 
authority, was able to feed his views into the Islamic Republic's foreign and security 
policy decision-making. 100 Ultimately, however, Khamenei emerged as a more powerful 
foreign and security policy operative in Khomeini's Iran. '°' (Ehteshami 1995: 168; 
Buchta 2000: 22 and Menashri 1990: 263-264,305,345) 
98 Apart from the SDC's core members, whose membership in the council was prescribed by the Iranian 
constitution, other high-ranking representatives of the Iranian government - including the interior and 
foreign ministers as well the minister of the IRGC - and the Islamic Republic's armed forces also 
attended the meetings of the SDC on a more or less regular basis (ibid.: 28-29). 
99 According to Iran's 1979 constitution, the supreme leader acts as the commander-in-chief of all Iranian 
armed forces. During the Iran-Iraq war, however, Khomeini delegated this position to the holder of the 
Iranian presidency and later to Rafsanjani. 
'°° The power struggle between Khamenei and Musavi is said to have benefited Rafsanjani, himself in 
competition with Khamenei, because it strengthened the image of Rafsanjani as being above political 
quarrelling and unassociated with the policy failures of the executive branch (Menashri 1990: 352). 
'' For example, three key ministers of the Musavi cabinet - oil, interior, and foreign affairs - were loyal 
to Khamenei and did not cooperate with the prime minister. Musavi is reported to have complained to 
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2.4.4.2 Key decision-makers: the Rafsanjani presidency (1989-1997) 
The end of the Iran-Iraq war in the summer of 1988 and the death of Ayatollah 
Khomeini a year later posed a dual challenge for the Islamic Republic's decision- 
making system. On the one hand, Iran's political elite had to streamline its decision- 
making procedures in order to increase the post-war reconstruction policies' prospect 
for success. On the other hand, the elite was faced with the fundamental dilemma of 
how to secure social stability and leadership continuity in the wake of the death of their 
charismatic leader. One of the end results of the elite responses to these challenges was 
the elevation of Ali Akbar Hashimi Rafsanjani and Ali Khamenei, already key players 
in Khomeini's Iran, to the very core of political power in the Islamic Republic. '02 
Elected as Iran's president in July 1989, Rafsanjani became the symbol of the 
country's post-war reconstruction efforts. Iran's economic rehabilitation and 
modernization in mind, Rafsanjani advocated a diplomatic course that sought to end the 
Islamic Republic's international isolation and to improve Iran's relations with the 
outside world. Rafsanjani's task was facilitated by the changes made in Iran's 
constitution in 1989 which abolished the office of prime minister from the political 
scene and made the president the sole holder of executive authority. Relying on his 
constitutional powers and on the informal power base he had created during the war 
years, Rafsanjani became a key decision-maker in post-Khomeini Iran. 
Of course, Rafsanjani had to share his power with Ali Khamenei, Khomeini's 
successor as Iran's supreme leader. While the position of the supreme leader remained 
the most important office in the Iranian political system, Khamenei's modest religious 
credentials posed a problem to his and to the whole regime's credibility. '03 As a 
Khomeini that decisions on foreign policy had been made without his knowledge. (Ibid.: 345,351 and 
Behrooz 1990: 28) 
102 The quick rise of Rafsanjani and Khamenei to top leadership positions in Iran in the course of the 
1980s was significantly expedited by the fates of their senior elite comrades. In particular, the deaths by 
assassination of Ayatollah Bihishti in June 1981 and president Muhammad Ali Rajai and prime minister 
Muhammad Javad Bahunar in August 1981, as well as the political downfall of Ayatollah Muntaziri, who 
had already been nominated as Khomeini's successor, improved Rafsanjani's and Khamenei's political 
fortunes. For a discussion of Muntaziri's nomination as the supreme leader-designate, see Menashri 
(1990: 347-350), and for an analysis of the reasons leading to Muntaziri's subsequent downfall, see 
Behrooz (1991: 609-610). Although one of the most influential members of the Iranian political elite 
during the Islamic Republic's first decade, Muntaziri seems not to have played a central role in foreign 
and security policy decision-making. 
103 Given that none of Khomeini's closest political confidants had possessed the religious credentials 
required from a person filling the post of the supreme leader, as speficied in the 1979 constitution, Iran's 
political elite amended the constitution in 1989 to the effect that future holders of the office of the 
supreme leader would no longer need to necessarily be leading authorities in religion. What now counted 
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consequence, Khamenei -a cleric who held only a mid-level theological rank and who, 
following his appointment as the supreme leader, expediently started to be addressed by 
the high-ranking title of ayatollah104 by Iran's political establishment - spent his first 
years as the new leader trying to strengthen his personal and religious authority. 105 This 
gave Rafsanjani more room for political action, even if the effective constellation of 
dual leadership in place in the aftermath of Khomeini's death fuelled the power 
competition between the two leading members of the Iranian political elite and their 
respective allies. 
By the time of the start of Rafsanjani's second term as president in 1993, the power 
struggle between him and Ayatollah Khamenei had shifted to the latter's advantage. In 
spite of the setbacks Khamenei had experienced in boosting his religious credentials and 
authority, he had nonetheless consolidated his political power and emerged as Iran's 
dominant decision-maker. Yet, at the same time, the relationship between Rafsanjani 
and Khamenei was coloured not only by competition and disagreements but also by 
continued cooperation in many areas of state policy, foreign and security affairs 
included. Both leaders recognized that the interests of the country and those of the 
Islamic regime necessitated cooperation between the two of them. (Buchta 2000: 25; 
Menashri 2001: 63-64 and Ehteshami and Hinnebusch 1997: 26) 
Some analysts characterize the collaboration between Khamenei and Rafsanjani as 
having been based on a more or less fixed division of labor between the two leaders. 
Such characterizations usually put the president at the helm of foreign affairs and the 
supreme leader, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, in charge of military 
matters. 106 While providing a rough picture of the two leaders' priorities in the sphere of 
foreign and security policy, however, this perspective most likely undervalues 
Rafsanjani's influence in defence-related matters and, conversely, Khamenei's role in 
most was the leader candidate's social and political achievements. Hence, the official Iranian 
justifications of the selection of Khamenei as Khomeini's successor focused above all on his political 
services to the Islamic Republic. 
104 For a discussion of the various titles and the theological hierarchy of the Iranian clergy, see Buchta 
(2000: 54). 
105 For a discussion of these efforts of Khamenei, see Gieling (1997) and Menashri (2001: 13-32). 
106 See, for example, Chubin and Tripp (1996: 50) who speak of Rafsanjani's control of the government 
and of Khamenei's control over the religious and revolutionary domain. Menashri (2001: 63-64), in turn, 
points to an informal division of labor in which Rafsanjani led Iran's economic and diplomatic pursuits 
and the supreme leader the country's cultural policies and relations with Islamist movements around the 
world. In yet another analysis, which treats the economic interests of Iran's elite as the driving force of 
Iranian state policies, Ansari (2006: 273) refers to a division of labor where the political forces led by 
Rafsanjani (in Ansari's conceptualization, the mercantile bourgeoisie) "provided the money" and those 
headed by Khamenei (the Islamic authoritarians) "the religious justification. " 
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steering Islamic Iran's diplomatic course. 107 If correct, this conclusion suggests that 
Rafsanjani and Khamenei were both intimately involved in the major national decisions 
made on arms control -a domain of state activity located at the crossroads of foreign 
and security policy - between 1989-1997, during the Rafsanjani presidency. 108 By the 
same token, the conclusion about the top Iranian leaders' dual participation in foreign 
and security policy decision-making implies that the offices of the president and the 
supreme leader and their respective staff members played a central role in devising and 
directing Iran's arms control operations. 
Often, however, it is the Islamic Republic's Supreme National Security Council that 
is said to have acted as the main venue for the formulation of guidelines for Iran's arms 
control policy. '09 The SNSC was created as a result of the constitutional amendments of 
1989 and it was charged with three sets of responsibilities explicitly spelled out in 
article 176 of the amended constitution: (a) determining the defence and national 
security policies of Iran within the framework of the general policies laid down by the 
supreme leader; (b) coordinating political, intelligence, social, cultural, and economic 
activities in relation to general defence and security policies; and (c) exploiting the 
Islamic Republic's material and non-material resources for facing internal and external 
threats. ' 10 
Accordingly, the SNSC has functioned as a key forum for the high-ranking members 
of Iran's foreign and security policy establishment to air their views on topical issues 
and to influence the content of national policies. As such, then, the SNSC has played an 
important unifying role in getting the relevant Iranian players behind individual 
decisions and in promoting the sense of solidarity within the Islamic Republic's 
political elite. Under the amended Iranian constitution, the SNSC, which is headed by 
Iran's president, is composed of the following Iranian authorities: (a) the heads of the 
107 Note, for example, Chubin's (2002: 78-79) later reference to Rafsanjani as the Iranian official with the 
most to say about WMD and issues related to military strategy, as someone easily displacing "Khamenei 
and others in the number and depth of his statements on these issues. " On the other hand, note Schirazi's 
(1997: 79) observation of Khamenei's insistence on determining Iranian foreign policies. 
108 Cf. Menashri's (2001: 64) general conclusion about Rafsanjani's and Khamenei's collaboration in 
decision-making: "It appears that these two leading revolutionary figures often discussed critical, and 
perhaps less critical, issues before making decisions. " 
09 The Iranian officials interviewed for this study, for example, pointed, without exception, to the central 
role of the SNSC in Iran's arms control decision-making. 
110 In the light of the emphasis laid on security issues by Iran's leadership, it follows from the SNSC's 
mandate, as pointed out by Schirazi (1997: 97), that, in theory, the council can define almost any event or 
issue as security relevant. In this sense, the SNSC may - much in the same fashion as its predecessor, the 
SDC, did during the Iran-Iraq war period - function as a supergovernment ignoring the Iranian state 
institutions' formal division of authority as defined in the country's constitution. 
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executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government; (b) the head of the joint 
chiefs of staff of the Iranian armed forces; (c) the head of the country's Plan and Budget 
Organization; (d) two representatives nominated by the supreme leader; (e) the 
ministers of the interior, intelligence, and foreign affairs; (f) the individual minister 
holding authority over the question being dealt with in the council; and, finally, (g) the 
highest ranking officers of the regular military and the IRGC. 
The SNSC makes its decisions through balloting, and the issues discussed in the 
council are normally brought before it either by the president or the supreme leader 
(Nourbakhsh 2005: 3). The decisions of the SNSC themselves become effective only 
after they have been accepted by the supreme leader. After such confirmation, the 
decisions taken by the SNSC will be forwarded to relevant bureaucratic agencies for 
implementation. These same agencies, including those dealing with arms control 
matters, serve the SNSC also by preparing issues for discussion and decision-making in 
the council. "' The SNSC's own secretariat and the council's sub-committees, which are 
specifically referred to in the amended constitution and which are presided over by the 
president or a SNSC member appointed by the president, significantly contribute to the 
preparatory process as well. 
Although the SNSC has become an integral part of the Islamic Republic's foreign and 
security policy machinery, it seems that during the Rafsanjani presidency, the dual 
leadership of Rafsanjani and Khamenei, the council acted more as a forum for intra-elite 
debate than as an actual locus of arms control decision-making. This assumption is 
supported by the fact that as the head of the SNSC, and above all, as a powerful holder 
of executive authority in the Islamic Republic, Rafsanjani exerted major personal 
influence on the council's activities. "2 On the other hand, Ayatollah Khamenei, without 
whose ratifications the decisions of the SNSC would have had little relevance in the 
first place, used his personal representatives in the council not only as source of 
information about the council's activities but also as a channel to communicate his 
views to the members of the SNSC. Seen from this angle, then, the SNSC gave its seal 
to decisions on the Islamic Republic's arms control operations rather than actually made 
them. 
111 Author's interview with an Iranian arms control official (D) who wishes to remain unidentified, 
summer 2002. 
112 According to Ehteshami and Hinnebusch (1997: 33), the SNSC was effectively controlled by the 
president and his staff. 
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2.4.4.3 Key decision-makers: the Khatami presidency (1997-2003) 
The election of Muhammad Khatami as the Iranian president in May 1997 introduced 
a new element into the Islamic Republic's decision-making scene. Khatami, a relatively 
unknown member of the Islamic Republic's political elite, enjoyed broad support 
among the Iranian people and was able to use this support and his newly-won 
presidential powers to promote a political agenda that envisioned major reforms in the 
Iranian society. Presenting himself as an alternative to the regime elite's old guard, 
president Khatami became a national decision-maker to be reckoned with. 
Though distancing himself from many of the policies of his predecessor, Khatami 
shared ex-president Rafsanjani's goal of improving the Islamic Republic's international 
image and relations by the means of constructive diplomacy. And like Rafsanjani, the 
new Iranian president viewed arms control as playing an important role in this general 
diplomatic effort. The major improvent in Iran's relations with its Arab neighbours 
forming the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), perhaps the Khatami administration's 
most significant foreign policy achievement, for example, included an arms control 
element. 
As far as arms control decision-making was concerned, the Khatami government's 
emphasis on open discussion and transparency made Iranian elite debates more public 
than ever before. It is no accident that the unprecedented openness by which elite 
deliberations on issues such as Iran's participation in the CWC, the Indian-Pakistani 
nuclear weapon tests of 1998, or the diplomatic crisis over the Islamic Republic's own 
nuclear program were conducted coincided with the Khatami presidency. 113 
And still, in the end, Khatami's actual influence on Iran's arms control policy 
remained limited, mostly pertaining to the management of the Islamic Republic's 
standard diplomatic operations and to the implementation of strategic decisions made 
elsewhere. The way in which the Islamic Republic handeled the diplomatic crisis over 
Iran's nuclear program during Khatami's presidency was the most evident manifestation 
of the powerlessness of the president, and the state institutions which he held authority 
113 In his assessment of Khatami's impact on Iran's foreign and security policies, Chubin (2002: 34) notes 
that Khatami also managed to create a political atmosphere where Iranian security debates became less 
alarmist and less obsessed with military aspects of security. 
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over, to play a central role in decision-making that dealt with the strategic direction of 
Iran's arms control operations. ' 14 
In fact, the nuclear case is illustrative of the general evolution of Khatami's political 
standing in Iran during his presidential term. After the early successes of the Khatami 
presidency, coloured by popular optimism and Iranian reformists' political 
determination, the reformist agenda and its proponents became a target of conservative 
Iranian forces' political, and in some cases physical, counterattack that effectively 
thwarted Khatami's attempts at reform. "5 The conservative response was led, or at least 
approved, by the Islamic Republic's supreme leader who wanted to ensure that the 
reformist trend in Iranian politics would not pose a threat to Iranian conservatives', and 
to his personal, power and political objectives. "6 
Hence, it was Ayatollah Khamenei that remained the ultimate decision-maker in 
Islamic Iran under the Khatami presidency. 117 Relying on the staff of the supreme 
leader's private office as well as on his personal representatives posted to all important 
state institutions, including those dealing with arms control matters, Khamenei 
exercised control over the various power centers in Iran and informed them of his views 
114 That president Khatami and his government were sidelined from the core decision-making processes 
related to the nuclear issue has been openly admitted by the members of the president's administration 
(Takeyh and Gvosdev 2004: 34). Although Khatami himself was closely involved in hastening the pace 
of Iran's nuclear projects after his election as president (Samii 2006: 79), Nourbakhsh (2005: 7) argues 
that the president was most probably kept uninformed about certain aspects of the nuclear program. 
Whether this could have been possible or not, it seems clear that most members of the Islamic Republic's 
bureaucratic elite have been unknowledgeable about the actual content of the Iranian nuclear program. A 
high-ranking Iranian arms control official interviewed for this study, for example, admitted in 2002, just 
before the international uproar over Iran's nuclear efforts erupted, that his country might be trying to 
build a nuclear bomb under the cover of a peaceful nuclear program and active arms control diplomacy 
(author's interview with an Iranian arms control official [C] who wishes to remain unidentified, summer 
2002). This statement is in direct contradiction with Farhi's (2004: 34) research which "could not find a 
single person, among the hardliners, reformists or even opposition leaders, who thought that Iran was 
Pursuing a nuclear weapons program. " 
15 Already in 2000, three years after the start of his presidency, Khatami himself publicly admitted to 
being unable to realize his political goals by declaring that he does "not have sufficient powers to 
implement the [Iranian] constitution" (cited in Amuzegar 2004). Two years later, in October 2002, he 
resignedly stated the following: "As the president I may not agree with many issues, but I can only act 
within the framework of the law and my powers, and do not have the right to interfere in other branches 
of government" (BBC Monitoring Middle East, 30 October 2002). 
116 Apart from the Iranian conservatives' resistance to the changes called for by Khatami and his allies, 
the Khatami-led reformist movement's failure resulted from Khatami's weak leadership and from the 
reformists' unwillingness to make full use of their popular support to push through their political 
programs. For a comprehensive discussion of the successes of the Khatami presidency, the conservative 
counterattack against the Islamic Republic's reformists, and the reformists' own political mistakes, see 
Ansari (2006). 
1" Khatami himself pointed to Khamenei's supremacy by noting that in the Islamic Republic, "the 
general direction of policies is determined by the leader, and all state organs are obliged to move in line 
with these policies" (BBC Monitoring Middle East, 30 October 2002). 
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on domestic issues and foreign affairs. ' 18 As the commander-in-chief of the Islamic 
Republic's armed forces, Ayatollah Khamenei continued to hold authority over the 
composition of those forces and Iran's military policies. And although president 
Khatami managed to leave a mark in Iranian diplomacy, no major foreign policy 
decision in the country was made without the supreme leader's direct or indirect 
participation. ' 19 
Whereas Ayatollah Khamenei managed, during the Khatami presidency, to fortify his 
position as Iran's decision-maker par excellence, the same period saw the decline of the 
political fortunes of Ali Akbar Hashimi Rafsanjani, the ex-president. Without the formal 
powers stemming from the office of the presidency, Rafsanjani was not able to exert the 
same influence on state matters as before. Nevertheless, as one of the Iranian regime's 
key figures and as somebody extremely well versed in the details of the Islamic 
Republic's foreign and security policies, he supposedly managed to retain a central role 
in the decision-making processes related to these areas of state activity. 
That Rafsanjani remained at the center of Iran's decision-making scene resulted not 
only from the broad informal influence he continued to exert in Iran - whether through 
his personal prestige, financial holdings, or his extensive network that reached all 
important power circles in the Iranian society -, but also from the fact that Ayatollah 
Khamenei secured the ex-president a pivotal formal position in Iran's political system. 
By expanding the composition of the Islamic Republic's so-called Expediency Council 
(EC) and extending Rafsanjani's chairmanship of that organ some two months before 
the May 1997 presidential election, the supreme leader ensured that the former president 
would also have an official institutional platform for his interventions in national 
decision-making. 120 (Menashri 2001: 92; Samii 2006: 76-77 and Nourbakhsh 2005: 5) 
118 At the time of Muhammad Khatami's first presidential term, some 600 people were estimated to be 
working directly within the supreme leader's private office or in the branches feeding into it. The total 
number of the supreme leader's personal representatives - including both those operating inside Iran and 
outside the country, for example, in Iranian cultural centers - was put at some 2,000. It should be noted 
that the status of the supreme leader's personal representatives has never been legally defined in the 
Iranian constitution. Khamenei simply inherited the representative system from Ayatollah Khomeini. 
(Buchta 2000: 46-49 and Schirazi 1997: 74) 
119 For example, it was the supreme leader and not the president, the chairman of the SNSC, who wielded 
actual control over that body (Menashri 2001: 65). 
120 Rafsanjani had presided over the EC already during his own presidency. As the head of the executive 
branch, thus, he had simultaneously presided over the institution capable of vetoing the decisions of the 
legislative branch. At the time of Rafsanjani's presidency, the council had selected its own chairman. In 
March 1997, it was Khamenei who confirmed that Rafsanjani would maintain his position as the head of 
the EC. (Nourbakhsh 2005: 4) 
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The EC had been established by Ayatollah Khomeini in early 1988 as a response to 
the persistent struggle over law-making authority between Iran's parliament and the so- 
called Guardian Council (GC), a body that possesses the right to veto the laws passed 
by the parliament if it considers them incompatible with Islamic law or the Iranian 
constitution. In order to break constant impasses that had resulted from the inability of 
the Majlis and the GC to agree on national legislation, Khomeini had declared that if the 
interest of the Islamic state so requires, the state has the right to disregard Islamic 
ordinances in legislation. Thus in Khomeini's opinion, the maintenance of the Islamic 
state or rule was the most important religious ordinance and, as such, the guiding 
principle of legislation. Soon after publicizing his view, Khomeini had formed the EC 
and charged it with the task of resolving legislative deadlocks between the Majlis and 
the GC by authoratively assessing the interest of the state in individual conflict 
situations. 121 (Schirazi 1997: 64 and Behrooz 1991: 604) 
Beside the function as the ultimate arbiter of disputes arising between the two Iranian 
legislative bodies, the EC, whose formal institutional status was anchored in articles 110 
and 112 of the Iranian constitution in 1989, has the responsibility to advise Iran's 
supreme leader in matters that pertain to the delineation of the country's general 
policies, as well as to consider any issue forwarded to it by the supreme leader. It was 
this advisory component of the EC's responsibilities that Ayatollah Khamenei had 
primarily in mind when he expanded the composition of the EC in March 1997 and 
hence increased the council's relevance in Iran's political scene. 122 While up to that time 
Khamenei had practically ignored the EC when making decisions on the general 
policies of the Islamic Republic, 123 now the supreme leader saw the council as a useful 
tool in controlling the political ambitions of Rafsanjani's presidential successor. 
(Menashri 2001: 92; Buchta 2000: 61 and Nourbakhsh 2005: 4-5) 
As the head of the expanded EC, Rafsanjani did not hesitate to use the council to 
bolster his personal influence and to obstruct the policies of the Khatami administration 
in the legislative and executive fields. Rafsanjani - who, together with his political 
121 In solving such cases, the EC, which makes its decisions by a majority vote, has the freedom to take 
one of three possible steps: either to agree with the position of the Majlis or with that of the GC, or to 
adopt a wholly independent position in a matter (Behrooz 1991: 605 and Schirazi 1997: 95). 
122 The EC, whose members are appointed by the supreme leader, came to include 25 permanent 
members, all well-known representatives of the Iranian elite. Politically, the line-up of the expanded EC 
corresponded with Ayatollah Khamenei's conservative preferences, a factor that subsequently made the 
council a conservative bastion against the Iranian reformists. (Menashri 2001: 93 and Nourbakhsh 2005: 
5) 
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proteges, had broken the pragmatist faction's alliance with the reformists in late 1998 
and aligned with the pragmatist wing of the conservative faction - sought to involve the 
EC in all major policy debates and ultimately managed to turn the council into an actor 
that often exercised considerable influence in national decision-making. 124 (Buchta 
2000: 63,150; Ehteshami 2004: 182 and Nourbakhsh 2005: 5) 
2.4.4.4 The bureaucratic elite 
The discussion of Islamic Iran's key decision-makers so far has suggested that 
although the inner workings of the country's decision-making system remain in many 
respects unknown to outside observers, it is still possible to identify the members of the 
Iranian elite who supposedly have had the biggest influence on the Islamic Republic's 
arms control policy. Below the central decision-makers identified above, however, there 
is another group of Iranian authorities who have closely participated in the country's 
arms control operations. These second-tier members of the Iranian elite, referred to here 
as the representatives of the Islamic Republic's bureaucratic elite, have sought to 
influence national arms control decision-making in order to promote the interests of the 
state agencies they have been linked to. 125 
In their efforts to leave a mark in the Islamic Republic's arms control decisions, the 
members of Iran's bureaucratic elite have exploited their position as operatives who 
have control over unique information and whose expertise is crucial for the formulation 
and execution of national arms control operations. The channels through which the 
bureaucratic elite has sought to influence Iranian arms control decisions have been both 
formal and informal. But even if informal avenues - such as familial, religious, or 
educational contacts - have played an important part in the Iranian bureaucracy's 
123 According to Nourbakhsh (2005: 5), many Iranians were not even aware of the EC before Rafsanjani's 
chairmanship of the council during Khatami's presidency. 
124 One symbolic illustration of Rafsanjani's continued role as a key Iranian decision-maker was the fact 
that as the chairman of the EC, he kept on meeting every high-ranking foreign dignitary visiting Iran 
(Nourbakhsh 2005: 5). 
125 It is important to note that, between Islamic Iran's key foreign and security policy decision-makers and 
the country's bureaucratic elite, there lies a group of highly powerful regime representatives whose 
influence in the Iranian society has levelled with that of the core Iranian decision-makers and certainly 
outranked that of Iran's bureaucratic elite. Yet, it is extremely difficult to say what actual role these 
regime figures - including the above-mentioned Ayatollah Muntaziri and other influential individuals 
such as Ayatollahs Ardibili, Mishkini, Yazdi, Jannati, or Vaiz-Tabasi - have played in the Islamic 
Republic's foreign and security policy decisions during the 1979-2003 period. The general hypothesis put 
forward here is that the role played by these 'grey area' actors has been indirect and not central from the 
perspective of the present study. 
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foreign and security policy networking (Byman et al. 2001: 25-28), it is nonetheless the 
formal state institutions that seem to have been the main target of the bureaucratic 
elite's arms control lobbying. 
As the Islamic Republic's main diplomatic actor, Iran's foreign ministry has been 
intimately involved in the country's arms control operations. Consequently, the holder 
of the post of foreign minister has been one of the key bureaucratic players in Iran's 
arms control decision-making. This was the case especially with Ali Akbar Vilayati 
who served as the Islamic Republic's foreign minister from 1981 to 1997. Vilayati, who 
was appointed to his post at the wish of Ayatollah Khomeini in December 1981, played 
an important part not only in developing and executing Iran's arms control operations, 
but also in changing the course of the Islamic Republic's foreign policy from an 
ideologically positioned orientation towards an increasingly pragmatic one. Vilayati's 
close ties to Ali Akbar Hashimi Rafsanjani and particularly to Ayatollah Khamenei 
significantly contributed to his successes as a bureaucratic actor. (Schirazi 1997: 72; 
Behrooz 1990: 23 and Ehteshami and Hinnebusch 1997: 35) 
Yet, it was his close association with Khamenei and the Iranian elite's conservative 
forces that also brought Vilayati's tenure as foreign minister to an end. As a result of 
Vilayati's conservative outlook and his explicit support for Ali Akbar Natiq-Nuri, the 
conservative candidate, in the 1997 presidential election, Muhammad Khatami replaced 
the long-time foreign minister with Kamal Kharrazi, Iran's then envoy to the UN. 
Despite his impeccable credentials as a member of Iran's political elite and as an 
experienced foreign policy operative, however, Kharrazi's influence in Iranian politics 
never reached that of his predecessor. Although an important executor of Khatami's 
foreign policy agenda, Kharrazi had to ultimately recognize that his political stature 
decreased along with the growing political impotence of the reformist president. 
Naturally, Iran's armed forces have also been keen on presenting and promoting their 
views on arms control. Thanks to its role as the defender of the Iranian revolution and 
the country's Islamic regime, the IRGC has had an easy access to the highest echelons 
of political power in Iran. 126 Muhsin Rizai, the commander of the IRGC from 1981 to 
126 Between 1982-1989, the IRGC even had its own ministry that helped the revolutionary guards in 
logistical matters, arms procurement, and in the running of administrative - such as financial, legal, and 
personnel - tasks. Although the leaders of the IRGC considered the ministry a valuable channel to 
influence Iran's political decision-makers, they simultaneously viewed the ministry as a tool of the 
civilian leadership to control the affairs of the IRGC. Accordingly, the IRGC commanders did not seem 
especially disappointed at the political leadership's decision in 1989 to abolish the IRGC ministry. It was 
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1997, has been the most influential military official in the Islamic Republic and, hence, 
presumably the most important military player in Iran's arms control decision- 
making. '27 Another military official who has most probably exerted major influence on 
the Islamic Republic's arms control decisions is Ali Shamkhani. 128 Before becoming 
Iran's defence minister in 1997, Shamkhani had acted, among others, as Rizai's deputy 
and as the commander of the IRGC's ground and naval forces. As for Iran's regular 
military, it has had much less influence on the Islamic Republic's arms control decision- 
making than the IRGC. But as the Iranian leadership's trust in the political loyalty of the 
regular military has increased over the years, the regular military has managed to 
strengthen its relative position in the Islamic Republic's foreign and security policy 
deliberations (Byman et al. 2001: xii). 
Apart from the Iranian foreign ministry and armed forces, the bureaucratic players 
who have wanted to have a say in the Islamic Republic's arms control decision-making 
have mainly come from the AEOI and Iran's ministry of intelligence. Riza Amrullahi, 
the long-time head of the AEOI, and his successor Ghulamriza Aghazadih have been the 
two key advocates of the Iranian nuclear establishment's interests in national arms 
control debates. Amrullahi played a central role in presenting and implementing post- 
revolutionary Iran's nuclear policies at the IAEA during the Islamic Republic's first two 
decades, whereas Aghazadih, former oil minister who was appointed to his post by 
president Khatami in 1997, took over the AEOI at a time when Iran was not only 
accelerating its nuclear efforts but also becoming a source of increasing concern for the 
international arms control community. 
The chiefs of the Islamic Republic's intelligence ministry, too, have actively 
participated in Iranian security deliberations. Given that the intelligence ministry is 
charged with the task of defending the regime against internal and external subversion, 
combined that year with the regular military's defence ministry into a Ministry of Defence and Armed 
Forces Logistics. (Katzman 1993: 101-103) 
127 Ayatollah Khamenei dismissed Rizai from his position as the IRGC commander in September 1997 
after strong pressure from president Khatami who had been highly critical of Rizai's interference in 
politics and his open conservative sympathies. Some analysts suggest that Khatami's disapproval of Rizai 
offered the supreme leader a good opportunity to replace the long-time IRGC commander with a less 
powerful and politically ambitious personality. Rizai was succeeded by Yahya Rahim-Safavi, another 
central IRGC figure, who shared his predecessor's hardline views and sought to influence the content of 
Iranian arms control decisions during the Khatami presidency. (Buchta 2000: 124-125 and Nourbakhsh 
2005: 10-11) 
128 According to Chubin (2006: 39), for example, Shamkhani was among the small group of Iranian 
decision-makers - alongside with Ayatollah Khamenei, Ali Akbar Hashimi Rafsanjani, Muhammad 
Khatami, and Hasan Ruhani, the secretary of the SNSC - that made the strategic decisions with regard to 
the handling of the diplomatic crisis over the Islamic Republic's nuclear program. 
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the Iranian elite has attached great value to what the ministry has had to say about arms 
control-related matters. Ali Yunisi, who served as the intelligence minister of president 
Khatami's cabinet since 1999, for example, was one of the key ministerial-level 
operatives taking part in the planning of Iran's dealings with the IAEA during the 
diplomatic crisis over the Islamic Republic's nuclear program. Similarly, Ali Fallahian, 
Yunisi's long-time predecessor, as well as Muhammad Muhammadi-Rayshahri, post- 
revolutionary Iran's first intelligence minister, in particular, have been influential 
players in the country's political scene. 129 
During the Islamic Republic's first decade, the members of Iran's bureaucratic elite 
sought to promote their interests, first of all, by presenting their views to Ayatollah 
Khomeini, to his key advisers in the office of the supreme leader, and to Khomeini's 
personal representatives placed in various state bodies. Given Khomeini's practically 
unlimited powers in post-revolutionary Iran, his approval of a bureaucratic viewpoint 
contributed not only to a bureaucratic agency's ability to influence policy but also to its 
status in the intra-governmental power constellation. The SDC was another key channel 
through which bureaucratic actors were able to present and promote their views on 
foreign and security policy matters. And of course, the executive branch discussions and 
decision-makers were the basic targets of bureaucratic lobbying. 
During the post-Khomeini era, the formal avenues available to the bureaucratic elite 
to influence debate on foreign and security affairs remained essentially the same - even 
if the relative importance of the various centers of decision-making power, as discussed 
earlier, varied to some extent throughout the 1989-2003 period. The emergence of the 
SNSC and the Rafsanjani-led EC as arenas for foreign and security policy deliberations 
constituted the most visible new element in the Islamic Republic's decision-making 
system. Especially the SNSC became an important venue for the Iranian elite to 
exchange views on issues such as arms control. That Hasan Ruhani, the long-time 
secretary of the SNSC and Ayatollah Khamenei's political representative in the council, 
rose to become one of Islamic Iran's most influential foreign and security policy 
operatives testifies to the SNSC's central position in the Iranian decision-making 
structure. Another sign of the council's centrality is the fact that it was the SNSC, and 
129 Akhavi (1987: 183), for example, names Rayshahri as one of the most important members of Iran's 
political elite during the Islamic Republic's first decade. Other regime dignitaries mentioned in Akhavi's 
nine-member list include Ayatollahs Khomeini and Muntaziri, Ali Akbar Hashimi Rafsanjani, Ali 
Khamenei, and Mir-Husain Musavi. In a more recent assessment, Buchta (2000: 9) lists Rayshahri, a 
member of the EC, among the nine most influential members of the Islamic Republic's political elite. 
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not the Islamic Republic's foreign ministry, that was authorized by the supreme leader, 
in 2003, to lead Iran's diplomatic activities in the crisis over its nuclear program. ' 30 
Often, as a result of their position in Iran's political elite, high-ranking 
representatives of the Islamic Republic's bureaucratic establishment have been 
nominated to serve in the very same state bodies which have possessed decision-making 
power in arms control matters and acted as targets of bureaucratic lobbying. 131 A good 
example of a former member of the bureaucratic elite himself becoming a target of such 
lobbying is Ali Akbar Vilayati, who, following his dismissal as foreign minister, was 
appointed as Ayatollah Khamenei's advisor for foreign affairs. 132 This role as a key 
functionary of the supreme leader's office not only offered Vilayati an opportunity to 
directly influence Ayatollah Khamenei's foreign policy thinking but also put him in at 
the center of Iranian foreign policy-making. 133 Vilayati, who also functioned a member 
of the EC, is said to have played an influential role in the activities of the EC by heading 
the council's committee for political and security affairs (Buchta 2000: 63-64). 134 
As far as the Iranian bureaucratic agencies' relative influence on the Islamic 
Republic's arms control decisions is concerned, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to 
exactly say what role each Iranian agency has played in the handling of the individual 
arms control issues discussed in the present study. Generally speaking, however, it 
would seem that the Iranian armed forces and the IRGC, in particular, has been the most 
influential bureaucratic actor in the Islamic Republic's arms control deliberations. Due 
130 The SNSC secretary Ruhani, who was named Iran's chief negotiator in the nuclear issue, was 
reportedly involved in making decisions on both the strategic and the tactical aspects of the country's 
response to the nuclear crisis. Ruhani, who was also a representative of the EC, is said to have been one 
of the few members of the Iranian political elite closely associated with decisions on core foreign and 
security policy questions in post-Khomeini Iran. (Chubin 2006: 38-39 and 2002: 38 and Nourbakhsh 
2005: 3,7) 
131 More seldomly, some members of the bureaucratic establishment have occupied a dual role in the 
sense that they have held an interest group position and simultaneously been members of a state organ 
with decision-making powers. Note, for example, the membership of Ghulamriza Aghazadih, the head of 
the AEOI, in the EC or the role of Hasan Firuzabadi, the head of the joint chiefs of staff of the Iranian 
armed forces, as Ayatollah Khamenei's special advisor on military affairs and as a member of the EC 
(Buchta 2000: 47,62). 
132 According to Buchta (2000: 47), the supreme leader's office employs altogether ten special advisers 
focusing on different areas of state policy. 
133 As the supreme leader's advisor, Vilayati took part, for example, in formulating Iran's diplomatic 
course in the crisis over its nuclear program. Both in this task and more generally, Vilayati did not 
hesitate to undermine the position and authority of Kamal Kharrazi, president Khatami's foreign minister. 
(Chubin 2006: 39: Ehteshami 2002: 293 and Nourbakhsh 2005: 2) 
13' The history of the Islamic Republic knows plenty of other cases where a bureaucratic actor has turned 
into an operative representing a body with decision-making powers. Muhsin Rizai, for example, was 
appointed as the secretary of the EC soon after he had lost his commander position in the IRCG. Even 
after his dismissal, Rizai presumably remained one of the most influential security policy players in Iran. 
(Buchta 2000: 71 and Chubin 2002: 38) 
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to the priority the Iranian regime gives to security issues, the leaders of the Islamic 
Republic have supposedly listened more to the IRGC's arms control views than to those 
of other bureuacratic agencies. The IRGC's influence in the bureaucratic bargaining 
process has stemmed not only from its expertise and links to the Islamic Republic's top 
leadership, but also from its status as the ultimate defender of the revolution as well as 
from its institutional power. Due to the power the IRGC holds in the Iranian society, 
Iran's key decision-makers have been forced to listen to the IRGC commanders' views 
merely to keep them satisfied with national policies. 
At the same time, however, the IRGC has presumably never been able to dictate the 
content, objectives, or means of the Islamic Republic's arms control operations. Like 
other bureaucratic actors, it has had to sell its views to Iran's key decision-makers and 
to try to convince the political leadership of the superiority of its approaches to 
individual arms control questions. This task has supposedly been easier when arms 
control issues have become topical at times of crisis or when they have touched the 
Islamic Republic's core security interests. The farther the issues on Iran's arms control 
agenda have been from crisis situations and from the Islamic Republic's vital interests, 
thus, the greater the role of other bureaucratic players in Iranian arms control decision- 
making has been. Similarly, it can be assumed that the increased pragmatism in the 
Islamic Republic's foreign policy has reduced the IRGC's relative influence in the 
country's arms control-related bureaucratic bargaining. 
The phenomenon of bureaucratic politics is often considered an obstacle to optimal, 
rational state decision-making. 135 In other words, the process of bureaucratic 
competition and bargaining is seen as leading to compromise decisions that are 
reflective of bureaucratic balances of power at any one given time rather than geared to 
maximize national interest. When it comes to the case of Islamic Iran, however, it is not 
clear whether the negative view of bureaucratic politics is warranted. The existence of 
multiple state institutions that constantly test the boundaries of their authority and the 
division of the Islamic Republic's elite into various political factions mean that 
bureaucratic influences on Iranian arms control decision-making need not necessarily be 
only negative. On the contrary, they may very well inject an element of dispassion, 
competence, and continuity to Iran's otherwise turbulent decision-making system and 
hence improve the quality of the country's arms control decisions. 
135 For a discussion of three theoretical models of foreign policy decision-making - the rational actor, the 
political, and the psychological model -, see Webber and Smith (2002: 51-62). 
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2.4.5 The consensus principle 
As discussed above, the fragmentation of the Iranian regime along factional lines and 
the Iranian bureaucratic agencies' institutional interests have created a situation where 
various competing elite actors have constantly sought to leave a mark in the Islamic 
Republic's foreign and security policy decisions. Although the ultimate decision- 
making power in Iran's foreign and security affairs has been in the hands of a small 
group of powerful regime representatives, these individuals have often taken the 
multiple elite voices into account in their decisions. Consensus-building has thus been a 
distinctive feature of the Iranian decision-making process. 136 
Iranian leaders' readiness to compromise and to take part in political horse-trading in 
order to secure the Iranian political elite's more or less explicit support for their 
decisions has stemmed from two main considerations. First, consensus has been seen as 
a way of ensuring that intra-elite disagreements do not paralyze the management of the 
Islamic Republic's foreign relations and its security affairs. By trying to produce 
decisions that are broadly supported by the members of the country's elite, Iran's 
leaders have sought to increase the likelihood that their decisions will not be 
undermined in the implementation phase. Secondly, and more generally, Iranian 
leaders' efforts at consensus-building have been reflective of their goal of maintaining 
the unity of the country's Islamic regime. Because of their fear that disagreements 
within the regime play into the hands of its domestic and foreign opponents, Iran's 
leaders have tried to ensure that their decisions do not create major divisions within the 
country's elite. ' 37 (Byman et al. 2001: 22; Hermann 1990: 14 and Hagan 1987: 344) 
There are a number of factors that have facilitated consensus-building in the Iranian 
context. The shared view that Iran should be ruled by clerics and on the basis of 
religious principles has constituted the fundamental prerequisite for intra-elite 
136 The Iranian arms control officials interviewed for this study all referred to the importance of 
consensus-building in the Islamic Republic's arms control decision-making. Also see Byman et al. (2001: 
xii-xiii, 21-22). 
137 Concern over the unity of the Islamic regime has been a recurrent theme, among others, in the 
argumentation of the Iranian supreme leaders who have regarded themselves as mediators remaining 
above the elite's political infighting. Whereas Ayatollah Khomeini's role as a guide or final arbiter was 
widely recognized by the members of the Iranian elite, Khomeini's successor Ayatollah Khamenei has 
had difficulties in winning similar kind of respect from his elite peers. Khamenei's more or less open 
identification with the Iranian regime clergy's conservative forces - itself a result of Khamenei's attempts 
to improve his political and religious standing - has weakened the authority of the institution of the 
supreme leader (Schirazi 1997: 78; Menashri 2001: 41 and Moslem 2002: 37). 
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agreements on Iranian state affairs. The elite members' common interest in maintaining 
the clerical regime and in formulating policies that are believed to be in line with Islam 
have not only limited the range of various viewpoints within the regime, but also 
contributed to the elite members' acceptance of each other as legitimate political actors 
as well as to their acceptance of the rules of the Islamic Republic's political life. 
That the Iranian regime members' mutual disagreements have pertained more to 
domestic issues than to foreign and security policy questions has been another key 
factor contributing to intra-elite consensus-building. Especially in the area of security 
policy the views of the elite have often been identical. 138 Apart from shared ideological 
premises, this uniformity of views has resulted from shared historical experiences. As a 
result of such binding experiences as opposition to the Shah prior to the 1979 revolution 
or the Islamic Republic's war against Iraq in 1980-1988, Iranian elite members' images 
of the world have closely corresponded with each other. 
Common allegiances, beliefs, and experiences notwithstanding, Iranian leaders' 
efforts at arms control-related consensus-building have been facilitated by the nature of 
the arms control enterprise itself. Given that the international arms control agenda 
changes only slowly and that diplomatic deliberations on the various agenda topics can 
go on for years, even decades, without significant breakthroughs, there has often been 
no need for Iran to formulate detailed national approaches to individual arms control 
issues. Under such circumstances, Iran's leaders have been able to make decisions that 
adopt lowest common denominator positions - agreed upon in fora such as the SNSC or 
the EC - and thereby satisfy the basic demands of the various factional and bureaucratic 
actors operating within the regime. By basing Iran's arms control operations on general 
argumentative principles and expressing their personal stances in broad terms, thus, the 
leaders of the Islamic Republic have been able to limit intra-elite controversies and to 
convince various elite actors that their interests have been registered in the decision- 
making process. 
138 Chubin (2002: 40-41), for example, concludes that even the security policy viewpoints of Ayatollah 
Khamenei and the reformist president Muhammad Khatami did not significantly differ from each other. 
Similarly, the Islamic Republic's representatives themselves have often pointed to the uniformity of the 
Iranian state officials' foreign and security policy views. As noted, for example, by one Iranian arms 
control official, the differences of view in the Islamic Republic about the country's arms control policy 
have concerned more the means of Iranian arms control operations than their content or overall direction 
(author's interview with an Iranian arms control official (A) who wishes to remain unidentified, summer 
2002). Moshaver's (2005: 177,192) study of Islamic Iran's foreign policy goes so far as suggesting that 
the strong ideological similarities between the Iranian elite members' foreign policy views essentially 
render the analytical division of the Islamic Republic's political elite into various factions irrelevant. 
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Yet the Iranian leaders' efforts to associate all elite forces with national arms control 
decisions have not been without their problems. In the first place, the general way in 
which Iran's arms control positions have been formulated has allowed various elite 
operatives to offer conflicting interpretations of the purposes of the Islamic Republic's 
arms control operations. 139This has led to mixed signals in Islamic Iran's arms control 
policy and thereby complicated Iranian arms control officials' efforts to pursue a 
consistent diplomatic course. 140 Furthermore, Iran's national interests and the quality of 
its policies have suffered from the consensus principle's propensity to generate 
decisions that rest more on domestic power calculations than on substantive analysis of 
the policy problems at hand (Destler 1991: 193,195). 
Apart from discouraging informed policy discussions and long-term policy planning, 
the search for consensus in Iranian decision-making has also weakened the country's 
ability to react to diplomatic situations requiring unambiguous and speedy responses. 
When faced with such situations, Iran's decision-makers have often been forced to open 
earlier elite agreements and to renegotiate them (Byman et al. 2001: 23). That the 
application of the consensus principle has resulted in inefficient decision-making 
processes has been acknowledged by Iran's arms control officials themselves. In the 
context of the post-2002 diplomatic arm-wrestling over the country's nuclear program, 
for example, the leaders of the Islamic Republic were reportedly unable, at the outset of 
the crisis, to brief Iran's bureaucratic functionaries of the details of the country's policy 
in the matter. ' 41 
139 That Iran's broadly formulated arms control stances have provided various elite operatives with the 
sense of having made gains in intra-elite policy debates is illustrated, among others, by the fact that 
although critical of the Khatami administration's moderate views on foreign policy, Iran's conservative 
forces did not seem to be particularly worried about president Khatami's reformist diplomatic 
argumentation because, as noted by Eisenstadt (2004: 24), it served a useful purpose by "winning Iran 
diplomatic points abroad and providing political cover for the activities of the hardliners in the security 
services and armed forces. " According to Gasiorowski (2005) and Chubin (2002: 84), Ayatollah 
Khamenei allowed the Iranian reformists to realize some of their objectives because he knew that the 
Iranian people strongly supported the Khatami administration's reformist aspirations. In their analysis, 
thus, the supreme leader and his allies from the conservative camp essentially used the Iranian reformists 
as a tool to reduce popular dissatisfaction while simultaneously making sure that the policies of the 
reformists would not seriously threaten the conservatives' leading position in the Islamic Republic's 
power configuration. 
ao The attempts by Iran's leaders to get the various sections of the country's elite behind national foreign 
and security policy decisions have increased the relative influence in the decision-making process of 
those elite members who have put emphasis on the Islamic Republic's ideological objectives. These 
ideologically oriented members of the Iranian elite have often managed to set the parameters of intra-elite 
debates and even to prevent or delay diplomatic operations. (Chubin 1994: 68 and Chubin and Tripp 
1996: 51-52) 
N Ali Salihi, Iran's representative to the IAEA at the time, for example, subsequently complained that he 
had had major difficulties in getting instructions for diplomatic action from his political masters in 
Tehran. He attributed these difficulties to the existence of multiple actors within the Iranian leadership 
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At the end of the day, however, one should not overstate the role of consensus- 
building in Iranian decision-making. It is more than likely that in critical situations and 
in matters that have concerned the Islamic Republic's core foreign and security policy 
interests, Iran's key policy-makers have refrained from consensus-building and 
effectively insulated arms control decision-making from factional and bureaucratic 
politics. 142 Of course, the insulation of critical arms control issues from elite 
deliberations has not prevented Iran's decision-makers from trying to promote the 
impression that the Islamic Republic's arms control decisions are not only based on the 
will of the Iranian people but also expressions of extensive intra-elite debates. In a 
related manner, Iran's arms control officials have not hesitated to try to use the 
conflicting voices emanating from the country's elite circles as a diplomatic asset in 
international negotiations. The tactic pursued by the Iranians in such cases has been to 
warn the other parties of the possibility that a rejection of Iran's diplomatic positions 
would allow domestic critics in the Islamic Republic to strengthen their influence on the 
matter and, consequently, force the Iranian representatives to adopt a more 
uncompromising stance in the future. '43 
References to foreign and security policy disagreements in the Majlis, the Iranian 
parliament, as well as to the fact that the Majlis can seek to influence national arms 
control operations through legislative initiatives and through its role as the state body 
responsible for the ratification of Iran's international treaties, have been one 
manifestation of this diplomatic tactic. Yet what the Iranian officials have kept quiet 
about is that, in actuality, Iran's arms control commitments have never been dependent 
on the views of the Majlis. Given the realities of the Islamic Republic's political life, the 
Majlis has been more or less sidelined from the arms control decision-making 
process. 144 Although the Majlis has actively discussed foreign and security policy issues 
and to the secrecy surrounding Iranian decision-making. (Traub 2004). Alluding to Iranian arms control 
decision-making in general, Zarif and Alborzi (1999: 515), two representatives of the Islamic Republic's 
foreign ministry, characterize the decision-making process as "complicated and time consuming. " 
142 For a similar conclusion, see Chubin (2002: 38); Iran: Where next on the nuclear standoff? (2004: 9) 
and Samii (2006: 64,74). Generally speaking, there are three basic strategies available for national 
foreign and security policy decision-makers to deal with domestic opposition in the policy-making 
process: (a) accommodation (that is, bargaining and controversy avoidance); (b) mobilization 
(legitimization of the regime and its policies); and (c) insulation (deflecting, suppressing, and overriding 
opposition) (Hagan 1995: 128-132). 
143 For these same tactical reasons, Iran's leaders have at times actively encouraged dissenting elite voices 
to come to the fore. By doing so, they have engaged in what Hill (2003: 82) alludes to as the diplomatic 
game of speaking with competing voices. 
144 All Akbar Natiq-Nuri, then speaker of the Majlis, for example, directly admitted in 1992 that the 
Iranian parliament played only a marginal role in the area of foreign policy (Schirazi 1997: 97). This 
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and made use of its right to question cabinet ministers on the Islamic Republic's foreign 
and security policies, it has essentially remained a forum for intra-elite debate rather 
than functioned as an independent actor in the decision-making process. 
As noted above, a key purpose of the Iranian leaders' consensus-building efforts has 
been to ensure that however enthusiastic about a foreign and security policy-related 
decision, the relevant members of the country's elite still agree to follow a certain 
course of action. In other words, the aim has been to decrease the possibility that the 
implementation phase of national decisions, the translation of decisions into political 
action, brings about discrepancies between intended and observed state behaviour. 145 
As the focus of this work is on the substantive content and objectives of the Islamic 
Republic's arms control policy and not on the consequences or outcomes of Iran's arms 
control operations, the implementation aspects of the Iranian policy are beyond the 
scope of the present study. Generally, however, we can conclude that the 
implementation of the Islamic Republic's foreign and security policy decisions has 
suffered from at least four kinds of difficulties. First, the agencies and individuals 
responsible for the execution of national policies have not always carried out the 
political leadership's decisions in full and have sometimes even actively worked against 
them. Not even Ayatollah Khomeini, the Islamic Republic's all-powerful leader, was 
able to obtain absolute obedience from his subordinates. Not infrequently, the 
competing forces within Iran's bureaucratic machinery sought to interpret Khomeini's 
orders to their own advantage, manipulated them for their own interests, and even tried 
to block their execution (Schirazi 1997: 80). 146 
marginalization has been a source of frustration for the members of the Majlis ever since the Islamic 
Republic's first decade (Behrooz 1990: 23). The only major occasion when the Majlis could have used its 
powers to influence Iran's arms control policy was the ratification of the CWC in the summer of 1997. 
Even if some members of the Majlis opposed the treaty, the factional composition of the parliament was 
such that the Majlis could not have agreed on a decision against the ratification and hence against the 
Iranian leadership's long-standing diplomatic efforts in chemical arms control. It should also be pointed 
out that the Iranian parliaments' attempts to influence the country's foreign and security policies through 
legislative initiatives have been seriously hampered by the constitutional right of the GC and the EC to 
torpedo such initiatives. 
gas As pointed out by Hill (2003), "foreign policy actions cannot be understood without an appreciation of 
their implementation phase, which is at least as important as that of decision-making, given that outcomes 
are so often markedly different from original intentions. " 
146 As far as Iranian state agencies' commitment to the political leadership's foreign and security policy 
decisions is concerned, the IRGC has most probably been the most problematic actor in this regard. To 
give an arms control-related example of the IRGC's independent activities, in 1984, during the Iran-Iraq 
war, the IRGC reportedly violated a UN-brokered moratorium on the shelling of civilian targets in order 
to undermine the position of Ali Khamenei, Iran's president and the chairman of the SDC at the time 
(Katzman 1993: 132). Whatever the exact details of this episode, the fact remains that the possibility of 
the IRGC becoming a law unto itself has been a constant source of concern for the leaders of the Islamic 
Republic. 
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Secondly, the implementation of Iranian leadership's foreign and security policy 
decisions has suffered from the lack of institutional and organizational resources needed 
to put national decisions into action. This has been the case especially in situations 
where the political leaders' decisions have rested on unrealistic assessments of the 
problems in question. Thirdly, the discrepancies between intent and action in Iranian 
policies have in some cases resulted from political leaders' unclear or vague expressions 
of the objectives and procedures required for implementation. The lack of a clear 
division of labour between the bureaucratic agencies dealing with foreign and security 
policy matters has only complicated such problems. Finally, although the lowest 
common denominator positions typical of consensus agreements have contributed to 
successful execution of political orders in Iran, they have occasionally also become an 
obstacle to the national decisions' consistent implementation. In other words, when a 
consensus agreement has been questioned and challenged within the elite, the 
subsequent renegotiations on the issue have changed the parameters of the original 
implementation process. (Hill 2003: 127; Hermann 1990: 19 and Byman et al. 2001: 21, 
23) 
In the final analysis, of course, one should note that incongruities between declared 
and observed state behaviour may also be caused by factors not directly related to the 
implementation problems mentioned above. In the Iranian case, one such factor has 
been the existence of extra-governmental actors seeking to promote their own foreign 
and security policy agendas. 147 Also, there is always the possibility that the 
discrepancies between the Islamic Republic's officially stated intentions and its actual 
behaviour are illustrative of a deliberate dual policy. In arms control terms, this would 
mean that while taking part in international arms control deliberations and seeking to 
reap the benefits arising from such participation, Iran simultaneously pursues policies 
that are undermined by the very same efforts it is promoting diplomatically. 
Although the problems pertaining to the implementation of the Islamic Republic's 
foreign and security policies have by no means disappeared from the Iranian policy 
scene, their relative role has presumably decreased in the course of the Islamic 
Republic's existence. Over time, the leaders of Islamic Iran have managed to strengthen 
their control over the country's extra-governmental actors, in addition to which the 
147 The activities of extra-governmental operatives overshadowed Iran's foreign and security policies 
especially during the Islamic Republic's first decade. Ayatollah Muntaziri's efforts, through his private 
office, to export Iran's revolution to neighbouring countries was a good example of such unofficial 
intervention in the foreign and security policy arena (Akhavi 1987: 200 and Behrooz 1991: 610). 
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Iranian state agencies' commitment to respecting and following their political leaders' 
foreign and security policy orders has increased. The regime's consolidation, the Iranian 
leaders' emphasis on elite consensus, and the bureaucratic operatives' fear to challenge 
their political masters aside, the implementation of national arms control decisions has 
been facilitated by the fact that arms control issues have only rarely aroused major 
political passions within the Islamic Republic's political elite. 148 
2.5 Continuity and Change in Iran's Arms Control Policy 
One of the objectives of the present work, as noted in the introductory chapter, is to 
try to tentatively see to what extent the arms control operations of Islamic Iran have 
been characterized by continuity and change. Aiming to piece the historical evolution of 
the Islamic Republic's arms control policy together, this study seeks to identify Iran's 
initial positions on individual arms control issues related to conventional, chemical, 
biological, and nuclear arms control, and then empirically establish how, if at all, those 
initial issue positions149 have changed in the course of the 1979-2003 period under 
discussion. The focus will be on four distinct aspects of Iran's arms control policy: 
primarily on the substantive content and objectives of Iranian issue positions, and 
secondarily on the means and the level of effort of Iran's arms control operations. In 
addition to tentatively seeking to recognize the elements of continuity and change in 
Islamic Iran's arms control policy, the present work offers preliminary conclusions 
about the factors that have led Iran to either initiate change in its arms control activities 
or to stick to essentially unchanged courses of action. 
It is presumable that the Islamic Republic's arms control policy has in some respects 
undergone constant change during the 1979-2003 period. For example, Iran's armed 
conflict with Iraq in 1980-1988 forced Iranian officials to calibrate their arms control 
operations so that they would serve the country's war effort. Also, every now and then, 
the Islamic Republic has adjusted its approaches to individual arms control issues in 
order to strengthen its bargaining power vis-a-vis other countries. Finally, one should 
take into account the fact that, in time, arms control issues themselves have changed in 
148 This paragraph draws upon Byman et al. (2001: 2,22,29); author's interview with an Iranian arms 
control official (A) who wishes to remain unidentified, summer 2002, and Nourbakhsh (2005: 2). 
149 The term 'initial issue position' is borrowed from Mansbach and Vasquez (1981: 189). 
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terms of substance, the patterns of behaviour characterizing them, as well as in terms of 
the cast of international actors interacting over them (Mansbach and Vasquez 1981: 11). 
On the other hand, however, it is important to draw a conceptual distinction between 
minor and major changes in Islamic Iran's arms control operations. Thus while the 
Iranian regime has certainly not been immune to developments and pressures emanating 
from the country's international and domestic policy environments, the impact of such 
changes on the Islamic Republic's arms control operations may have been only minor. 
In short: they have not necessarily altered either the substantive core or the fundamental 
objectives of the Iranian policy. This conclusion would be supported by the scholarly 
observation that profound shifts in states' foreign and security policies emerge slowly 
and are normally rare. '50 It would also be backed by the fact that the issues on the 
international arms control agenda usually have a long life-span. As a consequence, there 
is often no urgent need for states to review their initial issue positions on individual 
arms control matters. 
Still, at the same time, the assumption that the possible changes in Iran's arms control 
operations during the first 25 years of the Islamic Republic's existence have been only 
minor is challenged by the broadly shared view among Iran scholars according to which 
the first quarter-century of the Islamic Republic's history can be analytically divided 
into three separate phases: the Khomeini decade (1979-1989), the Rafsanjani 
presidency (1989-1997), and the presidency of Muhammad Khatami (1997-2003). The 
purpose of such three-era periodizations has been to point out that even though many 
things in Iran have remained constant throughout the Islamic Republic's existence, the 
country's societal and political life has also experienced a number of significant changes 
that have set the various stages of the Islamic Republic's development apart from each 
other. 151 
Aso As put by Welch (2005: 7): "[... ] the ship of state is ordinarily ponderous, not nimble. It is insensitive 
to minor changes in the environment. It alters course only with great effort, and only when absolutely 
necessary. The state does not - because it cannot - constantly sample the outside world, adjusting and 
fine-tuning its behavior so as to optimize something (such as "power" or "the national interest"). " For 
other scholarly discussions making the same point, see Destler (1991: 187) and Gustavsson (1999: 80). 
151 Iran scholars have used different kind of terminology for their three-era periodizations. Wright (2000) 
and Buchta (2005), for example, speak of the First, Second, and Third (Islamic) Republic, whereas 
Mozaffari (1999) distinguishes between a Revolutionary, Thermidorian, and an Enigmatic era. It should 
be noted that some Iran observers have applied the three-era periodization basically only for organizing 
their narration, whereas others have focused on the nature and the features of the societal and political 
changes that have taken place in the Islamic Republic as well as sought to identify the factors behind 
them. The beginning of the Islamic Republic's second era has usually been associated with two events: 
Iran's announcement, in July 1988, to accept a cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war and the death of Ayatollah 
Khomeini in the summer of 1989. Muhammad Khatami's victory in the May 1997 Iranian presidential 
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Given that the present work seeks not only to tentatively identify the elements of 
continuity and change in the Islamic Republic's arms control policy, but also to 
preliminarily assess how closely the possible changes in Iran's arms control diplomacy 
have reflected the changes that have characterized Islamic Iran's general foreign policy 
orientation in the 1979-2003 period, it is necessary here to elaborate, first, on the 
characteristics of the shifts in the Iranian foreign policy orientation, and, secondly, on 
the factors that have led the leadership of Islamic Iran to alter the country's foreign 
policy line during the Rafsanjani and Khatami presidencies. 
In the Islamic Republic's first decade, Iran's leaders focused on distancing the 
country's foreign policy from that of the Pahlavi period and on steering it into a new, 
revolutionary course. This fundamental shift152 in Iran's foreign policy resulted in the 
formulation of an orientation that put great weight on ideological objectives. With a 
vision of a new world order in mind, the foreign policy officials of the Islamic Republic, 
led and inspired by Ayatollah Khomeini, openly challenged the existing realities in 
world affairs, rejected the great powers' domination of the international system, and 
viewed Iran's Islamic model as a remedy to the ills of the mankind. Hoping to export 
this model to other countries and to win converts to its cause internationally, the Islamic 
Republic adopted an active foreign policy line that aimed to transform Iran into a 
revolutionary global player in international affairs. 
Following the end of the Iran-Iraq war and the death of Khomeini, the Islamic 
Republic's foreign policy took a more moderate direction. ' 53 While during the Iranian 
revolution's first decade the profound redirection of Iran's foreign policy had been 
illustrative of the transformation of the Iranian state, the change of the Iranian regime, 
the post-Khomeini changes in the country's foreign policy resulted from the Iranian 
election, in turn, has been generally regarded as the starting point for the Islamic Republic's third phase of 
development. 
152 The transition from the Pahlavi period foreign policy line to the post-revolutionary course amounted to 
what Hermann (1990: 5-6) refers to as international orientation change. In his conceptual framework, 
international orientation change is the most extreme form of foreign policy change. As put by Hermann, it 
"involves dramatic changes in both words and deeds in multiple issue areas with respect to the actor's 
relationship with external entities. " 
153 As noted earlier in section 2.4.2, Islamic Iran's foreign policy had shown initial signs of pragmatism 
and moderation already during Khomeini's rule. Describing the various trends in Iran's foreign policy 
under Khomeini, Behrooz (1990: 23-28) speaks of the years 1984-1989 as the pragmatist period in the 
foreign policy of Khomeini's Iran, the period that marked the beginning of a more pragmatic approach to 
the conduct of the Islamic Republic's foreign relations. 
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leaders' conscious efforts to correct the Islamic Republic's foreign policy course. 154 
Although the Iranian leadership did not abandon its ideological aspirations, it 
nevertheless reduced the role of ideological considerations in the Islamic Republic's 
foreign policy. The interests of the Iranian state took supremacy over the Iranian elite's 
ideological objectives, and the de-ideologization process manifested itself also in the 
selection of the means to further the country's foreign policy interests. The Islamic 
Republic resorted increasingly to normal diplomatic channels in the management of its 
foreign affairs, in addition to which it discarded its strict, ideology-driven differentation 
between Iran's friends and enemies. Moreover, the Iranian regime's zeal to alter the 
international system diminished. (Mozaffari 1999: 9,13-15; Ehteshami 1995: 138-139, 
145-146,165-167 and Buchta 2005: 22,29) 
The trend of de-radicalization, together with the shift from idealism towards an 
increasing degree of realism and pragmatism that characterized Iran's foreign policy in 
the Rafsanjani years, subsequently passed into the presidency of Muhammad Khatami. 
Yet, under Khatami, Iran not only continued to improve its relations with the outside 
world, step up the conciliatory tone of its foreign policy rhetoric, as well as to declare 
its commitment to constructive and responsible diplomatic behaviour, but it also began 
to distance itself from the ideological legacy of the Khomeini period. Unlike his 
predecessor, who viewed an anti-dogmatic or non-ideological foreign policy as a 
necessary evil to achieve other ends, president Khatami put the ideological factor back 
on the top of the Islamic Republic's foreign policy agenda. But unlike in the 1980s, this 
time the ideological message coming from Iran was welcomed by the outside world. 
Khatami's emphasis on dialogue and cooperation between cultures and civilizations 
raised hopes that a moderate and non-confrontational approach to international affairs 
would become a permanent feature of the Islamic Republic's foreign policy. 
What, then, are the factors that led the Islamic Republic to review its foreign policy 
orientation during the Rafsanjani and Khatami presidencies? Theoretical literature on 
foreign policy change would suggest that the sources of change are to be found either 
from Iran's external environment, its domestic circumstances, or from factors pertaining 
to the Islamic Republic's foreign policy decision-making process. 155 Alternatively, 
Asa For a conceptual distinction between foreign policy change resulting from state transformation or 
regime change and self-correcting change, that is, foreign policy change that occurs when the existing 
government chooses to move in a different policy direction, see Hermann (1990: 5). 
155 Instead of speaking about the sources of major foreign policy change, some foreign policy scholars 
have approached the change problematique by concentrating on factors that are believed to prevent major 
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change in Iran's foreign policy may have been caused by simultaneous interplay of 
external, domestic, and decision-making factors. Instead of single-level explanation, 
thus, a multi-level analysis might constitute a more fruitful approach to the change 
question. 
Basically, major foreign policy changes result either from national decision-makers' 
recognition that their existing policies are failing or taking too heavy a toll on them in 
one way or another, or from significant developments in their international 
environment, most often from dramatic actions taken by other states, which force them 
to review and alter the policies in place. ' 56 In the latter case, states not only adjust to 
independent phenomena in their external environment, but may end up altering their 
foreign policies also because of the negative consequences their own foreign policy 
behaviour has had on other international actors. (Hermann 1990: 4,11-13; Welch 2005: 
45 and Goldmann 1988: 6) 
The recognition by national decision-makers that their existing foreign policy is 
flawed and in need of thorough revision may be a genuine move on the part of 
government representatives or an acknowledgment more or less imposed on them by 
other politically relevant domestic forces. Put differently, major foreign policy change 
may originate from the realization by national authoritative decision units, whether 
individual leaders or groups within the government, that their national foreign policy 
course has become anachronistic, or from the decision units' tactical efforts to use 
policy changes as a tool to counter foreign policy criticism presented by domestic 
political actors, who, of course, may themselves initiate profound foreign policy change 
if capable of removing the ruling government from office. (Hermann 1990: 7-8,11-12) 
Apart from referring to political, economic, ideological, and other change sources 
located at the international and the domestic level, foreign policy theorists have pointed 
out that factors pertaining to the foreign policy decision-making process can play a 
crucial role in obstructing or facilitating profound foreign policy change. The factors 
related to the decision-making process have often been viewed as an intervening 
foreign policy change from happening or to at least reduce the scope of change or to delay it. Goldmann 
(1988), for example, has adopted this logic by introducing the concept of "stabilizers. " By them, he refers 
to phenomena that tend to inhibit foreign policy change even when there is pressure for change. In his 
framework of analysis, Goldmann distinguishes between four kinds of stabilizers: administrative 
(identified through the study of the structure and mode of operation of national bureaucracies), political 
(domestic politics), cognitive (beliefs on which foreign policy is based), and international (a state's 
external relations). 
156 For the finding that major foreign policy change is often linked to crisis situations, domestic or 
international, see, for example, Hermann (1990: 16); Gustavsson (1999: 86-87) and Welch (2005: 38). 
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element in the source-change mechanism, an element determining what ultimate effect 
international and domestic sources of change will have on foreign policy decision- 
makers. Theoretical studies of such factors have focused, among others, on the role of 
national decision-makers' personality traits as well as on the role of their beliefs, 
perceptions, and other cognitive characteristics in foreign policy change. Moreover, 
foreign policy analysts have sought, for example, to assess the implications of 
organizational settings and bureaucratic politics for foreign policy change. (Gustavsson 
1999: 77-78,87; Welch 2005: 31,44-46 and Hermann 1990: 13) 
Iran observers' discussions of the changes in Iranian foreign policy have rarely, 
explicitly at least, relied on the insights provided by foreign policy theorists. This has 
also been the case in regard to the studies that have divided the Islamic Republic's 
foreign policy into three distinctive periods. Only seldom have the three-era 
periodizations' conclusions about the sources of change in the Islamic Republic's 
foreign policy been based on clearly spelled-out conceptual frameworks. Yet, the 
principal change factors identified in them have been highly uniform. 
In the first place, the three-era periodizations seem to share the view that the first 
major shift in the Islamic Republic's foreign policy during the Rafsanjani presidency 
was primarily caused by Iran's war against Iraq. ' 57 It was the war - that is, a dramatic 
event originating from Iran's external environment - and its repercussions that forced 
Iranian leaders to alter the country's foreign policy course. In order to preserve the 
Islamic state and regime, they had to embark on post-war economic and military 
reconstruction and, as a consequence, to increasingly distance their country from a 
foreign policy orientation that had been dominated by ideological considerations and 
driven wedges between the Islamic Republic and the rest of the world. The Iranian 
leadership recognized that the Islamic Republic's post-war economic and military 
recovery depended on outside assistance and on constructive diplomatic behaviour. 
The students of Iran's foreign policy have also viewed the death of Ayatollah 
Khomeini in the summer of 1989 as a factor that facilitated the transition to a more 
moderate foreign policy course. It made it easier for the pragmatically oriented 
members of the Islamic Republic's elite to dissociate themselves from a strict 
interpretation of the revolution's ideological premises and to get the upper hand of the 
elite's radical forces. In addition, the post-Khomeini changes in the Islamic Republic's 
157 For discussions emphasizing the war's central explanatory role, see Ehteshami (1995); Buchta (2005) 
and Wright (2000). 
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foreign policy were facilitated by the end of the Cold War and the subsequent 
dissolution of the Soviet Union and the bipolar international system. The dramatic 
developments in world politics not only increased the Iranian leaders' sense of the 
Islamic regime's vulnerabilities and eroded the foundations of the revolutionary Iranian 
approach to international affairs, but they provided a good opportunity for the Islamic 
Republic to restructure and improve its relations with the outside world as well. 
(Moshaver 2005: 180; Wright 2000: 136 and Ehteshami 1995: 145) 
Whereas Iran scholars' three-era periodizations have attributed the Rafsanjani-era 
changes in the Islamic Republic's foreign policy first and foremost to the war, an 
external source of change, the analyses of the foreign policy shift that took place during 
the presidency of Muhammad Khatami have ascribed explanatory priority to domestic 
factors. 158 They have pointed out that it was the Iranian population's deep 
dissatisfaction with the Islamic Republic's economic, political, and socio-cultural 
conditions that led them to elect a relatively unknown cleric as their president and to 
strongly support his reformist political program. The deep-seated domestic problems 
have also been seen as a catalyst for the changes that occurred in Iran's intra-elite 
ideological climate and left a mark in the Khatami administration's foreign policy. 
The pressures emanating from Iran's external environment, including international 
processes such as globalization, have received only a secondary role in the three-era 
periodizations' treatment of the factors explaining change in the Islamic Republic's 
foreign policy under Khatami. As far as the potential sources of change pertaining to the 
Iranian foreign policy decision-making process are concerned, they have - legitimately 
or not - remained more or less absent from Iran scholars' analyses. The relationship 
between Iranian bureaucratic politics and the aspects of continuity and change in the 
Islamic Republic's foreign policy is among the research questions related to the 
decision-making process that have remained unanswered. The general assumption 
among foreign policy theorists is that the phenomenon of bureaucratic politics acts as an 
obstacle to foreign policy change. Yet, the high probability that Islamic Iran's core 
leadership has insulated decision-making on key foreign and security policy matters 
from bureaucratic pressures would support Welch's (2005: 63) observation that 
sometimes national leaders manage to govern their countries "almost as though 
unencumbered by any machinery of government at all. " 
158 Note, for example, the thrust of argument in Ansari (2000); Wright (2000) and Moshaver (2005). 
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3 ISLAMIC IRAN AND THE CONTROL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS' 
3.1 The Shah's Military Legacy 
3.1.1 The Iranian military from 1953 to 1968 
The year 1953 marked the beginning of the close political and military relationship 
that evolved between Iran and the United States during the rule of Shah Muhammad 
Reza Pahlavi. Following the U. S. - and British-instigated coup d'etat of August 1953 - 
which removed the nationalist prime minister Muhammad Musaddiq and his 
government from office and put Muhammad Reza Pahlavi at the helm of political power 
in Iran - the pro-Western Shah started to strengthen and modernize his armed forces in 
order to block any future threat, whether internal or external, to the Pahlavi monarchy. 
The Shah's efforts were strongly supported by the U. S. administration of president 
Eisenhower who viewed Iran as an integral part of America's Perimeter Defense 
strategy which aimed to stop the spread of Soviet influence in Asia with the help of 
local allies. Iran's unique geopolitical location between the Soviet Union and the 
economically indispensable oil fields of the Persian Gulf made the Shah's regime an 
important component of the U. S. strategy. (Gasiorowski 1990: 146-147) 
The Eisenhower administration's interest in consolidating the Shah's rule 
domestically and in containing the Soviet Union led the United States to channel large 
amounts of economic and military aid to Iran. In 1954, the United States gave more than 
$100 million in economic and military assistance to the Shah's government, a sum that 
accounted for about 60 percent of the Iranian government's total expenses that year. 
Between the fiscal years of 1954-1957, the U. S. aid made up some 30 percent of 
Iranian government expenditures. However, it was not until 1957 that the United States 
dramatically increased its military aid to Iran. The shift in the U. S. policy was 
exemplified by the fact that between the short period of 1956-1958, Iran's military 
expenditures grew from $23 million to $104.9 million. Increased U. S. military 
assistance enabled the Iranian armed forces to expand in manpower, speed up military 
Armaments that are not classified as WMD are collectively alluded to as conventional weapons. They 
constitute the main type of weaponry in states' military arsenals. The distinction between conventional 
and other types of weapons emerged with the advent of nuclear weapons at the end of the Second World 
War. (Tulliu and Schmalberger 2001: 15) 
107 
construction projects, and procure a wide variety of military hardware, including such 
advanced equipment as F-84G jet fighters. (Ibid.: 149,151-152) 
At the end of the 1950s, the mission of Iran's armed forces began to change. While 
the military remained as the fundamental pillar, the ultimate guarantor of the Shah's 
rule, it increasingly started to focus on external threats to Iran's national security. Iran's 
membership in the Baghdad Pact - an alliance of the United Kingdom, Turkey, Iraq, 
Iran, and Pakistan that was established in 1955 to contain the Soviet Union - and the 
Shah's increased military cooperation with regional allies were among the practical 
manifestations of the Iranian military's evolving mission. The shift in Iran's military 
outlook from regime security to national security was expedited not only by the Shah's 
perception of the communist threat but by regional developments as well. In particular, 
the coup carried out in neighbouring Iraq in 1958 by military officers sympathetic to the 
radical pan-Arab ideology of Egypt's president Gamal Abdel Nasser further convinced 
the Shah that Iran had to improve its military capabilities against foreign threats. 
(Chubin 1977: 197-198 and Pollack 2004: 78-79) 
Thus, in the course of the 1960s, the Shah tried forcefully to build up Iran's military 
strength vis-a-vis foreign powers. Apart from the concern over the Soviet and pan-Arab 
threats, 2 the Shah's armament efforts were influenced by two other key factors. First, 
the Shah viewed strong national armed forces as a means to make his country more 
independent of foreign powers and to increase its diplomatic freedom of action. 3 
Secondly, the Shah wanted to ensure that Iran would be able to defend itself in the 
future in case foreign powers would lose their interest in its security. One of the Shah's 
fears was that the depolarization of the Cold War international system would reduce 
2 In the 1960s, Egypt's Nasser openly challenged the Shah by claiming that Iran was an oppressor of Arab 
peoples and a country that sought to colonize the Gulf Arab sheikhdoms. Worried that Nasser's ideology 
would find a receptive audience among Iran's Arab population in the Khuzistan province and gain a 
foothold in the Persian Gulf region, the Shah took concrete steps to deal with the pan-Arab threat. In 
1964, for example, he assisted Yemeni royalists to fight the country's republicans, who were closely 
allied with Egypt, by providing them with military equipment and training in Iran. (Marschall 2003: 6-8 
and Chubin and Zabih 1974: 72) 
3 Iran's improved relations with the Soviet Union were one indication of the Shah's willingness to pursue 
a more independent foreign policy course. The relations between the two countries stabilized in 1962 
after the Soviet leadership accepted Iranian assurances concerning the United States' military presence in 
Iran and after the Shah pledged that no foreign missiles capable of threatening the Soviet Union would be 
deployed on the Iranian soil. The steps taken by Iran paved the way for increased diplomatic and 
economic cooperation between the two countries. The Shah even made the symbolic gesture of 
purchasing some military transports from the Soviet Union and hence extending the bilateral cooperation 
to the military realm. Of course, the Soviet Union never ceased to be the central concern in the Shah's 
threat analyses. The Shah feared, among others, that the Soviet Union would use some pretext to invoke 
the 1921 Treaty of Friendship between Iran and the Soviet Union which permitted the Soviet Union to 
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Iran's importance in Western military calculations. (Chubin 1977: 198 and Pollack 
2004: 76) 
More specifically, the Shah feared that U. S. commitment to Iran's security would 
start to fade. The Shah's concerns were fuelled by the worries publicly voiced by U. S. 
political and military leaders about the social and economic implications of Iran's rapid 
military build-up. As a result of such worries, in 1959, the United States had decided to 
cut its military aid to the Shah and, instead, expand its economic assistance to Iran. 4 
And after the rise of John F. Kennedy to U. S. presidency in 1961, the Americans began 
- much to the chagrin of the Shah, who had repeatedly maintained that America's 
military assistance to his country was not adequate - to increasingly couple their 
military aid to Iran with demands for democratic reforms in the country. Another key 
factor that undermined the United States' credibility as a defender of Iran was the 
Indian-Pakistani war of 1965. In the Shah's view, the decision taken by the Americans 
to remain neutral in the conflict and not to supply arms to Pakistan, whose military was 
dependent on U. S. equipment and spare parts, amounted to a blatant abandonment of an 
ally. 5 (Gasiorowski 1990: 152; Chubin 1977: 198 and Cottrell et al. 1980: 152) 
Still, the Shah recognized that the military he envisioned for himself could be created 
only with the help of the United States. Thus, while continuing to improve Iran's 
ground forces, in 1965, the Shah began discussing the purchase of F-4 combat aircraft 
and other sophisticated conventional weaponry from the Americans. That same year, the 
Shah also started to expand the modest Iranian navy. As a result of Iran's increased oil 
revenues and the consolidation of the Shah's regime domestically, 6 the United States 
significantly cut its economic and military assistance to Iran in the mid-1960s. By 1967, 
militarily intervene in Iran if a third party would use the Iranian territory to threaten the Soviet Union's 
security interests. (Chubin 1977: 197 and Menashri 1990: 100) 
In March 1959, the United States and Iran had signed a bilateral agreement in which the United States 
undertook to continue its military and economic assistance to Iran. In return, Iran had pledged to take 
effective measures to develop its economy. Most importantly, however, the March 1959 agreement 
between the United States and the Shah had contained a pledge by the United States to come to Iran's 
assistance in the case of an aggression against that country. The exact wording of the U. S. pledge read as 
follows: "In the case of aggression against Iran, the Government of the United States of America, in 
accordance with the Constitution of the United States of America, will take such appropriate action, 
including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon and as is envisaged in the Joint 
Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East, in order to assist the Government of Iran at 
its request. " (Ramazani 1975: 282-283 and Pollack 2004: 80) 
5 In the wake of the 1965 war, the Shah stated that "now we know that the United States would not come 
to aid us if we are attacked" (cited in Chubin and Zabih 1974: 96). 
6 The Shah's armed forces violently suppressed the political activism and demonstrations that took place 
in Iran during the spring and summer of 1963. The events of 1963 were the last major domestic challenge 
to the Shah's regime before the commencement of the series of events that led to the 1979 revolution. For 
a discussion of the political turmoil in Iran in 1963, see Bakhash (1984: 27-30). 
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both forms of aid were terminated. The change in the nature of U. S. -Iranian arms deals 
from military assistance to cash and credit sales diminished the Shah's dependence on 
the Americans and increased his diplomatic freedom to build up and develop his armed 
forces. (Cottrell et al. 1980: 152; Cottrell and Dougherty 1977: 12 and Gasiorowski 
1990: 153) 
By 1968, Iran had a military of 221,000 men. Of these, as many as 200,000 served in 
the country's ground forces which consisted of seven infantry divisions, one armoured 
division, and an independent armoured brigade. The Iranian air force was composed of 
15,000 men and had 200 combat aircraft, including F-4D, F-5, and F-86 fighters. The 
Shah's navy had 6,000 men and consisted of two U. S. destroyer escorts, two former 
British escorts of World War II vintage, two U. S. -built minesweepers, as well as of a 
variety of smaller patrol craft, landing craft, and maintenance ships. In 1968, the money 
allocated to defence accounted for 5.6 percent of Iran's GNP. This allotment was 
considerably smaller than the ones witnessed during the massive military military build- 
up upon which the Shah embarked at the end of the 1960s and which lasted until the 
1979 revolution. (The Military Balance 1968-1969,1968: 32-33 and Cottrell et al. 
1980: 152) 
3.1.2 The decade of massive military build-up 
3.1.2.1 The Shah's arms acquisitions 
Following the termination of U. S. military aid to Iran, the Shah's government began 
to buy large amounts of advanced weaponry for the country's armed forces. In 1970, the 
value of Iran's arms purchases from the United States totalled $127.7 million, and the 
pace of the Shah's military build-up efforts intensified after the increase in oil prices in 
1971 and especially after the huge oil price leap of 1973. The four-fold rise in oil 
income that year laid the economic foundation for Iran's ambitious arms procurement 
program. The decision taken in 1972 by the U. S. president Richard Nixon to allow the 
Shah to buy virtually any type of conventional weaponry from the United States was 
another crucial factor that cleared the path for Iran's dramatic military build-up in the 
1970s. The main rationale of Nixon's decision was to strengthen Iran's ability to defend 
itself as well as its allies and American interests in the Persian Gulf and hence enable 
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the Shah to act as Washington's proxy in the region. 7 (Gasiorowski 1990: 153 and 
Pollack 2004: 104) 
The Shah's arms procurement policy was straightforward and unambiguous: he 
wanted to acquire the most sophisticated hardware available, to buy as much as 
possible, and to do so as soon as possible. Although the vast majority of the new Iranian 
weaponry continued to come from the United States - between 1972 and 1976, Iran's 
purchases from the United States totalled $10.4 billion - Iran bought armaments from 
other sources as well, including Britain, France, the Soviet Union, Italy, West Germany, 
and Israel. The hardware obtained from these secondary suppliers ranged from navy 
frigates, helicopters, tanks, and missiles to artillery, armoured personnel carriers, and 
small arms. By importing weapons from different sources, the Shah wanted to reduce 
the risk of becoming too dependent on a single supplier, that is, the United States. 8 He 
also tried to transform Iran's overall dependence on imported armaments into a political 
asset by using weapons procurement as a way to strengthen diplomatic relations with 
the supplier countries. (Chubin 1978: 261-262; Cottrell and Dougherty 1977: 14-15,40 
and Chubin 1977: 220) 
The Shah's goal was to simultaneously develop all the services of the Iranian military 
both quantitatively and qualitatively. As a result of his efforts, the number of soldiers in 
Iran's ground forces grew from 200,000 men in 1968 to 285,000 men in the summer of 
1978. By that time, the ground forces consisted of three armoured divisions, three 
infantry divisions, four independent brigades - one armoured, one infantry, one 
airborne, and one special force -, four surface-to-air missile battalions, and an army 
aviation command. The troops were equipped with a wide variety of weapons systems, 
including 760 British Chieftain tanks, 860 American M-47/48 and M-60 medium tanks, 
250 British Scorpion tanks, and a substantial range of guns and missiles such as the 
HAWK. Equipment on order at the time included 1,300 Chieftain tanks, improved 
Under the so-called Nixon Doctrine, the United States leant on regional proxies to free up diplomatic 
and military resources for its superpower competition with the Soviet Union. In the Persian Gulf context, 
the doctrine took the form of what became known as the "Twin Pillars" strategy. Although the Nixon 
administration designated Saudi Arabia as one of America's twin pillars in the Gulf - the move was 
essentially a diplomatic concession to Gulf Arabs - it was the Shah's Iran that played the central role in 
the U. S. strategy. (Pollack 2004: 102-103) 
8 The diversification of Iran's arms sources mainly concerned the country's ground forces and navy, for 
the equipment purchased for the Iranian air force were almost exclusively of American origin (Chubin 
1978: 262). 
HAWK missiles, as well as over 500 American Bell helicopters. 9 (The Military Balance 
1978-1979,1978: 37 and Sargent 1979: 275) 
The major modernization of the Iranian navy that had been launched by the Shah in 
the mid-1960s resulted in the creation of by far the most powerful fleet in the Persian 
Gulf. By mid-1978, the number of men serving in the Iranian navy had reached 28,000 
- compared with 6,000 men in 1968 and 11,500 in 1973. The nucleus of Iran's naval 
inventory consisted of three destroyers and four frigates armed with surface-to-surface 
and surface-to-air missiles. In addition to the corvettes, patrol boats, minesweepers, 
landing ships, logistic support ships, and hovercraft in Iran's naval arsenal in 1978, the 
Shah had, among others, six Type-209 submarines, four Spruance-class destroyers, and 
six Lupo-class frigates on order. The Iranian navy had also created an air arm that 
consisted of tens of various types of aircraft. 10 (The Military Balance 1973-1974,1973: 
32; The Military Balance 1978-1979,1978: 37 and Sargent 1979: 275) 
The highest priority in the Shah's military planning was given to Iran's air force. As a 
result of the efforts to expand the air force that had begun in 1965, in 1978, the Shah's 
air force consisted of 459 combat aircraft and 100,000 men - in 1968 and 1973 the 
number of air force staff had been 15,000 and 40,000, respectively. The aircraft ordered 
by Iran during the 1970s came from U. S. producers such as Grumman, Northrop, and 
Mc-Donnell Douglas. The aircraft procured from these manufacturers included F-4E, F- 
4 Phantom, and F-5E fighters, the highly advanced F-14 Tomcat being the most 
sophisticated aircraft in Iran's inventory. Moreover, Iran had placed an order for at least 
160 F- 16 fighters in late 1976 and also negotiated for the purchase of the highly modern 
multi-mission F-18 aircraft. Taking into account the F-16 fighters, Iran's air force had 
altogether more than 200 items on order in 1978, including three Airborne Warning and 
Air Control Systems aircraft. ' 
One aspect of the Shah's highly ambitious military program was to lay the foundation 
for a major domestic arms industry in Iran. While during the first decades of the Shah's 
rule arms production in Iran had been confined to the manufacture of small arms and 
ammunition, in the 1970s Iran began to strive for a national arms industry that would 
9 For a detailed account of the equipment in the possession of the Iranian ground forces in the summer of 
1978, that is, some seven months before the 1979 revolution, see The Military Balance 1978-1979 (1978: 
37). 
10 For a detailed account of the Iranian navy's inventory in 1978, see ibid. 
" This paragraph draws upon The Military Balance 1973-1974 (1973: 82); The Military Balance 1974- 
1975 (1974: 89); The Military Balance 1975-1976 (1975: 90); The Military Balance 1977-1978 (1977: 
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ultimately be capable of producing most of the weapons needed by the country's 
military. Iran's desire to reduce its dependence on foreign weapons supplies coincided 
with foreign arms producers' interest in gaining a foothold in a country that not only 
was a promising weapons market but also offered cheap land, labour, and raw materials 
for the manufacturers who were aiming at global production. Consequently, during the 
1970s, the Shah's government signed a number of contracts with foreign arms 
producers regarding the repair, maintenance, and production of sophisticated and low- 
technology military equipment in Iran. They included projects for the repair and 
maintenance of F-5 fighters, for the production of Bell 214A and Bell 209AH 
helicopters, as well as for the production of missiles, light armoured vehicles, and 
various types of small arms, including light mortars and assault rifles. (Sayigh 1997: 
178 and Ehteshami 1990: 42-43) 
3.1.2.2 The criticism of the Shah's armament policy 
The rapid build-up of the three arms of the Iranian military, together with the Shah 
government's moves towards military industrialization, posed a heavy burden on the 
Iranian economy. Between 1972-1978, Iran's military expenditures totalled $54.8 
billion. In 1972 and 1973, they accounted for approximately 9 percent of the country's 
GNP, whereas in 1974 the figure rose to 12.1 percent and in 1975 further to 14.7 
percent. In 1976,13.2 percent and in 1977 11.3 percent of Iran's GNP was directed to 
the military. The highest share of military expenditures, 15.8 percent of the GNP, was 
recorded in 1978, the Shah regime's last year in power. Moreover, it is important to 
note that some of the civilian items in the central government's annual budgets were 
actually military allocations. During the final years of the 1970s, for example, 
approximately 70 percent of the money earmarked for public housing ended up in 
military construction projects. (World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1972- 
1982,1984: 30 and Moran 1978: 180) 
Thus, it was not surprising that the Shah's military program was criticized not only 
by the Iranian political forces that opposed the Pahlavi regime, but also by observers 
inside and outside Iran who did not necessarily have anything against the monarchy per 
se. The criticism voiced by such observers centered on the build-up program's 
97); The Military Balance 1978-1979 (1978: 37,105); Cottrell et al. (1980: 156) and Cottrell and 
Dougherty (1977: 16). 
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economic aspects. The main point made by them was that the opportunity costs of Iran's 
military program were extremely high: the Shah's military efforts were seen as an 
obstacle to much-needed development and infrastructure projects in Iran. The critics 
also touched upon the phenomena of corruption and waste that hung over Iran's military 
projects as well as argued that the high priority given to the development of Iran's 
armed forces led Iranian decision-makers to underestimate the need for dealing with the 
social discontent that was spreading in the country. While not denying Iran's national 
security needs, the critics were of the opinion that those needs could have been met with 
a more moderate strategy. (Moran 1978: 179,190; Martin 1977: 230,234 and Zabih 
1988: 12) 
There were also other considerations that were raised to underline the problems 
related to Iran's rapid military build-up. Even some political circles in the United States, 
the Shah's main arms source, seriously questioned the prudence of large-scale arms 
transfers to Iran. On the one hand, the U. S. critics maintained that arms shipments to 
Iran were potentially destabilizing and thereby a danger to the security of the Persian 
Gulf region. Some even regarded the Shah's military efforts as an indication of the 
monarch's expansionist foreign policy intentions. On the other hand, the U. S. critics 
emphasized that the Iranians simply were not capable of integrating the large amounts 
of advanced imported weaponry into their armed forces. The problem of absorption - 
caused, above all, by the lack of training, research, and production skills, as well as by 
the lack of organizational capabilities - was recognized also by those who generally 
supported the Shah's military plans. (Cottrell and Dougherty 1977: 40,44-45 and 
Chubin 1997a: 229) 
So was the problem of dependence which consisted of two dimensions. In the first 
place, Iran's inability to manage the imported arms technology not only increased the 
risk that the sophisticated armaments in Iran's military inventory would become 
obsolete before the Iranians would actually ever learn to use them, but also raised a 
more fundamental question. Given the constant advances made in arms technology and 
the Shah's imperative of acquiring state-of-the-art weaponry for his military, would Iran 
ever be able to break away from its technological dependence? 12 (Chubin 1977: 220- 
221) 
12 The Shah himself recognized that Iran's dependence on foreign, especially American, military 
technology was not unproblematic (Chubin 1997a: 229). 
114 
Secondly, the modernization of Iran's military establishment relied heavily on foreign 
manpower, a fact that limited, theoretically at least, Iranian armed forces' operational 
efficiency and freedom of action. Apart from the Iranian opposition groups that 
condemned the presence of foreign military personnel in their country in cultural and 
religious terms, the issue of manpower dependence also worried the Shah's U. S. 
partners who formed the large majority of the foreign military personnel living in Iran. 
The Americans feared, among others, that the U. S. nationals residing in Iran might end 
up as hostages in a conflict between Iran and some other regional state and that, 
therefore, the United States would be forced to become militarily involved in such a 
conflict. It is estimated that, in 1978, the number of U. S. advisors and technicians 
involved in defence-related tasks in Iran, together with dependants, comprised some 
50,000 people. 13 In addition, there were foreign nationals from countries like Britain 
and France working on Iranian military projects before the revolution. Also, the Shah's 
government had brought a large number of workers from India, Pakistan, South Korea, 
and the Philippines to boost such projects. 14 
Despite the criticism that was levelled at the pace and scale of the Shah's military 
program, however, the modernization of Iran's armed forces retained its undisputed 
position as the top issue on the Shah government's agenda. A good example of the 
Iranian priorities was the fact that, in the fall of 1978, the Iranian government was not 
ready to cancel the arms orders it had already made, even though the political unrest in 
the country was gaining momentum and becoming a serious threat to the monarchy. 
Instead, the government only chose to defer new weapons orders -a decision that 
amounted to a tactical rather than to a serious effort to re-examine Iran's arms policy. 
(Moran 1978: 191) 
3.1.2.3 The motives of the Shah's rapid military build-up 
What were, then, the factors or motives behind the Shah regime's ambitious military 
program in the 1970s? The main motive for the Shah's determination to rapidly procure 
large amounts of sophisticated weaponry for his armed forces was to deter potential 
aggressors from threatening Iran's national security. The neighbouring Soviet Union 
13 For a list of the U. S. companies participating in defence-related projects in Iran in 1975, see Cottrell et 
aI. (1980: 154). 
" This paragraph draws upon Cottrell and Dougherty (1977: 47); Zabih (1988: 11); Cottrell et al. (1980: 
153) and Chubin (1978: 270). 
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remained Iran's principal security problem. Although the relations between the two 
countries had improved since the early 1960s, the basic constellation of mutual 
suspicion and mistrust stayed unchanged. The period of superpower detente in the 
1970s did not alleviate Iranian fears, for from Iran's point of view, improved relations 
between the United States and the Soviet Union contained a potential danger: a better 
understanding between the two Cold War adversaries could reduce Western powers' 
interest in blocking Soviet expansionism in Iran's neighbourhood. In other words, 
Iranian authorities feared that superpower rapprochement might take place at the 
expense of their country's security interests. (Chubin 1978: 258-259) 
Even though the Soviet Union continued to pose the most urgent threat to Iran's 
national security, the Shah's government also closely followed the developments in the 
Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. As far as the Gulf was concerned, Iran needed to 
adopt itself to the new regional security situation which had resulted from Britain's 
decision to withdraw its military presence from the Gulf by the end of 1971. The 
military intentions of neighbouring Iraq, the Gulf Arab sheikhdoms' political stability, 
and the safe transit of Iran's imports and oil exports through the Persian Gulf were the 
other main issues on the Shah's Gulf security agenda. And in order to secure the safe 
transit of Iranian oil exports, the Shah had adopted a policy under which his country 
regarded its security perimeter as extending to the Indian Ocean. The Shah's fear that a 
hostile actor might cut Iran's access to the Indian Ocean and thereby seriously damage 
the country's economy had increased after the Soviet Union had entered the region in 
the late 1960s. The subsequent intensification of the East-West rivalry in the Indian 
Ocean posed a potential danger both to westward and eastward flow of Iranian oil 
across the waterway. This largely explained why the Shah eagerly strived for an ocean- 
going capability for the Iranian navy. (Martin 1977: 226-229 and Chubin 1977: 207- 
208) 
Iran's political, physical, and economic security aside, the Shah's ambitious military 
program was driven by a host of other factors as well. First, the build-up and 
modernization of the Iranian military was linked to the Shah's quest for a more active 
foreign policy: he saw the armed forces as a crucial instrument in support of his 
country's diplomacy. From 1973 onwards, leaning on Iran's dramatically increasing oil 
wealth and his role as a regional strongman, the Shah pursued an active foreign policy 
especially in Iran's immediate neighbourhood. The Shah's offer to put his country's 
military at the disposal of the Gulf Arab sheikhdoms threatened by domestic opposition 
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forces, his direct military support for the Omani government fighting local Marxist 
rebels, 15 and Iran' s arms shipments to Somalia that fought a war against Soviet-backed 
Ethiopians in 1976-1978 were just a few examples of the initiative and new confidence 
in Iran's foreign policy. (Chubin 1977: 197; Zabih 1988: 4-5 and Pollack 2004: 105) 
Moreover, the Shah, who wanted Iran to become a power on the world stage, one of 
the great powers, coupled the country's military strength with its economic well-being 
by arguing that, without military power, Iran could not become an economic power. 
According to the Shah, military capability to deter hostile actors from encroaching 
Iran's territorial integrity and from coercing Iran into political concessions was a 
necessary prerequisite for the development of the country's economy. On the other 
hand, the Shah believed that the process of military modernization would produce 
significant spin-offs for the civilian sector and thereby benefit the overall development 
of the Iranian economy. The expansion of Iran's national arms industry was partly 
based on this idea of spill-over. All in all, then, the Shah did not believe in the 
conceptual division between guns and butter. He was convinced that Iran could have 
both. (Martin 1977: 227 and Chubin 1978: 267-268) 
The Shah viewed his strengthened armed forces also as a vehicle for the 
modernization and Westernization of the Iranian society. Furthermore, he used the 
build-up process to get a firmer grip on the military itself. By deliberately fuelling 
competition within the armed forces over the fruits of the build-up process - that is, 
over resources and career advances - the Shah tried to bolster his senior officers' loyalty 
to the Pahlavi monarchy. In fact, the national and international image of the monarchy 
were important considerations in the Shah's military program. The monarch wanted to 
create a powerful and respectable Iranian military that would serve as a symbol of the 
achievements of his reign. (Zabih 1988: 6 and Chubin 1997a: 229) 
3.1.3 The Shah's Iran and arms control 
As the discussion above suggests, the Shah's Iran was far more interested in 
obtaining arms than in controlling them. Yet, this did not mean that arms control played 
no role in Iran's foreign and security policies during the Shah's rule. Under the Pahlavi 
15 Between 1973 and 1976, there were some 3,000 Iranian troops stationed in Oman, in support of the 
country's ruler, in connection with the successful Dhufar counter-insurgency operation (Zabih 1988: 11). 
For a discussion of the conflict between the Omani government and the Soviet-backed Dhufari rebels and 
Iran's involvement in it, see Ramazani (1979: 75-80). 
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monarch, Iran took regularly part in multilateral diplomatic deliberations on arms 
control and recognized the need for measures that would halt arms competition both in 
the area of conventional weaponry and WMD. According to the Shah's arms control 
officials, the world had reached a stage in which the use of military force - depicted by 
the Iranians as a normal feature of inter-state relations - jeopardized the ability of 
humanity to return to a peaceful and human manner of life after armed conflicts. As 
stated by the Iranian foreign minister addressing the UN General Assembly's first 
special session on disarmament in June 1978: "[... ] given the new dimensions and 
sophistication of armaments, modern man no longer has a guarantee that he will be able 
to return to a normal life after heightened conflict and warfare. " (A/S-10/PV. 18,1978: 
338) 
Under these conditions, Iran's arms control officials pointed out, the community of 
nations had to strive for what they saw as the ultimate objective of all arms control 
efforts also called for by the UN: general and complete disarmament under effective 
international control (A/C. 1/33/PV. 14,1978: 67). Thus, the Shah's government pursued 
a two-track policy in the sense that it not only wanted to guarantee Iran's national 
security by significantly strengthening the country's armed forces, but it also considered 
it necessary for Iran to be involved in international arms control diplomacy. The 
signing, among others, of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963, the Seabed 
Treaty in 1971, the Environmental Modification Convention in 1977, and particularly 
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1968 and the Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention in 1972 were clear indications of Iran's desire to be a party 
to international arms control arrangements. '6 
One of the themes Iranian representatives often brought up in their arms control 
pronouncements was the link between arms control and the economic conditions of the 
world. The Iranians argued that the contribution of arms control to international peace 
and security would remain modest unless the problems of poverty and economic 
dislocation were seriously tackled by the international community. Wide and growing 
welfare gaps were seen by the Iranians as a factor which, in the long run, would 
constitute a fundamental obstacle to the preservation of international peace and stability. 
Also, Iran's officials pointed out that arms acquisitions drained national resources that 
were urgently needed for development purposes. While such remarks might strike as 
16 For a list of the multilateral arms control instruments signed by Iran both before and after the 1979 
revolution, see <http: //www. un. org/Depts/dda/DDAHome. htm>. 
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surprising given the Shah government's own dramatic military build-up, the crux of the 
Iranian argument was that it was the arms race between the major powers that was at the 
root of the problem. As put by the foreign minister of Iran in June 1978: "It should be 
recalled that nearly a third of all the scientific and technological manpower and research 
expenditures of the industrial powers is geared to military purposes and that a very few 
industrial countries account for three fourths of the total world military spending. " As a 
consequence, the Shah's foreign minister continued, if the industrial world continued to 
allocate enormous resources to military purposes, the much-sought new international 
economic order would stand little chance of success. '7 (A/S-1O/PV. 18,1978: 338-339) 
Arms control considerations were also present in Iran's regional policy. The Shah's 
Iran was one of the main supporters of the initiative that called on the UN to declare the 
Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. The meeting of non-aligned countries in Lusaka, 
Zambia, in September 1970 was an important landmark for the initiative. The 
conference declared that the Indian Ocean should become a zone of peace from which 
great power rivalries, military bases, and nuclear weapons would be excluded. Iran 
supported the non-aligned countries' declaration and was subsequently among the 
drafters of the 1971 UN declaration that called for the establishment of a zone of peace 
in the Indian Ocean. The declaration called for a halt to further expansion of great 
power military presence in the Indian Ocean and for the elimination from that area of all 
bases, military installations, nuclear weapons, and other types of WMD. Moreover, it 
called on the littoral and hinterland states of the Indian Ocean, on the permanent 
members of the UN, as well as on other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean to 
ensure that their warships and aircraft would not use the Indian Ocean for any threat or 
use of force against any of the region's littoral or hinterland states. (Cottrell and Burrell 
1972: xxiii and Yearbook of the United Nations 1971,1974: 33-34) 
Despite the fact that the zone of peace proposal received wide support among the 
members of the world organization, the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean - the 
United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France - expressed their reservations about 
the initiative and accordingly watered down its implementation. Nevertheless, the 
Indian Ocean initiative remained on the agenda of the UN throughout the 1970s, and 
Iran continued to voice its support for the proposal. In October 1978, for example, the 
17 Iran called for a wider international recognition of the connection between arms control and 
development and strongly supported UN-led efforts to study that connection: "We consider this to be one 
of the most vital undertakings to promote disarmament as well as to assure progress towards global social 
and economic goals. " (A/C. 1/33/PV. 14,1978: 67 and CD/PV. 6,1979: 32) 
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Iranian representative addressing the UN General Assembly restated Iran's interest in 
the zone of peace plan: "As a bordering state, Iran will continue its efforts within and 
outside the United Nations system to contribute to the achievement of that objective and 
will assist in keeping the zone free from great-power rivalry. " Moreover, Iran's 
representatives were of the opinion that the zone of peace idea should be extended to 
cover other geographical areas of the world as well. (A/33/PV. 20,1978: 386 and 
A/C. 1/33/PV. 14,1978: 71) 
Iran's position on the Indian Ocean proposal is a good example of how the Shah's 
government used arms control as an instrument of foreign policy. Although the Shah 
undoubtedly regarded military power as the best way of securing Iran's interests in the 
Indian Ocean, arms control played a role, albeit a secondary, in the execution of the 
Iranian strategy in the region. The same cannot be said about Iran's Persian Gulf 
strategy which centered more or less exclusively on military power. As Iran's policy in 
the Gulf was based on the view that the maintenance of Gulf security was the regional 
states' exclusive responsibility (A/33/PV. 20,1978: 386), the basic question remaining 
for the Shah was whether to act unilaterally or together with other Gulf states in this 
regard. In the end, in the course of the 1970s, Iran promoted both approaches. While 
occupied with the build-up of the Iranian armed forces, the Shah's government 
simultaneously promoted the idea of a regional security arrangement. Due to differing 
interpretations among the Gulf states of the benefits and feasibility of regional security 
cooperation, however, Iran's diplomatic proposals - ranging from a formal defence pact 
to a loose and informal understanding - did not lead to concrete results. 
' 8 (Chubin 1977: 
205-206) 
On balance, it is clear that the Shah had no rosy expectations of international arms 
control deliberations' security benefits to his country. Iran's general skepticism towards 
arms control manifested itself, for example, in the statement it made to the UN in 
October 1978: "Though disarmament deliberations in the past, whether in the General 
Assembly or in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, have produced some 
agreements and treaties, those have for the most part been partial measures. In fact 
many of the measures previously agreed upon remain such a far cry from meaningful 
18 The only exception was the bilateral security agreement of March 1974 between Iran and Oman. In the 
agreement, which stressed that the ensurance of security and stability in the Hormoz Strait and its 
adjoining seas was the responsibility of the bordering states, the two parties agreed to hold regular 
consultations and take coordinated and joint measures, including the use of each other's facilities when 
deemed necessary, in order to safeguard security in the region (Marschall 2003: 10,213). 
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disarmament that global peace and security have hardly been enhanced. " According to 
the Iranian representative addressing the Geneva-based Committee on Disarmament in 
January 1979, the reasons for the problems and the meager results in international arms 
control diplomacy were known to everyone: "One need only read the newspapers to 
note the increasing number of military-related items. Conflict and hostilities abound, 
and weapons developments are reported with spreading headlines. " (A/C. 1/33/PV. 14, 
1978: 66 and CD/PV. 6,1979: 28) 
As the Shah's officials believed that international arms control diplomacy had not 
managed to significantly contribute to states' national security, they often emphasized 
that each country, naturally including Iran, had the right to prepare itself militarily to 
defend its security. That this same argument was also put to use to quell international 
criticism of the Shah's ambitious armament policy was illustrated by the following 
Iranian statement: "[... ] the discussion about arms expenditures is inextricably linked to 
the question of national security. We cannot disregard the fact that as long as it remains 
impossible to establish viable international security arrangements through the United 
Nations, nations cannot be prevented from taking into consideration the requirements of 
their national security. " For the Iranians, then, military force was the only instrument 
that was capable of guaranteeing Iran's and other states' national security. Indeed, in the 
Shah's thinking, military weakness was a threat to peace and an invitation to attack. 
(CD/PV. 6,1979: 32 and Chubin 1978: 259) 
On the whole, then, the Shah's Iran remained highly skeptical about the future of 
international arms control. Still, it did not reject diplomatic deliberations on the subject 
and called for international measures that would further the cause of arms control. 
Iranian officials argued that the vicious cycle of military action and reaction could be 
broken, but that it would require that the major powers would be the first to opt for arms 
control because it was the military competition between them that acted as the principal 
driving force behind the world-wide arms build-up. The Iranians pointed out that the 
major powers' near-monopoly in military research, development, and supply placed on 
those powers a special responsibility to formulate and implement measures that would 
ultimately lead to general and complete disarmament. A corollary of this Iranian 
argument was the view that progress in conventional arms control was ultimately 
dependent on achievements in nuclear arms control. Even though the Shah's officials 
stressed that steps taken in the area of conventional arms control should not await the 
elimination of nuclear weapons, they nevertheless maintained that achievements in 
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nuclear arms control were a prerequisite for significant diplomatic results in 
conventional arms control. Iran's representatives argued that by stepping up its arms 
control efforts, the international community could block the world-wide build-up of 
conventional armaments. As one Iranian arms control official put to his foreign 
colleagues at the CD, "it is our job to seek to reverse this trend, to make the limitation 
of armaments a working policy of all governments. " (A/S-10/PV. 18,1978: 338-339; 
A/C. l/33/PV. 14,1978: 71 and CD/PV. 6,1979: 28) 
3.2 Entering the Debate: Islamic Iran's Initial Remarks on Arms Control 
3.2.1 Denouncing the Shah's military build-up 
At the rhetorical level at least, Iran's arms control policy changed dramatically as a 
result of the 1979 revolution. As the post-Pahlavi Iran's foreign and security policies 
were revised to correspond with the country's political and ideological transformation, 
it was inevitable that the policy changes would also leave a mark in Iran's arms control 
operations. Given that the new Iranian elite needed time for gaining full control of 
Iran's government structures and for setting the agenda of objectives for the newly 
founded Islamic Republic, however, it took a while before Iran's arms control policy 
began to take its new distinctive shape. As pointed out by the Iranian representative 
speaking to the Committee on Disarmament in July 1979, "the Iranian revolution, which 
has shaken the foundations of the former regime, is engaged in a thorough reassessment 
of Iranian foreign and domestic policy" (CD/PV. 45,1979: 6). 
But while waiting for the explicit formulation of the new regime's stands on various 
arms control issues, Iranian officials at home and those representing the Islamic 
Republic abroad - at first including many officials who had been appointed to their 
posts by the Shah's government - did not have to operate empty-handed. In fact, the 
first major theme raised by them was foreseeable. Since the Shah's military efforts had 
been among the questions Iran's various revolutionary forces had all strongly objected 
to, it was only natural that the starting point for post-Pahlavi Iran's arms control 
argumentation was to distance the Islamic Republic's military and security policies 
from those of the Shah regime. 
In addition to cautiously repeating some of the Iranian arms control stands originating 
from the Shah's time, most of which were related to the control of WMD, thus, the 
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Iranian representative addressing the Committee on Disarmament in July 1979 
underscored the differences between the policies of the former and the current Iranian 
regimes and strongly criticized the Shah's armament policy. According to the Iranian 
representative, the Pahlavi regime had masqueraded itself as a defender of arms control, 
while in practice, it had devoted a very large part of Iran's GNP to armaments. To 
support his argument, the official referred to the growth of Iran's military spending 
under the Shah. Whereas in 1953, under Muhammad Musaddiq's government, Iran's 
military expenditures had constituted only 2 percent of the country's GNP, the 
representative of the Islamic Republic argued, in 1971 the share of defence costs had 
risen to 12 percent and in 1977 to 25 percent of the GNP. The Iranian representative 
also pointed out that after the major oil price rises in the early 1970s, the budget of the 
Iranian army had increased fivefold from $2 billion in 1973 to $10 billion in 1975, and 
that it had kept on increasing until the eve of the "great revolution of 1979. "19 (Ibid. ) 
In the Iranian representative's opinion, the Shah government's quest for military 
power had taken place at the expense of ordinary Iranian people whose urgent needs had 
been ignored. In 1977-1978, in proportion to its revenue, the official maintained, Iran 
had possessed the biggest military budget in the world. The Shah regime's focus on the 
military sector, the representative of the Islamic Republic continued, had meant that 
during that two-year period, the former Iranian government had almost totally neglected 
the development of the country's health and other public services. Thus, the official of 
the Islamic Republic summed up, "when the supporters of the former regime talked 
about disarmament, it was pure cynicism and hypocrisy. " (Ibid.: 7) 
Apart from discrediting the Shah's domestic priorities and questioning the motives of 
pre-revolutionary Iranian regime's arms control policy, the representative of the Islamic 
Republic pledged that the new leadership in Iran would not follow the former regime's 
footsteps: "The provisional government of the Islamic Republic of Iran aims in its 
domestic policy at creating a fairer, more humane society, in conformity with the high 
values of Iranian culture and Islam. [... ] it follows, so far as concerns the crucial 
problems of arms and disarmament, that the Iranian people, the leaders of its revolution 
19 One of the first major diplomatic steps taken by the post-Pahlavi Iranian government was to cancel the 
orders - with the total value of $11 billion - placed for U. S. armaments by the ousted Shah. The Islamic 
Republic also cancelled the orders made by the Shah for military equipment from secondary suppliers, 
such as France and West Germany. Moreover, in the course of 1979, the Islamic Republic declared its 
willingness to resell to the United States or to any other country weaponry that had been purchased by 
Iran shortly before the Shah's overthrow. In the spring of 1980, not long before the outbreak of the Iran- 
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and its government intend to break away from the hypocritical practices of the former 
regime. " (Ibid.: 6) 
The policies of the pre-revolutionary Iranian regime were strongly criticized also in 
the statement delivered by Iran at the UN General Assembly's First Committee in 
October 1979. According to Iran's committee representative, for over 10 years, the 
Shah's regime had been engaged in a military build-up that had reached "psychopathic 
proportions" and diverted much-needed human and material resources of the Iranian 
people to war-like purposes. He also pointed out that the Shah's military efforts had 
been supported by a number of foreign countries - such as the United States, the United 
Kingdom, France, West Germany, the Soviet Union, and Israel - eagerly selling 
weaponry to Iran's armed forces. And still in the end, the Iranian representative 
concluded, "even the latest innovations in weapon gadgetry had not been able to save an 
infested regime from the wrath of its own people. " (A/C. 1/34/PV. 20,1979: 58) 
3.2.2 Arms transfers as instruments of imperialism 
The weapons transfers to the Shah's military from abroad constituted another central 
theme in Iran's arms control argumentation immediately after the revolution. 
Elaborations on the subject by Ibrahim Yazdi, the foreign minister of Iran's provisional 
government headed by prime minister Mihdi Bazargan, provided an illuminative sample 
of the new Iranian leadership's attempts to distance Islamic Iran from the policies of 
Pahlavi Iran. According to Yazdi, the first high Iranian official after the revolution to 
address the UN General Assembly's annual session, international arms transfers to Iran 
during the Shah period had been manifestations of international arms producers' 
"imperialistic" designs. He argued that by providing the Shah with "repressive 
technology" and by contributing to the militarization of the Iranian society, imperialists 
had hoped to maintain the political status quo in Iran. Such a status quo, Yazdi claimed, 
would have enabled imperialists to continue the "exploitation and manipulation" of the 
Iranian people. In Yazdi's view, the Shah - who was emphasized by the Iranian foreign 
minister to have used severe repression and oppression against his own countrymen - 
had collaborated with imperialists in the implementation of their schemes. (A/34/PV. 21, 
1979: 447) 
Iraq war, for example, the officials of the Islamic Republic still tried to sell Iran's F-4 Phantom fighters to 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. (Menashri 1990: 98-99; Chubin 1997a: 230 and Marschall 2003: 67) 
124 
The foreign minister of the Islamic Republic stressed to his international audience 
that arms transfers to subservient local rulers in the developing world were among the 
principal methods through which the major powers pursued their imperialistic policies. 
Yazdi pointed out that those who produced and sold armaments lived in a few advanced 
industrial countries, whereas those who used the ever more sophisticated weaponry 
were more and more often the impoverished peoples of the Third World. Arms trading, 
Yazdi concluded, was a new but a less visible form of domination and exploitation to 
which the "wretched of the earth" were subjected. In the Iranian foreign minister's 
analysis, the poor of the world had become the fighters of the proxy wars of the rich, 
and for this reason, the militarization of politics in the Third World had reached an 
alarming stage. Yazdi reminded that, more often than not, imperialists justified their 
weapons shipments by referring to the arms receiving countries' security needs. Yet the 
true motives of such arms transfers lay elsewhere: "Both the East and the West are 
exploiting the misperceptions and militarization of the Third World countries in 
accordance with their imperialistic game-plans, which include the expansion of their 
own self-serving arms race. [... ] nationalism, once a source of solidarity against 
imperialism, is now becoming an excuse for militarized societies to engage in civil and 
regional wars. " (Ibid.: 448) 
The foreign minister of the Islamic Republic also pointed out that Iran's experience 
as a victim of the imperialistists' ambitions was not a unique one. On the contrary, the 
fate of the Iranian people had already been shared by many other nations. In Yazdi's 
view, too many governments continued to use imported armaments against their own 
peoples, often more effectively than the arms producers had originally intended. In the 
same manner, too many governments continued to spend more money on "institutions 
of coercion" than on education or public health. In Yazdi's assessment, the Shah of Iran 
had probably been "the most irrational ruler in this category, " but he added that there 
were still plenty of "smaller shahs" in the world. (A/34/PV. 21,1979: 446-447) 
In the Iranian foreign minister's reading of international relations, militarization of 
politics in the Third World through arms transfers was something that would continue to 
peril the peoples of the developing world in the foreseeable future. 20 Still, Yazdi 
20 According to Yazdi, imperialists' dominance of the world based on their economic and military power. 
Economic resources made it possible for them to build up military capabilities which, in turn, were 
employed to exploit other nations not only economically but culturally as well: "[... ] as the economic gap 
between the privileged few and the wretched many increases, so does the cultural gap. The enclaves of 
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believed that through concerted national and international efforts, the imperialistic 
policies of the major powers could be blocked. His belief that the prevailing 
circumstances in the Third World could be altered stemmed, above all, from the 
experience of the Iranian revolution. The foreign minister of the new Iranian regime 
emphasized that the problems of insecurity and violence in the Third World could be 
effectively dealt with only in native socio-cultural contexts. Reliance on any other 
formula would help imperialists to continue to hold a grip over the Third World. (Ibid.: 
448) 
Yazdi argued that the UN had a special responsibility to help developing countries in 
their battle against imperialism and, therefore, also an obligation to focus on the 
problem of international arms transfers: "It is the position of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran that the United Nations should be as active in combatting the new forms of 
imperialism as it was in the struggle against colonialism. The cultural domination and 
militarization of the Third World can be as destructive of the rights and humanity of 
nations as violation of their sovereignty. " According to the foreign minister of the 
Islamic Republic, the UN cannot ignore the crimes of authoritarian rulers on the basis 
that they are committed within national boundaries. If authoritarian rulers procure their 
arms, ammunition, and weapons technology from abroad, he argued, then the 
deliberations on their crimes cannot be confined within national boundaries, either. 
Finally, Yazdi also made it known that, in the eyes of Islamic Iran, the legitimacy of the 
UN depended on how the world organization would manage to help Third World 
countries to fight imperialism in practice. (Ibid. ) 
3.2.3 Assurances of diplomatic participation 
The points made by foreign minister Yazdi at the UN in October 1979 were repeated 
in subsequent statements delievered by other Iranian officials. In view of Islamic Iran's 
revolutionary outlook on international issues, it was not surprising that those 
pronouncements often started with an explicit expression of Iran's disappointment at the 
achievements of international arms control diplomacy. This was the case, for example, 
in October 1979 when the Islamic Republic addressed the UN General Assembly's First 
Committee. Referring to the results of contemporary international arms control, Iran's 
wealth and power in many under-developed countries are also enclaves of imported cultures and life- 
styles. " (A/34/PV. 21,1979: 446-447) 
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committee representative told his foreign colleagues that the balance sheet of their 
collective efforts had remained a record of consistent failures and only incidental gains: 
"The simple truth is that we have been operating in an international enclave with little 
or no input into the mainstream of political decisions. The voices which echo in this 
room vanish into stacks of documents, never allowed to bother the conscience of those 
whose judgements and decisions matter in shaping world events. " (A/C. 1/34/PV. 20, 
1979: 52) 
According to the Iranian official, there was plenty of evidence to validate his claim. 
The extent of military spending in the world, he argued, showed that reliance on 
military power continued to dominate the policies of states. The 1970s, designated as a 
disarmament decade by the UN, the Iranian representative continued, had brought in its 
wake a doubling of overall military expenditure in the world. From the Iranian 
perspective, it was the vast increases in great power military spending that was the real 
source of concern. To be sure, the Islamic Republic's representative in the First 
Committee argued, arms control as a goal had been supported by the great powers at a 
high level of rhetorical consistency. But in the final analysis, he added, it had become 
clear that they did not possess the political will to act. Among those advocating and 
benefiting from such political inaction were the "powerful military bureaucracies, 
influential and richly financed weapon industries, their lobbies, their captive legislators, 
those for whom paranoia or past wars are a way of life. " (Ibid. ) 
Iran's representative stressed that the great powers' constant rearmament efforts had 
produced dire consequences for the countries of the Third World. He argued that the 
vast increases in major powers' military spending had enabled them to project power in 
a more menacing way and to draw the nations of the Third World into big power 
conflicts to fight their wars as proxies. Moreover, the representative of the Islamic 
Republic stressed, the imposition of the great power "power play" on the Third World 
had meant that developing countries' scarce resources had been channelled to military 
procurement, resulting in arms race patterns similar to those among the great powers, 
and it had also led to the persistence of racial and colonial domination in the Third 
World as well as to the imposition of ideologies alien to indigenous cultures. (Ibid.: 57- 
58) 
Islamic Iran's arms control officials did not hesitate to claim that Iranians knew what 
they were talking about when alluding to the dangers and repercussions of arms 
competition and aggressive military policies. Before the 1979 revolution, they argued, 
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the Iranian people had been subject to the Shah's senseless and burdensome military 
efforts. And after the revolution, the argument went on, the Islamic Republic had 
become the target of great power hostility. As lamented by one Iranian official: "The 
recent escalation of the United States presence in the Indian Ocean and its extension to 
the Persian Gulf is a glaring example of imperialistic pursuits aimed at harassment and 
intimidation of people who strive to protect their dignity and independence. [... ] 
increasingly, we see less inhibitions on the part of responsible officials to show off 
capabilities and to apply brute force under such headings as 'contingency force, ' 'rapid 
deployment forces, ' 'unilateral corps, ' and so on. " Instead of contributing to the 
creation of an international climate of peace, stability, and understanding, the officials 
of the Islamic Republic warned, such developments heightened mutual suspicions and 
led to further aggravation of arms competition at the global and the regional level. 
(Ibid.: 57 and CD/PV. 82,1980: 20) 
In addition to pointing to U. S. military presence in the Persian Gulf and the Indian 
Ocean, 21 Iranian officials used Operation Eagle Claw - the unsuccessful U. S. military 
rescue mission of April 1980 to free the staff of the U. S. embassy held hostage in Iran - 
as further evidence of great power hostility towards Iran. 22 Iranian officials condemned 
the operation as a military aggression against their country, said that the incident would 
aggravate the security situation in the Persian Gulf region, and deplored the double- 
facedness of the U. S. government which only recently, the Iranians maintained, had 
declared that the United States would refrain from using force against Iran. In the 
Iranian interpretation, the failed American military operation testified to the U. S 
goverment's unwillingness to admit that the logic of "gunboat diplomacy" belonged to 
the past. (CD/PV. 82,1980: 20-21) 
As far as Islamic Iran's own policies were concerned, Iranian officials emphasized 
that their country had no military ambitions whatsoever. According to them, the people 
21 The administration of president Carter significantly increased the United States' military presence in 
the Gulf as a response to the seizure of the U. S. embassy in Tehran by a group of militant students on 4 
November 1979 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. Apart from the AWACS 
aircraft stationed in Saudi Arabia and the B-52 bombers overflying the Arabian Sea, by October 1980, the 
United States had 32 warships, including three aircraft carriers, operating in the Indian Ocean basin 
(Marschall 2003: 181). 
22 For the background and details of the U. S. operation, see Sick (1985: 280-302) and Pollack (2004: 
153-169). As a result of the November 1979 occupation of the U. S. embassy and the hostage crisis that 
ensued, the United States had broken off its diplomatic relations with Iran on 7 April 1980. The hostage 
crisis had isolated Iran in the international system and estranged it particularly from the West. The seizure 
of the U. S. embassy and the taking of the American hostages had been explicitly disapproved, among 
others, by the International Court of Justice, the UN Security Council, and the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference. (Ramazani 1983: 13) 
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of Iran genuinely aspired to peace, and it was the Iranian authorities' task to realize the 
wishes of Iran's "liberated masses. " Participation in international arms control 
diplomacy was regarded as one way of doing so. Iran's representatives stressed that 
despite its doubts and reservations, the Islamic Republic would contribute to 
international deliberations in the field of arms control. 23 Also, they continued to 
repeatedly point out that there was an essential qualitative difference between the 
Islamic Republic's and the Shah regime's arms control policies. Whereas the 
monarchical regime had used arms control as a facade behind which the Shah 
government's vicious intentions had been hidden, the Iranian argument went, the 
Islamic Republic wanted to genuinely work for the cause of arms control: "We speak on 
these [arms control] issues with no claim to novelty yet with a clear conscience. For no 
longer do our words seek to disguise an adventurous military build-up under the 
euphemism of national defence. No longer are they phrased to justify the plundering of 
the main source of our national livelihood in exchange for military hardware. " 
(A/C. 1 /34/PV. 20,1979: 51) 
Indeed, the representatives of the Islamic Republic were of the opinion that in light of 
the bad experiences of the people of Iran with the Shah and foreign governments, the 
Islamic Republic had extra moral credit when making calls for the intensification of 
international arms control efforts. For example, the Iranians maintained, their country's 
pleas for the scale-down of arms competition in the Third World through regional 
cooperation had great moral authority because the Iranian people had had the misfortune 
of suffering from a senseless national arms build-up. To further portray the Islamic 
Republic's arms control policy as serious and tinged with initiative, Iranian 
representatives pointed out that, after the revolution, the newly founded Islamic 
Republic had swiftly dismantled military bases and dissociated Iran from military 
alliances. 24 As the foreign minister of Iran's provisional government stated, the Islamic 
23 One Iranian official characterized the Islamic Republic's approach to international arms control as 
follows: "[... ] our criticism reflects no hostility, just as our pessimism conveys no sense of despair" 
(A/C. 1 /34/PV. 20,1979: 51). 
24 After the revolution, Iran had taken immediate steps to withdraw from the Shah's international military 
commitments. Thus, in March 1979, the post-Pahlavi regime had pulled back the Iranian troops sent to 
Oman by the Shah in 1973. Similarly, in March 1979, Iran had withdrawn from the Central Treaty 
Organization (CENTO), the successor to the Baghdad Pact which had been renamed by the remaining 
members after Iraq had withdrawn from it in 1959. By the time of the Iranian revolution, CENTO had 
largely transformed into a framework for economic cooperation between its member states. As far as the 
United States was concerned, Iran's post-revolutionary government had closed down the two intelligence 
collection sites of the United States - providing data on the Soviet Union's missile tests - in northern 
Iran, and later, on 5 November 1979, the Islamic Republic cancelled Iran's bilateral defence agreement of 
1959 with the Americans. On the same day, the Islamic Republic also abrogated the security-related 
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Republic was committed to the stance that "the maintenance and propagation of bloc 
alliances based on a military network" only served the cause of "imperialism and 
tyranny. " Thus, the Islamic Republic vehemently opposed the presence of foreign 
military forces and bases on the territory of other and especially Third World countries. 
From the perspective of the Iranian leadership, such presence was a manifestation of 
"hegemonism. " (Ibid.: 58,61 and A/34/PV. 21,1979: 445) 
The Islamic Republic also informed that it would join the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM) in order to pursue a policy of peace and friendship on the basis of justice, 
equality, and mutual respect, and that it looked forward to a very active membership in 
it. According to Iranian officials, the Islamic Republic's identification with non-aligned 
countries was consistent with the policy of former nationalist prime minister 
Muhammad Musaddiq, designated by the Iranians as one of the original advocates of 
non-alignment. In addition, the representatives of the Islamic Republic argued that great 
power imperialism and its negative implications could be countered only if arms control 
measures focusing on the tools of violence coincided with a moral transformation 
among nations. As urged by Ibrahim Yazdi: "We must also confront the habits and 
perceptions which we have inherited and internalized without thought or reflection. " 
The representatives of the Islamic Republic pointed out that the reliance of the Iranian 
people on their moral power when confronting the military might of the Shah's regime 
was a compelling piece of evidence of the fact that, in the end, weapons cannot 
overcome the moral strength of the people. Accordingly, Iranian representatives 
stressed, the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic would be based on the doctrines of 
the Koran, the tradition of Prophet Muhammad, and on the principle of "neither East 
nor West, only the Islamic Republic. " The outer boundaries of Islamic Iran's arms 
control policy had been established. (A/34/PV. 21,1979: 444-446 and A/C. 1/34/PV. 20, 
1979: 58-59) 
3.3 Arms Control in the Context of War 
As a result of Iran's war with Iraq, starting in September 1980, the Islamic Republic's 
arms control operations became part of its war effort. While during the first months 
after the revolution Iranian arms control officials had concentrated on criticizing the 
articles V and VI of Iran's 1921 Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union. (Marschall 2003: 64; 
Menashri 1990: 100,156; Gasiorowski 1990: 158-159 and Pollack 2004: 122) 
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policies of the Shah and presenting the rudiments of the post-Pahlavi regime's arms 
control thinking, the war with Iraq necessitated that all aspects of Iranian diplomacy 
were put in the service of the country's war policy. Accordingly, in 1980-1988, the 
Islamic Republic's arms control operations strongly reflected its experiences and needs 
in the war. As discussed below in chapter 4, the role of arms control as a diplomatic 
extension of Iran's war policy became most evident in the area of chemical arms 
control. Militarily unable to deter Iraq from using chemical weapons against Iranian 
troops and civilians, the Islamic Republic launched a diplomatic offensive from 1984 
onwards to fiercely condemn Iraq's chemical warfare and to call for international 
measures against Iraq's use of WMD. Yet, the Iranians made use of arms control as a 
diplomatic instrument also in connection with issues that pertained to the use of 
conventional weaponry in the Iran-Iraq war. 
3.3.1 The Islamic Republic's perception of the Iran-Iraq war 
The Iraqi invasion of Iran on 22 September 1980 took the Iranian leadership by 
surprise. Despite the fact that the relations between Iran and Iraq had significantly 
deteriorated since the Iranian revolution - resulting, among others, in sporadic low- 
intensity armed clashes along the land border between the two countries -, the Iranian 
leadership had not expected that the tensions would eventually lead to an Iraqi invasion 
and all-out war. This was later acknowledged, among others, by Iran's president Ali 
Khamenei who, in September 1987, told the UN General Assembly that with regard to 
the Iraqi attack, "we were at first taken by surprise, we should admit. " In his address to 
the General Assembly, Khamenei also expressed the official Iranian view according to 
which the Iranian leadership's preoccupation with innumerable internal problems, 
together with the post-revolutionary regime's lack of experience in government affairs, 
had been the main factors enabling the Iraqi army to penetrate into Iranian soil. 
(A/42/PV. 6,1987: 38) 
While the authorities of the Islamic Republic admitted that they had initially been 
perplexed by Iraq's military move, they argued that the motives behind the Iraqi attack 
themselves were easy to recognize. In essence, Iranian officials depicted the war as an 
imperialistic conspiracy against the Iranian revolution and the country's new regime. 25 
25 In the Iranian view, the war started by Iraq was the culmination of the efforts of imperialists and their 
local allies to destroy the achievements and the future of the Iranian revolution. Iranian officials claimed 
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The officials of the Islamic Republic maintained that the "imposed war, " as it became 
officially known in Iran, was a consequence of the fact that "the Islamic revolution of 
Iran and the downfall of the Shah had shattered the classic vision of power in the 
Middle East and upset the division of the world by the superpowers into zones of 
influence. " More specifically, the Iranians claimed that Iran's revolution and the Islamic 
regime's intention to free the Persian Gulf region from superpower influence had turned 
the political and military calculations of imperialists, and particularly those of the 
United States, upside down and led the superpowers to review their policies in the 
region. As a result, instantly after the revolution, the representatives of the Islamic 
Republic argued, imperialistic powers had started to pursue two main objectives in the 
Persian Gulf: first, to find a replacement for the Shah as the subservient regional 
strongman, and secondly, to destroy the anti-imperialistic revolution in Iran. 
(A/35/PV. 33,1980: 673 and A/C. 1/35/PV. 20,1980: 43) 
In Iranian officials' reading of the causes of the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam Hussein's Iraq 
had taken the role previously belonging to the Shah as the regional "servant" of 
imperialists. In the words of one Iranian official: "The forces of imperialism were 
fortunate. They found an oppressive and ambitious regime in that area [the Persian 
Gulf] which was not only more than ready to replace the Shah, but also ready to attempt 
to destroy the Islamic revolution by using the most barbaric and inhumane methods 
[... ]" (ibid.: 44-45). In the Iranian view, thus, Saddam Hussein's war objectives were 
ultimately defined by imperialists and particularly by the United States - the 
imperialistic power that had lost "one of its most loyal and powerful allies in the form 
of the Shah's corrupt regime" (A/36/PV. 26,1981: 109-110). The officials of the 
Islamic Republic argued that Iraq's invasion of Iran and its effort to expand its borders 
were part of the plan to elevate Saddam Hussein's Iraq to the position of a leading 
regional power that would protect the interests of imperialists by trying to destroy the 
Islamic revolution in Iran, topple the Iranian regime, and prevent the Iranian revolution 
- considered a model for other nations - from spreading to other parts of the Muslim 
that actions against the revolution and the Islamic Republic by foreign powers had begun shortly after the 
downfall of the Shah's regime and included criminal measures such as bombings, assassinations, 
attempted military coups d'etat, and commando missions. According to the Iranians, imperialistic powers 
had tried to fuel domestic unrest and supported counter-revolutionary forces in Iran also after the 
commencement of the Iran-Iraq war. Thus, for example, the bomb explosion in Tehran on 30 August 
1981 - which killed Muhammad Ali Rajai, the newly elected president of the Islamic Republic, as well as 
prime minister Muhammad Javad Bahunar - was attributed to the United States and its local agents. 
(A/35/PV. 33,1980: 671,673; A/42/PV. 6,1987: 33-37 and A/36/PV. 26,1981: 107) 
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and the "oppressed" world. (A/35/PV. 33,1980: 673; A/37/PV. 27,1982: 518 and 
A/38/PV. 13,1983: 188) 
Iranian authorities further maintained that Saddam Hussein's thirst for "personal 
glory and grandeur" had also played a role, albeit a secondary one, in Iraq's decision to 
invade Iran. As underscored by one Iranian arms control diplomat: "Indeed, Saddam's 
personal ambition to become the new gendarme of the region, particularly in the 
absence of the Shah, cannot be underestimated" (A/37/PV. 41,1982: 717). The Iraqi 
president was believed by the Iranians to be striving for the annexation of Iran's 
Khuzistan province in order to get hold of its oil resources and to acquire an easy access 
to the strategically crucial Persian Gulf. Moreover, Saddam Hussein was told to be 
trying to gain sovereignty over the whole of the Shatt al-Arab waterway. 26 Thus, Iranian 
officials claimed that Iraq's efforts to stir up racial and religious hatred not only among 
Iraqi and Iranian people but also among the wider Muslim world, together with Saddam 
Hussein's effort to depict the Iran-Iraq war as a confrontation between Arabs and 
Persians, were aimed at distorting the real character of the war. In the end, the Iranians 
argued, the Iran-Iraq war was no more and no less than a "struggle between imperialism 
and its agent and gendarme - Saddam Hussein - on the one side, and the people, both 
Iranian and Iraqi, Persian and Arab, on the other. " (A/35/PV. 33,1980: 671,673; 
A/37/PV. 27,1982: 518 and A/42/PV. 6,1987: 37) 
In the Iranian analysis, Iraq would not have been able to launch an attack against the 
Islamic Republic without imperialistic powers' military assistance. Given that those 
powers did not want to become directly involved in the Iran-Iraq war, 27 Iran's officials 
maintained, arms transfers to the "mercenary Ba'thist regime" were the main instrument 
for the foreign players to boost Iraq's war effort. The Iranians referred to Iraq as a 
textbook example of a country - eager to put itself in the service of world imperialism - 
that had been encouraged by imperialists to acquire huge quantities of armaments and to 
pursue policies of domination and aggression. (A/C. 1/35/PV. 20,1980: 43) 
Moreover, Iranian officials pointed out that the war between Iran and Iraq provided 
arms manufacturing countries with a highly lucrative market for their products. In fact, 
they claimed that the imperialists of the East and West deliberately fuelled the war in 
26 The officials of the Islamic Republic refer to Shatt al-Arab as the Arvand Rud. 
27 The Islamic Republic argued that the Vietnam war had demonstrated that the time for direct 
superpower involvement "in implementing imperialistic policies in the developing world" had passed. 
Instead, as the case of the Iran-Iraq war demonstrated, imperialists were using the services of dependent 
regional "gendarmes. " (A/C. l /35. PV. 20,1980: 43) 
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order to sell weapons to Iraq and to other Arab countries of the Persian Gulf. As 
observed by Iran's foreign minister Ali Akbar Vilayati at the Conference on 
Disarmament in April 1985: "Even a simple-minded optimistic appraisal of the motives 
of some of the countries supporting Iraq would lead to the logical conclusion that they 
have secured their arms markets at the cost of creating and sustaining tensions of the 
worst kind in the [Persian Gulf] region. " According to the Iranians, one technique used 
by imperialists to sell their weapons to Iraq and its Gulf Arab allies was to baselessly 
accuse the Islamic Republic of having committed criminal acts in the war and of having 
incited political unrest within the neighbouring Gulf countries. (CD/PV. 308,1985: 8 
and A/36/PV. 26,1981: 112-113) 
The officials of the Islamic Republic strongly condemned international arms transfers 
to Iraq and stressed that the sophisticated weaponry in Iraq's possession had caused 
considerable suffering among Iran's civilian population. Hence, for example, Iranian 
officials pointed out that Iraq had targeted Iranian civilians with disastrous 
consequences with missiles produced in the United States, 28 the Soviet Union, 29 and 
France. 30 These suppliers of "huge military and financial assistance" to Iraq - also 
excoriated as those who had armed the Iraqi regime to the teeth - were depicted by the 
Iranians as the real aggressors of the war, as those who had urged Iraq to continue 
fighting against the Islamic Republic. Furthermore, the representatives of the Islamic 
Republic argued that international arms transfers to Iraq and to other Gulf Arab states 
28 The initial reaction of the United States to the Iran-Iraq war was one of disinterest, for both belligerents 
had a bad reputation in Washington. However, from 1982 onwards, in response to Iran's advances on the 
battlefield, the United States started to actively favour and support Iraq in the conflict. The reorientation 
of the U. S. policy resulted from the concern that Iraq's defeat would enable Tehran's radical government 
to subvert the oil-rich Arab sheikhdoms of the Gulf and threaten Israel and America's other Arab allies in 
the Middle East. The Americans also believed that Iraq's defeat could lead to increased Soviet influence 
in the Gulf. Although the United States had declared an arms embargo on both warring parties and 
thereby, contrary to Iran's accusations, refrained from direct arms sales to Saddam Hussein, U. S. 
armaments found their way to Iraq through third parties. Moreover, the Americans monitored third 
country arms sales to Iraq in order to make sure that the Iraqis had the weaponry they needed. Other 
forms of U. S. military support for the Iraqi war effort included the provision of high-value military 
intelligence and advice, economic aid, which freed up Iraqi money for arms purchases, and exports of 
high technology. (Pollack 2004: 182,234,206-208; Marschall 2003: 180 and Adib-Moghaddam 2007: 
76-77) 
29 The Soviet Union was Iraq's primary weapons supplier during the war. At the beginning of the Iran- 
Iraq conflict, the Soviets pledged neutrality in the war and stopped direct arms shipments to Iraq. In 1982, 
as a result of Iran's refusal to end the war, however, the Soviet Union resumed its massive arms deliveries 
to Iraq. (Cordesman and Wagner 1990: 103-104) 
30 French arms transfers to Iraq had started already in the 1970s. During the Iran-Iraq war, France acted 
as one of Saddam Hussein's main weapons suppliers. Of particular concern to the Iranians were the 
French deliveries to Iraq's air force. With the help of the Super Etendard and Mirage F-I fighters in its 
use, and the Exocet anti-ship missiles and AS-30L bombs used in those planes, Iraq bombed military and 
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had intensified arms racing in the region and drained the economic resources of the 
region's Muslim people. Stressing that the money used for arms purchases could be 
used for non-military purposes, the Iranians expressed their hope to see the day when 
arms-manufacturing states would no longer consider the production and sales of 
armaments a profitable business and a tool to generate economic growth. 31 
In addition to expressly condemning the arms supplies of the United States, the 
Soviet Union, and France to Iraq (CD/PV. 108,1981: 12 and A/37/PV. 27,1982: 521), 
the authorities of the Islamic Republic forcefully disapproved all other forms of foreign 
assistance to the Iraqi war effort. Therefore, for example, Iran accused Gulf Arab 
sheikhdoms32 of providing substantial financial aid to the Iraqi regime and blamed such 
Arab countries as Egypt and Jordan for their involvement in the war. Egypt was claimed 
by the Iranians to have provided the Iraqi army not only with war materiel but also with 
soldiers to fight against Iranian troops, 33 whereas Jordan was said to have acted as an 
important conduit through which arms intended for Iraq were shipped. 34 (A/36/PV. 26, 
1981: 113; A/40/PV. 69,1985: 91 and A/S-15/PV. 19,1988: 382-383,385) 
3.3.2 Warring Iran and international arms control 
Against the backdrop of Iran's perception that it was being militarily confronted by 
an international front operating through Iraq and headed by world imperialism, it was 
clear that, during the Iran-Iraq war, global arms control issues were not among the 
Iranian leadership's highest priorities. Still, Iran used international arms control fora to 
voice its disapproval of the prevailing conditions in international relations which it 
defined as the ultimate reason for Iran's plight as an innocent victim of external 
aggression. A corollary of this Iranian argument was the claim that the Iran-Iraq war 
civilian targets in Iran as well as carried out missions against Iranian oil facilities and tankers in the 
Persian Gulf. (Menashri 1990: 290; Pollack 2004: 196-197,206 and Marschall 2003: 77,195) 
31 This paragraph draws upon A/C. 1/35/PV. 20 (1980: 43-45,47-50); A/S-12/PV. 3 (1982: 31); 
A/38/PV. 13 (1983: 188); A/39/PV. 15 (1984: 297) and A/40/PV. 20 (1985: 61). 
32 Although all Gulf Arab sheikhdoms supported Iraq in its war against Iran, there were differing views 
among them about the severity of the threat posed by the Islamic Republic. While Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, 
and Bahrain were highly concerned over Iran's efforts to export its revolution to other Persian Gulf 
countries and over the spread of the war to their territory, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman - 
geographically more distant from the war front - had a less alarmist view and thereby better relations with 
Iran. (Marschall 2003: 62) 
33 Iran's accusations were true, for in addition to the fact that Egyptian workers living in Iraq were 
recruited to fight against Iran, Egypt sold armaments - such as small arms, ammunition, and anti-tank 
rockets - to warring Iraq (Cordesman and Wagner 1990: 119,135). 
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had proved, for its part, that international arms control deliberations were unable to 
bring about arrangements that would protect nations from the persistent peril of inter- 
state wars (CD/PV. 404,1987: 5). Frustrated by the constellations of the Iran-Iraq war, 
the officials of the Islamic Republic characterized the balance-sheet of international 
arms control as a record of consistent disappointments and called on the international 
community to take real arms control steps instead of organizing endless series of 
diplomatic meetings that only give empty promises. As the Iranian foreign minister 
Vilayati rhetorically asked: "How long will those [arms control] talks continue and how 
long should people wait [for tangible results]? God knows (A/S-12/PV. 3,1982: 33). "35 
Iran's view of the factors that were blocking progress in international arms control 
were summarized by Vilayati in his statement to the Conference on Disarmament in 
February 1986. The list he presented contained seven individual factors: (1) the arms 
race between the superpowers to gain larger spheres of influence in the world; (2) the 
efforts by the major powers to impose hegemonism on other states; (3) the efforts by the 
major powers to elevate arms racing in new dimensions; (4) the military manoeuvres 
and bases of the major powers in sensitive quarters of the world; (5) the major powers' 
efforts to fan up differences and border conflicts among Third World countries; (6) the 
suppressive policies of the major powers against Third World countries aiming to 
prevent developing countries from strengthening their independence and security and 
from making progress in various areas of societal life; and (7) the major power efforts to 
weaken the credibility of international organizations by exerting persistent influence on 
small countries. 36 (CD/PV. 343,1986: 343) 
While, despite the on-going war, Iranian authorities continued to underscore the 
Islamic Republic's willingness to contribute to international arms control deliberations 
and not to abandon that field of diplomatic activity, they nevertheless pointed out that 
the poor state of international arms control could be altered only if international 
34 Apart from acting as an important supply route for Iraq, Jordan provided volunteers, trained troops, and 
air bases as refuge for Saddam Hussein's military (ibid.: 74). 
35 For other similar Iranian pronouncements, see CD/PV. 242 (1984: 8) and CD/PV. 343 (1986: 7). 
36 Also note the following remark by Vilayati from June 1982: "Progress in such vital and delicate 
[international arms control] problems is impeded by differing opinions, procedural formalities, 
bureaucracy at the national and international level, the indifference of great powers, conflicts, competition 
and rivalries and the lack of confidence among the powers of the East and West, as a result of which the 
disarmament issue is deadlocked" (A/S-12/PV. 3,1982: 32). It is important to note here that, on occasion, 
both implicitly and explicitly, Iran's arms control officials made a certain qualification when discussing 
the problems of international arms control. This was the distinction made between the deeds of 
governments on the one hand and the deeds of ordinary people on the other. In the Iranian view, it was 
governments and power-seeking rulers, not ordinary people, who were responsible for the problems in 
arms control and world affairs in general. (A/35/PV. 33,1980: 680) 
136 
relations underwent a fundamental change. 37 An international order free from power 
politics, mistrust, and rivalries was seen by the Iranians as a necessary prerequisite for 
progress in international arms control. According to them, the establishment of 
international peace and security had to be based on the principle of common and equal 
security for all nations (CD/PV. 379,1986: 6). Hence, Iranian representatives 
maintained that although the main responsibility for arms control laid with the two 
superpowers whose huge weapons arsenals threatened the whole world, bilateral arms 
control between the United States and the Soviet Union would not benefit the nations of 
the Third World if they continued to remain the objects of the superpowers' 
domineering policies (A/S-15/PV. 3,1988: 45). 
Iran's calls for change in international relations in general and in arms control 
diplomacy in particular included statements that brought Iranian authorities' ideological 
premises properly to the fore. The incorporation of the theme of cultural development in 
Iran's arms control argumentation was a case in point. The Iranians argued that success 
in international arms control was ultimately dependent on states' readiness to transform 
morally, for the international community was suffering from cultural poverty, "a grave 
moral crisis. " As far as the linkage drawn by Iran between moral development and arms 
control was concerned, the June 1982 statement by the Islamic Republic's foreign 
minister to the UN General Assembly's second special session on disarmament was 
among the most articulate: "[Arms control] discussions, conferences and debates will 
attain the desired objectives only when the participants have the desire and 
determination in good faith to solve the difficulties, and this will not be possible unless 
morality, spirituality, perspicacity and international public opinion prevail. " 
(A/37/PV. 27,1982: 516; A/38/PV. 13,1983: 186 and A/S-12/PV. 3,1982: 32) 
Resultantly, the representatives of the Islamic Republic pointed out that it was 
necessary for the international community to follow the example of the Iranian 
revolution and to adher to the teachings of the prophets. 38 As noted by Iran's president 
Ali Khamenei: "The prophets invited people to submit to God, because this crushes the 
feeling of egocentrism and superiority in man [... ]. They persuaded man to control his 
37 The Islamic Republic declared that it did not intend to give up its faith in international law and in 
international efforts in the area of arms control. Instead, Iran's representatives stressed, their country's 
intention was to point out that those efforts needed "a new soul. " (CD/PV. 130,1981: 31 and A/S- 
12/PV. 3,1982: 33) 
38 The Iranians were of the opinion that the revolution in their country had partly been a consequence of 
the "inefficiency of the existing [social] systems in the world and the emptiness and falsehood of the 
slogans of democracy and equality in those systems" (A/42/PV. 6,1987: 26). 
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instinct of domination and superiority. They also warned against wasting human 
potential and slipping into the mire of moral corruption" (A/42/PV. 6,1987: 22). 
In Iran's opinion, it was the countries of the oppressed world that had to take the 
initiative and lead the fight against imperialistic forces' efforts to obstruct progress in 
international arms control: "We are looking forward to the day when the United Nations 
[... ] may free itself from the influential clutches of the superpowers [... ] and succeed in 
contributing to international peace, security and disarmament. That day shall never 
come except through the unity of the oppressed and tyrannized nations of the world and 
their faith and reliance on God the Almighty in their struggles against oppression and 
world imperialism" (A/S-12/PV. 3,1982: 36). 39 
In the end, Iranian authorities stressed, the future of the nations of the oppressed 
world would depend on the outlook they would choose. In the words of president 
Khamenei: "Exploiting his intrinsic talents man can build the world created for him in 
the most beautiful ways and, flying on the two wings of faith and knowledge, rise to the 
highest spiritual and material peaks. Conversely, man can create a hell of oppression 
and corruption by going astray and wasting and perverting his God-given potential" 
(A/42/PV. 6,1987: 22). According to the officials of the Islamic Republic, it was a 
sacred duty for states to strive for an international system that was free from war and 
built on the principles of justice and equality. 40 They claimed that Iran had paved the 
way for the oppressed by strictly following the prophetic maxim "neither oppress nor let 
others oppress you. " Iran's rejection of the Cold War international order, under which 
global security rested on the balance of power between two military blocs and not on 
the rule of law, the Iranian argument went, was a manifestation of the Islamic 
Republic's commitment and resolve. It was now the time for other states to take similar 
steps. (CD/PV. 343,1986: 7; A/42/PV. 6,1987: 23-25 and A/41/PV. 19,1986: 96) 
In order to explain away the apparent contradiction between Iran's calls for arms 
control on moral grounds and the fact that the country was in war with Iraq, the officials 
of the Islamic Republic argued that in the face of the international conspiracy aimed at 
destroying Iran's Islamic social order, Iranians had been left with no other choice than 
39 Iranian authorities claimed that the policies of imperialistic powers based on careful studies of the 
history of the peoples of the world. According to them, imperialists focused on the peoples' weaknesses 
and fuelled conflicts among individual countries for the purpose of exploitation and domination. (A/S- 
12/PV. 3,1982: 33) 
40 In the opinion of president Khamenei, surrender to the enemies of justice, virtuousness, and charity 
would only result in the destruction of those values and amount to acquiescence in evil, oppression, and 
corruption (A/42/PV. 6,1987: 23-25). 
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to take up arms. According to Iranian representatives, their country had made a number 
of friendly gestures to its neighbours immediately after the revolution in order to 
encourage the regional states to turn a new page in their relations and to commit 
themselves to arms control. The decisions taken by the Islamic Republic to withdraw 
from CENTO and to cancel the Shah government's orders of sophisticated conventional 
weaponry from Western suppliers were referred to as unambiguous diplomatic signals 
of post-revolutionary Iran's peaceful intentions and of its willingness to contribute to 
the ending of the regional arms race. However, Iranian officials told that the signals sent 
by their country had produced a disappointing response. In the words of one Iranian 
representative: "We never suspected that others were actually waiting to exploit the 
movement that had started in Iran towards demilitarization. What the Iranian people 
experienced was that good faith brought about foreign occupation and that, 
unfortunately, there was no way out except armed struggle. " (A/C. 1/35/PV. 52,1980: 
97) 
The Iranians thus maintained that external powers had compelled the Islamic 
Republic to stray from the path of arms control and rely on military force. After having 
pointed out that the defence of the Islamic Republic was not only a self-evident and 
legitimate right of the Iranian people but also a religious duty sanctioned by Islam, 41 
Iranian officials made no effort to hide their country's war objectives. As Iran's military 
managed, in 1982, to effectively liberate all of the Iranian territority occupied by Iraq 
and gained an upper hand in the war, the officials of the Islamic Republic began to 
emphasize that the punishment of the aggressor and the toppling of Saddam Hussein 
were their country's main preoccupations in the war. 42 These war objectives were 
defined by Iranian officials as defensive, for according to the Iranians, the long-term 
security of the Islamic Republic and the Persian Gulf region could not be ensured unless 
the regime of Saddam Hussein was overthrown. Iran's authorities argued that to give in 
to the "logic and adventurism of the oppressors" by making peace with Saddam Hussein 
would amount to inviting other parties to endanger the security of the Islamic Republic. 
In other words, the Iraqi government needed to be punished for the sake of deterring 
41 For this point, see A/37/PV. 41 (1982: 717); A/37/PV. 96 (1982: 1592) and A/41/PV. 19 (1986: 141- 
142). Hence, Iranian authorities often spoke of the Iran-Iraq war as a "sacred defence. " 
a' In September 1982, Saudi Arabia had proposed a peace agreement between Iran and Iraq which would 
have included a payment of $70 billion in reparations to the Islamic Republic. Unlike Saddam Hussein, 
who had immediately accepted the Saudi proposal, the Iranians had rejected it. Later, the Islamic 
Republic rejected the peace calls made by the Saudis in bilateral talks with Iran in May 1985. The Saudis 
reportedly again offered money to Iran to stop the war. (Pollack 2004: 194 and Marschall 2003: 83) 
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Iraq and other actors from militarily challenging Iran again in the future. (A/37/PV. 27. 
1982: 518-519; A/40/PV. 20,1985: 63-65 and A/42/PV. 6,1987: 41) 
In the Iranian argumentation, the theme of punishing the aggressor was inseperably 
linked with the notion of a just peace. The officials of the Islamic Republic pointed out 
that the Iranian definition of peace consisted of two equally important dimensions: first, 
of the absence of hostilities between the belligerents and, secondly, of the victim's 
agreement with the terms by which the hostilities were brought to an end - irrespective 
of whether such terms would please the aggressor or not. Iranian officials told that the 
Islamic Republic thought peace to be a beautiful word but found the word justice even 
more attractive. As a result, in its foreign policy, Iran would place greater priority on 
adherence to international principles based on justice than on bilateral relations with 
individual states. (A/40/PV. 69,1985: 89; A/41/PV. 19,1986: 109-110 and A/42/PV. 6, 
1987: 42) 
From the Iranian perspective, then, the question of Iraq was something that had to be 
dealt with before any meaningful steps in strengthening regional security in the Persian 
Gulf could be taken. Iran's representatives also made it known that due to the war with 
Iraq, the Islamic Republic felt it was not able to contribute to international arms control 
as much as it would have wanted to. 43 Yet, Iranian authorities did not consider the war 
against Iraq to be a total hindrance to substantive participation in international arms 
control deliberations. Quite to the contrary, the Iranians believed that their country had a 
lot to contribute to the subject matter, not least because of an important quality it 
possessed: Islamic Iran's arms control views were based on real-life experiences, not on 
hypothetical intellectual constructs. Whereas previously Iranian officials had backed 
this argument by pointing to the experiences of the Iranian people with the policies of 
the Shah and his foreign supporters, now they supported it by alluding to Iran's 
experiences in the war (A/S-12/PV. 3,1982: 34-35 and A/40/PV. 20,1985: 56). Due to 44 
43 Note, for example, the following statement by foreign minister Vilayati at the Conference on 
Disarmament in August 1986: "The Islamic Republic of Iran, as a newly born system, has been faced 
with numerous problems and obstacles which have been imposed upon it, and consequently we have not 
been able to play a complete and decisive role in the realization of the objectives of the Conference 
(CD/PV. 379,1986: 3). " Moreover, the war was told by the Iranians to have made it more difficult for the 
Islamic Republic to execute other foreign policy objectives, such as supporting the "oppressed" of the 
world (A/40/PV. 20,1985: 71-72). During the initial stages of the Iran-Iraq war, though, the authorities of 
the Islamic Republic seemed to be more confident of their ability to pursue an active foreign policy 
outside the war context (see A/36/PV. 26,1981: 118-120 and A/37/PV. 27,1982: 517). 
" Of course, in the Iranian analysis, the "imposed war" was a logical continuation of imperialistic 
powers' hostile policies towards Iran, and in this sense, the war did not fundamentally differ from those 
powers' antagonistic activities in the pre-war period. 
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the war and its negative implications, the officials of the Islamic Republic argued, the 
people of Iran possessed special realism and urgency as far as the need for practical 
measures in the realm of international arms control was concerned (CD/PV. 108,1981: 
13,16). 
At the same time, Iranian officials were careful to avoid implying that the Islamic 
Republic's arms control operations aimed at patching up Iran's military weaknesses on 
the battlefield. They claimed Iran to be capable of defeating Iraq militarily45 and said 
that their government's diplomatic activities in the area of multilateral arms control 
were part of the Islamic Republic's determination to work for the goal of a just world 
order. The officials of the Islamic Republic also liked to assert that it was hard to find 
any other nation taking the issue of international peace and security as seriously as Iran. 
(A/C. 1/35/PV. 52,1980: 96 and A/36/PV. 26,1981: 104-105) 
Consequently, in the course of the war years, Iran's arms control officials regularly 
discussed issues that pertained to global control of conventional weaponry. They 
stressed that, in the opinion of Iran, portrayed as a major victim of conventional arms 
use herself, the international community had paid far too little attention to the 
quantitative and qualitative regulation of such weapons. The Iranians regretted the lack 
of international interest in conventional arms control and warned that the destructive 
power of conventional armaments had almost reached that of WMD. Also, the Iranians 
stressed that the production, technological sophistication, and diversity of conventional 
weapons had reached an alarming level. Hence, they called for strong and immediate 
measures in conventional arms control and called on the international community to 
give conventional arms control the same emphasis and status as to the control of WMD. 
So far, the representatives of the Islamic Republic concluded, international 
achievements in the realm of conventional arms control had remained very modest. 
(CD/PV. 379,1986: 3,7; CD/PV. 242,1984: 11 and CD/PV. 308,1985: 7) 
On the one hand, Iran's war-time argumentation on conventional arms control 
reflected the Iranian leadership's desire to profile the Islamic Republic's standing in 
international arms control diplomacy. Following the general thrust of the Islamic 
as In this connection, the Iranians often maintained that the Islamic Republic was morally superior to Iraq 
which meant that Iran would inevitably win the war. In war, Iran's officials noted, faith and self-sacrifice, 
not weapons, played the decisive role. (A/35/PV. 33,1980: 674; CD/PV. 108,1981: 13 and A/42/PV. 6, 
1987: 43). Accordingly, the Iranians asserted that Iranian soldiers' eagerness for martyrdom neutralized 
the Iraqi advantage of easily acquiring sophisticated weaponry from both Western and Eastern bloc 
countries (CD/PV. 379,1986: 3). Yet, the Iranian assertions should not be interpreted as meaning that the 
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Republic's foreign policy, the efforts to build a distinct arms control identity for post- 
Pahlavi Iran included a strong universalist element: Iranian officials sought to portray 
the Islamic Republic as a defender and spokesman of the "oppressed" of the world. As a 
consequence, Iran continued its verbal attacks against the Cold War superpowers and 
their military policies. Iran's representatives asserted that in spite of paying lip service 
to the need for conventional arms control, the superpowers only focused on building up 
their military capabilities and imposed their arms racing on Third World nations by 
forcing developing countries to arm themselves as well (A/36/PV. 26,1981: 122 and 
CD/PV. 343,1986: 6-7). 
Furthermore, the Iranians maintained that socialism and capitalism were at such an 
impasse that the Soviet Union and the United States had to exploit the countries of the 
Third World through arms trade in order to save their social orders from collapsing. 
Therefore, Iranian representatives argued, neither one of the superpowers hesitated to 
scare the countries of the Third World with intense propaganda campaigns and to lure 
them into procuring state-of-the-art conventional weaponry. The pressure put by the 
superpowers was told by the Iranians to be directed especially towards countries that 
were involved in armed conflicts or situated close to conflict theaters because the 
anxieties of such countries were easy to manipulate. From the Iranian point of view, 
arms shipments by the superpowers were also always motivated by the great power 
desire to politically dominate the Third World. Overall, then, Iran's strong diplomatic 
criticism of imperialistic arms policies markedly coloured warring Iran's arms control 
operations. The officials of the Islamic Republic crystallized this aspect of Iran's 
argumentation into a slogan according to which arms control was a process that 
contributed to decolonization, whereas arms racing was a symptom of colonialism. 
(A/S-12/PV. 3,1982: 33; CD/PV. 379,1986: 5 and A/C. 1/41/PV. 24,1986: 19-20) 
Although the Islamic Republic enthusiastically voiced its views about conventional 
arms control and called for international steps in that area of multilateral diplomacy, it 
had very little to offer to the debate on concrete conventional arms control measures. 
Whether this resulted from the challenges and demands of the war against Iraq or from 
poor diplomatic capabilities, the fact remains that Iran's policy recommendations did 
not strike as having been founded on much of forethought. Quite the opposite, the 
Islamic Republic's diplomatic initiatives consisted of a set of general exhortations 
officials of the Islamic Republic overlooked or underestimated the importance of armaments in the war 
equation. Iran's arms control operations during the war were a clear indication to the contrary. 
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which, in the majority of the cases, were not elaborated on by Iranian officials. As a 
result, the singular Iranian proposals, such as the call for the establishment of zones free 
of conventional superpower weaponry (A/C. l/41. PV. 24,1986: 22) or for the adoption 
of a no-first-use of conventional weapons principle, a concept borrowed from the 
nuclear weapons debate, remained at the level of mere diplomatic remarks (CD/PV. 379, 
1986: 7). 46 
In a similar manner, Iran's allusions to the economic repercussions of arms racing 
lacked in-depth analyses. Even though the officials of the Islamic Republic persistently 
expressed their dissatisfaction, among others, with the fact that states' military budgets 
both in the developed and developing world kept on rising at a time when the people of 
the Third World suffered from the lack of food and education and other major social 
problems (A/S-12/PV. 3,1982: 31 and A/40/PV. 20,1985: 72), they did not provide any 
concrete roadmaps of how arms control measures could bring about changes in the 
prevailing conditions. Instead, the Iranians settled for making general calls for the sharp 
reduction of the world's military expenditures, the allocation of the resources reserved 
for military procurement to the economic and social development of the Third World, 
the control of the production of conventional weapons, the reorganization of 
international arms trade, and finally, the control of arms exports to the developing 
world. (A/S-12/PV. 3,1982: 33-34; CD/PV. 242,1984: 12 and A/S-15/PV. 3,1988: 45) 
While making such calls, Iranian officials saw to it that the Islamic Republic's views 
about its potential and actual allies in international arms control discussions were 
noticed. They let it be known that Iran identified itself diplomatically with the countries 
of the Third World and urged those states to refrain from buying armaments from the 
superpowers. Iran's arms control officials also stressed the importance of the Non- 
Aligned Movement's activities in the field of arms control, but demanded that the NAM 
should be "purged from the stooges of the superpowers. " The Iranians noted that joint 
arms control efforts by developing and non-aligned countries were a necessity because 
the superpowers and their allies were blocking all progress in conventional arms control 
46 Put into action, the idea of no-first-use of conventional weapons would mean that states would use 
conventional weapons only for defensive purposes, that is, only as a response to an armed attack. Given 
that the arms control officials of the Islamic Republic did not elaborate on what they meant by the no- 
first-use principle, many questions pertaining to the Iranian proposal remained unanswered. To give one 
example, the Iranians did not discuss what effects the adoption of such a principle would, or should, have 
on states' conventional weapons arsenals in quantitative or qualitative terms. 
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and rendering the arms control machinery of the UN impotent. 47 At the end of the day, 
the Iranians argued, countries that did not manufacture conventional weapons had to 
contribute to the creation of international arms control instruments dealing with this 
category of weaponry in order to strengthen their own national security. (A/37/PV. 27, 
1982: 520; A/38/PV. 13,1983: 181 and CD/PV. 404,1987: 4) 
3.3.3 The question of Iraq's surface-to-surface missiles 
In order to further Iran's security interests in the war against Iraq, the arms control 
officials of the Islamic Republic sought to draw the attention of the international 
community to weapons issues that were of critical concern to Iranians but which they 
were not able to deal with militarily on the war front. One of such issues was Iraq's use 
of surface-to-surface missiles against military and civilian targets in Iran. Targeted by 
Iraqi SSM, Iranian authorities referred to SSM as a category of conventional weapons 
whose production and transfers should be immediately controlled by the international 
community (CD/PV. 286,1984: 26). 
The use of SSM became part of Iraq's military operations soon after the war between 
the two countries had broken out. First Iraqi SSM were launched on 8 October 1980, 
and the target of these Soviet-supplied Frog-7 missiles was the Iranian city of Dizful 
(O'Ballance 1988: 38). Two days later, at the UN General Assembly, Iran strongly 
condemned Iraq's SSM attacks and accused the Iraqi regime of "fighting a dirty war of 
unprecedented cruelty and devastation. " The Iranian representative addressing the 
General Assembly said that the Iraqi missiles had been deliberately and indiscriminately 
fired at residential areas, hospitals, and schools around midnight while people were 
asleep. According to him, a great section of Dizful had been destroyed by Iraq's 
missiles. In this connection, the Iranian representative also elaborated on Iran's own war 
policy. By referring to guidelines set by Ayatollah Khomeini himself, he pointed out 
that the Islamic Republic would never conduct military operations against innocent Iraqi 
civilians. This, the Iranian representative stressed, was an imperative based on the 
principles of Islam. (A/35/PV. 33,1980: 674) 
On 26 October 1980, Iraq launched its second series of SSM attacks against Iran. 
Again, the missiles were targeted at the Iranian city of Dizful and caused civilian 
" As put by Iranian officials, the superpowers had "disarmed the United Nations" (A/S-12/PV. 3,1982: 
35). 
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casualties (O'Ballance 1988: 38). Iran expressed its anger about the strikes in the UN 
General Assembly's First Committee and accused Iraq of having relied on "barbaric and 
inhumane" methods of warfare. The Islamic Republic also asked what the responsibility 
of the countries supplying missiles to Iraq was for the lost Iranian lives and property. 
(A/C. l/35/PV. 20,1980: 44-45). During 1981-1982, Iraq launched altogether some 55 
Frog-7 SSM against Iranian targets (Navias 1993: 133). 48 In addition, from 1982 
onwards, Iraq began to deploy the Soviet-made Scud-B missile whose military 
effectiveness clearly exceeded that of the Frog-7 (Cordesman and Wagner 1990: 496- 
497). The continuation of Iraq's missile strikes and Iran's inability to produce an 
effective military response - partly resulting from the fact that the Islamic Republic 
lacked a SSM force of its own - prompted Iranian arms control officials to toughen their 
rhetoric on international fora. While intensely criticizing Iraq's SSM attacks and 
referring to the human and material costs of those strikes, Iran's representatives also 
expressed their astonishment at the international community's silence over Iraq's 
"savage" methods of warfare (CD/PV. 108,1981: 12 and A/37/PV. 27,1982: 518). 
Moreover, they reiterated that the Islamic Republic was committed to a policy of 
limiting its war operations to Iraqi military positions (CD/PV. 130,1981: 31). 
In 1983, the officials of the Islamic Republic stated that they had lost all their hope as 
far as the international community's intervention in Iraq's SSM use against Iranian 
civilian targets was concerned. 49 Henceforth, then, they pointed out, the only purpose of 
Iranian diplomatic statements on Iraqi missile strikes would be to provide information 
about the attacks so that the international community could have a "clearer picture of 
what is going on and understand why the Iranians feel that the only way to respond to 
this ruthless enemy is on the field of battle" (A/38/PV. 13,1983: 190). During 1984, Iran 
sought to realize this objective by listing and condemning the SSM attacks carried out 
by Iraq which totalled 27 that year (CD/PV. 254,1984: 32-33; A/39/PV. 15,1984: 297 
and Cordesman and Wagner 1990: 525). In April 1985, at the Conference on 
Disarmament, Iran's foreign minister accused Iraq of having violated the moratorium 
between the two countries which had been agreed upon on 12 June 1984 through the 
mediation of the UN and under which both Iran and Iraq had promised not to shell or 
48 In 1980, in total, Iraq had fired 10 Frog-7 missiles at Iran (Navias 1993: 133). 
49 According to Iranian officials, the international community's lack of interest in Iraq's war-time crimes 
resulted from the manipulations of the "oppressor superpowers" (A/38/PV. 13,1983: 190). 
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bomb each other's civilian areas. 50 Besides complaining about the Iraqi armed forces' 
contravention of the June 1984 moratorium, foreign minister Vilayati reminded the CD 
that Iraq had not paid any heed to the UN secretary-general's pleas for the cessation of 
military attacks on civilian and population centres which he had presented to both 
s countries one month earlier. ' (CD/PV. 308,1985: 8) 
It was not thus unexpected that later in 1985, the tone of Iranian statements became 
more strict. Iran's officials pointed out that Iraq's contravention of the June 1984 
moratorium and other war-time crimes had once again shown that the only effective 
way to counter Iraq was through the use of force. Iran's "limited retaliatory actions" 
were said to have been the only factor which had made the Iraqi regime reduce its 
missile attacks against Iranian civilian targets (A/40/PV. 20,1985: 58-60). In fact, by 
the time Iran made these points, it had been able to create a SSM force of its own. Iran 
fired its first Scud-B missiles in March 1985 (Cordesman and Wagner 1990: 497) and it 
continued to strike Iraqi targets, both military and civilian, throughout the rest of the 
war. 52 Iran acquired its SSM with the help of China, North Korea, Libya, and Syria, in 
addition to which the Islamic Republic bought them from the open market (Ehteshami 
2000a: 150). 
After Iran had attained the ability to hit Iraq with its own SSM, the Islamic 
Republic's missile-related statements concentrated on legitimizing the Iranian strikes. 
The earlier remarks about Iran's military restraint were thus quietly sidelined. The 
officials of the Islamic Republic continued to refer to Iraq's attacks against Iranian 
civilian targets53 - characterized by the Iranians, among others, as war crimes defying 
all norms of international law - and emphasized that Iran had been left with no other 
choice than to retaliate in kind (A/41/PV. 19,1986: 102). Without the Islamic Republic's 
SSM reprisals, the Iranian argument went, nothing would have deterred Iraq from 
launching additional missiles. In this sense, then, Iran's arms control officials defined 
the Islamic Republic's missile strikes as purely defensive and, following an already 
50 The first time Iran had accused Iraq of having contravened the June 1984 moratorium had already been 
in December 1984 (O'Ballance 1988: 154). 
51 For the UN secretary-general's appeals of March 1985 regarding the implementation of the June 1984 
moratorium, see <http: //www. un. int/iran/res/doclO. html> and <http: //www. un. int/iran/res/docl l . html>. 52 Iran launched some 14 Scud-B missiles against Iraqi targets in 1985,8 in 1986,18 in 1987, and 77 in 
1988 (Navias 1993: 133). 
53 It is estimated that Iraq's war-time missile attacks on Iranian cities killed in all some 2,000 people 
(Tarzi 2004: 97). In addition, Iraq's missile strikes had a significant terrorizing effect on the Iranian 
people. The fear that Iraq would load chemical warheads on its SSM naturally added to the terror effect. 
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familiar argumentative guideline, sought to portray Iran as a victim of the policies of the 
immoral and inhumane Iraqi regime. 
As the intermittent SSM exchanges of 1986 and 1987 transformed into a 52-day 
period of full-blown missile war in 1988 - the most intensive phase of the so-called war 
of the cities during which an estimated total number of 264 SSM were fired (Cordesman 
and Wagner 1990: 502) - Iran's officials emphasized again that the missile attacks by 
the Islamic Republic were manifestations of its right to respond to Iraq's SSM 
aggressions. As one Iranian diplomat put it in April 1988: " [... ] our attacks have only a 
deterrent aspect. We did not start the 'war of the cities, ' we will not continue the 'war of 
the cities' [... ]. [... ] whenever Iraq stops attacks on cities, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
will stop" (CD/PV. 456,1988: 7). Apart from asserting Iran's innocence in the 
intensification of the missile exchanges between the warring parties in 1988, the arms 
control officials of the Islamic Republic wanted to signal to Iraq and to the countries 
supporting it that Iraq's SSM attacks would not affect the course of the war but only 
increase Iran's resolve to continue the battle against the regime of Saddam Hussein 
(CD/PV. 445,1988: 8). 
3.3.4 Maritime security in the Persian Gulf 
Another war-time issue that caused considerable concern among the Iranian 
leadership and was regularly raised internationally by the Islamic Republic's arms 
control officials was the maritime security situation in the Persian Gulf. Due to the 
waterway's fundamental importance to Iran's national and economic security, let alone 
for the Islamic Republic's ability to wage the war against Iraq in the first place, the 
question of maritime security in the Gulf occupied the minds of Iranian decision-makers 
right from the outset of the Iran-Iraq conflict. As the war aggravated foreign powers' 
concerns about the freedom and safety of navigation in the Persian Gulf and 
subsequently brought about an increased superpower naval presence in the Gulf and the 
Indian Ocean, 54 the Islamic Republic stepped up its criticism of the superpowers' 
military moves in the region. 
In the opinion of Iranian authorities, both superpowers, but the United States in 
particular, used the Iran-Iraq war as a pretext under which they dispatched naval units in 
sa For the naval presence of the superpowers in the Gulf and the Indian Ocean during the initial phases of 
the Iran-Iraq war, see EI-Shazly (1998: 146-151). 
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the Gulf and the Indian Ocean (A/36/PV. 26,1981: 116). The representatives of the 
Islamic Republic argued that the dispatches pointedly illustrated that the United States 
and the Soviet Union based their foreign policies on a conception of racial superiority 
among nations. According to the Iranians, the feeling of racial superiority explained not 
only the superpowers' shameless intrusion into the Gulf and the Indian Ocean, but also 
their arrogant contention that they had vital national interests to protect in the region. 
(A/38/PV. 13,1983: 192). Moreover, Iran's arms control officials expressed their 
disapproval of the regional states' support for the superpowers' naval operations. For 
example, Oman, which had allowed the U. S. navy to control the Masirah island base in 
return for military aid (EI-Shazly 1998: 146-147), was strongly condemned by the 
Iranians for placing military bases at the disposal of the "world-devouring imperialism 
of America. " (A/36/PV. 26,1981: 123 and A/S-12/PV. 3,1982: 36) 
Regularly, then, the representatives of the Islamic Republic made it known that they 
strongly opposed the efforts of foreign governments to project naval power in the 
Persian Gulf and act as "policemen" for the region. In their view, the security of the 
waterway had to be safeguarded exclusively by the regional states. (A/35/PV. 33,1980: 
673). Foreign naval presence in the Gulf and the Indian Ocean "for the protection of 
imperialistic interests" was defined by the Iranians as a factor that undermined the 
political tranquility and stability of the region. On this basis, the leadership of the 
Islamic Republic demanded that the superpowers should end their military presence in 
the Gulf and the Indian Ocean, stop interfering in the affairs of the region, and close 
down all naval and other military bases they had in the area. (A/36/PV. 26,1981: 124- 
125 and A/37/PV. 27,1982: 519). The officials of the Islamic Republic consistently 
supported - as the Iranian government under the Shah had done - the Indian Ocean 
zone of peace initiative at the UN (A/37/PV. 27,1982: 519), and more ambitiously, 
insisted on the elimination of great power military presence and rivalries from all other 
regions of the world as well (A/S-12/PV. 3,1982: 36). 
In spite of its calls for naval arms control and for joint regional efforts to guarantee 
the security of the Gulf and the Indian Ocean, however, warring Iran reserved itself the 
right to take unilateral military steps if necessary. Due to the importance of the Gulf to 
their country, Iranian arms control officials argued, the Islamic Republic was entitled to 
control that strategically vital waterway: "The Islamic Republic [... ] is responsible for 
the security of the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz and will sharply oppose any 
measure that disturbs the security and traquility of the area and creates obstacles for the 
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passage of ships and marine transportation, and will with all its might ensure the 
security of that waterway on the basis of international laws and regulations" (ibid. ). 
Accordingly, Iran notified the international community that it would firmly deal with 
any conspiracy or act of aggression directed against the Iranian revolution or the 
country's Islamic regime. Iran made it also clear that it would promptly react to any 
action aimed at endangering Iran's vital interests in the Gulf. If Iran's interests were put 
into jeopardy, the representatives of the Islamic Republic threatened, it would result in 
complete closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the entrance point to the Persian Gulf, and the 
stoppage of the flow of oil from the region. Furthermore, Iranian officials stressed that 
the Islamic Republic would not tolerate arms shipments to Iraq through the strait. 
Notwithstanding their tough language and warnings, however, Iranian representatives 
simultaneously assured that their country would carry out its threats only in extreme 
circumstances. Therefore, the regional states would not need to worry about Iran's 
intentions in the Gulf which, the Iranians stressed, were entirely defensive. The Islamic 
Republic was also told to be willing to establish close and friendly relations with its 
littoral neighbours on the Arab side of the Gulf. Those who claimed the opposite and 
portrayed the Islamic Republic as an evil actor, the Iranians argued, were the same 
foreign powers that supported Iraq's war efforts and sought to justify their military 
presence in the region. (A/37/PV. 27,1982: 519 and A/3 8/PV. 13,1983: 190) 
The mixture of threats, assurances, and calls for arms control characterized Iran's 
Gulf-related statements even after the start of the so-called tanker war in the Iran-Iraq 
conflict in 1984. The tanker war was a direct result of Iraq's conclusion that after four 
years of fighting against Iran, its military would not be able to achieve a decisive 
breakthrough on the battlefield. Therefore, in order to weaken Iran's economy and to 
internationalize the Iran-Iraq war, and thereby force Iran to end the hostilities and to sit 
down at the negotiating table, Iraq took advantage of its airpower superiority and started 
to hit economic targets that were vital for the Islamic Republic's ability to fight the war, 
such as tankers that carried Iranian oil through the Gulf, oil refineries, and Iranian oil- 
export terminals. (El-Shazly 1998: 1) 
The Iranian leadership was well aware of Iraq's objectives. But according to Iranian 
officials, Iraq's attacks on commercial shipping in the Gulf were a desperate attempt to 
ignore the fact that the tide of the war had turned in favour of the Islamic Republic. The 
Iraqi strikes were said by the Iranians to have only caused tension throughout the 
region, endangered international peace and security, and put the stability of the world 
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economy at risk. (A/39/PV. 15,1984: 297 and A/40/PV. 20,1985: 63-65). Iran's 
response to the Iraqi actions was composed of a diplomatic and military component. 
Iran regularly condemned Iraq's operations in international diplomatic fora and asked 
why the UN allowed Iraq to violate international law by targeting vessels belonging to 
non-belligerent countries in the Gulf. In the Iranian officials' view, the world 
organization's indifference in the matter encouraged Iraq to continue its unlawful 
attacks. (A/39/PV. 15,1984: 296-297) 
Militarily, Iran opted for retaliating against Iraq by harassing and attacking the 
shipping of Iraq's main financial and logistical supporters, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. 55 
Iran's decision to target Iraq's Gulf allies was a consequence of the fact that by the time 
of the tanker war's start in 1984, Iraq no longer exported oil by sea through the Gulf. 
For this reason, Iran - whose navy had dominated the Iran-Iraq conflict's naval theater 
right from the beginning of the war - was forced to retaliate against maritime traffic that 
indirectly benefited Iraq. During the tanker war, the Islamic Republic threatened its Gulf 
Arab neighbours on a continuous basis and referred to unspecified dire consequences 
should they continue to contribute to the Iraqi war effort. Iranian authorities also 
reminded their Arab neighbours of the Iranian position according to which Saddam 
Hussein's regime had to be toppled and punished for the sake of a lasting peace in the 
Gulf. 
Intermittently, when the fluctuating war-time relations between Iran and the Gulf 
Arab sheikhdoms were undergoing a warmer period, though, the Islamic Republic 
flirted with them by emphasizing the need for strong and friendly relations among the 
littoral states of the Persian Gulf. 56 In 1986, as part of Iran's efforts to drive a 
diplomatic wedge between Iraq and other Gulf Arab states and to get foreign military 
forces out of the region, the officials of the Islamic Republic stressed that all littoral 
states of the Gulf had to explore the possibilities that were available for making 
arrangements for the establishment of a durable and permanent peace in the region. 
Iranian officials proposed the establishment of an indigenous Gulf security arrangement 
that would be built on five fundamental conditions: absolute respect for the regional 
states' sovereignty, the regional states' political independence and territorial integrity, 
ss In the period of 1980-1988, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, both highly fearful of the Islamic Republic's 
radical ideology and military intentions, financed the Iraqi war effort with an average of $500 million per 
month (Mofid 1990: 369). 
56 The amalgam of tough and soft tones in Iran's diplomatic language vis-ä-vis Gulf Arab countries is 
well represented in A/41 /PV. 19 (1986: 111). 
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the principle of non-intervention in the regional states' internal affairs, and lastly, extra- 
regional states' neutrality with regard to the Iran-Iraq war. 57 (S/18376,1986: 12) 
Naturally, foreign powers, who were increasingly worried about the developments in 
the Gulf, continued to get their share of the Islamic Republic's verbal attacks. This was 
the case especially after 1987 when the U. S. -led Western naval intervention in the Gulf 
to protect Kuwaiti and Saudi oil exports took place. 58 In the Iranian opinion, the foreign 
naval presence in the Gulf was a manifestation of outside powers' eagerness to 
safeguard their interests in the region without bothering to take into account the interests 
of the Gulf countries themselves (A/42/PV. 6,1987: 56). Not unexpectedly, Iran's 
diplomatic criticism was mainly targeted at the United States or the "arch-Satan, " to 
borrow the epithet used by the Iranian authorities. According to Iran's arms control 
officials - who feared that the U. S. intervention in the Gulf was designed to pressure 
Iran to stop the fighting and to impose a cease-fire favouring Iraq, and who were not 
sure whether the Americans had even more vicious military intensions vis-a-vis the 
Islamic Republic59 -, the naval presence of the United States seriously undermined the 
security situation in the region. As argued by foreign minister Vilayati at the UN 
General Assembly's third special session on disarmament in June 1988: "The military 
forces of the United States and its allies [... ] invaded the Persian Gulf and, under the 
guise of maintaining the security of this international waterway, caused its increasing 
instability. In less than a year since the dispatch of foreign forces to the Persian Gulf, 
there has not been a single day without an incident [... ]" (A/S-15/PV. 3,1988: 48-49). 
Iranian authorities used the naval incidents in the Gulf - especially the U. S. strikes at 
Iran's naval and oil installations - as examples of America's hostility towards Iranians 
and of outside powers' imperialistic aspirations to dominate the region (A/42/PV. 6, 
1987: 51,56). To block these alleged ambitions, the officials of the Islamic Republic 
voiced Iran's categorical rejection of the superpower rivalry and domination efforts in 
the Persian Gulf (A/S-15/PV. 3,1988: 49). They pointed out that there was an urgent 
need for naval arms control measures in the Gulf and called for an immediate and 
unconditional withdrawal of all foreign naval forces from the region. 60 Iran's calls were 
S' Iran tried to promote the idea of an indigenous Gulf security arrangement also in 1987 and 1988 
through bilateral consultations with the Gulf Arab governments (Marschall 2003: 93). 
58 Responding to Kuwait's request for the protection of its tankers, also the Soviet Union dispatched a 
naval force in the Gulf in 1987. 
59 For a discussion of these Iranian fears, see Ramazani (1990b: 38) and McNaugher (1989: 179). 
60 In the course of 1987-1988, naval units from the following extra-regional states were dispatched in the 
Gulf: the United States (29 warships in 1987 and 32 in 1988), the United Kingdom (18/8), the Soviet 
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supported by statements which concluded that, due to the heavy foreign naval presence 
in the Gulf that aimed at humiliating and imposing pressure on the littoral states, the 
establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean was more important than ever. 61 
(A/C. 1/42/PV. 44,1987: 46) 
The Islamic Republic's Gulf-related deliberations based on the core premise or belief 
that regional arrangements free from the influence of the East and the West were the 
best way of ensuring security in the region. Iranian authorities pointed out that the 
Islamic Republic itself was ready to contribute to the establishment of an indigenous 
regional security system and that Iran had already called for concrete steps to be taken 
in that direction. In the opinion of the Islamic Republic, and this was made clear on a 
number of occasions, the dismantling of all foreign military bases and the elimination of 
foreign military presence in the Persian Gulf constituted the fundamental first step in 
any regional security framework. In addition, the Iranians continued, if such an 
arrangement was to materialize, all the regional states should be internationally assured 
against both intra- and extra-regional acts or threats of aggression. To present the 
Islamic Republic's intentions in a good light, Iranian officials said that their country had 
been willing to participate in international mine-sweeping operations in the Gulf but 
that Iran's offers had been rejected by the "proponents of tension in the region and 
particularly by Iraq, which is responsible for mining the Persian Gulf. " (CD/PV. 404, 
1987: 5 A/S-15/PV. 3,1988: 49) 
What the Iranians were less enthusiastic to elaborate upon was the military operations 
of their own naval forces in the maritime theater of the Iran-Iraq conflict. Even after the 
arrival of the foreign armada to the Gulf in 1987, Iran continued to retaliate against 
Iraq's tanker strikes by harassing and attacking third party vessels. Eventually, such 
actions brought the Iranian navy into direct conflict with foreign naval forces in the Gulf 
and particularly with those of the United States. The naval clashes between the Islamic 
Republic and the United States in the course of 1987-1988 constituted a heavy blow not 
only to the Iranian navy but also to the country's war morale in general. 62 Consequently, 
the negative repercussions of the tanker war partially contributed to the fact that the 
Union (15/8), France (14/7), Italy (8/6), Belgium (4/2), and the Netherlands (4/2) (El-Shazly 1998: 239, 
256). 
61 In this connection, Iran's representatives also criticized the UN for its inability to deliver tangible 
results in the field of naval arms control. The Iranians argued, among others, that the world organization 
had done nothing to condemn the presence and actions of foreign naval forces in the Persian Gulf (A/S- 
15/PV. 3,1988: 49). 
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leadership of the Islamic Republic finally decided to abandon its unbending war policy 
and, on 18 July 1988, announced its unconditional acceptance of the UN Security 
Council resolution 598 which established a cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war. 63 The cease- 
fire took effect a month later, on 20 August 1988. 
3.4 The Islamic Republic's Post-War Rearmament Program64 
Iran's decision to end the war with Iraq was in many ways a bitter and a humiliating 
experience for the authorities of the Islamic Republic. For years, they had asked the 
Iranian people to bear the enormous personal and societal costs of the war, the 
continuation of which was declared to be essential for the sake of the revolution and 
Islam. And yet, in the end, the Islamic Republic's main war objectives during 1982- 
1988 never materialized: Iran was neither able to punish the Iraqi leadership for the 
initiation of the Iran-Iraq war and nor was it capable of exporting its revolution to Iraq 
by overthrowing the regime of Saddam Hussein. Instead, by all accounts, the eight-year 
war with Iraq left a disastrous legacy to the Iranian nation. Most strikingly, an estimated 
450,000-730,000 Iranians, including both combatants and civilians, were killed as a 
result of the conflict, in addition to which some 600,000-1,200,000 Iranians were 
wounded in the course of the war (Cordesman and Wagner 1990: 3). 65 The economic 
costs of the Iran-Iraq conflict were equally dramatic. According to one estimate, the 
grand total economic costs of the conflict to both warring parties were as huge as 
$1,097 billion, of which the Islamic Republic's share alone accounted for $644.3 billion 
(Mofid 1990: 368). 66 
62 For the tanker war clashes between Iran and the United States, see E1-Shazly (1998: 299,353-356) and 
Ramazani (1990b: 41-44,50). 
63 By agreeing to discontinue all military actions related to the war, as demanded in the Security 
Council's resolution, Iran's acceptance of the cease-fire effectively amounted to a unilateral arms control 
measure. 
6' This section deals with Iran's conventional weapons programs. The Islamic Republic's post-war 
interest in WMD will be discussed in chapter 6. Given that the question of Iran's SSM has been linked, 
first and foremost, to the diplomatic and scholarly debate on the Islamic Republic's WMD - and 
especially nuclear weapons - ambitions, Iran's rearmament efforts in the SSM sphere will be discussed 
separately in chapter 5. This, of course, is not to suggest that SSM have not played an important role in 
Iran's conventional weapons arsenal. 
65 The respective rough estimates for Iraqi casualties are 150,000-340,000 killed and 400,000-700,000 
wounded (Cordesman and Wagner 1990: 3). According to official Iranian sources, some 205,000 Iranians 
- including both combatants and civilians - lost their lives in the Iran-Iraq war (IRMA, 23 September 
2000). 
66 These figures mean that in 1980-1988, on average each year, 60 percent of Iran's and 111 percent of 
Iraq's GNP went to war-related costs (Mofid 1990: 368). 
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The human and material costs of war, together with the conflict's domestic political 
ramifications, largely explained why the Iranian leadership ultimately recognized that 
ending the war was in the Islamic Republic's interest. The Iranian leadership's fear that 
the hardships and the war-weariness of the Iranian people would turn the nation against 
the Islamic regime was a major factor contributing to Iran's acceptance of the cease-fire. 
Iraq's military advances on the battlefront during 1988, the naval intervention of the 
United States in the Gulf in 1987, together with the diplomatic pressure put on the 
Islamic Republic from various directions, were also partly responsible for the Iranian 
leadership's eventual - and, indeed, for many a surprising - decision to disengage the 
country from the long-lived conflict. (Ramazani 1990b: 49-52 and Moin 1999: 267- 
269) 
After the Islamic Republic had unconditionally accepted the UN Security Council 
Resolution 598, Iran's leadership immediately began to justify the decision to the 
domestic audience in Iran. In this process, three main arguments were put forth. First, 
Iranian authorities emphasized that the war had not mattered that much to the Islamic 
Republic after all. Whereas in the course of the conflict Iran's leaders had presented the 
Iran-Iraq war as an inevitable and a necessary struggle against the international 
conspirators responsible for the conflict and as a boon to the vitality of Iran's Islamic 
system, now they maintained that the conflict had become a strain on the execution of 
the Iranian revolution's goals and ideals. Of course, the leaders of the Islamic Republic 
stressed, Iran would continue its battle against the forces of evil but, from now on, the 
fight would take place outside the burdensome war context. (Gieling 1999: 169) 
Iranian authorities' argumentative U-turn was further evident in the statements that 
referred to the history of Islam and drew a parallel between the Islamic Republic's 
acceptance of the cease-fire and the actions of Prophet Muhammad. Pointing to the so- 
called treaty of Hubaidiya concluded between the Prophet and the pagan Meccans in 
628, Iran's leaders argued that the Prophet himself had viewed peace with an enemy as 
a wise strategic move. The fact that Ayatollah Khomeini had personally blessed the 
cease-fire decision was used as the third principal argument to justify Iran's desire to 
end the war. By presenting the acceptance of the Security Council Resolution 598 as 
Khomeini's personal decision, Iranian authorities tried to convince the Iranian people 
that the supreme leader's acceptance of the cease-fire testified to a far-sighted strategy 
based on divine inspiration. (Ibid.: 166,169-170) 
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Iranian authorities' attempts to shift the Iranian people's attention from the war 
experience to the post-war era were not solely part of the regime's face-saving efforts 
but also a reflection of the fact that the Iranian government was faced with a task of 
huge proportions, namely the country's post-war reconstruction. In the area of foreign 
policy, the imperative of reconstruction brought the issue of Iran's relations with the 
rest of the world to the fore. On the one hand, the leaders of the Islamic Republic had to 
rethink and revise their foreign policy priorities and to formulate a diplomatic course 
that would directly benefit their reconstruction efforts. In practice, this meant that the 
Islamic Republic had to improve its relations with foreign governments at the expense 
of its ideological objectives. On the other hand, Iran's leaders had to focus on ensuring 
that on the threshold of the post-war era, the country's national security would not be 
threatened. Otherwise, the reconstruction efforts would not stand a chance of success. 
Soon after the end of the war, thus, the Islamic Republic started to rearm and modernize 
its armed forces. 
When the war between Iran and Iraq broke out in September 1980, the Iranian 
military was undergoing a period of major internal tumult. The chaos within the armed 
forces resulted from the general upheaval within the Iranian society as well as from the 
steps taken by the power-holders of the newly established Islamic Republic to 
systematically purge the military from elements loyal to the monarchy and other 
political tendencies regarded as a threat to the new regime. At first, the purges in the 
military concerned those high-ranking officers of the armed forces that had been closely 
identified with the policies of the Shah's regime. Later, the authorities of the Islamic 
Republic targeted the elements of the military personnel that could not convince the 
Iranian leadership of their loyalty or, more seriously, had directly taken part in the coup 
attempts made in the country in the course of 1980.67 
In spite of the demands of some revolutionary forces in Iran, the leftist groups in 
particular, that Iran's armed forces - commonly regarded as a symbol of the ousted 
Shah's reign - should be replaced with a people's army, the leadership of the Islamic 
Republic ultimately decided not to dismantle Iran's regular armed forces. There were 
three main reasons for this. First, the Soviet invasion of neighbouring Afghanistan in 
67 The military personnel targeted by the Islamic Republic's authorities faced execution, imprisonment, 
and other forms of punishment such as domestic exile and forced retirement. For a detailed discussion of 
the purge and the punishment of Iranian military personnel after the 1979 revolution, as well as of the 
coup attempts of 1980 in which some active and retired members of the officer corps were involved, see 
Zabih (1988: 115-130) and Schahgaldian (1987: 17-27). 
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December 1979 and Iran's mounting tensions with Iraq illustrated that the Islamic 
Republic needed a professional military to protect itself against external threats. 
Secondly, the ethnic-separatist and tribal uprisings that took place across Iran following 
the revolution demanded the Islamic regime to retain the country's military functional. 68 
The third factor contributing to the regular armed forces' survival was the fact that the 
decision-makers of the Islamic Republic had conflicting views about the future of the 
country's military establishment. Thanks to those among the political elite who spoke 
for the co-optation of the regular armed forces to the structures of the Islamic Republic, 
the regular military managed to survive. (Hunter 1992: 47) 
In the end, it was the commencement of the Iran-Iraq war that kept Iran's regular 
armed forces existentially afloat. After the hostilities between the two neighbours had 
broken out, the leaders of the Islamic Republic reviewed their policy vis-a-vis the 
country's military establishment. As a result, they brought the wave of purge and 
punishment to a halt and declared their intention to instead fully Islamize the Iranian 
military (Zabih 1988: 128). 69 But while the regular armed forces bore the main 
responsibility for war operations against Iraq's troops, Iran's Islamic leadership 
remained highly suspicious of the military establishment's depth of commitment and of 
its loyalty to the country's new regime. These suspicions led the leaders of the Islamic 
Republic to strengthen the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps in Iran's 
military scene. Initially, after the revolution, the IRGC had been established to 
counterbalance the regular armed forces by internally defending the revolution. 
The status of Iran's regular armed forces was further undermined by Iranian leaders' 
undervaluation of the importance of training, expertise, formal organization, and 
technology in the war equation. The political elite of the Islamic Republic believed that 
ideology, fervor, and commitment could be translated into tangible and powerful 
military assets. As far as arms procurement and equipment maintenance were 
concerned, this belief produced major practical difficulties for warring Iran's military 
forces. For example, the Iranian leadership's decision after the revolution to cancel $11 
billion in arms on order from the United States proved to be short-sighted, for later in 
the course of the war against Iraq, the Islamic Republic had to spend huge amounts of 
68 In the aftermath of the revolution, all Iranian ethnic minority groups, save Azari-Turks, demanded 
autonomy for themselves. However, the leadership of the Islamic Republic portrayed such demands as an 
imperialist plot and crushed any challenge to the central government in Tehran militarily. (Menashri 
1990: 14) 
69 For the Islamization efforts in practice, see Zabih (1988: 136-161). 
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money to find spare parts and replacements on the black market for the U. S. weaponry 
in Iran's arsenal. (Chubin 1997a: 230) 
The confrontational nature of Islamic Iran's foreign policy was another factor that 
detrimentally affected Iran's war-time arms procurement efforts. As a result of the 
seizure of U. S. diplomats as hostages in November 1979 and the major diplomatic crisis 
between the Islamic Republic and the United States that ensued, Iran practically lost its 
access to Western armaments and had to desperately find alternative weapons sources. 
Consequently, during the war years, Iran imported most of its arms from China, North 
Korea, the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites, as well as from a number of 
developing countries in Asia and Latin America. In terms of conversion and integration, 
the inflow of military hardware from a wide variety of states - by the end of the war, the 
Islamic Republic had received weapons supplies from more than twenty different 
sources - posed remarkable challenges to Iran's armed forces. And yet in the end, those 
imports did not manage to alleviate the equipment deficiencies - particularly in the 
spheres of armor as well as naval and air warfare - that had resulted from Iran's 
inaccessibility to Western and especially U. S. hardware. (Cordesman 1993: 398-401 
and Chubin 1994: 18-19) 
3.4.1 Iran's foreign weapons sources 
After the hostilities between Iran and Iraq terminated in 1988, the leadership of the 
Islamic Republic embarked upon a reconstruction strategy composed of three major 
elements: economic development, opening to the outside world, and rearmament of 
Iran's armed forces. Although the general thrust of the reconstruction strategy received 
wide support within the Islamic Republic's political elite, there were differing views 
among the elite of the relative importance of each of the strategy's three elements. Thus, 
for example, there were elite voices that called for the reduction of military expenditures 
and the number of men serving in the country's armed forces. Because of the lack of 
progress in the peace negotiations between the Islamic Republic and Iraq, and due to 
Iran's volatile security environment and the Iranian leadership's desire not to anger the 
country's military establishment, however, those suggestions did not materialize. 
Moreover, the mere fact that Iran had lost some 40-60 percent of its major land-force 
weaponry during the final stages of the war in the spring and summer of 1988 made the 
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rearmament program a necessity. (Hashim 1995: 50; Hunter 1992: 54 and Cordesman 
2000a: 2) 
The Islamic Republic's post-war rearmament efforts based on a number internal 
evaluations that had been conducted in 1988 and 1989 regarding the war-time 
performance of the various wings of the Iranian armed forces. One of the lessons drawn 
by the Iranians from the war was that their vulnerability to international diplomatic 
measures blocking Iran's access to the international arms market had to be significantly 
reduced. Iranian authorities concluded that the impact of such arms control measures 
would be best eliminated through the establishment of diverse and reliable sources of 
weapons supply, the stockpiling of large amounts of armaments and spare parts in case 
there would be critical interruptions in the supply chain, and the enhancement of 
domestic arms production in Iran. (Ehteshami 1993: 76 and Chubin 1994: 18) 
As the Islamic Republic's access to the badly needed Western-made weapons 
systems continued to be highly limited even after the end of the war, Iran's post-war 
rearmament efforts focused on arms deals with the same principal suppliers that had 
shipped armaments to Iran during the war period. The first major sign of Iran's intention 
to rebuild and at the same time modernize the country's weapons inventory was the 
agreement signed between the Islamic Republic and the Soviet Union in the summer of 
1989 during Ali Akbar Hashimi Rafsanjani's visit to Moscow. In this arms and military 
assistance agreement, which formed a part of a more comprehensive $15 billion trade 
and investment deal between the two countries, the Soviet Union pledged to provide 
Iran with modern advanced weapons systems, including MiG-29 fighters, T-72 main 
battle tanks, air-to-air missiles, anti-aircraft missile systems, and air defence radar 
systems. (Ehteshami 1994: 33-34) 
Subsequently, the Islamic Republic continued to import various types of modern 
conventional weaponry from Russian manufacturers. By turning to Russia, the Islamic 
Republic tried to get hold of the kind of advanced weaponry it had not been able 
procure from Western producers because of the political obstacles involved. In addition 
to the weapons systems mentioned above, Iran's post-war arms imports from Russia 
included BMP-1. BMP-2, and other armored infantry fighting vehicles, possibly large 
numbers of M-46 and D-30 artillery weapons, AT-2, AT-3, and AT-4 anti-tank guided 
missile launchers, Su-24 fighters, Mi-17 support and utility helicopters, SA-6 and SA-5 
air-defence systems, three Kilo-class submarines, advanced torpedoes, as well as 
modern anti-ship mines. (Cordesman 2000a: 70-71 and Eisenstadt 1996: 37) 
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Arms acquisitions from China also played a central role in Iran's post-war 
rearmament program. While during the Iran-Iraq conflict the Islamic Republic had used 
China mainly as a source for low-quality replacements and ammunitions, Iran's post- 
war procurements from the Chinese focused on more advanced weaponry, such as 
Type-69 tanks, 146mm self-propelled weapons, Type-63 107mm multiple-rocket 
launchers, F-7M fighters, HQ-2B surface-to-air missile batteries, Houdong-class missile 
patrol boats, C-802 and C-801 K anti-ship missiles, HY-2 coastal missiles, and EM-52 
rocket-propelled sea-mines. Russia and China aside, the Islamic Republic sought to 
procure advanced conventional weaponry from a number of other countries as well. For 
example, Iran imported T-72 tanks from Poland, 146mm self-propelled weapons from 
North Korea, and trainer fighters from Brazil and Pakistan. In addition, Iranian officials 
approached various producers in Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America in order to 
purchase modern weapons technology. By using the channels established in the course 
of the war, Iran also continued its attempts to smuggle in arms from a number of 
Western countries. (Cordesman 1999a: 63-65,68; Eisenstadt 1996: 37 and Oren 2000: 
93) 
3.4.2 The volume and the quality of Iran's arms imports 
Quantitatively, the trend of the Islamic Republic's post-war arms imports was a 
steadily decreasing one. During the 1987-1990 period, covering the two final years of 
the war and the first two years of the post-war era, the total value of Iran's new weapons 
agreements was about $10.3 billion. Of this sum, purchases from Russia constituted an 
estimated $2.5 billion and acquisitions from China about $3.4 billion. Iran's European 
arms imports totalled some $2.3 billion, of which Eastern European hardware made up 
the most part. Iran did manage to acquire some equipment from Western European 
producers, such as Italian and German support and utility helicopters, but these 
purchases totalled a modest sum of $200 million. The Islamic Republic's arms imports 
from other countries during the 1987-1990 period totalled some $2.1 billion, North 
Korea being the main weapons source in this category. (Cordesman 1999a: 62,65) 
Between 1991 and 1994, Iran's new arms deals totalled only about $4.8 billion. Iran's 
most important supplier in 1991-1994 was Russia with whom the Islamic Republic 
signed some $1.2 billion worth of agreements, whereas the value of arms imports from 
China decreased to about $400 million. Other trading partners of Iran during this period 
159 
included arms producers from Eastern Europe and North Korea. In the course of the 
next four years, in 1995-1998, the total value of the Islamic Republic's new arms 
agreements continued to drop. Iran's arms expenditures amounted to an estimated $1.4 
billion, of which orders from China accounted for about a half. Russia's share of Iran's 
arms purchases decreased significantly during this period, to some $200 million. The 
remaining Iranian agreements in 1995-1998 were signed mainly with North Korea and 
Eastern European arms producers. (Ibid.: 62; Cordesman 1999b: 84 and Cordesman 
2000a: 21) 
From a qualitative point of view, the Islamic Republic's post-war arms imports were 
not able to alleviate the major weaknesses in Iran's conventional weapons arsenal. In 
the first place, the combination of the fact that Iran still remained heavily dependent on 
Western-made weapons systems and the fact that Islamic Republic continued to face 
serious difficulties in obtaining equipment, spare parts, and ammunition from Western 
sources posed a considerable problem for the Iranian armed forces. A large part of the 
Western - mainly U. S. - armaments in Iran's arsenal were becoming helplessly 
obsolete, which further complicated Iranian military planning and underscored the need 
for maintaining good relations with the suppliers that were ready to do business with the 
Islamic Republic. To make things worse for Iranian authorities, however, Western 
governments actively tried to block transfers of sophisticated conventional weaponry to 
the Islamic Republic. Thus, for example, the decrease in arms deals between Iran and 
Russia during 1995-1998 found a partial explanation in the pressure the U. S. 
government put on Russia regarding arms exports to Iran. 70 (Cordesman 1999a: 67-73 
and Chubin 1997a: 231,240) 
Inaccessability to Western hardware and supplier unreliability aside, the Islamic 
Republic's post-war rearmament program faced other major difficulties as well. For one 
thing, Iran's reliance on Asian, Russian, and Eastern European weaponry created 
notable problems in the sphere of equipment conversion and standardization. For 
another, the issue of incompatibility of the weaponry in Iran's inventory caused serious 
troubles for the Iranians. The incompatibility problem had two dimensions. On the one 
hand, Iran's Western-supplied weapons systems were not interoperable with the 
armaments originating from Asia, Russia, and Eastern Europe. On the other hand, there 
70 In June 1995, Russia had promised the United States to stop selling armaments to Iran and to complete 
the delivery of all weapons previously sold to the Islamic Republic by the end of 1999. While it never 
actually fully stood by its promise, Russia officially withdrew from the 1995 agreement in November 
2000. (Arms Control Today, December 2000) 
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were serious incompatibility problems between the Asian, Russian, and Eastern 
European armaments themselves. Although much of the Iranian equipment imported 
from Asian countries - first and foremost from China and North Korea - was based on 
older Russian designs, there were differences between those weapons systems and the 
newer Russian and Eastern European designs that the Iranians had procured. 
Differences in parts, maintenance procedures, and training, among others, exacerbated 
Iranian armed forces' problems not only in the sphere of interoperability but also in the 
areas of sustainability, training, and tactical operations. (Cordesman 1999a: 66-67 and 
Chubin 1997a: 240) 
All in all, the Iranians were faced with the fact that the military hardware they had 
imported since the end of the Iran-Iraq war was clearly inferior to Western-made 
armaments both in terms of technological sophistication and military effectiveness. 
Moreover, due to economic constraints, the Islamic Republic had not been able to 
purchase the full variety of weaponry offered by non-Western manufacturers. 
Accordingly, significant gaps remained in the Iranian arms inventory. For example, 
Iran's ground forces continued to suffer from the lack of items such as infantry fighting 
vehicles, modern communications, command, control and intelligence systems, night 
vision equipment, and advanced ammunitions. The absence of adequate air defences as 
well as the Iranian air force's problems with avionics and radar and missile systems 
were other examples of the Islamic Republic's hardware shortages. (Eisenstadt 1996: 
44-47; Chubin 1994: 40-42 and Chubin 1997a: 240) 
To some extent, however, the declining volume of Iran's post-war conventional arms 
imports reflected the changes in the Islamic Republic's security environment. Above all, 
the Gulf conflict of 1990-1991 and its disastrous implications for Iraq - Iran's most 
immediate external security problem - gave the Islamic Republic some leeway as far as 
the rearmament imperative was concerned. In regional comparison, the level of Iran's 
arms acquisitions since the end of the Iran-Iraq war remained below that of its southern 
Gulf Arab neighbours. To give one example, Saudi Arabia's new arms purchases 
between 1991-1998 totalled some $38.1 billion, compared with the Islamic Republic's 
acquisitions of some $6.2 billion. The arms deals signed by Kuwait during the same 
period were worth about $7.6 billion, and even the arms imports of the United Arab 
Emirates, totalling some $12.4 billion between 1991-1998, clearly exceeded the value 
of Iran's purchases. (Cordesman 2000a: 21) 
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The Islamic Republic's post-Iran-Iraq war arms imports were inferior to those of its 
southern Gulf neighbours in qualitative terms, too. Unlike Iran, the countries of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council had an easy access to Western manufacturers' state-of-the-art 
conventional armaments whose military effectiveness had become highly evident in the 
course of the 1990-1991 Gulf conflict. The overwhelming military power of the 
American-led coalition in the brief forty-three-day war against Iraq in early 1991 had 
demonstrated the Iranians that they would hardly be able to reduce the technological 
lead of the states that were in possession of advanced conventional weaponry in the near 
future. Given the technological supremacy of the developed world, embodied in the 
military might of the United States, the Islamic Republic's leadership may have 
concluded that instead of trying to keep up with the so-called revolution in military 
affairs, Iran should focus on building up its WMD capabilities. In fact, many other 
Middle Eastern states may have drawn the same conclusion, for no other regional state 
except Israel could have realistically hoped to acquire, develop, and integrate RMA into 
its military structure in the foreseeable future. (Chubin 1994: 20 and Anthony and Jones 
1998: 5,21-22) 
The unlikelihood that the debilitated Irag71 would have threatened Iran's national 
security any time soon and the high probability that Saudi Arabia and other GCC 
countries would have been closely assisted by the United States in the event of a 
military confrontation between them and Iran may have further precipitated Iranian 
leaders to shift emphasis from conventional weapons to WMD. Moreover, although the 
Islamic Republic's post-war rearmament program had faced numerous difficulties, 
Iran's armed forces had recovered from the Iran-Iraq war to the extent that even with its 
existing conventional capabilities, the Islamic Republic would have been able to meet 
its basic defensive requirements. For example, as far as the military balance between the 
Islamic Republic and Iraq, Iran's most immediate military concern, was concerned, it 
was believed, at the end of the 1990s, that the balance had gradually started to shift in 
the favour of Iran. (Rathmell 1999: 42-44,46) 
The scope and the problems of Iran's post-war rearmament program suggested that, 
for the foreseeable future, the Islamic Republic's abilities to use conventional force for 
offensive military purposes would remain weak. Nevertheless, there were elements in 
the Iranian program that worried especially Iran's Gulf Arab neighbours. Such worries 
" For a discussion of the consequences of the 1990-1991 Gulf conflict to Iraq, see Yetiv (1999: 149- 
150). 
162 
centered, above all, around the steps taken by the Islamic Republic to develop an 
effective naval force. Iran's acquisitions - among others - of three Kilo-class 
submarines from Russia, Houdong-class missile boats as well as anti-ship and coastal 
missiles from China, together with the Islamic Republic's busy naval exercise schedule 
and its deployment of anti-ship missiles in the strategically located Abu Musa and Tunb 
islands in the Gulf, caused serious concern about Iran's naval intentions among the 
regional states (Oren 2000: 93). 
However, while Iran's activities in the naval field were driven by the Islamic 
Republic's desire to be able to project power in the Gulf and to deny the control of the 
waterway to an interventionary force, Iran's naval undertakings were targeted at extra- 
regional states - above all the United States - rather than the Gulf Arab states. 
Moreover, Iran's critical economic dependence on the Persian Gulf as a transit route 
meant that the Islamic Republic had every incentive to refrain from actions that could 
have put the stability of the Gulf in jeopardy. Iran's propensity for cautious behaviour 
was further increased by the awareness that military adventurism in the region might 
bring the country's naval forces into direct confrontation with U. S. naval units 
patrolling the Gulf as well as by the fact that the naval forces of the Islamic Republic 
themselves were suffering from a host of internal weaknesses. They included equipment 
deficiencies as well as problems related to effective employment of Iran's submarine 
capability. (Chubin 1994: 45; Eisenstadt 1996: 49,52-54 and Cordesman 1999a: 71) 
3.4.3 Domestic arms production 
As noted earlier, the leadership of the Islamic Republic viewed the strengthening of 
Iran's domestic weapons production capacity as an essential component of the country's 
post-war rearmament drive. The objective of establishing a strong Iranian military- 
industrial base stemmed from two principal considerations: Iran's desire to reduce its 
vulnerability to what it considered the political whims of international arms suppliers 
and its belief that domestic production reduced overall weapons procurement costs. 
During the first years after the revolution, Iranian authorities had not given serious 
attention to the issue of indigenous arms production. The situation changed in 1983 
when the Islamic Republic started to respond to its war-time combat needs and to its 
international isolation by reviving the military-industrial sector inherited from the Shah. 
As a result, Iranian ordnance factories ultimately managed to supply a considerable part 
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of the country's need for combat consumables - ammunitions as well as various kinds 
of small arms and spare parts - in the course of the war. Simultaneously, however, Iran 
was not able to domestically fill the major gaps in sophisticated weaponry in its arsenal. 
It was this shortcoming the authorities of the Islamic Republic began to address after the 
end of the Iran-Iraq war. (Chubin 1994: 33 and Sayigh 1997: 179-180,182) 
Iran's post-war arms production efforts were successful in many respects. For 
example, the Iranians were capable of significantly building up the country's reserves of 
basic weaponry and ammunitions. Most of the small arms needed by Iran's armed 
forces were now domestically manufactured, in addition to which Iranian ordnance 
plants managed to rebuild armor and engines for the country's armored weapons and a 
host of weapons systems imported from Western, Asian, and former Soviet bloc 
sources. Furthermore, the Islamic Republic's arms industry reached the capacity to 
make spare parts for Iran's Western-supplied tanks and other armored vehicles, as well 
as to produce a limited number of light-wheeled armored personnel carriers. Also, the 
Iranians succeeded, among others, in upgrading some of the military aircraft supplied 
by the Americans during the Shah's rule, in producing long-range rockets, and in 
adapting Chinese anti-ship missile systems for use on patrol craft and Western-made 
ships. 72 (Cordesman 1999a: 74-75) 
Yet in spite of the increased allocation of resources to indigenous arms production 
and the indisputable strides made by the Islamic Republic in this area particularly at the 
end of the 1990s, Iran's arms industry was not able to diminish the Islamic Republic's 
dependence on foreign sophisticated conventional weaponry. The problems blocking 
Iranian breakthroughs in the development of technologically advanced armaments 
continued to be numerous. Some of them were related to the overall management of the 
country's arms industry. Even though the management structures had been somewhat 
rationalized since the end of the Iran-Iraq war, Iran's arms industry still suffered from 
duplication of efforts, waste, and corruption -a good example of Iranian inefficiencies 
was the fact that the country's regular armed forces and the IRGC continued to have 
separate weapons production programs. Added to these, there were more fundamental 
problems that stemmed from the weaknesses of Iran's scientific, industrial, and 
educational infrastructure. (Eisenstadt 1998: 74-75; Hashim 1995: 57 and Cordesman 
1999a: 73-74) 
72 For a detailed description of the military items produced by the Islamic Republic's ordnance factories, 
see Sayigh (1997: 184-191) and Cordesman (1999a: 76-78). 
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Because of its poor international reputation, the Islamic Republic had formidable 
difficulties in obtaining materials, components, and assistance from abroad for its arms 
manufacture efforts. These troubles not only delayed Iran's weapons production 
programs but also limited the sophistication of Iranian-made hardware. Obviously, the 
Islamic Republic would not have tried to obtain foreign items and expertise had its own 
industrial base been broad and advanced enough to support activities in the sphere of 
military manufacturing. That this was not the case was illustrated, among others, by 
Iranian civilian industries' inability to provide local ordnance factories with many of the 
support equipment and spare parts needed in weapons production. (Sayigh 1997: 192- 
193) 
The problems in the Islamic Republic's research and development sector - such as 
inadequate funding and training, weak research infrastructure, and insufficient contacts 
between researchers and production units - further undermined Iranian efforts to 
achieve self-sufficiency in the production of conventional weaponry. The state of Iran's 
national research and development sector was expected to remain poor, for Iran's 
educational system itself was plagued with major difficulties. In addition to the fact that 
a large section of qualified Iranian academics had left the country after the revolution, 
the educational institutions of the Islamic Republic suffered, among others, from the 
lack of funding, from ideological favouritism at the expense of expertise, and from 
excessive bureaucracy. (Hashim 1997: 220-221 and Hashim 1995: 57-58) 
Ultimately, Iran's efforts in the sphere of domestic arms production were hampered 
by the Islamic Republic's difficult economic situation. But even if the leadership of the 
Islamic Republic was not able to channel as much financial resources to the domestic 
arms industry as it would have liked to, the Islamic Republic was still spending several 
hundred million dollars annually on the domestic production of conventional armaments 
(Cordesman 1999a: 73). This sum and Iran's plans to expand the country's arms 
production capacity indicated that the leadership of the Islamic Republic was committed 
to the goal of self-sufficiency in arms production. 
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3.5 Post-War Arms Control Operations: From the Cease-fire to the Gulf Conflict 
3.5.1 The regional arena 
Iran's post-war conventional arms control policy can be divided into four discernible 
phases. The first phase covered the period between July 1988 and August 1990, in other 
words, the time between Iran's acceptance of the UN Security Council Resolution 598 
and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990. During these months, Iran's foreign 
policy-makers were primarily occupied with two issues, both of which concerned Iran's 
relations with its Arab neighbours: the UN-sponsored peace talks between the Islamic 
Republic and Iraq and the formulation of a pragmatic policy in the Gulf benefiting 
Iran's reconstruction imperative. 
As far as the peace negotiations between Iran and Iraq were concerned, the parties 
were not able to achieve a breakthrough in their discussions. 73 Differing views of the 
issues that had to be solved before a final peace settlement led to a deadlock which did 
not open until Iraq had become entangled in its military operation in Kuwait. From the 
arms control point of view, the Security Council Resolution 598, which had established 
the framework for Iranian-Iraqi peace talks, steered the negotiations only in broad 
terms. Paragraph one of the resolution demanded both parties to discontinue all military 
actions and to withdraw their forces to internationally recognized boundaries, whereas 
paragraph eight requested the UN secretary-general to examine - in consultation with 
Iran, Iraq, and other Gulf states - measures that would enhance security and stability in 
the region. The fact that paragraph one was not observed by the negotiating parties and 
that paragraph eight did not bring about concrete arms control measures in the Gulf 
supports, for its part, the observation according to which conflicts that end in stalemate 
without a victory very rarely generate arrangements related to the control of armaments. 
Rather, a stalemate outcome fuels arms build-up because former belligerents are not 
ready to reduce their military capabilities as long as there is no final peace settlement in 
place and renewed hostilities remain a constant possibility. (Resolutions and Decisions 
of the Security Council 1987,1988: 5-6 and Tanner 1993: 29-33) 
The 'no war, no peace' stalemate with Iraq between the two Gulf conflicts posed a 
dilemma for Iran's leadership. It obstructed not only the implementation of much- 
73 For a detailed discussion of the peace talks between Iran and Iraq during the period under 
consideration, see Parasiliti (1993: 225-232). 
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needed reconstruction measures at home but also major openings in the area of foreign 
policy. Above all, it bred tension that could have escalated to recommencement of 
armed hostilities. This was repeatedly underlined by Iranian officials who regarded 
Iraq's refusal to withdraw its troops from Iranian soil even after the cease-fire had come 
into effect as the most serious obstacle to a peace settlement between the two countries. 
In the Iranian view, Iraq's refusal to withdraw its military forces from Iranian territory 
indicated that the Iraqi leadership had not given up the expansionist objectives that had 
inspired it to start the Iran-Iraq war in the first place. (CD/PV. 514,1989: 4; CD/PV. 543, 
1990: 12 and A/44/PV. 13,1989: 97) 
But the Iraqi leadership's own ambitions were not viewed as the only reason for 
Iraq's behaviour and for the 'no war, no peace' deadlock. As Hashimi Rafsanjani, the 
president of the Islamic Republic, pointed out in November 1989, Iranian authorities 
believed that Western powers - and the United States, in particular - fuelled discord and 
tension in the Gulf in order to legitimize their continued military presence in the region. 
These same forces were said to be responsible for the Security Council's reluctance to 
guarantee Iraq's compliance with resolution 598. (Rafsanjani 1989: 462 and 
A/C. 1/44/PV. 13,1989: 3) 
As the peace talks between Iran and Iraq remained stalled, the Islamic Republic, 
ready to pursue a more open and pragmatic foreign policy, tried to make advances in its 
relations with other Gulf Arab governments. In fact, the overtures made by Iran to 
promote cooperation and confidence between the Islamic Republic and GCC countries 
had started soon after the cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war had taken effect. One crucial 
element in Iran's diplomatic argumentation on cooperation in the Gulf was the idea of a 
regional security system. In October 1988, at the UN, Iran's foreign minister Vilayati 
declared the Islamic Republic's willingness to establish firm and friendly relations with 
its littoral Gulf Arab neighbours in order to provide long-term security for the region. 
By referring to Iran's 1986 proposal for a regional security arrangement, Vilayati 
pointed out that Iran had declared its readiness for regional cooperation already during 
the Iran-Iraq war, and thus, had pursued a constructive policy in the Gulf for years. 74 
(A/43/PV. 14,1988: 73) 
74 For another Iranian statement pointing to the consistency of the Islamic Republic's Gulf policy, see 
Rafsanjani (1989: 460). As a gesture of goodwill towards GCC states, in early 1989 Iran offered to help 
clear mines off their coasts (Marschall 2003: 101). 
167 
In the Iranian view, common religious, cultural, and economic ties between the 
Persian Gulf countries provided the essential basis for greater solidarity and cooperation 
among them. These ties, Iranian officials argued, had to be utilized for the creation of an 
indigeneous regional security system free from extra-regional involvement. 75 As a first 
step towards security cooperation in the Gulf, the officials of the Islamic Republic 
maintained, Gulf countries should engage in a constructive dialogue and thereby lay the 
foundation for more ambitious cooperation measures. According to the Iranians, such a 
dialogue could include informal diplomatic discussions about the threat perceptions of 
individual Gulf countries, for example, along the lines set by the countries of the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in their talks on confidence- 
and security-building measures in Vienna in 1989.76 Subsequently, the Gulf states could 
establish "formal collective security arrangements" that would also include far-reaching 
arms control measures. 77 (Ibid.; A/44/PV. 13,1989: 101 and CD/PV. 543,1990: 12) 
Simultaneously, however, the arms control officials of the Islamic Republic warned 
that the presence of foreign military forces in the Gulf constituted a serious threat to 
regional efforts to establish an indigeneous security system. In the Iranian analysis, the 
reason for the presence of foreign forces in the Gulf was clear and logical: to dominate 
an oil-rich and strategically important region of the world by intimidating the Gulf 
countries so that they would not challenge the interests of Western powers, and 
particularly those of the United States, in the area. 78 To counter the foreign naval 
presence in the Gulf, the Islamic Republic made repeated calls for effective naval arms 
control measures in the Gulf and the Indian Ocean. The implementation of the long- 
lived Indian Ocean peace zone initiative by the member states of the UN was regarded 
75 Iranian officials stressed the point that the security of the Persian Gulf region should rest in the hands of 
the regional states only both in its statements on multilateral arms control fora as well as in bilateral talks 
with GCC countries (Marschall 2003: 24,104). 
76 According to Iranian officials, the Islamic Republic was "deeply convinced that immediate confidence- 
building measures must be adopted" in the Gulf (A/CN. 10/PV. 146,1990: 58). The CSCE countries' 
diplomatic talks in Vienna, to which the Iranians alluded to, produced a final document that was adopted 
in November 1990. The 1990 Vienna document dealt with exchange of military information, reduction of 
risks, military contacts, observation of military activities, constraints on military activities, verification, 
communications, as well as implementation assessment. For the details of the CSCE document, see 
Goldblat (1994: 162-164). 
77 It should be noted that, at this stage, Iran's deliberations on Gulf security left the door open for Iraq's 
participation in the regional security cooperation. However, as the relations between the Islamic Republic 
and Iraq remained tense and no peace agreement was in sight, the Gulf Arab sheikhdoms were the real 
target of Iran's diplomatic initiatives. (CD/PV. 543,1990: 12) 
78 See A/43/PV. 14 (1988: 73-75) and A/C. 1/43/PV. 15 (1988: 58). According to the Iranians, the policies 
of the major powers in the Gulf testified to a general great power behavioral pattern. As put by one 
Iranian diplomat, "big powers' naval armaments - particularly those of the United States - have always 
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by the Iranians as an appropriate diplomatic mechanism for the purpose 
(A/C. 1/43/PV. 33,1988: 41 and CD/PV. 514,1989: 6). 79 
The authorities of the Islamic Republic stated that the threat of foreign military 
presence in the Persian Gulf - defined by them as a danger to the sovereignty and 
security of the Gulf states, as an economic burden to GCC states, and as a manifestation 
of global naval arms racing - necessitated a new approach to Gulf security. The 
approach put forth by the Iranians based on the fundamental premise, a traditional 
Iranian view, that the security of the Persian Gulf was the exclusive responsibility of the 
littoral states. In the view of the Islamic Republic's president, cooperation and 
coordination between Iran and GCC countries should rest on respect for the standards 
and principles recognized by the international community and the Islamic world. 
Accordingly, president Rafsanjani continued, Iran harboured no power political 
ambitions vis-ä-vis the Persian Gulf and strongly condemned the idea of a regional 
guardian or policeman acting independently or on behalf of foreign powers - the role 
Iran's ousted Shah and Saddam Hussein were claimed by the Iranians to have been 
saddled with. Furthermore, Rafsanjani assured Iran's Gulf neighbours that there could 
be a constructive relationship between the Islamic Republic and GCC countries, even if 
Iran was the largest country in the region, had the longest coastline, and was one of the 
oldest nations in the Persian Gulf. (A/C. 1/43/PV. 15,1988: 58; Rafsanjani 1989: 462- 
465 and CD/PV. 514,1989: 6) 
In spite of the Islamic Republic's conciliatory overtures towards the Gulf Arab 
countries, however, Iranian officials did not remain silent about security issues they 
considered to be straining Iran-GCC relations. First and foremost, the Iranian 
government was critical of the fact that the GCC governments' security policies relied 
on extra-regional and especially U. S. military support. In the words of president 
Rafsanjani, "to seek protection from others out of fear of one's own neighbours or 
brothers or coreligionists is not in accordance with the spirit of Islam and freedom- 
loving people. " He reminded Iran's Gulf Arab neighbours that reliance on foreign 
actors, who were uninterested in the regional states' well-being, should be abandoned, 
played an undeniable role in facilitating military action by those powers against developing countries" 
(A/CN. I O/PV. 146,1990: 59). 
79 Iran's representatives argued that in the face of the cease-fire between Iran and Iraq and the Soviet 
withdrawal from Afghanistan in early 1989, there were no pretexts left for Western powers to justify their 
military presence in the Gulf and for their refusal to implement the Indian Ocean initiative 
(A/C. 1/44/PV. 13,1989: 12). 
169 
and attempts by foreign powers to create discord and division between Iran and GCC 
countries categorically rejected. (Rafsanjani 1989: 463-464) 
Moreover, Iran expressed its concern about GCC countries' recent arms purchases. 
By referring in particular to Saudi Arabia's massive arms acquisitions, the officials of 
the Islamic Republic disapprovingly noted that some Gulf countries were continuously 
arming themselves with sophisticated conventional weaponry. 80 As a result, Iran's arms 
control officials declared that major arms-producing countries should significantly 
constrain their arms transfers to the Persian Gulf region and to the whole of the Middle 
East. In addition, they insisted that the major arms-manufacturers and all other extra- 
regional states should support and respect any regional arms control arrangement agreed 
on in the Persian Gulf. (CD/PV. 543,1990 11; A/CN. 10/PV. 146,1990: 59 and 
A/C. 1/44/PV. 3 5,1989: 7) 
3.5.2 The global facet of the Iranian argumentation 
While regional matters were on the top of Iran's foreign policy agenda during the 
July 1988-August 1990 period, the officials of the Islamic Republic took a stand on the 
state of arms control on the global scene as well. 8' First of all, the Iranians shared the 
optimism generated by the profound changes in the Cold War international system. The 
relaxation of the competition between the Soviet Union and the United States, the re- 
formation of Europe's political map, and the progress made in ending long-lived 
regional conflicts in Africa and Asia impressed foreign minister Vilayati to declare, in 
October 1988, that "the era of dominance by superpowers over the destinies of the Third 
World and the oppressed nations is very much a closed chapter. " In Iran's view, the 
positive developments in world politics made the prospects for the halting of the global 
arms race exceptionally promising. Therefore, the officials of the Islamic Republic 
underscored, it was of utmost importance that the new international atmosphere would 
be translated into global and regional arms control arrangements. (A/43/PV. 14,1988: 
62; A/C. 1/43/PV. 15,1988: 51 and A/C. 1/44/PV. 13,1989: 2) 
The optimistic tones in Iran's diplomatic language notwithstanding, Iranian officials 
mostly concentrated on the international security issues they found troublesome and 
80 For GCC countries' arms purchases between 1987-1990, see Cordesman (2000a: 19,21). 
8! Iran's officials argued that success in regional arms control depended on positive developments and 
achievements at the international level (A/C. 1/44/PV. 3 5,1989: 7). 
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disturbing. Increased sophistication of conventional weapons and the growth of national 
conventional arms arsenals in various parts of the world were among such issues 
(A/C. 1/43/PV. 53,1988: 27-28 and CD/PV. 514,1989: 5). According to Iranian 
officials, the qualitative and quantitative build-up of conventional weapons strengthened 
the spiral of arms racing and forced individual states to seek security through arms 
acquisitions. The search for armaments and the sense of false security that weapons 
created, the Iranians added, led to increased inter-state tensions and put a heavy burden 
on national economies especially in the developing world. (CD/PV. 479,1988: 2-3 and 
A/C. 1/43/PV. 15,1988: 51) 
As expected, Iranian authorities blamed the major powers and their "domineering 
policies" for the global conventional arms race. In the Iranian analysis, arms transfers 
by the major powers to the Third World stemmed not only from commercial 
calculations but also from the major powers' desire to gain more influence in recipient 
countries' political and cultural lives. Major power disregard - even in the middle of the 
groundbreaking changes that were occurring in the international system - for 
developing countries' threat perceptions and arms control proposals were mentioned by 
the Iranians as yet another example of the continuous disparagement Third World states 
were subjected to. 82 It seemed, the Iranians claimed, that the only way for developing 
countries to be taken seriously was to strengthen their national military arsenals. 
(A/C. 1/43/PV. 53,1988: 31 and CD/PV. 543,1990: 10) 
In the end, however, the representatives of the Islamic Republic emphasized that the 
control of conventional armaments, and not the build-up of military capabilities, was the 
right choice on the path towards increased international and regional security. But the 
success of arms control diplomacy itself, the Iranians stressed, was dependent on states' 
respect for two key factors that should guide international relations: the principle of 
justice and international law. Iran, the officials of the Islamic Republic assured, 
followed the principle of justice and international law and also had a special 
commitment to arms control. This commitment was told by the Iranians to stem, first, 
from the Islamic Republic's ideological premises and, secondly, from its desire to avoid 
82 In this connection, Iranian authorities expressed their opposition to the thesis according to which the 
United States had won the Cold War. In Iran's analysis, the dissolution of the Cold War international 
system had resulted from the downfall of the superpower ideologies of socialism and capitalism, which, 
Iranian officials pointed out, had failed because they were "materialistic and alien to human nature. " Still, 
at the same time, the Islamic Republic's fears of an international order dominated by the United States 
were evident in many Iranian pronouncements. The Iranians argued, among others, that no one state 
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another war experience. (CD/PV. 514,1989: 4; A/44/PV. 13,1989: 91 and CD/PV. 543, 
1990: 10) 
3.6 Iran and the Gulf Conflict of 1990-1991 
The Islamic Republic's efforts between July 1988 and August 1990 to reach its main 
foreign policy objectives in the Gulf did not turn out to be successful. First, the peace 
talks between Iran and Iraq, though showing some progress in the spring and summer of 
1990, had not produced a final settlement. 83 Secondly, the Iranian-desired 
rapprochement with GCC countries had failed, largely because of the strained relations 
between Saudi Arabia, the key GCC player, and the Islamic Republic. 84 However, the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 and the Islamic Republic's neutrality in the 
1990-1991 Gulf conflict that followed significantly advanced Iranian objectives in the 
region. Saddam Hussein's decision, conveyed to president Rafsanjani in a letter dated 
14 August 1990, to give in to Iran's demands in the peace talks - most notably, his 
readiness to share the sovereignty of Shatt al-Arab and to pull back Iraqi troops from 
Iranian territory - in order to focus Iraq's energies on the military operation in Kuwait 
constituted a clear diplomatic victory for the Iranians. Moreover, the Islamic Republic's 
unequivocal condemnation of the Iraqi invasion and its policy of neutrality during the 
Gulf conflict altered GCC states' perceptions of Iran's foreign policy intentions and, 
accordingly, positively affected the problematic relations between the Islamic Republic 
and the Gulf Arab sheikhdoms. 85 
Iran's neutral diplomatic position on the Gulf conflict of 1990-1991 - which marked 
the second phase of the Islamic Republic's post-Iran-Iraq war argumentation on 
conventional arms control - rested on three major objectives. By adopting an even- 
handed policy with respect to the Gulf conflict, the Islamic Republic wanted to 
safeguard Gulf security, reduce tensions between Iran and the Arab world, and improve 
its reputation in the West (Amirahmadi 1993: 95). As far as the security situation in the 
should be allowed to make unilateral decisions on global security, including arms control. (CD/PV. 543, 
1990: 10) 
83 For the Iran-Iraq peace talks in the course of spring and summer of 1990, see Parasiliti (1993: 229- 
232). 
84 For the state of Iran-GCC relations between July 1988 and August 1990, see Chubin (1992: 62-65,70). 85 For statements in which the representatives of the Islamic Republic condemned the Iraqi aggression, 
demanded Iraq's immediate withdrawal from Kuwait, and simultaneously expressed Iran's disapproval of 
the presence of foreign military forces in the Gulf, see A/45/PV-5 (1990: 43-47) and A/45/PV. 6l (1990: 
38). 
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region was concerned, the Gulf conflict proved to be a mixed blessing for the Iranians. 
On the positive side, the crushing military defeat suffered by Iraq against the U. S. -led 
coalition forces in the 43-day war between 17 January and 27 February 1991 
undoubtedly benefited the Iranians who had been highly worried about Iraq's military 
build-up and intentions since the end of the Iran-Iraq war. On the negative side, Iraq's 
military adventurism led to a massive influx of foreign military forces to the Gulf 
region, a development the Iranians would have strongly liked not to take place. 
From the Iranian point of view, then, the ideal result of the Gulf conflict would have 
been the military defeat of Iraq, coupled with the withdrawal of foreign military forces 
from the Gulf and the establishment of a new Gulf security system formed exclusively 
by the regional states themselves. In the course of the Gulf conflict, thus, Iran's 
representatives actively promoted their views on Gulf security and explicated the 
fundamental components of a regional security system as defined by the Islamic 
Republic. Reminding their Arab neighbours that the Gulf conflict had increased the 
need for an indigenous security arrangement in the region, Iranian authorities argued 
that such an arrangement should be free from all forms of foreign involvement, for only 
the regional states - tied by religious, cultural, and economic bonds - could guarantee 
the long-term stability and interests of the region. The representatives of the Islamic 
Republic also pointed out that a Gulf security arrangement should include all the 
regional states because any exclusion would inevitably breed tension and instability in 
the future. 86 (A/C. 1/45/PV. 46,1990: 46; Amirahmadi 1993: 94 and CD/PV. 582,1991: 
3) 
According to the officials of the Islamic Republic, the UN Security Council 
Resolution 598 provided the necessary institutional framework for the proposed 
regional security arrangement. By referring to that resolution's paragraph eight, they 
maintained that the regional states should hold their security discussions in cooperation 
with the UN secretary-general. In return, the Iranians added, the world organization 
should support the deliberations between the Gulf countries and to ensure that the 
eventual regional arrangement would be compatible with the principles and objectives 
of the UN. (CD/PV. 582,1991: 3) 
86 In addition to using multilateral arms control fora to express its demand that foreign military forces 
should withdraw from the Persian Gulf and that the security of the region should be jointly safeguarded 
by the Gulf states themselves, the Islamic Republic presented its views on Gulf security during the Gulf 
conflict also in bilateral talks with individual Gulf Arab governments both in GCC capitals and in Tehran 
(Marschall 2003: 107,109). 
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In Iran's view, a collective security arrangement in the Gulf would pave the way not 
only for joint action against external security problems, but for arms control as well. 
Iranian representatives pointed out that a regional security system would reverse the 
trend of regional arms racing and enable the regional states to allocate a large part of the 
resources reserved for military purposes to the economic, scientific, and technological 
development of the region (A/C. 1/45/PV. 46,1990: 29-30). Accordingly, the Iranians 
were of the opinion that the formation of a security arrangement in the Gulf should be 
accompanied with explicit and concrete measures in the field arms control. Such 
measures, the Iranians said, could include steps that would aim to tackle the build-up of 
state-of-the-art conventional weaponry in the region expedited by the Gulf conflict and 
to exclude the presence of foreign military forces in the region - two objectives the 
Iranians found outstandingly important. 87 
With regard to the first issue, Iran's arms control officials underscored the need for 
regional CBM, 88 whereas their calls for naval arms control both at the international and 
the regional level - including the implementation of the Indian Ocean zone of peace 
initiative - were meant to deal with the issue of foreign military presence in the Persian 
Gulf. Ultimately, the representatives of the Islamic Republic linked their views on the 
limitation of conventional armaments to the control of WMD by stating that measures 
such as the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East 
would strengthen the Iranian-proposed collective security system among the Gulf states. 
(A/C. 1/45/PV. 46,1990: 27,29-30 and A/C. 1/45/PV. 6,1990: 41-42) 
On the whole, Iran's pronouncements on Gulf security and regional arms control in 
this period reflected the Islamic Republic's desire not to be excluded from the post-Gulf 
conflict political and security order in the region. For this reason, Iranian authorities 
were highly critical of those Gulf-related security cooperation plans - presented at the 
time of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent war between Iraq and the U. S. -led 
coalition forces - which did not consider Iran's participation necessary. 
89 One of such 
plans was the inter-Arab initiative built around the so-called Damascus Declaration of 
87 For Iranian statements underlining the dangers pertaining to the build-up of advanced conventional 
weaponry in the Gulf, see A/45/PV. 5 (1990: 48) and CD/PV. 582 (1991: 2-3). For statements in which the 
Islamic Republic condemned foreign military presence in the Gulf and portrayed it as a threat to the 
security and interests of the regional states, see A/45/PV. 5 (1990: 46-47) and A/45/PV. 61 (1990: 38). 
88 In this connection, the Iranians emphasized that ever since the 1979 Iranian revolution, the Islamic 
Republic had been ready to promote the implementation of CBM in the Persian Gulf. Iran's 1986 
proposal for a regional security arrangement was mentioned as the most potent proof of this. 
(A/C. 1/45/PV. 35,1990: 21 and A/C. 1/45/PV. 46,1990: 27) 
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March 1991 in which Egyptian and Syrian troops were planned to be stationed in GCC 
countries in order to strengthen and support local military forces against external 
threats. The fact that the Islamic Republic was closed out of this plan angered Iran's 
leaders who saw the Damascus Declaration as a deliberate attempt to isolate the Islamic 
Republic and to increase Arab influence in the Gulf region. In the Iranian view, no 
security arrangement in the area would succeed without Iranian participation because, in 
the final analysis, the Islamic Republic was the "pillar of regional stability and security" 
(A/45/PV. 5,1990: 46). 
3.7 Iran's Arms Control Operations in the Post-Gulf Conflict Period9o 
3.7.1 The regional arena 
Despite active diplomatic efforts during the Gulf conflict, the Islamic Republic was 
not able to convince its Gulf Arab neighbours of the need to create an indigenous 
security arrangement in the region. Even though some Gulf sheikhdoms - Kuwait, 
Qatar, and especially Oman - adopted a receptive attitude towards Iran's diplomatic 
initiatives (Ehteshami 1995: 152), 91 in the end, GCC states chose to organize their post- 
Gulf conflict security through bilateral defense agreements with Western powers and 
especially with the United States. 92 As a result of these security agreements, signed 
between 1991-1994, GCC countries became destinations for large-scale transfers of 
sophisticated conventional weaponry from the West and thereby maintained their status 
as one of the world's largest market for conventional armaments. This development 
starkly contrasted with the international debate in the aftermath of the Gulf conflict on 
the urgency to limit arms transfers to the Middle East. It also diminished prospects for 
arms control in the Gulf. With the exception of the arms control measures directed at the 
89 For the various plans presented in the course of the Gulf conflict on how to organize Gulf security in 
the conflict's aftermath, see Amirahmadi (1993: 113). 
90 The term 'post-Gulf conflict period' - the third distinctive phase of Iran's conventional arms control 
policy following the end of the Iran-Iraq war - is used here to refer to the time period between the end of 
the Gulf conflict on 27 February 1991 and the election of Muhammad Khatami as the president of the 
Islamic Republic on 23 May 1997. 
91 For example, at the GCC summit of December 1990, Iran's participation in a Gulf security arrangement 
had been one of the topics of the conference (Marschall 2003: 110). 
9' For the bilateral security agreements between the Gulf Arab sheikhdoms and Western governments - 
which included provisions, among others, on joint military exercises, on the Western powers' access to 
GCC states' ports and facilities, as well as on the prepositioning of Western military equipment in the 
Gulf Arab sheikhdoms - see Cordesman (2000b: 77-78,89-91,101,107-108,116-117,123-124). 
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defeated Iraq, embodied in the UN Security Council Resolution 687 that dealt with the 
control of Iraq's conventional arms and its WMD arsenal, the post-Gulf conflict period 
did not generate far-reaching arms control measures in the Persian Gulf. 
Expectedly, the Iranian leadership was highly critical of GCC governments' security 
cooperation with Western powers. 93 Such collaboration was viewed by the Iranians as a 
conscious effort to anchor the West's military and political power in the region and to 
ostracize the Islamic Republic from regional politics. In the same vein, Iranian 
authorities were highly skeptical of the Western Middle East- and Gulf-related arms 
control proposals that were made in the aftermath of the Gulf conflict. 94 
The U. S. initiative of June 1991 carrying the name of president George H. W. Bush, 
in particular, captured the Islamic Republic's diplomatic attention. In Iran's assessment, 
the Bush initiative - which called on the world's major arms suppliers to avoid 
destabilizing arms transfers to the Middle East and to strengthen their national export 
control mechanisms - was intended to bolster the major powers' hegemonic intentions 
in the Middle East and to weaken the military capabilities of those regional states that 
opposed such aspirations. 95 Moreover, the Iranians believed that Western governments 
would in any case give a preferential treatment to their Gulf allies in any potential arms 
control arrangement exclusively agreed on by the major arms exporters. 96 (Ali 1996: 
48). Finally, the fact that the Bush administration acted against its own arms control 
initiative by announcing massive arms sales to some Middle Eastern governments in the 
aftermath of the Gulf conflict contributed to Iran's suspicions of the motives of the U. S. 
initiative. 97 
The Islamic Republic's critical approach to arms control proposals that conflicted 
with Iran's attempts to keep the initiative in Middle East- and particularly Gulf-related 
93 After Kuwait had signed a ten-year bilateral agreement with the United States in September 1991, for 
example, the Islamic Republic criticized the agreement as being "bound to encourage more military 
intervention from the U. S. in the region" and laying "the foundations of insecurity and instability. " Also 
note the following remark made by president Rafsanjani in February 1993: "We are opposed to these 
[security] pacts and believe that any military presence of the Westerners in the region is a factor 
disturbing peace and stability. " (Marschall 2003: 164 and Gargash 1996: 145) 
94 For a discussion of the various arms control proposals made after the end of the Gulf conflict, see 
Steinberg (1993: 183-184). 
95 Due to reasons that become evident in the context of Islamic Iran's WMD-related arms control 
operations, neither did Iran's leaders warm to the other key elements of the June 1991 Bush initiative. 
These included the proposal for a freeze on the acquisition, production, and testing of SSM in the Middle 
East as well as the call for a verifiable ban on the production and acquisition in the Middle East of 
enriched uranium and separated plutonium (ibid.: 183). 
% In this connection, the representatives of the Islamic Republic further noted that if the Arab countries of 
the Middle East continued to receive sophisticated conventional weaponry from the West, the non-Arab 
countries of the region - meaning Iran - should be entitled to acquire them as well (Ali 1996: 48). 
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arms control matters in local hands was also evident with regard to the multilateral arms 
control talks that were held within the Arms Control and Regional Security working 
group of the Middle East peace negotiations. 98 Iran's critical attitude towards those talks 
emanated from the Islamic Republic's general opposition to the peace process that had 
been launched in the fall 1991 Madrid peace conference between Israel, the 
Palestinians, and Arab governments. In reality, Iranian officials claimed, the peace talks 
were a process of "force, intimidation, suppression, submission and surrender -a 
conspiracy against Islam and Palestine" (Zarif 1995: 120 and A/48/PV. 14,1993: 21). 
This Iranian stance illustrated that even if the Islamic Republic had been invited to join 
the ACRS talks, it would have been both ideologically and politically very difficult for 
the Iranians to take part in them. However, the officials of the Islamic Republic 
understood that by remaining outside the ACRS mechanism, Iran's chances to achieve 
its arms control objectives in the Middle East and the Gulf diminished. The fact that all 
GCC states took part in the ACRS talks only added to Iran's sense of diplomatic 
isolation. 
As a result of the post-Gulf conflict security arrangements between GCC states and 
Western governments and the ACRS process, Iran's decision-makers were forced to 
devise policies that better corresponded with the political and military realities in the 
Gulf and the wider Middle East. In the Gulf, Iran's revised diplomatic approach 
consisted of two elements. On the one hand, through diplomatic openings, the Islamic 
Republic tried to weaken the security ties between GCC states and Western powers, 
sought to improve the relations with its Gulf Arab neighbours, and attempted to 
convince them of the necessity of an alternative, Iranian-driven regional security 
scheme. On the other hand, as the Iran-GCC relations were making a slow progress for 
the most part of the post-Gulf conflict period, the Islamic Republic pursued its regional 
security interests by seeking to take advantage of the Gulf Arab governments' mutual 
tensions and by cultivating bilateral relations with individual GCC states (Chubin and 
Tripp 1996: 36). 
Iran's conventional arms control operations in the post-Gulf conflict period consisted 
of already familiar diplomatic stances and of new initiatives. As for the former, the 
Islamic Republic's proposal for a regional security system free from external influence 
97 For a discussion of the Bush administration's arms sales to the Middle East, see Steinberg (1993: 184). 98 Iran, together with Iraq and Libya, were not invited to participate in the ACRS talks which began in 
early 1992 and broke down in 1995. For a detailed account of the content and the results of the ACRS 
talks, see Junnola (1998: 47-52). 
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dominated Iranian officials' diplomatic argumentation. In the Islamic Republic's view, 
the Gulf conflict had only intensified the need for indigenous security cooperation in the 
region. Recognizing that cooperation between the Gulf states in non-military fields 
would help to pave the way for regional collaboration in the security realm, Iranian 
officials called for the expansion of political, economic, and cultural relations among 
the regional states. Also, the Iranians pointed out that regional cooperation in the Gulf 
should be founded on the following principles: sovereignty and territorial integrity, 
inviolability of international borders, non-resort to force in the settlement of disputes, 
and non-interference in each other's internal affairs (A/46/PV. 5,1991: 56 and 
A/47/PV. 79,1992: 76). 
While speaking for increased political, economic, and cultural interaction among the 
Gulf states, however, Iranian authorities were of the opinion that cooperation in the area 
of security should not depend on developments in other sectors of regional cooperation. 
Thus, they argued that the time was ripe for the Gulf states to agree on region-wide 
CBM. It was during the post-Gulf conflict period that the concept of CBM really made 
its way to the Islamic Republic's diplomatic lexicon. While before and during the Iran- 
Iraq war the representatives of the Islamic Republic had very rarely referred to CBM, 99 
in the 1990s CBM became an established component of Iran's Gulf argumentation. The 
Iranians saw CBM as an indispensable instrument that would strengthen the Gulf states' 
mutual ties to a level that would make the establishment of a regional security system 
and the implementation of comprehensive arms control measures possible. 
Throughout the post-Gulf conflict period, the arms control officials of the Islamic 
Republic called for the establishment of a joint forum where the Gulf states could 
discuss security issues - including mutual threat perceptions and military doctrines - 
and to agree on CBM that would be "compatible with the requirements of the 
region. " I00 By referring to experiences in other regions, the Iranians argued that the 
establishment of an institutionalized channel of communication would make it much 
easier for the Gulf states to promote mutual security cooperation (CD/PV. 659,1993: 8 
and A/50/PV. 5,1995: 29). Despite the fact that the GCC governments did not warm to 
Iran's calls for the creation of a joint discussion forum and the fact that the relations 
" For the rare Iranian references to the concept of CBM before the 1990s, see CD/PV. 343 (1986: 7-8) 
and CD/PV. 404 (1987: 4-5). 
100 For these Iranian calls, see CD/PV. 659 (1993: 9); A/49/PV. 73 (1994: 19) and Zarif (1995: 124). 
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between GCC states and Iran remained modest at best, 1°' however, Iranian officials 
continued to underline the necessity of joint security deliberations. Thus, in February 
1996, for example, the Islamic Republic's deputy foreign minister addressing the World 
Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, made a proposal for a comprehensive 
negotiating security conference among the eight littoral states of the Persian Gulf that 
would take place under the auspices of the UN. 102 According to the Iranian 
representative, such a conference could cover a broad range of security issues and 
include diplomatic discussions on the application in the region of different types of 
CBM, such as the exchange of military information, promotion of contacts between 
Gulf militaries, as well as advance notification and observation of military activities. In 
addition, the deputy foreign minister of the Islamic Republic maintained, the regional 
states could agree on the conclusion of non-aggression pacts among themselves103 and 
take action in the field of WMD arms control as well. (Zarif 1996: 452) 
Although Iran's arms control officials made repeated calls for the establishment of a 
forum where Gulf states could air their views on security matters, they did not view the 
existence of such a forum as an absolute condition for the implementation of regional 
CBM. While waiting for the creation of a Gulf forum for security debate, thus, Iran 
made unilateral diplomatic proposals for various kinds of regional CBM. These 
included calls on the Gulf states to enhance transparency in armaments through regional 
cooperation in the context of the UN Register of Conventional Arms (CD/PV. 683, 
1994: 18 and A/50/PV. 5,1995: 29-30), to regularly exchange reports on national 
military holdings (CD/PV. 690,1994: 13 and Sadeghi-Dolatabadi 1995: 149), to give 
prior notifications and explanations of national arms acquisitions, as well as to notify 
each other in advance of troop movements and military manoeuvres involving more 
than one division (CD/PV. 625,1992: 6 and Mashhadi 1995: 88). 
Moreover, the Islamic Republic's offers to conduct bilateral and multilateral military 
exercises with its Gulf neighbours were essentially CBM proposals intended to foster 
101 For an Iranian statement referring to the lack of dialogue and confidence between GCC states and Iran, 
see Sadeghi-Dolatabadi (1995: 143). 
102 It is important to point out here that, in theory, the Islamic Republic's pronouncements on regional 
security included Iraq in all aspects of multilateral security cooperation in the Gulf. In practice, however, 
Iran's security initiatives were directed to GCC states, for it was difficult to imagine that either GCC 
governments or Iran would have been ready to cooperate with Saddam Hussein, the initiator of two wars 
in the Gulf. Note, for example, the following statement made by Iran's UN ambassador in 1994: "We can 
start [regional security cooperation] with other countries excluding Iraq, and when Iraq changes, we can 
decide collectively to admit them" (Kharrazi 1994: 129). 103 The Islamic Republic had made its first public offer to sign non-aggression pacts with its Gulf Arab 
neighbors in Qatar in December 1995 (Potter 1997: 239,246). 
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security cooperation among the regional states. In 1994, for example, Iran expressed its 
willingness to hold joint land exercises with GCC militaries. '04 In 1995, Iran supposedly 
held joint military exercises with the Omani navy, and in June that year, an Omani 
warship visited an Iranian port, Bushihr, for the first time since the Iranian revolution - 
an act that corresponded with the Iranian wish for regular and periodic exchange of 
visits to military bases between the Gulf states. Furthermore, in the spring of 1996, the 
representatives of Iran's political and military establishment announced the country's 
readiness to hold joint naval exercises with Kuwait and other GCC states. In May 1996, 
Qatar declined another Iranian offer for a bilateral defence treaty, but the fact that two 
Iranian navy ships made the first friendly port visit to Qatar in 17 years in June 1996 
demonstrated that Iran's CBM proposals found resonance at least in some GCC 
governmental circles. (Chubin and Tripp 1996: 23; Potter 1997: 239-240 and Mashhadi 
1995: 88) 
In the end, the officials of the Islamic Republic regarded regional CBM as a 
springboard for the establishment of an indigenous security system in the Gulf. On the 
path towards this goal, the Iranians marketed not only the ideas of the implementation 
of regional CBM and non-aggression pacts among the Gulf states, but also referred to 
the concept of non-offensive defence as a mechanism that could be used to strengthen 
cooperation and security in the Gulf (Zarif 1996: 451). Yet Iran's diplomatic statements 
did not include any detailed elaborations on what the implementation of a NOD 
arrangement in the Persian Gulf would entail. Iranian officials merely pointed to the 
NOD's basic idea that states should organize their national security in ways which do 
not pose threats to other countries. Having the basic premise of NOD in mind, the 
officials of the Islamic Republic also introduced a new concept at the CD in September 
1994. The notion of a "defensive security scheme" was put forth by Iran as a reference 
to the Islamic Republic's view that the armaments in the arsenals of the Gulf states - 
and all other countries, for that matter - ought to serve only defensive purposes: 
weapons that enhance capacity for "sudden aggressive strikes and extensive military 
offensives" should be eliminated. (CD/PV. 690,1994: 10) 
While Iran's NOD-based arguments were straightforward calls for quantitative and 
qualitative arms control in the Persian Gulf, in principle, however, Iran viewed far- 
reaching arms control measures as belonging to the context of the Gulf regional security 
10' In 1994, Iran also went further by offering to sign a bilateral defence pact with Qatar. Iran's leadership 
reportedly proposed to put some 30,000 Iranian soldiers at Qatar's disposal. (Chubin and Tripp 1996: 36) 
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system. In other words, even though Iran seemed to be ready to deviate from a line of 
thought that divided Gulf security cooperation into distinct stages, ' 05 fundamentally, 
they regarded joint defence and comprehensive arms control activities as the climax of 
regional security cooperation. Thus, Iran's arms control officials argued that the 
establishment of an indigenous security system in the Gulf would be an act of arms 
control itself, because it would reverse the trend of arms racing in the Gulf 
(A/CN. 10/PV. 157,1991: 39-40). As for individual arms control proposals related to 
conventional weapons made by Iran in the post-Gulf conflict period, they included the 
following suggestions: the reduction of Gulf states' military budgets and arms 
purchases; 106 the channelling of resources reserved for military purposes to the 
development of both the Gulf region107 and the poor countries of the Third World; ' 08 the 
conversion of military production facilities to civilian ones; ' 09 and finally, the 
elimination of the presence of foreign military forces in the Gulf. 110 
Iranian representatives pointed out that the Islamic Republic's arms control proposals 
were not exhaustive and welcomed "other positive initiatives which may contribute to 
the collective security of the Persian Gulf' (CD/PV. 659,1993: 9). 111 That Iran was 
ready to discuss regional arms control issues both multilaterally and bilaterally 
(A/50/PV. 5,1995: 30) further testified to the Islamic Republic's diplomatic flexibility 
regarding the forms of Gulf security cooperation. As far as the role of external actors in 
the Iranian-visioned Gulf security system was concerned, the officials of the Islamic 
Republic made numerous references to the importance of a UN contribution to the 
105 Take, for example, the suggestion made by the Iranian deputy foreign minister in Davos in February 
1996 - referred to above - that put CBM and more dramatic arms control steps in the same negotiation 
basket. Deviations of this kind were at least partly explained by Iran's frustration over GCC governments' 
lukewarm responses to the Islamic Republic's diplomatic overtures. Still, Iranian officials did not seem to 
have any unrealistic expectations in this regard in the first place. Note, for example, the words of Iran's 
UN ambassador in 1994: "I think that in the future they [GCC states] will understand that cooperation 
with Iran would be in their interest. We are showing patience and prudence, because it takes time" 
(Kharrazi 1994: 128). 
106 See The Islamic Republic of Iran and Disarmament (1994: 19) and A/50/PV. 5 (1995: 29). It should be 
noted that neither Iran nor its GCC neighbours had submitted military budget information to the UN 
reporting mechanism that had been created through the UN General Assembly resolution 35/142B of 
December 1980. For the details of the UN reporting mechanism dealing with military budgets, see 
<http: //www. un. org/Depts/dda/CAB/index. htm>. 
107 See CD/PV. 690 (1994: 13) and Sadeghi-Dolatabadi (1995: 149). 
108 See Mashhadi (1995: 88). 
109 See CD/PV. 659 (1993: 9) and The Islamic Republic of Iran and Disarmament (1994: 19). 
110 See A/48/PV. 14 (1993: 23) and A/C. 1/51/PV. 13 (1996: 19). During the post-Gulf conflict period, 
Iran's arms control officials repeatedly stressed that the major powers were not interested in the "genuine 
and long-term security" of the Gulf region. According to them, the presence of foreign forces in the 
region had historically produced only domestic instability within the regional countries and fuelled 
tensions between them. (A/C. 1 /46/PV. 42,1991: 41 and Zarif 1995: 124) 
'II Also see The Islamic Republic of Iran: Myth and Reality (1994: 269). 
181 
creation of such a system. In 1991, for example, the Iranians argued that the inclusion of 
the UN in Gulf security discussions would ensure that no regional state or grouping 
would be able to impose its views on other Gulf states. Moreover, the diplomatic 
umbrella of the UN was viewed by the Iranians as highly important because it would 
function as a much-needed link between the arms control deliberations at the Gulf level 
and the arms control instruments at the global level. In general, Iran's arms control 
officials demanded that external powers should respect and support indigenous security 
cooperation in the Gulf and refrain from sowing discord and tension in the region. This, 
the Iranians stressed, would contribute to the success of the regional security talks and 
thereby to the birth of a new security paradigm in the region - one that would not rest 
on competition, rivalry, and bloc formation. (A/C. 1/46/PV. 42,1991: 42-43; A/49/PV. 5, 
1994: 40 and Zarif 1996: 450) 
3.7.2 The global aspects of Iran's arms control operations 
3.7.2.1 The Islamic Republic and the new world order 
Even if the Islamic Republic's conventional arms control operations in the post-Gulf 
conflict period concentrated mainly on the Persian Gulf region, Iran did not remain 
passive in diplomatic discussions that dealt with global control of conventional 
weaponry. As one Iranian representative underscored in October 1992, "global and 
regional approaches to disarmament complete each other and should thus be pursued 
simultaneously in order to promote regional and international peace and security" 
(A/C. 1/47/PV. 5,1992: 57). 
International diplomatic deliberations on conventional arms control offered Iranian 
officials a forum where they were able to present their views not only on individual 
arms control issues but also on the changes that had taken place in the international 
system after the end of the Cold War - changes that had given birth to the notion of a 
"new world order. "112 At first, the Iranians seemed to share the international enthusiasm 
over the transitions in world politics. In September 1991. for example, foreign minister 
Vilayati told the UN General Assembly that the international community was facing a 
''golden opportunity for a new world order. " According to Vilayati, the new world order 
112 For a discussion of the various interpretations of the idea of the new world order presented after the 
unraveling of the Cold War international system, see Dorraj (1994: 13-40). 
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had to be founded on the UN Charter and the principles of justice, peace, security, and 
equality, as well as on mutual respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
states and for the cultural and moral values of all nations. ' 13 (A/46/PV. 5,1991: 48) 
Iranian officials argued that it was highly important that states would transform the 
positive international atmosphere into concrete steps in the field of arms control. In their 
view, both the identification and the amelioration of the security problems of the post- 
Cold War era were tasks that had to be carried out multilaterally by the international 
community as a whole (A/C. 1/46/PV. 42,1991: 38). Success in the realm of arms 
control, the Iranians maintained, was dependent particularly on the willingness of the 
major powers to abandon the mind-set of domination and the use of force as a means to 
promote national objectives (A/47/PV. 5,1992: 48). As a remedy for international 
rivalry and hostility - and as a step towards a new, just world order - the representatives 
of the Islamic Republic referred to Iran's defensive security scheme proposal of 
September 1994 and argued that conventional and WMD arms control constituted 
integral parts of that scheme (CD/PV. 690,1994: 10). At the same time, however, 
Iranian representatives emphasized that without international measures that would focus 
on the root causes of armed conflicts - especially on the problems of development, 
poverty, and overpopulation - the global quest for peace and security would be futile 
(A/C. 1/46/PV. 42,1991: 38 and A/51/PV. 4,1996: 29). 
By the mid-1990s, Iran's excitement over the prospects of a new world order had 
markedly waned. Even in the early years of the decade, Iran had pointed to a number of 
international developments it had considered worrisome. These had included the 
refugee problems and ethnic tensions plaguing various regions of the world 
(A/C. 1/46/PV. 42,1991: 38), the alleged double standard of the Western world - told by 
Iranian officials to be evident, for example, in the way in which the West had reacted to 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, on the one hand, and the plight of Muslims in warring 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, on the other -, as well as the fear of a confrontation between the 
rich North and the poor South (CD/PV. 625,1992: 2-3 and A/47/PV. 5,1992: 57). And 
by 1996, the Iranians were disappointed and skeptical enough to present a gloomy 
assessment of the state of world affairs. As formulated by foreign minister Vilayati at 
the UN General Assembly in September that year: "[... ] a complex movement has 
113 Iranian officials referred to the advances made in the area of arms control in Europe and to the 
concerted international action against Iraq during the Gulf conflict as signs of the fact that states were at a 
juncture of new international circumstances and opportunities (A/CN. 10/PV. 157,1991: 37 and 
CD! PV. 625,1992: 2). 
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emerged towards autocracy or even totalitarianism at the international level, a trend 
which is founded on hegemony and flouts justice, freedom, participation, the rule of 
law, tolerance, human rights, pluralism and democracy in a dangerous and 
unprecedented manner" (A/51 /PV. 4,1996: 25). 114 
3.7.2.2 The United Nations Conventional Arms Register 
The mix of optimism and pessimism also coloured Iran's post-Gulf conflict 
diplomatic stances on individual issues that pertained to global control of conventional 
armaments. Iran's policy with regard to the UN Conventional Arms Register was a case 
in point. On the one hand, the Islamic Republic was among the clear majority of the UN 
member states that voted for the General Assembly resolution 46/36L that established 
the world organization's arms register in December 1991,115 it highly welcomed the 
promotion of transparency in armaments underlined in that resolution (A/C. 1/49/PV. 9, 
1994: 15), and referred to the arms register as a mechanism that advances international 
and regional arms control efforts and as a component of the Iranian-promoted defensive 
security scheme (CD/PV. 690,1994: 12). 
On the other hand, and in the final analysis, however, Iran's general support for the 
conventional arms register was overshadowed by the critical aspects of the Iranian 
argumentation. Iran's criticism of the UN register was composed of two dimensions. 
First and most importantly, the Iranians thought that the register's scope was too 
narrow. They constantly aired the view that the arms register should be expanded to 
include corresponding information about states' WMD arsenals. As lamented by one 
114 Iran's references to the term 'new international totalitarianism' reflected, above all, the Islamic 
Republic's uneasiness with the United States' leading position in the post-Cold War international system. 
The term was used, among others, in connection with Iranian criticism of the U. S. economic sanctions 
against the Islamic Republic (A/51/PV. 4,1996: 26). 
15 The UN Register of Conventional Arms is the only global cooperative regime relating to conventional 
weapons transfers and holdings. As a transparency measure, it was designed to serve as a global CBM 
and as a first step towards global restrictions on conventional weapons shipments and arsenals. The 
countries that participate in the register are asked to annually provide information about their 
conventional arms imports and exports during the previous calendar year. Information is requested on 
seven categories of major conventional weapons - that is, battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large 
calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles or missile systems - 
and the participants' reports are supposed to be submitted to the UN by the end of May each year. The 
reports are expected to include data on the number of weapons the participants have imported and 
exported during the one-year period and both on the sources and the destinations of the arms transfers in 
question. In addition, states are invited, on a voluntary basis, to provide further qualitative data on their 
weapons transfers and on their military holdings and arms procurement through national production. For 
more on the UN Register of Conventional Arms, see Yearbook of the United Nations 1991 (1992: 58-59); 
Kervers (1998: 1-7) and Chalmers and Greene (1999: 1-9). 
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arms control official of the Islamic Republic at the CD in August 1993, "weapons of 
mass destruction, which were agreed to be part of this [register] exercise, are 
deliberately subdued, despite the fact that transparency for these weapons has definitely 
more significant effect and impact on our security than that of conventional weapons" 
(CD/PV. 659,1993: 8). 16 
Besides indicating that Iran's arms control policy prioritized WMD matters over 
conventional weapons issues, such Iranian statements illustrated that Iran belonged to 
the minority of states in the register regime that made a linkage between transparency in 
conventional and non-conventional armaments. The fact that the Islamic Republic, 
unlike most participants of the arms register and against the generally held diplomatic 
view, did not see the regime as a seperate issue exclusively pertaining to conventional 
armaments became evident also from Iran's voting behaviour at the UN. On many 
occasions, Iranian officials expressed their reservations about the content of UN 
resolutions that dealt with the arms register or with the topic of transparency in 
armaments in general, and sometimes, even completely abstained from them., 17 
Moreover, Iran often joined hands with some other Third World countries, such as 
Egypt, to diplomatically press for the inclusion of an eighth category of weapons, WMD 
stockpiles, to the original register regime. This happened, for example, during the 
second UN review of the arms register in 1997 (Kervers 1998: 5). Iranian and Egyptian 
diplomats also shared the argument that low participation in the register regime by 
Middle Eastern governments was due to their dissatisfaction with the register's lack of a 
WMD dimension (CD/PV. 659,1993: 8). "g 
116 The standard Iranian diplomatic formulation went as follows: "The United Nations Register of 
Conventional Arms could serve as a real confidence-building measure only if it was expanded to include 
data and information on all types of conventional weapons as well as weapons of mass destruction in all 
their aspects. This was the basic thrust of the General Assembly resolution 46/36L of December 1991. " 
This wording can be found in connection with every Iranian arms register report prepared for the UN in 
the post-Gulf conflict period (see <http//: www. un. org/Depts/dda/CAB/index. htm>). For other Iranian 
pronouncements that call for the inclusion of a WMD category in the arms register, see (CD/PV. 625, 
1992: 6 and A/C. 1/51/PV. 22,1996: 24). 
'" See A/C. 1/49/PV. 25 (1994: 6-7) and A/C. 115 1 /PV. 22 (1996: 24). 
118 The point made by Egypt and Iran regarding the Middle Eastern participation linked the register issue 
to the wider arms control debate in the Middle East. As both the Arab states and Iran regarded the control 
of Israel's WMD arsenal as a fundamental diplomatic objective, references to poor Middle Eastern 
participation in the conventional arms register need to be seen against this background. Even though 
Israel and its policies were at the center of the Islamic Republic's general foreign policy argumentation, in 
the area of arms control it was the context of WMD in which the Iranians really began to focus on Israel. 
Iranian deliberations on conventional arms control contained relatively few remarks on Israel, and the 
Iranian statements that included comments on Israel usually repeated the Iranian position according to 
which Israel's arms policies fuelled and to a large extent caused the conventional arms racing in the 
Middle East (A/49/PV. 5,1994: 39). 
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In addition to the demands for a specific WMD category, the brief history of the UN 
arms register regime has been tinged with calls by some countries, for example, for the 
expansion of the register's original weapons categories and for the expansion of the 
register's scope to include military holdings and procurement from national production 
as well. ' 19 During the post-Gulf conflict years, Iran lent its support to the idea of 
broadening the register's original definitions of major conventional weapons120 
(A/C. 1/49/PV. 25,1994: 7) and repeatedly underlined the necessity of including national 
holdings to the UN regime, 121 even though none of its own register reports between 
1992-1996 contained so-called background information of the Islamic Republic's 
national military holdings. 122 Moreover, Iranian officials took the national holdings 
issue one step further by strongly arguing that the register should also contain 
quantitative and qualitative data on those armaments that were placed outside national 
territories through bilateral or multilateral security agreements. ' 23 
As regards the subject of procurement from national production, the Iranians were of 
the view that the efforts to expand the register in this respect should focus on major 
arms-producing countries' procurement activities. The Islamic Republic made a 
distinction between the arms production of the developed world's private companies 
and the developing countries' weapons manufacturing, and argued that it was above all 
the developed countries' national procurement from private companies that should be 
covered by the register regime, whereas developing countries' arms manufacturing 
ought to be internationally supported so that Third World states would gain self- 
sufficiency in arms production and be able to meet their minimum defence needs. 
Furthermore, Iran's arms control officials made calls for international assistance for 
developing countries' efforts to convert military facilities to civilian ones. (CD/PV. 690, 
1994: 12 and The Islamic Republic of Iran and Disarmament 1994: 20-2 1) 
The second set of issues sparking Iranian dissatisfaction with the UN arms register 
had to do with the regime's operation. For one thing, the Islamic Republic claimed that 
international deliberations on the register regime and on transparency in armaments 
themselves were devoid of openness and transparency. In 1994, for example, Iran's 
"9 These two issues were high on the agenda during the first and the second UN review of the register's 
operation in 1994 and 1997, respectively. For a discussion of the 1994 and 1997 reviews, see Laurance 
and Wulf (1995: 557-567) and Kervers (1998: 2-5). 
120 For the original definitions, see Yearbook of the United Nations 1991 (1992: 59). 
121 See CD/PV. 625 (1992: 6) and The Islamic Republic of Iran and Disarmament (1994: 20). 
122 See <http//: www. un. org/Depts/dda/CAB/index. htm>. 
123 See CD/PV. 625 (1992: 6) and CD/PV. 683 (1994: 19). 
186 
arms control officials argued that the selection process for the members of the first UN 
Group of Governmental Experts - appointed by the UN secretary-general and charged 
with the task of reviewing the arms register's operation'24 - had been completely non- 
transparent, and that the group's discussions had been held "behind closed doors. " As a 
result, at first, Iran opposed diplomatic plans that called for the establishment of a new 
experts group to report on the register's operation and its further development in 1997, 
but in the end, in December 1994, voted for the 1997 review at the UN General 
Assembly. (CD/PV. 683,1994: 19; A/C. 1/49/PV. 25,1994: 7-8 and Laurance and Wulf 
1995: 567) 
In spite of the positive vote, however, the officials of the Islamic Republic underlined 
that the diplomatic follow-up of the arms register should not be monopolized by the 
same major powers that were responsible for destabilizing arms transfers in the first 
place. Iran's willingness to reorganize the review mechanism was one manifestation of 
the Islamic Republic's position that all participants should have a say in the monitoring 
of the register regime. In the Iranian view, the CD, as the sole multilateral forum for 
arms control negotiations, should become the principal body for deliberations on 
transparency in armaments. The expert groups of the UN should only function as 
specialist bodies assisting the CD. (CD/PV. 625,1992: 6 and A/C. 1/50/PV. 22,1995: 12) 
Yet by 1996, the Iranians seemed to have acquiesced to the register regime's existing 
review mechanism. On 14 November that year, the Iranian representative addressing the 
UN General Assembly's First Committee implied that the deliberations on transparency 
in armaments at the CD had not brought about Iranian-desired results. Accordingly, the 
official said that his government was strongly of the opinion that the 1997 expert group 
reviewing the operation of the arms register should be established on the basis of 
equitable political and geographical representation. This diplomatic wish of Iran 
materialized, partly at least, in 1997, when a representative of the Islamic Republic took 
part for the first time in the work of an expert group of the register regime. 
(A/C. 1 /51 /PV. 22,1996: 24) 
For another thing, and independently of the Iranian criticism focusing on procedural 
matters, the representatives of the Islamic Republic claimed that the register regime had 
not altered states' behaviour in the area of international arms transfers. According to 
them, the UN register had neither been able to control destabilizing accumulation of 
124 Experts from 23 governments took part in the work of the 1994 Group of Experts. Iran was not 
represented in the group. 
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conventional weapons in various parts of the world nor led to self-restraint in the 
transfer of such weaponry, in particular by the major conventional arms manufacturers 
(A/C. 1 /51 /PV . 13,1996: 19 and A/C. 1 /51 /PV . 22,1996: 24). Even though constantly 
pointing to the importance of measures that control conventional arms transfers, the 
Iranians added, the major powers continued to sign military contracts of huge 
proportions (CD/PV. 625,1992: 6). In fact, the officials of the Islamic Republic viewed 
the UN arms register's poor performance as an indication of the major powers' 
politically and commercially motivated efforts to obstruct advances in global 
conventional arms control (A/50/PV. 5,1995: 30). 
Iran used the situation in the Persian Gulf as another example of the arms register's 
insignificance. Given that no Gulf Arab government had provided information to the 
UN register, the Islamic Republic argued, the regional efforts to promote transparency 
in armaments did not hold a bright future. ' 25 Iranian officials said that wide regional 
participation in the register regime would contribute to Gulf security, but 
simultaneously also noted that unilateral transparency measures could turn out to be 
harmful because they might "invite aggression. " Thus, at first, Iran seemed to link its 
participation in the register regime with GCC states' behaviour, and with that of Saudi 
Arabia, in particular. In the end, however, the Islamic Republic decided to send 
information to the register regardless of GCC governments' responses. Iran submitted 
its first register report, for the calendar year 1992, on 15 November 1994.126 (The 
Islamic Republic of Iran and Disarmament 1994: 22; Zarif 1995: 125 and Chalmers and 
Greene 1995: 247) 
The Islamic Republic provided register reports also for the rest of the post-Gulf 
conflict period, even if the Iranian submissions were regularly late. Thus, Iran's report 
for the calendar year 1993 was submitted in November 1994, for 1994 in December 
1995, and for the calendar years 1995 and 1996 as late as in July 1997.127 One reason 
125 It should be noted that all Gulf Arab states - save Iraq that abstained - voted for the UN General 
Assembly resolution 46/36L that established the world organization's arms register. Between 1992-1996, 
however, no Gulf Arab government provided data to the register on its conventional arms transfers. Oman 
and Qatar did provide reports concerning the calendar year 1992 in 1993, but those reports contained no 
quantitative or qualitative data on the two countries' arms transfers. (Yearbook of the United Nations 
1991,1992: 59) and <http: //www. un. org/Depts/dda/CAB/index. htm>) 
126 See <http: //www. un. org/Depts/dda/CAB/index. htm>. 
127 Ibid. Another problem related to the Iranian reports was that they contained only data concerning 
arms-exporting countries that had already submitted their own returns, although the information in Iran's 
and the exporters' reports was not always identical. Also, doubts were expressed over the credibility of 
the Islamic Republic's register reports. Especially in the case of missiles and missile-systems, the seventh 
arms category of the UN register, Iran was suspected of not having reported all relevant information about 
its transfers. (Arnett 1998a: 436 and Anthony and Jones 1998: 15,28) 
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Iranian officials cited as having caused the delays was cooperation problems within the 
Iranian bureaucracy, especially on the part of the Islamic Republic's defence ministry 
(Arnett 1998a: 436,446). As for the substance of Iran's register reports, Iranian 
authorities provided detailed data on the Islamic Republic's conventional arms imports 
as well as so-called "nil reports" on arms exports which indicated that Iran had not 
exported any of the weaponry covered by the register regime. Iran's reports did not 
contain any qualitative background information about the Islamic Republic's arms 
acquisitions. The only acquisition-related comment made in the reports was that Iran's 
imports were intended for replacement purposes. 128 
3.7.2.3 The inadequacy of transparency in armaments 
Given Iran's reserved attitude towards the operation of the UN register, it was not 
surprising that in the post-Gulf conflict years, the representatives of the Islamic 
Republic made calls for more dramatic steps in the field of global conventional arms 
control. In Iran's view, there was an urgent need for effective arms control measures 
because the major arms-producing countries continued to pump conventional weaponry 
to different and especially to the conflict-ridden parts of the world (A/51/PV. 32,1996: 
24). Again, developments in the Gulf region were used by Iranian officials as an 
example of the inability of international transparency efforts to curb the proliferation 
and dangerous accumulation of major conventional weapons. According to the Iranians, 
the fact that GCC governments were constantly induced and compelled into relying on 
foreign forces and purchasing huge amounts of military hardware from abroad testified 
to a general international pattern (Rafsanjani 1995: 700 and Zarif 1995: 122). Also, the 
officials of the Islamic Republic seemed to suggest that as part of their sales strategies, 
major weapons exporters sought to press arms-importing governments, such as those in 
the Gulf, to ignore and even torpedo arms control initiatives (A/CN. 10/PV. 181,1993: 
31 and Kharrazi 1994: 128). 
Another strategy used by the major arms-manufacturing countries to promote their 
sales and politico-military influence worldwide, the Iranians maintained, was to fuel 
regional tensions and to create imaginary enemies. The way in which Western 
governments demonized the Islamic Republic and questioned the legitimacy of its 
rearmament program was told by Iranian authorities to be indicative of such schemes. 
128 Ibid. 
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Consequently, the arms control officials of the Islamic Republic sought to defend their 
government from charges of pursuing a massive rearmament program. First of all, they 
argued that Iran's conventional arms purchases were markedly low compared with those 
of other Gulf governments. According to Iranian calculations, the Islamic Republic 
allocated only an average of 1.6 percent of its GDP to national defence. 129 (Shahabi 
1994: 279-280; A/51/PV. 4,1996: 28 and A/49/PV. 5,1994: 40) 
Secondly, the Iranians maintained that the low level of their country's military 
expenditures indicated that the Islamic Republic's military intentions were purely 
defensive. As one Iranian diplomat assured in December 1992, Iran's military strength 
"has never been, and will never be, used for expansionism and aggression against 
others. " Repeating the argument recorded in Iran's UN arms register reports, the 
representatives of the Islamic Republic said that the purpose of Iranian arms 
acquisitions was to replenish capabilities that had been lost in the Iran-Iraq war. 
Moreover, the Iranians argued that faced with turmoil and hostility on its western, 
northern, eastern, and southern borders, their country could not afford to overlook its 
security concerns and to ignore the maintenance of its defence capabilities. 
(A/47/PV. 79,1992: 73; Shahabi 1994: 279-280 and CD/PV. 690,1994: 13) 
By speaking of the Islamic Republic's modest rearmament efforts and benign military 
intentions, Iranian authorities also wanted to signal that they were credible advocates of 
global control of conventional armaments. To promote this perception internationally, 
the Iranians presented a number of arms control initiatives - even if they did not seem 
to be interested in investing too much diplomatic energies on the details of such 
proposals. Iran's initiatives included calls for "comprehensive, non-selective, balanced 
and effective reduction of conventional arms" through global reduction of military 
budgets, weapons procurement, and the presence of foreign forces in various parts of 
the world (A/48/PV. 14,1993: 23 and A/48/PV. 68,1993: 17). In addition, the officials 
of the Islamic Republic alluded to the importance of arms control measures that would 
affect the supply of conventional weaponry, such as limiting the major powers' arms 
129 It should be noted here that international observers viewed the figure provided by the Iranians as too 
low. For example, the estimates by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) 
were clearly higher. According to IISS, in 1993, Iran's defence expenditures constituted some 3.4 percent 
of the country's GDP and in 1994 some 3.8 percent. In 1995, some 4.8 percent of the Islamic Republic's 
GDP was allocated to defence, whereas in 1996 the figure was 5 percent. (The Military Balance 1995/96, 
1995: 265 and The Military Balance 1997/98,1997: 294) 
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manufacturing or pressuring key arms-producing countries to curb their export 
activities130 (A/C. 1/49/PV. 9,1994: 15 and A/C. 1/50/PV. 11,1995: 13). 
3.8 The Khatami Presidency 
Muhammad Khatami's victory in the Iranian presidential election of May 1997 
marked the beginning of the fourth discernible phase in the Islamic Republic's 
conventional arms control policy since the end of the Iran-Iraq war. Even though 
president Khatami's political program focused primarily on domestic issues, the 
introduction by the Khatami administration of a new vocabulary in Iran's political 
language left a mark in the Islamic Republic's international relations as well. But as the 
case of arms control illustrates, the changes in the political language often did not 
translate into changes in Iran's actual diplomatic positions. As a consequence, Islamic 
Iran's arms control stances under president Khatami were highly congruent with those 
of the Rafsanjani administration. At the same time, however, one should not 
underestimate the fact that the Khatami government's conciliatory foreign policy 
argumentation increased the credibility of the Islamic Republic's arms control 
operations both regionally and internationally. 
3.8.1 Global security networking 
During the Rafsanjani presidency, Iran's attempts to improve its relations with the 
outside world had stemmed primarily from the domestic needs generated by Iran's 
eight-year war against Iraq. While the Islamic Republic's severe economic and other 
societal problems necessitated the Khatami administration to pursue a pragmatic foreign 
policy course, too, what distinguished the tenures of the two Iranian presidents from 
each other was the fact that the Khatami period brought about a reassessment of the 
ideological fundaments that had guided Iran's foreign policy orientation ever since the 
1979 revolution. In other words, president Khatami not only followed the diplomatic 
footsteps of his predecessor, but also took one step further by developing and 
130 Related to this point, Iranian officials also argued that it would be necessary to strengthen the UN arms 
register by including transfers of high technology with military applications in it (CD/PV. 625,1992: 6 
and The Islamic Republic of Iran and Disarmament 1994: 21). 
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advocating the adoption of a new set of ideological pillars to steer his country's 
diplomatic efforts. 
The notion of "dialogue among civilizations" became the key catchword of Iranian 
foreign policy during the Khatami period. Under this discursive rubric, Iran's 
representatives signalled that the Islamic Republic was prepared to break away from the 
confrontational aspects of its foreign policy, to reintegrate itself into the family of 
nations, and to struggle against disintegrating tendencies in the international system 
through the promotion of dialogue and cooperation within and between civilizations. ' 31 
At the same time, the Khatami administration studiously emphasized that the Islamic 
Republic's efforts in this respect were guided by three fundamental principles, namely, 
dignity, wisdom, and interest. Put differently, the authorities of the Islamic Republic 
said that they would ensure that their country's foreign policy would not compromise 
the dignity of the Iranian nation, that it would be based on the core values of the Iranian 
society, and that it would focus on advancing Iran's national interests (Kharrazi 1997: 2 
and Nejad-Hosseinian 1998: 1-2). 
On 2 February 1999, at the CD, Iran introduced the notion of "global security 
networking" and defined it as the "security interpretation of the concept of dialogue 
among civilizations. " Hoping to impress a new concept upon the multilateral diplomatic 
debate on security and arms control, Iranian officials sought to draw diplomatic 
attention to issues their government viewed as undermining international peace and 
security. Thus, on the one hand, the Khatami administration was highly critical of major 
power dominance of international arms control arenas. The representatives of the 
Islamic Republic stressed that all members of the community of states should be on an 
equal level and entitled to take part in discussions and negotiations dealing with 
international security and arms control. On the other hand, the Iranians strongly rejected 
what they described as the division of the international community into two distinct 
groupings: those who enjoyed the protection of military alliances and state-of-the-art 
armaments and those who were classified as threats to international peace and security 
and whose security concerns were completely ignored. (Kharrazi 1999: 492; A/52/PV. 6, 
1997: 25 and CD/PV. 812,1999: 3) 
13' Of course, Khatami's concept of dialogue among civilizations was directed to the domestic Iranian 
audience as well. Above all, it sought to point out to the Iranian people that they would benefit from 
dialogue and cooperation with other members of the international community. By learning to understand 
the strengths and weaknesses of other nations and cultures, Khatami's argument went, the Iranian society 
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The notion of global security networking was put forward by Iranian officials as a 
remedy for what president Khatami characterized as "domination, unilateralism, 
confrontation and exclusion" in the international system. The Iranians argued that if 
states were ready to adopt the concept of global security networking and to share its 
fundamental assumption according to which the security of one group could not be 
achieved without the security of the other, they would be able to abandon the doctrine of 
the balance of power and their reliance on military blocs. 132 The Khatami administration 
stressed that global security networking was a mechanism that based on inclusion and 
participation, 133 a mechanism that used existing security and arms control arrangements 
to promote cooperation instead of competition. Thus, the officials of the Islamic 
Republic did not question the legitimacy of existing security and arms control 
instruments but challenged the modes of thought that sustained prevailing security 
policies - that is, the "doctrines and policies of the arms race" and "pseudo-scientific 
theories of clash and conflict between nations and civilizations, " as one Iranian 
representative described them. (A/53/PV. 8,1998: 7; CD/PV. 812,1999: 3,6 and 
A/54/PV. 12,1999: 12) 
The Khatami administration's paradigmatic deliberations did not bring about changes 
in the Islamic Republic's diplomatic positions on individual issues pertaining to 
international control of conventional armaments. Thus, under president Khatami, the 
Islamic Republic continued to call for the adoption of multilateral diplomatic measures 
aimed at arresting the global conventional arms race. In addition to making specific 
calls for the reduction of military expenditures, national arms arsenals, and international 
weapons transfers, Iran's representatives referred to the need to control the 
manufacturing of conventional weapons, especially that of the major arms-producing 
countries. Without meaningful steps in the area of conventional arms control, the 
Khatami administration argued, mistrust and anxiety in the international system would 
increase and the limited financial resources of the world's poorest countries would 
- and the Islamic civilization at large - would be able to restore its vitality and to find solutions to its 
existing problems. 
132 As specified by one Iranian representative: "This new security paradigm [global security networking] 
starts with the proposition that security is the indivisible need and demand of the entire human race. [... ] 
thus, the adoption of security enhancement by one country or coalition is not tantamount to loss or 
deprivation for others. Rather, as with components of any network, measures by any group to enhance its 
security augment the security of the entire network and all its members. " (Zarif 1999: 4) 
133 Interestingly, in this connection, the Khatami administration pointed to the importance of the 
participation of non-governmental organizations in international arms control efforts. In the Iranian 
opinion, NGO could play an instrumental role in global security networking (A/C. 1/53/PV. 6,1998: 6 and 
A/54/PV. 12,1999: 11,13). 
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continue to be wasted on military expenses. 134 (A/C. 1/52/PV. 11,1997: 21 
A/CN. 1O/PV. 222,1998: 16 and A/C. 1/53/PV. 6,1998: 5) 
Restating the position already adopted by the Rafsanjani administration, the Khatami 
government noted that transparency in armaments provided a necessary, even if a 
modest, starting point for global control of conventional weapons. The Iranians 
continued to express their diplomatic support for the UN Conventional Arms Register, 
although the Khatami administration did not submit a national register report for the 
calendar year 1997 and refrained from further returns after its 1998 report. 135 These 
reporting omissions may have been linked to Iran's general criticism of the UN 
register's scope and operation, for the officials of the Islamic Republic continued to 
demand that the arms register should be expanded to cover WMD, together with high 
technology with military applications, and fortified such demands with their voting 
behaviour at the UN. Furthermore, the Iranians continued to emphasize that there was 
no evidence that the register regime had led to self-restraint in the transfer of 
conventional armaments, especially on the part of the major arms suppliers. 
(A/C. 1/52. PV. 11,1997: 21; A/C. 1/52/PV. 23,1997: 6 and A/C. 1/53/PV. 24,1998: 4) 
Having the Persian Gulf in mind, Iranian officials also asked why there were no 
rigorous international efforts to promote full regional participation in the arms register, 
especially in regions with a record of massive arms purchases. 136 According to the 
Iranians, diplomatic indifference to regional participation in the register regime was one 
of the reasons why the 1997 Group of Experts was unable to make substantive 
134 Yet, at the same time, the Iranians regularly pointed out that the correct marching order in international 
arms control diplomacy should always be kept in mind: conventional arms control was secondary in 
importance to the control of WMD. Take, for example, the following Iranian remark: "The imperative of 
nuclear disarmament should under no circumstances be overshadowed by the ongoing negotiations and 
deliberations on conventional weapons" (A/52/PV. 47,1997: 17). Also, the Iranian statement that 
international arms control efforts should be built on past achievements and especially on the final 
document of the UN General Assembly's first special session devoted to disarmament (SSOD I), held in 
1978, was indicative of Iran's priorities (A/C. 1/52/PV. 11,1997: 22). The final document of SSOD I 
raised nuclear weapons and other WMD to the center of international arms control diplomacy. For the 
document's content, see Yearbook of the United Nations 1978 (1981: 39-49). 
135 Iran submitted an arms register report for the calendar year 1998 on 28 September 1999. According to 
the report, in 1998 the Islamic Republic had imported the following items from Russia: four T-72 battle 
tanks, three BMP-2 armoured combat vehicles, two large calibre artillery systems (140mm) and two 
unspecified items belonging to the weapon category of missiles and missile launchers. Some observers 
suspected that there might have been a connection between the Khatami administration's hesitation to 
provide reports on the Islamic Republic's conventional arms transfers and the fact that China, one of 
Iran's most important arms suppliers, had declined - since its 1997 report which had dealt with the 
calendar year 1996 - to provide register replies to the world organization. (A/54/226/Add. 1,1999: 4 and 
Chalmers and Greene 1999: 4-5) 
136 Iran and Qatar were the only Persian Gulf states that at least once provided data to the UN arms 
register during the tenure of the Khatami administration. Qatar submitted national register reports for the 
calendar years 1997 and 1999. (<http: //www. un. org/Depts/dda/CAB/index. htm>) 
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recommendations to the UN General Assembly with regard to the arms register's 
development. 137 (A/C. 1/52/PV. 23,1997: 6-7 and A/C. 1/53/PV. 24,1998: 4) 
3.8.2 Detente, dialogue, and confidence-building in the Persian Gulf 
The main focus of the Islamic Republic's foreign policy under president Khatami was 
on the Persian Gulf region. The Khatami administration constantly pointed out that 
Iran's Gulf policy had three core objectives: detente, dialogue, and confidence-building. 
According to Iranian officials, the objectives were widely shared by the various factions 
of the Islamic Republic's political elite138 and reflected their country's desire to build 
peace and promote mutual understanding and cooperation in the region. Declaring that 
Gulf security was the single most important issue on Iran's foreign policy agenda, the 
Khatami administration put a major emphasis on arms control in its Gulf diplomacy. 
(A/52/PV. 6,1997: 25 and Kharrazi 1998a: 145) 
The establishment of an indigenous regional security system in the Persian Gulf 
remained the principal objective in the Islamic Republic's security argumentation. For 
example, in September 1998, at the UN, president Khatami invited Iran's Gulf Arab 
neighbours to establish a joint security system in the region. 139 The Iranian president 
also restated his country's condemnation of the presence of foreign, and particularly 
U. S., military forces in the Persian Gulf and characterized such a presence as an insult 
to the regional states. (A/53/PV. 8,1998: 7 and IRNA, 25 April 2000) 
Referring to what they portrayed as the adverse consequences of foreign military 
presence in the Gulf - including regional tension, instability, and militarization'40 - the 
137 The Khatami administration reiterated Iran's position that the Islamic Republic would be ready to 
consider any diplomatic suggestion for starting negotiations on transparency in armaments at the CD, 
provided that such proposals would promote greater transparency in WMD and high-tech conventional 
armaments (A/C. 1 /53/PV. 24,1998: 4). 
138 During his visit to Qatar in May 2000, for example, Iran's foreign minister Kamal Kharrazi stated that 
there was a consensus among all political factions in the Islamic Republic over the fundaments of the 
country's Gulf policy (BBC Monitoring Middle East, 1 May 2000). 
139 During the Khatami presidency, Iran's arms control officials continued to include Iraq in the Iranian- 
visioned Gulf security system. Nevertheless, due to the Islamic Republic's and the Gulf Arab 
sheikhdoms' suspicions of the intentions of Saddam Hussein's Iraq, in practice, Iran's calls for regional 
security cooperation in the Gulf continued to be directed at GCC governments. Moreover, it should be 
noted that the Khatami administration did not deem it necessary that all the regional countries would take 
part in the proposed security arrangement right from the beginning. Foreign minister Kharrazi, for 
example, stated that it sufficed if the outstanding countries would prepare themselves for participation and 
join the arrangement later at an appropriate juncture. (A/52/PV. 6,1997: 25 and IRNA, 24 January 2000) 
140 According to Ali Shamkhani, the Khatami administration's defence minister, the foreign military 
forces in the Gulf aimed, among others, at "ruining relations between the regional governments" (IRNA, 
25 April 2000). Iran's foreign minister Kharrazi, in turn, stated that the military presence of the United 
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Islamic Republic's political and military leadership demanded the withdrawal of foreign 
forces from the region. In the Iranian view, the regional states were fully capable of 
arriving at an indigenous arrangement for Gulf security, in addition to which Iran's 
representatives argued that Iran's military capabilities could serve as a guarantee for 
regional security and declared their country's readiness to put its capabilities at GCC 
countries' disposal. The Islamic Republic's offers to help Oman to modernize its 
defence system and to provide technological know-how to the Omani air force were 
among Iran's defence cooperation initiatives. '41 (Kharrazi 1997: 4; BBC Monitoring 
Middle East, 1 May 2000 and 18 July 2000 and IRNA, 8 April 2000) 
However, president Khatami and his lieutenants acknowledged that the 
materialization of a regional security arrangement in the Gulf was a distant scenario, 142 
and therefore, relied on a diplomatic approach that divided Gulf security cooperation 
into various stages. The defence minister of the Islamic Republic was among the Iranian 
officials explicating such a division. According to Ali Shamkhani, the Persian Gulf 
states should start their security cooperation with different kinds of CBM and then 
gradually move, step-by step, towards "more sensitive stages of security cooperation" 
(Eisenstadt 1998: 76). 
Consequently, the Khatami administration attempted actively to promote diplomatic 
dialogue on CBM between Iran and GCC governments as well as the actual 
implementation of such measures. Of Iran's Gulf Arab neighbours, Oman was the most 
favourable soil for the Khatami administration's diplomatic overtures. In the first place, 
the navies of the Islamic Republic and Oman conducted reciprocal port visits -a 
practice already familiar from the Rafsanjani period (ibid.: 94). Secondly, 
representatives from the two countries' armed forces participated in each other's 
military exercises as observers. Such exchanges were speeded up by a bilateral Iranian- 
States in the Gulf was "worse than the security problems that stemmed from the two devastating wars in 
the region [... ]" (IRNA, 24 January 2000). Curiously, under president Khatami, Iran's discussion of the 
consequences of foreign military presence in the Gulf included a new theme, namely the pollution of the 
Persian Gulf, which, Iranian officials claimed, was mainly caused by the U. S. naval vessels (IRNA, 29 
February 2000 and Eisenstadt 1998: 75). 
141 The central role the Iranians envisioned for their armed forces in the Gulf security system was related 
to the traditional Iranian perception that their country was a key regional player. Note, for example, the 
speech by the Islamic Republic's UN ambassador in June 1998 in which he postulated that Iran was "the 
hinge of security and stability" not only in the Persian Gulf but also in the wider region consisting of 
Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Indian subcontinent (Nejad-Hosseinian 1998: 2). 
142 In January 2000, for example, the foreign minister of the Islamic Republic admitted that "it may be the 
case that the formation of this [security] apparatus for the time being would not be possible in practice 
[... ]. " Simultaneously, however, he underlined that it was important that the regional states would adopt 
the idea of a regional security system as the ultimately objective. (IRMA, 24 January 2000) 
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Omani agreement on military observers signed in Tehran in November 1998. The 
accord reportedly provided that the two countries would send observers to each other's 
military exercises on an annual basis (IRNA, 9 April 2000). After the signing of the 
November 1998 accord, Omani representatives observed at least Iran's Vahdat-77 naval 
exercise of December 1998 in the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Gulf of 
Oman (Jane 's Defence Weekly, 9 December 1998), the Vahdat-78 naval exercise of 
February-March 2000 in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz (IRNA, 23 February 
2000), and the Vahdat-79 naval exercise in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz at 
the end of the same year (BBC Monitoring Middle East, 29 October 2000). In a similar 
manner, representatives from the Islamic Republic observed Omani military 
manoeuvres (Corless 1999: 3 and The Middle East Military Balance 1999-2000,2000: 
184). 
Iranian authorities also made it known to Oman that the Islamic Republic would be 
willing to take the military cooperation between the two countries to a more ambitious 
level. Defence minister Shamkhani, among others, stated that Iran would place no 
restrictions on its security cooperation with Oman (BBC Monitoring Middle East, 14 
November 1998). As a consequence, diplomatic talks between Iran and Oman touched, 
among others, upon the issue of joint military exercises (BBC Monitoring Middle East, 
6 August 1998). The Iranians noted that regional military exercises in the Persian Gulf 
would undermine the false perception vigorously marketed by the enemies of the 
Islamic Republic that Iran was a threat to the region's security and stability (Corless 
1999: 3). 143 
In the end, however, Iranian-Omani talks on joint military exercises did not lead to 
concrete arrangements, for Oman regarded CBM as a sufficient form of security 
cooperation with the Islamic Republic and ruled out more ambitious forms of security 
interaction. The Omani stance became clear in April 2000, after Iran and Oman had 
143 According to the commander of the regular Iranian navy, joint military operations between the Islamic 
Republic and its GCC neighbours would "restore peace and stability to the Persian Gulf region" (Xinhua, 
4 March 2000). As far as the Islamic Republic's own naval exercises were concerned, Iranian officials 
attached a message of peace to those manoeuvres. For example, during the Vahdat-78 and Vahdat-79 
naval exercises, Iran's military representatives stated that the main message of the war games was "peace 
and security in light of unity among regional countries" (IRNA, 28 February 2000 and BBC Monitoring 
Middle East, 29 October 2000). Iranian officials also maintained that the Islamic Republic had changed 
the code-names of its naval operations - from "Victory" to "Unity" (Vahdat) - in order to convey the 
message of peace and cooperation in the region (BBC Monitoring Middle East, 4 December 1998). 
Finally, the Iranians claimed that unlike the foreign naval forces that were patrolling the Persian Gulf, the 
Islamic Republic's naval forces had done everything possible to avoid harming the marine environment 
of the Persian Gulf (Eisenstadt 1998: 75). 
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signed a bilateral agreement in Tehran dealing with the safety of navigation in the Strait 
of Hormuz. Commenting on the interpretations made of that agreement by some Arab 
commentators, a senior official of the Omani foreign ministry crystallized his 
government's position: "There is neither security nor defence agreement [between 
Oman and Iran]. If there is need for such an agreement, then such a need must be 
addressed within the GCC as a group and Iran as a neighbouring state. That is if there is 
any need for such thing. " (BBC Monitoring Middle East, 16 April 2000 and 24 April 
2000) 
The Khatami administration raised the issue of joint naval exercises also in its 
bilateral talks with Kuwait (The Middle Eastern Balance 1999-2000,2000: 184). 
However, Kuwaiti authorities declined the Iranian offers, and the security cooperation 
between the two countries was confined to so-called low-security issues, such as drug 
trafficking and other forms of organized crime. Iran and Kuwait signed a bilateral 
agreement dealing with domestic security issues in October 2000 (AFP, 3 October 
2000). Iran's security relations with Qatar remained modest as well, for the Qatari 
government did not warm to the Islamic Republic's security initiatives which included 
calls for joint military training and exercises. Resultantly, security discussions between 
the two parties were limited to issues such as the exchange of military attaches and 
delegations (BBC Monitoring Middle East, 18 July 2000). Security cooperation between 
Iran and Bahrain remained at a rudimentary level, too, whereas the Islamic Republic's 
security dialogue with the United Arab Emirates was blocked altogether by the on- 
going dispute between the two governments over the control of the Persian Gulf islands 
of Abu Musa and Greater and Lesser Tunbs. '44 
Improved relations between the Islamic Republic and Saudi Arabia, the most 
influential GCC state, were the most significant aspect of the Khatami administration's 
detente policy in the Gulf. '45 Nevertheless, the advances made by the two countries in 
political, economic, and cultural cooperation did not translate into far-reaching security 
interaction. Iranian naval vessels did pay port visits to Saudi Arabia at least in March 
1° For a discussion of the islands dispute, which had escalated already in the early 1990s as a result of 
Iran's actions in Abu Musa, see Schofield (1997: 142-156) and Marschall (2003: 121-137). 
145 Given that Saudi Arabia was the leading power in the GCC, improved bilateral relations with the 
Saudi government were a prerequisite for the realization of Iran's foreign policy objectives - such as the 
containment of Iraq, the reaching of an agreement among the Gulf states on harmonized oil policies, and 
the increase of GCC investments in the Iranian economy - in the Persian Gulf. Saudi Arabia's readiness 
to warm up relations with the Islamic Republic stemmed primarily from the country's economic problems 
as well as from the deterioration of the Middle East peace process and the emergence of a Turkish-Israeli 
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1998 and early 1999 (Eisenstadt 1998: 75 and Corless 1999: 3), in addition to which 
high-ranking military and civilian officials from the two states met each other both in 
Iran and Saudi Arabia. During the Saudi defence minister's visit to Tehran in the spring 
of 1999, for example, Iran briefed Saudi military officials about the Islamic Republic's 
defence capabilities, and the two parties agreed to exchange military attaches (BBC 
Monitoring Middle East, 10 May 1999). In the course of the Iranian defence minister's 
visit to Saudi Arabia a year later, the first visit by a senior Iranian defence official to 
Saudi Arabia since the 1979 Iranian revolution, the Islamic Republic's military 
delegation was informed about the various aspects of Saudi Arabia's defence system 
(BBC Monitoring Middle East, 1 May 2000). 
Still, in the end, the implementation of more dramatic CBM between the two parties 
did not take place. As a result, the subsequent rounds of Iranian-Saudi security talks 
centered around low-security issues and the conclusion of a bilateral agreement similar 
to the one between the Islamic Republic and Kuwait. 146 In fact, Saudi authorities did not 
hesitate to publicly dash Iran's hopes for the creation of an indigenous security 
arrangement in the Gulf. As stated by Saudi Arabia's defence minister, "direct 
cooperation with Iran to protect the Gulf is out of the question. " (Itar-Tass, 23 April 
2000; BBC Monitoring Middle East, 15 February 2001 and Reuters, 27 April 2000) 
But even if the Iranians failed to convince their Gulf Arab neighbours of the benefits 
of deeper regional security cooperation, they did not refrain from presenting and 
advocating their views of Gulf security and regional arms control. Hence, the Iranians 
repeatedly expressed their interest in signing defence pacts with individual GCC 
countries147 and continued to question the wisdom of those countries' security 
arrangements with Western governments, and particularly with the United States. 
According to foreign minister Kharrazi, "purchase of security through reliance on 
foreign powers" had only led to the strengthening of extra-regional powers' presence 
and influence in the Persian Gulf (Kharrazi 2000a: 1). Furthermore, the officials of the 
Islamic Republic continued to point, among others, to the destabilizing impact that the 
alliance sealed in the February 1996 military cooperation agreement between the two parties. (Marschall 
2003: 59,142-143) 
146 The Iranian-Saudi agreement dealing mainly with drug trafficking and terrorism was ultimately signed 
in Tehran in April 2001. 
'a' President Khatami, for example, stated in February 1999 that the Islamic Republic was ready to sign 
defence pacts with the regional states. This Iranian desire was also expressed by many high-ranking 
military representatives of the Islamic Republic. As the commander of the regular Iranian navy stated 
after the Vahdat-78 naval exercise in March 2000: "We have announced our readiness to ink defence 
accords with regional countries. " (IRMA, 18 February 1999 and X inhua, 4 March 2000) 
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massive conventional arms transfers to the Persian Gulf had on the region, made calls 
for full regional participation in the UN conventional weapons register, 148 and proposed 
cuts to the Gulf countries' defence budgets. 149 In addition, Iranian authorities stressed 
that their government "warmly welcomes and in fact promotes" any regional initiative 
that aims to strengthen peace and security in the Persian Gulf region. (A/52/PV. 6,1997: 
25; A/C. 1/52/PV. 11,1997: 21 and A/53/PV. 12,1998: 46) 
All in all, then, the Khatami administration's Gulf-related arms control operations 
strongly relied on the diplomatic foundation built during the Rafsanjani presidency. The 
continuity in Iran's policies in the Gulf meant that in spite of the general normalization 
of relations between Iran and GCC countries in the Khatami years, a process that had 
gained momentum during the final months of the Rafsanjani presidency and was 
significantly speeded up by the Khatami administration's friendly gestures to the Gulf 
Arab sheikhdoms, a number issues continued to burden Iranian-GCC security relations. 
One of such issues was the continued U. S. military presence in the Gulf 150 And still, the 
fact that the Khatami administration's diplomatic message of detente, dialogue, and 
confidence-building evoked positive responses from GCC governments meant that the 
Islamic Republic's hopes for the institutionalization of the confidence- and security- 
building efforts in the region were not necessarily excessive. ' 51 
148 When referring to the poor regional participation in the UN arms register, Iranian officials argued that 
Israel's "militarism" was a major reason for the Persian Gulf countries' reluctance to submit data on their 
arms transfers to the UN. Pointing to the wider Middle Eastern context, Hashimi Rafsanjani, the chairman 
of the Islamic Republic's Expediency Council, even maintained that arms racing in the Middle East 
would not end "while Israel is present. " (A/C. 1/52/PV. 11,1997: 21 and Rafsanjani 2000: 3) 
149 In this connection, the Iranians wanted to "frankly and sincerely" inform that of all the Middle Eastern 
countries, Iran allocated the lowest GDP percentage to national armed forces. In September 1997, foreign 
minister Kharrazi said that in 1995 and 1996, the Islamic Republic's military expenditures had constituted 
3.3 percent of the country's GDP. Compared with the official Iranian estimates dating from the 
Rafsanjani period, the figures presented by Kharrazi came closer to the estimates made by outside 
observers. The representatives of the Khatami administration also emphasized that Iran's arms 
acquisitions were intended purely for defensive purposes. As noted by president Khatami himself: "[... ] 
we have no intention for aggression. Indeed, we have no intention to invade others, nor do we see this a 
right thing to do in light of our fundamental principles and policies. " At the same time, however, the 
Iranians did not fail to point out that their country had every right to develop its defence capabilities. The 
development of the Islamic Republic's defence capabilities, Iranian officials argued, was necessitated by 
the tension and instability in Iran's immediate neighbourhood. (A/52/PV. 6,1997: 25; Khatami 1999: 3 
and Zarif 1999: 2-3) 
ISO Of course, there were more fundamental factors that ultimately defined the nature of Iranian-GCC 
security relations. Geopolitical realities, demographic factors, and the Islamic Republic's turbulent 
domestic political scene made it inevitable for the Gulf Arab sheikhdoms to view Iran as a potential threat 
to their national security. 
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3.9 Iran and Micro-Disarmament 
In January 1995, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the secretary-general of the UN, introduced 
the concept of micro-disarmament to the international arms control debate. 152 With this 
concept, he wanted to draw the attention of the community of states to the control of the 
tools of violence that accounted for most deaths in contemporary armed conflicts: anti- 
personnel mines, assault rifles, and other types of small arms. The fact that internal 
conflicts, 153 as opposed to inter-state wars, had become a key feature of the post-Cold 
War world's conflict scene was the main reason that the concept of micro-disarmament 
found resonance among governments and became a central issue on the international 
arms control agenda. 
From Iran's point of view, the rise of the micro-disarmament debate in the mid-1990s 
was a mixed blessing. On the one hand, increased international attention on the 
disastrous humanitarian and social consequences of APM enabled Iran, a badly mine- 
infested country, to more effectively seek external help for its own landmine problem. 
On the other hand, the authorities of the Islamic Republic ultimately adopted a reserved 
diplomatic attitude towards multilateral deliberations on the control of APM and other 
small arms because they feared that micro-disarmament could weaken Iran's military 
ability to defend itself. Moreover, while not publicly admitting it, the Iranians did not 
want that international small arms control measures would place limits to their 
country's domestic weapons production and to the Islamic Republic's commercially and 
politically motivated small arms transfers abroad. 
151 For an expression of the Iranian wish for institutionalized confidence- and security-building 
mechanisms in the Persian Gulf region, see Kharrazi (2000: 1). 
152 For Boutros-Ghali's discussion of micro-disarmament, see (A/50/60,1995: 14-15). 
153 Following Brown (1996: 1), internal conflicts can be defined as "violent or potentially violent political 
disputes whose origins can be traced primarily to domestic rather than systemic factors, and where armed 
violence takes place or threatens to take place primarily within the borders of a single state. " According to 
the study by Wallensteen and Sollenberg (1997: 339), between 1989-1996, only six out of the total of 
101 armed conflicts in the world involved the territory and the armed forces of more than one state. 
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3.9.1 The control of anti-personnel mines' 54 
Multilateral diplomatic efforts to control APM have mainly resulted from the 
international community's desire to alleviate the humanitarian problems caused by the 
global landmine crisis. 155 APM pose a great threat to the peoples of war-torn countries 
not only during armed conflicts but also after the hostilities have ended. In addition to 
killing and maiming both combatants and civilians, landmines obstruct the economic 
and social development of mine-infested states and cause damage to those countries' 
environmental resources. Moreover, APM cause displacement, inhibit the movement of 
refugees and internally displaced persons, and also make it difficult for international 
organizations and aid agencies to alleviate the sufferings of mine victims on the field. 156 
As far as Iran's mine-related arms control operations were concerned, the 
representatives of the Islamic Republic regularly referred to the negative implications of 
the global landmine problem and acknowledged that "uncleared APMs pose one of the 
most serious humanitarian challenges facing the world today" (A/50/PV. 91,1995: 12- 
13 and A/52/PV. 75,1997: 24). But while supporting and calling for international 
cooperation in the clearance of APM in various parts of the world, the Iranians focused 
on discussing their own country's landmine problem. According to the Islamic 
Republic's officials, some 16 million landmines157 had been laid in those parts of the 
Iranian territory occupied by Iraq at the various stages of the 1980-1988 war, covering 
more than four million hectares of Iranian Soil. 158 The Iranians emphasized that apart 
Asa The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-personnel 
Mines and on their Destruction of 1997 - the so-called Ottawa Convention or Mine-Ban Treaty (MBT) - 
defines an APM as a mine "designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and 
that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons" (see article 2[1] of the convention). APM 
contain 10 to 250 g of explosive substance and detonate under low pressure. They are produced in four 
categories: directional, fragmentation or omni-directional, bounding, and blast. (Goldblat 1999: 9 and 
Smith 1996: 275-276) 
155 It is estimated that there are some 60-70 million landmines scattered within at least 70 countries 
around the world (Hidden Killers 1998). 
156 For a discussion of the various aspects of the global landmine problem, see ibid. For a discussion 
focusing on the medical consequences of APM, see Coupland (1997). 
15' Although the accuracy of the official Iranian estimate on the number APM laid in the country during 
the Iran-Iraq war may be doubtful, the fact remains that, in numerical terms, Iran is the most heavily- 
mined country in the world after Egypt (Strategic Comments 1997: 1). 
158 The suggestion by the authorities of the Islamic Republic that Iraq's armed forces alone were 
responsible for the uncleared APM in Iranian territory blurs the fact that, during the Iran-Iraq war, both 
warring parties used APM extensively for tactical purposes. In the early stages of the war, it was the 
Iranians who resorted to large-scale use of landmines in order to stop Iraq's advances. However, as the 
Iranians started to get the upper hand in the conflict, it was Iraq's turn to rely on APM. Initially, Iraq had 
used mines to defend its territorial gains inside Iran and to gain more leeway in the deployment of its 
troops on the front. After the Iranians managed to force Iraq to go on the defensive, the Iraqis started a 
massive mining campaign in order to block Iran's offensives. From a military point of view, Iraq's use of 
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from the physical and material damages caused by APM during the war, uncleared 
landmines had taken enormous expanses of Iran's agricultural land out of production 
and rendered them uninhabitable. Moreover, the representatives of the Islamic Republic 
noted that civilians - villagers, farmers, and shephards - living in Iran's mine-infested 
areas continued to be occasionally killed or maimed by uncleared mines. In November 
1998, the Iranian representative addressing the UN General Assembly stated that since 
the end of the Iran-Iraq war, more than 1,500 Iranians had been killed and more than 
7,000 maimed or injured by APM. '59 (A/49/PV. 44,1994: 25; A/51/PV. 74,1996: 7 and 
A/53/PV. 60,1998: 24) 
Iranian authorities' post-war efforts to clear the country's mine-infected areas had 
been only partially successful. According to the officials of the Islamic Republic, during 
the ten-year period of 1988-1998, the governmental agencies responsible for mine- 
action - including the ministry of the interior, the foreign ministry, and various branches 
of the Islamic Republic's armed forces (Landmine Monitor Report 2000,2000) - had 
managed to clear some 6.2 million APM and other "unexploded devices" dating from 
the war period (A/53/PV. 60,1998: 24). 160 The Iranians maintained that the slow 
progress made in mine-clearance had resulted from two main factors: first, from the 
absence of documentation regarding the location of the mine-fields in the Iranian 
APM turned out to be highly successful, for due to the lack of mine-clearance technology, Iran had major 
problems in breaking Iraq's mine defences. The fact that Iranian troops often detonated APM by jumping 
upon them or by using sticks to activate them testified to the Iranian leadership's readiness to accept a 
high number of casualties to compensate the absence of mine-clearance equipment. Few of the mines 
used either by Iran or Iraq during the war were marked or mapped, and the great majority of the war-time 
minefields remained uncleared. (Cordersman and Wagner 1990: 448-450 and Anti-Personnel Landmines 
- Friend or Foe? 1998) 159 In January 2000, "The High Center for Research and Informatics" (HCRI) - an Iranian organization 
affiliated with the Foundation for the Disabled and Oppressed, one of the country's most important 
revolutionary foundations - conducted a survey of landmine casualties in the Iranian province of Ilam 
bordering Iraq. According to the survey, Ilam had the most serious mine problem in western Iran, whereas 
Mihran, Dihluran, and Musian were the most mine-contaminated cities in the Ilam province. Of the 394 
civilians died because of landmines in Ilam in 1989-1999,98 were under the age of 20. Shepherds were 
another population group particularly vulnerable to uncleared APM. Other heavily mine-infested areas in 
western and southwestern Iran are located in the provinces of Khuzistan, Kirmanshah, Kurdistan, and 
West Azarbaijan. (Landmine Monitor Report 2000,2000) 
160 The figures given by Iranian officials regarding the cleared mines were not uniform. In 1994, the 
Iranians said that they had "neutralized and destroyed" 6 million APM since the end of the Iran-Iraq war 
(A/49/PV. 44,1994: 25). In 1995 and 1996, in turn, the officials of the Islamic Republic stated that Iran 
had succeeded in neutralizing more than one third of all the "mines and sub-munitions" laid in the country 
during the "imposed" war (A/50/PV. 91,1995: 13 and A/51/PV. 74,1996: 7). Finally, a year later, in 1997, 
Iranian officials only spoke of "a significant number of mines and unexploded devices" destroyed 
(A/52/PV. 75,1997: 24). For the most part, the Iranians had conducted their mine-clearance operations 
manually, although mechanical methods had been employed as well. Iran is reported to have been able to 
domestically produce an unmanned, remotely operated mine-clearance vehicle called Taftan-1. 
(Landmine Monitor Report 2000,2000) 
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territory, and secondly, from the lack of modern mine-detection and -clearance 
equipment (A/50/PV. 91,1995: 13 and A/51/PV. 74,1996: 7). 
Consequently, the alleviation of the landmine problem in Iran through international 
assistance and cooperation became a key objective of the Islamic Republic's APM 
diplomacy. Iranian officials argued that as a first step towards the amelioration of the 
global APM crisis, the international community should gather and disseminate detailed 
information about the extent of the landmine problem in various parts of the developing 
world, including Iran itself. In the Iranian view, those states that had laid landmines in 
foreign territories had a special responsibility to provide maps, records, and 
documentation on APM to mine-infested countries and to the UN. Iran lent its support 
for the world organization's efforts to create a comprehensive APM database and 
demanded that the database should contain information about the advanced mine- 
clearance technology internationally available as well as about the restrictions that 
prevented mine-infested countries from obtaining such technology. (A/49/PV. 44,1994: 
25 and A/50/PV. 91,1995: 13) 
Indeed, Iranian officials were highly vocal about the problems pertaining to mine- 
clearance technology transfers to the developing world. They argued that due to the lack 
of political will on the part of developed countries, manifested in "discriminatory and 
unjustified" export-control arrangements, no serious international attempt had been 
made to provide mine-infested countries with state-of-the-art mine-clearance 
technology. The Iranians insisted that international efforts to ban APM should be 
accompanied by technological assistance to mine-infested states as well as to the mine- 
action programs of the UN. 161 In the Iranian opinion, the member states of the UN 
should empower the world organization to ensure that no restrictions were applied to 
impede developing countries' access to mine-clearance technology. Also, the 
representatives of the Islamic Republic pointed out that the governments in possession 
of advanced detection and clearance technology should inform the UN of the kind of 
contribution they could make to the world organization's mine-action programs. 
(A/50/PV. 91,1995: 13 and A/53/PV. 60,1998: 24-25) 
161 By technological assistance, Iranian authorities meant not only mine-detection and -clearance 
equipment but also the technological know-how that would enable mine-infested countries to 
domestically produce such equipment. In 1995, in connection with the review conference of the so-called 
Inhumane Weapons Convention of 1981, for example, Iran's representatives insisted that the state parties 
should transfer technology to mine-infested countries for the production of self-destructing mines (IRNA, 
II October 1995). 
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Generally, the Islamic Republic viewed the UN as the focal point for international 
mine-action and APM control efforts. 162 In addition to pointing out that the world 
organization had a special responsibility to facilitate mine-clearance technology 
transfers, the officials of the Islamic Republic also emphasized that the UN should 
encourage, plan, and coordinate research on mine-clearance technologies. ' 63 Moreover, 
the Iranians demanded that developed countries should allocate more financial 
assistance to the mine-programs of the UN as well as to individual states that suffered 
from landmines. 1 64 (A/C. 1/51/PV. 21,1996: 2 and A/52/PV. 75,1997: 24) 
Iran itself was among the countries that had requested international assistance in 
mine-clearance and welcomed any help in this regard from the UN, individual 
governments, and NGO. In 1996, the Islamic Republic began discussions with the UN 
Development Programme for the preparation of a national mine-action program. The 
parties agreed on a pilot project on the clearing and marking of minefields in western 
Iran in 1997, but the actual implementation of the project failed to proceed presumably 
due to budgetary constraints on the Iranian side. Furthermore, the Islamic Republic 
made it known that the UN had agreed to send a mission to Iran to map out the 
country's mine situation. 165 (A/53/PV. 60,1998: 25; Landmine Monitor Report 1999, 
1999: 885 and Landmine Monitor Report 2000,2000) 
But while welcoming international mine-action assistance, Iranian authorities also 
carefully defined the nature and the limits of the cooperation with foreign parties. The 
Iranians stressed that international mine-action programs should be carried out so that 
162 For the role of the UN in international mine-action efforts, see 
<http: //www. un. org/Depts/dpko/mine/index. html>. 
163 Iran claimed that the poor state of research on mine-clearance technologies forced developing 
countries to base their clearance efforts on technologies almost identical with those employed already in 
the 1940s (A/50/PV. 91,1995: 13). 
164 Iran's diplomatic statements on landmines often pointed to the fact that mine-clearance is a highly 
expensive enterprise. Whereas the price of an APM can be less than $2, the same APM may cost between 
$300-1000 to clear. Furthermore, it should be noted that besides highlighting the role of the UN in 
international mine-action and APM control efforts, the Islamic Republic recognized the importance of the 
participation of NGO in such efforts. Take, for example, the following Iranian statement made in 1997: 
"It is encouraging to note that during the past two years efforts in the field of mine-action programmes by 
the United Nations, individual countries and non-govern mental organizations have been intensified [... ]. " 
(A/50/PV. 91,1995: 13; A/49/357,1994: 2,7 and A/52/PV. 75,1997: 24) 
'65 The first known Iranian conference on the country's landmine problem was organized in Tehran on 
15-16 February 2000. The conference, entitled "The First International Conference on Landmine Victim 
Assistance during Peace Period, " was organized by the HCRI, with the help of the Trauma Care 
Foundation of Norway and the World Health Organization. As far as Iranian mine victim assistance and 
consciousness-raising programs were concerned, the HCRI was reported to have planned to conduct a 
pilot study on such programs. The same organization had reportedly also presented a project on mine 
victim assistance to the Islamic Republic's health ministry as well as to the Norwegian foreign ministry. 
(Landmine Monitor Report 2000,2000 and <http: //www. un. org/Depts/dpko/mine/index. html>) 
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they would respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and equality of states, and that 
such programs should not be used as a pretext to interfere with the target states' internal 
affairs. The officials of the Islamic Republic also noted that even though the mine- 
infested countries receiving external assistance were obliged to cooperate with the 
governments and organizations involved in mine-action services, mine-clearance was a 
"humanitarian requirement" and, therefore, should not be linked to any diplomatic 
preconditions or commitments. (Takht-Ravanchi 1996: 2; A/52/PV. 75,1997: 24 and 
A/53/PV. 60,1998: 25) 
Still, in spite of its negative experiences with APM, Iran was not willing to commit 
itself to international mine-control instruments, even if it regularly lent its support for 
"genuine" international efforts to ban APM -a code-word for the Islamic Republic's 
position that international mine-control measures should focus on "indiscriminate" or 
"illegitimate" use of landmines (A/C. 1/51/PV. 21,1996: 2 and A/52/PV. 75,1997: 24). 
According to the Iranians, the APM question had two dimensions, a humanitarian and a 
military one. Therefore, international mine-control activities had to take notice of the 
fact that "a large number of countries consider the military aspects of landmines as 
indispensable" (CD/PV. 753,1997: 21). 166 Iran, the officials of the Islamic Republic 
strongly underscored, reserved itself the right to use landmines to safeguard its national 
security until a "universally acceptable" agreement to ban APM or a viable alternative 
to replace APM as a means of defence would be in place (A/C. 1/52/PV. 20,1997: 4). 167 
Resultantly, Iran did not adhere even to those existing mine-control instruments that 
did not ban the military use of APM per se. The Islamic Republic did not sign the so- 
called Inhumane Weapons Convention of 1981 which, in its Protocol II, sets limits to 
the use of mines, booby-traps, and "other devices. " 168 Neither did Iran become a party 
to the Amended Protocol II of the Inhumane Weapons Convention, 169 even though in 
166 The military attractiveness of APM is based on a number of factors. Landmines are cheap to procure, 
easy to deploy, and their use for defensive purposes reduces the number of casualties. APM are also an 
effective tool of psychological warfare, for they create feelings of helplessness and panic among 
combatants and civilians. Moreover, APM need no maintenance or logistical support once they have been 
laid. For a discussion of these and other military benefits of APM, see Smith (1996: 278-279) and Copper 
(2000: 1-2). 
167 For Iranian statements calling for intensified international efforts to find a military alternative to 
landmines, see Adeli (1997: 3) and A/52/PV. 75 (1997: 25). 
168 For the content of Protocol II of the Inhumane Weapons Convention, which seeks to reduce civilian 
casualties caused by APM in the course and after armed conflicts, see Goldblat (1999: 10-11). 
169 The Amended Protocol II was adopted in May 1996 by the review conference of the Inhumane 
Weapons Convention. The amended protocol aimed to further reduce civilian casualties and the loss of 
land for civilian purposes caused by APM. For an assessment of the Amended Protocol II, see ibid. (12- 
14). 
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November 1998, at the UN, Iran informed that it had "expedited the process of 
acceding" to that document (A/C. 1 /53/PV. 23,1998: 20). ' 70 
As far as the Islamic Republic's attitude towards the Ottawa Convention or the MBT 
was concerned, Iranian representatives maintained that, in its present form, the treaty 
did not satisfactorily balance the humanitarian and the military aspects of the landmine 
question. l7' Therefore, Iran ruled out its participation in the MBT, at least for the time 
being, even though at the signing conference of the MBT in Ottawa in December 1997, 
the Islamic Republic's representative expressed his government's support for the efforts 
"by some states to ban APMs through adoption of a legally binding agreement amongst 
themselves" -a formulation denoting the Iranian stance that the MBT was an 
arrangement that did not bind those states that stayed outside the convention (Adeli 
1997: 2). 172 
Iran's disinterest in the MBT had become evident already during the diplomatic 
process - the so-called Ottawa process - that ultimately produced the treaty. For 
example, the Islamic Republic had been absent from voting on the UN General 
Assembly resolution 51/45/S of December 1996 that had urged all states to work for an 
international agreement banning APM, it had not endorsed the Brussels Declaration of 
June 1997 in support of a mine-ban treaty, and it had abstained from voting on the 1997 
General Assembly resolution 52/38A that had backed the adoption of the MBT. 
Subsequently, in 1998, Iran abstained from voting on the General Assembly resolution 
53/77N which welcomed new signatories to the MBT and urged the full implementation 
of the convention. And a year later, the Islamic Republic was among the 20 
governments that abstained on the vote on the General Assembly resolution 54/54B in 
170 Interestingly, an Iranian statement made two weeks later implied that the Islamic Republic's accession 
to the Amended Protocol II was linked to developed countries' willingness to respond to Iranian requests 
for international mine-clearance assistance (A/53/PV. 60,1998: 25). 
"1 As one Iranian arms control official put it in November 1997, one month before the signing conference 
of the MBT: "That [Ottawa] process was expected to result in the preparation of a comprehensive and 
balanced document to address both the security and humanitarian aspects of the [landmine] problem, and 
to make provisions for financial support and the transfer of relevant advanced technology to affected 
countries, enabling those states to overcome this serious problem. Regrettably, the final Oslo text does not 
meet these concerns in a clear and concrete manner" (A/C. 1/52/PV. 20,1997: 15). For an analysis and the 
details of the MBT, see Georghiades (1998: 53-62). 
172 By December 2000,139 countries had signed and 109 ratified the treaty. The wide international 
participation in the convention meant that the MBT would have significant effects on future development 
of customary international law on APM. This would make it much more difficult for countries like Iran to 
defend the argument that the provisions of the MBT only bind the treaty members. 
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support of the MBT. 173 (Landmine Monitor Report 1999,1999: 883-884 and 
<http: //www. icbl. org>) 
The main reason for Iran's reluctance to join the MBT was the military utility of 
APM. The officials of the Islamic Republic argued that landmines were the only viable 
means for Iran to defend its long borders in one of the most conflict-ridden parts of the 
world (Landmine Monitor Report 2000,2000). 174 Moreover, the Iranians drew a close 
linkage between the issue of landmines and the drug trafficking taking place from 
Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Iranian territory and maintained that, without 
landmines, the Islamic Republic would not be able to repel drug trafficking operations 
on its borders. 175 Also, the Iranians discretely let it be known that foreign assistance to 
their country in finding substitutive defence options particularly along the Iranian- 
Afghan border would make it easier for their goverment to consider accession to 
international mine-control arrangements. ' 76 
Apart from security motives, there were also other factors, pertaining primarily to 
commercial and foreign policy considerations, that explained Iran's reluctance to join 
international mine-control instruments. As a producer and exporter of APM, the Islamic 
Republic had little interest in taking part in diplomatic arrangements that would impede 
the activities of its arms industry. ' 77 Even though Iran announced its intention to halt the 
production of APM (Steinberg 2000), declared in December 1997 that it would not 
export landmines (Adeli 1997: 3), and informed, in November 1998, that it had imposed 
a moratorium on the export of APM (A/C. 1/53/PV. 23,1998: 20), it was not clear 
whether the Iranians had actually committed themselves to such measures. 
The fact that APM of Iranian origin were regularly detected in countries like 
Afghanistan and Sudan (BBC Monitoring Central Asia, 13 October 1998 and Landmine 
Monitor Report 2000,2000) raised suspicions about the sincerity of the Iranian 
13 Iranian officials constantly pointed out that the CD was the proper - and, for the time being, the only 
thinkable - forum for international negotiations on a "balanced, comprehensive and universally 
acceptable" ban on APM (A/C. 1/53/PV. 23,1998: 20 and A/53/PV. 60,1998: 25). 
174 There is no information available about the number of APM deployed by Iran on its borders 
(Landmine Monitor Report 2000,2000). 
15 Iran's use of landmines to secure its eastern borders meant, as pointed out by Dokhanchi (2004), that 
there were two mine-related developments occurring in the country. In western Iran, the focus of the 
Islamic Republic's authorities was on demining, whereas in the eastern parts of the country the Iranians 
were occupied with mine-planting. 
176 Author's interview with an Iranian arms control official (B) who wishes to remain unidentified, 
summer 2000. 
177 The Islamic Republic started to produce large numbers of APM during the Iran-Iraq war. The war-time 
production added to the estimated 1.5-2.5 million APM imported to Iran between 1969-1978 from the 
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diplomatic declarations. Of course, the officials of the Islamic Republic could have 
always argued that the Iranian landmines detected abroad had been transferred prior to 
such declarations or that their government had never intended to put restrictions on non- 
commerical mine shipments. Indeed, there was plenty of evidence at the time of Iranian 
weapons transfers to political actors sympathetic to the Islamic Republic. Iran's use of 
weapons shipments as a foreign policy tool involved not only APM but other kinds of 
small arms as well. 
3.9.2 Small arms control 
International deliberations on the control of small arms have consisted of two 
separate tracks of diplomatic talks. In spite of the fact that APM are a category of small 
arms, the mine question has been dealt with independently and separated from what has 
become known as the debate on small arms and light weapons. 178 The international 
community's interest in the control of small arms has stemmed first and foremost from 
the concern over the enormous human suffering caused by the use of those weapons in 
internal conflicts in various parts of the world. Not only contributing to the intensity, 
duration, and destructiveness of internal conflicts, the proliferation, accumulation, and 
use of small arms poses a serious threat to post-conflict peace-building and 
reconstruction as well. The elevation of the small arms issue to the international arms 
control agenda has also been speeded up by the fact that small arms are the main 
instruments of violence for nationally and transnationally operating criminal and 
terrorist groups. 179 
United States by the Shah's government. (Wareham 1998: 4 and Landmine Monitor Report 1999,1999: 
885) 
178 There are no single definitions of the terms 'small arms' and 'light weapons. ' However, those put 
forward by the UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms have been widely used. According to 
the panel - an expert group composed of representatives from 16 countries which was given the task, in 
December 1995, by the UN General Assembly to try to find answers to three central small arms-related 
questions: first, what kinds of small arms were used in the conflicts dealt with by the UN?; secondly, 
what were the causes for the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of small arms?; and finally, what 
could be done about the small arms problem? - small arms are weapons designed for personal use, 
whereas light weapons are those designed for use by several persons serving as a crew. Small arms 
include revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, sub-machine-guns, assault rifles, and light 
machine-guns. Heavy machine-guns, portable anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, and light mortars are 
examples of light weapons. (A/52/298,1997: 11-12). For the purpose of the following discussion, 'small 
arms' is used as a general term referring both to small arms and light weapons, as well as to the 
ammunition used in such armaments. 
19 For more on the characteristics of the global small arms problem, see Pirseyedi (2000: 3-10). It is 
estimated that, globally, there are more than 500 million small arms in existence. Such weapons are 
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Iran's diplomatic approach to the question of small arms was reserved right from the 
start. Given that the Islamic Republic was a producer and an exporter of small arms and 
that it used small arms transfers as an instrument to promote its foreign policy 
objectives, Iran's diplomatic cautiousness was hardly surprising. The Islamic Republic 
produced a wide variety of small arms, both under license and indigenously. The 
Iranian-manufactured products included, first of all, different kinds of ammunition 
ranging from bullets for assault rifles and sub-machine-guns to medium-calibre 
projectiles for machine-guns and shells for light mortars. As for actual armaments, the 
weaponry produced in Iranian ordnance factories included handgrenades, assault rifles, 
sub-machine-guns, light and heavy machine-guns, light mortars, as well as anti-tank 
weapons. (Sayigh 1997: 184-185 and The Military Balance 1998/99,1998: 306-309) 
A significant number of these weapons were transferred abroad by the authorities of 
the Islamic Republic, either in the form of commercial transactions or politico-military 
assistance. Even though the Iranians often exaggerated the volume of their country's 
arms exports, Iranian-produced small arms were actively offered to potential buyers 
directly and at major international arms exhibitions (IRNA, 11 April 2000 and AP, 30 
April 2000). As for the politically motivated small arms transfers, the Islamic Republic 
supported non-state actors in various conflicts theaters by providing arms and 
ammunition to them. Often, Iranian officials denied such arms shipments, 180 but at 
times, they did not hesitate to underscore the importance of armaments as a means to 
solve political conflict. This was the case, for example, in October 1993, when the 
Iranian foreign minister told UN that arms transfers to Bosnian Muslims would serve 
the cause of peace in the ongoing civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (A/48/PV. 14,1993: 
21). 
Accordingly, Iran supplied large amounts of small arms and ammunition to Bosnian 
Muslim fighters in the course of the civil war, mostly via Turkey and Croatia (Hunter 
1997: 538-540). Apart from Bosnia, Iran shipped small arms to forces opposing the 
ruling Taliban movement in Afghanistan, in addition to which Iranian small arms ended 
up in the hands of at least the following non-state actors: Hizballah in Lebanon, 
produced in over 70 states on an industrial scale and in numerous countries as a craft industry. (A/54/258, 
1999: 8) 
180 For a statement to this effect, see the pronouncement from 1992 by president Rafsanjani who denied 
the Islamic Republic's involvement in the conflict in Sudan (Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, 1993: 783) and the statement by president Khatami from 1999 in which he said that, contrary to 
international claims, the Islamic Republic was not providing weaponry to Palestinian militants (Khatami 
1999: 2). 
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Palestinian rejectionist groups, such as Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, sympathetic 
Kurdish groups, and Sudanese Muslim fighters (Pirseyedi 2000: 22-24; The Middle 
East Military Balance 1999-2000,2000: 183-184 and Patterns of Global Terrorism 
1999,2000). 
Despite the Islamic Republic's cautious diplomatic approach to small arms control - 
also explained by Iranian authorities' reluctance to accept limitations on the weaponry 
that was essential to the maintenance of domestic stability in their country - Iran's 
representatives emphasized that their government had nothing against diplomatic 
deliberations on small arms contol per se. At the same time, however, the Iranians noted 
that such discussions should neither obscure the priorities of multilateral arms control 
diplomacy as explicated in the final document of SSOD I of 1978 nor weaken the 
financial and operational resources of the UN in the area of WMD arms control or 
"macro-disarmament. " (A/C. 1/50/PV. 28,1995: 9 and A/C. 115 1 /PV. 13,1996: 19) 
Still, in the course of time, Iranian authorities came to recognize the importance of 
small arms control and the fact that the proliferation, accumulation, and misuse of such 
weapons posed a threat to the interests of the Islamic Republic as well. 181 Iran voted in 
favour of the key UN resolutions pertaining to small arms, 182 and had a representative 
both in the UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms and in the UN Group of 
Governmental Experts on Small Arms. 183 
Iran's diplomatic oscillation between the view that small arms production and 
transfers were legitimate rights of every state and the growing international consensus 
that something had to be done about the spread and misuse of small arms meant that, 
like many other governments, the Islamic Republic focused its small arms 
argumentation on the control of illicit small arms trade - an issue which did not 
endanger states' arms production and transfers. ' 84 According to Iranian officials, who 
18' For general Iranian analyses of the nature and the implications of the global small arms problem, see 
A/CN. 10/PV. 227 (1999: 4) and Nejad-Hosseinian (2000: 1). 
182 For Iran's voting behaviour in this regard, see Serafini (2000: xii, 3-6). 
183 The group of governmental experts, appointed by the UN secretary-general in April 1998, was given 
the task to map out the progress made in the implementation of the recommendations made by the UN 
small arms panel in 1997. For the UN expert group's final report of August 1999, see A/54/258 (1999: 2- 
25). 
184 Illicit trade in small arms refers to small arms trade that is contrary to the national laws of the country 
of origin or the recipient state, and/or international law. There are differing views among states on 
whether small arms transfers by foreign governments to non-state actors should be automatically defined 
as illicit. Given the Islamic Republic's own track record in this regard, it was evident that Iran belonged 
to the states giving a negative answer to the question. The Islamic Republic's use of weapons transfers as 
a foreign policy instrument also largely explained why Iranian authorities showed no interest in the 
planned UN Firearms Protocol. The purpose of the protocol - which was adopted in May 2001 by UN 
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defined illicit small arms trade as a major threat to national and regional security and 
pointed out that the phenomenon was inseparably linked with the problems of terrorism 
and drug trafficking, the international community should seriously address the question 
(A/C. 1/53/PV. 6,1998: 13). 
Ironically, Iranian officials used the violence in Afghanistan as a prime example of 
the disastrous consequences of the circulation and accumulation of illicit small arms. 
The Iranians argued that illicit small arms transfers to Afghanistan had fuelled the 
Afghan civil war and increased ethnic, religious, and criminal violence in that country 
(A/52/PV. 74,1997: 3 and A/C. 1/53/PV. 6,1998: 13). 185 Also, the authorities of the 
Islamic Republic pointed out that large numbers of the illicit weaponry shipped to 
Afghanistan had been retransferred out of the country to other regional states, including 
Iran itself (A/53/PV. 8,1998: 6 and A/53/PV. 84,1998: 14). Moreover, Iranian officials 
stressed that, in recent years, the Islamic Republic had practically been waging a war on 
its eastern borders against drug traffickers equipped with various types of small arms - 
including surface-to-air missiles - and even heavy weaponry (Kharrazi 1998b: 2 and 
A/54/PV. 78,1999: 20). 
Problems on Iran's eastern borders were not the Iranian leadership's only worry in 
this respect. Even though in many ways weak and by and large non-influential, there 
were militant opposition groups inside Iran that had chosen the path of armed conflict as 
a means to oppose the Islamic Republic. 186 The attacks by such groups against Iran's 
Islamic regime had almost exclusively been conducted with various kinds of small 
arms. 187 Therefore, it was clear that the officials of the Islamic Republic had also these 
General Assembly resolution 55/255 (see A/RES/55/255,2001) as the third supplementary protocol to the 
UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime - was to combat the illicit manufacturing of and 
trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition. Article 3 of the protocol defined the 
term 'illicit trafficking' as "the import, export, acquisition, sale, delivery, movement or transfer of 
firearms, their parts and components and ammunition from or across the territory of one State Party to 
that of another State Party if any one of the States Parties concerned does not authorize it in accordance 
with the terms of this Protocol or if the firearms are not marked in accordance with article 8 of this 
Protocol. " 
185 In the Iranian analysis, the lack of "responsible central authority in Afghanistan" had encouraged the 
people of Afghanistan to ensure their own security by resorting to small arms, which, in turn, had fed into 
additional accumulation of those weapons and increased violence (Nejad-Hosseinian 2000: 2). 
186 The main militant Iranian opposition groups consisted of the Islamic-Marxist Mujahidin-e Khalq, the 
Kurdish Democratic Party-Iran - both based in Iraq - and the armed Sunni groups operating inside Iran. 
For the characteristics and the operations of these groups, see Buchta (2000: 102-120). 
187 For example, the Mujahidin-e Khalq, considered a terrorist organization by Iranian authorities, had 
become famous for its attacks with light mortars, in addition to which the fighters of the Mujahidin were 
equipped with other kinds of small arms, such as handgrenades, pistols, and assault rifles. The Iranian 
media regularly reported on the arrests of the members of the Mujahidin and on the weaponry in their 
possession when caught. 
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groups in mind when making calls for international cooperation in the control of illicit 
small arms trade. 
According to Iranian authorities, the Islamic Republic was prepared to support "any 
initiative by the United Nations and individual countries" to deal with the issue of illicit 
small arms trade (A/C. 1/53/PV. 6,1998: 13). The Iranians welcomed the decision taken 
by the UN to convene an international conference on illicit trade in small arms in New 
York in July 2001 and emphasized that the world organization had the main 
responsibility for the elaboration of practical measures to tackle the problem. In the 
Iranian view, the recommendations listed in the reports prepared by the UN small arms 
panel and the UN expert group provided valuable guidelines for concrete measures in 
this respect. 188 The registration and the marking of small arms from the time of their 
manufacture were mentioned by the Iranians as examples of steps that would make it 
easier for the international community to track down and stop the movements of illicit 
small arms. Iranian representatives also argued that the states of the developed world 
should more forcefully regulate the "excessive production of small arms" by their arms 
industries. (A/54/260,1999: 12-13 and Nejad-Hosseinian 2000: 2) 
Furthermore, the officials of the Islamic Republic pointed out that the efforts made at 
the global level to tackle the small arms problem should be accompanied by 
corresponding measures at the regional level. In Iran's opinion, regional cooperation in 
small arms control was instrumental because such cooperation would produce solutions 
based on specific knowledge of the regional circumstances (A/54/260,1999: 13). By 
implying that Iran possessed such knowledge and by underscoring the linkage between 
the proliferation, accumulation, and misuse of small arms and the problem of drug 
trafficking, the officials of the Islamic Republic tried to persuade the international 
community to help Iran to fight the organized criminal groups involved in contraband 
trafficking into and out of Iran. Interestingly, Iranian officials made calls not only for 
political, material, and financial support, but for foreign military equipment assistance 
as well. (A/54/PV. 78,1999: 20 and Campaign Against Drug Trafficking, 2000: 11) 
188 For the recommendations referred to by the Iranians, see A/54! 258 (1999: 14-24). 
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4 ISLAMIC IRAN AND CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 
DISARMAMENT' 
4.1 Chemical Disarmament 
Prior to the start of the eight-year war between Iran and Iraq in September 1980, the 
officials of the Islamic Republic seemed to consider chemical disarmament just another 
standard subject on the international arms control agenda. Even though they did argue 
that chemical disarmament was the most important arms control issue after nuclear 
disarmament and made repeated calls for immediate international action in the area of 
chemical arms control (CD/PV. 45,1979: 13), their diplomatic pronouncements were 
routine contributions to a general inter-state debate rather than expressions of urgent 
national needs. 
Thus, following the diplomatic guidelines set by the regime of the ousted Shah, the 
representatives of the Islamic Republic maintained that the international community 
should tackle the issue of chemical weapons before those WMD would become regular 
instruments in states' military arsenals. To hinder the realization of such a discouraging 
scenario, the Iranians maintained, the international community should subject existing 
stocks of chemical weapons to limitation measures and to make sure that no new 
country would be able to acquire chemical armaments. According to the officials of the 
Islamic Republic, the control of chemical weapons was a concern of both the developed 
and the developing world. While the Iranians underlined the importance of superpower 
deliberations on the subject and gave their support to bilateral limitation talks between 
the United States and the Soviet Union, they nonetheless emphasized that the main goal 
in chemical arms control was to conclude the multilateral diplomatic process that had 
gained momentum in the early 1970s and to prepare an international disarmament 
Chemical armaments refer to weapons that "deliberately employ the toxic properties of chemical 
substances to cause death or harm" and to the munitions and devices used to deliver them to their target 
(Tulliu and Schmalberger 2001: 57,59). Biological weapons, in turn, consist of biological warfare agents 
and the mechanism of their delivery. Biological warfare agents are "living organisms, whatever their 
nature, or infective material derived from them, that are intended to cause disease or death in man, 
animals, or plants and whose effectiveness depends on their ability to multiply in the person, animal, or 
plant attacked. " Bacteria, viruses, rickettsia, fungi, and toxins constitute the main classes of biological 
warfare agents. They can be weaponized for delivery by various means, such as bombs and missiles. 
(Mäkelä 2002: 127; Flowerree 1993: 999 and Pearson 1993: 109-110) 
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convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical 
weapons. 2 (Ibid. and CD/PV. 61,1980: 11) 
After the commencement of the Iran-Iraq war, however, the context of Iran's 
chemical arms control operations underwent a dramatic change. Confronted with Iraq's 
use of chemical weapons, the Iranian operations transformed from deliberations on 
potential security problems into responses to concrete threats to Iran's national security. 
Since the Iranians were not able to militarily deter Iraq from resorting to chemical 
warfare, the only option left for them to influence Iraq's behaviour was to call on the 
international community to demand the Iraqis to stop their breaches of international law. 
4.1.1 Iran's war-time chemical arms control operations 
4.1.1.1 The emergence of the Iraqi chemical threat, 1980-1983 
According to the official Iranian view, presented during and after the Iran-Iraq war, 
Iraq started its chemical attacks against Iranian troops in January 1981 (CD/PV. 130, 
1981: 31; A/C. 1/42/PV. 17,1987: 8 and A/C. 1/44/PV. 13,1989: 3). 3 Thus, the claims 
made by Iranian representatives in 1980 that Iraq had resorted to the use of chemical 
weapons against the Iranian military during the initial stages of the war (Cordesman and 
Wagner 1990: 513 and Robinson 1985: 207) and that Saddam Hussein was planning to 
use WMD against Iranian civilians as well (A/C. 1/35/PV. 20,1980: 44-45) appear to 
have implied two things. In the first place, they indicate that the officials of the Islamic 
Republic quickly adopted the issue of chemical weapons as a part of their war 
propaganda. Secondly, and more importantly, the Iranian claims suggest that, at the 
time of the commencement of the Iran-Iraq war, the authorities of the Islamic Republic 
were at least to some extent informed about Iraq's chemical capabilities and, therefore, 
worried about the possibility that Iraq would start to systematically use chemical agents 
against their country. The fact that Iraq had established its Chemical Warfare Corps in 
1964 (Flowerree 1993: 1000) and tried to boost its chemical weapons program during 
2 The call for the creation of an international chemical disarmament treaty had been made by Iran already 
under the Shah (A/S-10/PV. 18,1978: 339 and CD/PV. 6,1979: 30). 
3 The officials of the Islamic Republic did not provide an exact start-off date for Iraq's chemical warfare, 
but the reference to January 1981 probably points to the Iranian accusation, recorded by Robinson (1985: 
207), that Iraqi aircraft dropped chemical bombs on the Ahwaz region on 9 January 1981. 
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the 1970s (Karsh 1993: 32-33 and Russell 2005b: 193) gave plenty of grounds for the 
Iranian worries. 4 
It is generally believed that by the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, Iraq's chemical 
arsenal was modest at best (Karsh 1993: 33). 5 Accordingly, even if Iran's claims about 
Iraq's chemical weapons use against Iranian troop concentrations in 1981 were true, it 
was not until 1983 that Iraq used other chemical agents than non-lethal tear gas on the 
battlefield (Flowerree 1993: 1002). 6 This probably explains why Iranian arms control 
officials' pre-1983 statements only rarely alluded to Iraqi chemical weapons. 7 Instead, 
Iranian representatives focused on criticizing the general state of international chemical 
arms control. In June 1982, for example, the foreign minister of the Islamic Republic 
noted that, "in the case of the total and effective prohibition of the production and 
stockpiling of chemical weapons and of their eradication, " no progress had been made. 
To support his assessment that the situation would remain the same in the coming years, 
the Iranian foreign minister referred to past use of chemical substances by the United 
States in the Vietnam War and to on-going U. S. chemical armament efforts under the 
administration of president Ronald Reagan. In spite of their pessimistic view of the state 
of international chemical arms control, however, the Iranians voted in favour of UN 
General Assembly resolutions 36/96A and 36/96B of 1981 as well as 37/98A and 
37/98C of 1982 which all dealt with chemical disarmament. 8 (A/S-12/PV. 3,1982: 33; 
4 It should be noted that, at the time, Iran's armed forces were poorly prepared to shield themselves from 
chemical attacks. According to the officials of the Islamic Republic, such unpreparedness was a direct 
result of Iran's military planning under the Shah which had based on the U. S. -NATO premise that 
viewed the Iranian military merely as a 24-hour buffer against an attack carried out by the Soviet Union 
(author's interview with Hassan Mashhadi, The Hague, 8 July 2002). 
5 Initially, Iraq's chemical weapons program had begun as a response and counterweight to Israel's WMD 
efforts. In the course of the 1960s and 1970s, Iraq had received outside assistance for its program from 
Egypt - whose military had used chemical weapons against royalist tribesmen in Yemen in the early 
1960s -, European equipment suppliers, and first and foremost from the Soviet Union. The Soviet help 
had consisted not only of transfers of essential chemical materials and precursors as well as of the sale 
mustard gas stockpiles, but also of scientific and technological expertise and of advice on military 
doctrine. (Hiltermann 2007: 12,26-27 and Russell 2005b: 192-194) 
6 Tear gas belongs to so-called control agents which "produce temporary irritating or disabling effects 
when in contact with the eyes or inhaled" (Cordesman and Wagner 1990: 515). 
For example, Mir Husain Musavi, the foreign minister of the Islamic Republic, made no mention of 
Iraq's chemical weapons in his address to the UN General Assembly in October 1981. Neither did his 
successor Ali Akbar Vilayati make any references to Iraq's chemical weapons in his statement to the 
General Assembly's second special session on disarmament in June 1982 or in his address to the General 
Assembly in October 1982. 
8 The resolutions in question mainly underlined the necessity of the earliest elaboration and conclusion of 
an international convention on the prohibition of the development, production, and stockpiling of all 
chemical weapons (see Yearbook of the United Nations 1981,1985: 72-73 and Yearbook of the United 
Nations 1982,1986: 101-102). 
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Yearbook of the United Nations 1981,1985: 72-73 and Yearbook of the United Nations 
1982,1986: 96,101-102). 
Although Iran claimed that Iraq's first use of mustard gas9 occurred in October 1982 
(Karsh 1993: 35), the first major Iraqi employment of chemical agents against Iranians 
took place in July-August 1983 during the Islamic Republic's military offensive - 
code-named Wal-Fajr II - in the northern Kurdish area near the Iraqi town of Haj 
Umran (Ali 2001: 47-48). 10 Diplomatically, Iran responded to Iraq's chemical weapons 
use during Wal-Fajr II by bringing the matter to the UN secretary-general's attention in 
a letter dated on 18 August 1983 (Yearbook of the United Nations 1983,1987: 238). 
Still, it was not until late October 1983 that Iran was forced to step up its diplomatic 
efforts against Iraq's chemical warfare. " On 28 October, the officials of the Islamic 
Republic informed the secretary-general about Iraq's use of chemical weapons and 
asked him to verify their claim (Mostaghimi and Taromsari 1997: 65). In a letter of 3 
November 1983 to the UN Security Council - sent through the secretary-general - Iran 
claimed that, in the preceding weeks, Iraq had on numerous occasions resorted to 
chemical warfare, and repeated its request for a representative of the secretary-general 
to examine the medical and military evidence of those attacks (Yearbook of the United 
Nations 1983,1987: 62,241). 
Iran's appeals to the UN continued throughout November 1983. On 9 November, the 
Islamic Republic reported to the world organization that Iraq had targeted civilian 
Iranian population with chemical armaments. According to Iranian authorities, shrapnel 
from two Iraqi artillery rounds fired into the Piranshahr area on 25 October and the 
injuries caused by those munitions had testified to Iraq's deployment of chemical 
agents. The Iranians made it diplomatically known that they had provided samples 
9 Mustard gas is one of so-called blister agents, that is, "agents that destroy skin and tissue, cause 
blindness upon contact with the eyes, and which can result in fatal respiratory damage. " Blister agents can 
be absorbed through skin contact or inhalation. Their military utility is based on their ability to inflict 
rapid mass casualties over a wide area, also in the case that the target group is equipped with respirators. 
(Cordesman and Wagner 1990: 515 and Robinson 2002: 124) 
10 The Iraqi leadership's initial decision to resort to chemical warfare in the Iran-Iraq war stemmed from 
the fact that the human-wave attacks carried out by Iranian troops, mostly by untrained and essentially 
unarmed irregulars, posed a major challenge to Iraq's military defences. Chemical weapons were seen by 
the Iraqis as an effective means to block Iran's human-wave attacks - which based on the idea that the 
Islamic Republic's superior manpower pool would ultimately drain off Iraq's ammunition supplies - as 
well as to install a sense of fear in Iranian soldiers' minds. As far as Iraq's use of chemical weapons 
during Wal-Fajr II was concerned, the Haj Umran episode was the first documented instance since World 
War I in which chemical armaments were employed in battle between two large conventional forces. 
(Hiltermann 2007: xv, 25-26 and Russell 2005b: 194-196) 
11 Note, for example, that the Iranian foreign minister's address to the UN General Assembly in 
September 1983 had not yet included any remarks about Iraqi use of WMD. 
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validating the Iraqi attack of 25 October to the Islamic Republic's UN mission, and that 
this purported evidence would be available for inspection by any expert assigned by the 
secretary-general. Iran repeated its accusation of Iraq's WMD use against Iranian 
civilians and troops to the UN on 16 November - specific references were made to a 
bomb dropped on a village near the town of Banih on 21 October and to three rounds of 
chemical shells fired at "the front line" on 30 October - and expressed the hope that the 
secretary-general would dispatch a team of experts to the sites in question in order to 
verify Iran's claims before the traces of the chemicals employed would disappear. 
According to Iran, Iraq's chemical attacks of October 1983 had included the use of 
mustard gas and compounds containing arsenic. (Ibid. ) 
Not unexpectedly, Iraq categorically rejected all Iranian accusations of chemical 
warfare. Iraqi authorities argued that Iran's claims were attempts to manipulate the UN 
for propaganda purposes and accused the Islamic Republic of trying to use the issue of 
chemical weapons as a means to divert international attention from Iran's refusal to halt 
its "war of aggression" and to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict. Resultantly, the 
Iraqi leadership was strongly against the Iranian proposals for the dispatch of UN 
secretary-general's representatives to investigate Iraqi use of toxic weapons. (Ibid. ) 
From the Iranian perspective, Iraq's obstructive diplomacy struck as highly effective. 
The Islamic Republic's frustration with what it regarded as the international 
community's total disregard for Iraq's shameless breaches of international law became 
evident, for example, in December 1983, when Iranian officials accused the UN 
Security Council of pro-Iraqi attitudes. In Iran's opinion, the Security Council had 
hampered the acquisition of evidence of Iraq's chemical warfare by doing nothing while 
much of the existing evidence was fading away due to lapse of time. Because of their 
inaction, Iranian authorities argued, the members of the Security Council bore partial 
responsibility for Iraq's use of WMD. 12 More directly, the Iranians accused the Soviet 
Union and France, two of the five permanent members of the council, of supplying Iraq 
with chemical armaments. (Ibid. and Robinson 1984: 331) 
12 Iranian authorities had criticized the Security Council of pro-Iraqi sympathies right from the outset of 
the Iran-Iraq war. The reason was that, contrary to Iranian expectations, the council had not designated 
Iraq as the aggressor and demanded the Iraqi government to withdraw its forces from Iranian territory. 
Instead, in a presidential statement of 23 September 1980 and in resolution 479 of 28 September 1980, the 
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4.1.1.2 The Islamic Republic's diplomatic offensive, 1984-1986 
Iranian diplomacy in 1984 
The statements made by Iran in late 1983 laid the foundation for the Islamic 
Republic's war-time diplomacy in the area of chemical arms control. As Iraq, 
encouraged by international tolerance of its conduct, began, from 1984 onwards, to 
escalate its chemical warfare by integrating chemical operations with regular military 
planning and by probing new technologies (Ali 2001: 48-49 and Hiltermann 2007: 
149), Iranian authorities were forced to correspondingly intensify their diplomatic 
efforts to mobilize world opinion against Iraq's use of toxic weapons. 13 Thorough 
recording of Iraq's chemical attacks and regular releases of information about them 
were among the methods Iranian officials resorted to. 
In 1984, Iran's first announcement to the UN of Iraqi use of chemical armaments was 
made on 29 February, when the officials of the Islamic Republic claimed that, on 26 and 
27 February, Iraq had resorted to the use of chemical bombs in the Hur al-Huwaiza area 
in the southern part of the war front. On 29 February, the Iranians also maintained that 
Iraq's largest chemical bombardment to date had taken place on 28 February during 
Iran's military offensive - code-named Khaibar - in the Hur al-Huwaiza area. Over 700 
Iranian combatants were reported to have been injured during that Iraqi bombardment. 
In March 1984, Iranian authorities informed the international community of Iraqi 
chemical attacks in the same operational theater. Iraq was told to have used chemical 
weapons on a massive scale in the Hur al-Huwaiza area on 9 March and in the Jufair 
region on 17 March. What made Iraq's chemical attacks during operation Khaibar 
exceptional was that they constituted the first recorded battlefield use of nerve gas in 
history. The nerve agent employed by the Iraqis was tabun. 14 (Yearbook of the United 
Nations 1984,1988: 231; CD/PV. 254,1984: 31 and Hiltermann 2007: 34) 
council had only called on both parties to desist from all armed activity and to seek a peaceful solution to 
their dispute. 
13 As pointed out by one representative of the Islamic Republic, the year 1984 marked the beginning of 
systematic use of chemical armaments by Iraq and thereby also the starting point for intense Iranian 
diplomatic efforts against such weapons (author's interview with an Iranian arms control official [C] who 
wishes to remain unidentified, summer 2002). 
14 Tabun and other nerve agents - which can be absorbed through inhalation or skin contact - quickly 
disrupt the nervous system by binding to enzymes critical to nerve functions, causing convulsions and/or 
paralysis, and often resulting in death. The military utility of nerve agents is based on their ability to 
inflict rapid mass casualties over a wide area, also in cases where the target group is equipped with 
respirators. Iraq's tactical calculations for employing tabun based on the fact that tabun, unlike mustard 
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Given that from April 1984 onwards the ground battles between Iran and Iraq turned 
into a war of attrition - and that Iraq's troops consequently did not need to resort to gas 
warfare in order to halt Iran's infantry offensives -, the number of Iranian references to 
Iraqi chemical attacks decreased during the rest of the year. Nonetheless, this did not 
mean that the officials of the Islamic Republic remained silent in the matter of chemical 
weapons. At the end of April 1984, for example, they charged Iraq of chemical warfare 
that month and made similar accusations later in August by claiming that the Iraqi 
military had chemically targeted the Iranian city of Abadan on 16 August. According to 
Iranian officials, between 13 March - when a group of specialists appointed by the UN 
secretary-general went to Iran to investigate Iranian allegations of Iraqi use of chemical 
armaments 15 - and 30 August 1984, Iraq had used chemical agents against Iranian 
troops and civilians at least on 24 occasions. The agents used in those attacks were 
reported to have included mustard gas and tabun. 16 
The officials of the Islamic Republic explained that the main motive for their active 
reporting on Iraq's use of chemical armaments was religious. 17 It was their Islamic duty 
to publicize the Iraqi crimes, to expose the dire consequences of those violations, and to 
call for international measures stopping Iraq's attacks. To justify their strong demands 
for international action against the regime of Saddam Hussein, Iranian representatives 
referred, in the first place, to the humanitarian suffering caused by Iraq's chemical 
assaults. The medical repercussions of the Iraqi attacks were regularly brought up by the 
Iranians who meticulously listed and presented information about the number of Iranian 
gas, the standard agent used by the Iraqis, dissipates quickly and makes it possible for soldiers to move 
swiftly into a contaminated area. Whereas it is believed that the Iraqis had reached self-sufficiency in the 
production of mustard gas - and the capability to weaponize that agent - by the time of the 
commencement of the Iran-Iraq war, Iraq's nerve agent efforts reportedly took a major leap forward in 
the course of 1982 with the help of private Western suppliers. (Cordesman and Wagner 1990: 515; 
Robinson 2002: 124 and Hiltermann 2007: 26-27,35) 
15 The UN group of specialists made a fact-finding visit to Iran from 13 to 19 March 1984. The Islamic 
Republic had lodged a formal request for such a visit on 8 March, and on the same day, alluding to the 
humanitarian principles embodied in the UN Charter and to the moral responsibilities vested in his office, 
the secretary-general had announced his decision to dispatch an investigatory mission to Iran. The UN 
experts - who did not visit Iraq because of the Iraqi government's refusal to issue a permission - 
concluded in their report to the Security Council that chemical weapons in the form of aerial bombs had 
been used in the areas inspected by them in Iran. According to the report, the chemical agents employed 
had consisted of mustard gas and tabun. However, the UN investigators did not take a stand on who had 
carried out the chemical attacks in question. (Robinson 1985: 182; Yearbook of the United Nations 1984, 
1988: 232 and Hiltermann 2007: 59-60). After the publication of the expert group's report, Iranian 
officials began to allude to it as a proof of the validity of their claims regarding Iraqi chemical weapons 
use (CD/PV. 254,1984: 32-33 and CD/PV. 262,1984: 8). 
16 This paragraph draws upon CD/PV. 262 (1984: 8,65); CD/PV. 283 (1984: 41); CD/PV. 286 (1984: 27) 
and CD/PV. 254 (1984: 30,32). 
1' Note, for example, the speech by foreign minister Vilayati at the CD in February 1984 (CD/PV. 242, 
1984: 9). 
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chemical-related deaths in Iranian and foreign hospitals 18 as well as about the various 
kinds of physical and psychological symptoms caused by the chemical agents employed 
by Iraq. 19 Iranian officials also pointed out that Iraq's chemical warfare had seriously 
damaged the natural environment. (CD/PV. 242,1984: 10-11 and CD/PV. 254,1984: 
30-31) 
The second main point made by the officials of the Islamic Republic to substantiate 
their calls for international measures against Iraq was that the use of chemical weapons 
by the Iraqi military gravely threatened the credibility of international law and 
especially that of the so-called Geneva Protocol of 1925.20 At the time of the Iran-Iraq 
war, the Geneva Protocol -a legal instrument that prohibits the use of chemical 
weapons in war - was the only major international treaty focusing on such armaments. 
21 
The Iranians maintained that Iraq's chemical weapons use had dramatically heightened 
the risk that states would start to disregard the protocol's obligations and abandon the 
conceptual distinction between chemical and conventional armaments. Such a 
development, Iranian officials extended their argument, could in turn increase the 
possibility that even nuclear weapons would be used in future conflicts. All in all, then, 
by consenting or by paying no heed to Iraq's use of chemical weapons, Iranian 
authorities summarized, governments would not only compromise the humane 
principles and ideals of the mankind, evade their responsibility for the fate of the Iranian 
people, and stand out against the world public opinion that abhorred chemical 
armaments, but would also be held accountable for the increased threat of WMD to 
international and regional security. 22 
18 During the Iran-Iraq war, Iranian victims of Iraq's chemical assaults were treated at least in the 
following foreign countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom, and West Germany. 
19 To support their diplomatic efforts, Iranian authorities also invited foreign reporters and physicians to 
visit the Islamic Republic and to meet Iranian patients described as chemical weapons casualties. In 
addition, they organized medical gatherings dealing with chemical weapons. Already in November 1983, 
the Iranians had held an international medical conference in Tehran during which they had presented 
evidence of Iraq's chemical warfare and presented living victims of Iraqi chemical attacks. (CD/PV. 262, 
1984: 8; Robinson 1985: 213,215 and O'Ballance 1988: 149) 
20 The Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of 
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare entered into force in 1928. 
21 From a strictly legal point of view, the Geneva Protocol - to which Iran became a party in 1929 and 
Iraq two years later in 1931 - is part of international humanitarian law and not an arms control 
instrument. The protocol does not ban the possession or the development of chemical armaments, and 
neither does it prohibit the use of those weapons in non-war situations. It should be noted that in addition 
to declaring Iraq's chemical warfare as a breach against the Geneva Protocol, Iranian officials pointed to 
legal interpretations according to which the use of chemical weapons was against international customary 
law as well (CD/PV. 254,1984: 30). 
22 This paragraph draws upon CD/PV. 254 (1984: 32-33); CD/PV. 286 (1984: 26-27); A/C. 1/39/PV. 36 
(1984: 62-65) and A/C. 1/39/PV. 40 (1984: 71). 
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The fact that Iran's intense diplomacy did not produce the kind of international 
response the Islamic Republic had hoped for caused major irritation among the Iranian 
leadership. Maintaining that their country was facing an international "conspiracy of 
silence, " the leaders of the Islamic Republic, whose radical outlook on domestic and 
international affairs generated little sympathy or credibility internationally, declared it 
astonishing that most governments were not interested in punishing or even criticizing 
Iraq for its use of WMD. 23 The UN Security Council was the central target of the 
Islamic Republic's criticism. According to Iranian officials, the inaction and 
indifference of the "so-called Security Council" - claimed by the Iranians to be only 
interested in securing the objectives of the major powers - encouraged Iraq to continue 
its chemical warfare. That the Security Council had not responded to the March 1984 
UN specialist group report by producing a resolution that would have condemned, and 
included measures to halt, Iraq's chemical attacks was told by the Iranians to illustrate, 
for its part, that the Security Council had silently approved Iraq's "barbarous crimes" 
which, in the Iranian view, had originally been initiated because the Iraqi leadership had 
become frustrated with the ineffectivity of the sophisticated conventional weaponry 
delivered to the regime of Saddam Hussein by the major powers. 24 (A/39/PV. 15,1984: 
296-297; A/C. 1/39/PV. 36,1984: 61 and CD/PV. 262,1984: 7-9) 
Iranian representatives tried to strengthen the legitimacy of their diplomatic demands 
by making constant allusions to the Islamic Republic's own declared position not to 
resort to chemical warfare due to religious and humanitarian reasons. Even though the 
Geneva Protocol of 1925 was interpreted by the Iranians to allow a state party to 
retaliate in kind against another contracting party if subjected to a chemical attack, the 
Islamic Republic was told not to be willing to pursue the option sanctioned by 
23 For statements reflecting Iranian authorities' frustration, see CD/PV. 254 (1984: 31-33) and CD/PV. 262 
(1984: 9-10). 
24 After receiving the UN investigators' March 1984 report, the Security Council had agreed on a weak 
presidential statement which, among others, condemned the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war 
- thereby not identifying Iraq as the culprit - and, to the dismay of Iranian authorities, called on both the 
Islamic Republic and Iraq to scrupulously adhere to the obligations of the Geneva Protocol. Prior to the 
Security Council's presidential statement, Iraqi officials had seen a lot of diplomatic trouble to make sure 
that the council would not name their country as the perpetrator and that the council would link the 
chemical weapons matter to the issue of ending the war. The United States - which, on 5 March 1984, 
had publicly acknowledged and condemned Iraq's use of chemical weapons but, at the same time, had 
started to take sides with Iraq in the war - had played a central role in the formulation of a Security 
Council response that corresponded to Iraq's wishes. (Yearbook of the United Nations 1984,1988: 232 
and Hiltermann 2007: 39-40,60-61) 
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international law. 25 Iranian officials pointed out that their leaders had seriously 
considered the issue of chemical retaliation but had decided to firmly forgo such course 
of action. Nevertheless, deliberately or not, Iranian authorities gave ambiguous and even 
conflicting information about the Islamic Republic's own chemical weapons capability. 
While some Iranian officials said that Iran had not so far produced any chemical 
armaments and that the production of WMD had been forbidden by the religious 
authorities of the Islamic Republic, some Iranian representatives implied that the 
Islamic Republic actually possessed a chemical weapons capability which it nonetheless 
was not prepared to employ. 26 (CD/PV. 262,1984: 9; A/C. 1/39/PV. 36,1984: 66; 
A/C. 1/39/PV. 40,1984: 72-75 and Eisenstadt 1998b: 9) 
Irrespective of their contradictory statements, Iranian officials made it clearly known 
that the Islamic Republic's magnanimous position on the use of chemical weapons was 
not unchanging. On the contrary, should the international community continue to ignore 
Iraq's chemical attacks, Iran would have no other choice than to reluctantly retaliate in 
kind. 27 Interestingly, the Islamic Republic's diplomatic warnings not only shifted the 
responsibility for potential Iranian use of chemical weapons to the international 
community, but also suggested that Islamic law, to which the Iranians had referred to as 
prohibiting the use of chemical armaments, did not forbid chemical warfare under all 
circumstances. If a certain, unspecified threshold was crossed, Islamic law would allow 
25 The Iranian legal reading of the Geneva Protocol based on the fact that due to the large number of 
reservations made to the instrument by states parties that had retained the right to retaliate with chemical 
weapons against any chemical attack upon themselves as well as against non-members of the protocol, 
the Geneva Protocol was widely viewed as an arrangement prohibiting only the first-use of chemical 
armaments. It should be mentioned that Iran had never made reservations to the protocol, whereas Iraq 
had joined the protocol "on condition that the Iraq government shall be bound by the provisions of the 
Protocol only towards those states which have both signed and ratified it or have acceded thereto, and that 
it shall not be bound by the Protocol towards any state at enmity with Iraq whose armed forces, or the 
forces of whose allies, do not respect the provisions of the Protocol. " After having signed the 1993 
Chemical Weapons Convention, many states withdrew their reservations to the Geneva Protocol. For the 
content of the reservations made to the protocol by various governments, see 
<http: //projects. sipri. se/cbw/docs/cbw-hist-geneva-res. html>. 
26 On 29 June 1984, the UN secretary-general addressed a message to the presidents of Iran and Iraq in 
which he called on both governments to declare to him within three days that each undertook a solemn 
commitment not to use chemical weapons. In his response of 2 July, the president of the Islamic Republic 
welcomed the secretary-general's message and stated that Iran had never retaliated in kind against Iraq's 
chemical assaults and that it was fully committed to non-use of chemical armaments. Later, Iranian 
officials explained that even though the secretary-general's call had been unfair because it had juxtaposed 
Iran with "criminal Iraq, " the Islamic Republic did not want to make a noise of "this injustice" due to its 
willingness to support the secretary-general's arms control efforts. As far as Iraq was concerned, it never 
responded to the secretary-general's request of June 1984. (Yearbook of the United Nations 1984,1988: 
237; A/C. l/39/PV. 36,1984: 66 and Robinson 1985: 183) 
27 As emphasized by Iran's permanent representative to the UN: "We hate such a solution and we do not 
wish to have it imposed on us" (A/C. l/39/PV. 36,1984: 66). 
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Iran to resort to chemical weapons. 28 (A/C. 1/39/PV. 36,1984: 66 and A/C. 1/39/PV. 40, 
1984: 17) 
The officials of the Islamic Republic also strongly denounced the views of the foreign 
governments that linked the curtailment of Iraq's chemical weapons use with the 
termination of the Iran-Iraq war. Iran maintained that chemical warfare did not 
constitute just another dimension of the war but was an independent matter that needed 
immediate attention. The linkages made between chemical weapons use and war 
termination, the Iranians said, gave the impression that chemical warfare was 
permissible under certain conditions and that the issue of WMD use was not serious 
enough to be dealt with autonomously. Moreover, by agreeing to negotiate with Iraq, 
the Islamic Republic would be admitting that chemical weapons were in fact an 
effective policy instrument. The coupling of chemical weapons use with political issues, 
the Iranians continued, would set a dangerous precedent, for potential users of WMD 
would always find friends to diplomatically defend their unlawful actions. To curb the 
international criticism that Iran was not ready to sit down at the negotiating table with 
Iraq, the representatives of the Islamic Republic bluntly asked who would have been 
ready to negotiate with Hitler when his reign was coming to an end. (CD/PV. 262,1984: 
11 and A/C. 1/39/PV. 36,1984: 62-65,71) 
Iran's dissatisfaction with the international response to Iraq's chemical warfare had a 
major effect on the way the Islamic Republic viewed multilateral diplomatic efforts in 
the realm of chemical arms control. In the Iranian analysis, Iraq's unhindered use of 
chemical armaments had shown that the world was in a situation where there were no 
effective restrictions on the sale and use of those WMD. The representatives of the 
Islamic Republic charged countries like France, the United Kingdom, the United States, 
and the Soviet Union with supplying and promoting Iraq's chemical weapons program29 
and called for immediate international measures to stop the transfers of chemical 
28 The statements made by Iranian officials did not elaborate on the content of Islamic law with regard to 
the use of chemical armaments. However, Ayatollah Khomeini reportedly dismissed the idea of chemical 
weapons use during the war by referring to the Islamic injuction prohibiting combatants from polluting 
the natural environment. The sources of Islamic jurisprudence also contain injunctions that prohibit the 
use of weapons that cause indiscriminate damage and obscure the distinction between combatants and 
non-combatants. (Ali 2001: 51; author's interview with an Iranian arms control official [D] who wishes to 
remain unidentified, summer 2002, and Aboul-Enein and Zuhur 2004: 22-23) 
29 Iran supported its charges by referring to international media and NGO reports (CD/PV. 242,1984: 9- 
10). The various sources of Iraq's war-time imports for its chemical weapons program, together with the 
fact that many Western governments - including those of the United States and Germany - authorized the 
sale to Saddam Hussein of numerous dual-use items with WMD applications, are documented, for 
example, in the Washington Post (30 December 2002), Adib-Moghaddam (2006: 31,35) and Hiltermann 
(2007: 62,222,235). 
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technology and armaments to Iraq. 30 The so-called "first-degree agents of aggression" - 
that is, those who supplied WMD to Iraq and, therefore, bore the main responsibility for 
Iraq's use of chemical agents - were claimed by the Iranians to also be the ones who 
blocked any meaningful progress in international chemical arms control. (CD/PV. 242, 
1984: 7,9; Ali 2001: 48 and Yearbook of the United Nations 1984,1988: 233,237) 
In the Iranian view, the Iran-Iraq war had shown that the Geneva Protocol of 1925 
had no practical relevance. It was only a document to which arms control diplomats 
eloquently alluded to at international gatherings. 31 In a similar manner, Iranian officials 
criticized the international diplomatic efforts to produce a convention that would 
prohibit the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons. They 
maintained that the "long, boring and fruitless" deliberations on the Chemical Weapons 
Convention were a tool used by the major powers to fool the world public opinion and 
to prevent "tyrannized countries" from gaining their rights. In reality, the Iranians said, 
the major powers were heavily involved in producing chemical weapons in order to 
promote their "inhumane and colonial" policies. The major powers, the Iranians added, 
were interested in chemical arms control only if it benefited themselves. Thus, for 
example, Iranian officials pointed out that while diplomatic suggestions had been put 
forth for the establishment of a chemical-weapon-free zone in Europe, nobody had 
shown corresponding interest in prohibiting chemical armaments in conflict-prone 
regions such as the Middle East or the Far East. (CD/PV. 242,1984: 8,11 and 
CD/PV. 262,1984: 9,11) 
Below the harsh rhetorical surface, however, the authorities of the Islamic Republic 
recognized that an international chemical disarmament treaty, however far ahead, would 
contribute to Iran's national security. In addition, the Iranians understood that in the 
wake of their experiences with Iraq's chemical attacks and with the international 
community's half-hearted response to the Iraqi breaches, the diplomatic discussions on 
the CWC would provide them a valuable forum to raise up issues that pertained to 
30 Iran also demanded the UN secretary-general to conduct detailed investigations to determine which 
countries had contributed to Iraq's chemical weapons program. It should be noted that, at the end of 
March 1984, the United States had declared a ban on the export of precursor chemicals to both Iraq and 
Iran. In addition, the administration of president Reagan had approached a number of its foreign allies in 
Europe and elsewhere to call on them to take corresponding steps. In Iran's opinion, the export control 
efforts of the United States were a hypocritical propaganda move whose real aim was to conceal 
Washington's role in supplying chemicals to Iraq. (CD/PV. 262,1984: 9 and Hiltermann 2007: 53,63) 
31 As put by one Iranian representative in October 1984: "If the authors of the 1925 Geneva Protocol [... ] 
could possibly know that some 60 years later the result of their efforts would be ridiculed so openly and 
shamelessly by an unscrupulous, unrestrained regime such as that of the present-day Iraq, they would 
hardly think their Protocol worth the paper it was written on" (A/39/PV. 15,1984: 298). 
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chemical weapons use in the Iran-Iraq war. Consequently, Iranian arms control 
diplomats took active part in the CWC negotiations which began in 1984 within the ad 
hoc working group - later ad hoc committee - established for the purpose at the CD. 
32 
According to Iran's CWC negotiators, chemical disarmament was the most pressing 
disarmament challenge faced by the international community. For that reason, the 
officials of the Islamic Republic said, their country would do everything in its capacity 
to ensure the early conclusion of an effective international convention. As for the 
content of the planned legal instrument, Iranian representatives stressed that the treaty 
should include mechanisms for the prevention of the use of chemical weapons and for 
the punishment of those resorting to chemical warfare. Iran called for the destruction of 
all existing chemical weapons stockpiles and production facilities in the world and 
supported the idea that the destruction and conversion of existing chemical weapons 
arsenals would be verified by on-site observers. 33 (A/39/PV. 15,1984: 298; CD/PV. 242, 
1984: 11 and CD/PV. 286,1984: 28) 
If a party or a non-party to the CWC decided to produce or employ chemical 
armaments, Iranian CWC negotiators argued, such a country should be collectively 
punished by the CWC member states. Otherwise, the Iranians stressed, the CWC would 
face the same fate of impotence as the Geneva Protocol, and the violators of the 
convention would get off the hook in the same way as Iraq did after the publication of 
the UN specialist group report of March 1984. Furthermore, the Iranian negotiators 
argued, a country that becomes a victim of chemical warfare should receive immediate 
help from other CWC states parties in order to combat the aggression through 
"defensive and protective measures. "34 In the Iranian view, a state targeted with 
chemical weapons should also be entitled, under the planned convention, to receive 
medical help from abroad. Moreover, Iranian representatives were of the opinion that 
the CWC should include a mechanism, a permanent fact-finding team, that would 
32 For a historical overview of multilateral diplomatic efforts in the area of chemical arms control prior to 
1984, see Robinson (1998: 17-32). 
33 Iranian negotiators noted that the verification mechanism of the CWC should be effective enough to 
cover not only the stages of the development and production of chemical weapons but the stockpiling, 
acquiring, transfer, and use of such armaments as well. Iranian authorities stressed that their experiences 
with Iraq enabled them to provide the drafters of the CWC with valuable advice and information as far as 
the development of the CWC's verification system - and the whole convention, for that matter - was 
concerned. "Let us learn the general from experiencing the specific" was the declared Iranian motto in 
this connection. (CD/PV. 262,1984: 10 and A/C. 1/39/PV. 36,1984: 62-65) 
34 As already noted above, when Iraq started the use of chemical weapons against Iran, the troops of the 
Islamic Republic had practically no defensive gear to protect themselves from the effects of chemical 
agents. It took several years before Iran was properly able to domestically produce protective equipment 
(Zanders 2001: 3). 
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automatically respond to a victim state's request for an inspection to verify the use of 
chemical armaments. (CD/PV. 262,1984: 9 and CD/PV. 286,1984: 28) 
Iranian officials reminded their co-negotiators that in order to guarantee the success 
of the future CWC, they had to collectively rectify the damages done to international 
chemical disarmament by Iraq's actions. Accordingly, the Islamic Republic called on all 
governments to condemn the use of chemical weapons and to reaffirm their 
commitment to the Geneva Protocol. In addition, Iran stressed that chemical weapons 
use should be defined in the future CWC as a war crime for which the perpetrators 
would be internationally punished. The officials of the Islamic Republic pointed out that 
the diplomatic proposals of their country should be taken seriously, for the Iranian 
people, as the latest victims of chemical armaments, were able to see "the gloomy future 
in store for all mankind" if the use of those WMD continued. (A/39/PV. 15,1984: 299; 
A/C. 1/39/PV. 40,1984: 71-75 and CD/PV. 262,1984: 10) 
Iranian diplomacy in 1985 and 1986 
On 11 March 1985, Iran's armed forces launched a major land offensive, code-named 
Operation Badr, across the Huwaiza marshes in the southern sector of the war front. In 
order to prevent the Iranians from achieving their tactical objective of seizing the Iraqi 
city of Basra and cutting it off from the rest of the country (Cordesman and Wagner 
1990: 201), on 13 March, the Iraqi military resorted to chemical warfare for the first 
time since August 1984 (CD/PV. 299,1985: 10). This incident, together with Iraq's 
subsequent chemical attacks during March and April 1985,35 sparked a strong 
35 The Iranians claimed that, between 13 March and 9 April 1985, Iraq used chemical weapons on 33 
different occasions. After those attacks - that is, after the heavy land battles between Iran and Iraq again 
transformed into sporadic clashes - Iraq used chemical armaments in the course of 1985 only seldom. 
According to official Iranian information, during the rest of 1985, Iraq used chemical weapons at least on 
17 April, 7 and 8 May, and 2 November. In the course of 1985, Iran continued to meticulously report the 
medical implications of Iraq's chemical warfare. One of the reasons Iranian officials gave for their 
continuous references to the medical aspects of Iraq's chemical weapons use was that Iran's experiences 
as a victim of chemical warfare provided highly valuable information to the national delegations involved 
in multilateral negotiations on the CWC. Another reason given by the Iranians was that the Islamic 
Republic did not want to see the crimes committed by Iraq to be repeated in other parts of the world. In 
April 1985, the UN secretary-general dispatched a medical expert to visit Iranian patients allegedly 
suffering from the effects of chemical weapons and being treated in European hospitals. The core 
conclusion of the expert visit was that chemical weapons - mustard gas - had been used during March 
1985 in the war between Iran and Iraq. Although the final report of the UN investigation, once again, 
refrained from naming the party guilty of chemical warfare, Iranian authorities referred to the 1985 
specialist report as another piece of indisputable evidence of Iraq's violations of the Geneva Protocol. 
(CD/PV. 308,1985: 9,11; Yearbook of the United Nations 1985,1989: 247-248; CD/PV. 348,1986: 21 
and Hiltermann 2007: 69) 
227 
diplomatic response from the Islamic Republic's officials who maintained that Iraq's 
resumption of chemical warfare marked a new stage in that country's use of WMD. 
According to the Iranians, the Iraqi military had employed not only tabun and mustard 
gas in its 1985 attacks, but also new chemical agents such as an agent composed of 
"Tabun and an asphyxiating agent" and an agent comprised of "Tabun, cyanide 
36 compounds as well as mustard gas" (CD/PV. 308,1985: 9 and CD/PV. 309,1985: 34). 
Given Iraq's continuing violations of international law, Iranian representatives 
reiterated their demands for immediate international action to stop Iraq's chemical 
warfare. 37 In the Iranian view, Iraq's actions were against all universal values of 
humanity and severely jeopardized the credibility of international law and such 
international bodies as the UN and the CD. The officials of the Islamic Republic 
continued to blame foreign governments for what they described as those governments' 
"catastrophic and conspiratorial indifference" to Iraqi use of WMD and maintained that 
such inaction was increasing pressure on the Iranian side to consider the legally 
permissible option of chemical retaliation. According to Iranian representatives, the 
Islamic Republic was no longer ready to unilaterally sustain the consequences of Iraq's 
crimes. (CD/PV. 308,1985: 8-12 and A/40/PV. 20,1985: 56-62) 
Simultaneously, however, the officials of the Islamic Republic noted that even if 
chemical retaliation seemed to be the only effective way to counter Iraq's chemical 
warfare, the Islamic Republic was committed, for the time being at least, to nurturing 
the values and principles it was speaking for. The use of chemical weapons was 
declared to be Iran's last resort. Iranian authorities thus implied that by relying on 
diplomacy and not on military force, the Islamic Republic wanted to avoid losing the 
36 By 1985, Iraq had managed to improve its chemical warfare capabilities in two central ways. First, the 
Iraqis had overcome problems with their chemical munitions' timing fuses. Secondly, the Iraqis had 
managed to improve the quality of their tabun arsenal and hence saturate larger areas with that gas. As for 
the Iranian claims that Iraq used cyanide gas in the Iran-Iraq war, they remained, and still remain, 
unproven. (Hiltermann 2007: 66-67) 
37 In his letter of May 1985 to the UN, Iran's foreign minister stated that the world organization and its 
Security Council "must mobilize all international means in their power" to immediately stop the Iraqi use 
of chemical armaments. The Islamic Republic also repeated its position according to which the 
application of international instruments dealing with chemical weapons cannot be conditional upon a 
cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war. As regards the Security Council, it had, on 25 April 1985, reacted to the 
UN chemical weapons investigator's report by condemning the renewed use of chemical weapons in the 
Iran-Iraq war and by urging both warring parties to observe international humanitarian law. While the 
statement issued by the Security Council did not condemn Iraq for chemical weapons use, it did, however, 
make a reference to Iranian soldiers as the victims of chemical armaments. (Yearbook of the United 
Nations 1985,1989: 242,248; Hiltermann 2007: 69 and Robinson 1986: 161) 
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moral superiority it believed it possessed over Iraq in the war. 38 Iran's diplomatic 
openings in 1985 included the request, made in February, for the stationing of a 
permanent UN expert mission in Tehran to investigate Iraq's chemical weapons use - 
an initiative which did not find adequate support within the world organization. 
Furthermore, the representatives of the Islamic Republic stressed the urgency of 
international deliberations on the development of a diplomatic mechanism that would 
ensure that states respect international regulations. This Iranian call was directed, 
among others, to the national delegations working on the CWC. Even though Iranian 
authorities continued to acknowledge the importance of the creation of an effective 
disarmament instrument concerning chemical weapons, they strongly criticized the 
CWC negotiators' priorities in their talks at the CD. In the Iranian view, priority should 
be given to measures that aim to stop current crimes and not to diplomatic discussions 
that focus on the future. (CD/PV. 308,1985: 9-12 and Yearbook of the United Nations 
1985,1989: 247) 
In February 1986, the Islamic Republic informed the international community about 
Iraq's large-scale use of chemical armaments during Iran's ultimately victorious Wal 
Fajr-VIII land offensive against the Faw peninsula on the west side of the Shatt al-Arab 
waterway. 39 In the wake of Iraq's intensive chemical attacks, which caused serious 
problems for Iranian soldiers who lacked chemical defence equipment and training to 
use protective gear, 40 Iran strongly condemned Iraq's chemical assaults and continued to 
call on the international community to react to the Iraqi operations without delay. 41 In 
the Islamic Republic's view, Iraq's chemical attacks - which, Iranian officials alleged, 
38 According to Wright (1989: 185), the consideration of moral superiority played a central role in Iranian 
decision-makers' war-time deliberations on whether to chemically attack Iraq or not. 
39 According to Iranian officials, Iraq's first chemical operation in 1986 had taken place in January. The 
Islamic Republic accused Iraq of chemical weapons use in the Yibis area on 25 and 26 January and in the 
Ain-i Khush area on 26 and 27 January, as well as of several chemical attacks conducted on 30 and 31 
January in the Chilat area (CD/PV. 340,1986: 31 and Yearbook of the United Nations 1986,1990: 232). 
40 The authorities of the Islamic Republic considered the number of chemically injured soldiers in the 
Faw peninsula threatening and had major problems in finding substitutes for the Iranian casualties. Later, 
the Islamic Republic claimed that it had suffered 12,000 casualties from chemical weapons alone at Faw. 
(Tousi 1997: 56 and Hiltermann 2007: 72) 
41 In 1986, Iran accused Iraq of chemical warfare throughout the year. According to Iranian authorities, 
Iraq resorted to massive use of chemical agents - mustard gas, nerve gas, and cyanide - against Iranian 
military and civilian targets in February and March in the course of Iran's operation Wal Fajr-VIII as well 
as Wal Fajr-IX which was launched in northern Iraqi Kurdish territory on 15 February. Iraq's chemical 
attacks were reported to have caused injuries also to Iraqi soldiers captured by Iran and to those Iraqis 
situated in no man's land between the warring armies. (CDIPV. 340,1986: 31; CD/PV. 348,1986: 19-20; 
Yearbook of the United Nations 1986,1990: 232-234 and O'Ballance 1988: 179,181). Furthermore, Iran 
claimed that, between 21 March and 14 August, Iraq used chemical armaments on five separate 
occasions, in addition to which the Iraqis were told to have resorted to chemical warfare in September and 
December 1986. (CD/PV. 379,1986: 4 and Yearbook of the United Nations 1986,1990: 234) 
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were encouraged and fuelled by the "irresponsible attitudes on the part of certain 
countries" - posed a fundamental dilemma for the international community. As 
formulated by foreign minister Vilayati at the UN in October 1986: "If a small country 
such as Iraq can permit itself heedlessly to violate one of the most important 
international conventions [the Geneva Protocol], what is to guarantee other existing or 
future conventions? " (Cordesman and Wagner 1990: 223; CD/PV. 348,1986: 18 and 
A/41/PV. 19,1986: 104-105) 
As far as the Islamic Republic's own approach to chemical weapons use was 
concerned, Iranian officials argued that their country was striving hard for the 
maintenance of respect for the core values of humanity and the regulations of 
international law. 42 The fact that Iran had not retaliated in kind against Iraq's gross 
violations of those values and regulations, the Iranians added, testified to Iran's 
commitment not to use WMD (CD/PV. 348,1986: 18). Nevertheless, the authorities of 
the Islamic Republic also made it clear that they viewed the punishment of Iraq as a 
duty and reserved their country the right to defend its national security by all necessary 
means (CD/PV. 370,1986: 11 and CD/PV. 379,1986: 5). The Iranian prime minister's 
announcement in December 1986 that the Islamic Republic had developed its own 
chemical warfare technology was indicative of the Iranian determination to have the 
chemical option available. 43 In fact, on 13 February 1986, Iraq claimed to the UN that, 
on 12 and 13 February, Iran had resorted to the use of mustard gas in the Iran-Iraq war. 
According to the Iraqi minister of culture and information, Iran's allegations that Iraq 
was using chemical weapons were made in order to justify the Islamic Republic's own 
use of such weapons against his country. Iranian authorities categorically denied all 
42 As one representative of the Islamic Republic stated in March 1986: "[... ] international law has always 
been emphasized by the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran as being of vital importance for the 
security of all nations and for the strengthening of [... ] justice in international relations" (CD/PV. 348, 
1986: 18). 
43 The existing research literature on Iran's chemical weapons program and capability is mostly based on 
intelligence information - especially on that of the United States - whose reliability cannot be verified by 
scholars. Still, the Islamic Republic is believed to have launched a crash program to develop chemical 
weapons in 1983 or 1984 in response to Iraq's chemical warfare. In the early stages of the program, 
which was led by the IRGC, Iran purchased the necessary chemical processing equipment and precursors 
from West European, U. S., and Japanese suppliers. After the imposition of chemical export controls on 
Iraq and Iran in the mid-1980s, the Islamic Republic was forced to find alternative sources, such as India 
and Syria, for its chemical imports - even if certain Western suppliers, especially West German, 
continued to play a central role in the Iranian acquisitions. It is believed that by 1986-1987, the Islamic 
Republic had developed the capability to produce enough chemical warfare agents for its means of 
delivery, that is, aerial bombs and artillery shells. The agents produced in war-time Iran included mustard 
and various kinds of blood gases. Most experts, however, agree that the Islamic Republic was not able to 
build a militarily significant infrastructure for the production of chemical weapons during the war years. 
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Iraqi accusations of gas warfare. 44 (Ali 2001: 51 and Yearbook of the United Nations 
1986,1990: 232) 
Even though the demoralizing effect of Iraq's use of chemical armaments was 
constantly visible in Iran's diplomatic pronouncements of 1986, the Islamic Republic 
did succeeded in obtaining increased international support for its case against Iraq's 
chemical warfare. One of the most important events for the Iranians in this respect was 
the publication of the report of the group of specialists assembled by the UN secretary- 
general on 24 February 1986 to investigate the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq 
war. 45 After a visit to Iran from 26 February to 3 March 1986, the expert group 
unanimously concluded that mustard gas had been employed on many occasions against 
Iranian troops by means of aerial bombs and identified Iraq for the first time 
conclusively as the culprit. The UN specialists also reported that they had found 
evidence of the use of nerve gas. On 18 March, the Islamic Republic thanked the 
secretary-general for the expert group's work and for its "well-balanced and fair" report. 
Moreover, the Iranian government stressed that it was expecting the international 
community and the UN Security Council to immediately condemn Iraq for its use of 
chemical armaments. (Yearbook of the United Nations 1986,1990: 233 and CD/PV. 348, 
1986: 22) 
The Security Council's response to the specialist group report came on 21 March in 
the form of a declaration that explicitly alluded to Iraqi use of chemical weapons against 
Iranian armed forces and strongly condemned Iraq's continued resort to chemical 
warfare. In spite of Iran's subsequent nonchalant comment that the Security Council's 
declaration had come years too late, the fact that the council had finally named and 
condemned Iraq for violating the Geneva Protocol marked a momentary victory for the 
Islamic Republic in its diplomatic battle against its enemy. (Yearbook of the United 
Nations 1986,1990: 233-234) 
However, as international condemnations did not stop Iraq from resorting to gas 
warfare, Iranian diplomats were forced to continue to strive for the realization of 
immediate arms control objectives. Increased international pressure on Iraq to stop the 
(Carus 2000: 7; Karsh 1993: 34-35; Eisenstadt 1998b: 1-2; Cordesman and Al-Rodhan 2006: 28-29 and 
Lundin et al. 1988: 122) 
44 The question of Iranian use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war will be discussed in greater detail 
in chapter 6. 
45 Iran had approached the secretary-general on 12 February with a request for a UN mission that would 
be sent to Tehran to carry out on-site investigations in order to confirm Iraq's latest uses of chemical 
agents (CD/PV. 340,1986: 31). 
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use of chemical weapons, a total ban on the exportation to Iraq of chemical substances 
and chemical-related technology, a UN-led investigation into the suppliers of chemical 
weapons and substances to Iraq, and the dispatch of a UN investigation team by the 
secretary-general at the earliest possible time whenever demanded by Iranian authorities 
were among such declared Iranian objectives. (CD/PV. 379,1986: 4-5 and A/41/PV. 19, 
1986: 104-106) 
Moreover, the Islamic Republic insisted that all states should declare chemical 
weapons use a war crime, 46 announce their commitment to the Geneva Protocol as well 
as to the principle of non-first use of chemical weapons, and devote their diplomatic 
energies to the development of chemical-weapon-free zones in different parts of the 
world. As far as the Islamic Republic's views on the CWC negotiations were concerned, 
Iranian officials expressed their government's hope that Iraq's chemical attacks would 
convince the negotiators of the urgent need to hasten the pace of their talks. Yet, at the 
same time, the Iranians continued to argue that it was more important to defend existing 
international regulations than to deliberate on future ones. Of the individual treaty- 
related issues discussed in the negotiations, the questions of compliance and verification 
received special Iranian attention. Iran's negotiators called for the establishment of an 
international committee that would have the power to determine, in controversial cases, 
whether a CWC state party was abiding by its treaty obligations. Such a committee, the 
Iranians underscored, should also be given the main responsibility for decisions on the 
destruction of potential treaty violators' chemical weapons stockpiles and production 
capabilities. 47 
4.1.1.3 The diplomatic endgame, 1987-1988 
In the course of 1987, Iraq intensified the scope of its chemical attacks against Iranian 
targets. By escalating the use of chemical agents on the battlefield, Iraqi military 
planners hoped to repel Iran's so-called final offensives which aimed to bring the long- 
lasting war to an end. 48 Iraq resorted to gas warfare throughout 1987, and the officials of 
46 Before doing that, Iranian officials argued, international bodies such as the International Court of 
Justice should independently deal with Iraq's violations of the Geneva Protocol, irrespective of whether 
Iran would officially file a complaint or not (A/41/PV. 19,1986: 106-107). 
47 This paragraph draws upon CD/PV. 340 (1986: 31); CD/PV. 348 (1986: 22); CD/PV. 379 (1986: 5,8) 
and A/C. 1/4 1 /PV. 24 (1986: 22). 
48 In 1987, Iraq continued to use chemical weapons against advancing Iranian troops but it also resorted to 
pre-emptive gas attacks against Iranian forces' staging areas. The tactical purpose of the rear-area gas 
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the Islamic Republic kept on minutely publicizing Iraq's violations of the Geneva 
Protocol. 49 Iraq's use of chemical armaments in 1987 reached its peak on 28 June when 
Iraqi armed forces attacked the Iranian Kurdish town of Sardasht, a regular encampment 
for Iranian soldiers, with chemical rockets. 50 Outraged by the incident, Iranian 
authorities pointed out that the attack on Sardasht was the first time that Iraq had 
poisoned an Iranian town in its totality. The Iranians maintained that the Iraqi attack 
was without precedent in the history of contemporary warfare and, in fact, the first time 
in the history of mankind that a populated town had been attacked with chemical 
weapons. 51 As stated by one Iranian official in October 1987: "The name of Sardasht 
will be recorded in encyclopedia and history books alongside Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
as evidence of shame on human civilization. " (CD/PV. 425,1987: 3 and 
A/C. 1/42/PV. 17,1987: 8) 
Iraq's chemical operations, which contributed to Iranian armed forces' inability to 
achieve a decisive breakthrough on the war front, significantly increased the political 
pressure on the Islamic Republic's leaders. Consequently, Iranian officials warned the 
international community that Iraq's chemical warfare was tinged with increasingly 
dangerous features. Iraq's calculated targeting of civilian areas, including Iraqi nationals 
attacks was to weaken Iran's frontline capabilities by targeting Iranian supply lines and reserve troops 
who generally lacked proper chemical protection. The planning of the Iraqi chemical strikes was 
facilitated by the U. S. government which supplied highly valuable military intelligence on Iran to the 
Iraqis. In 1987, Iraq also adopted a conscious policy of targeting Kurdish rebels and civilian population - 
mostly Iraqi and Iranian Kurds - with chemical armaments. The Iraqi leadership's rationale for the use of 
gas against Iranian civilians was to strike against targets that acted as Iranian troops' staging areas, 
whereas the aim of the chemical attacks against Iraq's own Kurdish population was to undermine the 
popular support for the Kurdish insurgency inside the country. In order to make its chemical operations 
more effective, the Iraqi leadership had, since late 1986, introduced a modified command and control 
system for its chemical warfare. Up to that time, chemical release authority had been exclusively in the 
hands of Saddam Hussein, but now individual Iraqi field commanders were allowed to make decisions on 
the use of gas. (Hiltermann 2007: 12-13,66-67,79-80; Russell 2005b: 195-196 and McCarthy and 
Tucker 2000: 63-65) 
49 According to the representatives of the Islamic Republic, Iraq used chemical weapons in 1987 at least 
on the following occasions: 7,9,10,13,14,16,18,20,24-25, and 27-29 January; 6 February; 7 and 19 
March; 7-11,15-16,21-22, and 28 April; 7-8 and 24 May; 14,21,26, and 28-29 June; 1 and 11 July; 
17-18 September, and on 8 October. (Yearbook of the United Nations 1987,1992: 218,231-232,234; 
CD/PV. 404,1987: 7; CD/PV. 406,1987: 31 and CD/PV. 417,1987: 11) 
so Immediately after the Sardasht incident, Iran informed that thousands of inhabitants of Sardasht had 
been affected by Iraq's chemical assault. A year later, in June 1988, Iran claimed that the Iraqi chemical 
bombardment of four civilian areas of Sardasht had "martyred and wounded" 8,025 people. At the time of 
the Iraqi attack, the Iranians added, Sardasht had had 12,000 inhabitants. (CD/PV. 417,1987: 11; 
A/C. 1/42/PV. 17,1987: 8 and A/S-15/PV. 3,1988: 45-46) 
51 Worried that the Sardasht attack would create widespread fear and panic among the Iranian population, 
the authorities of the Islamic Republic did not broadcast the news of the attack inside the country 
(Hiltermann 2007: 85). 
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themselves, 52 was told by the Iranians to be the most alarming new development. 53 By 
referring to statements made by captured Iraqi soldiers, Iranian representatives claimed 
that Iraq now regarded strikes at civilian targets as a standard military procedure. 
Iranian diplomats even forwarded a message from the Islamic Association of Iranian 
Physicians to the UN in which the association expressed its view that the objective of 
Iraq's chemical weapons use was to devastate Iran. The fact that the Iraqi military was 
deploying new and more deadly chemical compounds, Iranian officials argued, only 
increased the humanitarian threat posed by Iraq. (CD/PV. 406,1987: 31-32; 
CD/PV. 417,1987: 11 and Yearbook of the United Nations 1987,1992: 222,232-234) 
As before, the representatives of the Islamic Republic accused the international 
community and especially the major powers and the UN Security Council54 of allowing 
Iraq to continue its chemical warfare. They pointed out that the Iranian people could not 
help concluding that international silence vis-a-vis Iraq was an indication of a quiet 
approval of the Iraqi violations. Iranian officials strongly criticized countries such as the 
United States, France, and the United Kingdom for hindering the Security Council from 
acting in the matter of chemical weapons use. The Iranians asked, among others, why 
Western governments supported a NATO doctrine that left the door open for a nuclear 
response to a military attack carried out by chemical weapons but, at the same time, 
ignored tragedies such as the one in Sardasht and linked the issue of Iraq's chemical 
52 The fact that Iraq did not hesitate to use chemical weapons against the Iraqi Kurds who were fighting 
their own government and even against non-combatant Iraqi Kurds was mentioned by the Iranians as a 
telling example of the brutality of the regime of Saddam Hussein (A/C. 1/42/PV. 17,1987: 8 and Yearbook 
of the United Nations 1987,1992: 232). 
5 Iran claimed that the Iraqi tactic of chemically attacking innocent civilians was also explicitly referred 
to in the final report of the specialist group set by the UN secretary-general in the spring of 1987 to 
investigate the allegations of chemical weapons use in the Iran-Iraq war. In its final report of May 1987, 
based on visits to Iran and Iraq between 22 April and 3 May, the UN experts stated that they had found 
numerous civilian casualties of mustard gas attacks in Iran. The experts also reported that they had met 
local soldiers affected by mustard gas and probably phosgene in Iraq. In the absence of conclusive 
evidence, however, the expert group was not able to determine how the Iraqi fighters' injuries had been 
caused. (CD/PV. 417,1987: 11 and Yearbook of the United Nations 1987,1992: 232-233) 
s' In the Iranian view, the actions of the Security Council - including its response to the UN expert 
group's report of May 1987 which essentially consisted of a condemnation of the repeated use of 
chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war and of the prolongation of the conflict - proved that the council 
substantially lacked "the capability for concerted efforts at the political level. " Iranian representatives 
claimed that prevailing international political conditions prevented the council from taking any 
fundamental position, let alone any just decision, with regard to the Iran-Iraq war. As far as the Security 
Council resolution 598 of 20 July 1987 - which provided a framework for the termination of all military 
actions between the belligerents and for a negotiated final settlement - was concerned, the Islamic 
Republic stated, on 22 July, that the resolution suffered from fundamental defects and lacked the 
minimum balance necessary for future constructive activities. The Iranians were of the view that any 
diplomatic move towards ending the war should start with naming Iraq, which eagerly embraced the 
Security Council's resolution, as the original aggressor and as a repeat violator of the laws of war. 
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warfare with the termination of the Iran-Iraq conflict. (CD/PV. 425,1987: 4; 
A/C. l/42/PV. 17,1987: 8-10 and Yearbook of the United Nations 1987,1992: 232-234) 
In spite of their deep disappointment with what they viewed as the international 
community's application of political double standard, the leaders of the Islamic 
Republic continued to recognize that if they wished to influence Iraq's military 
behaviour, they had to try to obtain the support of the very same foreign powers that 
they strongly criticized on diplomatic fora. Hence, Iranian officials underlined the 
importance of concrete, strong, and prompt international responses to all violations of 
the Geneva Protocol and called on the community of states to utilize all possible ways 
to exert pressure on the violators of the protocol, so that the people of the world would 
not be at the mercy of the "whims and wishes of heartless criminals. " Furthermore, the 
Iranians stressed that political considerations should not play any role in governments' 
stances on the issue of chemical warfare. 55 If states allowed political calculations to 
affect their judgement, the Iranian argument went, they would set a highly dangerous 
precedent by critically lowering the threshold for chemical weapons use in the future. 56 
(CD/PV. 417,1987: 12; CD/PV. 404,1987: 7 and A/C. 1/42/PV. 17,1987: 11) 
In order to prevent Iraq from continuing its chemical warfare - which, the Islamic 
Republic emphasized, was undergoing alarming changes both in quantitative and 
qualitative terms - Iranian authorities asked the international community to immediately 
implement a number of Iraq-related diplomatic measures. First of all, they demanded 
that all governments that contributed to Iraq's production and deployment of chemical 
weapons should at once refrain from helping the regime of Saddam Hussein. 57 The 
Iranians pointed out that a meaningful embargo on the export to Iraq of chemical agents 
and technology should not only be mandatory to all states and administered by the UN, 
(CD/PV. 425,1987: 4; Yearbook of the United Nations 1987,1992: 223-224,233 and Hiltermann 2007: 
72) 
ss Take, for example, the following appeal made to the members of the CD by the Islamic Republic's 
foreign minister in April 1987: "I call on every member of this Conference to be a disarmament 
ambassador to his country and to the whole world, rather than being the representative of his country to 
the Conference" (CD/PV. 404,1987: 9). 
56 It should be also mentioned here that, in 1987, the officials of the Islamic Republic continued to 
express their support for the establishment of chemical-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and other 
parts of the world (ibid.: 6). 
According to Iranian authorities, any assistance to Iraq with the knowledge of that country's continuing 
resort to chemical warfare itself constituted a crime. While the Iranians acknowledged that many 
countries had banned the export to Iraq of materials that could be used in the production of chemical 
armaments, they argued that such bans were not stringent enough. Until such export bans were truly 
universal, the Iranians maintained, Iraq would be able find chemical substances and technology from 
alternate suppliers. Also, the Iranians argued that the lists of banned items in the existing export limitation 
arrangements were not comprehensive enough. (Ibid. and CD/PV. 417,1987: 12) 
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but it should also be automatic in the sense that such an embargo would apply to all 
future cases of chemical weapons use as well. (CD/PV. 404,1987: 6; CD/PV. 417,1987: 
12 and Yearbook of the United Nations 1987,1992: 232-234) 
Moreover, the Islamic Republic's officials called on the UN to immediately send 
expert missions to study Iraq's chemical weapons use whenever Iran would inform the 
world organization of such attacks. In addition, the Iranians requested the UN to 
conduct on-site investigations at chemical weapons production facilities in Iraq. 
Maintaining that Iraq's chemical warfare had critically weakened the credibility and 
effectivity of the Geneva Protocol, Iranian officials also called for the formulation, in 
the UN, of a declaration in which all the member states of the world organization would 
express their commitment to the protocol's provisions. In the opinion of the Islamic 
Republic, such universal endorsement of the Geneva Protocol, together with an 
international agreement on how to punish the violators of that legal instrument, would 
constitute a significant incentive for non-use of chemical armaments, especially at a 
time when the world was still waiting for the completion of the CWC negotiations. 58 
As far as the CWC talks were concerned, Iranian negotiators pointed out that due to 
Iran's fate as a victim of Iraq's extensive use of chemical armaments, the Islamic 
Republic regarded the planned convention as a highly important instrument and that it 
devoted a lot of its diplomatic resources to the successful and expeditious conclusion of 
the multilateral negotiations at the CD. As before, the Iranians also claimed that their 
country's victim status gave extra credibility to the Islamic Republic's diplomatic 
positions on chemical disarmament and called on national CWC delegations to take the 
lessons learned by Iran into account when working on the details of the draft 
convention. The Iranian delegation itself continued to prioritize compliance and 
verification issues in the treaty talks. The Islamic Republic supported the creation of a 
comprehesive verification and on-site inspection mechanism for the CWC, but added 
that such a mechanism would not guarantee the effective and trustworthy functioning of 
the convention unless there was an arrangement in place for international punitive 
measures against the states parties that would "seriously and deliberately" violate the 
treaty provisions. Iranian officials referred to the behaviour of Iraq in the Iran-Iraq 
conflict as a sufficient justification for clear and watertight CWC sanctions procedures. 
However, before deciding on the final form of the convention's sanctions system, the 
58 This paragraph draws upon CD/PV. 406 (1987: 32); CD/PV. 417 (1987: 12); Yearbook of the United 
Nations 1987 (1992: 232) and A/C. 1/42/PV. 17 (1987: 12). 
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Iranians added, it was necessary for the international community to decisively tackle the 
burning issue of Iraq. If nothing was done to stop Iraq's chemical crimes, the Iranian 
argument went, the future international treaty banning chemical weapons would be built 
on a very weak foundation. (CD/PV. 404,1987: 5,7; CD/PV. 406,1987: 31-32 and 
CD/PV. 425,1987: 3-5) 
The representatives of the Islamic Republic stressed that their own government would 
continue to abide by existing international regulations dealing with chemical armaments 
and to strictly follow the religious and humanitarian principles that guided Iranian 
decision-making. The Iranians vehemently rejected the accusations made by Iraq and 
countries such as Egypt, Israel, and the United States that Iran itself was resorting to gas 
warfare. Even though the Geneva Protocol did not forbid Iran to respond to Iraq's 
chemical attacks in kind, the officials of the Islamic Republic argued, their country had 
never used chemical weapons. To support their claim, they referred, among others, to 
the UN specialist group report of May 1987 which did not make any mention of Iranian 
use of WMD. Nevertheless, the Islamic Republic kept on retaining itself the right to 
resort to any measure in legitimate self-defence against Iraq's chemical assaults. This 
point was emphasized, for example, by prime minister Mir Husain Musavi who, on 27 
December 1987, told the Iranian parliament that the Islamic Republic had produced 
sophisticated chemical weapons but that it would not use them as long as it was not 
forced to do so. Musavi's declaration was a clear signal of the fact that, during 1987, the 
Iranian leadership's concerns over Iraq's employment of chemical armaments only 
deepened. 59 
In the course of 1988, the final year of the Iran-Iraq war, the Islamic Republic's 
representatives intensified their diplomatic efforts against chemical weapons, for the 
challenges posed to their country by Iraq's chemical warfare seemed more acute than 
ever. First of all, Iraq used huge amounts of chemical agents to support its highly 
successful ground offensives against Iran between mid-April and June 1988.60 
Secondly, the intensification of missile exchanges between Iraq and Iran, the so-called 
war of the cities, raised great concerns among Iranians that Iraq - whose officials 
openly threatened to launch chemical attacks on Iranian cities - might target Iran's 
59 This paragraph draws upon CD/PV. 409 (1987: 23); A/C. 1/42/PV. 17 (1987: 23); Yearbook of the United 
Nations 1987 (1992: 231-232) and Ali (2001: 51). 
60 For the military developments on the land front in the spring and summer of 1988, see Cordesman and 
Wagner (1990: 369-375,381-390). It should be noted here that officers from the U. S. Defense 
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population centers with missiles equipped with chemical payloads. 61 Finally, Iraq's 
employment of lethal gas against its own citizens in the Iraqi Kurdish town of Halabja 
on 16 March that year - presumably resulting in the death of several thousand 
civilians62 - seemed to confirm the Iranian belief that the government of Saddam 
Hussein knew very few, if any, limits to the use of WMD against the Islamic 
Republic. 63 
The case of Halabja, the most disastrous incident of chemical weapons use in the 
course of the eight-year war between Iran and Iraq, provided a rallying point for Iranian 
officials who fiercely called on the international community to put an end to Iraq's 
breaches of the Geneva Protocol and customary international law. 64 According to 
Iranian authorities, the "holocaust" or "genocide" of Halabja, as they described it, 65 had 
to convince even the most biased supporters of Iraq of the evil nature of Saddam 
Hussein's regime. The atrocities committed against civilians in Halabja, the Iranians 
argued, were a logical extension of Iraq's earlier behaviour, an act which the officials of 
the Islamic Republic had continuously warned about in the past, particularly after the 
Sardasht incident of June 1987 (CD/PV. 453,1988: 4 and A/S-15/PV. 3,1988: 46). 66 
Iran's diplomatic outbursts of anger, which the authorities of the Islamic Republic felt 
more than entitled to, were supplemented with strong demands for preventive and 
Intelligence Agency were reportedly directly involved in planning Iraq's chemical operations at the time 
(Hiltermann 2007: 140). 
61 Take, for example, the following mention made by an Iranian representative at the CD in April 1988: 
"They [the Iraqis] have determined that several big Iranian cities will be attacked with chemical weapons" 
(CD/PV. 456,1988: 7). The large numbers of people fleeing Tehran in the spring of 1988 - Wright (1989: 
174) estimates that at least a quarter of the capital's 12 million residents left the city - also testified to the 
major psychological terror effect Iraq's missiles and chemical weapons had on Iranians. 
62 Official Iranian sources speak of a death toll of 5,000 civilians. However, the exact number of chemical 
fatalities in Halabja is not known. 
63 In fact, during the final year of the Iran-Iraq war, the Iraqis did not even try to deny their use of 
chemical agents against Iranians. On 1 July 1988, Iraq's foreign minister openly admitted Iraq's chemical 
weapons use and justified it by claiming that Iran had started the chemical warfare (Cordesman and 
Wagner 1990: 389). 
6' The interpretation that Iraq's chemical warfare breached customary international law had not been 
actively put forth by Iranian officials since 1984 (A/S-15/PV. 19,1988: 382 and A/S-15/PV. 21,1988: 
423). 
65 The war-time comparisons made by the Islamic Republic between World War II crimes and the actions 
of Saddam Hussein's Iraq intensified after the Halabja incident. Take, for example, the following Iranian 
characterization from March 1988: "In Auschwitz, men and women were dragged to gas baths, but in 
Halabja poison and gas were taken to the houses of people" (CD/PV. 453,1988: 3). 
66 The UN Security Council reacted to the Halabja attack - and to the subsequent UN investigation of 
chemical weapons use which had pointed to the increase in the number of chemical casualties in the Iran- 
Iraq war, to the increased severity of the injuries sustained by them, as well as to the rising share of 
civilians among the victims - by adopting resolution 612 of 9 May 1988 in which it expressed its dismay 
at the intensification of chemical warfare in the Iran-Iraq war, vigorously condemned the continued use 
of chemical weapons in the conflict, and called on both countries to refrain from future use of chemical 
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punitive international measures against Iraq. 67 In the words of Iran's foreign minister: 
"[... ] even strongly worded positions will not be sufficient. Only, and I repeat only, by 
practical and unified action can we prevent the repetition of such crimes. " Iranian 
suggestions for international action vis-a-vis Iraq continued to include calls for 
immediate measures that would prevent the sale to Iraq of materials and technology 
needed in the production of chemical armaments68 as well as for the establishment of 
mechanisms, such as a system of permanent inspectors, to inspect and monitor Iraqi 
facilities producing chemical weapons. Furthermore, Iran proposed the formation of 
permanent international expert teams to investige - and hence to deter states from 
resorting to - chemical weapons use in the future. In addition, the Islamic Republic 
underscored the importance of a universal declaration in which governments would 
explicitly express anew their recommitment to the obligations of the Geneva Protocol. 
(CD/PV. 453,1988: 3 and A/S-15/PV. 3,1988: 47-48) 
In the course of 1988, the Islamic Republic kept on maintaining that it had never 
resorted and would never resort to the use of chemical weapons which was both illegal 
and immoral. 69 Even though Iraq's intensified chemical warfare had significantly 
undermined the morale of both the Iranian military and the Iranian population, the 
authorities of the Islamic Republic claimed that Iraq's employment of chemical 
armaments had made no difference in the war equation. According to them, Iran had 
already demonstrated its ability to militarily respond to Iraq's crimes on the battlefield 
and, therefore, the Islamic Republic's diplomatic calls for international measures against 
Iraq and particularly against its civilian-targeted gas attacks stemmed purely from 
ethical and humanitarian considerations. (CD/PV. 445,1988: 8-9 and CD/PV. 456,1988: 
7) 
armaments. Iran soon voiced its displeasure at the fact that the council had not identified Iraq as the party 
responsible for chemical warfare. (Yearbook of the United Nations 1988,1994: 189-190) 
67 In early June 1988, Iranian representatives pointed out at the UN General Assembly's special session 
devoted to disarmament that, since 13 January 1981, Iraq had resorted to chemical warfare on more than 
253 occasions. Even though the Islamic Republic had sent at least 153 letters to the UN with regard to 
Iraq's chemical weapons use, the Iranians continued, no effective measures had been adopted by the 
world organization in the matter. (A/S-15/PV. 3,1988: 45-46,48) 
68 More broadly, the Islamic Republic called, in late March 1988, for the imposition of a comprehensive 
international arms embargo on Iraq. It should also be noted that following the Halabja attack, the Islamic 
Republic sought to improve its standing in the eyes of its Gulf neighbours by visiting Oman, Qatar, and 
the United Arab Emirates and presenting them with evidence of Iraq's use of chemical weapons in 
Halabja. (Hiltermann 2007: 152 and Nonneman 2004: 185) 
69 After the gas attack on Halabja, Iraq claimed that it was the Iranians who had been responsible for the 
attack. Around the same time, the U. S. administration of president Reagan, driven by the belief that Iraq's 
chemical warfare was a lesser evil than advances made by the Islamic Republic in the war, had started to 
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If Iraq's behaviour was not checked, Iranian officials argued, not only would Iraq 
intensify its gas warfare with increasingly disastrous consequences, but the risk of 
chemical weapons use in other parts of the world would increase as well. Should 
governments continue to take an indifferent approach to chemical warfare, the Iranians 
stressed, they would ultimately be compelled to arm themselves with chemical 
armaments and, in the worst case, resort to in-kind retaliation in order to deter their 
adversaries from using WMD. As warned by the Iranian representative addressing the 
CD on 26 April 1988: "What we have to bear in mind is that when the genie is out, 
nobody will be able to put it back in the bottle. When chemical weapons become a 
warfare agent in every conflict in the world [... ], then it may too late even to feel sorry 
for this self-inflicted state. " (CD/PV. 453,1988: 3-4; CD/PV. 460,1988: 29 and A/S- 
15/PV. 3,1988: 45-47) 
Though mainly concentrating on the developments in the Iran-Iraq war, the officials 
of the Islamic Republic also continued to be involved in the multilateral talks on the 
CWC. As before, Iran's negotiators underlined the importance of the planned 
convention to their country and to the whole world and made repeated calls for the 
conclusion of the negotiations at the earliest possible time. 70 According to the Iranians, 
the main task for the CWC negotiators was to agree on a disarmament instrument that 
would be as universal as possible, for the more parties the instrument would succeed in 
inducing, the better the cause of international peace and security would be served. 
(CD/PV. 445,1988: 7-8 and CD/PV. 453,1988: 5) 
In order to achieve the goal of universality for the CWC, the Islamic Republic argued, 
the convention should provide incentives for states to become parties to the treaty. One 
such incentive was the provision of assistance by the other states parties to a member 
state that had become a victim of chemical weapons use or was under the threat of gas 
warfare. By referring to article X of the CWC's rolling text - that is, a regularly updated 
draft of the convention whose outline was first agreed in 1984 - the Iranians stated that 
in cases of chemical weapons use, the state parties should be obliged to automatically 
provide assistance to the victim. In cases of threat of use, the help provided by the states 
suggest that Iran had also played a role in the chemical assault on the Kurdish town. (Hiltermann 2007: 3- 
4,9-10) 
70 Iran was of the opinion that the negotiation process should be speeded up by holding special CWC 
sessions at the CD (A/S-15/PV. 3,1988: 47). 
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parties could be voluntary. 71 As far as additional accession incentives were concerned, 
Iran's negotiators supported, among others, the proposal according to which those states 
that would not join the CWC would be internationally prevented from obtaining certain 
chemical agents. Furthermore, the delegates of the Islamic Republic alluded to article 
XI of the draft convention - entitled "Economic and technological development" - and 
emphasized, like other developing countries, the importance of CWC provisions that 
would safeguard and advance those countries' economic and technological interests. 
(CD/PV. 453,1988: 6 and A/S-15/PV. 3,1988: 48) 
While Iran made calls for measures that would contribute to the universality of the 
CWC, it also stressed that once states had joined the convention, they should not be 
allowed to withdraw their treaty membership. Although the officials of the Islamic 
Republic defended the traditional right of states to withdraw from international 
agreements, they stressed that the CWC constituted an exceptional case because the 
convention would be a reflection of the fundamental needs and values of the 
international community. In the Iranian opinion, the inclusion of a provision in the 
CWC that would prevent the states parties from unilaterally terminating their CWC 
obligations would create general confidence and encourage countries under acute 
security threats to accede to the treaty. (A/S-15/PV. 3,1988: 48) 
Still, at the end of the day, it was the question of compliance and verification that 
continued to dominate Iran's argumentation on the CWC. Iran's concerns related to the 
issue were aired, among others, by the Islamic Republic's CD ambassador in March 
1988: "How much respect can we expect from states for the international agreements 
we try so hard to formulate in the form of conventions, protocols or others? And what 
can be done in order to ensure and enhance such respect? " To provide an answer to 
these questions, the representatives of the Islamic Republic referred to the UN General 
Assembly resolution 42/37C of November 1987 as a good basis for the CWC's 
verification system. In that resolution, the General Assembly had requested the UN 
secretary-general to carry out investigations in response to reports that may be brought 
to his attention by any UN member state concerning chemical weapons use violating the 
71 Article X of the draft CWC which the Iranians were referring to, entitled "Assistance and protection 
against chemical weapons, " dealt with the delivery and coordination of protection against chemical 
weapons, including decontamination equipment and medical help. 
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1925 Geneva Protocol. 72 In a similar manner, Iran's CWC negotiators argued, the 
Technical Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
(OPCW) - the planned international organization that would be charged with the task of 
verifying the implementation of the CWC - should immediately and automatically 
respond to a verification request made by a CWC member state. The reports of such 
investigations, the Iranians added, should be presented to the Executive Council of the 
OPCW, to the UN secretary-general, as well as to the UN Security Council. Those 
instances would then decide how to respond to treaty non-compliance under the CWC. 
The Iranians themselves made it known that their government would support the 
implementation of mandatory challenge inspections - that is, on-site investigations 
conducted by the treaty organization at any location or facility at very short notice - 
within the CWC framework. 73 (CD/PV. 445,1988: 8; CD/PV. 453,1988: 6 and A/S- 
15/PV. 3,1988: 47-48) 
4.1.2 From the cease-fire to the completion of the CWC 
Some students of the Iran-Iraq war have argued that, in the final analysis, the impact 
of chemical weapons on the overall course of the conflict remained insignificant. 
According to these observers, although having played an important tactical role in a 
number of individual battles during the war, strategically chemical weapons only 
amplified the effects of the primary determinants that steered the Iran-Iraq conflict. 74 
Iranian authorities, however, seem to have attached much more weight to the chemical 
weapons factor in the war equation. Apart from the fact that they referred to Iraq's use 
of chemical armaments as one of the key factors that contributed to the Islamic 
72 The General Assembly resolution 42/37C had been entitled "Measures to uphold the authority of the 
1925 Geneva Protocol and to support the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention. " For the 
resolution's content, see Yearbook of the United Nations 1987 (1992: 70-7 1). 
73 Challenge inspections are the most intrusive means of establishing facts in the law of international arms 
control. They serve two basic functions. First, challenge inspections act as deterrents to non-compliance 
with an arms control treaty or arrangement. Their second function is to re-establish confidence in an arms 
control instrument in a situation where one or more state parties are suspected of non-compliance. 
Challenge inspections differ from so-called routine inspections which refer to investigations made on 
declared sites at a regulated time. The so-called short notice or ad hoc inspections, in turn, are conducted 
on declared sites but at a short advance notice. Finally, inspections on invitation become relevant when a 
state suspected of non-compliance invites inspectors to its territory to confirm that its behaviour has not 
breached against international regulations or when a state invites outside observers to verify that it is 
fulfilling certain arms control obligations. (Kurzidem 1998: 249-250 and Hanski 1998: 45-46) 
74 Note, for example, the conclusion by Karsh (1993: 32,43) who argues that "the overall impact of non- 
conventional warfare on the general course of the war was marginal" and that "chemical warfare was not 
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Republic's decision to accept a cease-fire in July 1988,75 Iran's post-war arms control 
operations indicated that the issue of chemical warfare occupied a high place in Iranian 
decision-makers' deliberations on the lessons of the Iran-Iraq conflict. 
The conclusion that chemical armaments were an effective military tool was 
unambiguously expressed in the immediate post-war period by a number of high- 
ranking Iranian decision-makers, such as Ali Akbar Hashimi Rafsanjani. In his address 
to the IRGC in October 1988, Rafsanjani stated that the Iran-Iraq conflict had 
illustrated that chemical weapons were a "very decisive" instrument of warfare (Chubin 
1989: 22). 76 Iranian comments such as the one by Rafsanjani were indicative of the 
Iranian leadership's determination to ensure that their country would never again 
become a victim of chemical warfare and that no actor chemically targeting Iran would 
be spared from severe consequences. Also, they suggested that the Islamic Republic 
was committed to the development of a chemical weapons arsenal capable of acting as a 
military deterrent against foreign adversaries. 
The Iranian leitmotif of protecting the country from future WMD attacks heavily 
guided the Islamic Republic's post-war arms control diplomacy. Accordingly, from the 
time the cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war took effect until the commencement of the 
1990-1991 Gulf conflict in August 1990, Iran's chemical arms control efforts had two 
main objectives. First, Iranian officials were mobilized to rally support for an 
international condemnation of Iraq's war-time chemical crimes and to inform the 
international community about the threat Iraq's chemical armaments continued to pose 
in the post-Iran-Iraq-war era. Secondly, the arms control officials of the Islamic 
Republic were instructed to work for the implementation of international measures that 
would strengthen existing diplomatic arrangements pertaining to chemical arms control 
and to take active part in the on-going multilateral negotiations on the CWC. 
that crucial for Iraq's war operations. " For an opposite scholarly conclusion stressing the central role 
played by chemical weapons in the 1980-1988 war, see Hiltermann (2007). 
According to one Iranian representative, Iraq's chemical weapons, together with its missiles, "broke the 
backbone" of the Iranian leadership as far as the Islamic Republic's decision to accept the UN Security 
Council resolution 598 was concerned. Similar conclusions were drawn in post-war Iraq. Iraqi officials 
admitted that, in their view, chemical armaments, together with SSM, had saved their country from defeat 
during the war against Iran. By Iraqi accounts, Iraq used some 19,500 chemical bombs, over 54,000 
chemical artillery shells, and 27,000 short-range chemical filled rockets in the course of the 1980-1988 
war. (Author's interview with an Iranian arms control official [C] who wishes to remain unidentified, 
summer 2002; Eisenstadt 2000: 64 and Russell 2005b: 194) 
76 For an Iranian statement to this effect presented at an international arms control forum, see CD/PV. 625 
(1992: 4). 
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In the light of the delicate 'no war, no peace' situation between the Islamic Republic 
and Iraq at the time, thus, Iraq's capabilities continued to dominate Iranian thinking on 
chemical arms control. After Iraq directed its military intentions towards Kuwait in 
1990, and after the Kuwait-related ambitions of Saddam Hussein were overwhelmingly 
crushed by the U. S. -led coalition in the brief war of January-February 1991, however, 
the bilateral aspect in Iran's chemical arms control operations began to shift to the 
background. But even though the Islamic Republic now had the breathing space to 
devote more diplomatic energies on broader, and less urgent, regional and international 
arms control issues, Iran's war-time experience as a victim of gas warfare never ceased 
from being the ultimate factor that steered the Islamic Republic's chemical arms control 
operations. 
4.1.2.1 Iran's chemical diplomacy between the two Gulf conflicts 
The information provided by the authorities of the Islamic Republic about the number 
of Iranian victims of Iraq's war-time use of toxic weapons has been ambiguous. In April 
1988, three months before Iran unconditionally accepted the UN Security Council 
resolution 598, the officials of the Islamic Republic announced that some 27,500 
Iranians had been injured and 260 died as a result of Iraq's gas warfare (Karsh 1993: 
43). Ten years later, in March 1998, they stated that 60,000 Iranians had been exposed 
to Iraq's chemical weapon attacks and that many still needed treatment (Chubin and 
Green 1998: 159). 77 An article from April 2001, written by the Islamic Republic's 
deputy foreign minister, in turn maintained that more than 100,000 Iranian people, both 
military and civilian, had been exposed to the chemical warfare agents used by Iraq in 
the 1980s (Zarif 2001: 1). 78 
Whatever the exact number of the Iranian casualties, after the war, the authorities of 
the Islamic Republic continued to strongly criticize foreign and especially Western 
governments for their indifference towards Iraq's war-time deployment of chemical 
armaments. That indifference and negligence, Iranian officials argued, had encouraged 
Iraq to step up its gas warfare during the war, resulted in immense humanitarian 
" In November 2000, a representative of an Iranian war veteran organization told that over 15,000 
veterans suffering from chemical-related injuries had died in the 12 years after the end of the Iran-Iraq 
war (IRNA, 13 November 2000). 
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suffering, and established a highly dangerous precedent of political expediency 
suggesting that states could use toxic weapons with complete impunity. As a result, the 
Iranians added, chemical armaments had become a tempting option for military planners 
all over the world and, therefore, the most immediate threat to world security. 79 
(A/43/PV. 14,1988: 63,76-77; Tabatabai 1989: 321 and A/C. 1/44/PV. 13.1989: 4-5) 
In order to rectify the alarming situation as well as the damages done to the authority 
and prestige of the UN and international law by Iraq's unhindered use of chemical 
weapons during the Iran-Iraq conflict, the representatives of the Islamic Republic 
argued, governments should embark upon measures aimed at "eliminating chemical 
weapons from the face of the earth. " In the Iranian opinion, the international awakening 
resulting from Iraq's chemical attack against civilians in Halabja in March 1988,80 
together with the general thaw in the international political scene of the late 1980s, had 
created a promising window of opportunity for chemical disarmament. 8' (A/43/PV. 14, 
1988: 77 and A/C. 1/44/PV. 13,1989: 6) 
Iran stressed that pending the completion of the CWC, the international community 
should implement a set of substitutive or transitory measures focusing on the acute 
threat of chemical weapons. As a first step, Iranian officials put forth a proposal for an 
impartial study on the use of chemical armaments in the Iran-Iraq war. According to the 
representatives of the Islamic Republic, such a study would increase the awareness of 
the general public worldwide of the consequences of chemical warfare and - through 
the subsequent increase in sentiments against chemical weapons - pressure 
78 This figure was also presented to the author in July 2002 (author's interview with Hassan Mashhadi, 
The Hague, 8 July 2002) and was further mentioned in an Iranian diplomatic statement made in The 
Hague in October 2002 (Zamaninia 2002: 2). 
79 Iranian officials underscored that, compared with nuclear weapons, chemical armaments were cheap 
and easy to manufacture. This, the Iranians added, was a central factor that made chemical weapons a 
more topical threat to international security than nuclear weapons. (A/C. 1/43/PV. 15,1988: 52) 
80 Iran proposed that the date of Iraq's chemical assault on Halabja should be designated the international 
day of the campaign against chemical weapons (A/43/PV. 14,1988: 77). 
SI Yet, it should be noted that the diplomatic optimism expressed by the Iranians was reserved. For 
example, in late 1988, responding to France's offer to host an international conference in Paris in January 
1989 to consider the increased threat of chemical warfare and to reaffirm states' commitment to the 
Geneva Protocol, the representatives of the Islamic Republic asked why such a conference had not been 
held at the time when Iraq was poisoning Iranian soldiers and civilians with chemical armaments. While 
expressing its support to the "belated" Paris Conference - which was originally based on a U. S. 
diplomatic initiative - Iran emphasized that the conference should not be used as a venue to whitewash 
Iraq's past crimes or to cover up the fact that Iraq had received substantial foreign assistance for its 
chemical weapons program during the Iran-Iraq conflict. (A/C. 1/43/PV. 15,1988: 54-56 and 
AT. I /43/PV. 21,1988: 69-70) 
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governments to make speedy progress in chemical disarmament. 82 (A/C. 1/43/PV. 53, 
1988: 29-30) 
Meanwhile, the Iranians continued, all states should pledge that they would not use 
chemical armaments under any circumstances. The countries that had not signed the 
Geneva Protocol should be invited to adhere to it within a specific period of time, and 
the parties to the protocol that had made reservations on its implementation should 
repeal them as soon as possible so that the protocol would not be viewed as an 
instrument that only banned the first use of chemical weapons. Iranian authorities also 
emphasized the importance of national and international bans on the transfers of 
technology for the production of chemical weapons. (A/C. 1/43/PV. 15,1988: 53; 
A/C. 1/43/PV. 21,1988: 71 and A/C. 1/43/PV. 53,1988: 31) 
Moreover, the Iranians maintained that the international community should be 
prepared to act upon any allegation of chemical weapons use. In the Iranian view, such 
allegations should be investigated according to the mechanism formulated in the UN 
General Assembly resolution 42/37C of 1987.83 If chemical weapons were used, all 
governments should condemn such actions without any "biased political or bilateral 
considerations" in order to create strong moral pressure against the states resorting to 
gas warfare. In addition, countries using chemical armaments should be immediately 
punished by the international community. Iranian officials pointed to the application of 
international sanctions, such as trade embargos, and underscored that, if necessary, the 
UN Security Council should respond to gas warfare also through means that would 
involve the use of armed force as mentioned in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 84 
(A/C. 1/43/PV. 21,1988: 68,72-73 and A/44/PV. 13,1989: 96) 
As for the on-going negotiations on the CWC, the Islamic Republic continued to 
strive for the realization of the objectives it had already outlined during the war years. 
Iran emphasized the importance of a treaty that would be as foolproof and intrusive as 
82 The chemical arms control proposals made by the Islamic Republic immediately after the Iran-Iraq war 
reflected the more or less expressed Iranian premise that without acknowledging and condemning the 
chemical crimes committed in the past, the international community would not be able to credibly and 
efficiently respond to future challenges posed by chemical armaments (A/C. 1/43/PV. 21,1988: 71 and 
A/C. 1/43/PV. 39,1988: 13). 
83 See above section 4.1.1.3. 
84 Interestingly, even though the Iranians continued to castigate the UN Security Council for its 
performance during the Iran-Iraq war, they simultaneously defined the council as the ultimate actor in the 
formulation of punitive measures against countries using chemical weapons. Take, for example, the 
following remark made by an Iranian diplomat in November 1988: "After all, we have to bear in mind 
that the [UN] Charter confers on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security and that member states have agreed to accept and carry out its decisions 
in accordance with the Charter" (A/C. 1/43/PV. 39,1988: 13). 
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possible, for the Iranian people, the Islamic Republic's argument went, could not afford 
to risk their security and to give up the chemical weapons option in exchange for a weak 
convention. The officials of the Islamic Republic, who called for the creation of a treaty 
that would be of unlimited duration, also demanded that the states parties' adherence to 
the CWC should be globally verifiable, unconditional, and subject to no differing 
interpretations. In the Iranian view, the universality of the CWC was a fundamental goal 
that had to be attained. 85 Especially the participation of countries that had a record of 
chemical weapons use or of states that had assisted others to obtain the technology to 
produce and employ toxic weapons was considered by the Iranians to be of absolute 
importance. (CD/PV. 487,1989: 18 and CD/PV. 543,1990: 12) 
More specifically, the Islamic Republic argued that the U. S. negotiation position to 
allow chemical weapons states to retain two percent of their stockpiles until all 
countries capable of producing chemical armaments had become parties to the CWC 
was untenable. One could not possess chemical weapons and simultaneously demand 
others not to have them. The Iranians were also of the opinion that the destruction of 
chemical weapons, as stipulated in the CWC, should not take as long as 10 years as 
envisaged in the rolling text. Moreover, the Islamic Republic stated that the countries in 
possession of the largest stockpiles of chemical weapons and those with a record of gas 
warfare should be the ones starting the destruction process. 86 Iranian negotiators also 
insisted that the destruction process should start from the most sophisticated armaments 
and the most lethal chemical agents. (CD/PV. 514,1989: 6; A/C. 1/44/PV. 13,1989: 8-9 
and CD/PV. 543,1990: 12) 
As far as the investigation and verification mechanism of the CWC was concerned, 
Iran made calls for an effective system that would leave no room for violations. If a 
country would resort to toxic weapons use, the Islamic Republic noted, it should be 
subjected to punitive measures in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter. What 
Iranian officials declared to be crucial in this connection was the adoption of the 
principle of automaticity. As pointed out by the representative of the Islamic Republic 
85 This goal was told to be all the more important for countries that had been victims of gas warfare and 
for states that lived under the constant threat of chemical weapons. Such countries, the Iranians 
maintained, should also be guaranteed a strong representation in the planned international organization 
responsible for the implementation of the CWC. (A/44/PV. 13,1989: 96 and CD/PV. 543,1990: 13) 86 According to the Iranians, the destruction process should begin already prior to the conclusion of the 
CWC. Thus, the Islamic Republic welcomed the efforts made by the United States and the Soviet Union 
in the late 1980s to reduce the size of their chemical arsenals. Yet the Iranians also noted that the arms 
control advances made between the two superpowers should not take place at the expense of the 
multilateral efforts directed towards the CWC. (A, 'C. 1/44/PV. 13,1989: 8-9) 
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addressing the CD in March 1990: "Iran has been a victim of chemical weapons as well 
as political selectivity. We cannot therefore leave our security at the mercy of political 
decisions. " (CD/PV. 487,1989: 18 and CD/PV. 543,1990: 12) 
Accordingly, in the Iranian view, all parties to the CWC should automatically be 
entitled to receive all relevant information, including information on possible treaty 
violations, without any "political prejudice. " In the same vein, the processes for routine 
and challenge inspections as well as for inspections in the event of alleged chemical 
weapons use should not be hampered by "political decisions. " The officials of the 
Islamic Republic also maintained that decisions on punitive measures against treaty 
violators should be based on facts on the ground, not on political considerations. 
Finally, the Iranians demanded that international assistance to the victims of chemical 
warfare or to countries under the threat of toxic weapons use, as envisioned in article X 
of the rolling text, should be automatic. (CD/PV. 543,1990: 12) 
Not surprisingly, after the Iran-Iraq war, the Islamic Republic's CWC negotiators 
invested a lot of diplomatic energy in debates on article X of the draft convention. 
According to the Iranians, states had to be assured that if they became victims of gas 
warfare, the international community would come to their assistance. In Iran's view, 
such assistance, defined by Iranian negotiators as a significant incentive for CWC 
accession, had to be both automatic and mandatory. Following the war, the authorities 
of the Islamic Republic, who were confronted with the major task of post-war 
reconstruction, also started to devote more diplomatic attention to article XI of the draft 
CWC which dealt with the economic and technological development of the states 
parties as well as with international cooperation in the field of non-military chemical 
activities. Iran's views on article XI were presented not only by the Islamic Republic's 
officials but also by the representatives of Iran's chemical industry. Thus, at the 
Canberra Government-Industry Conference Against Chemical Weapons held in 
September 1989,87 for example, the Islamic Republic's approach to article XI was 
presented by a chemical industry member of the Iranian delegation. In his address to the 
conference, the Iranian delegate expressed his government's view that the CWC should 
take into account the legitimate concerns and needs of the developing world's chemical 
industries. He stressed that the CWC should facilitate economic and technological 
87 The purpose of the international conference organized by the Australian government in Canberra in 
September 1989 was to provide a forum for government and industry representatives to exchange views 
on the implications of the CWC and on the areas of concern with respect to the planned convention. For a 
discussion of the Canberra conference, see Flowerree (1993: 1015-1016). 
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cooperation - first and foremost in the form of chemical material and technology 
transfers - between developed and developing countries in order to compensate for the 
restrictions and obligations imposed by the convention. According to the Iranian 
delegate, the application of "unnecessary and discriminate" restrictions in chemical 
transfers - that is, the application of restrictions not agreed within the CWC treaty 
framework - was totally unacceptable. 
88 
The Islamic Republic's general diplomatic argumentation on chemical disarmament 
during the months between the two Gulf conflicts continued to strongly reflect Iran's 
anxiety about Iraq's chemical arsenal. 89 Given that the peace discussions between the 
Islamic Republic and Iraq had not brought about any significant results, the issue of 
Iraqi chemical weapons was regularly addressed by Iran. The officials of the Islamic 
Republic continued to claim that the problem of Iraqi chemical armaments had been 
created by the foreign governments that had supported Iraq's chemical weapons efforts 
in the course of the Iran-Iraq war and insisted that now, after the hostilities between the 
two countries had ended, those governments could not anymore use the argument of not 
wanting to get involved in the war as an excuse for not tackling the problem of Iraq's 
WMD. At the same time, however, the Iranians offered an explanation of why it was 
unlikely that Western governments would deal with the issue of Iraq's toxic weapons. 
By threatening to reveal the names of its WMD suppliers, the Iranian argument went, 
Iraq was successfully blackmailing Western powers for political concessions. 90 
(A/C. 1/43/PV. 21,1988: 69-70; A/C. 1/43/PV. 53,1988: 28 and CD/PV. 514,1989: 5) 
Pointing out that the 'no peace, no war' situation between Iran and Iraq bred tension 
and insecurity in the Gulf and the wider Middle East region as well as made it difficult 
for regional governments to give up the chemical weapons option and to accede to the 
88 This paragraph draws upon CD/PV. 479 (1988: 3); CD/PV. 514 (1989: 6); Dastgheib (1989: 323-324) 
and CD/PV. 543 (1990: 13). 
89 For Iranian statements alluding to the acute threat of Iraq's WMD capabilities, see A/44/PV. 13 (1989: 
94-95) and CD/PV. 534 (1990: 21). As noted by Parsi (2007: 143), many military strategists in Iran 
believed at the time that another confrontation with Iraq was inevitable and that the next conflict between 
the two parties would see the use of WMD at the very outset. 
90 This was what, in the Iranian view, had happened, for example, in connection with the international 
conference on chemical weapons held in Paris in January 1989. The fact that the final declaration of the 
conference had not mentioned Iraq by name when referring to recent cases of chemical weapons use was 
explained by Iranian officials to have resulted from Iraq's successful threat to reveal the names of its 
European suppliers of chemical agents and technology if mentioned as a culprit in that document 
(CD/PV. 514,1989: 6). It should be noted that following the end of the Iran-Iraq conflict, Iranian 
diplomats did not mention the individual countries that had supported Iraq's war-time chemical weapons 
efforts by name, but mostly used broad, undefined terms such as "certain states" to allude to such 
countries. 
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planned CWC, 91 Iranian officials made constant calls for international measures that 
would lead to the immediate implementation of the UN Security Council resolution 
598.92 Even though the Iranians recognized that, for the time being at least, the 
prospects for broad Middle Eastern participation in the CWC were dim, 93 they 
nevertheless regularly voiced their hope for a wide and simultaneous adherence to the 
CWC by the countries of the region and for the full implementation of the convention in 
the Middle East. 94 Pending the completion of the CWC and Middle Eastern states' full 
participation in the future treaty, Iranian representatives noted, scrupulous regional 
observance of the Geneva Protocol was of utmost importance. Moreover, the Islamic 
Republic spoke for the establishment of a chemical-weapon-free zone and more broadly 
of a zone free of all WMD in the Middle East as a remedy to the problem of regional 
WMD. (A/C. 1/44/PV. 13,1989: 11; CD/PV. 543,1990: 11-13 and A/CN. 10/PV. 146, 
1990: 58) 
In the months between the two Gulf conflicts, Iranian officials also continued to point 
out that that their government's post-war commitment to chemical disarmament derived 
from the war-time experiences of the Iranian people and from the Islamic Republic's 
moral values. 95 This national commitment to chemical disarmament was told by the 
Iranians to be a logical continuation of the Islamic Republic's war-time policy. 
91 Despite these warnings, however, Iran confirmed in connection with the 1989 Paris Conference that the 
Islamic Republic was ready to join the CWC, even if Iraq refused to do so (Herby 1992: 42). 
92 It should be noted that the UN Security Council resolution 598, which established the framework for 
peace negotiations between Iran and Iraq, did not include any specific recommendations or demands 
concerning chemical weapons. It only demanded both parties to discontinue all military actions and to 
withdraw all their forces to the internationally recognized borders. In addition, the resolution requested 
the UN secretary-general to examine, in consultation with Iran and Iraq and other regional states, 
measures to enhance the security and stability of the region. 
93 Consider, for example, the following statement made by the Iranian foreign minister at the CD in 
March 1990: "To be frank, if the [chemical weapons] convention was ready today, the chances of its 
success in our region would be somewhere near zero" (CD/PV. 543,1990: 11). 
94 Contrary to the position adopted by the great majority of Arab governments at the time, the Islamic 
Republic was of the opinion that the issues of chemical and nuclear weapons should not necessarily be 
linked with each other. As put by the Islamic Republic's foreign minister: "[... ] while we share the 
concerns about the proliferation of nuclear arms in our region and its parallels with chemical weapons, we 
do not feel that there has to be a direct link if this would compromise the fate of the CW convention. " The 
emphasis put by the Islamic Republic on the issue of chemical weapons was evident also in the Iranian 
position according to which the establishment of a regional security system in the Gulf -a central post- 
war foreign policy objective of the Islamic Republic - was subordinate to the more urgent aim of 
chemical disarmament in the region. However, Iran did not preclude the possibility that regional efforts in 
the field of chemical disarmament would be implemented in the context of an indigenous security 
arrangement. (Ibid.: 12-13) 
95 Some representatives of the Islamic Republic went as far as claiming that, for Iran, the issue of 
chemical weapons was "totally independent of the issue of bilateral relations and bilateral issues between 
the two countries of Iran and Iraq. " For those representatives, it was the Iranians' "deep moral and inner 
urge for the abolishment and complete eradication of chemical weapons" which explained their 
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Although Iran had possessed all the means to manufacture chemical weapons on a large 
scale and to use them extensively in retaliation during the war, the authorities of the 
Islamic Republic claimed, it had never resorted to gas warfare. 96 Iranian officials 
described their country's alleged self-restraint as "unprecedented in history" and said 
that their country had set a benchmark for state behaviour in international relations. The 
Islamic Republic's moral steadfastness, they added, was also evident in the way it had 
based its post-war security policy on diplomacy and particularly on the still unfinished 
CWC, even if it could have converted the capabilities and expertise acquired in the area 
of chemical armaments during the Iran-Iraq war into a military deterrent against 
immediate and potential threats to Iran's national security. (A/C. 1 /43/PV. 15,1988: 56; 
CD/PV. 514,1989: 4 and CD/PV. 543,1990: 11) 
4.1.2.2 From the Gulf Conflict of 1990-1991 to the final draft of the CWC 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 changed the political and military 
environment in which the arms control officials of the Islamic Republic had operated 
after the end of the Iran-Iraq war. As Iraq's armed forces became fully occupied with 
the realization of Saddam Hussein's military objectives in Kuwait, the threat of Iraqi 
chemical weapons ceased to be an immediate security concern for the Iranians. This was 
the case especially after the U. S. -led coalition forces defeated Iraq in the military 
operation known as Desert Storm between 17 January and 27 February 1991.97 The 
creation, in the UN Security Council resolution 687 of April 1991, of the United 
Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) to verify the post-war destruction of Iraq's 
chemical, biological, and missile capabilities98 meant that, from Iran's point of view, the 
government's active diplomacy in the realm of chemical disarmament. (A/C. 1/43/PV. 16,1988: 51-52; 
A/C. l/43/PV. 21,1988: 69-70 and CD/PV. 543,1990: 11) 
96 Iranian authorities strongly rejected Iraq's post-war accusations that Iran's armed forces had resorted to 
the use of toxic weapons in the course of the Iran-Iraq conflict. According to them, Iraqi officials made 
such "baseless accusations" in order to "distort the very clear facts about the painful and horrendous use 
of chemical weapons by Iraq. " The official Iranian denials were echoed by the representatives of Iran's 
chemical industry. As put by one industry representative, Iran's chemical industry "never took any 
measure to divert its products for the production of chemical weapons" during the war. Instead, he added, 
the chemical industry of the Islamic Republic "put its valuable scientific and technical experience at the 
disposal of the government to contribute to the early conclusion of the Convention for prohibition of 
chemical weapons. " (A/CN. 10/PV. 146,1990: 87-88 and Dastgheib 1989: 323) 
97 It should be noted that, during the Gulf conflict of 1990-1991, the Iranians had regularly expressed 
their concern for the threats made by Iraq to use chemical weapons against its adversaries (CD/PV. 582, 
1991: 4; A/46/PV. 66,1991: 52 and CD/PV. 625,1992: 6). 98 In exchange for a cease-fire and armistice, Iraq agreed to respect all relevant UN Security Council 
resolutions related to the Gulf conflict, including the Security Council resolution 687 which demanded the 
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international community had finally embarked upon measures the Islamic Republic had 
been championing for years. 99 
But although Iraq's military defeat and the efforts by UNSCOM to disarm Iraq highly 
served Iran's national interests and its objectives in the realm of chemical 
disarmament, '°° the Gulf conflict of 1990-1991 also generated new security problems 
for the Islamic Republic. On the one hand, Iranian officials were of the opinion that the 
conflict had accelerated regional arms racing both in the area conventional armaments 
and WMD. For this reason, the Iranians asserted, there was an urgent need in the Gulf 
region and the wider Middle East for arms control measures that would address both 
weapons categories. 101 On the other hand, the massive influx of Western military forces 
to the Persian Gulf following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was something the Iranians had 
not hoped for. Not only eroding the prospects for the establishment of the Iranian- 
promoted indigenous security system in the Gulf, the presence of foreign forces in the 
region was viewed by the Islamic Republic as a direct threat to regional and Iran's 
national security. This Iranian threat assessment included a WMD dimension, for 
already during Desert Storm the officials of the Islamic Republic had claimed, among 
others, that the U. S. fleets in the Gulf had access to chemical weapons. 102 
(A/C. 1/45/PV. 6,1990: 35; CD/PV. 582,1991: 4 and Chubin 1997b: 9) 
government of Saddam Hussein to unconditionally accept the destruction, removal or rendering harmless, 
under international supervision, of all Iraqi chemical and biological weapons, all stocks of agents and all 
related subsystems and components, as well as of all research, development, support and manufacturing 
facilities. 
99 The Gulf conflict provided Iranian authorities with an opportunity to argue that had the international 
community taken heed of the Islamic Republic's earlier warnings, Iraq's WMD, including its chemical 
weapons, would have never become a topical threat. Some Iranian officials could not conceal their 
satisfaction with the irony that was present in the confrontation between Iraq and Western governments. 
Take, for example, the following Iranian remark from 14 February 1991: "It is the paradox of history that 
the weapons provided to Iraq have now turned against their own suppliers. " (CD/PV. 582,1991: 2,4) 
100 As subsequently noted by one Iranian representative: "Of course the weakening of Iraq's military 
capabilities highly benefited us. The outcome of the [Gulf] conflict clearly contributed to our security 
(author's interview with an Iranian arms control official [D] who wishes to remain unidentified, summer 
2002). " Given the Islamic Republic's declared policy of neutrality in the 1990-1991 Gulf conflict, Iranian 
authorities officially kept quiet about their satisfaction with Iraq's military defeat in the war against the 
U. S. -led coalition forces. During and after the Gulf conflict, Iran called on the Iraqi government to abide 
with all relevant UN resolutions and thus also to allow UNSCOM to carry out its disarmament activities 
inside Iraq. At the same time, the Islamic Republic declared its own commitment to all UN resolutions 
related to the Gulf conflict. (A/45/PV. 5,1990: 47) 
101 In addition to calling for arms control in the Middle East, Iran continued to make a linkage between 
conventional arms control and WMD disarmament - among others, in the context of the issue of 
transparency in armaments (A/46/PV. 66,1991: 52 and CD/PV. 625,1992: 6). 
102 Subsequently, Iranian representatives referred to the chronic illnesses and symptoms suffered by many 
veterans of the allied forces who served in the Gulf region during Operation Desert Storm - collectively 
called the Gulf War syndrome or the Gulf War illnesses (Nicolson et al. 2002: 431) - to support their 
claim that the coalition forces had been equipped with chemical armaments (author's interview with an 
Iranian arms control official [D] who wishes to remain unidentified, summer 2002). 
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Nevertheless, in terms of urgency, the new threats to Iran, as portrayed by the 
authorities of the Islamic Republic, markedly differed from those of the Iran-Iraq war 
years and the pre-Gulf conflict period. Accordingly, after Iraq's WMD programs had 
been placed under international scrutiny, Iranian officials were able to more forcefully 
focus on multilateral international efforts in the field of chemical arms control. 
Naturally, the negotiations on the CWC - which had intensified as a result of the Iran- 
Iraq war and had been further hastened by the Gulf conflict as well as by the positive 
changes in East-West relations - constituted the most important endeavour in this 
respect. ' 03 As the negotiations in Geneva moved into the endgame stage, the officials of 
the Islamic Republic continued to underline the importance of the CWC and Iran's 
commitment to it, although they also aired their regret that the issue of chemical 
armaments had received minimal international attention at the time when Iranians were 
being victimized by those WMD (CD/PV. 625,1992: 4). 
In the Iranian view, the CWC had to be as comprehensive and universal as possible in 
order to bring about the elimination of toxic weapons from states' military arsenals. 
Also, Iranian negotiators stressed, the provisions of the CWC had to be well defined so 
that the convention would not leave any room for "self-serving political manouvres. " In 
addition to speaking for a final treaty document "devoid of political expediency, " the 
representatives of the Islamic Republic insisted that the CWC should take into account 
the legitimate interests and concerns of all negotiating parties. As far as the Islamic 
Republic's own worries were concerned, Iranian officials continued to argue that the 
major powers should not be allowed to maintain any chemical weapons in their arsenals 
as a security stock. After the United States gave up its demand for such an inventory in 
May 1991, Iran expressed its satisfaction that the "discriminatory" U. S. position 
contradicting the goal of total elimination of chemical weapons had been dropped. 
(A/45/PV. 5,1990: 49-50; A/C. 1/45/PV. 6,1990: 40-41 and A/C. 1/46/PV. 5,1991: 38) 
Moreover, the negotiators of the Islamic Republic continued to call for the creation of 
an efficient CWC verification mechanism that would deter the states parties from 
infringing their treaty obligations and from taking advantage of technological and 
103 While taking part in the CWC talks, the Iranians also continued to make calls for the strengthening of 
the 1925 Geneva Protocol. For example, they argued that all reservations made to the protocol by the 
states parties ought to be removed. Such diplomatic steps, the Iranians added, would help the protocol to 
"become a part of customary international law. " (A/C. 1/45/PV. 36,1990: 36 and CD/PV. 617,1992: 49). 
This position marked a departure from the war-time Iranian interpretations according to which the 
prohibitions of the Geneva Protocol had already entered into customary international law (see above note 
21 p. 221 and note 64 p. 238). 
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scientific progress in the chemical field for military purposes. However, the Iranians 
approached the topic of verification also with certain qualifications. First of all, they 
emphasized that the CWC verification mechanism should not fall into the trap of 
"excessive verification. " Undue interference in routine chemical industry activities that 
posed little or no risk to the objectives of the CWC was said by the Iranians to have 
"counter-productive confidence degrading results" that would adversely affect the 
verification of the chemical facilities truly relevant to the convention as well as increase 
the costs of verification. 104 In addition, Iranian negotiators insisted that the verification 
system should not be misused or politically manipulated. The Islamic Republic 
supported challenge inspections and the right of the states parties to unilaterally ask for 
a challenge inspection in situations of suspected non-compliance, but it also stressed 
that such a right should not be maliciously used for the purpose of obtaining 
information about the states parties' legitimate commercial or military secrets. ' 05 
Furthermore, related to the verification issue, Iran, along with many other developing 
countries, complained that article II of the draft convention lacked a clear definition of 
the munitions, devices, and equipment regarded as chemical weapons. 106 The lack of an 
unambiguous definition of what constituted a chemical weapon, Iranian officials noted, 
not only had a significant bearing on what the states parties were actually prohibited to 
possess and obliged to destroy, 107 but it also provided a hypothetical avenue for the state 
parties to use the verification procedure to the detriment of another member state. ' 08 
104 The concern over the financial implications of verification was a persistent theme in Iran's CWC 
argumentation and made the Islamic Republic to team up with other developing countries to require the 
creation of a cost-effective verification system for the convention. In August 1990, at the CD, Iran had 
presented the results of a national trial inspection that had been carried out to establish whether the 
various provisions of the draft CWC were applicable in practice. The high financial burden of the 
inspection had been mentioned by the Iranians as one of the key lessons of their exercise. (CD/PV. 625, 
1992: 5 and CD/PV. 573,1990: 11) 
105 Hence, Iran's CWC negotiators opposed the view that called for maximum inspection transparency, 
that is, for a treaty stipulation that would deprive the states parties of the right to prevent the OPCW from 
carrying out 'anytime, anyplace' inspections on their territories (Limone 2004: 3). 
106 As elaborated upon by one Iranian negotiator: " [... ] although there is a clear definition of what is 
prohibited as regards toxic chemicals and their precursors, there is no comparably clear definition of the 
munitions, devices and equipment that are also to be regarded as chemical weapons" (Mashhadi 1992: 
29). 
107 Iran was also dissatisfied with articles IV and V of the draft convention because they allowed for the 
possible extension of the duration of the chemical weapons destruction period and the conversion of 
chemical weapons production facilities without identifying a qualitative order of destruction (Ali 1996: 
38). 
108 In addition, Iran, like many other developing countries, was of the opinion that article II of the draft 
convention did not sufficiently limit the employment of riot control chemical agents to domestic use only. 
By the same token, Iran was dissatisfied with the fact that article II excluded herbicides as a means of 
warfare. (Mashhadi 1992: 30) 
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(CD/PV. 573,1990: 12; A/C. 1/46/PV. 5,1991: 39; CD/PV. 625,1992: 5 and Mashhadi 
1992: 29-30) 
Even though the Iranians managed to exert major diplomatic influence on the content 
of article X of the draft convention dealing with international assistance and protection 
against chemical weapons, the Islamic Republic was not happy that in contrast to its 
wishes and the opinion of many other developing countries, the coordination and 
delivery of protection within the CWC framework lacked automaticity. Iran underlined 
the importance of the principle of automaticity - which was contrasted by Iranian 
negotiators with "political misuse" - also in discussions that concerned the measures 
that would be taken, under article XII of the CWC, by the OPCW Conference of the 
States Parties to ensure compliance with the convention and to redress and remedy a 
situation that contravened the treaty's provisions. (Sims 2001: 58-59; A/C. 1/45/PV. 6, 
1990: 39 and Mashhadi 1992: 30) 
The Islamic Republic's willingness to have a say in the implementation and 
enforcement of the future convention explained the strong emphasis put by the Iranians 
on the issue of representation in the treaty organization created by the CWC. Iran was 
particularly sensitive about the composition of the OPCW's Executive Council, the 41- 
member organ responsible for the promotion of the implementation of, and compliance 
with, the convention. According to Iranian negotiators, the provisions related to the 
composition of the planned council were unbalanced, discriminatory, and therefore 
unacceptable. Iran insisted that the states parties had to have an equal chance to serve in 
the council and that no state party was entitled to special priviledges. In the Iranian 
view, the membership mechanism based on the division of the states parties into five 
geographical groupings meant that the countries belonging to the Asian group with a 
large number of states parties had lower chances of election to the council than, for 
example, those of the European grouping. In addition, Iranian negotiators opposed the 
article VIII provision of the draft CWC prescribing that four states parties of the nine- 
member Asian quota "shall, as a rule, be the states parties with the most significant 
national chemical industry in the region as determined by internationally reported and 
published data. "109 The Islamic Republic held to its views on the Executive Council till 
the last moment, for Iran's intransigence in the matter delayed the adoption of the final 
draft of the CWC by the CD on 3 September 1992. After last-minute consultations 
among the Asian members of the CD that day, Iran ultimately bent to existing 
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formulations on the Executive Council but only on the understanding that the matter 
would be taken up again in the future. (A/C. 1/46/PV. 5,1991: 39; CD/PV. 634,1992: 29 
and Mashhadi 1992: 30) 
Issues pertaining to article XI of the CWC also occupied a high place on the Islamic 
Republic's negotiation agenda. In this connection, Iranian officials made three main 
points. First, they stressed, together with other developing countries, that the provisions 
of the CWC should not impede the economic and technological development of the 
states parties. The Iranians pointed out that the safeguarding of peaceful activities in the 
field of chemical industry was an absolute necessity especially because 
underdevelopment continued to pose a major threat to developing countries' security 
and well-being. Thus, Iran lent its diplomatic support to the negotiation position put 
forth by states such as Egypt that developing countries were entitled to obtain explicit 
assurances from the developed world in this regard. (A/C. 1/45/PV. 6,1990: 41; 
CD/PV. 582,1991: 2 and Mashhadi 1992: 30) 
Secondly, and related to the first point, Iran was among the CWC delegations 
vehemently demanding that there should be no "discriminatory restrictions" on 
chemical trade and technology transfers between the states parties. By those restrictions 
Iran referred first and foremost to the export control activities of the so-called Australia 
Group, an informal inter-state consultative body established in 1985 to ensure that the 
member states' exports of certain chemicals as well as of dual-use chemical 
manufacturing facilities and equipment do not contribute to the proliferation of 
chemical armaments. ' 0 According to Iranian negotiators, all restrictions of the Australia 
Group should be abandoned once the CWC had entered into force. This obligation, the 
Iranians said, should also be expressly stated in the convention, for developing countries 
should not be left at the mercy of the faithful implementation of article XI by the 
industrialized countries. The Islamic Republic's foreign minister justified his 
government's demands in June 1992 in the following way: "After eight years of war 
which caused unimaginable ruin and destruction, we [Iranians] need to devote all our 
energy and resources to reconstruction. [... ] restrictions with no relevance to the CWC 
may cause irreparable adverse effects on our industry and economy. " (A/C. 1/46/PV. 5, 
1991: 40; CD/PV. 625,1992: 4 and Mashhadi 1992: 30) 
109 Article VIII, paragraph 23 (b). 110 For more on the Australia Group, which grew out of the concerns related to the use of chemical 
weapons in the Iran-Iraq war, see the group's website at <http: //www. australiagroup. net> 
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The third main point made by Iranian negotiators related to article XI was that as a 
compensation for committing themselves to the intrusive verification system of the 
CWC and to the obligations of the convention in general, the states parties and 
especially those of the developing world should be granted aid and assistance in the 
field of chemical activities not prohibited under the treaty. Emphasizing the importance 
of the chemical sector for the economic, scientific, and technological progress of the 
developing world, Iranian officials contended that article XI should expressly guarantee 
the states parties' access to chemical compounds and technologies for peaceful 
purposes. (A/C. 1/46/PV. 5,1991: 40 and CD/PV. 625,1992: 5) 
Iran argued that ensured access to chemical materials and technologies was a major 
incentive for governments to accede to the CWC. Yet, when discussing the CWC in the 
Middle Eastern context, Iranian representatives asserted that the security dimension of 
the convention was what ultimately counted most. Therefore, in order to secure the 
universality of the CWC and to prepare suitable ground for Middle Eastern countries' 
treaty accession, the Iranians contended, the international community ought to address 
the security concerns of those states and to convince them that their participation in the 
CWC would not diminish their security. In the Islamic Republic's analysis, the biggest 
obstacle to Middle Eastern participation in the CWC was the "intrasingent 
aggressiveness of Israel. " Iranian authorities argued that Israel possessed undeclared 
nuclear weapons and effectively had a nuclear monopoly in the region, in addition to 
which Israel was claimed by the Iranians to possess chemical and biological warfare 
capabilities as well. Unless Israel adhered to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, put its 
nuclear facilities under the safeguards of the IAEA, and joined the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention, the Iranians stressed, major Arab states would not join the 
C WC. 111 The Islamic Republic itself refrained from making a diplomatic linkage 
between chemical armaments and other WMD. Instead, Iranian authorities maintained 
that the CWC constituted a highly important milestone on the way towards a WMD-free 
Middle East. ' 12 Besides underlining the necessity of disarmament in the Middle East, 
1" By 1990, the following six Middle Eastern countries were suspected or proven to have a chemical 
arms capability: Israel, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Iraq, and Iran (Hiltermann 2007: 228). 
112 The urgent need for a WMD-free zone in the Middle East - an objective that, together with the goal of 
a nuclear-free Middle East, had been expressly referred to in the UN Security Council resolution 687 of 3 
April 1991 - was told by Iranian officials to stem from a number of factors. As one Iranian diplomat 
explained in October 1991: "[... ] the nuclear-weapon capability of the Zionist regime, the widespread use 
of chemical weapons against my country, and the violations of the safeguards of the IAEA by a non- 
nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT in our region, as illustrated by IAEA reports, are all matters of 
great concern to us. These make it all the more imperative to spare no effort to establish a zone free from 
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the representatives of the Islamic Republic also called for the creation of joint 
verification mechanisms in the field of WMD disarmament as a means to promote sub- 
regional security cooperation among the Persian Gulf countries. 13 
4.1.3 Towards the Iranian ratification of the CWC 
4.1.3.1 Iran and the implementation of the CWC 
The Chemical Weapons Convention, finalized at the CD in September 1992, was 
opened for signature in Paris in early 1993. Iran was among the original signatories by 
signing the convention on 13 January 1993. Although many of the points emphasized 
by Iranian negotiators during the CWC talks never made it to the final text of the 
convention, the representatives of the Islamic Republic eventually expressed their 
satisfaction with the treaty. 114 They regarded it as a model for other international arms 
control arrangements and as a culmination of their own hard diplomatic efforts in the 
area of chemical disarmament. In Iran's view, the existence of the CWC proved that the 
sufferings of the Iranian victims of Iraq's chemical warfare had also brought about 
something good. Paying their tributes to those victims, the authorities of the Islamic 
Republic pledged to remain diplomatically vigilant in order to ensure that the CWC will 
be effectively implemented. (Mashhadi 1993: 80; Velayati 1993: 1 and A/C. 1/47/PV. 5, 
1992: 53) 
Accordingly, the Islamic Republic emphasized that the justified international 
enthusiasm for the new treaty should not blur the fact that the CWC still had a number 
of shortcomings which had to be rectified as soon as possible. Because of those alleged 
shortcomings - told by the Iranians to have resulted from the fact that the CD acts on 
the basis of consensus and from the "supremacy of political exigencies" that had 
coloured the CWC negotiation process - the convention was viewed in Tehran as a 
document which did not reflect the positions of all the members of the CD and which 
did not take into account many of the "legitimate and logical demands" of the 
nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East" (A/C. 1/46/PV. 5,1991: 36- 
37). 
113 This paragraph draws upon CD/PV. 582 (1991: 4); A/C. 1/46/PV. 42 (1991: 42); CD/PV. 617 (1992: 49) 
and CD/PV. 625 (1992: 5-6). 
114 Addressing the signing ceremony of the CWC in Paris on 13 January 1993, foreign minister Vilayati 
characterized the treaty as "an outstanding achievement" (Velayati 1993: 1). For other Iranian 
pronouncements praising the CWC, see A/C. l/47(PV. 5 (1992: 49-50) and A/48/PV. 14 (1993: 23). 
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developing world. For this reason, the Iranians opined, the execution of the CWC had to 
receive major diplomatic attention, and the diplomatic deliberations on unresolved 
questions regarding treaty implementation had to result in clear and unambiguous 
agreements leaving little room for differing interpretations. ' 5 (A/47/PV. 5,1992: 49; 
Velayati 1993: 1-2 and Nassen 1995a: 2) 
There were many worries Iranian authorities voiced about the implementation of the 
CWC. For example, the Iranians were concerned over the convention's financial 
implications. Echoing the sentiments of the developing world in general, the Islamic 
Republic feared that due to the costs of verification, the prices of chemical industry end 
products would rise and that the price hikes would ultimately be paid by developing 
countries, the importers of those products. Related to this point, the Iranians warned 
about the possibility that the increased chemical industry expenses could give birth to 
cartels or even set in motion a development towards chemical monopolies. The officials 
of the Islamic Republic regarded such scenarios as disastrous for the developing world 
and asked industrialized countries to ensure that the CWC would not subject developing 
countries to unreasonable financial pressures. In the same vein, they maintained that the 
states parties in possession of chemical armaments and weapons production facilities 
should be the ones covering all the costs related to the destruction as well as to the 
verification of the destruction of those armaments and facilities. Hence, the Iranians 
underlined, developing countries should not be burdened, for example, with the 
destruction of chemical weapons in the former Soviet bloc countries. (Mashhadi 1993: 
82-85; The Islamic Republic of Iran and Disarmament 1994: 12 and Nasseri 1995a: 2- 
3) 
Article X of the CWC - which details measures to help states to protect themselves 
against chemical warfare - was another example of a treaty issue that was regularly 
raised by the officials of the Islamic Republic. As, in the Iranian view, a well- 
functioning assistance mechanism was a prerequisite for an effective treaty, Iranian 
representatives expressed their dissatisfaction with the text of paragraph 7(a) of article 
X which did not oblige the states parties to make financial contributions to the 
assistance fund mentioned in that article. According to the Iranians, binding financial 
115 At the Paris signing ceremony of the CWC in January 1993, the signatories agreed to set up a 
Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) to prepare the creation of the Organization for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons which, as stated in article VIII of the CWC, would be responsible for ensuring the 
implementation of the convention's provisions. Accordingly, before the OPCW - which is located in The 
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contributions would strengthen the credibility of the convention and thereby its role as a 
deterrent against the use or threat of use of chemical armaments. While speaking for 
mandatory contributions to the assistance fund, the officials of the Islamic Republic 
called for measures ensuring that voluntary contributions would flow into it. (PrepCom 
statement 1996: 3; The Islamic Republic of Iran and Disarmament 1994: 13 and 
Mashhadi 1993: 85) 
In the final analysis, however, the issues mentioned above were only of secondary 
importance to Iran. As Iranian officials had stated immediately after the completion of 
the CWC in 1992, there were three main questions the Islamic Republic wanted to raise 
in future discussions on the implementation of the CWC, all issues that the Iranians had 
already been underlining during the treaty negotiations: (1) the composition of the 
Executive Council of the OPCW; (2) the definition of the munitions, devices, and 
equipment regarded as chemical weapons under article II; and (3) the execution of 
article XI of the convention (A/C. l/47/PV. 5,1992: 49-50). 
In order to have a say in future implementation and development of the CWC, the 
representatives of the Islamic Republic continued to highlight the importance of the 
issue of the OPCW Executive Council's composition. Referring to the understanding 
reached at the very final stages of the CWC talks in September 1992, the Iranians 
argued that the "unbalanced and discriminatory" stipulations of article VIII had to be 
reviewed by the states parties. Iranian authorities repeated their argument according to 
which the division of the states parties into five geographical groupings -a division 
which, the Iranians claimed, did not reflect existing international circumstances but the 
realities of the bygone Cold War era - put the Asian states parties to a disadvantaged 
position because it was comparatively harder for them to become selected to serve in the 
council. (Ibid.: 52) 
Moreover, Iranian officials strongly criticized paragraph 23 of article VIII which 
stated that four of the countries chosen to the Executive Council from the Asian 
grouping shall be states parties with the most significant national chemical industry in 
the region. In the Iranian opinion, the industrial criterion, applied in the context of other 
geographical groupings as well, created a discriminatory system of priviledged or 
"quasi-permanent" seats in the council. In addition, the officials of the Islamic Republic 
argued that for many states parties the security dimension of the CWC outweighed the 
Hague - came into being at the entry into force of the CWC on 29 April 1997, the PrepCom provided the 
main forum for the states signatories to discuss matters related to the convention's implementation. 
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other aspects of the convention. For this reason, the countries that relied their security 
on the CWC should be entitled to ensured representation in the Executive Council., 16 
As far as the question of the definition of a chemical weapon under article II was 
concerned, Iran continued to underline the need for a clear understanding among the 
states parties. The principal reason for the Islamic Republic's diplomatic activism in the 
issue was the fear that a vague definition might broaden the scope of CWC inspections 
to areas regarded as unrelated to the convention, that is, to also cover information about 
the states parties' military establishments and conventional armaments. As stated by one 
Iranian arms control diplomat: "[... ] with the definition as it stands, any country may 
challenge another member in order to acquire intelligence information. Any type of 
airplane, tank, artillery, even handgrenades, may become subject to challenge. " What 
the weapons list presented by the Iranian official did not include was missiles. And yet, 
it was first and foremost the question of missiles that steered Iran's argumentation in 
this context, for the representatives of the Islamic Republic wanted to make sure that the 
stipulations of the CWC would not prevent Iran from pursuing its post-war missile 
program. ' 17 The Iranian position that article II of the convention should not cover 
delivery systems used for conventional purposes directly emanated from this premise. ' 18 
The fundamental demand of the Islamic Republic after the signing of the CWC was 
that all the states parties and all provisions of the convention should be treated equally. 
In no other connection did Iran's officials underline this principle as strongly as in 
debates on the implementation of article XI of the CWC. Between the Iranian signature 
and ratification of the CWC in 1993-1997, they constantly brought up the alleged 
problems with the execution of the treaty elements that were related to the states parties' 
economic and technological development and to their mutual chemical transfers for 
peaceful purposes. 
Iran's critical argumentation on article XI centered on the export control measures 
applied by the members of the Australia Group. In the Islamic Republic's opinion, the 
control measures of the Australia Group were against the spirit and the letter of the 
116 This paragraph draws upon A/C. l/47/PV. 5 (1992: 82-83); The Islamic Republic of Iran and 
Disarmament (1994: 13) and author's interview with an Iranian arms control official (D) who wishes to 
remain unidentified, summer 2002. 
117 For Iran's missile policies after the Iran-Iraq war, see below section 5.3.2 pp. 458-470. 118 This paragraph draws upon Nasseri (1995b: 239-240); PrepCom statement (1995a: 3) and author's 
interview with an Iranian arms control official (D) who wishes to remain unidentified, summer 2002. 
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CWC and should therefore be lifted upon the entry into force of the CWC. ' 19 According 
to Iran's interpretation, the Australia Group had politically committed itself to do so 
during the CWC talks by declaring, in its statement of 7 August 1992, that the members 
of the group would review their control measures "with the aim of removing such 
measures" for the benefit of the CWC states parties acting in "full compliance" with 
their treaty obligations. 120 It was this commitment, the officials of the Islamic Republic 
maintained, that had made the final agreement on the completion of the CWC possible 
in the first place. More fundamentally, however, the Iranians claimed that the 
restrictions of the Australia Group were untenable because they directly fought against 
the stipulations of the CWC, especially the clauses c, d, and e of paragraph 2 of article 
XI. 121 (Nasseri 1995a: 3; Nasseri 1997: 2 and PrepCom statement 1995a: 2-3) 
In addition to alluding to the political and legal commitments made by the members 
of the Australia Group to give up their export controls and to avoid hampering the 
economic, technological, and scientific development of the Third World, Iranian 
representatives argued that the birth of the CWC had made the group's activities 
obsolete. 122 Due to the comprehensive verification mechanism outlined in the 
119 In his statement at the signing ceremony of the CWC in Paris in January 1993, foreign minister 
Vilayati called on the Australia Group to immediately lift, as a sign of diplomatic good will, its 
restrictions vis-ä-vis the signatories of the convention (Velayati 1993: 2). Ultimately, however, Iran did 
not cling to this position but referred to the entry into force of the CWC as an acceptable deadline for the 
removal of the Australia Group's export controls. According to article XXI of the CWC, the convention 
enters into force "180 days after the date of the deposit of the 65`h instrument of ratification, but in no case 
earlier than two years after its opening for signature. " These requirements were met on 29 April 1997. 
120 This Australia Group statement became generally known as the "O'Sullivan statement, " named after 
the Australian ambassador Paul O'Sullivan who made the statement on behalf of the Australia Group at 
the CD. For the details of the O'Sullivan statement, see CD/1164 (1992). 
''' Paragraph 2 (c) of the CWC reads as follows: "The states parties shall not maintain among themselves 
any restrictions, including those in any international agreements, incompatible with the obligations 
undertaken under this Convention, which would restrict or impede trade and the development and 
promotion of scientific and technological knowledge in the field of chemistry for industrial, agricultural, 
research, medical, pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes. " Paragraph 2 (d) in turn stipulates that the 
states parties "shall not use this Convention as grounds for applying any measures other than those 
provided for, or permitted, under this Convention nor use any other international agreement for pursuing 
an objective inconsistent with this Convention, " whereas paragraph 2 (e) states that the states parties 
"shall undertake to review their existing national regulations in the field of trade in chemicals in order to 
render them consistent with the object and purpose of this Convention. " In the opinion of the member 
states of the Australia Group, their export control restrictions were consistent with paragraph I (d) of 
article I of the CWC according to which the states parties shall never under any circumstances "assist, 
encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a state party under this 
Convention. " The differences of opinion between the Australia Group and Iran - as well as many other 
developing countries - regarding the interpretation of article XI ultimately derived from differing views 
about the essence of the CWC. Whereas industrialized countries essentially viewed the convention as a 
disarmament treaty, developing countries pointed out that the CWC combined the subject matters of 
disarmament and development. (Mashhadi 1999: 70-71 and Ronzitti 1998: 533-542) 
122 Iranian officials argued that, prior to the CWC, the activities of the Australia Group had made sense 
because they had focused on preventing hostile countries such as Iraq from obtaining substances required 
for the production of chemical armaments (Mashhadi 1995: 87 and Nasseri 1997: 3). 
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convention, the Iranians told, there was no need for export control measures outside the 
CWC framework to ensure that states give up the chemical weapons option. 123 This 
view reflected Iran's general position according to which technology transfer issues 
should be regulated only through multilaterally negotiated legal instruments and not 
through ad hoc diplomatic arrangements such as the Australia Group. (A/C. 1/52/PV. 11, 
1997: 20 and A/C. 1/51/PV. 23,1996: 12) 
What the officials of the Islamic Republic found particularly annoying was that the 
"unjust, discriminatory, and politically motivated" restrictions of the Australia Group124 
had been directed towards countries - such as their own - that had actively contributed 
to the cause of chemical disarmament. In the Iranian view, it was totally unacceptable 
that, based on a purely subjective evaluation, the Australia Group defined which 
countries were viewed as CWC members of good standing. As a result, Iranian officials 
warned the international community that the export controls of the Australia Group not 
only hampered economic, technological, and scientific development in the Third 
World, 125 but also put the whole future of the CWC in jeopardy. In the first place, the 
Iranians stressed that the Australia Group restrictions discouraged developing countries 
to sign the convention because it was questionable that the CWC would help them in 
their development efforts. Secondly, the Islamic Republic warned that the arbitrary 
policies of the Australia Group reduced the willingness of some CWC signatories to 
ratify the convention, thus implying that its own ratification was linked with 
developments in the implementation of article XI. (The Islamic Republic of Iran and 
Disarmament 1994: 24 and Nasseri 1995b: 242) 
Instead of sticking to their "unilateral and partial" interpretation of the CWC, the 
officials of the Islamic Republic argued, the members of the Australia Group should 
enhance economic, scientific, and technological cooperation between developed and 
123 As formulated by one Iranian arms control diplomat: "If we were to have a [disarmament] regime that 
is internationally accepted and then separate regimes that are provided for and presented by certain 
countries, then what is the use of the international regime at all (Nasseri 1995b: 262-263)? " Amid the 
international optimism generated by the breakup of the Cold War international system, the representatives 
of the Islamic Republic also argued that extra-CWC export controls were against the positive spirit of the 
emerging "new world order" as well as the goal of the total elimination of WMD (A/49/PV. 5,1994: 39 
and The Islamic Republic of Iran and Disarmament 1994: 15). 
124 For Iranian statements characterizing the Australia Group restrictions as unjust, discriminatory, and 
biased, see Velayati (1993: 2) and Mashhadi (1993: 83-84). 
1`5 Iranian representatives maintained that the Australia Group restrictions had retarded economic, 
technological, and scientific development, among others, in their own country. In an international seminar 
on the implementation of the CWC held in Tehran in April 1996, for example, a representative of Iran's 
chemical industry said that the export controls of the Australia Group had caused problems for the Islamic 
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developing countries in the field of chemical activities not prohibited under the 
convention. Article XI of the CWC was told by the Iranians to actually oblige advanced 
industrialized states to do so. Therefore, Iranian representatives continued, the 
developed world should accept binding commitments to transfer chemical materials and 
technology as well as relevant scientific information to developing countries. In 
addition, the officials of the Islamic Republic added, unhindered trade in chemical 
materials and technology should be accompanied with direct financial and technical 
assistance to those Third World members of the CWC that suffered from practical 
problems related to the convention's implementation. The Islamic Republic stressed that 
the CWC was more than a mere disarmament treaty. Having committed themselves to 
the ban on chemical weapons under article I and to the intrusive verification system of 
the CWC, the Iranians argued, the Third World members of the convention were 
entitled to receive economic, technological, and scientific benefits in the field of 
peaceful chemical activities in exchange for their treaty membership. ' 26 
In order to present a solution to the controversy over Australia Group export controls, 
the Islamic Republic proposed that the matter ought to be settled among the CWC states 
parties. Iran called for the establishment of an international arrangement under the 
convention to debate matters pertaining to the transfer of chemical materials, 
equipment, and scientific information, on the one hand, and the proliferation of 
chemical armaments, on the other. Even though initially seeing the arrangement as a 
substitute for the Australia Group, Iranian authorities subsequently argued that it should 
be regarded as a mechanism transforming the Australia Group into a truly representative 
body that would ensure that both the suppliers and the recipients of chemicals would 
have a voice in transfer matters concerning them. 127 According to Iranian officials, the 
arrangement proposed by the Islamic Republic should guarantee that all CWC states 
parties would have an equal access to chemical materials, relevant equipment, and 
Republic's chemical industry - especially in the production of pesticides and herbicides - and damaged 
the Iranian economy (Ali 1996: 43 and Feakes 2001: 47). 
126 This paragraph draws upon PrepCom statement (1996: 3); The Islamic Republic of Iran and 
Disarmament (1994: 21); Mashhadi (1993: 85) and A/C. 1 /52/PV. 11 (1997: 21). 
12' One of the points regularly made by Iran's representatives in connection with their criticism of the 
Australia Group was that the group's decision-making was secretive. Iran's dissatisfaction with the 
alleged non-transparency of the Australia Group's activities led the officials of the Islamic Republic to 
make calls not only for transparency in armaments but for "transparency in export control regimes" as 
well. The Iranians also continued to refer to their government's oft-repeated position according to which 
international mechanisms promoting transparency in armaments - such the UN conventional arms 
register - should cover all categories of weapons, including chemical armaments and other WMD. 
(Nasseri 1995a: 3-4; CD. 'PV. 683.1994: 19 and A/C. 1,52/PV. 23,1997: 6) 
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scientific information, even if the materials, equipment, and data in question could be 
labelled as dual-use, that is, being applicable to military purposes as well. If necessary, 
the Iranians added, CWC member states could also agree among themselves on specific 
export control measures. However, such restrictions would only apply to non-members 
of the CWC. (Nassen 1997: 3; The Islamic Republic of Iran and Disarmament 1994: 21 
and A/C. 1/49/PV. 20,1994: 11) 
Demands for fairness and evenhandedness were also strongly present in Iranian 
statements on the state of chemical disarmament in the Middle Eastern context. 
Following the already familiar Iranian line of argumentation, the officials of the Islamic 
Republic referred to Israel's WMD arsenal - and to Israeli nuclear weapons, in 
particular - as well as to Israel's "militarism" as the reasons for Arab governments' 
reluctance to join the CWC. In the Iranian view, it was unacceptable that countries such 
as the United States allowed Israel to pursuit WMD programs and even supported them 
while making calls for broad Arab participation in the CWC. Such application of 
political double standard, the Iranians argued, fought against the goal of the universality 
of the CWC128 and destroyed hopes for arms control in the Middle East as well as for a 
comprehensive peace in the region. In Iran's assessment, nuclear transparency on the 
part of Israel and that country's participation in the NPT were the only diplomatic ways 
out of the existing arms control deadlock in the Middle East. Only after such Israeli 
moves would the path towards a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (WMDFZ) in 
the Middle East, the ultimate regional arms control objective officially envisioned by 
the Islamic Republic's representatives, be opened. (A/C. 1/52/PV. 11,1997: 21; The 
Islamic Republic of Iran and Disarmament 1994: 15 and A/51/PV. 4,1996: 28) 
Given their gloomy analysis of the prospects for disarmament in the broad Middle 
Eastern arena, the Iranians focused on the Persian Gulf sub-region where the political 
and security circumstances were told by them to be more conducive to chemical 
disarmament, thanks first and foremost to the reduced threat of Iraq's chemical arsenal. 
In order to build up trust between Iran and GCC states and to further the Iranian- 
promoted goal of an indigenous security architecture in the Gulf, the authorities of the 
Islamic Republic made calls for joint regional measures for the implementation and 
128 Iran's calls for the CWC's universality suggested that the Iranians understood the term 'universality' 
in two different ways. In the first place, it was used by Iranian authorities to mean the widest possible 
participation by states in the CWC. In the second place, the term was used to refer to the necessity that all 
major possessors of chemical weapons would commit themselves to the convention. (Cf. Mashhadi 1999: 
69) 
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ratification of the CWC. 129 In addition, they put forth the idea of the gradual 
development of regional verification arrangements with the help of the UN. 130 Iranian 
representatives pointed out that while highly important in its own right, regional 
cooperation in chemical disarmament could also help Gulf countries to move towards 
the establishment of a WMDFZ in their region. Moreover, the Iranians emphasized that 
the Islamic Republic's diplomatic proposals were in accordance with the notion of a 
defensive security scheme presented by their government at the CD in September 
1994131 as well as with their country's general anti-WMD posture. (CD/PV. 659,1993: 
8-9; Zarif 1996: 451 and A/51/PV. 4,1996: 28) 
Iran strongly rejected the accusations claiming that, despite its calls for chemical 
disarmament, the Islamic Republic itself was working on a clandestine chemical 
weapons program. 132 For example, in October 1997, one month before Iran's 
ratification of the CWC, the deputy foreign minister of the Islamic Republic stressed 
that his country had "never manufactured, deployed or used" chemical or biological 
weapons. Referring to the position emphasized by the Islamic Republic during the Iran- 
Iraq war, Iranian representatives stated that their country's strong antipathy against 
chemical armaments and other WMD stemmed from religious and humanitarian 
considerations. Also, they warned that baseless and biased accusations against countries 
that strongly supported international arms control instruments could have an adverse 
effect on those states' willingness to ratify the CWC. 133 The Iranians had already made 
such a warning in October 1993, less than a year after Iranian signature of the CWC, 
when a Chinese vessel suspected of transporting prohibited chemical substances to Iran 
had been stopped in the Gulf by the U. S. Navy. 134 (Zarif 1997: 3; A/52/PV. 6,1997: 25 
and A/48/PV. 14,1993: 23) 
129 In this spirit - and with the help of the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the PrepCom, the 
predecessor of the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW - the Islamic Republic organized a regional 
seminar in Tehran in April 1996 dealing with the implementation of the CWC. The foreign participants of 
the seminar mainly came from Gulf and Central Asian countries. In the seminar, the Iranians underlined, 
among others, the importance of international support and assistance within the CWC framework to 
promote regional cooperation in chemical disarmament (PrepCom statement 1996: 1-2). For a summary 
of the April 1996 seminar in Tehran, see PC-XIV/B/WP. 11 (1996). 
130 The Iranians added that their diplomatic suggestions were not exhaustive and welcomed any initiative 
made by Gulf Arab states to complement existing arms control treaties in the area of chemical weapons 
and other WMD (The Islamic Republic of Iran: Myth and Reality 1994: 269-270). 
131 See above section 3.7.1 p. 179. 
13- Islamic Iran's chemical weapons efforts will be discussed below in chapter 6. 133 According to Iranian officials, the governments accusing the Islamic Republic of the development of 
chemical weapons were the same that had helped Iraq to arm itself with such weapons in the course of the 
Iran-Iraq war (Cordesman 1999a: 265). 
134 For the details of the October 1993 incident in the Gulf, see All (1996: 39-40). 
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4.1.3.2 The ratification decision of 1997 
Its manifold reservations about the implementation of the CWC notwithstanding, Iran 
eventually ratified the convention in 1997. In the light of the emphasis put by the 
Islamic Republic on chemical disarmament since the early 1980s, the Iranian 
parliament's decision on 27 July 1997 to pass the ratification bill presented by the 
foreign ministry' 35 constituted a logical step in Islamic Iran's arms control efforts. 
Although some observers at the time had doubts about the Islamic Republic's readiness 
to ratify the CWC, 136 and although Iranian officials themselves intentionally fuelled 
such suspicions in order to strengthen their hand in diplomatic talks on the convention's 
execution, 137 Iran's CWC ratification seems to have never been under a serious threat. 
Still, the debate that took place within the Islamic Republic on the ratification of the 
CWC illustrated that the subject of chemical weapons continued to arouse strong 
feelings among the country's political and military leadership. 138 The Iranian elite 
members who opposed the ratification -a group consisting most notably of the 
representatives of Iran's armed forces, especially the IRGC, as well as of ideological 
hardliners with an antagonistic attitude towards any sort of cooperation with the West - 
viewed the CWC as a diplomatic arrangement that reduced the Islamic Republic's 
freedom of choice in security policy. They asked why Iran should tie its hands by giving 
up the chemical weapons option at a time when it was surrounded by countries such as 
Iraq, Pakistan, and India that were pursuing WMD programs at the fullest possible 
speed. The elite opponents of the CWC also referred to what they saw as Israel's 
development of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons without any international 
interference as well as to the dangers posed by WMD-equipped American forces 
135 The Guardian Council - the Iranian state body composed of twelve legal experts and responsible for 
determining whether the laws passed by the Majlis are compatible with Islamic law and with the Islamic 
Republic's constitution - approved the CWC ratification bill three days later, on 30 July 1997. 136 For an expert view from 1997 predicting that the Islamic Republic would not ratify the convention as 
long as the Arab governments linking their CWC participation with Israel's accession to the NPT would 
stay outside the treaty, see Chubin (1997b: 35). 
137 For Iranian pronouncements playing with the 'ratification card' - that is, implying that a positive 
ratification decision by the Majlis was far from being in the lap of the gods -, see Nasseri (1995a: 2 and 
1997: 5). 
138 Iranian officials subsequently tried to downplay the role of such differences of opinion by stating, 
among others, that there was "all but a unanimous consensus" among the Islamic Republic's decision- 
makers on the importance of the CWC. Simultaneously, however, the Iranians did also maintain that "in 
democratic countries such as Iran, " politicians and military people were allowed to freely express their 
opinions. (Zarif and Alborzi 1999: 517 and author's interview with an Iranian arms control official [D] 
who wishes to remain unidentified, summer 2002) 
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stationed in the Persian Gulf and to the massive WMD arsenals of the United States and 
Russia. 
139 
Furthermore, the opponents of the ratification pointed to the CWC ratification 
process in the United States and argued that the convention only served the interests of 
the major powers. The national exemptions formulated to the application of the CWC 
by U. S. lawmakers were said to illustrate how vulnerable the convention was to major 
power manipulation. 140 Finally, some members of the Islamic Republic's political and 
military establishment were sceptical about the CWC's efficiency in times of crisis. 
They stressed that the Geneva Protocol of 1925 had neither protected Iranians from 
Iraq's chemical attacks nor prompted international measures to stop Iraq's chemical 
crimes. If the Geneva protocol had been of no practical use, the Iranian critics asked, 
why should the Islamic Republic now put its faith in the CWC? 'al 
The Iranian elite members who supported Iran's ratification of the CWC likewise 
based their arguments first and foremost on the analysis of the convention's security 
implications. Yet in their view, Iran, the latest victim of chemical weapons use, would 
clearly benefit from a multilateral disarmament treaty banning chemical armaments. 
Iranian supporters of the CWC pointed out that, as a disarmament arrangement, the 
convention would provide absolute security advantages for their country because it 
aimed at totally eliminating a highly dangerous class of weaponry. They further noted 
that article X of the CWC entitled Iran to receive assistance and protection against 
chemical weapons in crisis situations and that the treaty obliged the states parties to 
promptly react to any breaches of its stipulations. The losses of human lives as well as 
the chronical illnesses, genetic disorders, and emotional and psychological wounds that 
had resulted from Iraq's chemical warfare during the "imposed war" - together with the 
fact that Iran still lived under the threat of chemical weapons - were underlined by the 
CWC supporters to be good reasons for their country to rely on the CWC. 142 
139 Author's interview with Hassan Mashhadi, The Hague, 8 July 2002; author's interview with an Iranian 
arms control official (D) who wishes to remain unidentified, summer 2002, and Byman et al. (2001: 97). 
140 The American national exemptions included a provision that allowed the country's president to refuse 
an on-site inspection if it was regarded as a threat to national security, a provision specifying that no 
samples collected in the course of a CWC inspection were allowed to be analyzed outside the U. S. 
territory, and finally, a provision that narrowed the number of industry facilities that were required to 
declare mixtures or solutions that contained scheduled chemicals posing a proliferation risk. The United 
States ratified the CWC on 25 April 1997, four days before the treaty's entry into force. (Smithson 2001: 
25) 
141 Author's interview with Hassan Mashhadi, The Hague, 8 July 2002, and author's interview with an 
Iranian arms control official (D) who wishes to remain unidentified, summer 2002. 
142 Ibid. Also see Zarif and Alborzi (1999: 517); Zarif (2001: 1) and Alborzi (2001: 1). 
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More broadly, the Iranian elite members pushing for the CWC's ratification declared 
that there was no legitimate room for chemical weapons or other WMD in the Islamic 
Republic's military doctrine. In the first place, WMD were inhumane and against the 
laws of Islam and hence against the religious convictions of the Iranian people. In the 
second place, Iranian supporters of the CWC maintained, WMD would not enhance or 
guarantee Iran's national security. On the contrary, by acquiring WMD Iran would 
subject itself to a number of major risks. Militarily, the Islamic Republic would become 
vulnerable to attacks by foreign powers wanting to prevent Iran from developing WMD, 
and in crisis situations, to WMD attacks by military forces situated in Iran's immediate 
neighbourhood. Iranian elite spokesmen for the CWC claimed that a national WMD 
capability would constitute a danger from an economic and societal perspective as well. 
In addition to WMD projects' dramatic national opportunity costs, by committing itself 
to WMD programs, the Islamic Republic would face various kinds of sanctions, both 
economic and political, enforced by the international community. 143 
The non-military aspects of the CWC played another important - albeit a secondary - 
role in the argumentation of those Iranian elite members who emphasized the benefits of 
the chemical treaty. By committing itself to the CWC, they maintained, the Islamic 
Republic would gain, theoretically at least, an access to unhindered trade in chemical 
materials and technology as well as to international economic, technological, and 
scientific cooperation in the field of peaceful chemical activities. By remaining outside 
the CWC framework, Iranian elite supporters of the CWC argued, their country would 
be worse off because it would lose all the rights granted to the states parties by the 
convention as well as the legal basis for its demands in matters pertaining to the treaty's 
article XI. The Iranian ratification of the CWC was also told to give a strong signal to 
foreign governments that the Islamic Republic was not working on a chemical weapons 
program and thereby help Iran to alter its international reputation as a potential 
proliferator. 144 
Ultimately, the Supreme National Security Council -a key Iranian decision-making 
body in foreign and security affairs - overruled the views of those criticizing Iran's 
ratification of the CWC and paved the way for the Majlis and Guardian Council 
decisions of July 1997 endorsing the ratification. On 3 November 1997, almost five 
14; Author's interview with Hassan Mashhadi, The Hague, 8 July 2002, and author's interview with an 
Iranian arms control official (D) who wishes to remain unidentified, summer 2002. 
144 Ibid. Also see Zarif and Alborzi (1999: 521-522); Mashhadi (1999: 69-71) and Alborzi (1999: 3). 
269 
years after its signature of the CWC, the Islamic Republic deposited its CWC 
ratification instrument with the secretary-general of the UN, the convention's 
depositary. 
Why did it, then, take nearly five years for Iran to ratify the CWC? Iranian officials 
referred to domestic bureaucratic workload, to their government's dissatisfaction with 
the implementation of the CWC, as well as to the need to convince various segments of 
the Islamic Republic's political and military establishment that the treaty would serve 
Iran's national interests as the main factors explaining the delay between Iran's 
signature and ratification of the CWC. 145 In addition, Iran was told to have waited for 
U. S. and Russian ratifications before going ahead with its own national process. 
According to Iranian representatives, the ratification of the CWC by the former Cold 
War adversaries was an absolute necessity, for the non-participation of the two major 
possessors of chemical armaments would not only have had negative budgetary, 
administrative, and technical implications for the practical running of the CWC 
arrangement, but, more importantly, it would have also severely eroded the authority, 
effectiveness, and universality of the convention. Had the Americans and the Russians 
not ratified the CWC, Iranian officials pointed out, the treaty would have effectively 
transformed from a disarmament agreement into a non-proliferation treaty. Such a 
development, the Iranians stressed, would have been totally unacceptable because it 
would have put the states parties in an unequal position and dramatically diminished the 
security value of the CWC. '46 (CD/PV. 743,1996: 21; A151/PV. 32,1996: 24 and 
PrepCom statement 1996: 1) 
145 Author's interview with Hassan Mashhadi, The Hague, 8 July 2002, and author's interview with an 
Iranian arms control official (D) who wishes to remain unidentified, summer 2002. 
146 In 1996, the Islamic Republic had proposed that the signatories of the CWC should organize a high- 
level conference to deliberate on the issue of U. S. and Russian ratification of the treaty (Chemical 
Weapons Convention Bulletin, September 1996). The main rationale for the Iranian proposal was to create 
diplomatic pressure on the Americans and the Russians to ratify the CWC. It is worth noting here that 
Russia's initial position that it was not able to ratify the CWC because of the high financial costs related 
to the implementation of the treaty was met with some sympathy in the Islamic Republic. Iranian 
authorities were of the opinion that it was the duty of advanced industrialized countries - and the United 
States, in particular - to help Russia to destroy its huge stockpiles of chemical weapons and hence 
contribute to Russian ratification of the CWC. As put by the Iranian representative addressing the first 
CWC Conference of the States Parties - the main organ of the OPCW which oversees the implementation 
of the convention and is composed of all member states - in The Hague on 8 May 1997: "As for Russia, 
whose participation is necessary to make the Convention meaningful, a will to address her concerns 
remains absent. Huge sums of money has been saved by NATO following the end of the Cold War. 
Hence, major countries within NATO should be willing and prepared to contribute in meeting the costs of 
chemical weapons destruction in Russia" (Nasseri 1997: 2). In the end, on 31 October 1997, the Russian 
Duma approved, after extensive debate, the ratification of the CWC. Russia deposited its CWC 
ratification instrument with the UN secretary-general on 5 November 1997, two days after the Iranian 
270 
It is likely that the delay in the Islamic Republic's ratification decision resulted before 
all else from diplomatic manoeuvring. By trying to give the impression that their 
country's ratification depended on other states' policies vis-a-vis the treaty, Iranian 
representatives hoped to advance their interests in intra-CWC debates. Nevertheless, at 
the end of the day, such interests were only secondary to the overarching objective 
which had occupied Islamic Iran's arms control officials for years: to have an 
international convention banning chemical weapons in place. The conclusion that the 
delay in Iran's CWC ratification amounted to diplomatic politicking is supported, 
among others, by the fact that while playing with the ratification card in the years after 
their country's signature of the CWC, Iranian authorities simultaneously had expressed 
concern over the slow pace of CWC ratifications in general147 as well as steadily built 
up the institutional and legislative infrastructure needed for the convention's national 
execution. 
In 1995, for example, the authorities of the Islamic Republic had informed the 
PrepCom that their country had finished preparations for the establishment of a national 
authority responsible for overseeing the implementation of the CWC in Iran. ' 48 They 
had also alluded to CWC-related consultations within the Iranian bureaucracy of which 
the inter-agency seminar on national implementation of the treaty held in Tehran in 
December 1995 had been given as a prime example. In November 1995, the Islamic 
Republic had handed over a Persian translation of the CWC to the Provisional Technical 
Secretariat of the PrepCom, in addition to which the Iranians had supposedly carried out 
a CWC trial inspection at a petrochemical plant in Shiraz that year. Furthermore, at the 
time, the Islamic Republic's foreign ministry had actively been preparing the CWC 
ratification bill for the foreign affairs committee of the Majlis. (C-IV/NAT. 11,1999: 1 
and PrepCom statement 1995b: 2) 
deposition. For a comprehensive list of the states parties and the signatory states to the CWC, see 
<http: //www. opcw. org/htmUdb/members frameset. html>. 
147 Take, for example, the following Iranian pronouncement from August 1993 which can be read both as 
a concealed threat and as an expression of concern: "There is already growing concern [... ] that the 
enthusiasm of many countries to sign the Convention will give way to reluctance or, at least, indifference 
when the time for ratification comes [... ]. The small number of ratifications so far in comparison with the 
number of signatories is a vivid signal. " (CD/PV. 659,1993: 7) 
148 Officially, the Iranian national authority started its activities after Iran's CWC ratification in 1997. It 
reports directly to the Islamic Republic's Supreme National Security Council. According to Iranian 
representatives, the purpose of the direct link established between the National Authority and the SNSC 
was to make sure that the National Authority had the "highest authority" in conducting its supervisory 
tasks. The secretariat of the National Authority is based in - and the international relations of the National 
Authority, such as its contacts with the OPCW, are managed through - the Islamic Republic's foreign 
ministry. (C-IV/NAT. 11,1999: 1) 
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If, thus, the more or less concealed threats made by Iran before the summer of 1997 
to refrain from ratifying the CWC is ultimately interpreted as diplomatic manoeuvring, 
a similar conclusion can drawn from the Majlis declaration which was attached to Iran's 
CWC ratification instrument and which listed the circumstances under which the 
Islamic Republic would reserve itself the right to withdraw from the convention. 149 
According to the Majlis declaration, steps aimed at Iranian withdrawal would be put in 
motion if. (1) the principle of equal treatment of all states parties in the implementation 
of all relevant provisions of the convention would be violated; (2) confidential 
information provided to the OPCW would be disclosed contrary to the provisions of the 
CWC; and (3) restrictions incompatible with the obligations under the convention 
would be imposed upon the states parties (OPCW. " The Legal Texts 1999: 112). 150 
The conditions spelled out by the Majlis indicated, for their part, that the existence of 
the CWC and the decreased threat of Iraq made it possible for Iranian authorities - who 
had argued, it should be reminded, during the CWC negotiations that no state party 
should be allowed to withdraw its treaty membership - to place diplomatic emphasis on 
issues that pertained to the economic and technological aspects of the CWC. 151 Still, it 
is difficult to imagine that the Islamic Republic would have stepped out of the CWC 
merely because of its long-lived dissatisfaction with the way in which the economic and 
technological dimensions of the convention had been downplayed by advanced 
149 According to article XVI of the CWC, each member state has the right to withdraw from the 
convention if it decides that "extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Convention, " have 
put the supreme interests of the state party in jeopardy. The states parties are obliged to give notice of 
their withdrawal 90 days in advance to all other member states, to the OPCW Executive Council, to the 
secretary-general of the UN, the depositary, as well as to the UN Security Council. Such notice is 
expected to include a statement of the "extraordinary events" that have jeopardized the vital interests of 
the withdrawing country. It should be noted that shortly before the Majlis ratification of the CWC, the 
Islamic Republic had hinted at the possibility of withdrawing from the convention should the dispute over 
Australia Group export controls not be satisfactorily resolved in the immediate future (Nasseri 1997: 3). 
Aso The declaration of the Iranian parliament obliged the Islamic Republic's foreign ministry to monitor 
international developments in the execution of the CWC and to report any violation of the three points 
listed by the Majlis to the SNSC. As stated in the Majlis declaration, the final decision on Iran's 
withdrawal from the CWC would be made by the SNSC upon the recommendation of Iran's president-led 
cabinet. The Islamic Republic's foreign ministry has performed the monitoring task assigned to it by the 
Majlis, among others, by instructing Iran's CWC National Authority to systematically collect information 
about the negative answers given by chemical suppliers to Iran's trade requests and about the restrictions 
applied by exporting states in the area of chemical materials and technology. (OPCW. " The Legal Texts 
1999: 112; Zarif and Alborzi 1999: 521 and C-IV/NAT. 11,1999: 6) 
ßs1 Beside listing the conditions under which Iran would reserve itself the right to withdraw from the 
CWC, the Majlis declaration repeated the Islamic Republic's overall views on the implementation of the 
CWC. For example, it reiterated the general Iranian demand that all the convention's provisions had to be 
fully, unconditionally, and indiscriminately implemented. Moreover, the Majlis declaration explicated 
Iran's position on article XI as well as stated that Iran, on the basis of Islamic principles and beliefs, 
"considers chemical weapons inhuman and has consistently been on the vanguard of the international 
efforts to abolish these weapons and prevent their use. " (OPCW. - The Legal Texts 1999: 111-112) 
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industrialized states. Should Islamic Iran ever decide to withdraw from the convention, 
a scenario that cannot be ruled out, such a decision would most likely be based on a 
widely shared perception within the Iranian elite that the CWC no longer contributes to 
the Islamic Republic's security. 
4.1.4 Iran's chemical diplomacy after the CWC ratification 
4.1.4.1 The Islamic Republic's 
development 
response to accusations of chemical weapons 
Iran's deposition of its CWC ratification instrument in November 1997 took place at 
a time when the domestic political landscape in the Islamic Republic was undergoing a 
significant change. As the ramifications of the rise of reformist Iranian elite forces - led 
by the newly-elected president Muhammad Khatami - extended not only to Iran's 
domestic politics but to its foreign policy as well, Iranian arms control operations were 
internationally regarded as important indicators of whether the Islamic Republic under 
president Khatami would distance itself from what were seen as worrisome elements of 
its foreign and security policy. 152 Therefore, after the Khatami administration had 
deposited Iran's CWC ratification instrument and thereby formally finalized Iran's 
participation in the treaty, 153 international observers began to wait for the content of 
Iranian national declarations which Iran, as a CWC state party, was obliged to submit to 
the OPCW within two months after the deposition of its ratification instrument. 154 
The contents of Iran's initial declarations remained unknown until November 1998, 
when Iranian authorities, in connection with the sixth Conference of the States Parties to 
152 The European Union, for example, closely monitored the political developments in Iran to see whether 
the emergence of reformist voices in that country's political elite would bring about changes in the 
Islamic Republic's arms policies and its arms control diplomacy, especially in the area of WMD (author's 
interview with an EU member state arms control official who wishes to remain unidentified, 17 
December 1999). 
153 The fact that it was the newly formed administration of president Khatami that deposited Iran's 
ratification instrument with the UN secretary-general did not convey a specific political message as far as 
the Islamic Republic's diplomatic course was concerned, for the delay between Iran's ratification of the 
CWC in July 1997 and the deposition of the ratification instrument in November 1997 was caused by 
domestic protocol-related considerations that resulted from the changes in Iran's executive branch 
following the May 1997 presidential elections (author's interview with an Iranian arms control official 
[D] who wishes to remain unidentified, summer 2002). 15' This obligation to provide the OPCW with so-called initial declarations is detailed in article III of the 
CWC. In essence, article III obliges the states parties to declare what chemical capabilities they currently 
have or have possessed in the past. In addition, the states parties are obliged to provide a general plan 
regarding the destruction of such capabilities. 
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the CWC, finally submitted their country's declaration documents to the OPCW. In 
order to dampen down the criticism that the delay in Iran's submission of national 
declarations constituted a technical non-compliance with the CWC, '55 the officials of 
the Islamic Republic gave a number of reasons for the deferral. According to standard 
Iranian explanation, the Islamic Republic simply did not have enough bureaucratic 
resources to collect and process all the declaration information in time. 156 However, 
Iran's diplomatic pronouncements also suggested that the officials of the Islamic 
Republic used the declarations issue as a tool to stress their dissatisfaction with a 
number of CWC-related issues, such as the ratification exemptions adopted by the 
United States and the implementation of article XI of the convention. ' 57 Moreover, 
given the conflicting views within Iran's political elite about the value of the country's 
CWC membership, it may have been that there were differences of view among Iranian 
authorities over the national declarations' content. 
In the end, and to the surprise of many observers, Iran disclosed in its CWC 
declarations, handed to the OPCW in November 1998, that it had pursued a chemical 
weapons program during the "last years" of the Iran-Iraq war. According to Iranian 
authorities, their country had possessed two chemical weapons production facilities 
which had provided Iranian armed forces with a "strictly limited" chemical 
capability. 158 The officials of the Islamic Republic explained the purpose of the Iranian 
program by stressing that in the wake of Iraq's readiness, during the war, to escalate its 
chemical warfare to major Iranian population centers, and in the light of the war-time 
disinterest of the international community - including that of the UN and the world 
organization's Security Council, in particular - in stopping Iraq's chemical crimes, 
Iran's Supreme Defence Council, the predecessor of the Supreme National Security 
155 Technical non-compliance with the CWC refers to a situation where a member state demonstrates a 
commitment to the fundamental objectives of the convention but fails to implement its treaty obligations 
to the letter. On the other hand, a state party is viewed as being in substantive non-compliance with the 
CWC if it seeks to deceive the treaty while simultaneously alluding to its technical compliance with the 
convention. (Sands and Pate 2001: 19) 
156 For Iranian statements making this point, see Alborzi (1998: 1) and C-IV/NAT. 1 1 (1999: 4). Along 
with the bureaucratic resources explanation, Iranian officials often noted that the deadline for the national 
declarations, as set out in the CWC, was simply too tight. As underlined by one Iranian representative: 
"The fact that only 36% of states parties could fulfill this part of their obligation [... ] is a clear indication 
that the timelines set out in the CWC were not feasible" (C-IV/NAT. 11 1999: 4). 
157 See A/C. 1/53/PV. 9 (1998: 25) and Alborzi (1998: 1-2). 158 Iran reportedly informed the OPCW that its war-time program had concerned the production of one 
single chemical agent, that is, mustard gas. The Iranian declarations, which are classified, supposedly also 
included information about the Islamic Republic's weapons storage and destruction facilities as well as 
about Iranian chemical industry facilities. (Hiltermann 2004: 164; author's interviews with Iranian arms 
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Council, had ultimately had no other choice than to authorize the development of a 
national chemical weapons capability. ' 59 (Alborzi 1998: 2 and Zarif and Alborzi 1999: 
517-519) 
However, Iranian authorities also stressed that although prime minister Musavi had 
informed the world about Iran's chemical weapons capability already back in 1986,160 
the Islamic Republic had never ended up actually using chemical armaments. While, 
over the war years, Iranian representatives had routinely alluded to religious and 
humanitarian considerations as the reason for Iran's disdain of chemical weapons, they 
subsequently introduced a somewhat more varied explanation for their country's non- 
use of such armaments. Above all, the fact that Iran's chemical arsenal had been 
quantitatively and qualitatively inferior to that of Iraq was told by the Iranians to have 
additionally discouraged their country from resorting to chemical warfare. Some Iranian 
officials suggested that, before all else, it had in fact been this factor - the fear of the 
conflict's escalation into an all-out chemical warfare in which Iran would have been on 
the receiving end of most of the chemical attacks - and not the Iranian leaders' religious 
and moral beliefs that had explained the Islamic Republic's non-use of chemical 
armaments during the "imposed war. " 161 
Given that Iran had never used chemical armaments, the officials of the Islamic 
Republic argued, it had not been difficult for their country to give up its chemical 
weapons option soon after the Iran-Iraq war had ended. According to Iran's initial 
declarations to the OPCW, the Islamic Republic had unilaterally terminated its chemical 
weapons program following the war and decided not to seek or produce chemical 
armaments in the future. Instead, Iran had made the decision - which, the Iranians 
claimed, had steered the diplomacy of the Islamic Republic ever since - to put its faith 
in an international legal ban on chemical weapons. Although Iranian authorities did not, 
control officials [C] and [D] who wish to remain unidentified, summer 2002, and Sands and Pate 2001: 
19) 
159 As formulated by two Iranian arms control officials in 1999: "Facing such an extensive use of 
chemical weapons [by Iraq] against soldiers and civilians alike coupled with the acquiescence and even 
open collaboration of major global players with the culprit, Iran concluded that no other alternative was 
left but to resort to the only remaining means of deterrence [... ]" (Zarif and Alborzi 1999: 518). 
160 See above section 4.1.1.2 p. 229. 
161 This paragraph draws upon Alborzi (1998: 2); Zarif and Alborzi (1999: 519) and author's interviews 
with Iranian arms control officials (C) and (D) who wish to remain unidentified, summer 2002. It should 
be noted that according to Moin (1999: 268-269), the IRGC had proposed - soon after the appointment of 
Ali Akbar Hashimi Rafsanjani as the acting commander-in-chief of the Iranian armed forces in June 1988 
- that the Islamic Republic should use its own chemical weapons in response to Iraq's chemical warfare. 
Fearing that Iranian chemical strikes would invite a crushing Iraqi response, however, Rafsanjani had 
convinced Ayatollah Khomeini of the wisdom of not acting upon the IRGC's advice. 
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publicly at least, elaborate on when, where, and how they had destroyed the chemical 
weapons developed in the war period, they did officially declare to the OPCW, in 
November 1998, that Iran no longer was in possession of chemical armaments. (Alborzi 
1998: 2; Zarif and Alborzi 1999: 519 and Mills 2002) 
In February 1999, the OPCW completed its first inspection mission to Iran. The 
purpose of the inspection was to examine the chemical sites and facilities listed in Iran's 
initial declarations as well as to check the accuracy of the declaration information 
provided by the Islamic Republic. As a result of the visit, the OPCW gave Iran a clean 
record and expressed its satisfaction with Iranian authorities' cooperation during the 
inspection. OPCW officials were particularly happy about the fact that Iran had 
destroyed its declared chemical weapons production facilities in the presence of the 
inspectors, even though under article V of the CWC, Iran would have had ten years after 
the convention's entry into force to destroy the facilities. The purpose of Iran's gesture 
of diplomatic good will, the officials of the Islamic Republic maintained, was to 
underscore their country's commitment to the CWC as well as to show, as put by one 
Iranian representative, that "we try to be more open than others. " Subsequent OPCW 
inspections in Iran162 also provided favourable outcomes for the Iranians. 163 
Despite the fact that the OPCW deemed the Islamic Republic to be in full compliance 
with the CWC, 164 Iran was still being suspected by some governments of producing and 
stockpiling chemical armaments. 1 65 Therefore, after Iran's ratification of the CWC in 
July 1997, the officials of the Islamic Republic were forced to continue to defend their 
country against such suspicions. The Iranians categorically rejected the WMD 
accusations made particularly by the United States and Israel and maintained that their 
162 Between 1999-2003, the OPCW conducted altogether 11 routine inspections in Iran (Iran's Strategic 
Weapons Programmes 2005: 73). 
163 This paragraph draws upon Mills (2002); Zarif and Alborzi (1999: 519) and author's interviews with 
Iranian arms control officials (C) and (D) who wish to remain unidentified, summer 2002. 
164 For an OPCW pronouncement to this effect, see, for example, the statement of 8 December 2000 made 
by Jose Mauricio Bustani, the director-general of the organization. In his statement, Bustani noted that the 
OPCW had "no reason whatsoever to question Iran's full compliance with the CWC" and pointed out that 
all the organization's verification activities in Iran had been conducted "in an atmosphere of openness and 
transparency, and with the full cooperation of the Iranian government" (Bustani 2000). Bustani's 
December 2000 statement was a response to an official Iranian complaint about a November 2000 article 
published in the OPCW's official journal which had been written by an Israeli scholar and which had 
implied that the Islamic Republic continued to possess chemical armaments and, therefore, was in 
substantive non-compliance with the CWC. 
165 Partly at least, these suspicions were fuelled by Iran's unwillingness to elaborate on what had 
happened to the chemical weapons in its possession during the war years. 
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country posed no threat to international or regional security. 166 The Islamic Republic's 
active diplomacy in the area of chemical disarmament, its declaration of past possession 
of chemical armaments, together with its readiness to destroy its chemical weapons 
production facilities far before the CWC deadline and in the presence of OPCW 
inspectors, were referred to by Iranian authorities as evidence of their country's 
impeccable behaviour and of its peaceful intentions. 167 Iranian representatives also 
stressed that the existence of differing views within Iran's leadership on foreign and 
security policy issues should not be misconstrued to mean that the Islamic Republic's 
arms control operations lacked authority or broad national support. 168 
Although the challenge inspections mentioned in article IX of the CWC provided the 
states parties with a mechanism to resolve questions about non-compliance, no member 
state had hitherto made use of them. 169 In the Iranian opinion, this fact had indicated, for 
its part, that those who accused the Islamic Republic of WMD development had nothing 
to base their claims on. Moreover, Iranian authorities stressed that should a CWC 
member state ultimately decide to launch a challenge inspection against their country, 
they would have nothing to hide. To the contrary, they would warmly welcome OPCW 
inspectors to their country. Yet, in the Iranian officials' analysis, it was highly unlikely 
that a challenge inspection against Iran would be initiated in the first place because such 
an inspection would deprive countries like the United States and Israel of the chance to 
make "baseless and politically motivated allegations" against the Islamic Republic. 1 70 
166 See BBC (30 December 1998) and IRNA (22 March 2000 and 17 December 2001). That Iranian 
representatives had to constantly deny the charges that their country pursued WMD possibly explained 
the lapsus made by the Iranian foreign ministry's spokesman who reportedly stated in September 2001, 
nearly three years after Iran's initial CWC declarations, that his country had "never been after acquiring 
WMD" (IRMA, 10 September 2001). 
167 Alborzi (1998: 2); Zarif and Alborzi (1999: 520) and author's interview with an Iranian arms control 
official (D) who wishes to remain unidentified, summer 2002. 
168 Author's interviews with Iranian arms control officials (C) and (D) who wish to remain unidentified, 
summer 2002. Zarif and Alborzi (1999: 515), two functionaries of the Iranian foreign ministry, 
commented the Islamic Republic's intra-elite debates as follows: "Transparency and tolerance for 
diversity of views even on subjects as complicated as non-proliferation and weapons of mass destruction 
is a necessity [... ]; a necessity that is easily appreciated for Western democracies, but often 
misunderstood and misinterpreted in the West when applied by Third World democracies such as Iran. " 
169 Paragraph 8 of article IX of the CWC states that each member state "has the right to request an on-site 
challenge inspection of any facility or location in the territory or in any other place under the jurisdiction 
or control of any other State Party for the sole purpose of clarifying and resolving any questions 
concerning possible non-compliance with the provisions of this Convention. " 
170 Author's interviews with Iranian arms control officials (C) and (D) who wish to remain unidentified, 
summer 2002. Sands and Pate (2001: 20) argue that the reluctance of CWC states parties to initiate a 
challenge inspection against Iran may have arisen from the concern that the Iranians would launch a 
retaliatory inspection. Furthermore, the United States and other countries suspecting the Islamic Republic 
of WMD development may have wanted to forgo the inspection option because they did not want to 
disclose sensitive intelligence they had on Iran. Smithson (2001: 28), in turn, suggests that there had been 
277 
Iranian representatives further noted that although their government supported challenge 
inspections, the challenge mechanism should be used with utmost diplomatic care, that 
is, only when all other means provided by the CWC to alleviate non-compliance 
concerns had been utilized and only in the context of cases that posed a major threat to 
the convention's objectives. In this respect, Iran's position was similar to that of CWC 
states parties such as Russia, China, and India. ' 71 (Sands and Pate 2001: 18-19) 
Under the presidency of Muhammad Khatami, the Iranian government continued to 
try to convince foreign skeptics of the Islamic Republic's strict commitment to its arms 
control obligations by pointing to the ideological premises that allegedly steered Islamic 
Iran's arms control operations. In addition to repeating the core Iranian argument that 
chemical weapons and other WMD were immoral and illegal under Islamic law, the 
representatives of the Islamic Republic made allusions to the notion of "global security 
networking" which was advertised by them as the security interpretation of the concept 
of "dialogue among civilizations, " the Khatami administration's ideological catchphrase 
in the realm of foreign policy. 172 According to Iranian officials, global security 
networking was a principle of diplomatic cooperation that would enhance the security of 
all nations and would leave no room for WMD or for "illusory theories of deterrence" 
emphasizing the importance of such armaments. Thus, in order to pave the way for 
global security networking and for a new, cooperative paradigm of international 
relations, the representatives of the Khatami administration stressed, the Islamic 
Republic had adopted the universal elimination of all kinds of WMD as a fundamental 
diplomatic objective. (CD/PV. 812,1999: 3 and A/54/PV. 12,1999: 13) 
4.1.4.2 Chemical arms control in the Middle East 
In the Iranian opinion, the WMD accusations levelled against the Islamic Republic by 
the United States and other Western governments were part of a selective and 
no challenge inspections against countries suspected of CWC non-compliance mainly because other 
governments were waiting for the United States to confront and punish the possible cheaters. 
71 Under article IX of the CWC, the states parties are advised to take advantage of certain consultative 
procedures before resorting to challenge inspections, the ultimate means offered by the treaty to deal with 
compliance concerns. As far as the case of Iran was concerned, at least the United States and Britain 
followed such procedures by bilaterally approaching the Khatami government and making requests for 
information about Iranian chemical activities, among others, in the development of chemical defences. 
Iran's diplomatic answers - provided in the course of 2001-2002 - to the U. S. and British queries were 
considered insufficient by both governments. (Author's interviews with Iranian arms control officials [C] 
and [D] who wish to remain unidentified, summer 2002) 
172 See above section 3.8.1 pp. 191-193. 
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discriminatory policy that had negative implications for arms control in the Middle East. 
The Khatami administration voiced its concern over the unpopularity of the CWC 
among the regional governments and criticized Western powers for not pressuring Israel 
to give up its nuclear weapons arsenal - thereby sympathizing with the Arab position 
that made a strong linkage between chemical and nuclear disarmament in the Middle 
East. ' 73 Yet, under Khatami, Iran seemed to distance itself more clearly than before 
from the Arab linkage stance, and instead of submitting to the deadlock in the Arab- 
Israeli arms control debate, the Khatami administration called for international measures 
that would tackle the question of WMD in the Middle East in a comprehensive manner 
but in a way that would still divide the open issues into individual categories. 174 Such an 
approach, Iranian officials stressed, would be in accordance with global security 
networking which underscored the importance of comprehensive WMD disarmament 
but did not rule out the adoption of partial measures to that end (Alborzi 1999: 2). 
The Khatami administration's references to global security networking were not the 
only new nuance in the Islamic Republic's argumentation on chemical disarmament in 
the Middle East. For example, the Iranian suggestion that major WMD states should 
give security guarantees to those Middle Eastern countries whose threat perceptions 
kept them from joining the CWC175 - that is, to reluctant Arab states - implied that the 
Iranians believed there to be a way to diplomatically circumvent the existing Arab- 
Israeli arms control standoff. Still, for the most part, Iran's arms control statements 
continued to refer to Israeli steps in the nuclear field as the starting point for 
comprehensive chemical disarmament in the Middle East. The officials of the Islamic 
Republic continued to speak for international measures that would isolate Israel and 
keep it under constant pressure until it agreed to join the NPT and to put an end to its 
WMD programs. ' 76 Only through such Israeli measures, Iranian officials asserted, 
would the establishment of a Middle Eastern WMDFZ, the Khatami administration's 
173 For Iranian pronouncements denouncing what the Islamic Republic viewed as the application of 
political double standard in the Middle East by Western governments and the United States, in particular, 
see Khareghani (2000: 3) and IRNA (10 September 2000). 
174 In the words of the Iranian representative addressing the fourth Conference of the States Parties to the 
CWC in June 1999: "Instead of creating strict linkage [between chemical and nuclear disarmament], we 
should embark upon serious political initiatives along parallel tracks in dealing with various WMD in a 
coherent manner based on their own individual merits" (Alborzi 1999: 2). "S For this Iranian proposal, see (ibid.: 3). 176 See Alborzi (1998: 2) and Khareghani (2000: 3). 
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ultimate declared disarmament objective in the region, become an achievable 
arrangement. 
177 
As far as the Islamic Republic's statements on the Persian Gulf sub-region were 
concerned, they made relatively few allusions to chemical disarmament. Certainly the 
fact that all GCC states had ratified the CWC between February 1995 and November 
2000 had made chemical disarmament in the Iran-GCC context a less urgent issue for 
the Iranians. 178 Resultantly, the representatives of the Khatami government - who were 
busy trying to convince the Gulf Arab sheikhdoms of the benefits resulting from CBM 
between Iran and the GCC states and who viewed such confidence-building efforts as a 
springboard for more comprehensive security cooperation - focused their argumentation 
on more ambitious ideas, such as the establishment of a WMDFZ in the Gulf or the 
creation of an indigenous security system in the region. 179 
However, there were two principal security issues in the Gulf that continued to 
seriously trouble Iranian authorities. The first was the foreign military presence in the 
region. In particular, the military activities of the U. S. forces were the target of Iran's 
regular condemnations (Chubin and Green 1998: 162). For example, Iranian military 
commanders alleged that the ships of the U. S. Fifth Fleet in the Gulf were equipped 
with WMD - including chemical weapons - and portrayed those U. S. weapons as a 
major threat to regional security as well as to the marine environment in the Gulf 
(Eisenstadt 1998a: 75). Not unexpectedly, the WMD ambitions of Saddam Hussein's 
Iraq constituted the second major Gulf security issue that worried Iranian decision- 
makers. In spite of the post-Gulf conflict efforts by UNSCOM to disarm Iraq, the 
Iranians believed that the Iraqis had managed to continue their WMD programs in 
defiance of relevant UN resolutions. 
Especially after August 1998, when Iraq had declared that it would suspend 
cooperation with UNSCOM and not allow the continuation of UN arms inspections, the 
threat posed by Iraq's WMD again became a central factor in Iran's arms control 
calculations. In February 1998, during the initial stage of the diplomatic crisis between 
1" President Khatami himself referred to the objectives of a WMDFZ in the Middle East and a WMD- 
free world, among others, in his speech to the UN General Assembly in September 1998 (A/53/PV. 8, 
1998: 7). 
178 Oman was the first GCC country to ratify the CWC on 8 February 1995. Saudi Arabia ratified the 
convention on 9 August 1996, Bahrain on 28 April 1997, Kuwait on 28 May 1997, Qatar on 3 September 
1997, and the United Arab Emirates on 28 November 2000. 
179 Thus, for example, the rapprochement between the Islamic Republic and Saudi Arabia during the 
presidency of Muhammad Khatami included joint calls for turning the Middle East into a zone free from 
WMD (Barletta and Tarzi 1999: 30). 
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Iraq and the international community over the UNSCOM inspections, the president of 
the Islamic Republic had underlined - on behalf of the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference - the importance of the implementation of the relevant Iraq-related UN 
Security Council resolutions as well as the complete elimination of Iraq's WMD 
capabilities (S/1998/165,1998: 2). Such Iranian statements were subsequently repeated 
by other Iranian authorities who expressed their serious concern over the standstill in 
UN weapons inspection activities in Iraq. 180 Thus, even though criticizing UNSCOM of 
not being transparent and politically independent's' and thereby questioning the 
reliability of the information provided by the commission, and even though making it 
known that the Islamic Republic was basically against ad hoc arms control 
arrangements created outside existing multilaterally negotiated treaty mechanisms, the 
representatives of the Islamic Republic gave their full support to the efforts of the UN 
Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) - the successor of 
UNSCOM established in December 1999 - to continue the UN-mandated weapons 
inspections in Iraq. ' 82 
The question of Iraq's WMD and the relative ease with which the international 
community managed to devise diplomatic responses to counter the Iraqi threat led 
Iranian officials to repeat their historical grievances against foreign governments. 
Referring to the Islamic Republic's loneliness in the face of Iraq's chemical weapons 
use during the Iran-Iraq war, the Iranians kept on asking why Iraq had not been 
considered a threat at the time when it had actually been using WMD. Expressing the 
bitterness felt by the Iranians, the Islamic Republic's representative addressing the fifth 
Conference of the States Parties to the CWC in May 2000, for example, made a call for 
strong international condemnation of those countries that had supplied chemical 
materials and technology to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war and thereby made it possible 
for Iraq to carry out its crimes in the first place (Khareghani 2000: 2). Moreover, in the 
summer of 2002, Iranian officials eagerly alluded to a news report by The New York 
180 Zarif and Alborzi (1999: 114) and author's interviews with Iranian arms control officials (C) and (D) 
who wish to remain unidentified, summer 2002. It should be noted here that Iranian pronouncements on 
Iraq's WMD were regularly accompanied with balancing allusions to Israel's WMD capabilities. 'g' The fact that the budget of UNSCOM was independent of the general budget of the UN and that the 
staff of UNSCOM mainly consisted of nationals of those states that made the biggest contributions to the 
commission's work - whether in terms of providing financial or human resources or intelligence 
information 
- sustained the perception in many countries, including Iran, that UNSCOM's operations 
were politically controlled by a handful of governments, mainly the United States (Blix 2004: 32). 
182 Author's interview with A. A. Soltanieh, Geneva, 22 July 2002, and author's interviews with Iranian 
arms control officials (C) and (D) who wish to remain unidentified, summer 2002. For a discussion of 
UNMOVIC, see Lewis (2001: 64-68). 
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Times which in its article of 17 August - based on interviews with high-ranking U. S. 
military figures - revealed that the United States had covertly provided military 
planning and intelligence assistance to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war, even though the 
U. S. government had been well informed of Iraq's record of chemical warfare. 183 
Apart from the authorities of the Islamic Republic, Iranian non-governmental 
organizations, such as The Society Supporting War Veterans Wounded by WMD, 
sought to keep the record and the consequences of Iraq's chemical weapons use in 
international limelight. As part of their activities, Iranian NGO provided detailed 
information about their country's chemical casualties to the UN as well as to foreign 
governments, condemned the support given by Western governments to Iraq during the 
Iran-Iraq war, and demanded that the war-time suppliers of chemical materials and 
technology to Iraq should be brought to justice "through internationally recognized 
channels. " 184 In this sense, Iranian NGO - whose actions were regularly harnessed by 
the authorities of the Islamic Republic to support official Iranian diplomacy - seemed to 
respond to the call made by the Khatami administration that the civil society in various 
parts of the world should advance the cause of global security networking and, by 
extension, international arms control (Zarif and Alborzi 1999: 117). 185 
4.1.4.3 Iran's discontent with international implementation of the CWC 
Article XI 
Following the Islamic Republic's ratification of the CWC in 1997, Iran's 
dissatisfaction with the states parties' implementation of article XI of the convention 
became a dominant feature of its diplomatic argumentation on chemical disarmament. 
The representatives of the Khatami administration strongly criticized the export controls 
of the Australia Group which they saw as an obstacle to developing countries' 
economic, technological, and scientific development. In Iran's opinion, Australia Group 
export controls were against the spirit and the letter of the CWC and thereby 
undermined the credibility and the relevance of the convention. If the Third World 
183 Author's correspondence with an Iranian arms control official (D) who wishes to remain unidentified, 
August 2002, and The New York Times (17 August 2002). 184 See IRNA (4 July 2000,14 October 2000, and 27 April 2002). 
185 For a discussion of the concept of civil society in the Islamic Republic, as defined by the Khatami-led 
Iranian reformists, see Ansari (2000: 144-148). 
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countries' right, recorded in article XI of the CWC, to receive economic, scientific, and 
technological benefits from their participation in the treaty continued to be 
compromised by the advanced industrialized states parties, Iranian officials maintained, 
there would be a growing risk that some CWC member states would start to overlook 
their treaty obligations and that non-members would decide to permanently disregard 
the convention. (CD/PV. 812,1999: 4; Alborzi 1999: 3 and Zarif 2001: 1) 
Accordingly, Iranian officials called on Western governments to commit themselves 
to the full implementation of the CWC and to recognize that violations of article XI 
would be as serious as those of article I which prohibited the states parties from 
developing, producing, otherwise acquiring, stockpiling or retaining, using, and 
transferring chemical armaments. The Iranians spoke for the abolition of Australia 
Group export controls and reminded the members of the group that it was their duty 
under the CWC to secure developing countries' full access to chemical materials and 
technology as well as to assist them in the field of peaceful chemical activities. 
Responding to Western governments' proliferation concerns, the authorities of the 
Islamic Republic stressed that the CWC provided the necessary assurances that any 
violation of article I of the treaty would be efficiently verified. The OPCW, Iranian 
officials added, was the only legitimate international authority to examine and address 
issues pertaining to CWC compliance. (Khareghani 2000: 3; Alborzi 2001: 2 and C- 
III/NAT. 4,1998: 1) 
Oftentimes, Iran allied itself with other like-minded CWC states parties to advance its 
diplomatic objectives. Thus, in November 1998, for example, the Islamic Republic, 
Pakistan, and Cuba submitted a joint draft resolution to the CWC Conference of the 
States Parties in which the three governments registered their demand that all extra- 
CWC export controls against the states parties should be removed. The draft resolution 
maintained that the CWC had not envisaged any export controls in chemical trade 
between the member states' 86 and stressed that no state party should undermine the 
186 It is important to emphasize here that, in Iran's opinion, export control measures should be directed 
only towards countries that were not participating in the CWC (Zarif 2001: 1). The Convention itself 
requires the states parties to implement specific restrictions on transfers of certain chemicals to countries 
that have not joined the CWC. According to the treaty, chemicals belonging to the so-called "Schedule 1" 
category - which comprises known chemical warfare agents such as sarin, mustard gas, and their 
immediate precursors, that have few if any legitimate applications - can be transferred only among the 
states parties in limited amounts and for particular purposes. Transfers of Schedule 1 chemicals to and 
from countries that are not parties to the CWC are prohibited. In April 2000, CWC states parties decided 
that also the so-called "Schedule 2" chemicals - which include toxic chemicals and precursors that are 
utilized in small quantities for commercial purposes - cannot be exported to, or imported from, countries 
that have not joined the treaty. The CWC allows transfers of "Schedule 3" chemicals - which refer to 
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authority of the OPCW to verify compliance with the convention by resorting to 
unilateral action. It also urged the states parties to review their existing export control 
practices and to render them consistent with the obligations set in article XI of the 
CWC. Finally, the draft resolution called on the member states to report to the 
Conference of the States Parties on the damages caused to their socio-economic 
development by extra-CWC export controls. (C-III/NAT. 4,1998: 1-2) 
In May 2001, the Islamic Republic tabled an initiative, supported by a dozen of other 
CWC member states, '87 which expanded the scope of the November 1998 three-party 
initiative by making a call for the establishment of an international cooperation 
committee that would be responsible for facilitating the implementation of article XI of 
the CWC. According to Iran, such a committee - whose exact terms of reference, 
composition, and functions were left open to be decided by the OPCW Executive 
Council - would enable the states parties, for example, to bring up cases in which they 
had been prevented from obtaining chemical materials and technology for peaceful 
purposes before a body that represented all CWC member states' interests. 188 
Not unexpectedly, the Iranian initiative - which was a diplomatic expression of the 
core Iranian view according to which the problems related to the implementation of 
article XI of the CWC could be solved only through a "rule-based and institutionalized 
approach" - did not receive the support of the CWC states parties belonging to the 
Australia Group. Iranian representatives acknowledged that the chances for the 
establishment of the committee were far from good and lamented that developing 
countries had no institutional or diplomatic means to pressure Western governments to 
accept the notion that there existed an inseparable link between disarmament and 
development. The Islamic Republic claimed that the export controls of the Australia 
Group had caused serious damage, among others, to its petrochemical industry as well 
chemicals and precursors produced in large commercial quantities but which can also be used in the 
manufacture of chemical weapons - for peaceful purposes to countries that are not parties to the 
convention. Iran, it should be pointed out, was among the CWC member states that supported the 
establishment of a ban on the transfers of Schedule 3 chemicals, too. This diplomatic stance of the Islamic 
Republic seemed to stem, above all, from the Iranian calculation that the economic implications of a 
Schedule 3 transfer ban would force non-members such as Israel - where the ban on Schedule 2 
chemicals had already awakened fears that the country would lose its access to sources of chemical 
supply and to important export markets - to seriously consider joining the CWC. (Tucker 2001: 3; Feakes 
2001: 46 and Steinberg 2000b) 
187 The other countries supporting Iran's May 2001 initiative made at the sixth CWC Conference of the 
States Parties were as follows: Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Malesia, Cameroon, 
Ethiopia, Nigeria, Sudan, Yemen, and Cuba. 
188 This paragraph draws upon C-VI/DEC/CRP. 18 (2001: 1-3) and author's interview with an Iranian 
arms control official (D) who wishes to remain unidentified, summer 2002. 
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as imposed major costs on its economy because Iran had been forced to obtain highly- 
needed chemical materials and technology from expensive alternative sources. The 
restrictions of the Australia Group and the politically motivated discriminatory 
considerations behind them, Iranian officials stressed, had also strengthened the hand of 
those within the Islamic Republic's political elite who pointed to the Majlis declaration 
attached to Iran's CWC ratification instrument and called for Iran's withdrawal from the 
CWC. Simultaneously, however, Iranian officials recognized that it was highly unlikely 
that their government would actually put the Majlis declaration into effect. '89 
In spite of the Islamic Republic's protests that some non-members of the CWC had 
not been targeted by Australia Group export controls while certain CWC states parties 
of good standing had been forced to face the consequences of such restrictions, Iranian 
authorities did not give up their efforts to broker a CWC-based solution to the 
diplomatic disagreements over the interpretation of article XI of the convention. In 
contrast, Iran sought accommodation with the Australia Group and signalled that it 
would be prepared to accept the existence of the group and its export controls if those 
restrictions were exclusively directed at CWC non-members, such as Iraq, and not at the 
states parties. As stated by the Iranian representative addressing the CWC Conference 
of the States Parties in October 2002: "Under the circumstances, it may be somewhat 
difficult to counter the argument that such informal controls [of the Australia Group] are 
necessitated by the realities of the current international security environment. " Still, the 
Islamic Republic also continued to point out to the members of the Australia Group that 
if they were not convinced of the OPCW's ability to verify compliance with the CWC, 
they should - instead of relying on a separate, extra-conventional monitoring 
mechanism - raise such concerns within the CWC framework and seek to improve the 
treaty in cooperation with other states parties. Diplomatic deliberations on proliferation 
concerns and article XI, Iranian officials underscored, could - and should - go hand in 
hand. 1 90 
189 This paragraph draws upon author's interviews with Iranian arms control officials (C) and (D) who 
wish to remain unidentified, summer 2002, and author's correspondence with an Iranian arms control 
official (D) who wishes to remain unidentified, November 2002. 190 This paragraph draws upon Zarif (2001: 2); Zamaninia (2002: 3-4) and author's interview with an 
Iranian arms control official (D) who wishes to remain unidentified, summer 2002. 
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The role and the future of the OPCW 
The Islamic Republic claimed that Western governments' distrust of the CWC 
became apparent not only from their unbending diplomatic stance with regard to the 
interpretation of the treaty's article XI, but also from their policies vis-ä-vis the OPCW, 
the international organization established by the states parties to oversee the execution 
of the CWC. In the Iranian analysis, the Americans, in particular, sought to put major 
diplomatic pressure on the OPCW in order to get the organization under their control. 
Such a U. S. policy, the officials of the Islamic Republic pointed out, was a main cause, 
among others, for the OPCW's financial problems. By taking advantage of its budgetary 
and financial leverage, the Iranians maintained, the U. S. government - whose 
contributions cover about one-fifth of the OPCW's expenses - tried to diplomatically 
blackmail the organization and to walk over other CWC states parties in The Hague. 191 
Iran's criticism of American diplomacy in the OPCW intensified after the 
inauguration of George W. Bush as the president of the United States in January 2001. 
In many respects, the Islamic Republic's verbal attacks against the Bush administration 
were responses to the latter's highly critical pronouncements on the Islamic Republic's 
domestic and foreign policies. '92 Yet they also strongly reflected the Iranian belief - 
shared by many other governments as well - that under the Bush administration, the 
United States had adopted a hostile attitude towards international arms control and 
founded its diplomacy almost exclusively on unilateral power politics. '93 The fate of 
Jose Mauricio Bustani, the OPCW's first director-general who was ultimately forced to 
leave his post in April 2002 as a result of a diplomatic offensive launched against him 
by the United States, was alluded to by Iranian officials as one manifestation of U. S. 
unilateralism, 194 
The Iranians - who eventually voted against the director-general's dismissal at the 
OPCW - rejected the accusations made against the Brazilian diplomat and maintained 
19' This paragraph draws upon Alborzi (2001: 1-2) and author's interview with an Iranian arms control 
official (D) who wishes to remain unidentified, summer 2002. 
19- Iranian authorities' views of the Bush administration - and vice versa - will be discussed in greater 
detail below in chapter 5. 193 Note, for example, the Iranian foreign minister's letter of 16 March 2002 to the UN secretary-general 
which contained the following paragraph: "There has been a growing trend within the current United 
States administration to undermine multilateral efforts aimed at addressing global menaces ranging from 
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction to environmental degradation" (Kharrazi 2002). 
194 The Americans accused Bustani of financial mismanagement as well as of efforts to expand the 
OPCW's activities to areas that were outside the organization's mandate. For the details of the so-called 
Bustani affair, see Arms Control Today (May 2002). 
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that the United States wanted to get rid of Bustani because he was "too independent for 
the Americans. " The OPCW director-general's independence, Iranian officials 
explained, was a headache for the Bush administration for two specific reasons. First of 
all, it was against the interests of U. S. chemical industries whose representatives 
fiercely lobbied the White House to weaken the ability of the OPCW to interfere with 
sensitive commercial activities. U. S. chemical industry lobbyists, the Iranian argument 
went, hoped to see the OPCW reduced to an international body concentrating on 
challenge inspections and on the destruction of existing chemical weapons arsenals. 
Secondly and more importantly, the Iranians continued, both the U. S. chemical industry 
executives and the country's political leadership shared the belief that the United States 
did not actually need the OPCW because, as the only superpower, it already possessed 
the means to deal with the dangers of chemical weapons proliferation by itself. 195 
Although the Islamic Republic informed at the time of the Bustani affair that it had 
not seen any evidence of the director-general's alleged financial mismanagement or of 
actitivities exceeding his mandate, in the end, Iran's position in the matter stemmed 
from more fundamental considerations than from those related to the person and the 
actions of the OPCW's highest official. On the one hand, Iranian officials argued that 
the U. S. efforts to oust Bustani were against the letter of the CWC which emphasized 
the independent nature of the director-general's position as well as the international 
character of his responsibilities. If those core principles were compromised, Iranian 
representatives asserted, it would erode the status of the OPCW and set a dangerous 
international precedent whereby any duly elected head of an international organization 
could become "vulnerable to the whims of one or a few major contributors. " On the 
other hand, the Islamic Republic was strongly against the manner in which the United 
States handled the Bustani affair. By sidelining the relevant organs of the OPCW in the 
process, the officials of the Islamic Republic argued, the Americans breached the rule of 
law and violated the OPCW's core organizational principles: transparency, equality, and 
fair and just treatment of all CWC states parties. On 25 July 2002, at the first special 
session of the CWC Conference of the States Parties, the member states elected a new 
director-general for the OPCW. The Islamic Republic voted for the election of Rogelio 
Pfirter, the U. S. -supported candidate from Argentina, whose views on the OPCW's role 
195 This paragraph draws upon author's interviews with Iranian arms control officials (C) and (D) who 
wish to remain unidentified, summer 2002, and Alborzi (2001: 2). 
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and future managed to convince Iran of the Argentinian diplomat's qualifications for the 
job. 196 
But even if Iranian authorities regarded the outcome of the Bustani affair as a serious 
blow to multilateral diplomacy and called on the international community to reject the 
arbitrary policies of the United States, they continued to emphasize the indispensability 
of the CWC. The Islamic Republic had managed to become a key member of the group 
of Asian states parties within the OPCW, and since May 1998, had continuously served 
in the organization's Executive Council. 197 At the practical diplomatic level, and with 
its limited financial resources, Iran tried to contribute to the work of the OPCW first and 
foremost in areas that pertained to article X of the CWC. 198 For example, pointing to its 
experience in treating victims of chemical warfare, Iran officially pledged to provide 
medical assistance to future victims of chemical weapons use. Furthermore, together 
with the OPCW, Iranian authorities organized a host of international gatherings dealing 
with medical aspects of chemical warfare. 199 On the whole, Iran was not happy with 
international implementation of article X of the CWC, mainly because, as pointed out 
by Iranian officials, there were no assurances that the states parties would receive 
adequate international assistance should they become a target of a chemical attack. 
Nonetheless, the efforts by the OPCW to speed up and improve its article X-related 
activities were noted with satisfaction in Tehran. (Alborzi 2001: 3 and Zamaninia 2002: 
3) 
At the national level, and often with the help of the OPCW, the authorities of the 
Islamic Republic continued to inform Iranian civil servants, customs officials, and 
chemical industry representatives of their duties and responsibilities under the CWC. 
Also, the members of the Khatami administration actively worked on preparing the 
necessary domestic legislation for national execution of the CWC -a responsibility of 
each state party under article VII of the convention. 200 
1% This paragraph draws upon author's interview with an Iranian arms control official (D) who wishes to 
remain unidentified, summer 2002; author's correspondence with an Iranian arms control official (D) who 
wishes to remain unidentified, November 2002, and Panahi-Azar (2002: 1-3). 
197 At its second session, the CWC Conference of the States Parties had elected Iran to sit on the 
Executive Council for a two-year term commencing on 12 May 1998. Since then, Iran had been re-elected 
for each consecutive two-year term. 
198 It is worth noting here that the head of the assistance and protection branch of the OPCW - responsible 
for matters concerning article X of the CWC - at the time was a former arms control diplomat of the 
Islamic Republic. 
199 For details of the medical cooperation between Iran and the OPCW, see Khareghani (2000: 4) and 
S/ 199/2000 (2000). 
200 This paragraph draws upon C-IV/NAT. 11 (1999: 5) and author's interview with an Iranian arms 
control official (D) who wishes to remain unidentified, summer 2002. 
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4.2 Biological Disarmament 
4.2.1 From the BTWC to the end of the Iran-Iraq war 
4.2.1.1 The Shah administration and biological disarmament 
Even though the use of micro-organisms and toxins as a means of warfare goes back 
to ancient times, ' efforts to control biological weapons are a recent phenomenon. The 
Geneva Protocol of 1925 constituted a landmark in this respect, for the protocol not 
only reaffirmed the prohibition of the use of poison during war -a ban already 
formulated at the 1899 and 1907 Hague International Peace Conferences - but extended 
the prohibition to the use of bacteriological weapons as well. 2 In practice, however, the 
value of the Geneva Protocol remained limited. This was mostly due to some states' 
reluctance to ratify the instrument, to the reservations made to it by many countries, and 
to the fact that the protocol did not restrain the research, development, or deployment of 
either chemical or biological armaments. (Kadlec et al. 1999: 97) 
It was not until the late 1960s that biological arms control began to receive major 
international attention. Increasing worries about the ineffectiveness of the Geneva 
Protocol in hindering biological weapons proliferation, the indiscriminate nature and 
unpredictability of biological armaments and the epidemiological risks related to them, 
together with the lack of epidemiological control measures for biological weapons, led 
to a diplomatic process that eventually brought about the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention which was opened for signature on 10 April 1972.3 States' 
readiness to accept the obligations of the new treaty based above all on the general 
For a discussion of the history of biological warfare, see Christopher et al. (1999: 17-19). 
2 At the time of the creation of the Geneva Protocol, biological weapons were referred to as 
bacteriological weapons. This was due to the fact that micro-organisms such as viruses and rickettsias 
were not known at the time. (Flowerree 1993: 999) 
3 Article I of the BTWC prohibits the states parties to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or 
retain microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of 
types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes. 
The prohibition recorded in article I also covers weapons, equipment and means of delivery designed to 
use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. However, it should be stressed here 
that the BTWC does not prohibit research and development on protection against biological armaments. 
The problem with such work is that it is often almost impossible to conclude whether research and 
development on biological weapons is geared for defensive or offensive purposes. 
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conclusion drawn at the time that biological armaments lacked military utility. 4 
(Christopher et al. 1999: 27 and Smithson 1998: 1) 
Iran was among the original signatories of the BTWC. The Shah administration 
signed the treaty on 10 April 1972, and the Iranian parliament ratified it on 22 August 
1973, some 19 months before the convention entered into force on 26 March 1975 after 
22 governments - including the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United 
Kingdom, the depositary governments - had deposited their ratification instruments. 
Nonetheless, the Shah government's approach to the BTWC was somewhat reserved, 
for although the Iranians had supported multilateral diplomatic deliberations on 
biological disarmament, they had been of the opinion that disarmament steps in the 
biological field should be inseparably linked with similar measures in the area of 
chemical armaments. (A/C. 1/PV. 1756,1970: 13 and A/C. 1/PV. 1808,1971: 8). 
Iran's insistence on the inseparability of biological and chemical disarmament 
stemmed from the concern, shared by many other countries as well, that the conclusion 
of a distinct accord dealing with biological weapons would undermine diplomatic 
efforts towards a ban on chemical weapons - which were viewed as a bigger threat than 
biological weapons - and divert the international community's attention from chemical 
arms control. Also, Iran feared that the adoption of a separate biological weapons 
convention might weaken the Geneva Protocol's ban on the use of chemical armaments. 
In the end, however, the Shah's government did not oppose the conclusion of the 
BTWC, even if Iranian officials did express the hope that the new treaty would increase 
the prospects for an early conclusion of a chemical disarmament instrument. In this 
context, they referred to article IX of the BTWC which obligated the states parties to 
continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on a 
chemical disarmament treaty. The stance that biological and chemical disarmament 
were intimately intertwined was a constant theme in Iran's biological arms control 
argumentation right until the final days of the Shah's regime. (A/PV. 2046,1972: 5; 
A/C. l/PV. 1881,1972: 4 and A/S-1O/PV. 18,1978: 339) 
J There are three main sets of issues that still continue to seriously undermine the military utility of 
biological weapons. The first involves the problems related to the maintenance of the virulance of 
biological warfare agents during storage, delivery, and dissemination. The second class of issues pertains 
to the difficulties in assessing what effects biological warfare agents will have on the target as well as 
non-targets. The fact that biological warfare - because of the inevitable incubation period biological 
agents need in order to affect the target - is not suitable for military situations requiring immediate impact 
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4.2.1.2 The First Review Conference of the BTWC 
The biological weapons convention of 1972 was one of the many international 
agreements that Iran's post-revolutionary leadership inherited from the Shah period. 
While the decision-makers of the newly founded Islamic Republic did not see any 
reason to question Iran's participation in the BTWC, neither did they seek to formulate 
a special role for their country in the area of biological arms control. The question of 
biological armaments thus remained a secondary issue on Islamic Iran's diplomatic 
agenda. Internationally, however, biological weapons were attracting increasing 
attention. Above all, the outbreak of anthrax in Sverdlovsk in the Soviet Union in 1979 
not only raised major international concern over the Soviet compliance with the 
BTWC, 5 but it also added to the already existing doubts over the convention's ability to 
assure compliance with its provisions. Furthermore, many BTWC states parties feared 
that the advances that were being made in biotechnology would precipitate renewed 
interest among military establishments in biological armaments. (Flowerree 1993: 1006) 
Not surprisingly, Iranian officials, occupied with matters related to the regime change 
in their country, stood on the sidelines of the biological arms control debate. In March 
1980, however, the Islamic Republic, along with 52 other countries, took part in the 
work of the First Review Conference of the BTWC and presented its views on the 
convention's performance. Given the concerns among the member states over the 
effectiveness of the BTWC, and the important fact that the treaty did not include any 
verification provisions, the major part of the review conference's work centered around 
the question of how to ensure the states parties' compliance with their treaty obligations 
and specifically around articles V and VI of the BTWC. 6 Sweden - supported by many 
constitutes the third major factor eroding the military utility of biological armaments. (Martin 2002: 71- 
74) 
S In the aftermath of the Sverdlovsk incident, the Soviet Union rejected any implication that it was not 
complying with the provisions of the BTWC. According to the Soviet explanation, there had been an 
outbreak of gastric anthrax in Sverdlovsk in April 1979 due to consumption of contaminated meat. More 
than a decade later, in May 1992, however, Russia's president Boris Yeltsin admitted that an accident in a 
local biological weapons production plant had been the real cause of the outbreak. For the details of the 
Sverdlovsk incident, see Meselson et at. (1999). 6 Article V of the BTWC obligates the states parties "to consult one another and to cooperate in solving 
any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the 
Convention. " It further states that "consultation and cooperation pursuant to this article may also be 
undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and 
in accordance with its Charter. " Article VI of the BTWC, in turn, gives each state party the right to lodge 
a complaint with the UN Security Council if it finds that another state party is acting in breach of the 
obligations of the BTWC. Such a complaint, as stated in article VI, "should include all possible evidence 
confirming its validity, as well as a request for its consideration by the Security Council. " The Security 
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neutral, non-aligned, and Western governments - made a proposal at the conference for 
the creation, through a treaty amendment, of a permanent consultative committee 
comprised of expert representatives from the member states. The purpose of the 
Swedish initiative was to establish a multilateral diplomatic mechanism for the BTWC's 
consultation and cooperation element which could then be activated whenever a 
compliance concern would arise. (Flowerree 1993: 1008 and Sims 2001: 32) 
Sweden envisaged a fact-finding function for the consultative committee by arguing 
that the committee, with whom the states parties would be obliged to cooperate, should 
be entrusted with a well-defined mandate and the necessary resources to conduct fact- 
finding missions in order to objectively assess whether a treaty violation had taken place 
or not. In addition, Sweden proposed that the states parties could lodge a compliance- 
related complaint with the UN Security Council, as prescribed in article VI, only after 
the consultative committee had reported the findings of its investigations as well as the 
views of its experts to all the member states. Hence, the supporters of the Swedish 
conference initiative sought to challenge the decisive position bestowed on the 
permanent members of the Security Council in article VI by trying to separate the fact- 
finding stage of the BTWC's complaint procedure from the views of the permament 
council members who, by using their veto rights, could, for whatever reason, prevent a 
compliance investigation from occurring and thereby prevent the international 
community from determining whether a violation under the BTWC had taken place. 
(BWC/CONF. I/C/SR. 3,1980: 2 and Goldblat and Bernauer 1991: 15) 
Iran lent its support to the Swedish proposal. The Iranian representative addressing 
the review conference expressed the Islamic Republic's satisfaction with the fact that 
there had not so far been need for resorting to the BTWC's complaint procedure. 
Simultaneously, however, she maintained that the mechanism itself was not fully 
satisfactory because it was vulnerable to the views of the UN Security Council's 
permanent members. As the establishment of a consultative committee through a treaty 
amendment would make the complaint procedure more immune to political exigencies 
and to discriminative practices, the Iranian representative argued, Sweden's conference 
initiative corresponded to the Islamic Republic's position in the matter. The Iranian 
Council has the ultimate authority to decide whether a complaint made against a state party will lead to an 
investigation. As stipulated in article VI of the BTWC: "Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to 
cooperate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with 
the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council. 
The Security Council shall inform the States Parties of the results of the investigation. " 
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official also made it known that the Islamic Republic would welcome any other 
proposal designed to improve and strengthen article VI of the BTWC. As, in the end, 
the Swedish call for a treaty amendment did not receive the support of the Soviet Union 
and its allies - who found the original complaint procedure satisfactory - and that of 
most Western governments - eager not to open the convention for amendments - the 
establishment of the consultative committee failed to materialize. 7 
(BWC/CONF. I/C/SR. 3,1980: 5; BWC/CONF. I/SR. 8,1980: 10-11 and Flowerree 
1993: 1008) 
Apart from presenting Iran's position in the complaint procedure issue, the 
representative of the Islamic Republic expressed her government's deep regret that the 
BTWC member states' obligation to negotiate in good faith to complete a chemical 
weapons convention - as referred to in the preamble of the BTWC and in the 
convention's article IX - had not led to concrete results. Iran demanded the states 
parties to fulfill this treaty obligation and underlined that a ban on chemical weapons 
was too important an issue to be left for the major powers to decide on, even if the 
Iranians simultaneously recognized the major powers' crucial role in diplomatic 
deliberations on chemical disarmament. The Islamic Republic also called for measures 
that would contribute to the universality of the BTWC. Iranian officials characterized 
the treaty as "an important step on the road to international confidence and security" and 
hoped that the greatest possible number of states would accede to the BTWC. 
Moreover, Iran hoped that the countries that had already joined the convention would 
agree on a mechanism making it possible for review conferences to be held at regular 
intervals or as required so that the functioning of the BTWC could be reviewed and the 
convention kept up to date with changing circumstances. 8 (BWC/CONF. I/SR. 8,1980: 
11) 
Nevertheless, the Swedish initiative set in motion a diplomatic process which sought to clarify and 
strengthen the BTWC's complaints mechanism in the future. The final declaration of the 1980 review 
conference dealt with the issue by referring to article V of the BTWC and stating that the procedures 
under that article include, among others, "the right of any State Party subsequently to request that a 
consultative meeting open to all States Parties be convened at expert level" (Flowerree 1993: 1008). 8 Article XII of the BTWC states that, five years after the entry into force of the convention, or earlier if 
requested by a majority of the states parties, the member states should hold a conference to review the 
treaty's operation. Basically, then, there was no legal obligation for the states parties to convene more 
than once. Nevertheless, a second BTWC review conference was held in September 1986, and in the third 
review conference of September 1991 the member states finally decided that there should be review 
conferences on a permanent basis, that is, once every five years. 
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4.2.1.3 The war period 
Iran's participation in the First Review Conference of the BTWC took place at a time 
when the country's foreign policy establishment was going through fundamental 
changes. The reorganization of the Iranian foreign ministry to correspond with the 
country's post-revolutionary political and ideological climate resulted not only in a 
major personnel reshuffle, but also led to a situation where the country's foreign policy 
officials were faced with the formidable task of delineating the new regime's positions 
on a wide array of diplomatic issues. 9 Iran's performance at the BTWC's first review 
conference seemingly reflected the turmoil in the Islamic Republic's political scene. By 
strictly sticking to the treaty-related issues raised at the conference and by leaning on a 
vocabulary stemming from the Shah period, the Islamic Republic's conference 
statements were indicative of a reactive and hesitant diplomatic approach. 
Biological arms control remained a marginal theme on the Islamic Republic's 
diplomatic agenda also after the policy-makers in Tehran had started to get a grip on the 
conduct of the new regime's foreign affairs. As the Iran-Iraq war and Iraq's use of 
chemical weapons in that conflict became the overriding concerns for the Islamic 
Republic's arms control officials, however, the issue of biological weapons, by 
becoming an element of Iran's diplomatic effort against Iraq's chemical warfare, got a 
new lease of life in Iranian diplomacy. In other words, the Islamic Republic's war-time 
biological arms control operations became tightly linked with the issue chemical 
armaments. ' 0 
Still, at times, Iranian officials differentiated between biological and chemical 
weapons when referring to Iraqi WMD use in the Iran-Iraq conflict. For example, in 
1984, when Iraq escalated its chemical warfare and the Islamic Republic 
9 For the changes in the Iranian foreign policy establishment after the revolution, see Menashri (1990: 9, 
97,244-245). 
10 Of course, the fact that Iraq most probably did not use biological warfare agents in the course of the 
1980-1988 war ultimately explains why the Islamic Republic's war-time biological arms control 
operations were subordinated to Iran's chemical diplomacy. Iranian officials subsequently acknowledged 
that, contrary to their war-time claims, they were not aware of Iraqi use of biological warfare agents 
during the Iran-Iraq conflict - either against Iranian targets or Iraq's own Kurdish population. It should be noted, however, that independently of the Iranians, a number of charges have been made to the effect 
that Iraq used biological warfare agents in the course of the 1980-1988 war. Iraqi Kurds, for example, 
have claimed that the regime of Saddam Hussein used biological weapons against them during the 
conflict, in addition to which some individual experts have maintained that Iraq's attack against the town 
of Halabja in March 1988 involved the use of not only chemical but biological agents as well. (Author's 
interview with A. A. Soltanieh, Geneva, 22 July 2002; Cordesman and Wagner 1996: 893 and 
Washington File, 19 September 2000) 
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correspondingly enhanced its diplomatic offensives against the employment of chemical 
armaments, Iran accused Iraq of having used chemical as well as biological warfare 
agents -a reference was made to toxins and mycotoxins - against Iran from the outset 
of the war. 11 (CD/PV. 242,1984: 10 and A/C. l/39/PV. 36,1984: 56) 
Yet in contrast to Iran's meticulous statements on Iraq's chemical weapons use, its 
references to Iraq's biological armaments were general accusations that failed to 
provide any details of the alleged Iraqi biological warfare. This feature of the Islamic 
Republic's diplomatic argumentation - together with the post-war Iranian 
acknowledgement that the Islamic Republic had no information about Iraqi use of 
biological armaments in the Iran-Iraq conflict - illustrated that Iran's biological 
weapons accusations were war propaganda. Iranian references to Iraqi biological 
weapons also showed how the officials of the Islamic Republic occasionally mistook 
biological weapons for chemical ones. In February 1984, for example, Iran's foreign 
minister claimed at the CD that some foreign governments had provided Iraq with 
biological weapons. A closer reading of foreign minister Vilayati's statement, however, 
suggests that what he actually meant was chemical weapons. Similarly, when discussing 
Iraq's use of chemical weapons, Iranian officials sometimes referred to the BTWC in 
order to make the point that international law forbade chemical warfare. Of course, the 
Iranian references to the BTWC can also be interpreted as a diplomatic effort to seek 
argumentative support in a situation where there was no distinct chemical disarmament 
treaty to lean on. The preamble and article VIII of the BTWC - which emphasize the 
significance of the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and call 
upon all states to comply with them - contained the legal message the Iranians wanted 
to convey. (CD/PV. 242,1984: 9,11 and CD/PV. 254,1984: 30) 
The primacy of the issue of chemical weapons in Iran's war-time arms control 
diplomacy became further evident in connection with the Second Review Conference of 
the BTWC held in Geneva in September 1986. While prior to the conference Iranian 
officials had referred to the weaknesses of the BTWC and especially to the treaty's lack 
of a verification mechanism, at the review conference itself they did not focus on 
specific BTWC-related issues but concentrated, instead, on discussing Iraq's chemical 
crimes. As admitted by the Iranians, their goverment viewed the conference as a good 
11 Iran had accused Iraq of the use of weapons that "spread germs" already during the battle for the city of 
Susangerd in November 1980. Later, however, the Iranians retracted from this allegation. (Karsh 1993: 
35) 
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opportunity to emphasize the need for states to respect the provisions of the 1925 
Geneva Protocol. (CD/PV. 242,1984: 8; CD/PV. 262,1984: 9 and BWC/CONF. II/SR. 8. 
1986: 11) 
According to the Islamic Republic's representatives, the world had significantly 
changed since the first BTWC review conference. The reason for this, the Iranians 
maintained, was Iraq's resort to chemical armaments which had eroded the principles 
and objectives of the Geneva Protocol as well as the BTWC. The Islamic Republic 
stressed that the international community's indifference to Iraq's breaches of 
international law had encouraged Saddam Hussein's regime to continue the use of 
WMD and thereby demanded the review conference to set up a mechanism through 
which state compliance with the Geneva Protocol could be guaranteed. Iran's 
conference delegation also called for international measures that would pressure Iraq to 
stop the use of chemical and toxin weapons' 2 and for a comprehensive ban on the export 
of dual-use chemical substances and technology to Iraq. Finally, the Islamic Republic 
asked the conference participants to declare the use of chemical armaments a war crime. 
(BWC/CONF. II/SR. 8,1986: 11) 
In addition to engaging themselves in a round of heated exchange of words with their 
Iraqi counterparts, 13 as well as underscoring the importance of the BTWC's 
universality, Iranian representatives sought to influence the wording of the review 
conference's final declaration, and in particular the section that dealt with article VIII of 
the BTWC. The Iranians hoped that the final declaration would note with concern the 
violations of the Geneva Protocol as verified by the specialists dispatched to Iran by the 
UN secretary-general in February 1986.14 Moreover, they wanted the final declaration 
to call on all the states parties as well as on all BTWC signatories that were parties to 
the Geneva Protocol, meaning Iraq, 15 to strictly comply with the provisions of the 
protocol. Finally, the Iranians hoped that the final declaration would call on those 
countries not yet parties to the Geneva Protocol to accede to it at the earliest possible 
date. (BWC/CONF. II/SR. 8,1986: 11 and DDA document 1986) 
12 The remark on toxin weapons is congruent with the earlier Iranian assertions claiming that Iraq had 
used biological armaments in its war against the Islamic Republic. Nevertheless, beyond this single 
remark, Iran's statement at the 1986 review conference did not elaborate on the biological dimension of 
the Iraqi threat. 
13 See BWC/CONF. II/SR. 8 (1986: 11,13-14). 
" See above section 4.1.1.2 p. 230. 
15 Iraq had signed the BTWC in May 1972, but did not ratify it until June 1991. The Iraqi ratification of 
the biological treaty was a direct result of the UN Security Council resolution 687 which effectively 
forced Iraq to become a BTWC state party. 
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Even though the review conference, against Iranian wishes, did not condemn Iraq for 
its breaches of the Geneva Protocol, its final declaration did make a reference to the 
report of the UN chemical weapons experts who visited Iran in early 1986, appealed to 
the members of the Geneva Protocol to fulfill their obligations under that document, as 
well as urged all countries not yet parties to the Geneva Protocol to adhere to it at the 
earliest possible date. Iranian representatives welcomed the review conference's 
adoption of a final declaration by consensus, but regretted the fact that the conference 
had failed to condemn Iraq's use chemical warfare in strong and clear terms. Alluding 
specifically to the diplomatic behaviour of Jordan, one of Iraq's staunchest supporters in 
the Iran-Iraq war, the Iranians also regretted that "one of the states parties to the 
Convention [BTWC] had endeavoured to obstruct such a condemnation. " 
(BWC/CONF. II/13/II, 1986: 8 and BWC/CONF. II/SR. 10,1986: 5) 
After the Second Review Conference of the BTWC, the arms control officials of the 
Islamic Republic, fully occupied with efforts to stop Iraq's chemical warfare, rarely 
referred to the issue of biological disarmament. In December 1986, Iran was among the 
countries sponsoring the UN General Assembly resolution 41/58 A which dealt with the 
BTWC review conference held two months earlier. Among others, the resolution noted 
with satisfaction that by the time of the review conference, more than one hundred 
countries had become parties to the BTWC, including all permanent members of the 
UN Security Council. ' 6 Also, the General Assembly resolution underscored the 
importance of the BTWC's universality by calling on all signatory states that had not 
ratified the treaty to do so without delay as well as by calling on those states that had 
not yet signed the BTWC to do so at an early date. (Yearbook of the United Nations 
1986,1990: 65) 
In November 1987, Iran sponsored the UN General Assembly resolution 42/37 B that 
also pertained to the follow-up of the September 1986 review conference. Specifically, 
the resolution concerned the timetable of the exchange of information agreed upon by 
the BTWC states parties at the conference. 17 In order to generate trust among the 
BTWC member states that the convention's provisions were respected, the second 
review conference had agreed on the implementation of a set of diplomatic steps 
generally known as the BTWC confidence-building measures A, B, C, and D. These 
16 The Islamic Republic had expressed its satisfaction with the broad member base of the BTWC already 
in its address to the September 1986 review conference (B WC/CONF. II/SR. 8,1986: 11). 17 For the details of the General Assembly resolution 42/37 B, see Yearbook of the United Nations 198, 
(1992: 71-72). 
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voluntary, politically binding measures - which aimed to increase the transparency of 
the activities that involved the use of biological agents and toxins and were permitted by 
the BTWC - included the following undertakings: exchange of data on relevant research 
centers and laboratories (the so-called BTWC confidence-building measure A); 
exchange of information on all outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurances 
caused by toxins that seem to deviate from the normal pattern (confidence-building 
measure B); encouragement of publication of results of biological research directly 
related to the BTWC (confidence-building measure C); and active promotion of 
contacts between scientists engaged in biological research (confidence-building measure 
D). (Yearbook of the United Nations 1987,1992: 71-72; Goldblat 1987: 412 and Sims 
2001: 61,64-65) 
In the course of 1987 and 1988, the Islamic Republic kept on using multilateral 
diplomatic discussions on biological arms control as a venue to warn the international 
community of serious consequences if it continued to remain indifferent to Iraq's 
chemical warfare. Alluding to the report of the UN specialist group set by the UN 
secretary-general in the spring of 1987 to investigate the use of chemical weapons in the 
Iran-Iraq war, Iranian representatives argued that international disinterest in Iraq's 
chemical crimes could irreparably weaken the Geneva Protocol and lead to a situation 
where the world would face an additional spectre, that of biological warfare. The 
Iranian references to the potential threat of biological weapons use suggested, for their 
part, that the Islamic Republic's earlier accusations of Iraq having used biological 
agents in the Iran-Iraq war had been unfounded. (CD/PV. 425,1987: 4 and CD/PV. 460, 
1988: 29) 
4.2.2 From the cease-fire to the formation of the BTWC Ad Hoc Group 
The coming into force of the cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war did not alter the Islamic 
Republic's arms control priorities. As the post-war relations between Iran and Iraq 
remained highly tense and Iraq's chemical weapons continued to pose a major threat to 
the security of the Islamic Republic, international efforts pertaining to biological arms 
control were not of primary interest to Iranian decision-makers. At the same time, 
however, the issue of biological weapons was not totally absent from Iran's immediate 
post-war diplomatic argumentation. Thus, in October 1989, for example, the Islamic 
Republic's foreign minister, in his address to the UN General Assembly, asserted that 
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the international community's indifference to Iraq's chemical warfare during the Iran- 
Iraq war had encouraged Iraq not only to build significant arsenals of chemical and 
biological weapons, but also to qualitatively improve the lethality of the WMD in its 
possession (A/44/PV. 13,1989: 94-95). 
Similarly, in March 1990, some five months before Iraq invaded neighbouring 
Kuwait, foreign minister Vilayati voiced his government's concern over the military 
capabilities and intentions of Saddam Hussein's Iraq. According to Vilayati, Iraq was 
engaged in an "extensive and ambitious" program of developing and stockpiling both 
chemical and biological weapons. Alluding to Iraq's arms ambitions, the Islamic 
Republic pointed out that the Middle East must be free from all kinds of WMD, 
including biological armaments. (CD/PV. 543,1990: 11 and A/C. 1/44/PV. 13,1989: 11) 
4.2.2.1 The 1991 BTWC review conference 
The Third Review Conference of the BTWC, held in Geneva in September 1991, 
marked the beginning of active Iranian diplomacy in the area of biological arms control. 
On the one hand, the timing of this change in Iran's diplomacy was related to the fact 
that the conference took place after Iraq had suffered a major defeat in the brief war of 
January-February 1991 against the U. S. -led coalition forces. In other words, the 
diminished danger of Iraq enabled Iranian officials to devote more attention to long- 
term diplomatic efforts and to put more emphasis on the issue of biological weapons. 
On the other hand, the Gulf conflict of 1990-1991 itself had demonstrated that Iraq's 
biological warfare capabilities constituted a direct threat to a number of countries, 
including Iran. First of all, the coalition forces had fought the war against Iraq under the 
shadow of the possibility that Iraq's military might resort to chemical and biological 
warfare. Secondly, and more importantly, the first post-Gulf conflict biological weapons 
inspection in Iraq - carried out by UNSCOM in August 1991 - had confirmed that Iraq, 
a signatory to the BTWC, had been capable of researching, producing, testing, and 
storing biological warfare agents (Pearson 1993: 122). 18 Thus, whether or not the 
Iranian claim that the UNSCOM's findings had merely confirmed what the authorities 
of the Islamic Republic had already known and warned for19 was true, the ramifications 
18 It was not until 1995 that Iraq itself admitted to having pursued a biological weapons program 
(Smithson 2004: 169). 
19 Author's interview with A. A. Soltanieh, Geneva, 22 July 2002. 
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of the UN weapons inspections in Iraq doubtlessly increased the importance of 
biological arms control on Islamic Iran's diplomatic agenda. 
The 1990-1991 Gulf conflict and its aftermath left a major mark on the September 
1991 BTWC review conference. Whereas at the time of the second review conference 
five years earlier many had still questioned the military value and utility of biological 
armaments (Goldblat 1987: 413), the Gulf conflict - together with fresh Western 
intelligence reports of biological weapons proliferation in the developing world - had 
brought about a dramatic change in the diplomatic mood. Hence, by the time of the 
Third Review Conference, the lure of biological armaments and the dangers posed by 
their proliferation had been widely recognized, a development which had resulted in 
renewed interest among the states parties in the development and strengthening of the 
BTWC. 
Iran's pronouncements at the 1991 review conference reflected the new diplomatic 
circumstances. According to Iranian representatives, the Iran-Iraq war and the Gulf 
conflict had convinced the international community that "weapons of mass destruction 
must be annihilated. " And due to the significant advances in biotechnology, the Iranians 
continued, biological weapons now constituted a serious threat to international security. 
In the Islamic Republic's opinion, the positive post-Cold War climate of the early 1990s 
in international politics offered a good opportunity for the states parties to improve the 
BTWC. Pointing to the central issue discussed at the review conference - that is, to the 
development of a legally binding verification mechanism for the convention -, the 
Iranians noted that they shared the other conference participants' worries about the 
proliferation of biological armaments as well as about the military potential of 
biotechnology, and that their country would support the development of a BTWC 
verification system intended for ensuring that governments fulfill their obligations 
under the convention. (Ranjbar 1991: 1-2) 
In this context, however, Iranian representatives drew a qualitative distinction 
between two broad classes of non-compliance with the BTWC and argued that 
international responses to cases of non-compliance should vary according to the 
violation in question. The use of biological weapons, the officials of the Islamic 
Republic specified, was the gravest form of BTWC non-compliance and thereby 
required immediate reaction and verification measures on the part of the states parties, 
including on-site inspections. On the other hand, Iranian representatives continued, 
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other types of treaty non-compliance should be treated differently, 20 in addition to 
which a specific set of verification measures should be developed to monitor states' 
activities in the development, production, stockpiling, and transfer of biological agents. 
Referring to article VI of the BTWC, the Islamic Republic also stressed that when 
dealing with potential cases of treaty violation, the UN Security Council should remain 
objective and refrain from discriminatory decisions based on political expediency. 
Finally, the Iranians expressed their view, shared by many other conference delegations 
as well, that the creation of a verification mechanism for the BTWC should take place 
within the framework of an additional protocol, thus leaving the main text of the 
convention untouched. 21 (BWC/CONF. III/23,1991: 111-112; Sims 2001: 57-58 and 
Ranjbar 1991: 5) 
Another major issue discussed at the 1991 review conference was the information 
exchange mechanism that had been agreed upon at the 1986 conference and which 
aimed at serving as a functional substitute for verification by generating confidence 
among the member states (Sims 2001: 23). The five-year period between the second and 
third review conferences had convinced the states parties that the scope of the BTWC 
confidence-building measures was too limited and that something had to be done to 
improve the poor record of participation by the states parties in the mechanism. The 
Iranians, who had sponsored the UN General Assembly resolutions of 1988 and 1989 
calling upon governments to partake in BTWC-related data exchange, 22 emphasized the 
important role information exchange in the strengthening of the BTWC and in the 
promotion of transparency among the states parties. Specifically, they alluded to the 
importance of the exchange of laboratorial information and named the document center 
of the UN secretariat as the focal point for data exchange between the BTWC member 
states. (Rosenberg 1993: 70 and Ranjbar 1991: 4) 
As for other issues related to the review conference, Iranian representatives critically 
pointed out that the BTWC lacked definitions so far as the terms "microbial or other 
20 No details were provided here. 21 In the end, the review conference discussions on a BTWC verification apparatus led to a decision 
according to which an Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts would be established to identify and 
examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint. The decision was a 
compromise between the majority view that favoured verification and the position of the United States 
which held that the creation of an effective verification system would not be possible and that, in fact, an 
ineffective verification mechanism would be dangerous because it could lull the states parties into a false 
sense of security. (Rosenberg 1993: 74-75 and Flowerree 1993: 1010) 
22 For the content of UN General Assembly resolutions 43/74 B of December 1988 and 44/115 C of 
December 1989, see Yearbook of the United Nations 1988 (1994: 78-79) and Yearbook of the United 
Nations 1989 (1997: 69-70). 
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biological agents" or "toxins" in article I of the convention were concerned. They also 
regretted that the term "peaceful purposes, " mentioned in the same article, had not been 
given a precise definition. These definitional shortcomings, the Iranian delegates 
stressed, had to be corrected so that the obligations of the states parties under the 
BTWC could be widened to include the obligation to declare what biological and toxin 
agents the member states possessed in their territory or under their control or 
juristiction. The states parties, the Iranians added, should also be obligated to declare 
the total quantities of such agents in national possession as well as the purposes the 
agents were serving. Such declarations, the officials of the Islamic Republic maintained, 
would enable the member states to embark on detailed data exchange on biological and 
toxin agents as well as on relevant equipment. Despite its review conference calls, 
however, the Islamic Republic itself had not hitherto participated in the BTWC's 
confidence-building mechanism. Neither had the Iranians given any reasons for their 
refusal to provide information nor suggested what might lead their government to 
change its behaviour in the matter. 23 (Ranjbar 1991: 2-3) 
Apart from the questions of verification and confidence-building, Iran's conference 
delegation pointed critically to the fact that the BTWC did not include an explicit 
prohibition on the use of biological weapons. 24 The Islamic Republic's interest in this 
definitional matter stemmed from the legal reality which made it possible for a country 
that was a party to both the BTWC and the Geneva Protocol to retain the reservations 
made to the protocol - concerning in-kind retaliation in the case of a chemical or 
biological attack - while simultaneously being bound not to develop, produce, 
stockpile, or otherwise acquire or retain biological weapons under the BTWC. In other 
23 The Third Review Conference of the BTWC developed the treaty's confidence-building mechanism, 
first of all, by refining the original measures adopted in 1986. This was the case especially with respect to 
the confidence-building measure A which was extended to politically obligate the states parties to provide 
information about national facilities which have a substantial proportion of their resources devoted to 
biological research and development. Secondly, the review conference added the following three new 
measures to the confidence-building mechanism: declaration of legislation, regulations, and other 
measures taken by the member states to implement the BTWC (the so-called confidence-building 
measure E); declaration of past activities in offensive and/or defensive biological research and 
development programs (confidence-building measure F); and declaration of all facilities producing 
vaccines for the protection of humans (confidence-building measures G). (Sims 2001: 70-73 and 
Flowerree 1993: 1010) 
24 At the time the BTWC was being negotiated in the early 1970s, the issue of an explicit prohibition on 
the use of biological weapons was hotly debated by the negotiating parties. In the end, such prohibition 
was left out of the treaty text due to legal considerations pertaining to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. It was 
feared that if an explicit ban on the use of biological weapons under all circumstances was written down 
into a separate biological disarmament treaty, it would undermine the Geneva Protocol's norm against 
chemical warfare because no independent treaty stipulating a similar ban on the use of chemical 
armaments existed at the time. (Sims 2001: 152) 
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words, Iran, which had not reserved itself the right to retaliate when joining the Geneva 
Protocol, wondered how the reservations made to the protocol could be compatible with 
the BTWC's prohibition of biological weapons possession. 25 
This legal contradiction and the lack of an explicit prohibition on the use of 
biological weapons in the BTWC, Iranian officials asserted, constituted "a serious 
potential danger to international peace and security. " As a result, Iranian delegates 
asked the review conference to consider how the states parties could correct the existing 
situation, in addition to which they called on all non-members of the Geneva Protocol to 
immediately join that instrument without any reservations and on all governments still 
retaining protocol reservations that did not exclude biological weapons from the scope 
of a national retaliation to cancel them. By joining the Geneva Protocol or by 
withdrawing their reservations to the protocol, the Iranians underlined, governments 
would contribute to the strengthening of the Geneva Protocol and thereby to the 
consolidation of the BTWC. 26 In this connection, the officials of the Islamic Republic 
also emphasized the importance of the BTWC's universality. Alluding specifically to 
the Middle Eastern context, they regretted that the "Zionist regime" had not joined 
either the NPT or the BTWC and portrayed Israel's reluctance to join those treaties as a 
source of tension in the region. (Ranjbar 1991: 3-4) 
Yet another issue raised by the Islamic Republic at the 1991 review conference 
involved article VII of the BTWC which deals with international assistance to those 
state parties that have become victims of a violation of the treaty. 27 Iran's delegates 
noted that no detailed mechanism existed for the implementation of article VII and 
suggested that the UN and the world organization's specialized agencies could take the 
responsibility for devising a set of potential measures in this respect. The idea of the 
establishment of an international assistance fund was put forth by the Iranians as one 
25 For a detailed discussion of the legal relationship between the Geneva Protocol reservations and the 
BTWC, see Sims (2001: 152-162). 
26 The 1991 BTWC review conference addressed the issue of Geneva Protocol reservations by stressing, 
in its final declaration, the importance of the withdrawal of "all reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol 
related to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention" (Final Declaration of the Third Review 
Conference 1991: 11). 
27 Article VII of the BTWC reads as follows: "Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to provide 
or support assistance, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to any Party to the Convention 
which so requests, if the [UN] Security Council decides that such Party has been exposed to danger as a 
result of violation of the Convention. " Article VII thus only applies to cases in which both the treaty 
violator and the victim of the violation are parties to the BTWC, in addition to which it gives the UN 
Security Council the ultimate power to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether international 
assistance under the BTWC is necessary or not. 
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step towards giving a concrete substance to article VII. 28 The representatives of the 
Islamic Republic made a conference initiative with regard to article X of the BTWC as 
well. 29 Iran's proposal called for the establishment of a UN-supervised world data bank 
intended for "smoothing the flow of information in the field of genetic engineering, 
biotechnology and other scientific developments. " This Iranian initiative became 
recorded in the review conference's final declaration. 30 (Ibid.: 4; BWC/CONF. III/23, 
1991: 113,120 and Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference 1991: 13) 
4.2.2.2 The VEREX deliberations of 1992-1993 
Following the 1991 BTWC review conference, international diplomatic efforts in the 
area of biological arms control continued to center around the topic of verification. As 
already mentioned above, at the Third Review Conference the states parties had agreed 
to create an Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to identify, examine, and evaluate 
from a scientific and technical standpoint potential verification measures with respect to 
the prohibitions of the convention. 31 The Islamic Republic held to its newly invigorated 
approach to biological arms control by actively participating in the VEREX process 
28 Eventually, Iran's fund proposal did not receive the review conference's support and the initiative was 
not recorded in the final declaration of the conference. Instead, the relevant section of the final declaration 
read as follows: "The Conference considers that in the event that this article [VII] might be invoked, the 
United Nations, with the help of appropriate intergovernmental organizations such as the World Health 
Organization (WHO), could play a coordinating role. " (Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference 
1991: 11) 
29 According to article X of the BTWC, the states parties "undertake to facilitate, and have the right to 
participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological 
information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. " The states 
parties, the article reads, "shall also cooperate in contributing individually or together with other States or 
international organizations to the further development and application of scientific discoveries in the field 
of bacteriology (biology) for prevention of disease, or for other peaceful purposes. " Article X further 
states that the BTWC "shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or 
technological development of States Parties to the Convention or international cooperation in the field of 
peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities. " 
° The relevant section of the final declaration read as follows: "The Conference considers that the 
establishment of a world data bank under the supervision of the United Nations might be a suitable way 
of facilitating the flow of information in the field of genetic engineering, biotechnology and other 
scientific developments" (Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference 1991: 13). 
31 This group of verification experts, which came to be known as VEREX, decided to focus its work on 
21 potential verification measures. They fell into two broad categories, off-site and on-site measures. The 
former consisted of four main types of activity: information monitoring (consisting of publication 
surveillance, legislation surveillance, data on transfers and transfers requests, multilateral information 
sharing, and exchange visits); data exchange (declarations including notification); remote sensing 
(satellite, aircraft, and ground-based surveillance); and inspections (sampling and identification and 
observation and auditing). The latter were composed of international arrangements; inspections 
(interviewing, visual inspection, identification of key equipment, auditing, sampling, and identification 
and medical examination); and continuous monitoring (instruments and personnel). For the details of the 
VEREX process, see Leitenberg (1996: 48-51) and Sims (2001: 94-103). 
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which began in March 1992 and ended in September 1993.32 Iran's VEREX delegation 
included experts from such national agencies and institutions as the foreign ministry, the 
Razi Vaccine and Serum Research Institute, as well the Medical Scientific University of 
Tehran. Iranian representatives' specific responsibilities in the VEREX process included 
work on on-site inspections - and specifically on the issues of interviewing, visual 
inspection, and medical examination - as well as on the observation element of off-site 
inspections. 
The Islamic Republic's diplomatic pronouncements in the course of the VEREX 
process testified to a cautious Iranian approach to verification. Iran's VEREX 
representatives recognized that the BTWC needed a verification mechanism but, still, 
the major part of their argumentation focused on the verification system's potential 
problems. The financial implications of verification were among the chief Iranian 
worries. Airing the sentiment common among developing countries, the Islamic 
Republic argued that the running of a verification system, even a simple one, would be 
extremely expensive. Moreover, the Iranians stressed that beside the direct expenses 
involved, one should take into account the potential indirect costs. Such costs, Iranian 
officials noted, could include the rise in prices of many raw materials due to the efforts 
by the developed countries' biological industries to compensate for the added expenses 
caused by verification. Iran also feared that rising industry costs could give birth to 
corporate mergers creating industry giants that would be capable of dictating the prices 
on the market. 33 (BWC/CONF. III/VEREX/WP. 25,1992: 3-4 and 
BWC/CONF. III/VEREX/WP. 27,1992: 3) 
In addition to emphasizing the necessity of a cost-effective verification system, the 
officials of the Islamic Republic noted that verification should not jeopardize BTWC 
states parties' commercial secrets and their confidential scientific and technological 
information. Furthermore, the Iranians expressed their concern over the effects of 
monitoring on the member states' sovereignty. Worried that verification could be used 
as a pretext for espionage, Iran's VEREX representatives spoke for the creation of a 
non-intrusive monitoring system which should not "look for violators, but rather to 
verify compliance. " This conceptual point of departure, the officials of the Islamic 
32 The 18-month VEREX exercise was divided into four sessions. The initial session (the so-called 
VEREX-1) took place between 30 March-10 April 1992, the second (VEREX-2) on 23 November-4 
December 1992, the third (VEREX-3) on 24 May-4 June 1993, and the final session between 13-24 
September 1993. 
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Republic maintained, should be combined with efforts to make the verification 
arrangement as reliable as possible. An unreliable monitoring system, the Iranians 
added, would generate false confidence in compliance among the states parties. 
(BWC/CONF. III/VEREX/WP. 25,1992: 4; BWC/CONF. III/VEREX/WP. 28,1992: 2 
and BWC/CONF. III/VEREX/WP. 94,1992: 1) 
It was during the VEREX process that the economic and technological aspects of the 
BTWC, as discussed in article X of the treaty, turned into a central theme in the Islamic 
Republic's biological arms control operations. Voicing the developing countries' 
common stand, Iran's VEREX representatives made it clear that the creation of a 
BTWC verification apparatus ought to be accompanied with measures that strengthen 
the international implementation of article X. Drawing a linkage between BTWC 
verification and the execution of article X, the officials of the Islamic Republic referred 
to comprehensive implementation of article X as an absolute necessity. Iran's VEREX 
representatives warned that the problems suffered by developing countries in the field of 
food production as well as disease control and prevention posed an immediate threat to 
Third World states' security and survival but also an indirect danger to the well-being 
and security of the developed world. (BWC/CONF. III/VEREX/WP. 25,1992: 2; 
BWC/CONF. III/VEREX/WP. 26,1992: 2-3 and BWC/CONF. III/VEREX/WP. 27, 
1992: 2-3) 
On the other hand, the Iranians actively called for concrete measures on the part of 
the advanced industrialized nations to ameliorate the medical, environmental, and 
agricultural problems suffered by the countries of the Third World - problems which, in 
the Iranian characterization, constituted a "natural biological bomb. " The best way to 
help the countries in trouble, the representatives of the Islamic Republic maintained, 
was to strengthen their material and intellectual resources in the field of biotechnology. 
Accordingly, Iran called on BTWC member states to devise, concomitantly with the 
efforts in the area of verification, mechanisms that would facilitate and accelerate 
biotechnology transfers to the Third World. The better the technology transferred, for 
example for the establishment of vaccine production facilities, the Iranians pointed out, 
the better the progress in the Third World would be. (BWC/CONF. III/VEREX/WP. 26, 
1992: 2; BWC/CONF. III/VEREX/WP. 25,1992: 2 and 
BWC/CONF. III/VEREX/WP. 94,1992: 1) 
;' The similarity of these Iranian concerns to those raised by the Islamic Republic in the context of the 
CWC is striking (see above the relevant passages in section 4.1). 
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With article X in mind, the officials of the Islamic Republic also forcefully spoke 
against restrictions on biological transfers and against other measures that might hamper 
the BTWC states parties' economic and scientific development. In Iran's view, trade 
and cooperation in the field of biotechnology should be free from political 
considerations, discriminative practices, and ill-founded arms proliferation suspicions, 
for such transfer restrictions could put human lives in the developing world at jeopardy. 
In this connection, Iranian representatives made a difference between BTWC states 
parties and countries that had not joined the treaty by suggesting that technology 
transfers to the latter should always be supervised by the WHO. As far as other Iranian 
comments on the implementation of article X were concerned, the officials of the 
Islamic Republic called on advanced industrialized nations, among others, to reduce the 
prices of biological materials exported to the Third World and to furnish developing 
countries with the latest scientific information on rare and exogenous diseases. 
(BWC/CONF. III/VEREX/WP. 27,1992: 3; BWC/CONF. III/VEREX/WP. 25,1992: 5 
and BWC/CONF. III/VEREX/WP. 26,1992: 3) 
Even though Iran's VEREX delegation insisted on meticulous international 
implementation of article X, it acknowledged that there was a fine line between peaceful 
and military application of biotechnology. Accordingly, the representatives of the 
Islamic Republic supported international measures that aimed at distinguishing between 
banned and legitimate biological activities. 34 But while some VEREX delegations were 
of the opinion that there was a need to create an independent international organization 
for the running of the planned BTWC verification arrangement, 35 the Iranians - who 
focused on pointing to the financial costs resulting from the creation of a new 
international agency - took an opposite view. According to the Islamic Republic, 
existing organizations, such as the WHO, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, as 
well as the UN Environment Programme, could well be charged with the task of 
monitoring. The WHO, for example, the Iranians argued, could conduct annual routine 
inspections at the biological facilities declared by the member states of the BTWC. 
34 As one Iranian VEREX paper put it: "[... ] with respect to biotechnological development in the last two 
decades and its position at the turn of the century, there are concerns that this technology might be 
misused for the production of biological weapons. Of course this is a legitimate concern which should be 
adequately addressed" (BWC/CONF. IIINEREX/WP. 25,1992: 3). 35 This view was prevalent, for example, among the countries of the European Union which subsequently, 
at the September 1994 BTWC Special Conference convened to examine the final report of VEREX, 
proposed the establishment of an independent verification inspectorate (Sims 2001: 111). 
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(BWC/CONF. III/VEREX/WP. 25,1992: 5 and BWC/CONF. III/VEREX/WP. 94,1992: 
2) 
As regards the individual verification measures identified, examined, and evaluated 
by VEREX, the Iranian delegation presented its own assessment of their usefulness and 
acceptability. Relying on what they labelled as a "quantitative approach, " the Iranians 
ranked the verification measures into an order of preference. 36 The measures that were 
most critically approached by the Islamic Republic included the following: aerial 
surveillance, satellite monitoring, intelligence activities, and export controls. 
(BWC/CONF. III/VEREX/WP. 30,1992: 1-8) 
The methods of verification aside, Iran's VEREX delegation also elaborated on the 
hypothetical scenario in which verification fails and biological weapons are being used. 
In such a situation, the Iranians concluded, the UN should have the capability to 
automatically dispatch a fact-finding team to the area where biological weapons use has 
occurred. By the same token, the representatives of the Islamic Republic noted, BTWC 
states parties should agree on the creation of an assistance mechanism that would be 
activated whenever a member state would become a victim of biological warfare. 
(BWC/CONF. III/VEREX/WP. 25,1992: 5) 
4.2.2.3 The Special Conference of 1994 
The pre-conference Iranian argumentation 
During 1992-1994, the Islamic Republic presented and promoted its views on 
biological arms control outside the VEREX framework as well. By doing so, Iranian 
authorities sought to support the work of their VEREX delegation and to underscore 
their positions on matters that had been raised in the VEREX talks and elsewhere. Thus, 
the officials of the Islamic Republic reaffirmed that there was an inseparable link 
between the development of a verification apparatus for the BTWC and comprehensive 
international implementation of the treaty's article X. Unlike in the context of earlier 
international arms control instruments, such as the CWC, the Iranians warned, this time 
36 There were seven basic criteria - all of which essentially epitomized the diplomatic concerns voiced by 
the Islamic Republic during the VEREX process - that were told to steer Iran's listing. In addition to 
weighing the reliability, practicability, feasibility, cost-effectiveness, and non-intrusiveness of the 
verification measures, the Iranians assessed to what extent such measures would put the states parties' 
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the states parties from the Third World would not yield to Western governments' 
verification aspirations, unless they were assured that the creation of the BTWC 
verification system would lead to the removal of all restrictions on the transfers, for 
peaceful purposes, of biological materials, equipment, and relevant scientific and 
technological information. The officials of the Islamic Republic called on the exporting 
countries to agree to a binding commitment to transfer biotechnology "at the broadest 
possible level" to the states parties from the developing world. (CD/PV. 659,1993: 7; 
A/CN. 10/PV. 186,1994: 23 and The Islamic Republic of Iran and Disarmament 1994: 
14,21) 
Iranian authorities regretted that developed countries had heretofore taken no heed of 
the developing countries' BTWC-related interests. In the Iranian opinion, the decision 
taken by the Australia Group in June 1993 to devise comprehensive export controls on 
biological agents and manufacturing equipment that could potentially be used in 
biological weapons programs was a good example of the developed countries' 
indifference to the needs of the Third World. 37 The Islamic Republic strongly 
condemned the Australia Group's June 1993 decision and said that it testified to the fact 
that the members of the group did not understand that a secured access to biotechnology 
had been, and still was, a key incentive for developing countries not only to join the 
BTWC, but also to comply with its provisions. Iranian representatives asserted that 
discriminatory, politically motivated "private club restrictions" seriously eroded the 
prospects for a consensus among the states parties in the issue of verification and 
merely contributed to an atmosphere of diplomatic suspicion and ill-will. They also 
emphasized that their country was ready to accept the creation of "transparent" 
international export controls but that such restrictions should, first, be agreed on within 
the BTWC framework and, secondly, be exclusively directed at countries that continued 
to remain outside the convention. (The Islamic Republic of Iran and Disarmament 1994: 
14,24; A/CN. 10/PV. 186,1994: 23 and The Islamic Republic of Iran: Myth and Reality 
1994: 270) 
scientific, technological, and commercial secrets into jeopardy or interfere with their national sovereignty. 
(BWC/CONF. III/VEREX/WP. 30,1992: 2) 
37 For the Australia Group's June 1993 meeting, see 
<http: //www. australiagroup. net/releases/ninety_three. htm> 
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According to Iran, it was an imperative for the states parties to try to ensure that the 
provisions of article I of the BTWC were universally respected. 38 Nevertheless, the 
officials of the Islamic Republic added, international efforts to prevent military 
applications of biotechnology had to be based on decisions made multilaterally, 
involving all BTWC member states. They also underscored that although a verification 
mechanism was needed to monitor the behaviour of the states parties, the future system 
should not be misused to meddle in their legitimate activities. (A/C. 1 /48/SR. 26,1993: 7 
and A/CN. 10/PV. 186,1994: 23) 
Iran's biological arms control argumentation of 1992-1994 included a strong regional 
dimension, too. The officials of the Islamic Republic were of the opinion that the 
positive diplomatic spirit of the "new international environment" had to be translated 
into WMD disarmament arrangements in regional settings and especially in conflict- 
ridden areas such as the Middle East. Repeating their standard diplomatic position, 
Iranian authorities demanded Israel to accede to the BTWC as well as to the NPT so that 
the Arab countries remaining outside the BTWC - most notably Egypt and Syria - 
would join the convention. While never linking its actual BTWC behaviour to Israel's 
policies, the Islamic Republic echoed the Arab governments' linkage thinking further 
by arguing that the Israeli treaty accessions would also increase the popularity of the 
planned BTWC verification system among the Arab states that were already parties to 
the BTWC but had adopted a skeptical attitude towards the verification mechanism. 
More fundamentally, the Iranians stressed, Israel's participation in the BTWC and the 
NPT would contribute, first, to diplomatic efforts aimed at finding a comprehensive 
solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and, secondly, to the formation of a WMDFZ in the 
Middle East. (CD/PV. 626,1992: 5-6; CD/PV. 659,1993: 8 and The Islamic Republic of 
Iran and Disarmament 1994: 15) 
Iranian officials claimed that the application of diplomatic double standard with 
respect to the Middle East by Western powers and especially the United States 
significantly contributed to Israel's unwillingness to respect the other regional states' 
arms control views. Not surprisingly, then, the authorities of the Islamic Republic took a 
critical stance on extra-regional proposals on Middle East arms control - such as the so- 
38 After the end of the VEREX process, the Islamic Republic characterized the VEREX talks as important 
and stressed the need for the creation of a BTWC verification system. The Iranians also declared their 
intention to be closely and constructively involved in the development and strengthening of the treaty. 
(The Islamic Republic of Iran and Disarmament 1994: 14 and The Islamic Republic of Iran: Myth and 
Reality 1994: 269-270) 
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called Bush initiative of 1991 which, among others, called on the regional states to join 
the BTWC - because they believed such proposals were designed to protect Israel's 
interests. Instead of asking Israel to end its WMD programs, the Iranians lamented, 
Western powers put diplomatic pressure on Arab governments to participate in 
international arms control instruments and accused regional countries such as Iran of 
harboring biological warfare ambitions, irrespective of the Islamic Republic's 
impeccable record in international arms control diplomacy. Iranian officials vehemently 
rejected all claims that their country was working on biological weapons and stressed, 
once again, that their government viewed all kinds of WMD as immoral. (Mashhadi 
1994: 82-83; Leitenberg 1996: 12 and Kharrazi 1994: 127) 
Iran argued that compared with the broader Middle Eastern arena, there were better 
chances for BTWC-related cooperation in the Persian Gulf because all the sub-regional 
states, save the United Arab Emirates, had acceded to the convention. 39 In November 
1991, the Islamic Republic had suggested at the UN that the Gulf countries should, with 
the world organization's support, give consideration to gradual establishment of joint 
verification mechanisms with regard to WMD and thereby mitigate existing tensions in 
Iran-GCC relations. In August 1993, the Islamic Republic's foreign minister specified 
the Iranian proposal by calling for expert consultations to prepare arrangements for joint 
verification of the BTWC within the region. (CD/PV. 659,1993: 8-9 and 
A/C. 1/46/PV. 42,1991: 42) 
After the Iranians - in September 1994 - had introduced the concept of a "defensive 
security scheme" as the guiding principle or model for the Gulf region's future security 
architecture, 40 they declared the "formulation of complementary regional verification 
mechanisms" for the BTWC as an integral component of that model and as a regional 
contribution to the broader international debate on the treaty's verification system. A 
more ambitious element in the security scheme promoted by the Islamic Republic - 
whose representatives invited other Gulf governments to put forward diplomatic 
initiatives for the development of an indigenous security architecture in the region - was 
the creation of a WMDFZ in the Persian Gulf. (CD/PV. 690,1994: 13 and The Islamic 
39 The United Arab Emirates remains the only Gulf Arab state that has not joined the BTWC. Saudi- 
Arabia and Kuwait ratified the treaty already in 1972, Qatar in 1975, whereas Bahrain's accession took 
place in October 1988 and Oman's in March 1992. As already noted above, Iraq did not join the BTWC 
until it was obliged to do so by the UN Security Council in June 1991. It should also be noted here that 
although Iranian authorities left the door open for Iraq's participation in joint Gulf security efforts, 
cooperation with an Iraqi government led by Saddam Hussein was effectively ruled out by them as 
politically impossible (see above section 3.7.1). 
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Republic of Iran and Disarmament 1994: 269 and The Islamic Republic of Iran: Myth 
and Reality 1994: 269-270) 
Iran's conference positions 
The discussion above of Islamic Iran's biological arms control operations testifies to 
a rapid evolution of Iranian diplomacy in a specific area of arms control. Prompted by 
the experiences and the end-result of the 1990-1991 Gulf conflict, as well as by the 
enhanced international efforts to improve the BTWC, the Islamic Republic formulated 
and presented the central features of its approach to biological arms control in the 
course of the early 1990s. Thus, by the time the states parties to the BTWC had 
gathered to a special conference in Geneva in September 1994 to examine the final 
report of VEREX, Iran's diplomatic stances on biological arms control were well 
known among the member states. 
This was the case in particular in regard to the linkage made by the Islamic Republic 
between the establishment of a BTWC verification system and what Iranian officials 
referred to as the "full implementation" of the treaty's article X. Together with China 
and India, Iran submitted a joint working paper at the Special Conference in which the 
three countries listed a set of article X-related factors which they laid down as a 
condition for their diplomatic support for a favourable decision on the verification 
mechanism. In the first place, Iran, China, and India demanded that the states parties 
from the developing world should have an "ensured access to materials, equipment and 
technology in the field of biology and biotechnology for peaceful purposes" and that the 
development of the BTWC verification mechanism should be "combined with 
guarantees for full access" to biological materials, equipment, and technology. 
(BWC/SPCONF/1,1994) 
Secondly, Iran, China, and India condemned the application of export controls 
against countries that had acceded to the BTWC and demanded that there should be no 
such restrictions among the states parties. To underline this point, the Islamic 
Republic's Special Conference delegation castigated the Australia Group's 1993 
decision to include biological agents and biological manufacturing equipment in its 
control list and said that the group's decision was in contravention with the BTWC. If 
the states parties were expected to "accede to the demands of verification, " Iran 
40 See section 3.7.1 pp. 179-180. 
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reiterated, all "arbitrary" export control arrangements had to be removed. Finally, the 
Islamic Republic, China, and India emphasized that the creation of a BTWC verification 
system should by no means hinder the development and promotion of cooperation 
between the states parties in the area of peaceful application of biotechnology. To the 
contrary, verification should be coupled with enhanced article X-related cooperation. 
(Ibid. and Nasseri 1994) 
As far as the planned BTWC verification apparatus was concerned, the three 
governments made a call for the creation of a cost-effective mechanism. In the view of 
Iran, China, and India, the establishment of an independent verification agency, such as 
the OPCW, was not desirable because it would produce a large and expensive 
bureaucracy. Instead, the three governments suggested, the states parties should make 
better use of existing international organizations. The WHO, for example, was said to 
be in a good position to assume biological verification responsibilities. Even though the 
joint working paper presented by Iran, China, and India did not elaborate on the 
individual verification measures that had been discussed during the VEREX process, its 
emphasis on off-site measures revealed the preferences of the three governments so far 
as the nature of the BTWC's verification system was concerned. 4' (BWC/SPCONF/l, 
1994 and Nasseri 1994) 
At the 1994 Special Conference, the member states of the BTWC not only discussed 
the findings and the final report of VEREX, but also took a significant diplomatic step 
by establishing a BTWC Ad Hoc Group (AHG), open to all the states parties, "to 
consider appropriate measures, including possible verification measures, and draft 
proposals to strengthen the Convention, to be included, as appropriate, in a legally 
binding instrument. " The AHG was mandated to carry out the following specific tasks: 
1) to define terms and objective criteria, such as lists of bacteriological (biological) 
agents and toxins, their threshold quantities, as well as equipment and types of 
activities, where relevant for specific measures designed to strengthen the BTWC; 2) to 
incorporate existing and additional enhanced confidence-building and transparency 
measures into the BTWC's verification regime; 3) to develop a system of measures to 
41 The final report of VEREX had drawn three main conclusions. First, the report stated that potential 
verification measures could be useful in varying degrees in enhancing confidence that the states parties 
are committed to their BTWC obligations. Secondly, the report concluded that no single verification 
measure was capable of indisputably differentiating between permitted and prohibited biological 
activities, even if verification measures were seen in the report as capable of providing information of 
varying utility in strengthening the BTWC. Thirdly, the VEREX report noted that the implementation of 
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promote compliance with the BTWC, including, as appropriate, measures identified, 
examined, and evaluated in the VEREX report; 42 and 4) to delineate specific measures 
designed to ensure effective and full implementation of article X of the convention. 43 
(BWC/SPCONF/1,1994) 
From the Islamic Republic's point of view, the mandate of the AHG seemed 
satisfactory, for the BTWC states parties' understanding that the aim of the AHG's 
work was to strengthen the treaty in a comprehensive manner - together with the 
specific reference to article X-related AHG activities - was of particular importance to 
the Iranians. 44 However, Iran's view of the AHG negotiations' prospects for success 
was not equally enthusiastic. In the Iranian opinion, there were a number of factors that 
continued to undermine international diplomatic efforts in the area of biological 
disarmament. These included the ambiguities regarding the major powers' military 
doctrines, the reservations concerning in-kind retaliation made to the 1925 Geneva 
Protocol, the poor results of the BTWC's data exchange mechanism, 45 and finally, the 
security problems in the Middle East as well as the lack of outside interest in improving 
the security situation in the region. But still, Iranian officials expressed their satisfaction 
with the Special Conference's decision to establish the AHG and pointed out that the 
future protocol prepared by the group should be acceded to and observed by all the 
member states of the BTWC. (Nasseri 1994 and A/C. 1/49/PV. 9,1994: 15) 46 
verification measures should not jeopardize sensitive commercial proprietary information and states' 
national security interests. (Kadlec et al. 1999: 102-103) 
42 The Special Conference stressed that the measures designed to promote compliance with the BTWC 
"should apply to all relevant facilities and activities, be reliable, cost effective, non-discriminatory and as 
non-intrusive as possible, consistent with the effective implementation of the system and should not lead 
to abuse" (B WC/SPCONF. / 1,1994). 
43 In this connection, the Special Conference also noted that the provisions of the BTWC "should not be 
used to impose restrictions and/or limitations on the transfer for purposes consistent with the objectives 
and the provisions of the Convention of scientific knowledge, technology, equipment and materials" 
(ibid. ). 
as At the Special Conference, the Islamic Republic had argued that the mandate of the AHG should be as 
wide as possible so that the concerns of all member states would be taken into account in the group's 
work (Nasseri 1994). 
°S Referring to the BTWC's confidence-building mechanism, Iranian officials lamented that the 
information provided by the states parties since the 1991 review conference had been "general and 
selective" (ibid. ). What they did not touch upon was the fact that the Islamic Republic itself had continued 
to refrain from participating in the data exchange. And as before, the Iranians had not given any reasons 
for their non-participation in the BTWC's confidence-building mechanism. It should be noted that, 
shortly before the Special Conference, the Islamic Republic had informed that it was in the process of 
collecting national data to be submitted to the states parties as soon as possible (The Islamic Republic of 
Iran and Disarmament 1994: 14). 
46 Thus, the Iranians were of the opinion that if the states parties wanted to create a separate verification 
protocol for the BTWC, they could not treat it as a legally independent instrument. A verification 
protocol, the officials of the Islamic Republic asserted, would be an integral part of the BTWC and, 
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4.2.3 The Ad Hoc Group years, 1995-2001 
The Ad Hoc Group of the states parties to the BTWC started its work in the 
beginning of 1995. On 4-6 January, it convened in Geneva for the inaugural procedural 
session with the participation of 49 countries, including Iran. The Islamic Republic took 
actively part in the group's work throughout the process. As characterized by one well- 
informed observer, of the some 40-50 states that regularly participated in the AHG talks 
of 1995-2001, Iran was among the 10-12 countries that formed the group's core 
(Dando 2000). 
At the second meeting of the AHG in July 1995, the group's chairman appointed four 
so-called Friends of the Chair to assist him in the consultations and negotiations on the 
four issues in the AHG's mandate - that is, definition of terms and objective criteria, 
confidence-building and transparency measures, measures to promote compliance, and 
measures related to article X. The Friend of the Chair position concerning the 
definitions was allotted to the Islamic Republic and was taken over by Ali Akbar 
Muhammadi, the president of the Razi Vaccine and Serum Research Institute. As far as 
the other AHG representatives of the Islamic Republic were concerned, they came, for 
the most part, from the Iranian foreign and defence ministries but also included medical 
and technical advisers from other relevant national agencies. 
4.2.3.1 The Fourth Review Conference of the BTWC 
Between January 1995 and mid-July 1997, as the members of the AHG were busy 
with preliminary elaboration of the elements of a protocol strengthening the BTWC, 
Iran's biological arms control operations took mostly place in other international fora, 
for example, at the Fourth Review Conference of the BTWC held in Geneva on 25 
November-4 December 1996. The Islamic Republic's main input to the review 
conference deliberations was the submission of a proposal for the amendment of the 
BTWC through the insertion of the word 'use' in the title and article I of the convention. 
Continuing from where it had left off at the 1991 review conference, Iran maintained 
that the lack of an explicit treaty provision banning the use of biological weapons, 
together with the retaliation reservations made to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, provided a 
therefore, the member states should not be given the freedom to decide whether to accede to the protocol 
or not. (Nassen 1994) 
315 
legal loophole for those who wished to challenge the notion that both the Geneva 
Protocol and the BTWC, as well as customary international law, already forbade the use 
of biological armaments. (Nassen 1996: 2-3 and Zanders et al. 1997: 457) 
Specifically, the representatives of the Islamic Republic raised the possibility that the 
countries that had joined the Geneva Protocol with retaliation reservations might argue 
that, in their case, only the first use of biological weapons was prohibited. States 
asserting that the use of biological armaments could be legitimate under certain 
circumstances, the Iranians warned, might try to support their claim by referring to 
article VIII of the BTWC which prescribes that nothing in the convention shall be 
interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any 
state under the Geneva Protocol. 47 (Nasseri 1996: 3-4) 
Iran's treaty amendment proposal was supported by several conference members of 
the group of non-aligned countries, such as India, Pakistan and Mexico. Nonetheless, 
the majority of the states parties was not willing to back the Iranian request. Western 
governments and Russia, for example, argued that although not explicitly written down, 
the ban on use was already included in the BTWC. Therefore, there was no reason to 
open the convention for amendments and to question the treaty provisions that had 
functioned well for over two decades. Some delegations warned that since a treaty 
amendment would have to be individually ratified by each state party, if accepted, the 
Iranian-driven amendment could be ratified by some but ignored by others. In such an 
eventuality, those rejecting the amendment would appear to condone the use of 
biological armaments. (BWC/CONF. IV/9,1996) 
The delegates of the Islamic Republic responded to this legal argument by stating that 
it had its merits, for it might, indeed, take a long time for some states to ratify the 
amendment. Therefore, the Iranians opined, the states parties attending the review 
conference should make an unequivocal declaration in which they would express their 
unanimous view that the original text of the BTWC prohibited the use of biological 
weapons. After doing that, the Iranian delegates continued, the states parties could 
safely adopt the treaty amendment and wait for the subsequent ratifications to take 
place. Hoping that its amendment proposal would be accepted, and supported by a 
number of non-aligned countries, the Islamic Republic suggested that a special BTWC 
conference would be convened to deal with the issue. Yet, most review conference 
47 At the 1996 review conference, the Iranians called on all the states that maintained reservations to the 
Geneva Protocol to withdraw them as quickly as possible (BWC/CONF. IV/9,1996). 
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delegations were of the view that a reaffirmation in the conference's final declaration 
that the BTWC forbids the use of biological weapons would be the appropriate step for 
the time being. In the end, this opinion prevailed, and the Fourth Review Conference 
eventually reaffirmed that any use of biological weapons would involve a breach of the 
convention. This diplomatic move effectively foiled the Islamic Republic's further 
efforts in the matter. (Nasseri 1996: 5 and BWC/CONF. IV/9,1996) 
In the amendment proposal's shadow, the Islamic Republic's review conference 
delegates raised also other issues that were of relevance to the conference and to the 
international biological arms control debate in general. Underlining the importance of 
article X in the BTWC, they repeated the standard Iranian position according to which 
no interpretation of the treaty justified restrictions on the transfers of biological 
materials, equipment, and technology for peaceful purposes between the states parties. 
The officials of the Islamic Republic demanded the conference participants to remove 
among themselves all existing restrictions on biological transfers and to embark upon 
multilateral negotiations, within the BTWC framework, with the aim of devising 
transfer guidelines not only in respect of the states parties but also vis-a-vis the 
countries that had not joined the convention. Moreover, the Iranians asserted that the 
BTWC obligated the states parties to do their utmost to promote cooperation between 
developed and developing countries in the field of biology and biotechnology. The 
increased threat of the spread of contagious diseases and infections, among others, was 
told to by the Iranians to make such cooperation an urgent necessity. (Nasseri 1996: 2, 
5-6) 
As far as other articles of the BTWC were concerned, the Islamic Republic's article 
VII-related request that the AHG would "discuss the detailed procedure for assistance in 
order to ensure that timely emergency assistance would be provided by the states parties 
if requested" was registered, in a slightly modified form, in the review conference's 
final declaration. 48 With regard to article V, which obligates the states parties to 
cooperate in solving treaty-related problems, the Iranians maintained that it provided 
"an appropriate framework for resolving any problems which may arise in relation to 
the objective, or in the application, of the provisions of the Convention. " In addition, 
48 Generally, Iranian representatives tried to avoid making linkages between the work of the Fourth 
Review Conference and that of the AHG. Although, in the Iranian opinion, one of the review 
conference's functions was to support the on-going AHG negotiations, the Islamic Republic pointed out 
that the conference "cannot be overshadowed and indeed stands well above those negotiations or any 
-44 
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they stressed that the states parties should refrain from taking unilateral action in 
resolving any concerns with regard to the implementation of the treaty. Finally, in 
respect of article VI, which contains the BTWC's complaint procedure, the Islamic 
Republic emphasized that even if the complaint mechanism centered around the UN 
Security Council, that fact should not prevent the states parties from collectively 
discussing and making decisions on cases of non-compliance and other violations of the 
BTWC. (BWC/CONF. IV/9,1996 and Sims 2001: 60) 
During the first phase of the AHG talks in 1995-1997, Iranian officials also kept on 
advancing their government's views on biological disarmament in the regional Middle 
Eastern setting. They called for the establishment of a WMDFZ in the Middle East and 
noted that the regional states' participation in all major international arms control 
instruments, including the BTWC, was a prerequisite for such a zone. As before, the 
Iranians put the blame for the poor state of arms control in the Middle East on Israel. On 
the one hand, the officials of the Islamic Republic argued, Israel's policies of 
"aggression, occupation and expansionism" undermined the cause of regional arms 
control. On the other hand, Israel's refusal to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA 
safeguards and to join the NPT, the CWC, as well as the BTWC, the Iranians pointed 
out, constituted a fundamental obstacle to a WMD-free Middle East. According to Iran, 
the major powers' support of Israel and their "short-sighted and discriminatory" 
attempts to secure their dominance and interests in the Middle East further aggrevated 
the region's security problems. (A/50/PV. 5,1995: 30-31; A/C. 1/50/PV. 11,1995: 13 
and Sadeghi-Dolatabadi 1995: 142) 
Once again, the political situation in the Gulf sub-region was told by the Iranians to 
offer better prospects for arms control. As a result, the officials of the Islamic Republic, 
who underscored their country's benevolent intentions and its commitment to 
international arms control arrangements, continued to call for Iranian-GCC security 
discussions and for the establishment of a WMDFZ in the Gulf which, the Iranians 
maintained, was needed, among others, because of the threat posed by Iraq and its 
WMD. Given the rudimentary nature of security collaboration in the Persian Gulf, the 
Islamic Republic's Gulf diplomacy only seldom detached the issue of biological 
weapons from the general Iranian discussion on WMD. The idea of regional verification 
cooperation in respect of the BTWC remained the only Iranian arms control initiative 
matter of significance that concerns the evaluation of the Convention, its improvement and strengthening 
in any form" (Nasseri 1996: 1). 
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that exclusively focused on biological armaments. (Zarif 1995: 120; Zarif 1996: 451- 
452 and Sadeghi-Dolatabadi 1995: 149) 
4.2.3.2 Iran's argumentation in the AHG 
Implementation of article X 
Iran's diplomatic activities during the AHG deliberations focused first and foremost 
on issues related to article X of the BTWC. Together with their colleagues from other 
NAM states such as China, India, Pakistan, and Brazil, the officials of the Islamic 
Republic reminded their co-negotiators of their view that the efforts to strengthen the 
BTWC and to create a verification system for the treaty must be combined with 
promises to the Third World states parties of full access to biological technology and 
sciences. In return for committing themselves to the obligations of article I of the 
BTWC and for giving their political support to the planned verification mechanism, 
Iranian negotiators argued, Third World states had the right to ask advanced industrial 
countries to facilitate and promote the fullest possible exchange of biological materials, 
equipment, as well as relevant scientific and technological information for peaceful 
purposes between developed and developing nations. (Kharrazi 1998c; BWC/AD HOC 
GROUP/WP. 149,1997: 1 and BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 419,2000: 2) 
The Islamic Republic urged developed states to fulfill their responsibility to ensure 
"effective and full implementation" of the BTWC, among others, by concluding 
bilateral, regional, and multilateral cooperation agreements with developing countries in 
the area of disease prevention. Iran's AHG negotiators also called on advanced 
industrialized states to help developing nations to establish research institutes so that 
Third World countries would have sufficient infrastructural means to make advances in 
the application of biology and biotechnology. Beside rewarding those states that 
respected the BTWC and intended to adhere to the legally binding verification protocol 
under negotiation, the Iranians maintained, such measures would enable industrialized 
countries to ensure and control that the developing countries' biological activities would 
remain within what is permitted by international law. (BWC/AD HOC 
GROUP/WP. 149,1997: 2; A/C. 1/53/PV. 6,1998: 13 and Mashhadi 1999: 75) 
Arguing that the future BTWC protocol should include explicit provisions that strike 
a balance between the disarmament and the development aspects of the BTWC, the 
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Islamic Republic's AHG negotiators strongly condemned the existing extra- 
conventional export controls that were applied against some treaty members. According 
to the Iranians, such restrictions violated the letter and spirit of the BTWC, and by 
weakening confidence between the states parties and thereby adversely affecting 
international security, they put the effective implementation of the convention as well as 
the planned protocol in jeopardy. In addition, Iranian officials specifically alluded to the 
dire consequences of export controls to their own country. Export controls were told by 
them to have hampered development efforts in Iran, among others, in the country's 
medical sector and especially in Iranian vaccination centers. 49 
The Islamic Republic's export control criticism was directed above all against the 
Australia Group. The Iranians were strongly of the opinion that the group had to be 
resolved immediately after the BTWC protocol's entry into force and after the treaty 
organization charged with the responsibility to implement the protocol was in place. 
Iran's AHG negotiators maintained that the establishment of the Australia Group during 
the Iran-Iraq war had been an understandable effort to fill an arms control vacuum, but 
that upon the entry into force of the BTWC protocol, the activities of the group would 
have no raison d'etre whatsoever. Instead of relying on extra-conventional export 
control mechanisms and ad hoc arrangements, the Iranians continued, the states parties 
should agree on "multilaterally negotiated, non-discriminatory and legally binding" 
transfer guidelines that would be included in and constitute an integral part of the 
BTWC protocol. (Soltanieh 2001a: 3; Kharrazi 1998c and BWC/AD HOC 
GROUP/WP. 452,2001: 2) 
Furthermore, Iran's AHG negotiators stressed that the decision on the transfer 
guidelines should lead to the harmonization of national export control policies. The 
Iranians called on all the states parties to review their existing export regulations in the 
field of biology, genetic engineering, microbiology, and other related areas in order to 
render them consistent with the objectives of the BTWC. The harmonization process 
was defined by the Iranians as a legally binding obligation that should arise from the 
future verification protocol. (BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 149,1997: 1 and BWC/AD 
HOC GROUP/WP. 452,2001: 2) 
As a concrete example of what the states parties could agree on, the representatives of 
the Islamic Republic alluded to the idea of end-user certificates that would replace 
49 This paragraph draws upon A/C. 1/52/PV. I1 (1997: 20); BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 452 (2001: 2) 
and author's interview with A. A. Soltanieh, Geneva, 22 July 2002. 
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existing extra-conventional transfer regulations upon the BTWC protocol's entry into 
force. Such certificates, the Iranians clarified, would be required from all transfer 
recipients and they would contain an assurance by the recipients that the items procured 
would be used for peaceful purposes only and that they would not be re-transferred to a 
third country without the original supplier's authorization. In addition, the certificates 
would state the types and the quantities of the received items, the purposes for which 
the items were obtained, as well as the names and the addresses of the end-users. As far 
as technology transfers between BTWC states parties and non-parties were concerned, 
the Islamic Republic called for a separate set of measures to cover those transactions. 
(BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 148,1997: 1-2; Mashhadi 1999: 74 and Soltanieh 2001a: 
3) 
Like a number of other NAM countries, Iran was of the view that the BTWC-based 
multilateral export regulation arrangement it was advocating would have to include a 
mechanism to settle transfer-related disputes among the states parties. The details of 
such a mechanism were specified in an Iranian AHG working paper from August 2000 
and in an AHG paper submitted by the Islamic Republic together with eight other NAM 
countries some three months later. 50 The main point made in the two papers was that if a 
state party was denied a biological transfer for a reason that it considered inconsistent 
with the provisions of the BTWC and article VII of the BTWC protocol's rolling text, 5' 
it would have the right to seek the annulment of the denial through certain procedures. 
The mechanism put forward by Iran's AHG negotiators and their NAM collegues gave 
priority to bilateral consultations between the party that had made the transfer request 
and the party that refused to carry out the transfer, but it also envisioned a situation 
where such consultations would not result in a settlement in the matter. In such a case, 
the complaining state would have the right to rely on a set of institutional steps which, if 
not bringing about a change in the other party's position, would ultimately lead to the 
imposition of punitive measures on that country. (BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 426, 
2000: 1-3 and BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 432,2000: 1-2) 
so The other NAM countries behind the November 2000 working paper were as follows: China, Cuba, 
India, Indonesia, Libya, Mexico, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. For a comprehensive list of the working papers 
submitted to the AHG by the national delegations between January 1995 and December 2000, see 
Pearson (2000: 19). The number of working papers produced by the Iranian delegation during that period 
amounted to 14. 
51 Article VII of the rolling text was entitled "Scientific and Technological Exchange for Peaceful 
Purposes and Technical Cooperation. " The first rolling text of the BTWC protocol was issued in June 
1997. From July 1997 onwards, the rolling text formed the basis for AHG negotiations. For the structure 
of the rolling text, see Töth (1997: 5). 
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In order to further secure developing countries' interests in the planned BTWC 
protocol, in March 1997 the Islamic Republic's AHG negotiators submitted a working 
paper which called for the establishment of a reporting system for the protocol that 
would obligate the states parties to make periodic declarations on the measures they had 
taken to implement the provisions of article X. The declarations would be examined in 
accordance with specific procedures outlined in the protocol, and after such 
examinations, recommendations regarding the implementation of article X would be 
made to the member states. Iranian representatives elaborated on the matter in another 
working paper in September 1997 in which they called for annual declarations that 
would cover all the measures taken by the states parties - individually or together with 
other countries or international organizations - in implementing article X. The Iranian 
paper also reserved the states parties the right to make declarations on any restrictions 
on the transfers of biological materials, equipment, and technology identified by them. 
(BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 149,1997: 2 and BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 227, 
1997: 1) 
The issue of article X declarations was jointly discussed by the group of NAM 
countries at the 13th session of the AHG in January 1999. The working paper by the 
NAM delegations on the matter stated that the states parties would have to annually 
provide a general description of the measures they had taken to facilitate the fullest 
possible exchange of biological materials, equipment, as well as relevant scientific and 
technological information for peaceful purposes. In a similar fashion, the member states 
would have to provide general information on the measures taken to promote the 
development and application of scientific discoveries for disease prevention or other 
peaceful purposes. The NAM paper also called on the states parties to provide 
information on any other measures taken by them to implement article X of the BTWC 
as well as on the specific steps taken by them to review their existing national trade 
legislation and regulations. (BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 350,1999: 1) 
Moreover, Iran and other NAM countries called for the establishment of a 
Cooperation Committee that would act as one of the BTWC protocol's subsidiary 
organs. The NAM working paper of January 1999 stated that the general purpose of the 
committee would be to ensure that article X of the BTWC and article VII of the protocol 
were effectively and fully executed. The powers and the functions of the committee 
would include the review of the functioning of the voluntary fund that would be created 
to finance scientific and technological cooperation between the states parties. The 
--qq 
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committee would also be responsible for advancing cooperation among the states parties 
in the exchange of biological materials, equipment, and technology for peaceful 
purposes and for promoting the publication and distribution of relevant research data 
among them. In the NAM plan, the cooperation committee would submit an annual 
report to the Conference of the States Parties - the main decision-making body of the 
planned international agency charged with the task of overseeing the implementation of 
the BTWC protocol - which would contain the committee's proposals and 
recommendations on how to further improve the implementation of article X of the 
BTWC. (BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 349,1999: 1) 
Given that several Western countries were highly reluctant to give up their extra- 
conventional export control arrangements52 and to accept the article X-related proposals 
made by the Islamic Republic and its AHG allies, at times, Iran's negotiators resorted to 
thinly veiled diplomatic threats in order to emphasize the centrality of article X-related 
issues to their government. Already prior to, as well as at the early stages of, the AHG 
deliberations, the Islamic Republic had warned that developed countries' insensitivity to 
developing countries' concerns and interests could prompt the latter to block the 
establishment of a verification system for the BTWC or, at least, induce them to stay 
outside the future verification protocol. (Nasseri 1995b: 242-243 and A/C. 1/51/PV. 13, 
1996: 18) 
The fact that the Islamic Republic was forced to resort to tough diplomatic language 
as late as in the summer of 2001 tellingly illustrated the durability of the conflicting 
positions on article X among the AHG delegations. At the 24th session of the AHG in 
July-August 2001,53 Iranian representatives lamented that there still seemed to be 
confusion among some delegations about the group's mandate and continued to stress 
the necessity of comprehensive strengthening of the BTWC. Explicit assurances of 
effective and full implementation of article X, the Iranians declared, were a key 
negotiation objective for their country. As put by the Islamic Republic's main 
negotiator, his government "could not accept any measures or mechanism which 
deprive the States Parties to the future Protocol from the access to equipment, materials 
and technology for peaceful purposes. " (Soltanieh 2001a: 1-3) 
52 In September 1997, the chairman of the AHG summarized the views of such Western countries as 
follows: "[... ] several industrialized countries regard export control regimes both now and in the future as 
being a necessary element to meet their obligations under article III of the BTWC and as an important 
ingredient of an integrated non-proliferation regime" (ibid.: 4). 
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The verification system 
The other principal subject focused on by the representatives of the Islamic Republic 
during the AHG process was the planned verification system itself. Even though the 
Iranians persistently declared that the strengthening of the BTWC consisted of a set of 
individual diplomatic measures of which the creation of a verification system for the 
treaty was only one, they acknowledged the verification system's importance to the 
effectiveness of the BTWC and to the realization of the principle that all WMD, 
including biological armaments, should be eliminated. And even if Iran drew a close 
linkage between verification and comprehensive international implementation of article 
X of the BTWC, it was not among the Third World states parties to whom the security 
benefits of verification were of secondary interest. On the contrary, Iranian officials 
regularly referred to the verification system's importance and, accordingly, vowed to 
fully support the AHG's work on the matter. (Nasseri 1995b: 238; Kharrazi 1998c and 
CD/PV. 812,1999: 29) 
In spite of Iran's general support for the creation of a BTWC verification system, 
however, the Islamic Republic's AHG negotiators made a number of demands 
pertaining to the details of that system. In the first place, they stressed that the system 
had to be "non-discriminatory. " This demand entailed not only the requirement that all 
states parties to the BTWC protocol would have to be treated equally and objectively in 
connection with verification, but also that all the states parties would have to have the 
chance to take part in the decision-making on verification issues. In a related manner, 
Iran strongly opposed the view put forth in the AHG talks that the planned verification 
mechanism would consist of broadly defined guidelines and allow the inspectors in the 
field to make the decisions on verification details on the basis of the case and the 
circumstances in question. Instead, the Islamic Republic hoped to see a system with 
strict and detailed verification procedures that would be uniform for all, a system devoid 
of what the Iranians labelled as "ad hoc elements" and as the suspicious "UNSCOM 
mentality. , 54 
Moreover, the Islamic Republic's AHG delegates pointed out that the verification 
system under negotiation should respect the states parties' national sovereignty and not 
53 The July-August 2001 meeting was the last of the altogether 24 sessions held by the AHG since 
January 1995. 
54 This paragraph draws upon Vorobiev (1996: 3); Pearson (1997: 19) and author's interview with A. A. 
Soltanieh, Geneva, 22 July 2002. 
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be "too intrusive. " In particular, the Iranians underlined, BTWC verification should not 
compromise either the states parties' commercial proprietary information or their 
national security interests. According to the Islamic Republic, the protection of national 
security needs was more important because considerations pertaining to commercial 
proprietary information were primarily a concern of only a few advanced nations, 
whereas national security issues concerned all the states parties. In addition, Iranian 
representatives stressed that the BTWC and its verification protocol constituted a 
sufficient and the only legitimate international framework for addressing BTWC non- 
compliance issues. (Kharrazi 1998c; Soltanieh 2001 a: 2 and A/C. 1/54/PV. 12,1999: 28) 
Iran's views on how the BTWC protocol should regulate the investigation of disease 
outbreaks testified, for its part, to the Islamic Republic's effort to prevent BTWC 
verification from jeopardizing its national security. Thus, the conceptual differentiation 
made by the AHG negotiators of Iran - and other NAM countries as well - between 
natural and unusual outbreaks of disease was intended to safeguard the states parties' 
national sovereignty and military security. Due to the similarities between an 
epidemiological investigation of a natural disease outbreak and an investigation of 
biological weapons use, Iranian delegates wanted to ensure that epidemiological 
investigations would not be used as covers for foreign espionage. Iran argued that 
natural outbreaks of disease fell in the domain of public health and that the investigation 
and control of such cases was the exclusive responsibility of individual states - even if 
they sought international assistance to support their national efforts. No BTWC state 
party, Iranian officials added, should be obligated to prove that an outbreak of disease 
on its territory was of natural origin. (BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 262,1998: 1,3-4; 
Toth 1997: 4 and BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 369,1999: 1-2) 
At the same time, however, the Islamic Republic and its AHG allies recognized that 
an unusual disease outbreak55 could be an indication of biological weapons use. 
Therefore, they maintained, the parties to the BTWC protocol should have the right to 
request the investigation of such incidents if they had "legitimate non-compliance 
concerns. " Yet the NAM delegations also pointed out that the states parties' right to 
request an investigation should be accompanied by certain obligations. In essence, they 
pointed out, the state party making the request should furnish the Executive Council of 
55 In an AHG working paper jointly submitted by the NAM delegations in January 1998, an unusual 
outbreak of disease was generally defined as an "outbreak which is unexpected within the prevailing 
context for the host agent and environment parameters" (BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 262,1998: 2). 
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the planned BTWC agency with the reasons why it believed that the disease outbreak in 
question was not natural as well as to substantiate its claim that the outbreak was 
directly related to activities prohibited by the BTWC by providing the council with 
detailed evidence and other necessary information. 56 Unless the state party making the 
request fulfilled such requirements, the NAM delegations maintained, the Executive 
Council should ignore the request. (BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 262,1998: 2,4 and 
BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 369,1999: 1-3) 
The Islamic Republic's national security concerns became evident also in the way in 
which it approached the verification-related conceptual distinction made in the AHG 
talks between "visits" and "investigations. "57 Stressing that the BTWC's verification 
system should rely, first and foremost, on "visits, " the Iranians - who mentioned 
random visits as a crucial component of an effective BTWC protocol - were of the 
opinion that that the declarations submitted to the BTWC agency by the states parties 
should form the backbone of the future verification activities of that organization. 58 If 
the various kinds of "visits" were not able to alleviate non-compliance suspicions, the 
representatives of the Islamic Republic noted, the states parties should make every 
effort to resolve them among themselves. Only if such efforts failed, the Iranians added, 
should the member states make use of the mechanism of "investigations. " In short, then, 
the Islamic Republic viewed "investigations" as a last resort to determine the facts 
pertaining to BTWC non-compliance concerns. 59 
56 The NAM delegations also stressed that the state party on whose territory - or in any other place under 
its jurisdiction or control -a BTWC non-compliance investigation would take place, should "have the 
right to provide information that indicates that the outbreak of disease is naturally occurring or otherwise 
unrelated to activities prohibited by the Convention" (BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 369,1999: 2). 
S' "Visits, " as discussed in the AHG, referred to verification activities not involving a BTWC non- 
compliance concern. The various kinds of "visits" listed by the AHG fell into five categories: a) random 
visits to declared facilities to confirm the accuracy of the national declarations made to the BTWC 
agency; b) ambiguity-related visits to resolve declaration ambiguities; c) clarification visits to resolve any 
uncertainty in declarations; d) request visits made for the BTWC agency to help compile declarations; and 
e) voluntary visits. "Investigations, " as discussed in the AHG, in turn, referred to inspections involving a 
BTWC non-compliance concern. They included two types of activities: field investigations - that is, 
verification activities in geographical areas where there had been a release of, or exposure of humans, 
animals, or plants, to biological agents or toxins that had given rise to a non-compliance concern - and 
facility investigations - inspections on facilities suspected of being engaged in prohibited activities. 
(Pearson 1997: 18) 
58 The declaration requirement basically meant that each BTWC state party would have to declare all 
relevant biological activities or facilities existing on its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction 
or control, as specified in the BTWC protocol, to the treaty organization. Such declarations would consist 
of initial declarations - made by a state party after the protocol would enter into force for that state party 
- as well as of annual declarations. 39 This paragraph draws upon author's interview with A. A. Soltanieh, Geneva, 22 July 2002, and 
BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 345 (1999: 3). 
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Other issues 
While concentrating on article X and verification, Iranian AHG negotiators' 
argumentation included remarks on other BTWC-related questions as well. In particular, 
the Iranians pointed, once again, to the fact that the BTWC did not include a provision 
explicitly banning the use of biological weapons. In the Islamic Republic's view, AHG 
talks provided an excellent opportunity for the states parties to discuss the issue and to 
fill the existing treaty loophole by making the necessary text amendments to the planned 
additional protocol. Iranian officials acknowledged that the deterrence effect of the 
BTWC was such that it rendered biological warfare unlikely and that the 1996 review 
conference had concluded that the convention implicitly banned biological weapons 
use. Yet, the Iranians argued that in the final analysis, the situation had basically 
remained unchanged: the lack of an explicit prohibition continued to constitute a legal 
escape clause that was vulnerable to exploitation especially by those countries which 
continued to maintain reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. (CD/PV. 753,1997: 20) 
In order to promote discussion on the prohibition issue in the AHG, the Iranian 
delegation submitted two working papers in which it called for text amendments either 
to the general provisions section of the BTWC verification protocol's rolling text or to 
its article I. Iran's paper of July 1999 called on the states parties to agree on an 
amendment stating that they would never under any circumstances use biological or 
toxin weapons. The second Iranian paper, introduced a year later in July 2000, in turn, 
proposed that the states parties would undertake "to exclude completely the possibility 
of the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins as weapons. " Iran's efforts 
were supported by other NAM countries, 60 but in the end, Iran's AHG delegates had no 
choice but to concede that their diplomatic activities in the matter did not get enough 
support among the member states. (BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 394,1999: 1 and 
BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 419,2000: 1) 
In the Iranian analysis, it was the United States that ultimately blocked their initiative 
in the AHG. According to the officials of the Islamic Republic, the Americans opposed 
the inclusion of an explicit ban on biological armaments use to the BTWC protocol 
60 See, for example, the final document of the XIII Ministerial Conference of the NAM held in Cartagena, 
Columbia, on 8-9 April 2000 which stated the following: "We reiterate our conviction that the use of 
biological weapons, in any way and under any circumstances, is effectively a violation of Article I of the 
[Biological and Toxin Weapons] Convention and we express the wish for this issue to be pursued further 
by the States Parties" (NAM Ministerial Conference Document 2000). 
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because such a provision would draw international attention to the United States' own 
use of a biological weapon in 1996. What the Iranians referred to was the allegation 
officially made by the government of Cuba in 1997 that, on 21 October 1996, an 
aeroplane registered to the U. S. State Department had sprayed an insect known as 
Thrips Palmi (palm thrips) over Cuba and caused a widespread infestation of the crop- 
killing pest in the western part of the country. 61 
During the AHG negotiations of 1995-2001, though mostly outside the actual AHG 
context, the officials of the Islamic Republic continued to present their government's 
views on biological disarmament in the Middle East. As before, the Iranians lumped 
biological armaments together with other WMD and spoke of the need to rid the region 
of all kinds of WMD. A Middle Eastern WMDFZ remained the Islamic Republic's key 
declared arms control objective in the region. And again, Iran named Israel as the main 
obstacle to the realization of such a zone. Israel's militarism and its WMD, particularly 
nuclear weapons, the oft-repeated Iranian argument went, continued to function as the 
main cause for the massive proliferation of armaments in the region and for the lack of 
progress in regional arms control. (A/CN. 10/PV. 222,1998: 17 and A/C. 1/52/PV. 11, 
1997: 21) 
Accordingly, the officials of the Islamic Republic called on Israel to join the NPT and 
to place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. The Islamic Republic also 
called on the regional governments to join all multilateral arms control instruments 
dealing with WMD, including the BTWC as well as the additional protocol still under 
negotiation in Geneva. Furthermore, Iranian authorities urged the major powers, 
particularly the United States, to end their support to Israel's WMD programs and to 
adopt a non-selective and non-discriminatory policy in the Middle East. (Sadeghi- 
Dolatabadi 1995: 142; A/C. 1/52/PV. 11,1997: 21 and A/C. 1/52/PV. 20,1997: 16) 
Iran maintained that due to their possession of WMD, Israel and Iraq were the most 
dangerous states in the region. For this reason, the Islamic Republic's AHG 
representatives demanded, both Israel and Iraq had to be among the states parties to the 
BTWC protocol upon that instrument's entry into force. As far as Iraq was concerned, 
the Iranians pointed out that even if they had no information about the details of Iraq's 
biological weapons program, it was clear that Iraq continued to pose a WMD threat to 
61 This paragraph draws upon author's interview with A. A. Soltanieh, Geneva, 22 July 2002; Spokesman 
statement (2001) and Sims (2001: 37,43). For the details of the Thrips Palmi case and the multilateral 
diplomatic process set in motion by the Cuban claim, which was characterized by the Iranians as valid 
and well-founded, see Sims (2001: 36-49). 
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their country. To support their argument, the officials of the Islamic Republic referred to 
Iraq's record of chemical warfare and noted that Iraq's accession to the BTWC in June 
1991 had not stemmed from a sincere national conviction but from outside political 
pressure. Hence, the Iranians continued, any setbacks in the UN efforts through 
I. JNSCOM and UNMOVIC to eliminate Iraq's biological weapons and other WMD 
were alarming and necessitated a resolute response on the part of the world 
organization. A firm diplomatic course of action vis-a-vis Iraq was all the more 
important, Iranian officials claimed, because animals exposed to biological warfare 
agents had been detected in the border region between Iraq and Iran in the 1990s. 62 
The authorities of the Islamic Republic continued to argue that in contrast to the 
problematic Middle Eastern arena, there were immediate possibilities for inter-state 
cooperation in the area of biological disarmament in the Persian Gulf sub-region. The 
Iranians stressed their country's readiness to engage in a serious diplomatic dialogue 
with the Gulf Arab monarchies and named the establishment of a WMDFZ in the Gulf 
as the central Iranian arms control objective in the sub-region. They also reintroduced 
the Islamic Republic's proposal for joint regional verification activities to complement 
those planned for the BTWC. 63 (A/51 /PV. 4,1996: 28 and Zarif 1996: 451) 
As before, however, Iranian officials were forced to try to refute the accusations 
made, above all, by Iranian opponents of the Islamic regime in Tehran, the United 
States, as well as Israel that the Islamic Republic was actually pursuing a biological 
weapons program of its own. 64 Iranian authorities strongly rejected such claims as 
baseless and told that the purpose of the accusations was to defame the Islamic Republic 
by "capitalizing on the general abhorrence of the civilized world of these barbaric 
weapons. " Also, in this connection, Iranian representatives restated their government's 
62 This paragraph draws upon Zarif and Alborzi (1999: 512); author's interview with A. A. Soltanieh, 
Geneva, 22 July 2002, and S/1998/165 (1998). 
63 Following the election of Muhammad Khatami as the fifth president of Islamic Iran in 1997, the 
Islamic Republic's diplomatic argumentation became coloured by the new Iranian administration's 
political language. As a consequence, the officials of the Islamic Republic - including president Khatami himself - emphasized that biological armaments and other WMD did not contribute to anyone's security. 
On the contrary, they maintained, such weapons posed a huge threat to international, regional, and 
national security and had to be banned and eliminated as called for by the notion of global security 
networking. (A/53/PV. 8,1998: 7; Press Release No. 162,1998: 1 and CD/PV. 812,1999: 3) 
60 In early 1999, for example, the Mujahidin-i Khalq Organization (MKO) - an Iranian opposition group defined as a terrorist organization by the Islamic Republic - claimed that the Iranian government was 
developing biological weapons. The United States, in turn, accused the Islamic Republic of biological 
weapons ambitions, among others, in July 2001 by stating that "Iran is known to be producing biological 
weapons. " Finally, the statement made by the spokesman of the Israeli government in April 2000 that Iran 
was arming itself with biological armaments and other WMD was one example of the Israeli conclusion 
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oft-declared position that, on the basis of its Islamic principles, the Islamic Republic 
considered biological armaments and other WMD inhumane and illegitimate. 65 (Press 
Release No. 162,1998: 1; Press Release No. 165,1999: 1 and Spokesman statement 
2001) 
Beside making the moral argument to defend their country against outside 
accusations, Iranian officials referred to the Islamic Republic's strict compliance with 
its BTWC obligations, to active Iranian participation in biological disarmament 
diplomacy, to its support to the planned BTWC verification system, as well as to Iran's 
efforts to advance biological disarmament in the regional Middle Eastern context, as 
evidence of the Islamic Republic's peaceful intentions and impeccable behaviour. Yet, 
Iranian representatives also pointed out that their country had every right, under the 
BTWC, to utilize the advances made in biology and biotechnology for peaceful 
purposes and for the benefit of the Iranian people. 66 
4.2.4 The demise of the Ad Hoc Group and beyond 
4.2.4.1 The twenty-fourth session of the AHG 
The U. S. statement of July 2001 
In July 2001, after six and half years of deliberations, the countries engaged in the 
AHG process convened in Geneva to the 24th session of the group. Most delegations 
attending the meeting had prepared themselves for a final round of negotiations which, 
it was widely hoped, would bring the AHG talks to a successful end. The aim was to 
conclude the additional protocol prior to the BTWC's Fifth Review Conference taking 
place in November 2001. Although controversial in the eyes of many participants, the 
so-called composite protocol text, presented by the chairman of the AHG to national 
delegations in March 2001, formed the basis for what was expected to be the final round 
of the negotiations. It based on the protocol's rolling text and on informal consultations 
of the Islamic Republic's military policies. (Press Release No. 165,1999: 1; Dow Jones, 27 July 2001, 
and The Jerusalem Post, 5 April 2000) 
65 In January 2000, in an interview with the Al-Jazeera television network, the former Iranian president 
Rafsanjani said that the Islamic Republic would never want to possess and use weapons whose victims 
would include innocent civilians (<https: //wwwl. columbia. edu/sec/cu/sipa/GULF2000>). 66 This paragraph draws upon Press Release No. 162 (1998: 1); Press Release No. 165 (1999: 1) and 
author's interview with A. A. Soltanieh, Geneva, 22 July 2002. 
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held by the chairman with national representatives in order to find compromise 
solutions to issues that still divided the AHG delegations. 67 
On the eve of the 24 tt' session, thus, most national delegations were prepared to make 
the final effort to defend their negotiation objectives as well as to make the concessions 
needed to have the BTWC protocol in place. In the end, however, the participants of the 
24`h session never reached this stage, for on 25 July, the third day of the session, the 
United States informed that it was withdrawing its support for the protocol. 68 The 
Americans, whose statement constituted a major disappointment to the great majority of 
the delegations, 69 gave three reasons for their rejection of the protocol. First, in the 
opinion of the United States, the protocol was not strong or efficient enough to detect 
secret proliferation of biological weapons. Secondly, the Americans claimed, the 
protocol unacceptably threatened commercial proprietary information. Finally, the 
United States viewed the protocol as a hazard to its national programs to defend against 
biological warfare. (Wheelis and Dando 2003) 
The U. S. rejection of the verification protocol marked a dramatic end to an 
ambiguous American approach to the AHG process. Throughout 1995-2001, the United 
States' AHG diplomacy had been overshadowed by domestic bureaucratic politics 
which had prevented the U. S. delegates from significantly contributing to the protocol 
negotiations. The fact that the U. S. statement of July 2001 was made by an 
administration openly critical of multilateral diplomatic efforts in the area arms control 
made the American announcement less surprising. 70 Indeed, there had already been 
prior signs of the Bush administration's disinterest in the AHG process before the 
fateful 24th session. For example, in connection with AHG discussions on the composite 
text, the American delegates had portrayed the text as too weak and as a threat not only 
to national security and commercial proprietary information but also to the export 
controls of the Australia Group. Whatever the ultimate explanation for the U. S. decision 
to reject the protocol, ' the July 2001 statement effectively watered down the AHG 7 
67 For a comparison between the composite and the rolling text, see Pearson (2001 b: 20-30). 
68 The United States stated that it was "unable to support the current text, even with changes, as an 
apropriate outcome of the Ad Hoc Group efforts" (Pearson 2001c: 6). 
6? For the AHG delegations' reactions to the U. S. announcement, see Pearson (2001d: 19-20). 
70 For statements made against the planned BTWC protocol by the administration of president George W. 
Bush, see Pearson (2001 c: 6) and Dow Jones (27 July 2001). 
" In addition to the official reasons given by the United States to justify its rejection of the protocol, other 
factors accounting for the American decision have been put forth by observers. Wheelis and Dando 
(2003), for example, argue that the decision may have resulted, above all, from the U. S. desire to continue 
its secret, offensively oriented biological defence programs and to actually expand them. 
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process, for few countries were expected to join the protocol without American 
participation. (Rosenberg 2001: 1-2) 
The rejection of the multilateral diplomatic process on the BTWC protocol by the 
archenemy of the Islamic Republic prompted a strong response from Iranian 
representatives. Expressing what he referred to as his government's "total 
disappointment, " the Islamic Republic's main AHG negotiator portrayed the U. S. 
questioning of the AHG talks' relevance as "totally unjustified. " Beside challenging the 
content of the U. S. statement of July 2001 and stressing the importance of the 
multilateral negotiations in Geneva, the Islamic Republic criticized American 
diplomacy in the AHG. Throughout the AHG years, Iranian officials claimed, the 
United States had sought to obstruct the protocol negotiations by "creating obstacles to 
consensus" and by imposing its stances on the rolling text. Then, after years of 
negotiations, the Iranians continued, the United States, by discrediting the protocol, 
suddenly "ignored all rules of international negotiations" and delivered a major blow to 
those who had made major diplomatic sacrifices to make that instrument a reality. 
Disheartened by the U. S. announcement, Iran suggested that the final document of the 
AHG's 24th session would explicitly record that the United States "killed the Protocol, " 
or, at least, include the U. S. statement of July 2001 as an appendix. Neither Iranian 
proposal was ultimately accepted. 72 
The authorities of the Islamic Republic discussed the U. S. rejection of the BTWC 
protocol outside the actual AHG context, too. In late July 2001, for example, they 
responded to a statement made by the White House that if a country like Iran, running 
an active biological weapons program, was interested in joining the BTWC protocol, 
there had to be something fundamentally wrong with that document. The foreign 
ministry of the Islamic Republic portrayed the allegation made by the Bush 
administration as "desperate and unfounded" and claimed that they were part of the 
American effort to justify their decision to block the finalization of the protocol. 
Subsequently, Iranian authorities regretted that U. S. diplomacy had prevented the 
creation of the planned BTWC agency, for such an organization, the officials of the 
Islamic Republic argued, would have provided Iran and other states baselessly accused 
'' This paragraph draws upon Soltanieh (2001b: 1-2) and author's interview with A. A. Soltanieh, 
Geneva, 22 July 2002. It should be noted that the efforts by Iran and some other AHG delegations to have 
the United States reprimanded for its rejection of the protocol resulted in a diplomatic quarrel ultimately 
leading to the collapse of the AHG's 24th session without the adoption of a final document (Feakes and 
Littlewood 2002: 164). 
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of biological weapons development with a multilateral forum where to defend 
themselves and to prove their peaceful intentions. 73 
In addition to casting a shadow over international disarmament efforts, Iranian 
representatives maintained, the U. S. rejection of the BTWC protocol had major regional 
repercussions as well, particularly in conflict-ridden regions such as the Middle East. 
Thanks to the Bush administration's decision, they pointed out, Iraq and especially 
Israel were able to continue their biological weapons programs without any serious 
international obstacles. And as a result of U. S. diplomacy, the representatives of the 
Islamic Republic continued, diplomatic efforts for the creation of a WMDFZ in the 
Middle East experienced a further setback. 74 
Iran and the composite protocol text 
The sudden and dramatic turn in the AHG process resulting from U. S. diplomacy 
blurred the fact that by the time the AHG's 24th session had begun on 23 July 2001, 
there had still been many outstanding issues standing in the way of a consensus needed 
for the creation of the BTWC protocol. For one thing, there were a number of 
delegations that viewed the composite text of the chairman as ignoring their 
fundamental negotiation positions. Iran was among those countries. Fearing that the 
chairman's text would be founded on diplomatic compromises detrimental to the 
interests of the Islamic Republic, Iranian officials had already stated, at the AHG's 22nd 
session in February 2001, that the introduction of a text parallel to the rolling text would 
not help the talks but only "endanger the friendly and cooperative atmosphere of the 
negotiations. " (Pearson 2001 a: 20 and CBW Conventions Bulletin, June 2001) 
At the 23rd AHG session in April-May 2001, after the chairman's text had been 
presented to national delegations, the Islamic Republic had continued to question the 
need for such a text. Together with six other NAM countries - China, Cuba, Indonesia, 
Libya, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka - Iran had submitted a working paper which underscored 
the role of the rolling text as the basis for further AHG talks and called upon other 
delegations to return to negotiations on the basis of that document. In addition to 
opposing the general idea of a composite protocol text, the representatives of the Islamic 
73 This paragraph draws upon Dow Jones (27 July 2001); Spokesman statement (2001) and author's 
interview with A. A. Soltanieh, Geneva, 22 July 2002. 7' This paragraph draws upon author's interview with A. A. Soltanieh, Geneva, 22 July 2002. 
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Republic had also touched upon the individual points of the chairman's text which, the 
Iranians had said, made the document unacceptable to the Iranian government. In 
essence, the officials of the Islamic Republic had maintained that the composite text did 
not strike an acceptable balance between the disarmament and development aspects of 
the planned protocol. In their view, the chairman's text had groundlessly emphasized 
the former. 75 (Report from Geneva 2001: 2-3 and BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 451, 
2001: 1) 
The main Iranian concern over the composite protocol text was that it sidelined the 
developing countries' strong opposition to extra-BTWC export controls. Even though 
the chairman's text had taken into account many of the article-X related issues raised by 
the Iranians and other NAM delegations, 76 it did not refer to the abolition of extra- 
conventional export controls as demanded by them. Dissatisfied with the situation, the 
representatives of the Islamic Republic made a final effort to advance their position in 
the matter and stressed that Iranian participation in the planned protocol was critically 
determined by how the issue of export controls would ultimately be dealt with. 
(Soltanieh 2001 a: 2-3 and Soltanieh 2001 b: 2) 
The provisions on BTWC protocol's entry into force constituted the other principal 
cause for Iran's dissatisfaction with the chairman's text. According to paragraph 1 of the 
composite text's article 27, the protocol "shall enter into force 180 days after the deposit 
of instruments of ratification by 65 States, which shall include seven States from Africa, 
four States from East Asia and the Pacific, four States from Eastern Europe, six States 
from Latin America and the Caribbean, nine States from among Western European and 
other States, and three States from West and South Asia, but not earlier than two years 
after its opening for signature. " 
The Islamic Republic argued against the composite text formulation by stating that 
the protocol's entry into force had to depend on the participation in the instrument of all 
the countries with advanced biological and biotechnological sectors. 77 Hence, the 
75 In a working paper from 4 May 2001, the NAM delegations had jointly stressed the "great importance" 
of comprehensive strengthening of the BTWC (BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 451,2001: 1). 76 For example, article 14 of the composite protocol text - entitled "Scientific and Technological 
Exchange for Peaceful Purposes and Technical Co-operation" - promoted international cooperation in the 
area of disease prevention, obligated the states parties to submit annual declarations on the 
implementation of the provisions of article X of the BTWC, as well as established the Cooperation 
Committee that the NAM states had called for. 
77 As put by the Islamic Republic's AHG delegation: "The Islamic Republic of Iran is of the view that if 
the Protocol enters into force, while the advanced countries in the field of biology and biotechnology do 
not adhere to it, the Protocol would not be more than a piece of paper and all valuable efforts made during 
the past years will be wasted" (Soltanieh 2001 a: 2). 
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Iranians maintained that a redrafted article 27 of the composite text should read as 
follows: "This Protocol shall enter into force 180 days after the deposit of instruments 
of ratification by 50 States having advanced biological capabilities and technologies 
[... ] but not earlier than two years after its opening for signature. " In order to answer the 
question how such advanced states would be defined or identified, Iran's AHG 
delegates referred to the information provided by the WHO and the BTWC's 
confidence-building mechanism as reliable and sufficient sources for the listing of those 
states. (BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 454,2001: 1-2) 
Iranian officials gave two main reasons for their interest in altered entry into force 
provisions for the protocol. On the one hand, they noted that the adoption of the 
advanced state criterion would contribute to the universality and effectiveness of the 
BTWC and its protocol. On the other hand, and more importantly, the Iranians said that 
the criterion would safeguard the Islamic Republic's and other countries' national 
security interests. Being located in the sensitive region of the Middle East where some 
countries had a free hand to work on biological weapons and other WMD, Iranian 
representatives asserted, the Islamic Republic had a major interest in making sure that 
Israel and Iraq would become parties to the BTWC protocol and subject to its 
verification system right from the beginning. Even if the application of the advanced 
state criterion might prolong the protocol's entry into force, the Iranian argument went, 
it would be better to have a universal and an effective protocol than to allow 
proliferators to opt out of the instrument. 78 
In the light of Iran's criticism of the composite text, it can be asked whether the 
Islamic Republic would have joined the protocol had the United States not decided to 
stall the AHG process. There are many reasons to believe that the answer would have 
been yes. To begin with, at the 24th session of the AHG, the Islamic Republic signalled 
that it had adopted a softer attitude towards the chairman's text. Instead of challenging 
the concept of a composite text, the Iranian delegation, borrowing the characterization 
made by the chairman of the AHG, now described the text as a "common denominator, 
not making everyone happy, but a ground for the compromise. " The threshold for the 
Iranian negotiators to accept the idea of a chairman's text was significantly lowered by 
78 This paragraph draws upon BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 454 (2001: 1-2); Soltanieh (2001 a: 2) and 
author's interview with A. A. Soltanieh, Geneva, 22 July 2002. 
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the fact that that text had always been firmly based on the rolling text whose importance 
had constantly been underscored by the Iranians. 79 
As for the content of the chairman's text, Iran's AHG delegation informed the 24th 
session that it would be ready to accept the text if it was subjected to "minor changes. , 80 
At the end of the day, what the Iranians - who had regularly pointed to their diplomatic 
flexibility in the AHG talks - wanted to do was to push through their position on the 
question of export controls. As subsequently admitted by Iranian officials, neither the 
question of the protocol's entry into force nor any other issue in the composite text 
would have been critical enough to prevent the Islamic Republic from accepting the 
document. Hence, even if observers of the AHG negotiations and Iranian officials 
themselves had stressed during the AHG talks that Iran's and other NAM countries' 
acceptance of the BTWC protocol would require greater diplomatic concessions on the 
part of other delegations than was the case in connection with the CWC negotiations of 
the early 1990s, it is difficult to envision that the Iranians would have ultimately 
decided to stay outside the protocol and the international agency created by it. 81 
This conclusion is supported by a number of factors. For example, Iran had a direct 
security interest in diplomatic efforts aimed at strengthening the international norm 
against biological weapons and in the establishment of a verification mechanism 
operated by a multilateral decision-making machinery. Furthermore, after the U. S. 
rejection of the AHG process, the officials of the Islamic Republic went so far as to 
imply that their government's acceptance of the composite protocol text would not have 
been dependent even on the end-result of the AHG talks on export controls. Of course, 
such a claim provided Iranian authorities with an argumentative tool to blame the 
United States for "killing" the AHG process and for dangerously undermining 
international efforts in biological disarmament. In an identical manner, many of the 
Islamic Republic's AHG allies used the U. S. decision to reject the AHG process as a 
79 This paragraph draws upon Soltanieh (2001a: 1-2) and author's interview with A. A. Soltanieh, 
Geneva, 22 July 2002. According to Pearson et al. (2001: 3), over 99% of the composite text's language 
was identical to that of the rolling text. 
80 The Iranian delegates pointed out that "nobody could, at this juncture, accept any drastic change" in the 
rolling or the composite text (Soltanieh 2001a: 2). 81 This paragraph draws upon author's interview with A. A. Soltanieh, Geneva, 22 July 2002: Soltanieh 
(2001 a: 1) and Töth (1997: 4). 
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means to cover the fact that their own policies had significantly slowed down the 
progress made in the 1995-2001 negotiations. 82 
When hypothesizing about what Iran's final position on the composite protocol text 
would have been, one should also take into account the fact that by staying out of the 
protocol, the Islamic Republic would have lost an access to a legal and an institutional 
framework within which, as in the case of the CWC and the OPCW, it could have 
advanced its diplomatic views on issues related to biological transfers and to 
technological and scientific cooperation. Similarly, one should pay attention to the 
preparations already made by Iranian authorities for a protocol membership. By the time 
of the AHG's 24th session, Iran had set up its interim national authority and agreed upon 
the necessary BTWC-related division of labour between the country's governmental 
agencies. In addition to training its bureaucrats and customs officials to implement the 
national obligations arising from the BTWC protocol, the Islamic Republic had 
integrated relevant Iranian industries into such preparatory work. Joint meetings 
between government officials and industry representatives, the national trial visit - in 
AHG parlance, a random visit - carried out at the Razi Vaccine and Serum Research 
Institute in December 1998, together with the development of special visa practices for 
international BTWC inspectors, served as further examples of the steps Iran had taken 
to prepare itself for the protocol era. 83 
According to the arms control officials of the Islamic Republic, the representatives of 
Iran's armed forces had been intimately involved in the discussions on the Islamic 
Republic's approach to the BTWC protocol. In the light of the controversies that had 
erupted within the Islamic Republic's power elite in connection with the CWC, 
however, it is very likely that significant sections of the Islamic Republic's armed 
forces were against Iranian participation in yet another disarmament instrument. Even if 
Iranian officials - by asserting that the case of the BTWC protocol did not resemble that 
of the CWC because Iran, a member of the BTWC since 1973, did not need to make the 
fundamental national decision of whether to join a completely new arms control treaty 
or not - either totally rejected such a conclusion or maintained that the Islamic 
Republic's decision-making machinery, including the Supreme National Security 
82 This paragraph draws upon author's interview with A. A. Soltanieh, Geneva, 22 July 2002; author's 
interview with an Iranian arms control official (A) who wishes to remain unidentified, summer 2002, and 
Feakes and Littlewood (2002: 163,170-171). 
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Council, allowed dissenting political actors to air their concerns in the national policy- 
making process, it seems safe to conclude that intra-elite Iranian criticism of the BTWC 
protocol largely consisted of the same argumentative elements that had been put forth 
with regard to the CWC. Thus, for Iran's military and civilian critics of the protocol - 
who were concerned, among others, over the Islamic Republic's freedom of choice in 
the area of military policy as well as over the WMD threats faced by the Islamic 
Republic, and who were highly suspicious of major power policies and of the BTWC's 
concrete benefits -, the U. S. rejection of the AHG process amounted to a welcome 
diplomatic shift which gave them ammunition in the intra-elite political battle over the 
84 BTWC protocol. 
4.2.4.2 The Fifth Review Conference of the BTWC: the November-December 2001 
session 
The fate of the AHG 
After the U. S. rejection of the BTWC protocol in July 2001, the countries that had 
taken part in the protocol negotiations had basically three choices to make regarding the 
future of the AHG process: either to abandon it, to postpone further negotiations on the 
protocol for a certain period of time, or to go ahead with them by building on the 
diplomatic results achieved up to that point. The Iranians, who had always stressed the 
importance of advanced industrialized states' participation in the planned protocol, 
opted for the third option and expressed their readiness to continue the AHG process 
without the Americans. 
The Iranian delegation taking part in the Fifth Review Conference of the BTWC, 85 
convening in Geneva between 19 November and 7 December 2001, some three months 
after the AHG's 24th session, elaborated on the Islamic Republic's position on the future 
83 This paragraph draws upon author's interview with A. A. Soltanieh, Geneva, 22 July 2002; BWC/AD 
HOC GROUP/WP. 345 (1999: 1-4) and author's interview with an Iranian arms control official (A) who 
wishes to remain unidentified, summer 2002. 
84 This paragraph draws upon author's interview with A. A. Soltanieh, Geneva, 22 July 2002; author's 
interview with an Iranian arms control official (A) who wishes to remain unidentified, summer 2002, and 
Jones (1998: 48). 
85 At the conference, the Islamic Republic had, once again, a large delegation taking part in multilateral 
deliberations on biological disarmament. The Iranian delegation consisted of representatives from the 
country's foreign and defence ministries as well as from the Ministry of Jihad and Agriculture, the 
Technology Cooperation Office, the Razi Vaccine and Serum Institute, and the Institut Pasteur of Iran. 
(BWC/CONF. V/INF. 3,2001: 16-17) 
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of the AHG process. According to the Iranian delegates, their country viewed the 
AHG's mandate as still being valid and called upon the states parties of the BTWC to 
restart their negotiations in order to finalize the additional protocol. The protocol talks, 
the Iranians suggested, should continue after the Fifth Review Conference and could be 
concluded within a time period of one year. In a review conference working paper 
introduced by the Islamic Republic on 27 November 2001, the Iranian delegates asked 
the conference to reaffirm in its final declaration "that the multilateral negotiations on a 
legally binding instrument shall be concluded and the text of such instrument be 
adopted by a Special Conference prior to the Sixth Review Conference. , 86 (Soltanieh 
2001c: 2; Soltanieh 2001e: 1,3 and BWC/CONF. V/COW/WP. 28,2001: 6) 
Iranian representatives were strongly against the idea that the AHG negotiations 
would be abandoned or substituted by a new diplomatic process. In the opinion of the 
Islamic Republic, there were no diplomatic alternatives to the AHG and the planned 
protocol that were capable of strengthening the BTWC and meeting the objectives 
spelled out in the Special Conference mandate of 1994. No other diplomatic avenue, 
Iranian authorities stressed, was acceptable to the Islamic Republic at this juncture. In 
fact, it was "humiliating" and "insulting, " the Iranians added, to suggest that years of 
hard collective work in the AHG had been meaningless. (Soltanieh 2001c: 2-3 and 
Soltanieh 2001e: 3) 
In order to underscore the importance of the AHG process to their country, Iran's 
review conference delagates not only pointed to the uniqueness of that process as well 
as to the planned BTWC protocol's central role in international efforts against 
biological weapons, but also resorted to tough diplomatic language which linked Iran's 
behaviour at the review conference to a decision on the AHG's future. If no plan was 
put in place for the continuation of the AHG negotiations, the Iranians threatened, their 
country might not be able join the consensus on a final conference declaration. "We 
want a successful conference, " the Iranian delegation declared, "but not at any price. " 
(Ibid. ) 
86 Iran's diplomatic commitment to the AHG process was shared by other NAM delegations. In a joint 
review conference working paper of 26 November 2001, the NAM delegations asked the conference to 
state "that the mandate of the Ad Hoc Group, as agreed by the Special Conference in 1994, remains valid 
and determines any future work of the Ad Hoc Group. " In addition, the NAM paper asked the review 
conference to call on the states parties to "restart and continue the work of the Ad Hoc Group [... ]. " 
(BWC/CONF. V/COW/WP. 13,2001: 1) 
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Strongly opposed to the ideas circulating in the fifth review conference that spoke of 
future strengthening of the BTWC without the AHG, 87 the officials of the Islamic 
Republic were bewildered by the statement made by the United States in the final hours 
of the conference on 7 December. In that statement, the United States called for the 
establishment of a diplomatic process that would replace the AHG talks and consist, 
first, of annual meetings held by the states parties to review the implementation of the 
measures adopted at the Fifth Review Conference, and secondly, of supplementary 
expert meetings that would focus on considering and elaborating measures to strengthen 
the convention. The U. S. initiative, which also called for an explicit termination of the 
AHG's mandate, was unacceptable not only to the Iranians but to other conference 
delegations as well. In the wake of the last-minute diplomatic manoeuvring by the 
United States, the Fifth Review Conference was ultimately suspended. In order to have 
enough time to find a way out of the diplomatic deadlock created by the controversial 
last-minute U. S. initiative, the conference participants decided to reconvene in Geneva 
in November 2002, after a 'cooling-off period of one year. (Rissanen 2002 and Feakes 
and Littlewood 2002: 169-170) 
The issue of non-compliance 
Beside being in fundamental conflict with the Iranian stand on the future of the AHG, 
the U. S. diplomacy at the Fifth Review Conference provoked Iranian authorities also by 
placing strong emphasis on the issue of BTWC non-compliance. The Americans used 
their opening statement at the conference to publicly accuse four BTWC states parties - 
Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and Libya - of operating clandestine biological weapons 
programs. 88 The United States called on those countries to immediately terminate their 
arms programs and to fully comply with the provisions of the BTWC. Alluding to the 
planned BTWC protocol, the U. S delegation also noted that their government would 
"not enter into agreements that allow rogue states or others to develop and deploy 
biological weapons. " (Rissanen 2002 and Feakes and Littlewood 2002: 167) 
87 For a discussion of the various scenarios put forth at the Fifth Review Conference regarding what steps 
the states parties could take to strengthen the BTWC after the review conference's end and without the 
p8lanned additional protocol, see Rissanen (2002). 
The U. S. statement also named Syria, which has signed the BTWC but not acceded to it, as well as 
Sudan, a non-state party, as countries that were pursuing biological weapons. 
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Following the U. S. statement, Iran exercised its right of reply to refute the allegation 
that it was pursuing biological weapons and not respecting its obligations under the 
BTWC. The Islamic Republic characterized the accusation made by the U. S. delegation 
as baseless and categorically rejected them. According to the Iranian delegates, their 
country's commitment to all multilateral arms control treaties related to WMD, its full 
cooperation with international agencies engaged in disarmament, as well as its active 
role in the AHG process testified, for their part, to Iran's peaceful intentions and its 
respect of international law. To strengthen their defence, the Iranians also pointed out 
that their country had participated in the BTWC's confidence-building mechanism by 
providing information about its biological activities to the UN. Having taken part in the 
mechanism for the first time in 1998 and then again in 1999,89 Iranian representatives 
were now able to refer to such participation as proof of the Islamic Republic's 
impeccable record in implementing the BTWC. (Soltanieh 2001 d: 1) 
Offended by the U. S. accusation, Iranian officials warned the Americans of the 
consequences of their "aggressive" diplomacy. False allegations by one BTWC state 
party against another, they argued, only caused confrontation between the review 
conference delegations and might result in the total failure of the conference. Thus, for 
the second time, the Islamic Republic pointed to its ability to block the adoption of a 
final document in order to support its conference diplomacy. In addition to making their 
thinly veiled threat, Iranian delegates launched a verbal counterattack against the 
Americans by stating that, in fact, it was the U. S. government that had violated the 
BTWC. On the one hand, the Iranians accused the United States of having shipped 
"deadly biological agents" to Israel as well as to its other allies despite those countries' 
disregard for international disarmament treaties. 90 
On the other hand, the representatives of the Islamic Republic accused the United 
States of "research and development in the area of biological weapons" by alluding to a 
recent news report published by the The New York Times. The article mentioned by the 
Iranians had revealed in early September 2001 that the U. S. government had lately 
undertaken secret research into biological weapons. The U. S. research activities had 
89 The reports handed over to the UN by Iran in September 1998 and October 1999 included information 
concerning the confidence-building measures A, B, and G. The Islamic Republic did not provide any 
reports to the UN in 2000 and 2001, but participated in the confidence-building mechanism again in 2002. 
(DDA/BWC/1998/CBM/Add. 1,1998: 45-65; DDA/BWC/1999/CBM/Add. 1,1999: 64-75 and 
BWC/CONF. VI/INF. 3,2006: 32) 
90 This paragraph draws upon Soltanieh (2001d: 1) and author's interview with A. A. Soltanieh, Geneva, 
22 July 2002. 
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reportedly begun under president Clinton and been embraced by the successor 
administration of president George W. Bush. According to The New York Times, the 
United States had completed two research projects during the Clinton administration, 
and a third secret program was waiting for the Bush administration's approval. 91 
(Soltanieh 2001 d: 1 and IHT, 5 September 2001) 
The Islamic Republic's diplomatic counterattack against the Americans included 
vehement criticism of the Bush administration's diplomacy in general. In addition to 
condemning the United States for having prevented the AHG from fulfilling its 1994 
mandate and for substituting a "unilateral approach" for the BTWC protocol, Iranian 
authorities referred to other U. S. activities as further evidence of that country's 
"dangerous mentality. " In the Iranian analysis, the U. S. plans for a national missile 
defence (NMD) system, its diplomatic efforts to have the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile 
(ABM) Treaty revised, its non-accession to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban 
Treaty, as well as the Bush administration's rejection of the Kyoto Protocol aimed at 
tackling global climate change illustrated that the Americans undermined international 
peace and security and obstructed multilateral diplomatic cooperation. 92 
The review of the operation of the BTWC 
The Islamic Republic's response to the U. S. diplomacy extended also to the article- 
by-article review of the BTWC's operation conducted by the participants of the Fifth 
Review Conference. Accordingly, when discussing article V of the BTWC, dealing with 
treaty-related problem solving, Iranian delegates not only stated that the existing 
provisions provided an appropriate framework for resolving any problems that might 
arise between the states parties, but also asked the member states "to refrain from 
unilateral and discriminatory action in resolving any concerns with regard to the 
implementation of the Convention. " Similarly, in connection with article VI, which 
contains the BTWC's complaint procedure, Iran wanted the conference to call on the 
91 The first secret project completed by the United States had concerned the building and testing of a 
Soviet-designed anthrax bomb which the CIA feared to be available on the international market. The 
Clinton administration's second project had focused on the construction of a small biological agent 
production facility from commercially available materials. The third project mentioned by The New York 
Times, which was subsequently given a go-ahead by the Bush administration, involved the reproduction 
of a genetically modified antrax organism originally produced by Russian scientists in the mid-1990s. 
(IHT, 5 September 2001 and Feakes and Littlewood 2002: 165) 
92 This paragraph draws upon Soltanieh (2001d: 1) and author's interview with A. A. Soltanieh, Geneva, 
22 July 2002. 
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states parties to refrain from baseless non-compliance accusations against each other. 
The representatives of the Islamic Republic stressed that any complaint of non- 
compliance should include factual evidence confirming the validity of the complaint 
and pointed out that diplomatic deliberations on any alleged breach of the BTWC 
should be conducted within the framework of the additional protocol. 
(BWC/CONF. V/COW/WP. 28,2001: 3) 
Iranian representatives' review of the other clauses of the BTWC focused on themes 
that had traditionally been highlighted by their government. As far as the universality of 
the convention was concerned, the Iranians underscored the importance of the treaty's 
universality to international and regional security, expressed their dissatisfaction with 
the fact that there were still countries with advanced biological and biotechnological 
sectors that had not joined the convention, and called on the remaining non-states 
parties to accede to the instrument as soon as possible. Also, the officials of the Islamic 
Republic appealed to the member states to use the bilateral and multilateral diplomatic 
means in their possession to persuade the outsiders to accede to the BTWC as well as 
expressed their hope that the objective of treaty universality would be taken seriously by 
the states parties. Referring to the case of the CWC, the Iranians claimed that their 
government's decision to ratify the chemical treaty in 1997 had been made with the 
expectation, based on assurances given to the president of the Islamic Republic "by 
some heads of states of friendly industrialized states, " that other countries, especially in 
the sensitive Middle Eastern region, would follow Iran's example. As those assurances 
never materialized, the Iranians declared, this time the states parties should actively 
strive for treaty universality so that Iran's "bitter experience" would not repeat itself in 
the context of the BTWC. 93 (Soltanieh 2001c: 3; BWC/CONF. V/COW/WP. 10,2001: 1 
and BWC/CONF. V/COW/WP. 28,2001: 6) 
The second major BTWC-related issue raised by the Islamic Republic at the Fifth 
Review Conference was the Iranian-promoted treaty provision that would explicitly ban 
the use of biological armaments. Again, Iranian officials reminded the states parties of 
the fact that the BTWC did not include an explicit ban on biological weapons use and 
noted that such a legal loophole could be exploited by the countries maintaining 
93 Iran's review conference comments on article IX of the BTWC, which speaks of the goal of chemical 
disarmament, included a condemnation of the U. S. national exemptions - adopted in 1997 - in the 
implementation of the CWC. Thus, the Islamic Republic asked the Fifth Review Conference to call on the 
states parties to the CWC not to enact national legislation that is in conflict with the objectives and 
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retaliation reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. And as before, they called on the 
states parties to deal with the issue "in the most urgent manner. " According to Iran, 
there were two ways to take care of the matter: either to insert the word "use" in the title 
and article I of the BTWC or to ask the countries maintaining retaliation reservations to 
the Geneva Protocol to withdraw them. Iran's review conference delegation preferred 
the first option and produced text drafts - both individually and together with other 
NAM delegations - for that purpose. (Soltanieh 2001c: 4; BWC/CONF. V/COW/WP. 28, 
2001: 1-2,6 and BWC/CONF. V/COW. WP. 11,2001: 1) 
Remembering the poor success of their previous text amendment efforts, however, 
the officials of the Islamic Republic sought to simultaneously promote the second 
option as well. They urged all the countries that still maintained reservations to the 
Geneva Protocol to withdraw them and called on the review conference to conclude that 
the Geneva Protocol reservations concerning in-kind retaliation were "totally 
incompatible" with article I of the BTWC. Although the Iranian delegation was realistic 
enough to acknowledge that the issue of use was unsolvable in the short term, it 
nevertheless stressed that their country would continue to resolutely raise the matter in 
the future. Consequently, Iranian delegates asked the conference to reaffirm that the 
Islamic Republic's proposal for the amendment of the title and article I of the BTWC to 
explicitly include the prohibition of biological weapons use should be considered by the 
states parties at the next, sixth BTWC review conference. (Soltanieh 2001c: 4; 
BWC/CONF. V/COW/WP. 28,2001: 5-6 and BWC/CONF. V/DC/WP. 1,2001: 1) 
The third major issue addressed by the Iranian delegation concerned with the 
implementation of article X. Together with their NAM allies, Iran's representatives 
emphasized that a "non-discriminatory and balanced" approach to the BTWC, fully 
taking into account the provisions of article X, was a prerequisite for the treaty's 
effective implementation. Also, they pointed out that the work done in the AHG on 
article X should constitute the basis for future efforts to strengthen that treaty provision. 
Leaning on its AHG argumentation, thus, the Islamic Republic condemned, once again, 
the existence of extra-BTWC export controls, especially those of the Australia Group, 
and noted that the states parties had a legal obligation to refrain from imposing 
restrictions or limitations on transfers between the member states of biological 
materials, technology, equipment, and research information for peaceful purposes. Due 
provisions of that treaty, as well as to immediately withdraw such legislation if it has already been 
approved. (Soltanieh 2001 d: I and BWC/CONF. V/COW/WP. 28,2001: 6) 
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to the "unilateral, discriminatory and self-imposed" restrictions of the Australia Group, 
the Iranians claimed, developing countries' efforts in the area of biology and 
biotechnology had faced serious barriers and their economies had suffered from 
significant financial damages. (Soltanieh 2001c: 3-4 and BWC/CONF. V/COW/WP. 25, 
2001: 1) 
In the Islamic Republic's assessment, extra-BTWC export controls had also 
undermined the treaty's universality. Given the problems related to the implementation 
of article X, the Iranian argument went, it was hard to convince outsiders that their 
accession to the BTWC would provide them with concrete benefits. The fact that there 
were non-states parties that continued to receive biological transfers from BTWC 
member states, Iranian officials added, further eroded the convention's appeal. 
Accordingly, in addition to asking the states parties to review their "national regulations 
governing international exchanges and transfers in order to ensure their consistency 
with the objectives of the Convention and specifically the provisions of Article X, "94 the 
Islamic Republic's delegates called on the conference participants to draw a clear line 
between the member states and the non-states parties and to refrain from biological 
transfers to the latter. (BWC/CONF. V/COW/WP. 28,2001: 3 and BWC/CONF. 
V/COW/WP. 9,2001: 2) 
Conversely, the Iranians demanded, the states parties from the developed world 
should reward those of the developing world for their treaty membership and for their 
commitment to the provisions of the BTWC by promoting scientific and technological 
exchanges and fostering international cooperation in the field of peaceful biological 
activities. Moreover, Iranian delegates continued, advanced industrialized countries 
should facilitate free trade and the fullest possible exchange in biological agents as well 
as necessary technologies for peaceful purposes in order to enhance the economic and 
technological development of the states parties. The Iranians also emphasized that the 
states parties' right to participate in those exchanges should be explicitly ensured. Iran's 
calls were endorsed by other NAM states and they were concretized through examples 
of how advanced industrialized countries could respond to them. The concrete measures 
referred to by the Iranians and other NAM delegations ranged from information 
exchange and the creation of biological data bases and training programs to the 
94 The citation is from a working paper jointly submitted by Iran, China, Cuba, India, Indonesia, Libya, 
and Pakistan at the Fifth Review Conference on 26 November 2001 (BWC/CONF. V/COW/WP. 9,2001: 
2). 
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improvement of the states parties' capabilities in the surveillance, prevention, and 
treatment of diseases. (BWC/CONF. V/COW/WP. 99 2001: 1 and 
BWC/CONF. V/COW/WP. 12,2001: 1-3) 
At the Fifth Review Conference, the NAM delegations also raised the issue of the 
establishment of a BTWC Cooperation Committee that had already been hotly debated 
in the AHG. Pointing out that there was a need for an institutional mechanism within 
the treaty that would "consult on, monitor and review activities fostering international 
cooperation and assistance and the fullest possible exchanges of equipment, materials 
and scientific and technological information" for peaceful purposes, the Islamic 
Republic and other NAM countries spoke of a committee that would meet on a regular 
basis, once a year at minimum. At those meetings, the NAM countries added, the 
committee would devise recommendations to the states parties with respect to the 
promotion of biological transfers and exchanges between them. 
(BWC/CONF. V/COW/WP. 9,2001: 1 and BWC/CONF. V/COW/WP. 31,2001: 1) 
As was the case during the AHG negotiations, the delegations of Iran, India, 
Indonesia, China, Cuba, Libya, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka were also jointly of the opinion 
that the BTWC needed a mechanism that would enable the states parties to settle their 
differences regarding biological transfers for peaceful purposes. If a state party was 
fully committed to its obligations under the BTWC but was still being denied a transfer 
by another state party, the NAM states opined, it ought to have the right to ask for 
redress through an institutionalized mechanism. Once again, however, the NAM 
delegations' calls for the establishment of such a mechanism as well as for the creation 
of a Cooperation Committee were rejected especially by the Western governments. 
(Soltanieh 2001 c: 4; BWC/CONF. V/COW/WP. 25,2001: 1 and Rissanen 2002) 
4.2.4.3 The Fifth Review Conference of the BTWC: the resumed session of November 
2002 
As already noted above, the statement made by the United States in the final hours of 
the Fifth Review Conference calling for the termination of the AHG's mandate had 
resulted in the conference's decision to adjourn its proceedings and to reconvene in 
November 2002. Thus, for the first time in the BTWC review conferences' history, the 
states parties had not been able to agree on a final declaration. In this sense, then, the 
deliberations by Iran and other conference participants on the substantive treaty-related 
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issues had turned out to be meaningless. Indicating how close the delegations had come 
to an agreement on a final declaration, the chairman of the conference stated that 95% 
of the draft declaration's content had been agreed upon by the time the United States 
had delivered its fateful statement (Rissanen 2002). 95 
Paralyzed by their failure to bring the Fifth Review Conference to a successful 
conclusion, the states parties remained diplomatically passive during the months before 
the commencement of the review conference's resumed session in November 2002. As 
far as Iran was concerned, two main biological arms control topics were touched upon 
by the officials of the Islamic Republic during this period: the issue of BTWC non- 
compliance and the fate of the AHG. As for the first subject, Iran continued to criticize 
the United States for its diplomacy at the November-December 2001 session of the 
review conference. Still offended by the fact that the U. S. delegation had publicly 
named Iran as one of the countries in non-compliance with the BTWC96 - as well as by 
the fact that the United States had requested the conference to call on Iran and the other 
countries it has listed as treaty violators to "terminate their offensive biological weapons 
programmes and to comply fully with their obligations" -, Iranian authorities continued 
to argue that it was in fact the Americans themselves who constantly undermined the 
cause of biological disarmament. The destructive U. S. diplomacy at the Fifth Review 
Conference, and prior to that, at the 24th session of the AHG, the Iranians maintained, 
were telling examples of the dangers posed by "U. S. unilateralism. " The Islamic 
Republic let it be known that should the Americans continue to baselessly accuse Iran 
of biological weapons development, it would be prepared to knock down consensus at 
the Fifth Review Conference's resumed session. 97 
As far as the future of the AHG process was concerned, the Islamic Republic 
continued to underscore the group's importance and uniqueness. In February 2002, at 
the CD, Iran reiterated its position that the finalization of the BTWC protocol was the 
only effective way of strengthening the BTWC and of combatting the future challenges 
faced by the states parties in the area of biological disarmament. Strict adherence to the 
95 An Iranian estimate speaks of 90% of the issues finalized (author's interview with A. A. Soltanieh, 
Geneva, 22 July 2002). 
96 Note, for example, the following Iranian defence against the U. S. assertion from February 2002: " [... ] 
we consider the development and the use of weapons of mass destruction inhuman, immoral, illegal and 
against our very basic principles. They have no place in our defence doctrine. We do not have, nor do we 
seek, any such weapons, and most certainly we do not accept or tolerate allegations by those who have 
clearly placed themselves and their protege [Israel] outside the law" (CD/PV. 900,2002: 10). 
97 This paragraph draws upon Pearson (2002: 19); Rissanen (2002) and author's interview with A. A. 
Soltanieh, Geneva, 22 July 2002. 
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1994 mandate of the AHG, Iranian officials argued, "would both ensure the total and 
effective ban of another category of weapons of mass destruction and leave no ground 
for baseless allegations of non-compliance which lack any verifiable justification. " The 
Iranians also stressed that the AHG process could - and should - go ahead without the 
participation of the United States. (CD/PV. 900,2002: 11) 
By the summer of 2002, however, the officials of the Islamic Republic had openly 
admitted that it was unrealistic to expect the AHG process to restart any time soon. 
They noted that the Americans had to reconsider their position on the AHG before any 
progress in the matter could be achieved, but did not believe that any changes in the 
U. S. stand would occur as long as the administration of president George W. Bush 
stayed in power. As the AHG process had been at least momentarily deserted, the 
Iranians were now ready to listen to diplomatic suggestions on how the states parties 
could strengthen the BTWC in the absence of the additional protocol. Yet, at the same 
time, as one Iranian official put it, the Islamic Republic focused on "keeping the AHG 
alive. " Dismissing efforts that aimed to terminate the mandate of the AHG, Iranian 
representatives emphasized that the 1994 mandate remained intact and that there was no 
time limit to it. Also, they stressed that the collective inventory of experience and 
knowledge resulting from years of hard work in the AHG was too valuable to be 
abandoned for good. At some point, Iranian officials declared, the states parties would 
have to restart the AHG process and successfully finalize it. 98 
After the suspension of the Fifth Review Conference on 7 December 2001, the 
chairman of the conference had started consultation rounds with national delegations in 
order to try to bridge the differences between them on the conference's outcome before 
the start of the resumed session of November 2002. The basic conclusion emerging 
from those discussions had been that the resumed session should solely concentrate on 
the issue of the states parties' post-conference cooperation with regard to the BTWC. 99 
As a result, on 6 November 2002, the chairman of the Fifth Review Conference 
introduced his proposal for the conference's final document which included details of a 
follow-up mechanism calling for a one-week annual meeting of the states parties each 
year until 2006, with each such gathering preceded by a two-week preparatory meeting 
98 This paragraph draws upon author's interview with A. A. Soltanieh, Geneva, 22 July 2002. 
" As put by the chairman of the conference himself: "The question of follow-up is crucial, as without 
agreement on this it is likely that nothing will be done by States Parties collectively to strengthen or even 
maintain the Convention until at least the next Review Conference, due in 2006" (cited in Pearson 2002: 
20). 
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of experts. According to the chairman's draft decision, each of the annual meetings 
would focus on a specific topic with the aim of implementing and strengthening the 
BTWC. (Pearson 2002: 21 and BWC/CONF. V/CRP. 3,2002: 1) 
In 2003, the chairman's proposal put forth, the states parties would discuss and 
promote common understanding and effective action on national measures to implement 
the prohibitions of the BTWC and on national measures to ensure the security of 
pathogenic micro-organisms and toxins. In 2004, they would deliberate on how to 
enhance international capabilities for responding to, investigating, and mitigating the 
effects of, biological weapons use or suspicious disease outbreaks, as well as on how to 
strengthen national and international efforts against infectious diseases. For 2005, the 
final year of the chairman's three-year scheme, the draft decision planned discussions 
on codes of conduct for scientists. Finally, the chairman's proposal stated that all the 
meetings by the states parties would reach their conclusions by consensus and that the 
Sixth Review Conference of 2006 would consider the work of the prior meetings and 
decide on further action. (BWC/CONF. V/CRP. 3,2002: 1) 
Providing a background for his draft decision, the chairman of the Fifth Review 
Conference told the participants of the resumed session that the document before them 
was not a typical product of a BTWC review conference. It was not a draft final 
declaration on whose formulation previous review conferences had mainly focused. 
Instead, it only dealt with what was strictly necessary to get the states parties out of the 
diplomatic deadlock in which they had ended up in December 2001. The chairman also 
recognized that the content of his proposal would not satisfy all delegations. 
Nevertheless, he said, the five topics listed in the draft decision to guide the diplomatic 
follow-up constituted the only realistic basis for future multilateral work on the 
implementation and strengthening of the BTWC. (Pearson 2002: 21-22) 
In the end, on 14 November 2002, the resumed session of the Fifth Review 
Conference adopted the chairman's text by consensus. Even though the Iranians and 
other NAM delegations ultimately went along with the follow-up mechanism put 
forward by the chairman - or what became known in the BTWC circles as the "new 
process" or "new approach" -, they had reservations about it as well as about the state 
of biological disarmament in general. '°° In a joint statement, the NAM delegations 
100 Immediately following the decision on the chairman's draft, Iran and other NAM countries stressed 
that their acceptance of the document had based on understanding that (a) "the ambiguities" in the 
chairman's text would be subsequently clarified, (b) the states parties were sovereign and could together 
and at any time decide on further BTWC-related diplomatic activities, (c) the 2006 BTWC review 
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expressed their displeasure with the "limited nature" of the final decision taken by the 
states parties. In their opinion, enhanced implementation of the BTWC was the 
maximum that could result from the follow-up process. Thus, the NAM delegations 
criticized, the outcome of the resumed session had turned out to be a far cry from the 
long-lived diplomatic goal of a legally binding BTWC protocol. In addition to 
expressing their "deep disappointment" at the fact that the states parties had not been 
able to strengthen the BTWC through the planned protocol - that the protocol had been 
"snatched away" from the states parties -, the NAM delegations regretted that the Fifth 
Review Conference had failed to succesfully conclude its work at its original session in 
2001. (BWC/CONF. V/15,2002: 1) 
However, Iran and other NAM countries did not view the resumed session's outcome 
merely through dark lenses. In their joint statement, the NAM delegations asserted that 
they had succeeded in preventing any attempt to foreclose the option that the states 
parties would embark upon "more meaningful work" in the future. They also took the 
credit for "preserving multilateralism as the only vehicle for preventing the 
reprehensible use of disease as instruments of terror and war in a sustainable way. " The 
NAM statement thus implied that the NAM delegations, including that of Iran, were 
satisfied with having achieved their main goal at the resumed session of the Fifth 
Review Conference: to keep the spotlight on the AHG and to make sure that the post- 
conference diplomatic follow-up - and the expert meetings prior to the annual 
gatherings of the states parties, in particular - could not be interpreted as replacing the 
AHG process. 10 1 
conference would decide on further action in the area of biological disarmament, and (d) the BTWC 
"forms a composite whole and that while it is possible to address related issues separately, it will be 
necessary for all of the inter-linked elements of the Convention - whether they relate to regulation, 
compliance or promotion - to be dealt with" (BWC/CONF. V/15,2002: 2). 101 This paragraph draws upon BWC/CONF. V/15 (2002: 1) and author's interview with A. A. Soltanieh, 
Geneva, 22 July 2002. 
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5 ISLAMIC IRAN AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS DISARMAMENT' 
5.1 From the Revolution to the Cease-Fire 
5.1.1 The Islamic Republic and the Shah's nuclear legacy 
5.1.1.1 The denouncement of the Shah's nuclear power program 
One of Iranian arms control officials' first tasks after the 1979 revolution was to draw 
a distinction between the policies of the ousted Pahlavi regime and those of the newly 
founded Islamic Republic. As a result, hard criticism of the Shah regime's military 
ambitions formed an integral part of Islamic Iran's initial, evolving arms control 
argumentation. In the opinion of the representatives of the Islamic Republic, the Shah 
had militarized the Iranian society by wasting huge sums of money on the country's 
military and on weapons imports that were intended, first and foremost, for 
strengthening the Shah's and, by extension, great power imperialists' grip on the Iranian 
nation. 2 
In the light of the strong denouncement of the Pahlavi regime and its allegedly 
destructive arms policies, it is striking that the criticism directed at the Shah by the 
authorities of the Islamic Republic did not include references to the Iranian monarch's 
interest in acquiring a nuclear weapons capability for his country. In spite of the fact 
that many people inside and outside Iran had believed at the time of the Shah that the 
ambitious nuclear power program launched by the Iranian monarch in 1974 had at least 
partly been motivated by military considerations, the officials of the Islamic Republic 
did not draw a linkage between the Shah and nuclear weapons. 3 
'A nuclear weapon consists of a nuclear explosive and a delivery system. It creates an explosion by 
releasing energy through nuclear fission or fission and fusion reactions. Fissile material is thus the 
essential component of a nuclear weapon. The term 'fissile material' refers mainly to the isotopes of 
uranium and plutonium that can be fissioned by thermal neutrons. Although uranium-235 and plutonium- 
239 are the fissile materials typically used in the production of nuclear armaments, there are other fissile 
materials potentially usable for weapons purposes. These include neptumium-237 - it is believed that one 
or more nuclear-weapon states may have tested a nuclear explosive using this material - and americium. 
A state needs some 8 kilograms of plutonium or 25 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to 
produce its first nuclear explosive. Ballistic missiles and bomber aircraft are the most sophisticated means 
employed to carry nuclear explosives to their targets. (Tulliu and Schmalberger 2001: 114,116; Walker 
and Berkhout 1999: 41,45 and Albright and Barbour 1999: 85) 
2 See above the discussion in section 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. 
3 According to Spector (1987: 46-50), the Shah had apparently had a clandestine nuclear weapons 
research program that had focused on uranium enrichment and plutonium separation technologies - that 
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That the representatives of the Islamic Republic did not allude to the Shah's nuclear 
weapons aspirations may have resulted from their ignorance of the details of the Shah's 
nuclear activities. However, a more plausible explanation could be that the decision- 
makers of the new Iranian regime ultimately refrained from publicly making the 
connection because they wanted to leave the nuclear weapons option open for 
themselves. In other words: why make noise about the military component of the Shah's 
nuclear program when it could be harnessed, if so desired, to serve the Islamic 
Republic? The explanation focusing on the military calculations of post-Pahlavi Iran's 
leaders is supported, among others, by the fact that soon after the revolution, some 
members of Iran's religious establishment openly expressed their interest in the 
development of nuclear weapons (Mossavar-Rahmani 1982: 217 and Spector 1987: 45, 
56). Also, it is supported by the belief that, following the revolution, the Islamic 
Republic probably inherited most of the data and know-how generated by the 
rudimentary nuclear weapons research efforts launched by the Shah (Koch and Wolf 
1997: 13 1). 4 But even though the representatives of the Islamic Republic seemed to 
intentionally sideline the military dimension of the Shah's nuclear ambitions and 
refrained from using the issue as further evidence of the purportedly dangerous nature 
of the ousted monarchical regime, they spared no criticism as far as the declared 
objectives of the Shah's nuclear power program themselves were concerned. On the 
contrary, the program was subjected to close scrutiny and its fundamentals were 
strongly challenged. 
is, on the development of a domestic capability for the production of fissile materials for weapons 
purposes - and on designing nuclear weapons themselves. During the final years of the Shah's rule, an 
active debate had taken place among observers on whether Iran was pursuing a nuclear weapons 
capability and what the incentives and disincentives for such a course of action were (see Hessing-Cahn 
[1975]; Martin [1977]; Cottrell and Dougherty [1977] and Cottrell et al. [1980]). Of course, the 
representatives of the Shah's regime had repeatedly denied Iran's interest in nuclear weapons. For official 
statements to this effect, see NPT/CONF/SR. 4 (1975) and NPT/CONF/C. 1/SR. 11 (1975) which 
underscored Iran's commitment to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its interest in global and 
regional nuclear disarmament. The debate on the Shah's nuclear intentions has continued after the 1979 
Iranian revolution. Although most observers seem to be convinced that the Shah was seeking a nuclear 
weapons capability, some have continued to dispute such a view. Akbar Etemad, the former head of the 
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and a central player in the Shah's nuclear power program in the 
1970s, for example, has claimed that "the Shah's nuclear ambition was only of a civilian nature with no 
military applications in mind. " On the other hand, Ardishir Zahidi, the Shah's foreign minister between 
1967-197 1, has argued that the Shah had "aimed at creating what is known as a 'surge capacity, ' that is to 
say to have the know-how, the infrastructure and the personnel needed to develop a nuclear military 
capacity within a short time without actually doing so. " Asadullah Alam, the Shah's close confidant and 
his long-time Imperial Court minister, in turn, has written in his memoirs that the monarch had probably 
envisioned Iran having nuclear armaments. (Etemad 1987: 213; The Wall Street Journal, 25 June 2004 
and Alam 1991: 453) 
4 The subject of Islamic Iran's nuclear weapons efforts will be discussed separately below in chapter 6. 
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The Shah had launched his nuclear program with the stated aim of providing Iran 
with a vast nuclear infrastructure that would be capable of accounting for much of the 
country's electricity needs and hence preserve oil, the vital Iranian source of foreign 
exchange, for export purposes. It was claimed at the time that, without a nuclear power 
program, Iran - whose industries and citizens were consuming more and more oil- 
generated electricity - could cease to be an oil exporter by the mid-1990s. The Shah's 
government had estimated, in 1974, that in order to sufficiently limit the domestic use 
of oil for power generation, Iran would need a nuclear infrastructure with an installed 
power capacity of 23,000 megawatts (MW). The Shah's original aim was that within a 
period of twenty years, his country would be able to cover some 40 percent of its total 
installed power capacity through nuclear reactors. Bearing the main responsibility for 
the realization of this objective, whose attainment was estimated to cost some $30 
billion, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, which had been established by the 
Shah in 1974, had rapidly started to conduct negotiations with a host of supplier 
countries - mainly France, West Germany, and the United States - on contracts that 
would provide Iran with a network of 23 nuclear power plants as well as with the fuel 
needed for those reactors. Also, Iranian authorities had shown interest in acquiring 
facilities to enrich uranium, fabricate reactor fuel, and reprocess spent fuel, as well as 
launched a number of national research and development projects that sought to 
contribute to Iran's nuclear program and generally strengthen the country's scientific 
and technical capabilities. 5 
By 1978, however, the Shah's government had realized that the planned nuclear 
power capacity of 23,000 MW by the year 1994 could not be achieved and 
acknowledged that the goals set for the Iranian nuclear program had to be revised. There 
had been a number of reasons that had necessitated the program's review. Financially, 
Iranian authorities' original plans had become unrealistic due to the rapid decrease in 
5 For detailed presentations of the various aspects of the Shah's nuclear program and its implementation, 
see Etemad (1987: 205-209); Mossavar-Rahmani (1982: 201-207) and Iran's Strategic Weapons 
Programmes (2005: 9-11). In addition to the economic rationale behind the Shah's nuclear program, and 
the military motive that is believed to also have played a role in Iranian nuclear calculations, there were 
other considerations that had pushed the Shah's government to embark on the program. According to 
Mossavar-Rahmani, Iran's nuclear efforts had been partly driven by the pressure put on Iranian 
authorities by Western countries which had hoped that Iran would spend its petrodollars on industrial 
goods and services imported from them. Moreover, the prestige believed to be accruing to Iran from 
belonging to the group of nuclear nations had supposedly been another additional motivation for the 
program. Finally, the fact that the Shah administration's dealings with foreign nuclear suppliers had 
presumably included an element of corruption had provided Iranian officials with a further incentive to 
implement the program. (Mossavar-Rahmani 1982: 204) 
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world market oil prices in the second half of the 1970s. Also, the sharply risen reactor 
prices in the same time period had challenged Iran's ability to execute its nuclear 
program. On top of the financial factors, increasing political instability within Iran, 
combined with a number of practical problems related to the nuclear program's 
implementation - such as finding suitable locations for the power plants -, had seriously 
obstructed the Shah's nuclear efforts. (Etemad 1987: 205 and Mossavar-Rahmani 1982: 
201-202) 
In the end, it was the post-Pahlavi leadership in Iran that turned out to have the final 
say on the future of the country's nuclear plans. And the decision made by the leaders of 
the Islamic Republic in the aftermath of the revolution was unambiguous: the nuclear 
program initiated by the Shah would be halted. Explaining their decision, the authorities 
of the Islamic Republic referred to a number of factors. First of all, by pointing to the 
program's massive costs, they questioned the nuclear effort's rationale altogether. As 
stressed by the president of the AEOI in September 1982, the Shah had embarked upon 
a major nuclear program "without any consideration for the living conditions and 
essential needs of the [Iranian] people" (GC/XXVI/OR. 242,1982: 28). 6 
Secondly, the authorities of the Islamic Republic maintained that the Shah's program 
had based on untenable fundaments and that its execution had suffered from major 
deficiencies. Especially the fact that Iran's nuclear efforts had been highly dependent on 
foreign hardware, materials, and services caught the post-revolutionary leadership's 
attention. Highly sensitive about the issue of national sovereignty, the leaders of the 
Islamic Republic portrayed the Shah's nuclear plans as yet another indication of the 
dethroned monarch's readiness to hand over Iran to the control of foreign powers. A 
less ideological Iranian argument went that the high degree of dependence on outside 
suppliers had put the country's nuclear program at the mercy of decisions made in the 
supplier countries and thereby critically hampered the prospects for long-term national 
planning and actions in the nuclear field. (GC/XXIV/OR. 223,1980: 26; 
GC/XXVI/OR. 242,1982: 28 and Mossavar-Rahmani 1982: 210-211) 
In addition to pointing to the financial ramifications of nuclear power production in 
Iran as well as to the issue of nuclear dependence, the post-revolutionary Iranian critics 
6 Also see Iran's September 1980 statement made at the International Atomic Energy Agency which 
noted that "the cost of generating electricity [by nuclear reactors] would have ended up being several 
times higher than the comparable cost in the supplier countries" (GC/XXIV/OR. 223,1980: 27). By 1978, 
it had been estimated that the final bill for the Shah's nuclear program would total $80-120 billion 
(Mossavar-Rahmani 1982: 201). 
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of the Shah's nuclear program claimed that the monarchical regime had overlooked the 
important fact that Iran's incomplete electric-power grid was not capable of efficiently 
transmitting the electricity produced by the planned reactors. As regards the nuclear 
reactors themselves, the representatives of the Islamic Republic pointed out that the 
Shah's regime had understated the risks pertaining to the selection of plant sites in a 
country which is prone to earthquakes. They also criticized the Shah's government for 
having paid too little attention to the issues of nuclear waste management and nuclear 
safety. Alluding to the March 1979 Three Mile Island nuclear accident in the United 
States, they noted that a developing country like Iran, lacking nuclear and technological 
know-how, would be particularly vulnerable to nuclear accidents and to the 
consequences of radioactive fall-out. (GC/XXIV/OR. 223,1980: 26; GC/XXVI/OR. 242, 
1982: 28 and Mossavar-Rahmani 1982: 212) 
The points raised by the officials of the Islamic Republic against the Shah's nuclear 
program closely followed the content of the criticism that had been directed at Iran's 
nuclear efforts already before the 1979 revolution by a small group of energy experts 
and economists working in the Iranian government and academia. 7 Following the 
revolution, thus, the authorities of the Islamic Republic were informed of the 
weaknesses of Iran's nuclear program and were able to quickly halt its implementation. 
The statement made by the head of the AEOI at the International Atomic Energy 
Agency in Vienna in September 1980 expressed the conclusion drawn by the new 
power-holders in Tehran: "The [Shah's] nuclear power project had run counter to the 
very fabric and spirit of Iran's revolutionary ideals, and had therefore been cancelled" 
(GC/XXIV/OR. 223,1980: 26). 
The first steps to slow down the pace of Iran's nuclear program had already been 
taken before the 1979 revolution. As a result of the Shah government's internal review 
of its nuclear activities during the final months of its rule, Iran had suspended 
negotiations with West Germany on the purchase of four and with the United States on 
the purchase of six to eight nuclear reactors. By mid-1978, thus, the Iranian leadership 
had recognized that the four nuclear units under construction at the time - two of them 
were being built at a site near the city of Bushehr on the Persian Gulf and the remaining 
two were to be placed at Darkhuvin near the city of Ahwaz in southwestern Iran - 
occupied its attention to the extent that the acquisition of new reactors was, at least 
See Mossavar-Rahmani (1982: 202,208-217). 
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temporarily, out of question. 8 Added to the suspension of negotiations with the Germans 
and the Americans on the purchase of additional reactors, in January 1979, in the 
middle of major political turmoil inside Iran, the caretaker government of Shahpur 
Bakhtiar had announced the cancellation of Iran's order for the two Darkhuvin reactors 
for which preliminary site work had been underway for two years. (Mossavar-Rahmani 
1982: 203,206) 
After the revolution, the new Iranian leadership continued from where the old regime 
had left off. In the course of 1979, the Islamic Republic called off the deal for the 
Bushehr reactors, and its eventual decision to halt the Shah's nuclear power program 
meant that all the country's nuclear fuel contracts with foreign suppliers were cancelled 
as well, including the agreement with Kraftwerk Union on the supply of fuel for the 
Bushehr reactors and the fuel supply contract with Framatome regarding the Darkhuvin 
units. 9 Furthermore, the Iranian revolution brought about the demise of the U. S. -Iran 
Nuclear Energy Agreement, the final draft of which had been signed on 10 July 1978. 
Had the agreement been put into effect, it would have resulted in wide-ranging nuclear 
assistance from the United States to Iran. 1° (Etemad 1987: 205-206 and Spector 1987: 
53,170) 
5.1.1.2 The start of the Islamic Republic's nuclear activities 
It has been argued that, in the aftermath of the 1979 revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini 
declared his opposition to nuclear science (Rathmell 1995: 11). If this really was the 
case, it did not take a long time for the new Iranian leadership to circumvent 
Khomeini's initial position. After the Islamic Republic had stopped the Shah's nuclear 
program and taken the necessary steps to free Iran from its nuclear deals with foreign 
suppliers, it began to elaborate on its attitude towards nuclear science and technology. 
8 The two 1,190 MW Bushehr plants had originally been ordered from Kraftwerk Union -a subsidiary of 
the German firm Siemens - in 1974, whereas the contract 
for the two 935 MW Darkhuvin units, signed 
the same year, had been made with the French company Framatome (Mossavar-Rahmani 1982: 206 and 
Hessing-Cahn 1975: 189). 
9 In 1974, as part of its nuclear program, the Shah's Iran had also acquired - through the provision of a 
loan of $1 billion to Eurodif, a French-led consortium -a 10 percent share in the Eurodif uranium 
enrichment plant based in Tricastin, France. In January 1980, however, the Islamic 
Republic made it 
known that it refused to buy 10 percent of the enriched uranium produced 
by the plant as called for by the 
Shah's contract with Eurodif. (Mossavar-Rahmani 1982: 206 and Albright and 
Hibbs 1992: 10) 
10 For the details of the nuclear agreement between the Shah's Iran and the United 
States and for an 
overview of the history of Iranian-U. S. nuclear relations, see 
Sahimi (2004) and Iran's Strategic 
Weapons Programmes (2005: 9-11). 
356 
On 24 September 1980, two days after the Iran-Iraq war had broken out, the 
representatives of the Islamic Republic stated at the IAEA that their government was 
fully committed to research and development in science and technology, and "within 
this context, was studying and pursuing the peaceful applications of nuclear science and 
technology" (GC/XXIV/OR. 223,1980: 26). 
Preparing ground for the Islamic Republic's activities in the nuclear area, Iranian 
officials further noted that in the light of their country's intention to diversify its energy 
resources, it needed development programs for the utilization of nuclear energy. The 
authorities of the Islamic Republic thus seemed to accept the fundamental notion 
initially put forward by the Shah's government that Iran needed a nuclear power 
program to satisfy the needs of its economy. To distance themselves from the former 
regime, however, the representatives of the Islamic Republic emphasized that post- 
revolutionary Iran's programs for the utilization of nuclear energy would rely on 
"locally acquired or developed experience and would entail [... ] the sharing of 
resources with other interested countries. " (Ibid. ) 
Subsequently, on various occasions during the war years, the Islamic Republic made 
it known that despite the funding and personnel reductions introduced at the AEOI in 
the aftermath of the revolution, it would keep a civilian nuclear power program alive. " 
In September 1982, for example, the president of the AEOI said that now that the 
Iranian people had become masters of their own destiny, his organization was ready to 
develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and to contribute to the "harmonious 
development of the country as a whole. " The stated Iranian aim was nuclear self- 
sufficiency. This objective was told by the Iranians to stem from two sets of 
considerations. First, it was one aspect of the Islamic Republic's general determination 
to be active in all fields of science and technology. Secondly, the Islamic Republic 
sought nuclear self-sufficiency because, inspired by Islamic ideology, it wanted to pass 
its know-how to the world's "oppressed nations" and to free them from the domination 
of the superpowers. The value of science, the Iranians emphasized, lay in its application, 
not in science itself. (GC/XXVI/OR. 242,1982: 28-29; GC/XXVII/OR. 253,1983: 17 
and GC/XXVIII/OR. 260,1984: 2) 
Officially, the Islamic Republic's nuclear activities during the war years focused on 
three main areas: natural uranium exploration, nuclear research, and the completion of 
For the financial and personnel cuts that hit the AEOI after the revolution, see Moore (1994: 383). 
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the Bushehr reactors. 12 As for the uranium exploration program, it survived from the 
Shah period and gained momentum after the revolution. In 1984, Iranian authorities 
announced the discovery of some 5,000 metric tons of uranium in the Saghand region of 
the Yazd province. Three years later, in 1987, the Islamic Republic informed that it was 
planning to set up a plant in the Yazd province producing uranium oxide concentrate or 
so-called yellowcake. (Etemad 1987: 206,215 and Cordesman 1993: 107) 
Another area of nuclear activity that remained somewhat immune to Iran's 
revolutionary turmoil was nuclear research. Even though many scientists involved in the 
Shah's program had left Iran as a result of the revolution, a significant number of 
nuclear researchers had stayed in the country. The main reason for this had been the 
post-revolutionary leadership's view that national work on nuclear research should go 
on. After a period of ferment, during which the AEOI had tried to keep the research 
teams together and lure back many of those who had occupied key places in them, the 
Islamic Republic succeeded in maintaining and gradually expanding Iranian nuclear 
research efforts whose main declared aim was to study the applications of nuclear 
science in medicine, agriculture, and industry. (Etemad 1987: 208; Spector 1987: 54, 
172 and GC/XXVIII/OR. 260,1984: 5) 
The opening of Iran's second nuclear research center in Isfahan in 1984 - the nuclear 
research center of Tehran University, established by the Shah in 1959, remained the 
country's primary research facility - was one indication of the Islamic Republic's 
determination to support the research activities that had been launched during the Shah 
years. The Iranians tried to obtain a nuclear research reactor for the Isfahan center by 
approaching France and Pakistan, but after unsuccessful discussions, they had to settle 
for a reactor delivered by China in 1985. Two years later, the Chinese provided Iran 
with a small calutron for the purpose of uranium enrichment research. Also in 1987, the 
Islamic Republic signed a nuclear deal with Argentina in which the Argentinians agreed 
to convert the Iranian research reactor based at Tehran University from burning 93 
12 In spite of these declared areas of emphasis, however, the AEOI set a wide-ranging agenda for the 
Islamic Republic's future nuclear efforts. The agenda was composed of five major objectives. First of all, 
the AEOI sought to gain access to nuclear science and technology. This effort involved the build-up of 
Iran's know-how in the design and construction of nuclear reactors, in nuclear fuel-cycle activities, as 
well as in other advanced nuclear technologies. Relatedly, the AEOI strove to train a new cadre of Iranian 
nuclear experts to advance the country's nuclear aspirations. Secondly, the AEOI aimed at offering 
nuclear services for industrial, agricultural, and medical purposes, and thirdly, at supplying the necessary 
raw materials for the country's nuclear fuel-cycle activities. Fourthly, the organization declared its 
intention to safeguard the natural environment and the Iranian people from radiation through radiological 
control and monitoring. Finally, the AEOI underscored the role of nuclear energy in 
fulfilling Iran's 
future electricity requirements. (Ibid. ) 
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percent enriched uranium fuel to using 20 percent enriched uranium fuel. This 
agreement had been necessitated by the fact that the Americans - who had supplied the 
Tehran University's 5 MW research reactor in 1967 - had, as a result of the hostage 
crisis between the Islamic Republic and the United States, refused to continue fuel 
supplies for the Tehran reactor. The U. S. refusal was part of the American policy of 
strongly opposing all nuclear cooperation with Islamic Iran. (Cordesman 1993: 105- 
106; Koch and Wolf 1997: 130 and Einhorn and Samore 2002: 51-52) 
As regards the future of the nuclear power plants whose construction had been 
abandoned shortly after the revolution, the post-revolutionary Iranian leadership 
eventually concluded that it wanted to see the two Bushehr reactors finished. 13 As a 
consequence, the debate in Iran about alternative uses for the nearly completed Bushehr 
facilities ended, 14 and the country's authorities began to contact foreign companies 
capable of completing the project. At this stage, the main focus was on the completion 
of the Bushehr-1 reactor. As stated by the Islamic Republic's IAEA representative in 
September 1984: "In view of all the technical, social, economic factors involved, the 
AEOI believed it essential to complete that power plant [Bushehr-1] and to put it into 
operation, in order to ensure Iran's self-sufficiency in that area and in other related 
industries" (GC/XXVIII/OR. 260,1984: 5). 
Understandably, the West German Kraftwerk Union, Iran's original contracting party, 
was the Islamic Republic's first choice as a negotiation partner. Although experts from 
West Germany visited the Bushehr site in 1984 to assess the amount of work needed to 
complete the two reactors, 15 the Islamic Republic ultimately never succeeded in 
inducing the Germans to finish the job. In addition to the contractual conflict between 
the Iranians and the Germans over the Islamic Republic's initial cancellation of the 
1974 Kraftwerk Union agreement, the dangers related to the on-going Iran-Iraq war 
contributed to West Germany's reluctance to get involved in the project. Still, the most 
important factor behind the German decision was the West German government's 
concern over the Islamic Republic's nuclear intentions. The fear of a nuclear weapon in 
13 At the time of the revolution, the first unit of the Bushehr site - the so-called Bushehr-1 - was 90 
percent complete, with 60 percent of the equipment installed, whereas the second unit, Bushehr-2, was 50 
percent complete. The AEOI estimated at the time that the completion of the two Bushehr plants would 
cost the Islamic Republic some $7 billion. (Koch and Wolf 1997: 127 and Mossavar-Rahmani 1982: 219) 
14 Soon after the revolution, some Iranians had suggested that the containment structures of the Bushehr 
facilities should be converted into storage silos for imported grain. Another suggestion - put forward, 
among others, by the newly appointed head of the AEOI - had been that the facilities would be used by 
two proposed fisheries and oceanographic institutes. (Mossavar-Rahmani 1982: 219) 
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the hands of a revolutionary regime that openly challenged regional and international 
status quo was not only a German worry but coloured the policies of other Western 
governments as well, especially those of the United States which actively sought to 
prevent West Germany and other countries from signing nuclear cooperation 
agreements with Iran. The diplomatic pressure applied by the Americans crucially 
contributed to the fact that the Islamic Republic was unable to find a nuclear partner to 
complete either one of the Bushehr reactors. 16 (Etemad 1987: 211,215; Spector 1987: 
53,170 and Albright 1995) 
After the revolution, then, the authorities of the Islamic Republic not only decided to 
resume work on the Bushehr site - which had formed the core of the Shah's nuclear 
program earlier so strongly criticized by the representatives of the new Iranian regime - 
but they simultaneously also inherited the burden of being suspected of nuclear 
weapons ambitions. The representatives of the Islamic Republic strongly rejected the 
accusations that Iran was interested in nuclear armaments' 7 and emphasized that all 
nations had the right to plan, develop, and implement peaceful nuclear programs for the 
purpose of economic and social development. This point was made, among others, by 
the Islamic Republic's prime minister Mir-Husain Musavi who stated, in his message of 
September 1987 to the IAEA, that nobody had the right to interfere with national 
nuclear power programs, provided that such programs were guided by moral 
considerations and principles (GC/XXXI/OR. 296,1987: 3). 
IS According to subsequent German estimates, the Bushehr-1 plant could have been completed in about a 
three years' time (Koch and Wolf 1997: 127). 
16 The diplomatic pressure applied by the Americans with regard to the Bushehr reactors arose from the 
U. S. concern that the Bushehr project would increase Iran's general understanding of nuclear matters and 
thereby enable the Iranians, in the long run, to use such know-how in the production of a nuclear weapon. 
Also, the Americans feared that the Bushehr project could act as a cover for clandestine Iranian nuclear 
weapons activities. Furthermore, the United States had taken into account the possibility that the Iranians 
could, at some future point, manage to reprocess the nuclear fuel used in the Bushehr reactors and 
separate plutonium from the spent fuel. By doing so and then withdrawing from the NPT under the 
treaty's article X- which allows the states parties to pull back from the NPT if they decide that 
"extraordinary events, " related to the treaty's subject matter, have jeopardized their supreme interests -, 
the U. S. argument went, the Islamic Republic would have free hands to use the plutonium for military 
purposes. Generally speaking, light-water nuclear reactors (LWR), such as the ones planned for the 
Bushehr site, pose a lesser nuclear-weapon proliferation risk than heavy-water nuclear reactors (HWR). 
This is because of the separation of plutonium from LWR fuel requires the shutting down of the reactor, 
an operation which can be easily noticed by other countries. Secondly, the plutonium separated from 
LWR fuel contains significant impurities, that is, low concentrations of plutonium-239 or so-called 
weapon-grade plutonium. HRW, on the other hand, are capable of producing high concentrations of 
plutonium-239. Moreover, they can burn natural uranium fuel, a fact which obviates the need for fuel 
enrichment facilities. (Koch and Wolf 1997: 128,131; Gilinsky 2004: 28-30 and Dealing with Iran's 
Nuclear Program 2003: 5) 
1' The Islamic Republic's statement at the UN General Assembly in September 1983, for example, 
characterized such accusations as "insipid, taunting jokes" (A/38/PV. 95,1983: 1550). 
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Indeed, the words 'morality' and 'virtue' played a central part in the Islamic 
Republic's diplomatic defence against the allegations that its nuclear efforts were 
motivated by military considerations. As Muslims, the Iranians argued, they recognized 
the importance of science but also understood that scientific efforts had to be based on 
virtue and morality without which there would always be the risk of science being 
utilized for "anti-humanitarian" purposes. Given that the Islamic Republic was 
following the principles and doctrines of Islam, Iranian officials underscored, it 
categorically condemned "anti-humanitarian uses of nuclear technology. " Iran's 
humane behaviour in the war against Iraq, the representatives of the Islamic Republic 
added, tellingly proved that their country was acting in accordance with the Islamic 
injunction that forbids the employment of science and technology to the detriment of the 
mankind. (GC/XXVI/OR. 242,1982: 28; GC/XXVIII/OR. 260,1984: 3 and 
GC/XXX/OR. 284,1986: 13-14) 
In the end, and despite official Iranian pronouncements to the contrary, the 
consequences of Iran's war against Iraq significantly obstructed the practical 
implementation of the Islamic Republic's nuclear plans. 18 Although it is difficult to say 
whether the Iran-Iraq conflict actually increased or decreased the status of the national 
nuclear program on Iranian decision-makers' war-time agenda, one thing remains clear: 
during the war years, the Islamic Republic made the fundamental decision to keep an 
Iranian nuclear program alive. 
5.1.2 The formation of the Islamic Republic's nuclear arms control operations 
5.1.2.1 Iran's opposition to nuclear weapons 
While it took some time for Iran's post-revolutionary leadership to formulate the new 
regime's approach to nuclear science and technology, the Islamic Republic's official 
position on nuclear weapons was clear right from the start. In the Iranian opinion, no 
country in the world was entitled to be in possession of such armaments. Alluding to the 
enormous destructive power of nuclear weapons, the representatives of the Islamic 
Republic repeatedly pointed out that a nuclear war could mean the end of the human 
18 For the Iranian claim that the Iran-Iraq war did not hamper the Islamic Republic's nuclear efforts, see 
the statements made by Iran at the IAEA in October 1983 and September 1984 in which it talked about 
"remarkable improvements" and "rapid progress" made in the nuclear field (GC/XXVII/OR. 253,1983: 
19 and GC/XXVIII/OR. 260,1984: 5). 
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species. They argued that the survival of humanity could be jeopardized not only by 
statesmen's conscious decisions to launch nuclear strikes, but also by their 
miscalculations and mistakes that could bring about an accidental nuclear war. And the 
longer the nuclear arms race especially between the superpowers continued, the Iranians 
added, the more likely it was that a nuclear catastrophe would ultimately actualize. 
(CD/PV. 286,1984: 25; A/38/PV. 13,1983: 191 and GC/XXVIII/OR. 260,1984: 6) 
In the face of the devastating magnitude of destruction potentially caused by nuclear 
armaments, the Islamic Republic maintained, the world had to get rid of those weapons 
as soon as possible. 19 The call for universal and total nuclear disarmament thus played a 
key role in the Islamic Republic's evolving arms control argumentation. According to 
Iranian authorities, no individual or country could feel safe until nuclear weapons were 
eliminated from the face of the earth. Iran's stated concern over nuclear warfare mainly 
stemmed from the Cold War confrontation between the nuclear-armed blocs of the East 
and the West, but it also had historical roots, for the events in Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
during World War II, Iranian officials argued, had demonstrated that nuclear weapons 
could potentially be used in any conflict situation involving a nuclear power. 
(GC/XXX/OR. 284,1986: 16; A/S-15/PV. 3,1988: 45 and GC/XXXI/OR. 301,1987: 8) 
Furthermore, the representatives of the Islamic Republic were of the opinion that 
even though all nations shared the obligation to advance the cause of nuclear 
disarmament, it was the five nuclear-weapon states (NWS) that had the main 
responsibility for the elimination of nuclear armaments. 20 Since nuclear weapons posed 
a threat to the whole mankind, the Iranians said, all efforts towards the achievement of a 
nuclear-weapon-free world should be detached from political calculations and 
exigencies. In practice, of course, nuclear arms control efforts between the Cold War 
adversaries were heavily coloured by power politics, a fact the Iranians did not miss. 
Quite the opposite, they strongly criticized the nuclear powers for disregarding their 
obligation, under article VI of the NPT, to take measures to halt the nuclear arms race 
19 For Iranian calls for speedy and comprehensive nuclear disarmament, see NPT/CONF. II/C. l/2 (1980: 
2) and CD/PV. 404 (1987: 4). Against the backdrop of the Islamic Republic's war-time worries, of which 
Iraq's use of chemical weapons was a central one, it is interesting to note that whereas before the Iran- 
Iraq war the authorities of the Islamic Republic had said that nuclear disarmament took absolute priority 
over other areas of disarmament (CD/PV. 45,1979: 7,9), in the course of the war nuclear disarmament 
was characterized more modestly as a vital issue requiring immediate action (CD/PV. 203,1983: 25,28). 
20 The 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons defined, in its article IX, a NWS as a 
state that had manufactured and detonated a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive devices prior to 1 
January 1967. Hence, the five NWS meant by the NPT were, and still are, the United States, Russia, the 
United Kingdom, France, and China. 
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and to commit themselves to nuclear disarmament. 21 According to Iranian authorities, 
nuclear powers' weapons arsenals continued to expand both in qualitative and 
quantitative terms, in addition to which nuclear weapons were increasingly being 
deployed on the soil of non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS). 22 (A/C. 1/39/PV. 36,1984: 
62-65; A/36/PV. 26,1981: 122 and GC/XXXI/OR. 296,1987: 4) 
As if this did not suffice, Iranian officials continued, the superpowers were even 
planning to militarize the outer space. Referring specifically to the U. S. defence 
research and development plan known as the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) or the 
"Star Wars, " which sought to create space-based systems to protect the United States 
from Soviet nuclear missile strikes, 23 the officials of the Islamic Republic feared that the 
SDI would only speed up nuclear arms racing and thereby seriously undermine 
international disarmament efforts. They expressed their government's opposition to the 
SDI and made repeated calls for the preparation of a comprehensive international 
convention banning the use of outer space for all kinds of military purposes. 24 
(CD/PV. 379,1986: 6; CD/PV. 425,1987: 7 and CD/PV. 286,1984: 26) 
From the Iranian standpoint, the SDI symbolized the superpowers' endless effort to 
gain military advantages over their opponents. This objective, Iranian officials argued, 
also characterized the superpowers' behaviour in their bilateral nuclear arms control 
talks. Even though welcoming the progress that was made in those negotiations, 25 the 
Islamic Republic ultimately regarded the bilateral deliberations as a diplomatic 
manifestation of the strategic competition between the United States and the Soviet 
21 Article VI of the NPT states that "each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in 
good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to 
nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective 
international control. " 
22 Under international law, the term 'non-nuclear-weapons states' refers to countries that have renounced 
the acquisition of nuclear weapons under article II of the NPT. 
23 For the details of the SDI, launched by the U. S. administration of president Reagan in March 1983 at a 
time of major diplomatic tension between the two superpowers, see Waller (1993). 
24 The Iranians thus wanted to go beyond the stipulations of the so-called Outer Space Treaty of 1967 
(Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 
including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies) which prohibits the deployment of objects carrying 
nuclear or any other kind of WMD in the earth's orbit, on celestial bodies, or in the outer space. The 
treaty does not deal with the deployment in outer space of weapons other than WMD and neither does it 
prohibit the launching of ballistic missiles with WMD - including nuclear warheads - through space. Iran 
signed the Outer Space Treaty in 1967 but has not ratified it. For a detailed discussion of the Outer Space 
Treaty, see Garthoff (1993). 
25 In 1979, for example, the Islamic Republic expressed its satisfaction over the signing of the second 
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) which took place in June that year (CD/PV. 45,1979: 7-8 
and A/C. 1/34/PV. 20,1979: 56). The treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union set limits on 
the parties' strategic nuclear delivery systems - that is, inter-continental ballistic missiles, submarine- 
launched ballistic missiles, air-to-surface ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers. 
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Union. 26 Beside using their arms control negotiations as an extension of their mutual 
rivalry, the Iranians claimed, American and Soviet authorities saw the bilateral arms 
control talks as a convenient channel to score propaganda points in international and 
domestic politics. 27 
In addition to criticizing the superpowers' record in nuclear arms control, the Islamic 
Republic strongly condemned the view that nuclear deterrence - the threat of the use of 
nuclear weapons by one country against a nuclear attack by another - guaranteed 
international peace and stability. In the Iranian view, the principle of nuclear deterrence 
and, by extension, the military doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD) - which 
provides a massive nuclear retaliation in response to a nuclear attack, thus resulting in 
the certain destruction of both the attacker and the defender - were totally unacceptable 
because they were simply not able to ensure international peace and security. According 
to the Islamic Republic, the dangers and uncertainties pertaining to the nuclear arms 
race made the deterrence constellation between the superpowers extremely unstable and 
put world security into serious jeopardy. Moreover, the Iranians found it morally 
appalling that armaments capable of destroying humanity played such an important role 
in the major powers' security calculations. (CD/PV. 108,1981: 13; A/S-15/PV. 3,1988: 
45 and CD/PV. 425,1987: 6) 
In the Iranian analysis, the superpowers' emphasis on nuclear weapons could not be 
explained merely by the Cold War. The Islamic Republic claimed that the United States 
and the Soviet Union viewed nuclear weapons also as a tool to pressure and blackmail 
Third World countries, the "oppressed, " politically. Striving for the supremacy of the 
world, Iranian authorities argued, the superpowers took advantage of developing 
countries' fear of nuclear weapons and sought to expand their spheres of domination. 
Should developing countries try to resist those efforts, the Iranian argument went, the 
superpowers would not rule out the use of nuclear arms to silence their adversaries. 28 
(A/S-12/PV. 3,1982: 32; CD/PV. 379,1986: 5 and A/C. 1/41/PV. 24,1986: 19-20) 
26 As one representative of the Islamic Republic put it in 1980: "Reviewing the lost opportunities of the 
last decade on the basis of the behaviour of the superpowers, one suspects that none of them was really 
interested in reducing the arms race, but rather that each of them was seeking only to disarm the other, 
while assuring the maintenance of its own weaponry" (CD/PV. 61,1980). 
27 The following Iranian statement from 1983 is indicative of the Islamic Republic's argument: "The 
actions of the superpowers show that their claims on [... ] the reduction and control of arms expenditure or 
the limitation of the number of submarine-launched ballistic missiles were nothing but an empty political 
yesture designed for their own publicity purposes" (AJ38/PV. 13,1983: 191). 
8 Furthermore, the Iranians argued that the superpowers regarded nuclear weapons as a symbol of 
prestige. Rejecting such a view, the officials of the Islamic Republic noted that most countries of the 
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As evidence of the superpowers' readiness to use nuclear weapons against developing 
countries, the Iranians raised two points. On the one hand, they alluded to the U. S. 
employment of atomic bombs to obliterate Hiroshima and Nagasaki in World War II 
and asked what assurances there were that "one day the United States would not resort 
to nuclear force in order to crush the oppressed people of the world. "29 On the other 
hand, the Iranians argued that the discussion among nuclear powers about limited 
nuclear war, the idea that nuclear weapons could be used in small numbers for 
battlefield purposes, indicated that the use of nuclear weapons was viewed as a serious 
war-fighting option. The Islamic Republic strongly condemned the concept of limited 
nuclear war and declared it as highly dangerous because it made nuclear war thinkable 
and thereby increased the possibility of an all-out nuclear war. 30 (GC/SPL. 1 /OR. 4, 
1986: 21; NPT/CONF. II/C. 1/2,1980: 2 and CD/PV. 286,1984: 25) 
From the Iranian viewpoint, then, the way in which the major powers viewed nuclear 
weapons was highly alarming. Great power nuclear arsenals not only increased 
international tension and served the cause of "tyranny and imperialism, " Iranian 
officials argued, but they also drove NNWS to seek a nuclear-weapon capability of their 
own for the protection of their security and sovereignty. Yet, at the same time, the 
Iranians noted that it was all nations' moral duty to refrain from the possession of 
nuclear arms and, instead, to concentrate on the promotion of nuclear disarmament as a 
means to alleviate their security concerns. (NPT/CONF. III/SR. 13/Add. 1,1985: 181 and 
CD/PV. 203,1983: 25) 
Believing that nuclear powers were not likely to change their military thinking and 
behaviour in the foreseeable future, the Iranians called on Third World states to take the 
lead in multilateral nuclear disarmament diplomacy. 31 Alluding to the calls made by 
Ayatollah Khomeini, the officials of the Islamic Republic also asked intellectuals all 
world did not possess nuclear arms but the lack of such weapons had not undermined their prestige 
(NPT/CONF. II/SR. 12,1980: 120). 
29 It should be emphasized in this connection that when the Islamic Republic spoke of the superpowers 
and their nuclear arms policies, it was the United States that bore the brunt of the Iranians' critical 
remarks. For Iranian verbal attacks against the United States, see A/36/PV. 26 (1981: 123) and 
GC/XXVII/OR. 253 (1983: 19). 
30 As put by one Iranian official who feared that a limited nuclear war could get out of the belligerents' 
hands and escalate into a full-blown nuclear confrontation: "It is naive to think that a nuclear war is like a 
boxing match - when it is going to get out of control 
it can be stopped merely by ringing the bell" 
(CD/PV. 242,1984: 7). The Iranian objection to the idea of limited nuclear war meant that the Islamic 
Republic joined the group of countries that called on NWS to adopt the principle of no-first-use of nuclear 
weapons in their military strategies and to lessen their reliance on nuclear arms (CD/PV. 308,1985: 12 
and A/C. 1/4 1 /PV. 24,1986: 22). 
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over the world to educate the "masses" on the dangers of nuclear armaments so that 
they would rise against them and their possessors. As a concrete example of how 
developing countries and other opponents of nuclear weapons could contribute to 
nuclear disarmament, Iranian officials put forth the idea of an "international police 
force" composed of Third World countries that would "control the atomic arsenals of 
the East and West" under the supervision of the IAEA. More generally, the Islamic 
Republic called on the opponents of nuclear weapons worldwide to strive for a moral 
transformation in international relations, for such a transformation, the Iranians 
maintained, was a precondition for changes in the military mind-sets that embraced 
nuclear armaments. (GC/XXVII/OR. 253,1983: 18 and A/34/PV. 21,1979: 447). 32 
5.1.2.2 The Islamic Republic and the nuclear non-proliferation regime 
In spite of Iran's 1983 proposal for the establishment of an international nuclear 
police force, an idea that was more of a diplomatic play on words than a serious arms 
control initiative, the post-revolutionary Iranian regime's first decade in power did not 
bring about major innovations in the country's nuclear arms control operations. On the 
contrary, there was a considerable continuity between the diplomacy of the ousted 
Pahlavi government and that of the Islamic Republic. The fact that the pre-revolutionary 
Iranian regime had for years spoken against nuclear weapons allowed the authorities of 
the Islamic Republic to lean on the diplomatic foundation that had been laid during the 
Shah era and to encrust it with their Islamic ideology. 33 
31 In this context, the Iranians drew a parallel between the nuclear arms race and colonization, on the one 
hand, and nuclear disarmament and decolonization, on the other (A/C. 1/41/PV. 24,1986: 19-20). 
32 Following the moral course of action they were advocating, Iranian authorities opposed, among others, 
NATO's deployment, from 1983 onwards, of Pershing-II intermediate-range nuclear missiles in West 
Germany. In the Iranian view, the deployment of the Pershings - whose purpose was to counter the Soviet 
deployment of its SS-20 missiles - increased international tension as well as the 
danger of nuclear war. 
Iranian officials went as far as claiming that the deployment of the Pershings, which had a range of 650- 
1,800 kilometers, was "directly and seriously endangering the very existence of Iran and many other 
countries in North Africa and West Asia. " As a consequence, the Iranian government lent its support to 
European peace movements which objected to NATO's missile deployment and stated that it was Iran's 
"Islamic and humanitarian duty" to speak against the Pershings. Subsequently, the 1987 Intermediate- 
Range Nuclear Forces (INF) agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union provided for the 
removal of this class of weaponry on both sides. The Islamic Republic welcomed the INF treaty by 
describing it as a "small but nevertheless a positive step on the path of nuclear disarmament. " 
(A/38/PV. 13,1983: 191; CD/PV. 242,1984: 12 and A/S- 15/PV. 3,1988: 45) 
33 For the continuity in Iran's nuclear arms control operations, see the following statements made by the 
pre-revolutionary Iranian regime on different nuclear arms control topics: A/S-10/PV. 18 (1978: 338) 
(opposition to nuclear weapons); A/C. 1/33/PV. 14 (1978: 67-70) (bilateral nuclear arms control 
between 
the United States and the Soviet Union); NPT/CONF/SR. 4 (1975: 14) (article IV of the NPT); CD/PV. 6 
(1979: 28) (comprehensive nuclear test ban); and A/C. 1/33/PV. 28 (1978: 37-4 1) (security assurances). 
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In addition to absorbing the core of the Shah regime's diplomatic legacy in the area 
of nuclear arms control, the Islamic Republic quickly declared its commitment to the 
international nuclear non-proliferation regime - that is, to the rules, norms, 
arrangements, organizations, and treaties established to prevent or retard the spread of 
nuclear arms (Redick 1993: 1079). Soon after the revolution, for example, Iranian 
authorities expressed their government's "great interest" in the NPT, the centerpiece of 
the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and affirmed the Islamic Republic's attachment to 
the treaty (CD/PV. 45,1979: 9,11). 34 But although the Iranians agreed to work within 
existing international nuclear arms control mechanisms and did not question the 
legitimacy of the basic elements of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, they remained 
highly critical of the regime's efficacy and did not hesitate to put forth their views about 
the changes they believed the regime urgently needed. 
The NPT itself, the representatives of the Islamic Republic constantly claimed, had 
not fulfilled its promises. 35 In the Iranian view, the NPT was inherently 
"discriminatory" and "humiliating" because it had obliged NNWS to give up important 
elements of their sovereignty - that is, to forswear the nuclear weapons option and to 
accept IAEA safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities and facilities - while, at 
the same time, it had not been able to ensure that NWS live up to their treaty 
commitments. The continuation of the nuclear arms race, the Iranians asserted, was a 
prime example of the fact that the NPT was not being implemented in a proper and 
balanced manner. In the Iranian analysis, the NPT was worthless unless it managed to 
prevent not only the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons but also the vertical 
proliferation of those armaments. 36 Even though the authorities of the Islamic Republic 
34 In essence, the NPT obligates nuclear-weapon states not to transfer or assist others in acquiring nuclear 
armaments (article I), whereas the non-nuclear states parties are prohibited by the NPT from developing 
or receiving nuclear weapons (article II). The treaty also establishes nuclear safeguards in order to 
guarantee that fissionable material produced or used in non-nuclear-weapon states is employed only for 
peaceful purposes (article III). Moreover, the NPT recognizes the right of the states parties to research, 
produce, and use nuclear energy for non-military purposes (article IV), in addition to which it calls on all 
the states parties to negotiate in good faith measures related to nuclear disarmament as well as to work 
towards a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control 
(article VI). Iran signed the NPT in July 1968 and deposited its instruments of ratification in February- 
March 1970. As far as the agreement between Iran and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in 
connection with the NPT was concerned, it entered into force in May 1974. For the details of the 
safeguards agreement between Iran and the IAEA, see INFCIRC/214 (1974). 
35 As one official of the Islamic Republic characterized in October 1979: "The Treaty on the Non- 
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, almost 10 years after its entry into force, remains a lopsided and 
unfullfilled instrument" (A/C. l/34/PV. 20,1979: 53-55). 
36 The term 'horizontal nuclear proliferation' refers to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by other 
countries than those classified as NWS in the NPT. 'Vertical nuclear proliferation, ' in turn, points to the 
efforts by NWS to increase the quantity and quality of their nuclear armaments. (Epstein 1993: 857) 
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recognized that the NPT had helped to block horizontal nuclear proliferation, they were 
highly disappointed at the treaty's contribution to the control of vertical nuclear 
proliferation. (NPT/CONF. II/SR. 12,1980: 119-120; NPT/CONF. III/SR. 13/Add. 1, 
1985: 181 and A/S-12/PV. 3,1982: 35) 
Iran's view on the implementation of article IV of the NPT 
Another major NPT-related subject causing dissatisfaction among Iranian authorities 
was the implementation of the treaty's article IV which obliges NWS to facilitate and 
promote the efforts by NNWS to apply nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. According 
to the Islamic Republic, NWS had neglected their responsibilities under article IV, in 
addition to which Iranian officials strongly condemned the export control measures 
taken by nuclear supplier countries outside the NPT to prevent the spread of nuclear 
weapons. 37 Pointing out that extra-NPT export controls fought against the independence 
and sovereignty of NNWS by preventing them from improving their scientific and 
industrial capabilities and by severely slowing down the execution of national nuclear 
programs for peaceful purposes, the representatives of the Islamic Republic declared all 
export control measures not sanctioned by the NPT - whether applied by one supplier 
or a group of supplier countries - as illegal and unacceptable. The IAEA's safeguards 
system introduced in the NPT, the Islamic Republic emphasized, constituted a sufficient 
and the only legitimate basis for ensuring that NNWS respect their legal obligation not 
to acquire nuclear armaments. Iranian officials noted that their government was ready to 
discuss the issue of additional nuclear verification measures if other NPT parties so 
wanted, but only on the condition that the potential new measures would be formalized 
within the IAEA framework and that they would be based on a consensus decision 
among NPT states parties. (NPT/CONF. II/C. II/34,1980: 1-5; GC/XXVIII/OR. 260, 
1984: 3-4 and GC/XXIX/OR. 271,1985: 35) 
The Islamic Republic's portrayal of the reasons for the nuclear suppliers' reluctance 
to cooperate with NNWS and especially with developing countries in the nuclear field 
emanated from the Iranian leadership's ideological premises. In essence, the officials of 
37 The Nuclear Suppliers Group, also known as the London Club, is one example of the extra-NPT export 
control arrangements the Iranians were alluding to. The NSG, created in 1975 in the aftermath of India's 
so-called peaceful nuclear explosion of 1974, is a group of nuclear supplier countries that oversees a set 
of guidelines aimed at ensuring that nuclear technology transfers are not diverted to nuclear explosive 
activities. For the NSG, see the group's own website at <www. nuclearsuppliersgroup. org>. 
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the Islamic Republic claimed, the major powers used the transfers of nuclear materials, 
equipment, technology, and know-how as a tool to promote their evil foreign policy 
objectives. By preventing Third World countries, under the pretext of security concerns, 
from having access to peaceful applications of nuclear energy, the Iranian argument 
went, the major powers and the superpowers, in particular, wanted to keep the 
"oppressed" of the world in a backward state and under their domination. On the one 
hand, Iranian authorities lamented, the nuclear suppliers shamelessly exploited 
developing countries' natural resources, including their natural uranium reserves, but on 
the other hand, they hampered those same states' economic and technological 
development. At best, Iranian officials asserted, Third World countries were only 
allowed to conduct basic, mostly outdated, nuclear research activities. 
(GC/XXVII/OR. 253,1983: 17-18; GC/XXIX/OR. 271,1985: 35 and GC/XXX/OR. 284, 
1986: 13-14) 
Highly frustrated at the state of international implementation of article IV of the NPT, 
the Islamic Republic adopted the role of a staunch advocate of free international nuclear 
trade. In principle, the Iranians were of the opinion that all states had an "absolute and 
unlimited right of access" to nuclear materials, science, and technology. 38 In practice, 
however, the Islamic Republic drew a distinction between countries that had joined the 
NPT and concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA and states 
that had not done so and demanded a preferential treatment for the former. Iranian 
officials called on nuclear suppliers to provide NNWS with guaranteed assurances of 
nuclear transfers and underscored the need for "non-discriminatory, predictable and 
stable" international nuclear trade. 39 (NPT/CONF. II/C. II/34,1980: 5; 
GC/XXVIII/OR. 260,1984: 3-4 and GC/XXIX/OR. 271,1985: 38-39) 
As far as concrete forms of nuclear assistance were concerned, the officials of the 
Islamic Republic asked nuclear suppliers and the IAEA to help Third World countries to 
38 As emphasized by the Iranian representative addressing the IAEA's general conference in October 
1983: "Science and technology belongs to all the nations of the world and should not be monopolized by 
a few countries" (GC/XXVII/OR. 253,1983: 17). Also see the Islamic Republic's IAEA statement from 
September 1982 which stressed that "while every country has its own culture, the transfer of science, 
technology and civilization should not be restricted by nationalistic principles but, rather, should be 
governed by a spirit of internationalism" (GC/XXVI/OR. 242,1982: 29). 
9 Iranian officials' efforts to speak against horizontal nuclear proliferation and to simultaneously defend 
Third World countries' peaceful nuclear activities occasionally resulted in contradictory statements. Note, 
for example, the inconsistency between the Iranian conclusion that the spread of nuclear technology 
increased the risk of military uses of nuclear energy (CD/PV. 242,1984: 13) and the Iranian claim that the 
transfer of nuclear technology did not differ from the transfer of any other type of technology 
(GC/XXVII/OR. 253,1983: 18). 
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build up their nuclear infrastructures, among others, by supporting and promoting 
developing countries' educational efforts and by sharing relevant scientific and 
technological information with them. Furthermore, Iranian officials called for the 
establishment of an international nuclear fuel bank that would ensure that developing 
countries have a secure long-term access to nuclear fuel supplies. The Islamic Republic 
also asked developed countries to help the developing ones to finance nuclear energy 
projects as well as called on them to establish a special fund within the IAEA to assist 
Third World countries in the development of peaceful nuclear activities. Seeking to put 
diplomatic pressure on nuclear suppliers in the issue of nuclear transfers, Iran allied 
itself with those developing countries that requested the IAEA's director-general to 
annually report to the agency's general conference on the member states' nuclear 
transfers and on the measures they had taken to promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy 
and international nuclear cooperation. More significantly, still, the Islamic Republic 
implied that if the implementation of article IV of the NPT continued to remain 
unsatisfactory, Iran might not support the treaty's planned extension in 1995.40 
(NPT/CONF. II/C. II/34,1980: 6; GC/XXIV/OR. 223,1980: 26-27 and 
GC/XXIX/OR. 271,1985: 39) 
Iran's argumentation on article IV was highly influenced by the Islamic Republic's 
experiences with its own nuclear efforts. The difficulties faced by the Iranians in the 
execution of their nuclear program generated critical comments on the NPT, on 
international nuclear non-proliferation efforts in general, and naturally on issues that 
specifically involved Iran's own nuclear activities. There were three principal subjects 
related to Iran's nuclear program that were brought up by the authorities of the Islamic 
Republic. First of all, the Iranians criticized the U. S. government's decision - taken in 
the wake of the November 1979-January 1981 hostage crisis between Iran and the 
United States - to discontinue its nuclear fuel supplies to the Tehran University's 
5 MW 
research reactor. Iranian representatives strongly condemned the U. S. government's cut- 
40 Article X of the NPT stipulates that 25 years after the convention's entry into force, "a conference shall 
be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an 
additional fixed period or periods. " The conference to review and extend the NPT took place in April- 
May 1995. At the conference, the states parties decided that the treaty shall continue in force indefinitely. 
Until the final stages of the 1995 conference, Iran held to the diplomatic position that the NPT should be 
extended only for limited periods of time. More accurately, Iran proposed an extension of 'rolling 
fixed 
periods of 25 years, ' with a review and extension conference at the end of each fixed period. As the 
discussion below will demonstrate, the Islamic Republic's position on the issue of treaty extension 
stemmed from its effort to use the matter as a bargaining chip to promote its diplomatic objectives. For a 
detailed discussion of the multilateral deliberations at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, 
see Johnson (1995a). 
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off decision and maintained that it had cost their country dearly in terms of both time 
and money. 41 In the Iranian opinion, the cancellation of U. S. fuel supplies to the Islamic 
Republic constituted a clear violation of article IV of the NPT and testified to the 
discrimination continuously practiced by NWS against NNWS. While threatening to 
take the matter to a civil court, Iranian authorities asked the IAEA to help them to find 
an alternate fuel source for the Tehran reactor. 42 (GC/XXX/OR. 284,1986: 14-15 and 
GC/XXIX/OR. 271,1985: 3 8-3 9) 
The theme of discrimination also coloured Iran's comments on the problems it faced 
in the construction of the Bushehr-1 reactor. West Germany, whose authorities had 
prohibited German companies to take part in the Bushehr project, was harshly criticized 
by the Islamic Republic for following the superpower policy of obstructing developing 
countries' peaceful nuclear efforts. West Germany's course of action, Iranian officials 
noted, seriously undermined that country's credibility as a nuclear supplier and severely 
compromised Iran's right to pursue peaceful applications of nuclear energy. Iranian 
representatives directed similar kind of criticism at the French government which had 
refused to transfer enriched uranium to the Islamic Republic. Although it was the 
Iranians themselves who had initially refused to buy their country's 10-percent share of 
the enriched uranium produced by the Eurodif plant in Tricastin, the authorities of the 
Islamic Republic now complained that their country had never received fuel supplies 
from France and that the French government was not willing to pay either principal or 
interest for the money the Shah's government had lent to Eurodif. The behaviour of the 
French government, the officials of the Islamic Republic concluded, was yet another 
indication of the arbitrary treatment Iran and other developing countries were subjected 
to by NWS. (GC/XXX/OR. 284,1986: 15 and GC/XXVII/OR. 253,1983: 18) 
As far as the IAEA was concerned, the post-revolutionary Iranian regime declared its 
full support for the agency's activities, even if Iranian authorities did little to hide their 
view that the IAEA had not much to offer to countries, such as their own, that had been 
wrongfully branded as potential nuclear proliferators. The Islamic Republic's unease 
with the agency became evident in numerous statements in which Iran criticized the 
41 According to the Islamic Republic, the "illogical sanction imposed by the United States" had seriously 
hampered Iranian nuclear scientists' work (GC/XXVIII/OR. 260,1984: 4). In September 1985, Iranian 
officials claimed that the indirect and direct financial costs to their country resulting from the U. S. 
decision had totalled "well over $10 million" (GC/XXIX/OR. 271,1985: 38). 
42 As already discussed above, the nuclear fuel problem regarding the Tehran University's research 
reactor was ultimately solved after Argentina had agreed to convert the reactor from burning 93 percent 
enriched uranium fuel to using 20 percent enriched uranium fuel. 
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IAEA for having placed too little emphasis on the promotional aspect of its mandate. 43 
According to the Islamic Republic, the activities of the IAEA left the impression that 
the agency was more interested in regulating devoloping countries' nuclear efforts than 
actually facilitating and promoting them. The lack of funds to finance assistance 
programs in the Third World, the Iranians argued, was a salient indication of the 
prevailing mentality within the IAEA. Iran called on developed countries to provide 
more funding to the agency and to ensure the constant flow of sufficient resources to the 
IAEA's assistance and cooperation programs with developing countries. 
(GC/XXIX/OR. 271,1985: 40; GC/XXX/OR. 284,1986: 13-14 and GC/XXXI/OR. 296, 
1987: 3,7) 
While stressing that the IAEA's safeguards system was the only acceptable 
arrangement to verify non-nuclear-weapon states' commitment to the NPT, the Islamic 
Republic found faults also in the way the IAEA was carrying out its regulatory tasks. 
For one thing, Iranian officials maintained that countries which had a modest nuclear 
program and a limited capacity to pay for the agency's verification activities, such as 
their own, were being excessively burdened with safeguards costs. For another, the 
representatives of the Islamic Republic expressed their dissatisfaction with the fact that 
the IAEA's full-scope safeguards did not concern NWS. Arguing that the agency's 
safeguards system should function as a means to shed light on the nuclear weapons 
activities of NWS, the Iranians called for the extension of the IAEA safeguards' scope. 
Iranian officials argued that the so-called voluntary offer agreements that the IAEA had 
signed with the five NWS, and which mandated the agency to apply safeguards to some 
or all civilian - but not to military - nuclear materials and facilities of NWS, were 
totally inadequate because they did not contribute to the prevention of vertical nuclear 
proliferation. 44 The Islamic Republic declared voluntary offer agreements as useless and 
asked the agency not to channel its scarce resources to their implementation. Instead, 
Iranian officials demanded, the IAEA should create "true safeguards" that would cover 
43 The functions of the IAEA, established in 1957, center around three areas of activity: (a) nuclear safety 
and security; (b) nuclear safeguards and verification (which comprise the so-called regulatory dimension 
of the agency's mandate), in addition to which the IAEA has the responsibility to (c) assist states with 
their nuclear research and development efforts as well as to contribute to practical application of nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes throughout the world (the IAEA's so-called promotional task). 
44 The full-scope safeguards and the voluntary offer agreements of the IAEA aside, there exists a third 
class of IAEA safeguards. In the case of India, Pakistan, and Israel - three countries that are known to 
possess nuclear weapons -, the agency applies safeguards that are 
based on so-called item-specific 
agreements. These agreements specify the nuclear material, non-nuclear material, facilities, and 
equipment to be safeguarded by the IAEA. For details of the various types of IAEA safeguards, see The 
Safeguards System of the International Atomic Energy Agency (2003). 
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nuclear-weapon states' civilian and military facilities. 45 (GC/XXIX/OR. 271,1985: 39- 
40; GC/XXX/OR. 284,1986: 14,16-17 and GC/XXXI/OR. 296,1987: 4) 
In essence, the Islamic Republic's argumentation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy 
testified to a diplomatic effort to balance between two contradictory factors: the Islamic 
Republic's ideological considerations - which underscored the importance of scientific 
and technological independence - and the hard reality, Iran's unavoidable dependence 
on foreign nuclear suppliers which eroded the credibility of Iran's ideological goal 
setting. While surely being aware of the difficulty of balancing between ideological and 
practical demands, the representatives of the Islamic Republic did not touch upon the 
question of how their country would manage to cling to its ideological principles while 
simultaneously trying to advance its nuclear program. Instead, they pointed to the 
injustice and discrimination their nuclear activities had constantly encountered and 
stressed that Iran's setbacks in the nuclear realm had made the attainment of the national 
objective of nuclear independence and self-sufficiency all the more important. 46 
Iran and other elements of the nuclear non-proliferation regime 
During the period between the 1979 Iranian revolution and the 1988 cease-fire in the 
Iran-Iraq war, the Islamic Republic's deliberations on the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime mainly centered around the NPT and especially around its clauses on nuclear 
disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. However, Iran's general opposition to 
nuclear arms easily translated into diplomatic positions on other aspects of the non- 
proliferation regime as well. Thus, for example, the officials of the post-Pahlavi Iranian 
regime quickly adopted a strong stance against nuclear weapons testing. Following the 
diplomatic footsteps of the Shah's regime, the Islamic Republic supported the 
international efforts that had started in the 1950s and aimed at the conclusion of a 
as One element of the Islamic Republic's diplomatic argumentation on nuclear safeguards was the 
demand that Middle Eastern, South Asian, and African countries should be given a stronger 
representation in the organs of the IAEA, and particularly in the agency's board of governors 
(GC/XXVII/OR. 253,1983: 19; GC/XXX/OR. 284,1986: 17 and GC/XXXI/OR. 296,1987: 4-6). The 35- 
member board of governors is responsible for approving the IAEA's safeguards procedures and 
agreements as well as for the general supervision of the agency's verification activities. Iran's 
dissatisfaction with what it referred to as "unbalanced representation" in the board of governors largely 
stemmed from the fact that the Islamic Republic itself had no seat in the board at the time. Iran had served 
in the board of governors in 1962-1964,1968-1970, and 1974-1976, and subsequently sat on the board 
apin in 1990-1992 and in 2001-2003. 
4 As stated by the president of the AEOI in September 1984, Iran's difficulties had strengthened Iranians' 
conviction that the only way forward was to "avoid all dependence on either the East or the West" 
(GC/XXVIII/OR. 260,1984: 5). 
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comprehensive ban on nuclear testing. In the opinion of Islamic Iran, a comprehensive 
test ban (CTB) had to be achieved as soon as possible, for it would add a crucial 
element to the nuclear non-proliferation regime and mark a significant step towards 
complete nuclear disarmament. (CD/PV. 45,1979: 11; CD/PV. 61,1980: 10 and 
A/C. 1/42/PV. 17,1987: 12) 
The Iranians based their demands for a CTB first and foremost on proliferation 
concerns. Not being able to test their weapons through explosions, the representatives of 
the Islamic Republic reasoned, NWS would find it hard to develop new types of nuclear 
armaments, which, in turn, would slow down the nuclear arms race and strengthen 
international peace and security. In addition to pointing to the CTB's role in blocking 
vertical nuclear proliferation, Iran underscored the importance of such a ban in 
preventing the spread of nuclear armaments to additional countries. Without testing, 
Iranian officials argued, it would be difficult for non-nuclear states to develop a nuclear 
weapon. (CD/PV. 45,1979: 11; NPT/CONF. II/C. 1/2,1980: 4 and CD/PV. 404,1987: 3) 
International efforts to ban nuclear tests had largely began as a result of the 
widespread concern that the radioactive fall-out from nuclear explosions would pose a 
serious risk to human health. Although the signing of the so-called Partial Test Ban 
Treaty of 1963 (PTBT) - which banned nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and 
under water47 - had markedly reduced the concerns over the health consequences of 
nuclear testing, the health factor continued to be used as an argument against nuclear 
explosions and it also coloured the Islamic Republic's diplomatic pronouncements. 
Should nuclear tests go on unabated, Iranian officials maintained, hundreds of 
thousands of people would prematurely die due to the effects of radiation. The Iranians 
pointed to the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear accident as a warning to the international 
community, even if the accident must have raised questions in Iran itself about the 
safety and rationality of the Islamic Republic's own nuclear program. Nevertheless, 
Iranian authorities were careful not to link the post-Chernobyl international debate on 
nuclear safety with their own nuclear plans. Instead, they claimed that radioactive 
releases from nuclear weapons and nuclear tests posed a far greater danger than civilian 
facilities' accidental releases. Finally, the Iranians representatives stated on many 
occasions that nuclear weapons tests constituted a threat not only to human health, but 
also to the natural environment as well as to the world's climatic equilibrium. (Loeb 
1993: 828,834; A/C. 1/42/PV. 17,1987: 12 and GC/SPL. I/OR. 4,1986: 20) 
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Stressing that nuclear tests gave rise to the feeling of insecurity throughout the world, 
the Islamic Republic joined those who called for the conclusion of a comprehensive 
test-ban treaty that would be of unlimited duration and attract the widest possible 
adherence. Iran pointed out to the nuclear powers that a clear majority of the members 
of the UN supported such a ban. By referring to the preamble of the NPT, the Iranians 
also maintained that NWS had in fact already committed themselves to the creation of a 
CTBT. 48 Like other NNWS, Iran viewed test ban negotiations as a symbol of how 
devoted NWS were to nuclear disarmament and how seriously they were complying 
with article VI of the NPT. Moreover, the representatives of the Islamic Republic raised 
the question of verification - the most contentious issue in the CTBT talks - and argued 
that there were enough technical means available to ensure the effective verification of 
states' compliance with the planned treaty. However, as nuclear tests continued to take 
place and the prospects for a speedy conclusion of a CTB remained distant, the Iranians 
called on NWS to agree, as an interim measure, on a nuclear test moratorium that would 
be immediately put into effect. 49 (NPT/CONF. II/C. 1/2,1980: 4-7; CD/PV. 45,1979: 11 
and A/C. 1/42/PV. 17,1987: 12) 
Beside the subject of nuclear testing, the Islamic Republic also touched upon other 
questions that were directly related to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, such as the 
issue of security assurances. The Iranians presented themselves as strong backers of the 
non-nuclear states' effort to receive assurances from the nuclear powers that they would 
not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against NNWS. This effort dated back to the 
time when the negotiations on the NPT had been under way and based on the argument, 
also voiced by the Islamic Republic, that NNWS were entitled to security assurances in 
return for giving up the nuclear weapons option. 50 (CD/PV. 61,1980: 10; 
NPT/CONF. II/SR. 12,1980: 121 and NPT/CONF. II/C. I/SR. 7,1980: 202) 
°' Iran had signed the PTBT on 8 August 1963 and deposited its ratification instruments on 5 May 1964. 
48 The preamble of the NPT reads that the countries concluding the treaty "seek to achieve the 
discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this 
end. " 
49 The issue of a comprehensive nuclear test moratorium gained momentum in the mid-1980s as a result 
of the changes in the composition of the Soviet leadership. Following the accession to power of Mikhail 
Gorbachev, the Soviet Union made a number of diplomatic initiatives regarding a multilateral nuclear test 
moratorium, in addition to which the Soviets declared to be bound by a unilateral test moratorium. Iran 
supported the steps taken by the Soviet Union and criticized the U. S. administration of president Reagan 
for not having positively responded to them. (Loeb 1993: 840-841; CD/PV. 379,1986: 7 and 
GC/SPL. I/OR. 4,1986: 21) 
50 Deliberations on security assurances have historically revolved around two key concepts. The term 
'negative security assurances' (NSA) refers to pledges made by nuclear powers that they will not use or 
threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. The term 'positive security assurances' (PSA), 
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It was only natural, Iranian officials maintained, that the Islamic Republic attached 
great importance to the issue of security assurances, for pending the realization of 
complete nuclear disarmament, Iran and other non-nuclear states had to try to find ways 
to protect themselves from the threat of nuclear weapons. In addition to pointing to the 
security benefits of such assurances, the Iranians argued that the incorporation of 
negative security assurances into the NPT as a legally binding NWS obligation would 
make the treaty more equitable as well as more attractive in the eyes of those countries 
that had not joined it. 51 (CD/PV. 404,1987: 4; CD/PV. 425,1987: 6 and 
NPT/CONF. II/SR. 12,1980: 121) 
Although the Iranians specifically referred to NSA that would be incorporated into 
the NPT, they did not seem to rule out the option that such assurances would 
alternatively be given in the form of a separate document or declaration. Iran only 
insisted that NSA would have to be legally binding and contain no interpretative 
loopholes. As a result, the Islamic Republic declared the unilateral statements hitherto 
made by individual nuclear states to the effect that they would not use nuclear weapons 
first as too ambiguous and too weak to satisfy the security needs of NNWS. 52 
(CD/PV. 45,1979: 13; NPT/CONF. II/C. 1/SR. 7,1980: 202) 
In the same vein, the Islamic Republic dismissed the positive security assurances 
given by the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom in 1968 in the 
form of the UN Security Council Resolution 255 as inadequate. The resolution had 
three major shortcomings of which Iran and other NNWS were well aware. First, it only 
expressed the nuclear powers' ambiguous pledge to "provide or support immediate 
assistance in accordance with the UN Charter" to a NNWS subjected to an aggression 
with nuclear weapons. Secondly, the 1968 resolution offered the nuclear powers the 
theoretical opportunity to exercise their veto as permanent members of the Security 
in turn, points to pledges made by nuclear powers that they will provide assistance or come to the aid of 
any non-nuclear country that has been attacked or threatened with nuclear armaments. Bunn and 
Timerbaev (1993: 11) have crystallized the non-nuclear states' approach to the issue of security 
assurances into the form of a question: "If we agree not to get nuclear weapons, will you agree not to 
attack or threaten us with them and to come to our aid if someone else does so? " Following the general 
course of the international diplomatic debate at the time, the remarks made by the Islamic Republic on 
security assurances mostly focused on NSA. 
51 Underscoring the link between NSA and the NPT, the Islamic Republic implied that NSA should be 
iven only to non-nuclear states that had joined the NPT (NPT/CONF. II/SR. 12,1980: 120). 
2 The United States, for example, had promised in 1978 that it would not use nuclear weapons against 
any non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT or any comparable internationally binding commitment 
not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, "except in the case of an attack on the United States, its 
territories or armed forces, or its allies, by any state allied to a nuclear-weapon state or associated with a 
nuclear-weapon state in carrying out or sustaining the attack" (Bunn and Timerbaev 1993: 13). 
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Council in cases where the council was requested to act against nuclear threats posed by 
the three pledging countries themselves. The final problem with the resolution was that 
two nuclear powers, France and China, had never joined it. (NPT/CONF. II/SR. 12, 
1980: 121; NPT/CONF. II/C. 1/SR. 7,1980: 202 and Bunn and Timerbaev 1993: 11-12) 
5.1.3 The Islamic Republic and regional nuclear arms control 
5.1.3.1 The support for nuclear-weapon-free zones53 
Post-revolutionary Iran's categorical opposition to nuclear weapons served as the 
starting-point for its approaches to issues dealing with regional nuclear arms control as 
well. The Islamic Republic's strong support for the establishment of nuclear-weapon- 
free zones in different parts of the world was a case in point. Just like their predecessors 
in the Shah's administration, the officials of the Islamic Republic viewed NWFZ as 
important elements of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and as political and legal 
shields against nuclear aggression. The Iranians expressed their country's support for 
existing NWFZ - that is, for the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco that established a NWFZ in 
Latin America and the Caribbean as well as for the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga which 
created a NWFZ in the South Pacific54 - and called on governments to agree on the 
formation of additional zones. (CD/PV. 45,1979: 12; NPT/CONF. II/C. 1/SR. 7,1980: 
202 and A/C. I/42/PV. 17,1987: 13) 
Naturally, the Islamic Republic's NWFZ diplomacy focused, above all, on the region 
of the Middle East. By adopting the 1974 initiative made by the Shah administration for 
the establishment of a NWFZ in the region, post-revolutionary Iran's policy-makers had 
a diplomatic tool available to be used in support of their demand for a nuclear-free 
Middle East, even if it should be noted that the Shah administration's 1974 proposal had 
been rather unspecific in terms of content. 55 It had only stated the need for a Middle 
Eastern NWFZ, concluded that the UN General Assembly was the most suitable forum 
53 The term 'nuclear-weapon-free zone' refers to a geographically defined area in which nuclear weapons 
may not be manufactured or produced. Other basic characteristics generally associated with the term 
include the prohibition of importation of nuclear armaments into the zone by a country that belongs to the 
zone as well as the principles that nuclear-weapon states do not station or store nuclear armaments within 
the borders of any zonal country and that they provide a guarantee neither to use nor threaten to use 
nuclear weapons against the countries that form the zone. (Redick 1993: 1079) 
54 For the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the NWFZ in the South Pacific, see ibid. (1993: 1081-1085) and the 
relevant articles in Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in the 21" Century (1997). 
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for diplomatic deliberations on the subject, and asked the General Assembly to conduct 
the precise delimitation of such a zone - in other words, to define the countries 
belonging to it. 56 (Karem 1988: 91-92) 
Iran's tendency not to elaborate on the modalities of a Middle Eastern NWFZ had 
continued even after the introduction of the 1974 initiative57 and eventually became a 
trait of the post-Pahlavi regime's diplomacy, too. During the Islamic Republic's first 
decade, Iranian authorities merely expressed their support for the establishment of a 
regional NWFZ, referred to the overwhelming popularity the idea was enjoying among 
the members of the UN, and welcomed diplomatic initiatives that would contribute to 
the creation of the zone. As a result of the Islamic Republic's half-hearted approach to 
the zone question, the diplomatic lead in the matter started to increasingly fall into the 
hands of Egypt, the co-sponsor of Iran's 1974 initiative at the UN. (A/C. 1/42/PV. 17, 
1987: 13 and NPT/CONF. II/C. 1/SR. 7,1980: 202) 
In a similar manner, the lack of elaboration characterized the Islamic Republic's war- 
time call, made in 1986, for a nuclear-weapon-free Persian Gulf sub-region. The Iranian 
proposal did not go beyond the basic notion that the Persian Gulf should remain free 
from nuclear weapons and that the regional governments should take diplomatic steps in 
the matter (A/41/PV. 19,1986: 122). The Islamic Republic's 1986 call, made at a time 
ss Chubin and Zabih (1974: 303) imply that the Shah administration's initiative for the denuclearization of 
the Middle East was suggestive of diplomatic improvisation rather than a product of thorough analysis. 
56 Iran presented its NWFZ initiative to the UN General Assembly in 1974 - the initiative was co- 
sponsored by Egypt - but the Shah's government had made a call for the establishment of such a zone at 
least as early as in 1970 (A/PV. 1857,1970: 5). In its July 1974 explanatory memorandum to the General 
Assembly, Iran stated that its NWFZ initiative should be given urgent consideration because "greater 
access by states to nuclear technology has rendered the danger of nuclear weapons proliferation, and a 
concomitant collapse of the non-proliferation structure, a more acute problem" (cited in Karem 1988: 91- 
92). It has been argued that the Shah's NWFZ proposal was tabled mainly as a response to Israel's 
nuclear weapons program and to reports that Israel had armed nuclear weapons during the 1973 Yom 
Kippur War (ibid.: 93; Arnett 1998a: 443 and Zak 2002: 62-63). Iran's official statement made at the first 
NPT review conference in May 1975, which underscored the danger of one or more Middle Eastern 
countries developing nuclear weapons, supports the conclusion that the ramifications of Israel's 
possession of nuclear weapons were a central concern to Iranian authorities and thereby played a crucial 
role in the 1974 proposal (NPT/CONF/C. I/SR. 11,1975: 3). The Shah himself shed light on the rationale 
for his administration's NWFZ initiative by stating the following: "[... ] I believe this course of nuclear 
armament [in the Middle East] is ridiculous. What are they trying to do? Do they intend to use it against 
the great powers? It would never be possible to achieve parity. Are we going to kill ourselves with it? The 
country that procures this medium for attacking others will not wait long before being smashed by 
another country that has utilized this medium beforehand" (cited in Cottrell and Dougherty 1977: 38). 
57 The Iranians had only alluded to the following requirements that are matters of course in any serious 
NWFZ scheme. First of all, they had emphasized that the formation of a Middle Eastern NWFZ should be 
based on the initiative of the regional states. Secondly, they had pointed out that the zone should be 
respected and supported by external states and especially by NWS who should also pledge that they 
would never use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the countries forming the zone. Finally, the 
Shah's officials had noted that the NWFZ should include effective measures for verification. 
(NPT/CONF/35/I, 1975: 21; NPT/CONF/C. II/SR. 5,1975: 7 and NPT/CONF/SR. 4,1975: 13) 
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when Iranian officials were trying to sell the idea of an indigenous Gulf security 
system, 58 was closely related to Iran's view that extra-regional military presence in the 
Gulf was unacceptable and that regional cooperation independent of the Cold War blocs 
of the East and the West was an indispensable way of furthering the cause of nuclear 
disarmament (CD/PV. 404,1987: 5). 
In addition to supporting the establishment of denuclearized zones in the Middle East 
and elsewhere, the Islamic Republic endorsed the creation of zones of peace throughout 
the world. 59 As a littoral state, Iran had a particular interest in international efforts, led 
by the non-aligned countries, that aimed for the establishment of a zone of peace in the 
Indian Ocean. The Islamic Republic argued that the issue deserved urgent diplomatic 
attention and criticized the major powers for standing in the way of the creation of a 
zone of peace in the area. 60 (A/36/PV. 26,1981: 121; A/38/PV. 13,1983: 191 and A/S- 
15/PV. 3,1988: 49) 
5.1.3.2 Iran's condemnation of Israel's and South Africa's nuclear activities 
The Islamic Republic's diplomatic argumentation on regional nuclear arms control 
included specific verbal attacks against two countries with whom post-Pahlavi Iran had 
- due to ideological reasons - cut off official relations: Israel and South Africa. 
According to the authorities of the Islamic Republic, there were strong indications that 
both countries were developing nuclear weapons and actually already possessed them. 61 
In the Iranian view, the possession of nuclear armaments by the two "racist and 
aggressive powers"62 posed a major threat to regional as well as to international peace 
58 See above section 3.3.4. 
59 The notion of a zone of peace encompasses a NWFZ but is more comprehensive, for not only pointing 
to disarmament measures, it covers inter-state cooperation in non-military fields as well. Moreover, 
armaments limitations within a zone of peace are not restricted to nuclear weapons and other WMD, but 
also include conventional arms control steps. For a detailed description of the various elements of a zone 
of peace, see Redick (1993: 1088). 
60 Also see above the discussion in sections 3.1.3 and 3.3.4. 
61 For Iranian claims to this effect, see A/C. l/34/PV. 20 (1979: 56); NPT/CONF. II/SR. 12 (1980: 121) and 
GC/XXIX/OR. 280 (1985: 13). While initially rejecting all suggestions that it was pursuing nuclear 
weapons, South Africa ultimately officially acknowledged, in March 1993, that it had developed a 
"limited nuclear deterrent capability" in the 1970s and 1980s. Israel, on the other hand, finished the 
development phase of its first nuclear bomb in 1966-67 and had an operational, even if a rudimentary, 
nuclear arms capability on the eve of the Six-Day War of June 1967. From 1970 onwards, it has been 
commonly assumed that Israel is a de facto nuclear-weapon state. (Stumpf 1995: 3 and Cohen 1998: 1) 
62 Iranian representatives also regularly alluded to reports claiming that Israel and South Africa were 
clandestinely collaborating with each other in the nuclear field (A/C. 1/34/PV. 20,1979: 56; 
NPT/CONF. II/SR. l2,1980: 121 and GC/XXIX/OR. 271,1985: 35-36). Analysts have held differing 
views about the extent of Israeli-South African nuclear cooperation. Drake (2002: 161,175), for example, 
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and security. Not only did Israeli and South African nuclear weapons endanger the 
health, security, and prosperity of the whole mankind and of the African and Middle 
Eastern people, in particular, the Islamic Republic's argument went, they increased the 
threat of regional nuclear arms races and thereby the possibility of disastrous nuclear 
confrontations as well. Israel's and South Africa's nuclear ambitions, combined with 
their reluctance to join the NPT and to accept the full-scope safeguards of the IAEA, 
Iranian officials added, stood in the way of the establishment of NWFZ in Africa and 
the Middle East. 63 (GC/XXXI/OR. 301,1987: 8; GC/XXIX. OR. 271,1985: 35-36 and 
NPT/CONF. II/SR. 12,1980: 121) 
In the Islamic Republic's analysis, Israel's and South Africa's interest in nuclear 
weapons was rooted in their intention to use such capabilities as a tool for "oppressive" 
military and foreign policies. The goal of a regional military superiority, Iranian 
authorities asserted, essentially steered the Israeli and South African nuclear policies. 
Both countries, the officials of the Islamic Republic underscored, also considered 
nuclear arms as a source of state power that could be translated into a diplomatic asset. 
Thus, the Iranians concluded, Israel and South Africa sought to utilize their status as 
nuclear powers for the purpose of "territorial expansion and hegemony" as well as for 
"political blackmail. " (GC/XXIX/OR. 271,1985: 35; NPT/CONF. II/SR. 12,1980: 121 
and NPT/CONF. II/C. I/SR. 7,1980: 202) 
maintains that Israel conducted a joint nuclear test with South Africa in 1979, whereas Feldman (1997: 
45) concludes that "while Israel and South Africa cooperated in a number of sensitive ventures, they have 
probably not cooperated in the nuclear realm. " According to Adeniji (2002: 38-39), however, documents 
of a secret court trial held in South Africa in 1989 testified to that country's extensive collaboration with 
Israel in regards to nuclear materials and technology. It is interesting to note in this connection that while 
the post-Pahlavi Iranian regime must have been well informed of Israel's conventional arms transfers to 
Iran during the Shah years, the Islamic Republic's Israel-related remarks made no mention of the Shah 
administration's cooperation with Israel in the development of ballistic missiles capable of carrying 
nuclear warheads. The Islamic Republic's silence in the matter seems to have been intentional, for, as 
noted by Parsi (2007: 76), Iranian officials later contacted the Shah's general, now residing in the United 
States, who had been in charge of the missile project in order to convince him to share the details of the 
Iranian-Israeli cooperation. However, the general rejected the request made by the authorities of the 
Islamic Republic. For the details of the Iranian-Israeli missile project, which was sealed in an agreement 
signed by the two parties in April 1977, see Sick (1991: 62-63) and Parsi (2007: 74-76). 
63 The 1964 declaration of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) for the creation of a NWFZ in Africa 
made Africa the first region to formally aim at regional denuclearization (Buo 1993: 17). Due to South 
Africa's unwillingness to denounce nuclear weapons, however, it was not until 1996 that the goal of an 
African NWFZ ultimately materialized. For the negotiating history and the details of the Treaty of 
Pelindaba which established a NWFZ in Africa, see Adeniji (2002: 35-162). As far as Israel was 
concerned, the Israeli government expressed, in October 1980, its support for the concept of a NWFZ in 
the Middle East. Nonetheless, Israeli authorities made it clear that the terms of such an arrangement 
would have to be based on direct Israeli-Arab negotiations. By coupling its interest in a Middle Eastern 
NWFZ with negotiations with Arab governments, Israel wanted to let it be known that without Arab 
states' acceptance of the Jewish state, they would not discuss the possibility of giving up their nuclear 
capabilities. (Feldman 1997: 249-250) 
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Strongly condemning Israeli and South African nuclear efforts, Iran made repeated 
diplomatic calls for the application of stringent international measures - formulated 
either within the UN or the IAEA - to stop and roll back those activities. 64 As a 
preliminary step, Iranian officials called on the major powers to publicize the 
information they had about the two countries' nuclear programs, so that international 
discussions on them could be conducted in a comprehensive and thorough manner. As 
far as practical arms control measures were concerned, the Islamic Republic asked 
governments to immediately terminate all nuclear cooperation with Israel and South 
Africa - unless the two regimes decided to join the NPT and to accept IAEA full-scope 
safeguards. All countries, nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear countries alike, 
Iranian officials declared, should refrain from assisting, encouraging, or inducing the 
Israelis and the South Africans to manufacture or acquire nuclear armaments. 
(A/C. 1/34/PV. 20,1979: 56; A/C. 1/42/PV. 17,1987: 14-15 and NPT/CONF. II/C. I/2, 
1980: 2) 
Moreover, the Iranians questioned the legitimacy of the two countries' participation 
in the activities of international organizations, such as the IAEA. Basically, as the 
president of the AEOI pointed out to the general conference of the IAEA in September 
1987, the Islamic Republic considered the mere existence of both regimes "unfounded 
and illegal. " Hence, Islamic Iran's politico-ideological mission against Israel and South 
Africa led Iranian officials to make calls, depending on the occasion, for the suspension 
of Israel's and South Africa's diplomatic privileges and rights in the IAEA as well as 
even for the expulsion of the two countries from the agency. 65 (GC/XXXI/OR. 296, 
1987: 6-7; GC/XXVII/OR. 256,1983: 11 and GC/XXX/OR. 292,1986: 4) 
The poor success of the Islamic Republic's diplomatic efforts in regards to Israel and 
South Africa led Iranian officials to blame other governments and the United States, in 
particular, for their disappointments. According to Iranian authorities, the United States, 
64 The subjects of South African and Israeli nuclear armament were regularly discussed in the UN 
General Assembly. The Islamic Republic strongly backed the diplomatic efforts of the African nations, 
led by Nigeria, to draw international attention to South Africa's nuclear program. Similarly, the Iranians 
supported diplomatic deliberations on Israel's nuclear armament, a topic that was included in the General 
Assembly's agenda in 1979 at the request of Iraq. (A/C. 1/34/PV. 20,1979: 56; NPT/CONF. II/C. I/SR. 7, 
1980: 203 and Yearbook of the United Nations 1979,1982: 43) 
65 As another sign of the Islamic Republic's uncompromising diplomatic line at the IAEA, take, for 
example, the Iranian statement of 3 October 1986 in which Iran's IAEA representative noted that if the 
nuclear facilities of Israel and South Africa were not placed under IAEA full-scope safeguards before the 
next session of the agency's general conference, his country would demand, as a short-term solution, the 
disapproval of the budget of the IAEA's safeguards department. In the Iranian view, the agency's 
inability to pressure Israel and South Africa to accept such safeguards would testify to the organization's 
ineffectiveness. (GC/XXX/OR. 291,1986: 9) 
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the "real cause of unrest all over the world, " objected to even the slightest criticism of 
Israeli and South African policies that openly defied world opinion. Given that the 
United States acted as the guardian of the two regimes, the officials of the Islamic 
Republic maintained, the Americans, together with their Western allies, would be held 
responsible for Israel's and South Africa's aggressions. That these two regimes 
continued to be supported by the United States, the country that had dropped atomic 
bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Iranian authorities claimed, proved, in its own right, 
that Israeli and South African nuclear efforts were intended for military purposes. 
(GC/XXX/OR. 292,1986: 4; GC/XXVII/OR. 256,1983: 16 and GC/XXXI/OR. 301, 
1987: 8) 
5.1.4 The Islamic Republic and attacks on nuclear facilities 
5.1.4.1 The bombings of Osirak 
As far as the 1980-1988 war between Iran and Iraq was concerned, nuclear weapons 
were not of direct relevance to the conflict. Still, by the time of the war's 
commencement in September 1980, the Iraqis had been working on a military nuclear 
program for almost a decade (Baram 2001: 26-28), whereas the post-revolutionary 
Iranian regime had just inherited the Shah's ambitious nuclear power program which 
had been widely regarded as a stepping stone to an Iranian nuclear weapons capability. 
At the onset of the war, then, the fear of a nuclear weapon in the hands of their enemy 
lived in the minds of both Iranian and Iraqi decision-makers. The officials of the Islamic 
Republic, for example, subsequently admitted that the possibility of Iraq getting hold of 
a nuclear weapon and actually using it against their country was a scenario the Iranians 
could not rule out in the course of the war. 
66 
In fact, it did not take a long time for Iran to act on its worries about Iraq's nuclear 
capabilities. On 30 September 1980, only about a week after the start of the Iran-Iraq 
war, the Islamic Republic launched an air raid against the Iraqi 40-MW nuclear research 
66 Author's interview with A. A. Soltanieh, the Islamic Republic's war-time resident representative to the 
IAEA, Geneva, 22 July 2002. At the beginning of the 1980s, the estimates about the time Iraq would need 
to build a nuclear weapon ranged from one to ten years 
(<www. fas. org/nuke/guide/iraq/facility/osiraq. htm>). 
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reactor known as Osirak located at Tuwaitha near Baghdad. 67 Although the extent of the 
damage caused by the two Iranian F-4 Phantom bombers - which composed a part of a 
group of Iranian aircraft attacking an electric power plant in the environs of Baghdad - 
has been a matter of speculation, the fact that the Israeli air force carried out a bombing 
mission at the same Iraqi nuclear site on 7 June 1981 suggests that Iran's September 
1980 attack was not militarily successful. 68 (O'Ballance 1988: 45 and 
<www. fas. org/nuke/guide/iraq/facility/osiraq. htm>) 
While it is hard to say how much intelligence the Islamic Republic had on Iraq's 
nuclear efforts prior to its strike against Osirak, it is clear that Iranian authorities viewed 
the Tuwaitha reactor as a crucial component of Iraq's effort to obtain a nuclear weapons 
capability and therefore sought to militarily delay the Iraqi regime's nuclear activities. 
This was certainly the conclusion Israel had drawn on the eve of their June 1981 air raid 
against Osirak. 69 The 1981 bombing of Osirak turned out to be a military success, for 
the eight Israeli warplanes carrying out the mission managed to fully destroy the reactor 
and to easily escape the Iraqi airspace. The Israeli air attack constituted a significant 
blow to Iraq's nuclear program and must have been a cause of major relief to the Iranian 
leadership. 
In public, however, there were no traces of Iranian satisfaction. Portraying and 
viewing itself as the champion of the Muslim world, the Islamic Republic took 
diplomatic advantage of the situation and adopted a highly critical stance against Israel 
in the international deliberations that followed the June 1981 incident. Strongly 
condemning the bombing of Osirak, the Iranians said that even though the target of the 
Israeli attack had been Iraq, the country which had invaded Iran and whose destructive 
67 The Tuwaitha reactor was a type of French reactor named after Osiris, the Egyptian god of the dead. 
The French supplier renamed the Iraqi facility Osirak by mixing the name Osiris with that of the recipient 
state. Iraqi authorities themselves, however, referred to the reactor as Tammuz after the name of the 
month of the Ba'th party revolution of 1968 and the Sumero-Akkadian god of fertility and rebirth. 
(<www. fas. org/nuke/guide/iraq/facility/osiraq. htm> and Baram 2001: 28) 
68 According to the Federation of American Scientists, the damages caused by the Iranian combat aircraft 
were only minor (<www. fas. org/nuke/guide/iraq/facility/osiraq. htm>). Iraqi authorities made a similar 
claim immediately after the September 1980 incident. Referring to French eyewitness accounts and Iraqi 
sources, however, O'Ballance (1988: 45) maintains that the Iranian raid caused serious damages at the 
site and led to purges within the Iraqi military. 
69 For the details of the Israeli raid, known as Operation Babylon, and for a discussion of the factors that 
led the government of prime minister Menachem Begin to conclude that Osirak posed a direct threat to 
Israel's security and had to be urgently destroyed through a pre-emptive strike, see Shlaim (1999: 384- 
387) and Feldman (1982: 115-121). Interestingly, the chief of intelligence of the Israeli Army had 
reportedly urged Iran to bomb Osirak soon after the Iran-Iraq war had broken out in September 1980. 
Some have claimed that Iran's Osirak operation of September 1980 had actually been conducted with 
Israeli assistance and intelligence. Conversely, some sources have suggested that Israel's raid against the 
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war policy had been continuously ignored by the international community, the Islamic 
Republic held to its ideological principles and aimed to further the cause of justice in 
the matter. In the Iranian characterization, the "shameful and despicable" bombing of 
Osirak was a flagrant violation of the basic norms of international law, an act that could 
not be legitimized in any circumstances, irrespective of the purpose the reactor was 
serving. 70 (CD/PV. 130,1981: 30-31; A/C. 1/36/PV. 24,1981: 38-40 and 
GC/XXVI/OR. 242,1982: 29) 
Iranian officials argued that the Israeli air raid was not only an attack against the 
Muslim people of Iraq, but also an act of violence against the umma, the whole of the 
Islamic community. 7' In this sense, the officials of the Islamic Republic maintained, the 
Israeli operation was in line with and indeed another manifestation of the aggressive 
anti-Muslim policies of the "Zionist regime" that was implementing the imperialistic 
objectives of the United States in the Middle East. In addition to performing their 
obligatory criticism of Israel and the United States, as well as reminding the two 
countries of the futility of any effort to drive a wedge into the diplomatic front formed 
by the Islamic countries in the Osirak issue, the Iranians were nonetheless careful not to 
give the impression that their government was siding with the regime of Saddam 
Hussein in the matter. Pointing out that their government's diplomatic stance on the 
Osirak incident was about fulfilling a religious duty, Iranian officials stated that it was 
highly ironic that the Osirak case had led the Iraqi regime, composed of war criminals, 
to deliver statements which called on all governments to refrain from the use or the 
threat of use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of states. 
(A/38/PV. 42,1983: 685; GC/XXVIII/OR. 267,1984: 12 and A/36/PV. 52,1981: 921) 
The Islamic Republic's diplomatic activities in the Osirak matter were partly steered 
by the Iranian concern that the air raid might have been indicative of a new Israeli 
Iraqi reactor made use of Iranian intelligence data. (<www. fas. org/nuke/guide/iraq/facility/osiraq. htm>; 
Parsi 2005 and Sick 1991: 207) 
70 Specifically, Iranian officials referred to the attack as a breach against the principles of the UN Charter, 
that is, against the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and political independence of states as well as against 
the principle of non-use of force in international relations. As for the Israelis, they justified their attack by 
pointing out that international law and article 51 of the UN Charter, in particular, allowed states to engage 
in acts of self-defence (<www. fas. org/nuke/guide/iraq/facility/osiraq. htm>). 
'' As stated by an Iranian representative at the UN in November 1985: "The military attack by the Zionist 
base of terror occupying Palestine is from our point of view of exactly the same criminal status as the 
attacks against Lebanon, Tunisia or the Islamic Republic of Iran. " Iranian talk of the Israeli violation of 
Iraq's "Islamic airspace" or the Iranian characterizations of Israel's bombing of Osirak as an attack on the 
property of the umma serve as further examples of Iran's effort to 'Islamize' the Osirak incident. 
(A/40/PV. 59,1985: 38-41 and A/41/PV. 51,1986: 56) 
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security doctrine underscoring the importance of military self-help and pre-emption. 72 
As a country interested in the application of nuclear energy and openly declaring its 
contempt of the Jewish state, Iran asked what guarantees there were that Israel would 
not bomb peaceful nuclear facilities in other countries as well. 73 Worried about Israel's 
military intentions, the Islamic Republic called for tough international measures against 
that country in relevant international organizations. At the IAEA, for example, Iran 
found the agency's strong condemnation of the attack on Osirak insufficient and 
demanded the expulsion of Israel from the organization, a position that was initially 
shared by many other Middle Eastern governments as well. 74 (GC/XXVUOR. 242,1982: 
29; GC/XXVIII/OR. 267,1984: 12 and GC/XXVIII/OR. 260,1984: 5-6) 
Even though Israel's attack against Osirak was criticized even by the United States, 
the strongest ally of Israel, the Americans sought to ensure that the ensuing diplomatic 
steps taken against Israel would not turn out to be as severe as those suggested by 
countries like Iran. The officials of the Islamic Republic were aware of the U. S. effort 
and sought to obstruct it. Thus, for example, Iranian representatives declared that if the 
United States tried to use its financial leverage as a deterrent against Israel's expulsion 
from the IAEA, the Islamic Republic would be ready to give extra financial support to 
the agency so that the loss of U. S. contributions could be compensated for in the short 
term. As a long-term solution to the problem, Iranian officials referred to a proposal 
made by Ali Khamenei, the president of the Islamic Republic, and called for the 
establishment of a special NAM fund that would allocate financial contributions to the 
IAEA and hence free the agency from "imperialist domination. " (GC/XXVII/OR. 253, 
1983: 16-17) 
5.1.4.2 Iraq's war-time attacks on Bushehr 
But it was not only the Israelis - or the Iranians, for that matter - who translated their 
fears about their enemy's nuclear intentions into concrete military action. On 24 March 
72 The Iranian concern was fuelled by those Israeli commentators who viewed the Osirak incident as a 
manifestation of a new military doctrine adopted by prime minister Menachem Begin. Speaking of a 
"Begin doctrine, " they referred to Israel's determination not to allow its enemies to construct nuclear 
reactors capable of manufacturing armaments that might be used against Israel. (Feldman 1997: 109) 
73 To retain the coherence of their argument in this context, the representatives of the Islamic Republic 
claimed that contrary to Israeli claims, the destroyed Iraqi reactor had been intended only for peaceful 
purposes (A/41/PV. 51,1986: 57-60). 
° For the international diplomatic debate that followed Israel's Operation Babylon, see Feldman (1982: 
127-141). 
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1984, Iraq launched an attack on the Bushehr nuclear reactor site in Iran. The 1984 
missile raid, which marked the first of a series of altogether six Iraqi attacks against 
Bushehr during the Iran-Iraq war (Koch and Wolf 1997: 127), 75 was characterized by 
Iranian authorities as a criminal act not less deplorable than Israel's bombing of Osirak. 
In fact, the officials of the Islamic Republic argued, it was the international 
community's tame response to the June 1981 Osirak incident that had induced and 
encouraged Iraq to imitate Israel (CD/PV. 283,1984: 42 and GC/XXVIII/OR. 260,1984: 
6). 
Following the March 1984 attack, which did not produce significant damages at the 
Bushehr site, Iranian authorities called on governments to agree on international 
regulations that would prohibit armed attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful 
purposes. More specifically, the Islamic Republic notified the IAEA of the Iraqi attack 
and asked the agency's board of governors to hold an extraordinary meeting on the 
issue. Also, the Iranians wanted the matter to be placed on the agenda of the board of 
governors' regular session as well as asked the IAEA's director-general to send a fact- 
finding team to Bushehr to verify the damages caused by the Iraqi raid. (CD/PV. 286, 
1984: 26; GC/XXVIII/OR. 260,1984: 6 and Etemad 1987: 224) 
That the Iranian requests were turned down by the IAEA was a major disappointment 
to the Islamic Republic. According to the agency's director-general, the verification of 
war damage and losses in respect to nuclear plants that were still under construction, did 
not contain radioactive material, and were not yet subject to IAEA safeguards did not 
fall under the agency's competence. This argument was repeated by the IAEA after the 
Iraqi attacks of February and March 1985 on Bushehr had taken place and after the 
Iranians had launched another round of diplomatic activities in the matter. 76 This time, 
after it had become clear that Iraq's targeting of Bushehr was part of its war planning, 
however, the Islamic Republic had not only repeated the requests made to the IAEA in 
1984, but also demanded the expulsion of Iraq from the agency and asked the member 
states to make every possible effort to prevent the recurrence of further military attacks 
75 The attacks against Bushehr took place on 24 March 1984; 12 February and 4 March 1985; 12 July 
1986; and 17 and 19 November 1987. In the fall of 1985, at the IAEA as well as at the third review 
conference of the NPT, the Islamic Republic informed that Iraq had, in three separate raids, also targeted 
Iran's nuclear research facilities in Tehran (GC/XXIX/OR. 272,1985: 40 and NPT/CONF. III/SR. 16, 
1985: 203). 
76 According to official Iranian information, Iraq's February 1985 attack against Bushehr killed one site 
staff member and caused some material damage to the Bushehr- I plant. The March 1985 incident did not 
produce casualties, but the material losses, the Iranians compared, were much more extensive than in 
February. (NPT/CONF. III/SR. 16,1985: 199) 
386 
against Iranian nuclear facilities. 77 (GOV/INF/471/Att. 21,1985: 1; GOV/INF/471/Att. 
13,1985: 1 and GC/XXIX/OR. 271,1985: 38) 
In 1985, Iran stepped up its Iraq-related diplomatic efforts outside the IAEA as well. 
At the third NPT review conference, held in August-September that year, the Iranians 
stated that the Islamic Republic's concern over Iraq's attacks should be documented in 
the conference's final declaration. The Iranians hoped that the conference would 
"strongly deplore" the attacks conducted by Iraq and urge all the states parties to 
provide necessary technical assistance to any NPT member whose peaceful nuclear 
facilities had been subjected to military attack so that its peaceful program could be 
restored and the damages suffered overcome. 78 (NPT/CONF. III/C. III/SR. 6,1985: 376; 
NPT/CONF. III/L. 5,1985: 1 and NPT/CONF. III/SR. 16,1985: 199,203) 
Iran was prepared to employ tough diplomatic tactics at the review conference in 
order to achieve its objectives. During the four-week conference's last session, the 
Islamic Republic still insisted that the final declaration should make an explicit 
reference to the Iraqi attacks. In the course of earlier negotiations on the declaration, 
Iran's delegates had agreed to go along with a draft text reading that the "Conference 
notes that the Islamic Republic of Iran states its concern regarding attacks on its nuclear 
facilities. " Given that even this softened Iranian formulation - which was strongly 
opposed by the Iraqi delegation - met resistance at the conference, the Islamic Republic 
bitterly let it be known that its acceptance of the final declaration would be dependent 
on the fate of Iran's text proposal. In the last minute, however, Iranian delegates 
recognized the limits of their diplomatic leverage and yielded to a compromise solution 
that saved the consensus needed for the final declaration's approval. According to the 
compromise reached, Iran withdrew its text proposal, in return of which the Islamic 
Republic's statement at the conference's final session, together with that of Iraq, was 
attached to the final declaration. (Statement by the Representative of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran 1985: 1-2; NPT/CONF. III/SR. 16,1985: 199-203 and Etemad 1987: 
225) 
77 Following Iraq's 1985 attacks, the officials of the Islamic Republic pointed out that Iraq was 
deliberately targeting Iran's ability to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. As put by the 
Iranians, "there were no significant military objectives to be achieved by attacking the [Bushehr] area or 
its surroundings" (NPT/CONF. III/SR. 16,1985: 199). 
78 In a paradoxical diplomatic twist of events, the Iranians made the latter proposal by referring to a draft 
text originally put forth by the Iraqi delegation whose proposal had been directed against Israel 
(NPT/CONF. I I I/L. 5,1985: 1). 
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The diplomatic setbacks encountered by the Iranians in 1984 and 1985 led them to 
strongly criticize the international community for its approach to the Iraqi attacks. By 
failing to take measures in a matter that constituted an offence against Iran and states' 
universal right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, the Iranian argument 
went, governments had encouraged Iraq to continue its attacks and thereby allowed the 
Iraqis to undermine the credibility of international organizations. 79 In Iranian 
authorities' view, the international community's insubstantial response to Iraq's attacks 
against Bushehr was another manifestation of the way in which governments were 
letting the regime of Saddam Hussein execute criminal acts against the Islamic Republic 
in the Iran-Iraq war. (GOV/INF/471/Att. 20,1985: 1; GC/XXIX/OR. 271,1985: 36-37 
and CD/PV. 308,1985: 12) 
Pointing their fingers specifically at the IAEA, Iranian officials questioned the 
agency's ability to carry out its responsibility to protect peaceful nuclear activities. 
Asking whether the IAEA's reluctance to act in the matter of Iraq was the result of the 
agency's organizational weaknesses or outright political discrimination against the 
Islamic Republic, Iranian representatives asserted that the IAEA had done their country 
wrong all the same. The agency's inaction, the Iranians added, had left their government 
no other choice than to regard the IAEA as a party to the Iraqi crimes and to draw the 
conclusion that peaceful nuclear installations that were still under construction were not 
protected against armed attacks, that nuclear installations were considered peaceful only 
if they were already subject to IAEA safeguards, and finally, that nuclear installations 
not under those safeguards were not protected against armed attacks, irrespective of the 
radiological hazards potentially resulting from such attacks. (GC/XXIX/OR. 271,1985: 
36; Yearbook of the United Nations 1985,1989: 249 and GOV/INF/471/Att. 20,1985: 
2) 
In February 1987, Iran began to transfer fissionable material to the Bushehr site. The 
purpose of the Iranian action was to undermine the IAEA's argument that because of the 
lack radioactive material at Bushehr, there were no sufficient grounds for the agency to 
respond to the Iraqi attacks. 80 Thus, following Iraq's November 1987 strikes against 
79 The Iranians stated, among others, that Iraq's attacks posed a serious threat to the role and activities of 
the IAEA in the development and promotion of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes (GOV/INF/471/Att. 
7,1985: 2). 
80 Prior to the start of Iran's nuclear material transfers to Bushehr, the Islamic Republic had countered the 
IAEA's argument by saying that the agency should take action against Iraq because Iran was a member of 
the NPT and had accepted the IAEA's full-scope safeguards. Moreover, Iranian representatives had 
pointed out that had their country's peaceful nuclear program been internationally allowed to proceed as 
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Bushehr, Iranian officials asked the IAEA to send a fact-finding team as well as nuclear 
safety and radiation protection experts to the site. 8' This time, the IAEA did not rule out 
the provision of assistance to the Islamic Republic, even though it asked Iranian 
authorities to first provide the agency with information about the nature and the quantity 
of the nuclear material stored at Bushehr so that the type of proper assistance could be 
determined. (Cordesman and Wagner 1990: 521 and Yearbook of the United Nations 
1987,1992: 223,230) 
From the Iranian standpoint, however, the IAEA's response came ultimately too late. 
Iraq's November 1987 strikes against Bushehr caused major damage to the site's 
reactors and seriously hampered the execution of the Islamic Republic's nuclear 
program. Although Iraq did not manage to destroy the crucial equipment and 
components reserved for the reactors - they were not stored at the site -, it was 
estimated at the time that the repairing of the Bushehr-1 unit alone would cost some $3- 
5 billion. (Yearbook of the United Nations 1987,1992: 230 and Koch and Wolf 1997: 
127). In the light of Israel's June 1981 air raid against Osirak and Iraq's repeated war- 
time attacks on Bushehr, thus, it was not surprising that Iran became one of the 
staunchest supporters of an international convention that would prohibit armed attacks 
on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes (CD/PV. 404,1987: 8; 
GC/XXXI/OR. 296,1987: 7 and GC/XXXI/COM. 5/OR. 55,1987: 10). 
5.2 From the Cease-Fire to the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty 
5.2.1 The basics of the Islamic Republic's post-war nuclear argumentation 
5.2.1.1 The call for complete nuclear disarmament 
After the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war and the 1990-1991 Gulf conflict, the officials of 
the Islamic Republic stepped up their diplomatic efforts in the area of nuclear arms 
control. As the military threat posed by Iraq had lost its urgency, the Iranians were able 
planned, the Bushehr-1 plant would have already come under IAEA safeguards. In other words, the IAEA 
should have taken into account that the facts on the ground it was alluding to had been created by foreign 
actors and not by Iran itself. (GC/XXIX/OR. 271,1985: 37) 
81 According to Iran, nine site personnel people and one foreign expert had been killed and severely 
wounded in Iraq's November attacks. In addition, Iranian officials stated, the Iraqi raids had inflicted 
serious damage on the Bushehr- I plant. Iran portrayed the November 1987 strikes as an escalation of the 
scope of the Iran-Iraq conflict. (Yearbook of the United Nations 1987,1992: 229-230) 
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to invest more of their diplomatic resources in arms control issues that had been 
overshadowed by Iran's war-time preoccupation with its Arab neighbour. In the early 
1990s and already before that, the Islamic Republic's nuclear arms control operations 
had also begun to take into account the lessons of the war against Iraq. Yet another 
important factor explaining the Islamic Republic's added focus on nuclear arms control 
following the two Gulf conflicts was that Iran had to take increasing pains to convince 
other governments that its nuclear power program, which Iranian leaders declared to be 
fully committed to, was intended only for peaceful purposes. 
After the cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war had taken effect in August 1988, then, 
Iranian officials had continued to underscore their country's categorical opposition to 
nuclear weapons and to military thinking that relied on the possession of such 
armaments. 82 Pointing to the threat posed by intentional or accidental use of nuclear 
weapons to the security of individual states and to the very survival of mankind, the 
Islamic Republic continued to declare the mere existence of nuclear weapons as 
spiritually and morally unacceptable and designated their elimination as the most 
important issue on the international arms control agenda. According to Iranian 
authorities, their country's strong interest in nuclear disarmament stemmed from 
religious and humanitiarian considerations as well as from the fact that Iran had been 
the latest victim of WMD use. (CD/PV. 479,1988: 35; A/C. 1/49/PV. 9,1994: 14 and 
GC/XXXVI/OR. 345,1992: 23) 
In the view of the Islamic Republic, the improved relations between the United States 
and the Soviet Union and the subsequent end of the Cold War had offered unique 
opportunities for nuclear disarmament. At the end of the 1980s, the Iranians had restated 
their satisfaction with the December 1987 U. S. -Soviet treaty on intermediate-range 
nuclear forces and pointed to the superpowers' September 1987 agreement to open 
nuclear risk reduction centers in their capitals as another cause for optimism in the area 
of nuclear arms control (CD/PV. 514,1989: 4). 83 The Islamic Republic had also greeted 
the completion of the U. S. -Soviet negotiations on the reduction and limitation of 
82 Iranian officials regarded the major nuclear powers' military doctrines - and the idea of nuclear 
deterrence, in particular - as factors that fuelled the nuclear arms race and the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. In the Iranian analysis, the belief in the indispensability of nuclear weapons coloured the major 
power relations and also encouraged regional powers to try to acquire security through nuclear 
superiority. As the doctrine of nuclear deterrence based on the threat of the use of nuclear weapons, the 
Iranians stated, it fought against international law and was morally reprehensible. (A/45/PV. 5,1990: 48; 
NPT/CONF. IV/SR. 8,1990: 149-150 and Zarif et al. 1996: 11) 
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strategic offensive arms which gave birth, after years of talks, to the first and the second 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I and START II) in 1991 and 1993, 
respectively (A/CN. I O/PV. 186,1994: 22). 84 Furthermore, the Islamic Republic had 
welcomed the decisions taken by the post-Soviet countries of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and 
Ukraine - which, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, had 
effectively become nuclear-weapon states - to give up their nuclear arsenals and to 
accede to the NPT as NNWS (CD/PV. 691,1994: 2). 85 
From the Iranian perspective, however, these nuclear arms control achievements had 
signified only a modest step towards the ultimate goal of complete nuclear 
disarmament. Thus, in addition to Iran's optimistic overtures, the Islamic Republic's 
post-Cold War argumentation on nuclear arms control repeatedly stressed how great a 
problem nuclear weapons continued to be. 86 More often than not, Iran's warnings 
translated into strong diplomatic expressions of disappointment at the state of 
international nuclear arms control. In the Iranian opinion, NWS still basically acted as if 
nothing had changed in the world after the end of the Cold War. Not only did the 
nuclear powers continue to ignore diplomatic calls for complete nuclear disarmament 
within a time-bound framework, the Iranians complained, but their military doctrines 
seemed to remain oblivious to the changes in the international system as well. 
(CD/PV. 690,1994: 10; A/50/PV. 124,1996: 10 and CD/PV. 625,1992: 3) 
The heavy reliance of major power military thinking on nuclear weapons, the 
officials of the Islamic Republic observed, was indicative of those powers' post-Cold 
War tendency to view nuclear armaments first and foremost as political weapons. The 
major powers regarded their nuclear arsenals as a guarantee for national prestige, 
influence, and power in what was being called the new world order. Such belief and the 
general mind-set of domination, the Iranian argument went, also explained why - 
83 The purpose of the U. S. -Soviet agreement on nuclear risk reduction centers had been to reduce the 
threat of an accidental nuclear war by establishing special communications links between the two states. 
For more on this agreement, see Goldblat (1994: 205 -206). 84 Under START I, the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed to cut their strategic nuclear 
arsenals to the maximum of 6,000 warheads per party, whereas START II had reduced superpower 
national holdings to 3,000-3,500 warheads. For the details of the START treaties, see ibid. (1994: 66- 
73). 
85 Belarus formally acceded to the NPT on 22 July 1993, Kazakhstan on 14 February 1994, and Ukraine 
on 5 December 1994. 
86 Note, for example, the following Iranian remark made at the CD in September 1993: "Of course, one 
cannot deny the fact that the world today is more secure and that the persistent high state of alert has, for 
the time being, come to a halt. [... ] but this fortunate and natural consequence of East-West thaw should 
by no means mask the dangers and threats still posed by the stubborn existence of so much nuclear 
weaponry around the globe" (CD/PV. 659,1993: 3). 
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instead of actual disarmament - the nuclear powers' post-Cold War diplomacy had 
concentrated on non-proliferation, the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons to 
87 additional countries. (CD/PV. 659,1993: 4; GC/39/OR. 3,1995: 18 and CD/PV. 690, 
1994: 9) 
Iran condemned the nuclear powers' military thinking as flawed and argued that, in 
the post-Cold War world, there were no excuses whatsoever left for states to justify 
their possession of nuclear armaments. First, and without putting forward an alternate 
explanation, Iranian authorities rejected the claim that nuclear weapons and the doctrine 
of nuclear deterrence had prevented a war between the great powers during the Cold 
War (Zarif et al. 1996: 11). Secondly, the Iranians pointed out that nuclear weapons 
were not capable of providing solutions to the security problems of the post-Cold War 
era, including "excessive nationalism, ethnic rivalry and regional conflicts" 
(CD/PV. 659,1993: 4). Neither, in the Iranian view, could the possession of nuclear 
armaments be transformed into a foreign policy asset nor regarded as a deterrent against 
conventional weapons or chemical and biological armaments (A/C. 1/47/PV. 5,1992: 
53-55). 
As there was no rational and certainly no moral case to be made to defend the 
possession of nuclear weapons, Iranian officials summarized, the world needed a new 
security order in which nuclear arms would play no role. 88 Accordingly, the Islamic 
Republic actively called on NWS to abandon the doctrine of nuclear deterrence and to 
commit themselves to complete elimination of nuclear weapons. As an alternative to the 
notions of deterrence and balance of power, Iran introduced, in September 1994, the 
concept of a "defensive security scheme" which envisaged an international order where 
states' armed forces would only serve defensive purposes and be free from nuclear 
armaments and other WMD. (A/47/PV. 5,1992: 49; A/49/PV. 5,1994: 39 and 
CD/PV. 690,1994: 10) 
In the Islamic Republic's view, complete nuclear disarmament should become a legal 
obligation arising from a "comprehensive, universal and non-discriminatory" 
87 The Islamic Republic objected to the central role given to non-proliferation in international arms 
control diplomacy because, in its opinion, non-proliferation was an approach that "breeds tension from 
within, aggravates imbalances and raises hostility" (CD/PV. 690,1994: 10). 
88 According to the Islamic Republic, NWS had the responsibility to explain to the world why they were 
not willing to give up their nuclear arsenals - in other words, what purpose their nuclear weaponry were 
serving (The Islamic Republic of Iran and Disarmament 1994: 1). 
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international convention. 89 Iranian representatives called on governments to set a target 
date by which the treaty banning and eliminating nuclear weapons should be finished. 
The 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT, the Iranians put forth, 
provided an excellent opportunity for states to agree on the target date as well as to set 
the negotiating process towards the final treaty in motion. As a first step, Iran focused 
on persuading governments to make the fundamental decision and pronounce their 
intention to rid the world of nuclear armaments within a fixed time period. 90 Irrespective 
of whether states were prepared to take such a step, the officials of the Islamic Republic 
declared, Iran would "not rest until our planet is free from the scourge of nuclear 
weapons. " (A/CN. 10/PV. 186,1994: 22; The Islamic Republic of Iran and Disarmament 
1994: 1-2 and A/50/PV. 124,1996: 12) 
5.2.1.2 The issue of security assurances 
Given the Islamic Republic's pessimistic assessment of nuclear powers' readiness - 
in the foreseeable future, at least - to destroy their nuclear arsenals and fundamentally 
revise their military doctrines, the Iranians had no illusions about the hurdles the 
proponents of complete nuclear disarmament were faced with. Therefore, while not 
prepared to make any compromises over its disarmament objective, Iran called for the 
implementation of interim international measures that would address the concerns of 
non-nuclear states and prepare the way for complete nuclear disarmament. 91 Security 
assurances were among the measures raised by the Iranians in this context. As before, 
the Islamic Republic was of the opinion that NNWS were fully entitled to security 
assurances from NWS in return for their acceptance of the NPT and their non-nuclear 
status. Not only would such assurances strengthen the security of NNWS, Iranian 
officials argued, but they would also reduce the possibility of non-nuclear states seeking 
to acquire a nuclear weapon capability of their own. (The Islamic Republic of Iran and 
Disarmament 1994: 5; CD/PV. 691,1994: 2-3 and CD/PV. 514,1989: 6-7) 
89 Alluding to START, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties' acronym, Iranian officials called for the 
completion of a "STOP" (Strategic and Nuclear Arms Out of Our Planet) treaty (CD/PV. 659,1993: 3 and 
Nasseri 1995b: 241). 
90 Iranian representatives referred to the year 2000 as the preferred target date for comprehensive nuclear 
disarmament (CD/PV. 625,1992: 4). 
91 It should be noted that Iranian officials considered such interim measures ultimately pointless unless 
they were universally acknowledged as temporary solutions and explicitly linked to the goal of complete 
nuclear disarmament. Take, for example, the following Iranian comment from February 1994: "Nuclear 
393 
Iran stressed the importance of both positive and negative security assurances. As for 
the former, the Islamic Republic welcomed the UN Security Council's resolution 984 of 
April 1995 in which each of the five NWS and permanent members of the council - that 
is, the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China - promised to act 
immediately in accordance with the relevant provisions of the UN Charter should any 
non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT become a victim of nuclear weapons use or 
the threat of use of those armaments. As for the measures available to the Security 
Council to assist the NNWS threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons, the resolution 
spoke of the investigation of such cases as well as of efforts to settle disputes and to 
restore international peace and security. Also, it referred to the provision of technical, 
medical, scientific, or humanitarian assistance to the victim state and to the Security 
Council's power to recommend appropriate procedures regarding compensation under 
international law for the losses, damages or injuries sustained as a result of nuclear 
aggression. (CD/PV. 691,1994: 3 and S/RES/984,1995: 2) 
Even though Iranian authorities characterized the resolution and the nuclear powers' 
PSA therein as a "step in the right direction, " they did not hide their fundamental 
dissatisfaction with the document. The Islamic Republic regretted that the resolution did 
not include a legal assurance on the part of the Security Council that it would 
automatically respond to the use or threat of use of nuclear armaments. Also, in the 
Iranian opinion, the nuclear powers should have explicitly stated that any aggression 
involving the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would constitute a threat to 
international peace and security, and as a result, obligate NWS not only to provide 
humanitarian, technical, scientific, or medical help to the victim countries, but also to 
"use all necessary means in defence of the victims in accordance with the UN Charter. " 
(NPT/CONF. 1995/32,1995: 100-101 and Kharrazi 1995) 
At the end of the day, however, the Islamic Republic viewed PSA as secondary in 
importance to NSA. 92 Echoing the post-Cold War international opinion which 
increasingly questioned the legitimacy of nuclear arms and the doctrine of nuclear 
deterrence, Iranian officials disapproved the fact that while NWS asked non-nuclear 
states to permanently forswear nuclear weapons by agreeing to the indefinite extension 
disarmament is the cardinal objective. Everything else finds meaning only under its shadow" 
(CD/PV. 671,1994: 18). 
92 Note, for example, the remark made by the Islamic Republic's UN representative in 1995 that in the 
diplomatic deliberations on security assurances, NSA constituted the "core of the problem" (Kharrazi 
1995). 
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of the NPT, NWS themselves were not ready to pledge not to use nuclear arms against 
NNWS. As a result, Iran, together with a host of other NAM countries, such as Egypt 
and Nigeria, linked its position on the extension of the NPT to results achieved in the 
matter of NSA. (CD/PV. 683,1994: 18; A/C. 1/49/PV. 9,1994: 14 and Bunn and 
Timerbaev 1993: 13) 
The Islamic Republic's NSA diplomacy centered on the demand that NWS should 
yield to an international legally binding instrument in which they would promise not to 
threaten or attack NNWS with nuclear armaments. As model arrangements, Iranian 
officials pointed to the treaties of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga which had established 
NWFZ in Latin America and the Caribbean and the South Pacific, respectively. 93 In the 
Additional Protocol II of the Tiatelolco Treaty, the five NWS had given NSA to the 
contracting parties. In Protocol II of the Rarotonga Treaty, NWS had committed 
themselves not to use or threaten to use nuclear explosive devices against any party to 
the treaty or against each other's territories located within the zone. As far as the form 
of the international NSA instrument Iran was calling for was concerned, the 
representatives of the Islamic Republic alluded to the conclusion of a protocol that 
would be attached to the NPT. The Iranians also brought up the option of a separate 
multilateral convention for the purpose. (Du Preez 2003; Kharrazi 1995 and 
A/CN. 10/PV. 186,1994: 23) 
Because of their insistence on an unambiguous legally binding NSA instrument and 
their principled opposition to unilateral NSA statements, Iranian authorities did not 
content themselves with the NSA declarations made by NWS in 1995 which were 
formally acknowledged by the UN Security Council resolution 984. The Islamic 
Republic was disappointed with the fact that the 1995 declarations were only politically 
binding and that, with the exception of those of China, the NSA given by the nuclear 
powers continued to be conditional. 94 The United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, 
and France qualified the assurances they gave to NNWS by excluding cases of invasion 
or any other attack on their respective countries, territories, armed forces or other 
troops, or against their allies or a state towards which they had security commitments, 
93 As one Iranian official noted in April 1994: "When the extension of the NPT is discussed, it is 
imperative that nuclear-weapon states extend the obligation they undertook in the Tlatelolco and 
Rarotonga treaties to all states parties to the NPT" (A/CN. 1O/PV. 186,1994: 23). 
94 In its 1995 declaration, China gave an unconditional assurance not to be the first to use nuclear 
weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones at any time or under any 
circumstances. China's pledge concerned the non-nuclear parties to the NPT and those non-nuclear states 
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carried out or sustained by a NNWS in alliance or association with a NWS. Moreover, 
the United States and the United Kingdom made an additional qualification by stating 
that they would not apply their assurances in cases where the beneficiary was in 
material breach of its non-proliferation obligations under the NPT. (CD/PV. 683,1994: 
18 and Du Preez 2003) 
The Islamic Republic's interest in NSA and its general opposition to nuclear weapons 
further translated into active Iranian diplomacy in the process that led the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) to declare, in July 1996, that the threat or use of nuclear weapons 
would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed 
conflict. The advisory opinion rendered by the court - which also held that there existed 
an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to 
nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control - 
was a response to two requests made for such an opinion, one by the WHO and the 
other by the UN General Assembly. 95 (Ware 1996) 
Iran strongly supported the requests made by the WHO and the General Assembly 
and ultimately provided the ICJ with two written statements on the cases. The Iranians 
also participated in a related oral hearing before the court. 96 During the process 
surrounding the advisory opinion issue, Iran and other NNWS criticized the United 
States, Russia, the United Kingdom, and France for having initially tried to prevent the 
WHO and the General Assembly from taking the case to the ICJ, and later, for having 
pressured the court not to give an answer in the matter. That these diplomatic efforts by 
the nuclear powers had failed and the advisory opinion of the ICJ eventually 
corresponded to Iran's stance paved the way for future Iranian demands for NSA, and 
more broadly, for complete nuclear disarmament. (A/C. 1/49/PV. 24,1994: 9; Zarif et al. 
1996: 1-2 and Ware 1996) 
that had entered into any comparable internationally recognized commitment not to manufacture or 
acquire nuclear explosive devices. (Du Preez 2003) 
95 In May 1993, the WHO had asked the ICJ to give an advisory opinion on whether, in view of the health 
and environmental effects, the use of nuclear weapons by a state in a war or other armed conflict would 
constitute a breach of its obligations under international law. The UN General Assembly, on the other 
hand, had, in its resolution of 15 December 1994, requested the court to render its advisory opinion on 
whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons was permitted under any circumstances. (Zarif et al. 1996: 
1-2) 
96For the details of Iran's legal argumentation in this connection, see ibid. (1996: 8-15). 
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5.2.1.3 Iran and the control of fissile materials 
The Islamic Republic's nuclear diplomacy included the demand that nuclear-weapon 
states should be transparent and provide information about their nuclear arsenals in 
order to facilitate the much-needed transition towards a nuclear-free world. In Iran's 
assessment, the publication of data on the world's nuclear weapons stockpiles would 
advance the cause of nuclear disarmament by generating confidence among states and 
by reassuring non-nuclear states of the nuclear powers' military intentions. With these 
considerations in mind, the authorities of the Islamic Republic supported the diplomatic 
stance which insisted on the inclusion of nuclear weapons and other WMD in the UN 
Register of Conventional Arms created in 1991. Because of the nuclear powers' 
rejection of such a position, the government of Argentina launched - in 1993, as a 
compromise solution - the idea of a separate nuclear weapons register. Had Argentina's 
ultimately unsuccessful proposal led to concrete steps in the matter, the Iranians, who 
strongly criticized the nuclear powers for their opposition to the expansion of the UN 
register's scope, would have most likely supported the establishment of a separate arms 
register. (CD/PV. 659,1993: 7-8 and Wulf 2000: 91-92) 
For the most part, Iran's calls for an expanded UN weapons register did not make 
specific references to nuclear bombs - as well as to the necessary delivery systems - but 
alluded generally to WMD in all their aspects. Accordingly, Iran's definition of WMD 
covered the fissile materials needed for the production of nuclear armaments. 97 In the 
Iranian view, the world had the right to receive information about the fissile materials 
available to nuclear-weapon states. But although the Islamic Republic coupled the issue 
of fissile materials with its diplomatic effort to promote the expansion of the UN arms 
register's scope, the nuclear powers' rejection of such efforts, combined with the fact 
that international deliberations on fissile materials were progressing on a distinct 
diplomatic track, led the Iranians to pursue the question of fissile materials outside the 
actual transparency in armaments debate. 
Efforts to control fissile materials date back to the aftermath of World War II and 
have always been tightly linked with the broader objectives of nuclear non-proliferation 
9' One estimate concludes that some 3,000 tonnes (metric tons) of fissile material have been produced 
since 1945. Of this quantity, one-third comprises the fissile material produced for, used in, and discharged 
from civil reactors and nuclear fuel-cycle facilities, whereas the remaining two-thirds involves the 
material produced for, used in, and extracted from nuclear warheads. (Walker 1999: 30) 
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and disarmament. 98 On the one hand, the control of fissile materials has been viewed as 
a means to inhibit the expansion of existing nuclear arsenals and to ensure that states do 
not act against their arms control commitments by secretly storing or assembling 
nuclear weapons. On the other hand, fissile material control has been regarded as a 
supplementary way of preventing the spread of nuclear armaments to additional 
countries and also as a crucial measure in the prevention of nuclear terrorism. (O'Neill 
1999: 41 and Shea 2003: 39) 
However, it was not until the early 1990s that international control efforts singularly 
focusing on fissile materials started to make real advances. The door for progress was 
opened by the decisions made, by 1992, by the United States and Russia to halt the 
production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons purposes. As a 
consequence, on 16 December 1993, the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted a 
resolution that called for the establishment of a non-discriminatory, multilateral, and 
internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material 
for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. (Johnson 1998: 106 and Shea 
2003: 39) 
The December 1993 resolution was a consensus text which did not reveal the 
disagreements that existed among states over the planned treaty's appropriate scope and 
over the content of fissile material control at large. During the diplomatic consultations 
of 1994 and early 1995 on the mandate of the fissile material ban negotiations, however, 
the differences of opinion became increasingly evident. Basically, there were two camps 
in the talks. The great majority of states belonged to the group which was of the view 
that the mandate should be for negotiating a ban that would cover not only the 
production of plutonium and HEU, but also the stockpiling of those materials. For this 
group of states, then, the conclusion of a comprehensive Fissile Material Treaty (FMT) 
was the ultimate objective. (Johnson 1998: 106 and Shea 2003: 51) 
Due to practical reasons, however, most of the countries belonging to the FMT camp 
were prepared to acquiesce in an international instrument that would only ban the future 
production of plutonium and HEU for weapons purposes and leave the issue of stocks - 
that is, past production of fissile materials - to be dealt with at a later stage. The 
rationale behind the decision to settle for a mere Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty 
(FMCT) was that NWS and India - counted among the undeclared or so-called 
threshold nuclear states - were prepared to block any diplomatic initiative that would go 
98 For a chronology of international fissile material control efforts, see Barbour (1999: 97-104). 
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beyond the ban on future production. Therefore, it was better to have a start, even a 
modest one, than to bring the whole process to a halt. That a FMCT would potentially 
cap the production of plutonium and HEU for military purposes in the five NWS and 
subject the fissile material production of the threshold states of India, Pakistan, and 
Israel under some sort of control was seen as a welcome prospect in itself. 99 (Johnson 
1995b; Johnson 1998: 106-107 and Shea 2003: 51) 
All members of the FMT camp were not ready for such a diplomatic concession. 
Some of them - among others, Pakistan, Egypt, Algeria, and also Iran - pushed hard for 
a broad interpretation of the scope of the planned fissile treaty. '°° The Islamic 
Republic's insistence on the inclusion of fissile material stocks into the treaty 
negotiations emanated from two main considerations. In the first place, as the Iranians 
coupled the control of fissile materials with the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament, 
from the Islamic Republic's standpoint a comprehensive FMT that would obligate NWS 
to reduce and dispose of their military fissile material stocks would serve the 
disarmament objective. 101 Secondly, the Islamic Republic's diplomatic focus on fissile 
material stockpiles stemmed from the major Iranian interest in international measures 
that would interfere with and impede the nuclear weapons programs of India, Pakistan, 
and Israel - all located in Iran's neighbourhood and strongly present in Iranian threat 
analyses. (Johnson 1995b; A/C. 1/49/PV. 9,1994: 14-15 and CD/PV. 683,1994: 20) 
Although pressing for controls on the fissile material stocks of the three threshold 
states as well as on those of the five NWS5 the officials of the Islamic Republic had no 
illusions about the difficulty of the task. As far as India, Pakistan, and Israel were 
concerned, Iran's principal goal was to see these countries join the NPT and subject 
9 Because the non-nuclear parties to the NPT have committed themselves, by accepting article II of the 
treaty, not to build nuclear weapons - in other words, not to use fissile material for weapon purposes -, a 
FMCT would, from a legal point of view, only concern the military production of fissile materials by the 
five NWS and the nuclear-weapon states not parties to the NPT. 
100 Note, for example, the following Iranian statement, made in June 1994, on the mandate of the fissile 
material ban negotiations: "This mandate must include an explicit reference to the current stockpiles 
dispersed in different parts of the world. One cannot envisage an eventual agreement on prohibition of 
fissile materials which leave huge amounts of the existing unsafeguarded materials untouched" 
(CD/PV. 683,1994: 20-21). For other Iranian calls for the inclusion of stockpiles in the international 
fissile material control instrument, see the Islamic Republic's relevant statements at the 1995 NPT 
Review and Extension Conference (NPT/CONF. 1995/SR. 8,1995: 100 and 
NPT/CONF. 1995/MC. 1 /WP. 5,1995: 294,296). Prior to the 1995 NPT conference, Iran stated that it 
would support the "limited renewal" of the NPT only if "careful attention" was paid at the conference to 
the views calling for a permanent ban on the production, development, and stockpiling of, as well as on 
the trade in, all fissile materials for nuclear weapons purposes (A/49/PV. 5,1994: 39). 
101 The reduction and disposal of fissile materials produced in the past would concern stocks that have 
arisen as a result of nuclear armament processes, nuclear weapon dismantlements, and the removal of 
redundant materials from military production cycles (Walker and Berkhout 1999: 5). 
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their nuclear activities to IAEA full-scope safeguards. Accordingly, the Islamic 
Republic argued that should an international fissile material ban reduce the possibility 
of the threshold countries joining the NPT, the instrument might not be worth the 
trouble. Iran voiced an alternative to a separate fissile material treaty by stating that a 
prohibition against the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes, imposed on 
all parties to the NPT, could be incorporated into the NPT as a treaty amendment. Such 
an approach, Iranian officials pointed out, would also serve to redress the "prevailing 
substantial imbalance in the NPT" as far as the responsibilities of NWS and NNWS 
were concerned. (A/CN. 10/PV. 186,1994: 22 and CD/PV. 683,1994: 20) 
Essentially, then, the Islamic Republic's fissile diplomacy based on a two-pronged 
approach. Both the possibility of an independent fissile ban treaty - that would regulate 
stockpiles and future production alike - and the option of a NPT-related arrangement 
were put forth by the Iranians. ' 02 But even though the representatives of the Islamic 
Republic did not publicly admit it, in practice, neither one of the Iranian-promoted 
schemes was realistically achievable. The only option that had the chance of succeeding 
was the conclusion of a FMCT. And serious discussions even on a FMCT would not 
have been possible had the major nuclear powers not concluded that, in the post-Cold 
War world, they possessed enough plutonium and HEU to refrain from further military 
production of those materials (Johnson 1998: 106). 
Still, from the same powers' point of view, there were good reasons to say no to 
diplomatic proposals going beyond the FMCT. Fundamentally, NWS - which mainly 
viewed the fissile treaty as a non-proliferation instrument and as a means to cap the 
military production of plutonium and HEU in the non-NPT threshold states - wanted to 
keep their fissile material stocks out of the reach of the outside world in order to 
safeguard information about their nuclear weapons arsenals and designs. ' 03 Similarly, 
India, Pakistan, and Israel were highly careful not to take part in international arms 
control arrangements that would compromise their ambiguous postures on nuclear 
weapons or narrow their strategic options. (Johnson 1998: 106 and Walker and 
Berkhout 1999: 15) 
102 Still, Iran did state that the negotiating mandate of an international fissile ban instrument should "leave 
the option open for the eventual outcome of negotiations to become part of, or be attached to, the NPT 
rather than constitute a separate treaty" (CD/PV. 683,1994: 21). 
103 The fissile material stocks serving current or future military needs are held, among others, in 
operational weapons (Walker and Berkhout 1999: 5). 
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The gulf between the FMCT camp and the FMT hardliners continued to exist despite 
the fact that, in March 1995, the CD, which had been designated as the most appropriate 
forum to negotiate the international treaty on fissile materials, managed to agree on the 
negotiating mandate. The content of this so-called "Shannon mandate" - named after 
the Canadian diplomat who had prepared the CD's March 1995 report that contained the 
negotiating mandate - was basically identical with the language of the UN General 
Assembly's December 1993 resolution. The only major difference between the UN 
resolution and the Shannon report was that the latter included an understanding 
according to which all issues pertaining to the planned treaty's scope could be addressed 
in the context of treaty negotiations. This formulation reflected the position of Iran and 
other staunch FMT supporters, and it enabled them to keep the issue of stocks on the 
table during subsequent fissile ban discussions. Yet, as the FMCT camp remained 
strongly opposed to the broad interpretation of the negotiating mandate, the discussions 
taking place after the adoption of the Shannon report quickly led to a diplomatic 
deadlock. ' 04 (Shea 2003: 51) 
5.2.2 Iran and the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty 
5.2.2.1 The pre-negotiations period 
International agreement on a CTB was another major objective of the Islamic 
Republic's post-war nuclear disarmament diplomacy. Like before, Iranian officials 
called for the establishment of a CTBT and viewed the treaty as a means to prevent both 
the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear armaments. Also, the Iranians argued 
that a CTB would put an end to the adverse health and environmental effects resulting 
from nuclear tests. And as the Islamic Republic continued to view the issue of CTB as 
104 It should be noted that the Shannon report itself made a distinction between two state groupings in the 
CD: those who viewed the negotiating mandate as only permitting the consideration of future production 
of fissile materials and those who viewed the mandate as permitting the consideration of both future and 
past production. In addition, the report made mention of countries that specifically underlined the 
importance of the planned treaty's comprehensiveness. According to these states, the fissile ban treaty 
should not only focus on the production of fissile materials, but it should also cover other relevant issues 
such as the management of such materials. (CD/1299,1995: 2). Iranian officials' statements on fissile 
materials concentrated almost entirely on the production dimension, even if the Iranians did touch upon 
other related issues as well. For example, the Islamic Republic expressed its concern over illicit 
trafficking of fissile materials. Yet, in the opinion of Iran, it was mainly the nuclear-weapon states' 
responsibility to manage and protect those materials from falling into the wrong hands. 
(GC/XXXVIII/COM. 5/OR. 2,1994: 7 and GC/XXXVIII/COM. 5/OR. 6,1994: 22) 
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an indicator of the willingness of NWS to fulfill their NPT-based obligation to move 
towards complete nuclear disarmament, Iranian representatives insisted that an 
agreement on a CTBT would significantly consolidate the NPT and enhance its 
credibility-105 (CD/PV. 659,1993: 4; GC/XXXIII/OR. 315,1989: 26 and 
A/CN. 10/PV. 165,1992: 50) 
In the Iranian opinion, the time was ripe for a CTBT both in a technical and a 
political sense. Technically, the representatives of the Islamic Republic maintained, 
there were no obstacles to a CTB, for underground nuclear tests could now be detected 
with a high degree of certainty. Pointing to the radical improvement in superpower 
relations and to the progress made in U. S. -Soviet arms control in the late 1980s, Iran 
argued that a CTBT would be also politically feasible. Although the Iranians welcomed 
the various nuclear test moratoria declared by some of the NWS in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, '°6 they regarded such measures as insufficient; a CTBT had to be 
negotiated as soon as possible. (CD/PV. 479,1988: 4; A/C. 1/46/PV. 5,1991: 34- 35 and 
A/C. 1/48/SR. 13,1993: 9) 
On 5 August 1988, the twenty-fifth anniversary of the signing of the PTBT, five non- 
nuclear signatories of the treaty made a call for a specific amendment conference to be 
held to convert the PTBT into a CTBT (Loeb 1993: 842). 107 Iran lent its support to the 
initiative and later became one of the countries formally asking for an amendment 
conference to take place (A/C. 1/43/PV. 15,1988: 57 and A/C. 1/44/PV. 13,1989: 10). 
Originally, the countries behind the amendment proposal had hoped that the conference 
would be convened prior to the 1990 NPT review conference, so that the results of the 
two events could be linked to each other. The supporters of a CTB tried to gain leverage 
in the amendment issue by implying that nuclear powers' opposition to the PTBT's 
amendment could jeopardize consensus at the subsequent NPT gathering. In the end, 
however, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom - the three 
depositary states of the PTBT - blocked the effort by scheduling the PTBT meeting for 
January 1991. (Spector and Smith 1990: 43) 
105 The preamble of the NPT refers to the "determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty 
banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to 
achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue 
negotiations to this end. " 
106 For these moratoria, see Loeb (1993: 827,840-843). 
107 The call for a PTBT amendment conference was an effort to revive the diplomatic CTBT discussions 
which had come to a deadlock. The provisions of the PTBT allow any state party to propose an 
amendment to the treaty, and upon request from one-third or more of the states parties, a conference must 
be convened by the depositary governments to consider such a proposal. (Goldblat 1995: 363) 
402 
Nonetheless, it was the issue of CTB that prevented the 1990 NPT conference from 
agreeing on a final declaration or even on a formal reaffirmation of support for the NPT. 
The disagreements between NAM and a number of other non-nuclear countries that 
asked NWS to constrain and reduce their nuclear arsenals through an expeditious 
conclusion of a CTBT and the United States and its allies - who viewed the CTB only 
as a long-term objective - ultimately brought the NPT conference to an unsuccessful 
close. 108 Iran's conference delegation was actively involved in the test-ban debate and 
promoted the NAM position in the matter. The Islamic Republic was also among the 
conference participants that underscored the importance of the PTBT amendment 
conference scheduled for January 1991. (Epstein 1990: 45-47; Spector and Smith 1990: 
39,43-44 and A/C. 1/45/PV. 6,1990: 38-39) 
In the end, the January 1991 PTBT conference turned out to be a disappointment for 
Iran and other non-nuclear states striving for the PTBT's transformation into a CTBT. 
Due to American and British opposition to the PTBT's modification, clearly expressed 
already prior to the conference's start, the amendment proposal presented at the 
gathering was never put to the vote (Goldblat 1995: 363). 109 Following the unsuccessful 
PTBT gathering, Iranian officials strongly criticized the two nuclear powers for their 
refusal to accept the non-nuclear states' amendment proposal and continued to advocate 
the treaty's modification. The Islamic Republic called for the adoption of a CTB prior to 
the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and asserted that world opinion 
demanded the creation of such a ban. (A/C. 1/46/PV. 5,1991: 35; A/C. 1/47/PV. 5,1992: 
56 and A/C. 1/48/SR. 13,1993: 9) 
In fact, the Iranians hardened their position by explicitly stating that their support for 
the NPT's extension was dependent on the progress made in the CTB question. In this 
respect, the Islamic Republic was following a diplomatic course that had been gaining 
currency among other NAM countries as well. Already at the 1990 NPT review 
conference, non-aligned countries, led by Mexico, had seriously discussed the 
possibility of making a direct linkage between the extension of the NPT - which 
108 In the final hours of the 1990 NPT review conference, the disagreement over a CTB crystallized into 
diplomatic wrangling between the United States and Mexico, the most passionate advocate of a test ban at 
the conference (Epstein 1990: 45-47 and Spector and Smith 1990: 39,43-44). 
109 The conference only managed to mandate its president to conduct consultations with a view to 
achieving progress towards a CTB and to resuming the conference's work at an appropriate time. Under 
the treaty amendment put forth by the non-aligned countries in January 1991, the parties would have 
undertaken - in addition to their obligations under the PTBT - to prohibit, prevent, and not to carry out 
any nuclear-weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion underground or in any other 
environment. (Goldblat 1995: 363) 
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required a simple majority decision - and a CTB. (A/C. 1/48/SR. 13,1993: 9 and Epstein 
1990: 45,47) 
5.2.2.2 The first year of the negotiations 
By 1994, as a result of increasing domestic and international pressure, NWS had 
ultimately recognized that the conclusion of a CTBT would be in their interest, too. In 
essence, NWS viewed the planned CTBT as an instrument that would help them to 
block the horizontal proliferation of nuclear armaments -a threat scenario which, in the 
wake of the end of the Cold War and the 1990-1991 Gulf conflict, had become one of 
nuclear powers' key foreign policy concerns. Consequently, in January 1994, the CD 
adopted a mandate for the negotiations on a CTBT. The January 1994 mandate called 
on the CD's already existing Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban "to negotiate 
intensively a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable CTBT, which would 
contribute effectively to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its 
aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore to the enhancement of 
international peace and security. " (Johnson 1997 and Johnson 1998: 88,90,100). 
Iran welcomed the mandate's adoption and became closely involved in the CTBT 
talks. In 1994, during which the national delegations mainly concentrated on presenting 
their governments' views on an optimal test-ban instrument, Iranian officials elaborated 
on the basic components of their negotiation position. Nonetheless, the Islamic Republic 
started the CTBT talks by criticizing the nuclear powers for their allegedly 
presumptuous approach to the negotiations. In the Iranian view, NWS behaved as if 
they were entitled to set the terms of the negotiations without any regard to non-nuclear 
states' interests. Fundamentally, the officials of the Islamic Republic complained, the 
nuclear powers wanted to create a document that would prevent other countries from 
conducting nuclear tests and simultaneously subject their own nuclear activities only to 
minor restrictions. Iran expressed its objection to such a policy and insisted that the 
planned test ban should tackle horizontal proliferation and, above all, pave the ground 
for complete nuclear disarmament. 110 (CD/PV. 671,1994: 17-18) 
1 10 As underscored by Iran's CTBT delegation: "We do not [... ] agree to the notion that the threat is 
limited to the emerging nuclear-weapon states and to horizontal proliferation. Indeed, we non-nuclear- 
weapons states see this exercise as only a step towards nuclear disarmament. Nuclear disarmament is the 
cardinal objective. " Resultantly, Iran was one of the countries that hoped to see the CTBT's preamble 
include text provisions that stress the treaty's role as a measure against the vertical proliferation of 
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The scope of obligations 
As far as the content of the CTBT was concerned, the Iranians, who wanted to see the 
treaty finished before the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, ' 11 took actively 
part, first of all, in the debate on the test-ban's scope of obligations. All national 
negotiators recognized that the treaty should ban nuclear-weapon tests in the 
atmosphere, in outer space, under water, and underground, but beyond this basic notion, 
no general agreement existed between the delegations. Iranian representatives spoke of 
a treaty that would bring about a "general and complete cessation of tests by all states in 
all environments for all time. " They explained their definition to cover not only 
explosive testing of nuclear weapons, but the so-called non-explosive tests carried out in 
laboratories as well. By bringing up the issue of laboratory experiments, which include 
such activities as computer simulation, the Islamic Republic's negotiators came close to 
the position of Indonesia's delegates who called for a ban on all nuclear testing, whether 
explosive or not. (The Islamic Republic of Iran and Disarmament 1994: 6, CD/PV. 683, 
1994: 21 and Johnson 1995c) 
The difference between the Iranian and Indonesian approaches was that the Islamic 
Republic's scope definition left the question of the so-called peaceful nuclear 
explosions (PNE) open. At the outset of the CTBT negotiations, China had presented its 
strong demand that, under the treaty, states should be allowed to carry out nuclear 
explosions for civilian - such as construction or commercial - purposes. Iranian 
negotiators agreed with the view advocated by the opponents of the Chinese proposal 
that it was extremely difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish PNE from explosions 
conducted for military purposes. Still, the Iranians did not rule out the possibility of a 
treaty provision allowing PNE to take place. Explaining their hesitation in the issue, 
Iran's representatives underlined their rejection of the notion prevalent in the developed 
world that peaceful activities which can theoretically serve military ends must always be 
monitored, controlled, or banned. The negotiators of the Islamic Republic said that their 
nuclear weapons as well as the necessity of total elimination of those armaments within a time-bound 
framework. (CD/PV. 671,1994: 18 and Johnson 1997) 
III For Iranian statements on the CTBT negotiations' preferred timetable, see CD/PV. 683 (1994: 22) and 
CD/PV. 690 (1994: 10-1 1). In these pronouncements, the Islamic Republic also restated the linkage it had 
made between the CTBT talks and its willingness to support what Iranian officials referred to as the 
"limited renewal" of the NPT in 1995. By coupling the two diplomatic processes with each other, the 
Islamic Republic hoped to gain political leverage in the CTBT negotiations. Moreover, the linkage made 
by the Iranians was indicative of the fear among NAM countries that, after having succeeded in securing 
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country had greatly suffered from such a conception. They also insisted that the future 
test-ban treaty should not contain any provisions that could be interpreted as restricting 
nuclear technology transfers for peaceful purposes. (Johnson 1995c; CD/PV. 671,1994: 
20 and The Islamic Republic of Iran and Disarmament 1994: 7) 
While refraining from adapting a clear stand on the PNE issue, Iran was against the 
American negotiation position that would have allowed NWS to carry out hydronuclear 
experiments (HNE) - that is, nuclear explosions of very low yield - to keep their 
nuclear weapons safe and reliable. Similarly, the Islamic Republic opposed the French 
and the British delegates' effort to reserve their countries the right to conduct, in 
exceptional circumstances, nuclear explosions without restriction on yield in order to 
ensure the safety of their nuclear arsenals. According to Iran, the safety exemptions put 
forth by the NWS were unacceptable because they could potentially be activated to 
mask weapon development activities. (Goldblat 1995: 364; Johnson 1995c and The 
Islamic Republic of Iran and Disarmament 1994: 7) 
During the CTBT talks, some delegations argued that the treaty should impose a ban 
both on the conduct of nuclear explosions and on preparations for such explosions. The 
Iranians' response to this initiative was somewhat lukewarm, for although they basically 
supported the idea, they implied that the formulation of such a provision might turn out 
to be too complex a task for the negotiators. Iran's delegates asked, for example, how 
such preparations would be defined and how one could be sure that states would not be 
baselessly accused of preparing themselves for a weapon test. (Goldblat 1995: 366; 
CD/PV. 671,1994: 20 and The Islamic Republic of Iran and Disarmament 1994: 7) 
Yet on a related issue, the Islamic Republic joined the view of those delegations that 
called on nuclear powers to close down all the sites they had used for nuclear testing. In 
the Iranian opinion, the CTBT should oblige all the states parties to close down their 
nuclear sites as well as to destroy any equipment specifically designed for test purposes. 
Iranian officials maintained that such measures were needed to reduce the possibility 
that nuclear powers would resume nuclear testing. (CD/PV. 683,1994: 21; 
A/C. 1/49/PV. 9,1994: 14 and CD/PV. 671,1994: 20) 
the extension of the NPT in 1995, NWS might lose their interest in the CTBT (A/49/PV. 5,1994: 39 and 
Johnson 1998: 98). 
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Verification 
The development of a system to detect and locate a possible nuclear test was naturally 
a central topic in the CTBT negotiations. The Islamic Republic's initial comments on 
verification outlined the basic characteristics of its position in the matter. Accordingly, 
Iran's negotiators called for a non-discriminatory, universal, technically effective, and 
internationally supervised verification system. More specifically, they expressed their 
government's view that verification activities under the CTBT should rely first and 
foremost on the application of seismic technologies and on-site inspections. (The 
Islamic Republic of Iran and Disarmament 1994: 8-9; CD/PV. 671,1994: 19 and 
CD/PV. 683,1994: 21) 
The Islamic Republic did not rule out future incorporation of non-seismic 
technologies - such as atmospheric, infrasound, and hydroacoustic monitoring - and 
other mechanisms into the planned verification system. Nonetheless, Iranian negotiators 
argued that such complementary steps would have to meet certain criteria. Among 
others, the Iranians declared, they would have to produce information that clearly 
contributes to the verification system's efficiency, be cost-effective, and not in any way 
interfere with the states parties' peaceful nuclear transfers, with their industrial 
development, or with their peaceful nuclear research. In addition, the representatives of 
the Islamic Republic pointed out that any complementary elements of the CTBT 
verification system would have to be operated and kept under multilateral international 
control. (CD/PV. 671,1994: 19; CD/PV. 683,1994: 21-22 and The Islamic Republic of 
Iran and Disarmament 1994: 8-9) 
The implementing organization 
As for the planned international organization charged with the task of executing and 
verifying the CTBT, the national delegations had two main proposals on the table. The 
first one entrusted the implementation task to the IAEA, whereas the majority of the 
delegations held that a separate CTBT organization (CTBTO) was needed. Iran's 
pronouncements on the matter did not lean towards either proposal but discussed both 
options. If the IAEA was to be entrusted with the CTBT's execution, Iranian negotiators 
stated, the technical capabilities of the agency would have to be strengthened and the 
IAEA's decision-making structures would have to be revised. The Islamic Republic 
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wanted to increase the diplomatic influence of the non-nuclear parties to the NPT and 
the future CTBT vis-a-vis the countries that would stay outside those instruments. 
(Johnson 1995c; CD/PV. 671,1994: 20 and The Islamic Republic of Iran and 
Disarmament 1994: 9) 
If, on the other hand, a specific CTBTO was to be founded, the Iranians continued, 
the member states would have to ensure that the agency would remain cost-effective 
and not have a large and complex bureaucracy. Also, the Islamic Republic found it 
crucial that the CTBTO would have the capability to analyze and disseminate the 
verification data transmitted to it. Moreover, supporting a proposal put forth by Japan, 
the Iranians argued that the CTBTO would need only one major decision-making organ, 
that is, the Conference of the States Parties that would comprise all the states parties, 
each with one vote. The rationale for the Japanese proposal was to allow the CTBT 
negotiators to avoid politically sensitive discussions on the composition of the 
Executive Council, the CTBTO's planned executive body. (The Islamic Republic of 
Iran and Disarmament 1994: 9; CD/PV. 683,1994: 22 and Johnson 1995c) 
Entry into force and withdrawal 
In regards to the test-ban treaty's entry into force (EIF), the Islamic Republic was of 
the opinion that the CTBT should enter into force only after all NWS and threshold 
nuclear states had joined it. At the same time, however, the Iranians acknowledged that 
the CTBT's EIF should not remain hostage to a few countries' refusal to become parties 
to it. Therefore, Iranian negotiators emphasized, the states that were hesitating to join 
the CTBT should be offered concrete incentives for treaty accession, for example, in the 
area of peaceful nuclear cooperation. Correspondingly, those who would remain outside 
the treaty should be subjected to international "punitive measures. " (CD/PV. 683,1994: 
22 and The Islamic Republic of Iran and Disarmament 1994: 9) 
On the issue of treaty withdrawal, Iran took an unequivocal stand: the withdrawal of 
"nuclear-weapon states and other nuclear advanced countries" from the CTBT should 
not be allowed because, otherwise, the treaty's meaning would be nullified. Beside 
making this fundamental point, Iranian representatives added that the final text of the 
CTBT should include clear provisions on how to deal with countries that would decide 
to back out of the treaty. Once again, the Islamic Republic envisioned the use of 
unspecified punitive measures as the preferred solution. Iranian negotiators wanted to 
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see clear treaty provisions in this regard, so that countries would be treated according to 
uniform criteria and rules. As an example of how states had been treated unevenly in the 
past, the Iranians drew a comparison between the cases of Israel and North Korea. 
Whereas Israel, despite its reluctance to join the NPT and to end its nuclear weapons 
program, had been left alone and even assisted in the nuclear field by the major powers, 
Iranian negotiators reprehended, North Korea's March 1993 decision to withdraw from 
the NPT had caused a major international uproar and led to enormous diplomatic 
pressure against that country. ' 12 (CD/PV. 683,1994: 22) 
5.2.2.3 The second and the third year of the negotiations 
Following the first round of the CTBT negotiations, in September 1994, the CD's 
nuclear test ban committee adopted a report which included a 95-page draft of the 
planned treaty. At this stage, however, the draft or the so-called rolling text was only a 
summary of the various positions put forth by the national delegations and, therefore, 
far from a uniform whole. As a result, in 1995, much of the CTBT negotiators' attention 
focused on identifying and sorting out the differences of view on various treaty issues. 
(Johnson 1995c) 
The delegates of the Islamic Republic naturally participated in the `clean-up' work, 
but having explicated their government's negotiation positions already in the course of 
1994, their statements of 1995 did not offer much new in terms of substance. Still, in 
1995, Iranian officials were not only closely involved in the CTBT deliberations, but 
they also strongly called for the adoption of a CTB in the course of the April-May NPT 
Review and Extension Conference. At the conference, Iran belonged to the group of 14 
non-aligned countries that objected to the indefinite extension of the NPT and wanted 
the treaty to be extended for rolling fixed periods of 25 years, each extension being 
dependent on the achievement of certain treaty-related objectives. The conclusion of a 
CTBT was one of such objectives referred to by the group. While, in the end, Iran and 
the like-minded non-aligned states were not able to push through their formula for a 
limited extension of the NPT, they nevertheless managed to obtain, in return for their 
support for a consensus that made the treaty permanent, a politically binding 
12 North Korea suspended the effectuation of its March 1993 decision - originally a response to the 
diplomatic arm wrestling between North Korea and the IAEA over international nuclear inspections in 
that country - in June 1993 after negotiations with the 
United States. In return, the Americans pledged not 
to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against North Korea. (Mansourov 1995: 27) 
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commitment from NWS that the CTBT would be finished no later than in 1996. 
(Epstein 1995 and Welsh 1995) 
In June 1995, in the middle of the CTBT talks, Jacques Chirac, the newly elected 
president of France, announced that his country would conduct a final series of 
underground nuclear tests by May 1996, after which the French government would be 
ready to sign the CTBT. France's announcement to end its nuclear test moratorium, 
which had been in force since 1992, sparked strong protests from all over the world, 
including Tehran. The authorities of the Islamic Republic characterized the decision as a 
blow to international nuclear disarmament efforts and to the outcome of the NPT's 
Review and Extension Conference. (Rauf 1995: 49 and CD/PV. 708,1995: 24) 
In the Iranian view, the French decision indicated, for its part, that having secured the 
indefinite extension of the NPT, NWS felt free again to follow their own nuclear 
agendas. In essence, the officials of the Islamic Republic claimed, the French 
announcement was indicative of the nuclear powers' firm determination to maintain and 
strengthen their nuclear arsenals. Taking into account the fact that China had conducted 
a nuclear test in May 1995, Iran condemned what it alluded to as the "nuclear test race" 
and insisted that pending the conclusion of the CTBT, nuclear powers should refrain 
from further testing. (CD/PV. 708,1995: 24; GC/39/OR. 3,1995: 19 and A/50/PV. 5, 
1995: 31) 
In September 1995, the CD's test-ban committee produced its second report on the 
CTBT negotiations which contained a 97-page draft treaty. The rolling text of 1995 
remained heavily bracketed, indicating that at the beginning of the third and final round 
of the CTBT talks, there were still substantial disagreements between the national 
delegations over the treaty's content. Iran pursued its active CTBT diplomacy during 
the negotiations' final year, and on 22 February 1996, in order to "encourage all 
interlocutors to consider possibilities for reasonable agreements both on the broader 
conceptual differences as well as the details and the wordings, " the Islamic Republic 
presented a draft or model CTBT of its own to the CD. (Johnson 1995c and CD/PV. 726, 
1996: 8) 
Although most countries welcomed the Iranian model treaty as an initiative that 
sought to facilitate the negotiations, there were voices among the delegations that 
viewed the proposal as nothing more than an effort to promote Iran's national positions 
(Johnson 1997). Whatever the Iranian model treaty's ultimate rationale, the draft text 
and the Islamic Republic's subsequent statements testified to a clear division made by 
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the Iranians between treaty issues that were of secondary importance, and thus 
negotiable, and questions regarding which there was no room for compromise. 
The scope of obligations 
Regarding the CTBT's scope of obligations, the Islamic Republic continued to point 
out that the treaty should ban nuclear tests at any place and of any yield. ' 13 In the 
Iranian view, the widely accepted wording put forward by Australia in March 1995, 
which prohibited "any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, " 
was unacceptable because it left the door open for qualitative development of nuclear 
weapons. Given that the Australian formulation covered only explosions, Iranian 
officials maintained, nuclear powers would still be able to conduct test simulations - 
whether through computer-assisted analyses or through so-called subcritical tests, that 
is, nuclear experiments that stop short of triggering a self-sustaining chain reaction 
(Tulliu and Schmalberger 2001: 119) - and thereby improve their weapon arsenals. 
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During 1996, Iran's earlier hesitation with the issue of PNE transformed into 
qualified acceptance of such explosions. Yet, the Iranian negotiators pointed out that 
PNE could be carried out only if certain requirements were met. First, the Iranians 
emphasized, it would have to be undisputably proven that nuclear explosions make a 
contribution to peaceful scientific research and other civilian activities. So far, Iranian 
officials added, no country had been able to provide evidence of PNE's civilian 
benefits. And even if the situation changed in the future, Iran's argument went, states 
would be allowed to carry out a peaceful explosion only with the blessing of the 
CTBTO's Conference of the States Parties -a 4/5 majority decision would be needed - 
and under strict international monitoring. The Conference of the States Parties would 
also be responsible for the details pertaining to the monitoring and verification of a 
PNE. 115 (CD/PV. 726,1996: 6 and CD/1384,1996: 7) 
113 The relevant formulation in the Islamic Republic's model treaty read as follows: "Each State Party 
undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out, any nuclear weapon test or any other nuclear 
explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control" (CD/1384,1996: 4). 
114 As one Iranian official noted in September 1996: "[... ] competition has already started in the 
accumulation and utilization of technology and data collected from nuclear explosions to conduct 
advanced simulation testing" (A/50/PV. 124,1996: 10). 
115 By 1996, it had become clear that the CTBT would be implemented by a separate international 
organization established for the purpose. The Conference of the States Parties was defined as the 
CTBTO's main organ. It was entrusted with the responsibility to oversee the implementation of, and 
review compliance with the CTBT, and to oversee the activities of the two other organs of the CTBTO: 
the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat. As the Conference of the States Parties would 
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As far as nuclear test sites were concerned, the Islamic Republic's position remained 
unchanged. In the Iranian view, states should be obliged, under the CTBT, to close such 
sites and to destroy all equipment designed for test purposes. As called for in the Iranian 
model treaty, the states parties would have the responsibility to inform the CTBTO, not 
later than six months after the CTBT's EIF, of the measures they had taken in this 
respect. Furthermore, in order to promote transparency and confidence among the states 
parties, the Islamic Republic's negotiators argued, governments should submit 
declarations to the CTBTO in which they would provide detailed information about 
their past nuclear tests. For the same reason, the Iranians continued, the states parties 
should also be obliged to provide the CTBTO with notification of "any explosion using 
300 tonnes or greater of TNT-equivalent blasting material detonated as a single 
explosion anywhere on its territory, or at any place under its jurisdiction or control. " 
(CD/PV. 726,1996: 7; CD/PV. 745,1996: 13 and CD/1384,1996: 62) 
Verification 
In the debate on CTBT verification, the Islamic Republic lent its support to a 
verification system based on the so-called International Monitoring System (IMS). In 
Iran's view, the IMS - which was ultimately agreed by the delegations to include a 
global, two-tier seismic system, supported by hydroacoustic, radionuclide, and 
infrasound networks" 6- provided a sufficient basis to ensure that compliance under the 
CTBT could be verified in an efficient and reliable manner. However, the Iranians 
added, additional technologies could be examined and potentially included in the IMS 
in the future to improve the verification system. (Johnson 1997; CD/PV. 726,1996: 6 
and CD/ 13 84,1996: 16) 
By the time of the start of the CTBT negotiations' final round in January 1996, the 
question of what kind of a role intelligence information - or, in CTBT parlance, 
information derived from national technical means (NTM) - should play in the planned 
verification system had become a major cause of dispute at the CD. Many countries - 
normally convene only once a year, the Executive Council would effectively act as the CTBTO's 
? rincipal decision-making body. 
16 More specifically, the IMS was agreed to include 50 primary seismic stations, 120 auxiliary seismic 
stations, 80 radionuclide stations for measuring radioactive particles in the atmosphere, 11 hydroacoustic 
stations and, finally, 60 infrasound stations. As indicated by Annex 1 of the CTBT, Iran agreed to take the 
responsibility for one primary seismological station (located in Tehran), two auxiliary seismological 
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Russia and the United States, among others - held that by accepting intelligence data as 
a source of information, the states parties would significantly increase the verification 
system's credibility and its deterrence effect. On the other hand, China, together with 
several non-aligned countries, was worried that NTM data would be available only to a 
few states and could be used to serve questionable political purposes. (Johnson 1997) 
Iran was among the countries that had major reservations about NMT information. In 
principle, it objected to the utilization of such data in CTBT-related verification. 
Indirectly pointing to the use of "partial" and "discriminatory" intelligence by "certain 
states" against the Islamic Republic in the past, Iranian officials argued that the CTBT 
should not offer a pretext under which states could implement malicious national 
policies. As it became clear that NTM data would play a role in the final document, 
however, the Islamic Republic softened its position and sought to leave a mark in the 
treaty text. The Iranians signalled their readiness to accept the utilization, "under 
international scrunity, " of information derived from NTM, but they added that the value 
of such data had to be viewed as secondary to that received from the IMS. Otherwise, 
Iran's negotiators emphasized, individual states would be able to register claims of 
treaty violations solely based on their own, "private and non-transparent sources. " 117 
(A/50/PV. 124,1996: 10-11; CD/PV. 740,1996: 26 and CD/PV. 745,1996: 12) 
Underscoring the primacy of IMS data in verification, the Islamic Republic argued 
that no other type of information should be allowed to be used to back up a request 
made by a state party for an OSI in an area where a nuclear explosion was suspected to 
have taken place. ' 18 The Iranians noted that the data transmitted by the IMS to the 
International Data Centre (IDC), which would form an integral part of the CTBTO, 
should be processed, analyzed, and reported on by the centre. In addition, each state 
party ought to have access not only to all information made available to the IDC, but 
also to all other data obtained by the CTBTO by means of the verification measures 
stations (Kirman and Masjid-i Sulayman, respectively), one radionuclide station (Tehran), and one 
infrasound station (Tehran). 
117 The Islamic Republic also expressed its view according to which NTM data, as referred to in the 
CTBT, could not in any way be interpreted as including information received from espionage and human 
intelligence - activities that were against the "generally recognized principles of international 
law" 
(CD/PV. 745,1996: 12). During the CTBT talks, the national delegations gave differing definitions to 
NTM. Some delegations viewed it as only covering technology - such as satellites - that might not be 
directly linked into the IMS, but could produce 'IMS-type' data. Some, in turn, stood at the other end of 
the spectrum by arguing that in addition to intelligence gathering technology, specialist satellites, signals 
and communications intercepts, NTM should cover human intelligence sources as well. (Johnson 1997) 
118 In its model treaty, Iran did mention NTM information in this connection, but gave such data only a 
supplementary role (CD/1384,1996: 21). 
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established by the treaty. While supporting OSI as a means to determine facts relating to 
compliance with the CTBT, the Iranians were of the opinion that before resorting to 
inspections, the states parties should make every effort to clarify and resolve, among 
themselves or with or through the CTBTO, any matter causing concern about possible 
treaty non-compliance. Only if such clarification and consultation efforts would prove 
futile, Iranian representatives emphasized, should the OSI mechanism be set in motion. 
(CD/PV. 726,1996: 6 and CD/1384,1996: 16-17,19) 
In regards to the OSI decision-making procedure, the Islamic Republic called for the 
adoption of a two-stage process. For the initial phase of an OSI, the Iranians advocated 
a procedure in which the inspection would go ahead unless a majority of three-quarters 
of the CTBTO's Executive Council was against it. In this early phase, Iran's negotiators 
put forth, the inspectors would have the right to conduct visual inspection of the area of 
a suspected nuclear explosion from the air, on the ground, as well as on and in the 
water. Also, they would be entitled to make aerial overflights of the area and conduct 
more focused monitoring, such as seismological and radiation measurements. If needed, 
the representatives of the Islamic Republic continued, the Executive Council could, 
after having reviewed the report prepared by CTBTO inspectors, decide on a 
consecutive phase of an OSI by a two-thirds majority of all members present and 
voting. During the second inspection phase, the Iranians envisaged, the inspectors 
would be allowed to resort to more thorough and sophisticated inspection activities. 
(CD/1384,1996: 21-23,57) 
The Executive Council 
Given the Executive Council's central role in the verification-related decision-making 
of the planned CTBTO, it was not surprising that the council's composition became a 
hotly debated subject during the negotiations. The Islamic Republic called for the 
establishment of a 65-member Executive Council elected by the Conference of the 
States Parties and composed of representatives from five regional groupings-119 Iranian 
delegates emphasized that each state party should have the right to serve, in accordance 
with the principle of rotation, in the council and condemned the efforts by NWS and 
119 The regional groups listed by Iran were as follows: Africa (with 15 seats in the Executive Council), 
Asia (16 seats), Eastern Europe (8 seats), Latin America and the Caribbean (11 seats), and Western 
Europe and others (15 seats) (CD/ 13 84,1996: 9). 
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some other countries to secure permanent seats in it. Still, the Iranians did not rule out 
the possibility that an individual state within a regional group could be continuously 
prevented from serving on the Executive Council. Ultimately, the Iranians noted, it was 
the regional groups' prerogative to determine which countries were designated to the 
council. (CD/1384,1996: 9; CD/PV. 726,1996: 8 and Johnson 1997) 
This Iranian stance was tightly linked with the Islamic Republic's strong rejection of 
the prevailing view at the negotiations of how the regional groups themselves ought to 
be delineated. At the heart of the matter was a dispute over Israel's affiliation. Whereas 
most delegations supported the formula in which Israel would be placed to the regional 
group of Middle Eastern and South Asian countries, the Islamic Republic wanted Israel 
to be considered as part of the Western countries. Explaining their position in the 
matter, the Iranians pointed out that if Israel was to be placed among the Middle Eastern 
and South Asian countries, that group's work would be coloured by constant "political 
problems" and the process of forming an Executive Council would become extremely 
difficult. In the end, and to the Islamic Republic's disappointment, the majority view 
prevailed. 120 (CD/PV. 745,1996: 14 and A/50/PV. 124,1996: 11) 
The preamble 
Another question which the representatives of the Islamic Republic put major 
emphasis on during the CTBT negotiations was the content of the treaty's preamble. As 
the preamble would set the political context for the whole document, the Iranians 
wanted to influence how the CTBT's meaning and spirit would be understood. 
Throughout the test-ban talks, Iranian delegates had underscored the treaty's importance 
as an instrument against horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
However, as it became clear that the final text would not comprehensively prevent the 
nuclear powers from modernizing their nuclear arsenals, Iran hoped that the nuclear 
powers would at least commit themselves to the notion of nuclear disarmament within a 
specific time-frame. 121 
120 Article Il of the CTBT stipulates that the Executive Council shall consist of 51 members. Of these 
states, ten will be from Africa, seven from Eastern Europe, nine from Latin America and the Caribbean, 
seven from the Middle East and South Asia, ten from North America and Western Europe, and finally, 
eight from South-East Asia, the Pacific and the Far East. 
121 As emphasized by the Islamic Republic: "[... ] lukewarm claims of commitment to nuclear 
disarmament can no longer be accepted. The CTBT, with all its shortcomings, should accelerate the 
process of nuclear disarmament through negotiations on a consecutive series of subsequent treaties. " If 
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Accordingly, while expressing their dissatisfaction with the dominant definition of 
the CTBT's scope of obligations, which left the door open for nuclear test simulations, 
the officials of the Islamic Republic signalled their country's readiness to go along with 
the prevailing scope formulation if, in return, the nuclear powers would accept the 
inclusion of the objective of "total elimination of all nuclear weapons at the earliest 
possible date within a time-bound framework" into the treaty's preamble. Iran put forth 
text proposals at the CD to support its demand for a diplomatic trade-off122 and allied 
with other non-aligned countries in the matter. On 27 June 1996, for example, Iran and 
12 other NAM countries'23 presented a joint working paper in which they proposed text 
passages for the CTBT's preambular paragraphs. The NAM initiative emphasized the 
role of the treaty in curbing vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, in addition to 
which the NAM delegations' text proposals made mention of complementary talks on a 
"comprehensive phased programme with agreed time-frames for the complete 
elimination of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery at the earliest possible 
time, " as well as affirmed the states parties' commitment to such negotiations. 
(CD/PV. 740,1996: 25-26; CD/PV. 726,1996: 6 and CD/NTB/WP. 336,1996: 1) 
Yet, once again, the Iranians experienced a diplomatic defeat. Due to strict U. S., 
British, and French opposition to treaty language alluding to the curbing of nuclear 
weapon development as an objective or purpose of the CTBT, the preamble of the final 
treaty text only noted that the CTBT would constrain the development and qualitative 
improvement of nuclear weapons and that an end to all nuclear explosions constituted a 
meaningful step in the realization of a systematic process to achieve nuclear 
disarmament. The Islamic Republic strongly criticized the three nuclear powers' 
negotiation stance' 24 and stated that the final draft's references to nuclear disarmament 
were inadequate. As a result, the Iranians summarized, the treaty text did "not meet the 
requirements of its mandate. " (Johnson 1997; A/51/PV. 4,1996: 27 and A/50/PV. 125, 
1996: 9) 
the CTBT would not be placed in "its appropriate nuclear disarmament context, " the Iranians stressed, it 
would lose its meaning. (A/50/PV. 124,1996: 12; A/50/PV. 125,1996: 9 and CD/PV. 740,1996: 25) 
NZZ See the Islamic Republic's model CTBT of February 1996 (CD/1384,1996: 2-3) and CD/PV. 745 
(1996: 12-13). 
123 The countries in question were as follows: Brazil, Cuba, Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico, Myanmar, 
Mongolia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, and Venezuela. 
124 Iranian officials lamented that any notion of introducing time-frames, even flexible ones, for measures 
leading to nuclear disarmament had been rejected and even ridiculed by the three NWS (A/50/PV. 124, 
1996: 10). 
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The adoption of the CTBT 
Iran's subsequent announcement that it could not accept the final draft of the CTBT 
stemmed not only from the Islamic Republic's discontent with the treaty's preamble, 
but had ultimately also to do with two other questions: the composition of the CTBTO's 
Executive Council and the role of NTM data in verification. As the final text neither 
corresponded to Iran's desire to have Israel removed from the regional group of Middle 
Eastern and South Asian countries125 nor ruled out the possibility that OSI would be 
launched based on information derived from NTM, 126 the Islamic Republic adopted an 
obstructionist diplomatic course. Together with India - whose negotiators had blocked 
the adoption of the final text of the CTBT by consensus as well as prevented the text 
from being attached to the final report of the CD's test-ban committee -, the Islamic 
Republic refused to allow the CD to transmit the test-ban committee's final report to the 
UN General Assembly. (CD/PV. 745,1996: 12; A/50/PV. 124,1996: 10-11 and Johnson 
1997) 
Justifying its diplomacy, Iran maintained that the CTBT had failed to meet the 
expectations of the great majority of states. On the one hand, the officials of the Islamic 
Republic argued that the final text had "grossly tilted towards the position of a few 
nuclear-weapon states and their allies. " Once again, the Iranians protested, international 
disarmament negotiations had been guided by the notion that those who possess and 
use, or are prepared to use, nuclear weapons and other WMD enjoy a privileged status 
among nations, whereas the others are only expected to compromise on their vital 
national interests. (A/50/PV. 124,1996: 11; CD/PV. 743,1996: 22 and CD/PV. 745, 
1996: 13) 
On the other hand, the Islamic Republic alluded to the negotiation process itself and 
labelled it as "undemocratic and dogmatic. " According to Iranian officials, the nuclear 
powers had dictated the negotiations' course and, especially at critical stages, drawn the 
limits to which issues were and were not allowed to be discussed. In addition to having 
made the crucial decisions on the CTBT's content behind the scenes and among 
themselves, the Iranians complained, the nuclear powers had strongly pressured other 
participants to succumb to their demands. Given the nature of the 1994-1996 
negotiations, the officials of the Islamic Republic noted, it was highly ironic that great 
125 See Annex I to the CTBT. 
'26 See article IV of the CTBT. 
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doubt existed about whether those same powers would ever actually ratify the treaty. 
(A/51/PV. 4,1996: 27; A/50/PV. 124,1996: 11 and CD/PV. 745,1996: 13) 
In the face of the CD's inability to accept the CTBT or to transmit the treaty text to 
the UN General Assembly, the government of Australia announced, on 22 August 1996, 
that it would put a resolution to the UN for the adoption of the CTBT. This was 
officially done on 9 September, with the support of 127 co-sponsoring nations. The UN 
General Assembly adopted the CTBT the next day, 127 and in the end, Iran was among 
the 158 countries voting for the adoption. 128 The Islamic Republic was also among the 
first governments to sign the test-ban treaty on 24 September 1996. Iran's foreign 
minister explained the Islamic Republic's decision to sign the CTBT after all in the 
following terms: "We, along with many other non-aligned countries, will join the 
signatories of this Treaty solely because of our commitment to be an active participant 
in any effort to combat the inhumane weapons of mass destruction. " 129 (Johnson 1997 
and A/51 /PV. 4,1996: 28) 
5.2.3 The Islamic Republic and peaceful uses of nuclear energy 
5.2.3.1 Iran's nuclear program 
During the period between the end of the Iran-Iraq war in July 1988 and the signing 
of the CTBT in September 1996, Iranian authorities continued to repudiate the 
persistent claims that the Islamic Republic's nuclear power program was serving 
military purposes. Such accusations had gained momentum after the 1980-1988 war as 
the Iranians had reconfirmed their commitment to a national nuclear project, and they 
became increasingly common in the aftermath of the 1990-1991 Gulf conflict. The 
127 The CTBT was adopted by 158 votes to 3. India, Libya, and Bhutan voted against, whereas Tanzania, 
Cuba, Syria, Lebanon, and Mauritania abstained. 
128 Iran made the following statement before the decisive vote at the UN on 10 September: "We are [... ] 
left with one choice, a choice between having a flawed treaty or abandoning the treaty altogether: an 
unwanted choice indeed. In our overall assessment, therefore, and on the basis of our desire for the 
nuclear-test ban, we would go along with the decision here, while reserving our position on the points we 
have stressed throughout the negotiations" (A/50/PV. 124,1996: 11-12). 
129 It should be noted here that Iran's signature of the CTBT was supplemented with enclosed declarations 
in which the Islamic Republic expressly stated its dissatisfaction with the CTBT's preamble, with the 
composition of the treaty organization's Executive Council, as well as with the role of NTM data in 
verification. For the content of the Iranian declarations, see 
<http: //disarmament. un. org: 8080/TreatyStatus. nsf>. 
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newly revealed efforts of Iraq to clandestinely produce nuclear arms 130 had strengthened 
the Western governments' belief that the proliferation of WMD, and especially of 
nuclear armaments, in developing countries had become the central security threat of 
the post-Cold War world. Iran was commonly referred to as one of the potential Third 
World proliferators. 1 31 
As always, the representatives of the Islamic Republic strongly rejected the 
suggestions that their country was interested in nuclear weapons. 132 There were a 
number of reasons, Iranian officials emphasized, that explained their country's aversion 
to those armaments. First of all, religious, moral, and humanitarian considerations ruled 
out the Islamic Republic's acquisition of nuclear weapons. 133 The experience of being 
the latest victim of WMD use, the Iranians maintained, had only strengthened their 
country's understanding of the evil nature of nuclear weapons and other WMD. 134 
Secondly, the officials of the Islamic Republic referred to the military uselessness of 
nuclear armaments. Nuclear weapons would not contribute to Iran's security, the Iranian 
argument went, because the major powers would still be capable of targeting and 
destroying Iranian nuclear sites, and because Iran would always be faced with countries 
with more powerful nuclear arsenals. 135 Finally, the officials of the Islamic Republic 
claimed that Iran simply did not have the financial resources and the technological 
capabilities for a national nuclear weapons program (Shahabi 1994: 280 and Hashim 
1995: 67). 
130 The IAEA - whose Iraq Action Team had been given the task, in April 1991, to investigate Iraq's 
nuclear weapon efforts - discovered in the course of 1991 that Iraq had been trying to secretly produce 
nuclear arms. The actitivities and findings of the Iraq Action Team will be discussed in greater detail 
below in section 5.2.5.1. 
131 Iran was regarded as one of the countries alternatively characterized in the West and particularly in the 
United States as "rogue, " "maverick, " "outlaw" or "backlash" states. Such countries were believed to be 
sufficiently immoral to use WMD or to employ terrorists to do the work on their behalf. It was claimed at 
the time, among others, that the Islamic Republic was showing increased interest in research activities 
related to uranium enrichment and plutonium separation. Moreover, it was claimed that Iran was secretly 
developing gas centrifuges for enriching uranium at several locations in the country. In this context, there 
was also discussion about Iranian efforts to induce Pakistan to help the Islamic Republic in the area of 
uranium enrichment. (Wright 2002: 8 and Albright and Hibbs 1992: 11) 
132 See A/C. 1/44/PV. 13 (1989: 11); A/49/PV. 5 (1994: 39) and the pronouncements cited in Chubin (1994: 
53,101). 
133 See GC/XXXVI/OR. 345 (1992: 23) and the pronouncements cited in Arnett (1998b: 39). 
'i" This point was made, among others, by the head of the AEOI at the IAEA in November 1992 
(GC/XXXVI/OR. 345,1992: 23). 
"s For the argument that nuclear weapons were militarily useless to Iran, see the statements made by 
Ayatollah Khamenei in July 1992 (cited in Chubin 1994: 53), by Akbar Turkan, the Islamic Republic's 
defence minister, in February 1993 (cited in Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran: Issues and 
Stances, 1993: 784), and by deputy foreign minister Muhammad Javad Larijani in October 1995 (cited in 
Arnett 1998b: 42). 
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In addition to explaining why the Islamic Republic was not interested in nuclear 
weapons, Iranian officials kept on explicating the motives behind their country's nuclear 
program. Chronic need for additional electricity generating capacity in a country that 
was undergoing post-war reconstruction was presented as the central explanation. 
Relatedly, the Iranians noted that the objective of reducing Iran's reliance on fossil fuels 
in electricity production and of preserving those fuels for export was another paramount 
consideration. 136 Still another key motive for their program, Iranian officials stressed, 
was to upgrade their country's scientific, technical, and industrial infrastructure by 
taking advantage of the various applications of nuclear technology. 137 Also, Iranian 
authorities alluded to environmental considerations and described nuclear power as an 
ecologically sound and beneficial way of producing energy. ' 38 Lastly, the Iranians 
pointed out that their country had already devoted huge sums of money to its nuclear 
program. It would thus be imprudent to let a national investment of great magnitude go 
to waste. 1 39 
That the Islamic Republic's announcements of the peaceful nature of its nuclear 
program continued to be openly questioned by some Western governments, and 
particularly by the United States and Israel, 140 sparked bitter responses from Iranian 
authorities. The lies that certain Western governments were spreading, the Iranians 
claimed, were part of those governments' long-lived political offensive against the 
Islamic Republic. 141 Iranian officials maintained that the 1990-1991 Gulf conflict and 
136 In the view of the Islamic Republic, it was imperative that countries rich in indigenous fossil fuel 
resources "reduce their total dependency on a single depletable commodity and shift their oil-based 
economy to other industries" (GC/XXXV/OR. 334,1991: 32). In this context, Iranian officials also 
referred to an estimate according to which by the year 2010, all the oil produced in Iran would be 
internally consumed (GC/39/OR. 3,1995: 18-19). 
137 See GC/XXXV/OR. 334 (1991: 32); Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran: Issues and Stances 
(1993: 784) and Chubin (1994: 50-51). Interestingly, in September 1996, Iran declared at the IAEA that 
the AEOI "was now ready to transfer to countries which so desired its scientific and technical skills in the 
fields of agriculture, medicine, isotopes and research and development programmes" (GC/40/OR. 2,1996: 
13). 
138 See GC/XXXVI/OR. 345 (1992: 26); GC/XXXVII/OR. 354 (1993: 29) and GC/40/OR. 2 (1996: 12-13). 
139 See GC/XXXV/OR. 334 (1991: 31); Shahabi (1994: 280) and Roshandel (1996a: 156-157). It should 
be noted that the information provided by Iranian officials about the costs of their country's nuclear 
power program was inconsistent. In September 1989, for example, Iran stated that it had already invested 
more than $3 billion in its nuclear project (GC/XXXIII/OR. 315,1989: 29). In 1990, Iranian officials 
spoke of a sum of "almost $4 billion" (GC/XXXIV/OR. 325,1990: 16) as well as of a national investment 
of "more than $4 billion" (NPT/CONF. IV/SR. 8,1990: 149). In 1994, however, the estimate given by the 
Iranians shrunk to "over $2 billion" (Shahabi 1994: 280). 
140 For American and Israeli statements accusing Iran of efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, see the 
pronouncements cited in Amirahmadi (1998: 2). 
aý As concluded by the head of the AEOI in 1993: "[... ] the West has embarked on a conspiracy against 
our independent country" (Foreign Poli(y- of the Islamic Republic of Iran: Issues and Stances, 1993: 784). 
Also see GC/XXXVII/OR. 354 (1993: 29-30) and GC/40/OR. 2 (1996: 13-14). 
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Saddam Hussein's recently discovered nuclear weapons program were being used as 
pretexts under which Western governments were denigrating the Islamic Republic by 
equating its military policies with those of Iraq. 142 Illicit trafficking of fissile material 
from nuclear sites in the former Soviet Union, the Iranians claimed, was another 
phenomenon that was being exploited to baselessly label the Islamic Republic as a 
nuclear proliferator. 1 43 As far as Israel was concerned, Iran said that the "false 
accusations spread by the Zionist-sponsored media" stemmed, above all, from Israel's 
effort to justify the existence of its nuclear weapons and to retain its technological 
superiority in the nuclear field in the Middle East. 144 
According to the officials of the Islamic Republic, Iran was paying a very heavy price 
for the politically motivated accusations made against it. Due to the false claims, the 
Iranians pointed out, Iran's access to peaceful applications of nuclear energy had been 
drastically curtailed. As a case in point, Iranian authorities referred to the nuclear 
reactor project at Bushehr which continued to officially constitute the core of the 
Islamic Republic's nuclear program. Although the Iran-Iraq war had ended and the 
conditions for resuming construction activities at the site had become favourable, 
Iranian officials lamented, the German government had refused to issue the required 
export licences for the completion of the Bushehr-1 plant. ' 45 Also, Iranian officials 
maintained, the Islamic Republic's nuclear research activities were suffering from 
142 See A/49/PV. 34 (1994: 10) and A/50/PV. 47 (1995: 2). 
143 As noted by the representative of the Islamic Republic at the IAEA in September 1995: "[... ] illicit 
trafficking [from the former Soviet Union] should not be used as a pretext for violating the sovereignty of 
States or depriving them of the right to benefit from the peaceful applications of nuclear energy" 
(GC/39/OR. 3,1995: 21). It was believed at the time that Iranian agents had been trying to obtain enriched 
uranium, among others, from Tajikistan and Kazakhstan (Albright and Hibbs 1992: 11 and Shaffer 2003). 
144 See GC/XXXVI/OR. 345 (1992: 25) and Roshandel (1996b: 58). 
1' Given that Germany was not willing to bend in the Bushehr issue, in August 1996, Iran filed a lawsuit 
with the International Commerce Commission in which it asked for $5.4 billion in compensation for 
Germany's failure to comply with the commission's 1982 ruling. In that ruling, the ICC had obligated the 
German firm Kraftwerk Union to deliver all the Bushehr-related plant materials and components stored 
outside Iran to the Islamic Republic. Yet, the legal action taken by Iran did not change Germany's 
diplomatic approach to the Bushehr matter. As far as Iranian-French nuclear relations were concerned, in 
1991, the authorities of the Islamic Republic - who had cancelled Iran's dealings with Eurodif in 1980 - 
began to pressure the French to supply Iran with enriched uranium. Nevertheless, the Iranian efforts 
proved unsuccessful, for Eurodif maintained that it was no longer under the obligation to make deliveries 
to Iran because the supply contract between the parties had expired in 1990. Even though - as a result of 
the settlement, in 1991, of a legal case that the Iranian government had filed against France - the Islamic 
Republic managed to retain an indirect share in Eurodif, the French government let it be known that it 
would prevent transfers of enriched uranium from France to Iran. (Koch and Wolf 1997: 128; Sahimi 
2003 and Albright and Hibbs 1992: 10) 
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tightened export restrictions in the supplier countries. 146 (GC/X: XXIII/OR. 315,1989: 
29; GC/XXXIV/OR. 325,1990: 16 and GC/XXXVII/OR. 354,1993: 30) 
As a result of what Iranian authorities characterized as nuclear "apartheid" 147 or "new 
colonialism, " 148 the Islamic Republic said it had been forced to look for alternative 
sources of nuclear technology. 149 China and Russia were named as Iran's new principal 
nuclear cooperation partners. Iranian officials declared that with the help of the two 
countries, their country wanted not only to finish the Bushehr project, but also to 
acquire additional nuclear reactors and research facilities. The Iranians also voiced their 
hope that, in future, nuclear energy would account for 10-20 percent of their country's 
energy needs (GC/XXXVI/OR. 345,1992: 26; GC/XXXVII/OR. 354,1993: 30 and 
Chubin 1994: 51-52). 
In 1992, China agreed in principle to supply the Islamic Republic with two nuclear 
power reactors. In addition, the two parties began negotiating possible deals for research 
reactors and nuclear fuel-cycle technology. Yet, once again, the Islamic Republic's 
nuclear plans were compromised by U. S. diplomacy. As part of an agreement, reached 
in 1997, on the activation of bilateral nuclear cooperation between the United States and 
China, the U. S. administration of president Clinton succeeded in persuading the Chinese 
government to forgo major nuclear collaboration with Iran. Resultantly, China 
terminated, among others, its work on a uranium conversion plant that was under 
construction in Isfahan. 150 (Einhorn and Samore 2002: 52 and Strategic Comments 
2003a) 
The Clinton administration managed to influence the scope of Iranian-Russian 
nuclear relations as well. Although the United States failed to convince Russia not to 
sign an agreement to finish the Bushehr-1 reactor with Iran -a $800 million contract to 
146 Moreover, the Iranians asserted that the accusations made against their country were undermining the 
credibility of the NPT, increasing international tensions, and escalating the arms race in the Middle East. 
The U. S. and Israeli pronouncements which envisaged the destruction of Iran's nuclear facilities as a 
means to stop its nuclear program were declared by the representatives of the Islamic Republic as 
particularly irresponsible. Ironically, the Iranians added, it was the military nuclear programs of countries 
like the United States and Israel that had brought peaceful nuclear programs - such as the one in Iran - 
into disrepute. (A/48/PV. 14,1993: 23; GC/40/OR. 2,1996: 11-12 and GC/XXXV/OR. 334,1991: 28) 
11' See GC/40/OR. 2 (1996: 8). 
148 See GC/XXXV/OR. 334 (1991: 29). 
149 For details about the Islamic Republic's post-Iran-Iraq war efforts to acquire nuclear materials and 
technology, see Eisenstadt (1996: 110-112); Koch and Wolf (1997: 127) and Sahimi (2003). As 
demonstrated by these sources, Iran's nuclear procurement activities faced major obstacles because of the 
supplier countries' export control measures. 
Aso Other areas in which the Chinese had assisted the Islamic Republic's nuclear efforts prior to the 1997 
agreement between the United States and China had included uranium mining and laser enrichment 
(Iran's Strategic Weapons Programmes 2005: 33). 
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this effect was concluded between Russia and the Islamic Republic in January 1995151 - 
the Clinton administration did succeed in annulling what turned out to be a secret 
protocol to the 1995 Bushehr deal. In the secret protocol, Russia had committed itself to 
supplying the Islamic Republic with key nuclear fuel-cycle facilities, including light 
water research reactors, fuel fabrication facilities, and an uranium enrichment centrifuge 
plant. Eventually, in the face of strong U. S. diplomatic pressure, Russia agreed - in 
what became known as the December 1995 Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement - to limit its 
nuclear cooperation with the Islamic Republic to the project that involved the 
construction of the Bushehr-1 plant. (Einhorn and Samore 2002: 53) 
As the strong U. S. reaction to the Iranian-Russian agreement on Bushehr suggested, 
the 1995 Bushehr deal merely fuelled international suspicions that the Islamic 
Republic's nuclear program was geared towards building bombs. To alleviate the 
concerns over its nuclear intentions, Iran stated, in 1995, that it would not keep the 
plutonium-laden spent fuel from the Bushehr reactors but return it to Russia for 
processing (The New York Times, 5 May 1995 and Arms Control Today, May/June 
1996). However, no final agreement on the issue was made between Iranian and 
Russian authorities. ' 52 
5.2.3.2 Iran and the implementation of article IV of the NPT 
The Islamic Republic's experiences with its own nuclear program continued to 
heavily influence the Iranian approach to international issues pertaining to peaceful uses 
of nuclear energy. Iranian officials were among the most outspoken critics of nuclear 
supplier countries' transfer policies and claimed that by not sufficiently assisting 
developing countries in the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, NWS were not living 
151 The 1995 Bushehr deal based on a protocol that had been signed between the parties already on 6 
March 1990. In that document, Russia had agreed to finish Bushehr-1 as well as to build two VVER-type 
reactors - each plant with a power production capacity of 440 MW - in Iran. Due to financial and 
technical problems, however, the construction of the VVER-440 reactors never materialized. Still, Iran 
and Russia continued to keep the issue of VVER plants, as well as the potential construction of the 
Bushehr-2 plant, on their joint nuclear agenda. According to Feldman, the head of the AEOI stated after 
the signing of the January 1995 Bushehr agreement that the Islamic Republic planned to build ten nuclear 
reactors for electricity generation. (Koch and Wolf 1997: 127 and Feldman 1997: 48) 
152 Despite its temporary concession to the Clinton administration, Russia continued to object to the 
interpretation that the Bushehr agreement would facilitate the building of an Iranian nuclear weapon. To 
explain their position, Russian authorities maintained that Iran was not in violation of its NPT 
commitments and that the safeguards of the IAEA would ensure that the light water nuclear power 
technology Russia was planning to transfer to Iran would not pose a significant proliferation risk. 
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up to the provisions of article IV of the NPT. Political discrimination, the Iranians 
asserted, 153 was the main reason for the poor state of Third World countries' nuclear 
sectors. States that did not have good political relations with the key supplier countries, 
the representatives of the Islamic Republic maintained, were being subjected to export 
controls, no matter how scrupulously they were observing the provisions of the NPT 
and their other international obligations. 154 (NPT/CONF. IV/SR. 8,1990: 149; The 
Islamic Republic of Iran and Disarmament 1994: 23 and A/CN. 10/PV. 186,1994: 23) 
Another indication of political discrimination, the Iranians noted, was the fact that 
countries that had not joined the NPT and committed themselves to IAEA full-scope 
safeguards continued to have an access to nuclear materials and technology. The case of 
Israel was mentioned by the Islamic Republic as the prime example. Although Israel 
pursued an active nuclear weapons program, Iranian officials argued, the United States, 
in particular, was providing the Israelis with nuclear supplies. Iran strongly condemned 
what it portrayed as the practice of political double standard and insisted that all states 
committed to relevant international laws and regulations should be entitled to take full 
advantage of peaceful applications of nuclear energy. (GC/XXXIII/OR. 315,1989: 27; 
A/51/PV. 4,1996: 28 and GC/XXXVII/OR. 354,1993: 30) 
Viewing the nuclear supplier countries' export control arrangements as a symbol of 
political discrimination in international relations, Iran kept on demanding that all 
nuclear-related export controls not part of the NPT regime, including those of the NSG 
or the so-called Zangger Committee, '55 should be dissolved as soon as possible. The 
control measures applied by such "closed-door clubs, " Iranian officials argued, violated 
the provisions of article IV of the NPT as well as the "sovereign rights of states. " 
(A/49/PV. 90,1994: 6; The Islamic Republic of Iran and Disarmament 1994: 3-4,23 
and NPT/CONF. IV/MC. II/SR. 3,1990: 306) 
Russia's assurances notwithstanding, the issue of Iranian-Russian nuclear cooperation continued to 
overshadow the relations between Russia and the United States. (Einhorn and Samore 2002: 53,56-58) 
153 "Discrimination is the rule and not even the exception, " Iranian authorities declared (The Islamic 
Republic of Iran and Disarmament 1994: 23). 
154 That Iraq had managed - despite being a member of the NPT and under IAEA full-scope safeguards - 
to pursue a secret nuclear weapons program, the Islamic Republic claimed, was being used as an excuse 
to tighten export controls against states that had fallen out of the supplier countries' diplomatic favour 
(A/50/PV. 47,1995: 2). Before the details of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons program had come to 
light in the aftermath of the 1990-1991 Gulf conflict, the Islamic Republic had objected to nuclear export 
controls by arguing that no developing country under IAEA full-scope safeguards had managed to divert 
its peaceful nuclear activities to military purposes (GC/XXXIV/OR. 325,1990: 16). 
iss For the history and the activities of the Zangger Committee, which establishes guidelines for nuclear 
transfers to non-nuclear-weapons states that are not parties to the NPT, see 
<http: //www. zanggercommittee. org>. 
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Despite their criticism, however, Iranian authorities expressed their readiness to 
discuss the issue of export controls if such deliberations were necessary to alleviate 
nuclear suppliers' proliferation concerns. The Iranians said that they understood the 
basic reasoning behind the nuclear suppliers' export controls but could not accept the 
"informal and secretive" nature of those arrangements. Accordingly, the Islamic 
Republic called for the establishment of a diplomatic forum composed of all NPT states 
parties that would decide on 
(NPT/CONF. 1995/MC. III/WP. 5, 
the application of nuclear 
1995: 397; CD/PV. 659, 
export controls. 
1993: 8 and 
GC/XXXVIII/OR. 3,1994: 7) 
At the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, the Islamic Republic asked the 
delegations to create an ad hoc committee within the NPT framework that would be 
responsible for formulating export control guidelines which would replace those of the 
existing extra-NPT mechanisms. Such a body, the Iranians elaborated, should also be 
charged with the task of ensuring that the non-nuclear parties to the NPT would have a 
full access, without discrimination, to nuclear materials and technology. Conversely, the 
officials of the Islamic Republic added, the members of the ad hoc committee should 
refrain from nuclear relations with countries that had not joined the NPT and accepted 
IAEA full-scope safeguards. Finally, the Iranians stated that the proposed committee 
could contemplate measures to strengthen the NPT's verification system as well as to 
discuss any other issue related to the implementation of the treaty's article IV. 156 
(NPT/CONF. 1995/32,1995: 313,377; NPT/CONF. 1995/MC. II/WP. 18,1995: 371,373 
and NPT/CONF. 1995/MC. III/WP. 5,1995: 398) 
Iranian authorities argued that while nuclear supplier countries should phase out their 
extra-NPT export controls and contribute to the creation of a truly universal export 
control mechanism, those states should also significantly increase their assistance to 
developing countries' peaceful nuclear programs. 157 For one thing, the Islamic Republic 
pointed out, nuclear suppliers should remove the barries that protected proprietary rights 
156 Prior to the 1995 NPT conference, the Islamic Republic had stated on many occasions that it would 
support the limited extension of the NPT only if non-nuclear states parties were granted full access to 
nuclear materials and technology for peaceful purposes (A/C. 1/48/SR. 13,1993: 9; A/49/PV. 5,1994: 39 
and Nasseri 1995b: 242). More generally, Iranian officials had argued that the disputes between NPT 
states parties over nuclear transfers and cooperation were encroaching the treaty's credibility. The Islamic 
Republic had even gone so far as to warn that "if the objectives of the developing countries in joining 
international treaties on nuclear weapons and technology were not met, such countries could not be 
expected to comply with the provisions of such treaties" (GC/XXXVIII/OR. 3,1994: 7). 
157 Once again, the Islamic Republic demanded explicit cooperation guarantees and called for the 
conclusion of an "international and legally binding instrument" that would regulate nuclear cooperation 
between developed and developing countries (NPT/CONF. IV/SR. 8,1990: 150). 
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and monopolies on certain nuclear technologies. 158 For another, developed states should 
help developing countries to finance peaceful nuclear plans and to procure the materials, 
equipment, and technologies needed for such programs. l59 Iran stressed that peaceful 
nuclear cooperation between states would play a crucial role in preventing the widening 
of the welfare gap between the North and the South as well as in ensuring peace and 
stability in the new, post-Cold War world order. 160 Science and technology, the 
representatives of the Islamic Republic emphasized, should not be treated as the 
property of certain nations, but be used to benefit the whole mankind. 161 
In the context of their deliberations on the issue of peaceful application of nuclear 
energy, Iranian officials also raised the question of armed attacks against nuclear 
facilities that are devoted to peaceful purposes. With Iraq's war-time targeting of 
Bushehr in mind, and fully cognizant of the U. S. and Israeli threats to bomb Iranian 
nuclear installations, 162 the Islamic Republic continued to call for the creation of an 
international treaty prohibiting such attacks. Without an international agreement for the 
purpose, Iranian officials maintained, states' peaceful nuclear programs would be under 
constant threat, particularly in conflict-ridden regions such as the Middle East. While 
warning that armed attacks on nuclear facilities could lead to political crises with 
catastrophic consequences, the Islamic Republic argued that an international treaty 
prohibiting attacks against nuclear installations could reduce the danger of radioactive 
fallout resulting from military strikes at nuclear sites. (GC/XXXIII/COM. 5/OR. 64, 
1989: 9; NPT/CONF. IV/MC. III/WP. 6,1990: 250 and NPT/CONF. 1995/MC. III/WP. 5, 
1995: 399) 
158 See GC/XXXIV/OR. 325 (1990: 14). 
159 See NPT/CONF. 1995/MC. III/WP. 5 (1995: 399); GC/XXXIII/OR. 315 (1989: 28-29) and CD/PV. 625 
(1992: 4). 
160 See GC/XXXIII/OR. 315 (1989: 26-27); GC/XXXVI/OR. 325 (1990: 16-17) and GC/XXXV/OR. 334 
(1991: 31). 
161 See GC/XXXIII/OR. 315 (1989: 25). Also note the following remark in a working paper jointly tabled 
by Iran and other NAM countries at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference: "[... ] all parties to 
the Treaty have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, services 
and scientific and technological information and to contribute, alone or in cooperation with other States, 
to the further development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes" (NPT/CONF. 1995/MC. IIUWP. 5, 
1995: 397). It is important to note that, as before, the Islamic Republic insisted that countries that were in 
violation of their disarmament obligations or had not joined the NPT should not be provided with nuclear 
assistance (GC/XXXV/OR. 334,1991: 32 and NPT/CONF. 1995/MC. II/WP. 18,1995: 371). 
162 Following the 1990-1991 Gulf conflict, the military scenario of targeting Iran's nuclear facilities and 
particularly the Bushehr site was increasingly discussed both in the United States and Israel. In January 
1994, for example, officials of the U. S. Department of Defense pointed out to NATO countries that the 
destruction of potential proliferators' nuclear sites was a pillar of the United States' counter-proliferation 
policy (Feldman 1997: 182). 
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As far as the content of the Iranian-promoted international treaty was concerned, the 
Islamic Republic insisted that the instrument should ban armed attacks both against 
nuclear facilities in operation and installations under construction. ' 63 In addition, the 
Iranians noted that the treaty should include a mechanism for punishing the aggressors, 
for mere condemnations of attacks on nuclear sites would not serve as a deterrent 
against such acts. Iranian officials pointed out that since an armed attack against a 
peaceful nuclear installation would constitute a violation of international law, the 
principles of the UN Charter, as well as the Statute of the IAEA, such an aggression 
should be immediately examined by the UN Security Council. And while the Security 
Council would decide on the punitive steps taken in the case of an attack against a 
nuclear facility, ' 64 the Iranians continued, the IAEA and the member states of the 
agency should provide the victim with radiation protection assistance and other 
necessary help. (GC/XXXII/OR. 305,1988: 21-22; NPT/CONF. IV/MC. III/WP. 6,1990: 
250 and GC/XXXIV/COM. 5/90,1990: 2) 
Finally, the Islamic Republic called on governments not to ignore the issue of armed 
attacks against nuclear facilities, for indifference in the matter would only make future 
attacks more likely. Using Iraq's war-time attacks on Bushehr as an example, Iranian 
authorities noted that their country's nuclear power program had suffered major 
setbacks as a result of the Iraqi raids carried out under "unjustifiable pretexts. " 
(GC/XXXIII/OR. 315,1989: 30 and A/C. 1/44/PV. 35,1989: 38) 
5.2.4 The Islamic Republic and the IAEA 
5.2.4.1 Iran's views on the agency's tasks 
While seeking to secure their access to nuclear materials and technology and to 
convince the international community of the peaceful nature of their country's nuclear 
activities, the authorities of the Islamic Republic constantly called on the IAEA to help 
163 As declared by the Islamic Republic at the IAEA soon after the cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war had 
taken effect: "The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran believes that military attacks against all 
nuclear facilities and installations intended for peaceful applications at any stage of construction, at any 
time during the suspension of construction activities or at any stage or utilization and/or operation should 
be prohibited" (GC/XXXII/COM. 5/OR. 60,1988: 6). 
16' According to the draft resolution submitted by Iran at the IAEA in September 1990, the depositories of 
the NPT, in their capacity as permanent members of the Security Council, had a special responsibility "to 
give full consideration to all appropriate measures to be undertaken by the Security Council in order to 
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Iran and other developing countries in their nuclear efforts. Iranian officials demanded 
that the IAEA should support developing countries' peaceful nuclear programs by 
increasing its technical assistance to them and by helping Third World states to finance 
national nuclear projects, for example, through a special fund established for the 
purpose. In addition, the Iranians maintained that the IAEA was responsible for 
encouraging and coordinating international cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy as well as for making sure that nuclear suppliers do not baselessly prevent 
developing countries from procuring nuclear materials and technology for peaceful 
purposes. (NPT/CONF. 1995/32,1995: 313,376-377; GC/39/OR. 3,1995: 23 and 
GC/XXXV/OR. 334,1991: 28) 
Generally, the Islamic Republic claimed, the IAEA's promotional and regulatory 
activities were not in balance. In the Iranian view, the agency had increasingly become a 
verification body which was neglecting the task of supporting the member states' 
nuclear projects. While the agency's verification activities enjoyed secure funding, 
Iranian officials noted, its promotional efforts continued to rely on the member states' 
voluntary donations. 1 65 Iran called on the IAEA to restore the balance in its activities 
and said that if the agency failed to do so, its credibility, together with that of the NPT, 
would be seriously compromised. (NPT/CONF. IV/MC. III/SR. 2,1990: 380; 
GC/XXXIV/OR. 325,1990: 16-17 and GC/39/OR. 3,1995: 20) 
Iran's efforts to facilitate and promote developing countries' nuclear activities aside, 
the officials of the Islamic Republic stressed that the IAEA should defend Third World 
states against the ungrounded accusations that those countries were interested in nuclear 
weapons. According to the Iranians, the agency should make it clear that it carried the 
sole responsibility for verifying non-nuclear-weapon states' compliance with the NPT 
and that its safeguards system provided sufficient assurances that NNWS were 
deal with the situation, including measures under Article VII of the United Nations Charter" 
(GC/XXXIV/COM. 5/90,1990: 2). 
165 The Islamic Republic was of the view that the costs of the IAEA's verification activities were too high. 
Although the Iranians welcomed the so-called voluntary offer agreements between NWS and the IAEA, 
they regarded the verification of the nuclear powers' civilian nuclear materials and facilities as an 
excessive burden to the agency's already meager budget (GC/XXXVII/OR. 354,1993: 27 and 
NPT/CONF. 1995/MC. III/WP. 5,1995: 399). Similarly, the Islamic Republic was not happy that the 
IAEA's safeguards expenses were rising due to increased utilization of nuclear energy in the developed 
world. Iranian officials found it "unacceptable to expect a Member State whose nuclear facilities had not 
changed since the establishment of the Agency, or which still had no such facilities, to cover the costs of 
safeguards implementation in other Member States which had increased their nuclear capacity and the 
number of their facilities at an enormous rate" (GC/XXXIV/OR. 325,1990: 17). Looking at the IAEA's 
responsibilities and activities, the Iranians were of the opinion that "the Agency's assistance should be 
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complying with their treaty obligations. Before the IAEA's discovery of Iraq's 
clandestine nuclear weapon program in 1991, the Islamic Republic had also asked the 
agency to point out that "no developing country had yet succeeded in diverting nuclear 
material from a power plant for military purposes. " 166 (GC/XXXII/OR. 305,1988: 20- 
21; NPT/CONF. 1995/32,1995: 377 and GC/XXXIV/OR. 325,1990: 16) 
As far as the IAEA's verification activities in Iran were concerned, continuous 
suspicions about the Islamic Republic's nuclear intentions prompted Iranian authorities 
to declare, in 1991, that they were prepared to allow the IAEA to have more inspection 
freedoms than warranted by the safeguards agreement between the two parties. Whereas 
in 1989 the Islamic Republic had affirmed that there would be no restrictions on IAEA 
inspectors travelling to Iran to conduct routine inspections of the country's declared 
nuclear materials and facilities, now the Iranians informed that that they would let the 
IAEA to visit any location in the country to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear 
activities. (GC/XXXIII/OR. 315,1989: 30 and Zak 2002: 19) 
Pursuant to the Islamic Republic's declaration, in February 1992 the IAEA visited six 
nuclear facilities in Iran of which three had never been inspected by the agency. 
Discussing the results of its trip, the inspection team of the IAEA said that it had been 
allowed to visit the locations agreed on167 without restrictions and that Iran's activities 
had been found to be consistent with the peaceful application of nuclear energy. In 
November 1993, the IAEA conducted a follow-up inspection in Iran by visiting relevant 
facilities in Isfahan, Karaj, and Tehran. What made the November 1993 visit special 
was that prior to the inspection, the IAEA had been provided with specific Iran-related 
intelligence by the U. S. government. The data provided by the Americans had included 
information originally gathered by the Iranian opposition group MKO suggesting that 
given primarily to developing countries and the burden of safeguards activities should logically be borne 
industrialized nations" (GC/XXXII/OR. 305,1988: 20). 2 
When discussing the IAEA's safeguards system, the officials of the Islamic Republic regretted that the 
IAEA safeguards did not apply to the military nuclear facilities and materials of NWS which, in the 
Iranian view, constituted the real source of the nuclear proliferation threat. In the same manner, Iranian 
officials continued to find it difficult to understand why Israel and other non-parties to the NPT, "with 
well-known and entirely non-peaceful nuclear programs, " were allowed to be members of the IAEA and 
even benefit from the agency's technical assistance. Those countries' reluctance to place their nuclear 
facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards, the Islamic Republic argued, seriously jeopardized the 
agency's credibility. (GC/XXXII/OR. 305,1988: 22; GC/XXXVI/OR. 345,1992: 24 and 
NPT/CONF. IV/MC. II/SR. 3,1990: 305-306) 
167 The details and the procedures of the IAEA's 1992 visit to Iran had been agreed on beforehand by the 
two parties and did not include all the agency's standard inspection measures. As the inspectors 
themselves subsequently underscored, the conclusions drawn by them were limited to the facilities and 
sites inspected by the IAEA team and were of relevance only to the time of the team's visit. (Zak 2002: 
20) 
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the Islamic Republic was working on a nuclear weapons program. In the end, however, 
the IAEA concluded, once again, that it had found no evidence of such illegal activities 
and that the Islamic Republic was in good standing with the NPT. (Zak 2002: 19-21) 
Not surprisingly, Iranian authorities quickly started to allude to the IAEA's 1992 and 
1993 visits as a clear indication of the fact that the accusations that Iran had nuclear 
weapons ambitions were baseless and politically motivated. 168 Not only had the IAEA's 
routine inspections always given a clean bill to their country, the Iranians asserted, but 
now also the agency's special visits to Iran had testified to the Islamic Republic's 
unwavering commitment to the NPT. 169 Iran's authorities let it be known that their 
invitation to the IAEA to conduct `anytime, anywhere' inspections in their country 
remained open170 and argued that this gesture of diplomatic good will on the part of the 
Islamic Republic should, in itself, put an end to the debate on Iran's nuclear intentions. 
5.2.4.2 Iran and the strengthened safeguards system 
Although Iranian statements on the IAEA put emphasis on the agency's role as a 
promoter of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, it was the regulatory aspect of the IAEA's 
mandate that came to dominate the relations between the IAEA and the Islamic 
Republic. This was not merely due to the routine inspections and the two special visits 
carried out by the agency in Iran, but it also had to do with the fact that by the early 
1990s, a broad international consensus had emerged on the need to strengthen the 
IAEA's safeguards system. 
There were three main factors that had brought about such a consensus. First, the 
1991 discovery that Iraq -a state party to the NPT that had only recently been declared 
by the IAEA to be in full compliance with its treaty obligations - had managed to 
develop an extensive nuclear weapons program had revealed the safeguards system's 
168 Furthermore, the results of the IAEA's special visits provided the Islamic Republic with the 
opportunity to make the general claim that the dangers of horizontal nuclear proliferation were 
"disproportionately exaggerated" (GC/XXXII/OR. 305,1988: 22). 
169 As one official of the Islamic Republic put it in 1995: "One country, my own, has accepted verification 
of the most intrusive nature, something similar to challenge inspection in the CWC on an informal basis. 
The [IAEA] team was allowed to look anywhere information has been received that there may be a 
possibility of some sort of violation. They went and they came back and said they had the opportunity to 
go wherever they wished. They had the information from all the countries that had some views about this 
available to them and they found nothing" (Nasseri 1995b: 263). For other corresponding Iranian 
statements, see GC/XXXVI/OR. 345 (1992: 25); Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran: Issues 
and Stances (1993: 784) and Kharrazi (1994: 126-127). 
170 The head of the AEOI stated in September 1992 that Iran's invitation remained in force because the 
Islamic Republic simply had nothing to hide (GC/XXXVI/OR. 345,1992: 25). 
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weaknesses. Secondly, North Korea's refusal in 1993 to allow a special IAEA 
inspection to take place in the country had reinforced the belief that the North Koreans 
possessed an advanced clandestine nuclear weapons program and demonstrated the 
limits of the IAEA's verification powers. "' Thirdly, suspicions that certain other 
developing countries, among them Iran, were using peaceful nuclear programs as 
shields for efforts to obtain a nuclear weapons capability had prompted governments to 
improve the agency's safeguards system. (Zak 2002: 4-6 and Rockwood 2002: 124- 
125) 
The central deficiency in the full-scope safeguards agreements between the IAEA and 
the non-nuclear parties to the NPT - which are based on the IAEA model document 
INFCIRC/153 (Corr. ) - had been that, under those agreements, the agency's right to 
carry out inspections had effectively been limited to nuclear facilities and other relevant 
locations declared to the agency by the states themselves. In other words, the IAEA 
inspections' purpose had always been to ensure the non-diversion of declared nuclear 
material to the development of nuclear weapons, whereas the establishment of the 
absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities had remained beyond the 
inspections' scope. ' 72 
To correct this fundamental shortcoming and to generally improve the regulatory 
powers of the IAEA, the member states authorized the agency to expand its verification 
mandate and capabilities. In 1992, as a first step, the IAEA's board of governors made a 
call for a universal reporting system under which the member states would voluntarily 
notify the agency of transfers of nuclear equipment and certain non-nuclear materials. 
The board also affirmed the IAEA's right to resort to special inspections and approved 
the use of all available information sources by the agency personnel during their 
1'1 Following North Korea's inspection refusal, the IAEA had prepared a report to the UN Security 
Council on North Korea's non-compliance with its safeguards agreement and on the existence of 
information suggesting that North Korea had failed to declare to the agency all the nuclear materials 
required to be safeguarded under its agreement with the IAEA. In response, North Korea declared that it 
would withdraw from the NPT. As already mentioned above, North Korea cancelled its withdrawal 
decision in June 1993. Moreover, the North Koreans agreed to freeze their nuclear program for the 
duration of future negotiations with the United States. (Rockwood 2002: 125 and Mansourov 1995: 27) 
172 It should be pointed out that the IAEA model document INFCIRC/153 (Corr. ) includes provisions on 
"special inspections" providing IAEA inspectors with an access to undeclared sites or to locations 
suspected of containing undeclared nuclear material. In practice, however, the IAEA member states' 
reserved attitude towards such inspections had made them effectively irrelevant. On the one hand, the 
member states had viewed the provisions on special inspections as not giving the IAEA unlimited right to 
seek out undeclared nuclear material or activities. On the other hand, some countries had expressed major 
political reservations about the concept of special inspections itself. Thus, by the early 1990s, the IAEA 
had never attempted to exercise the right of special inspections. (Rockwood 2002: 124 and Spector 1993: 
156) 
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inspections. The utilization of intelligence data in the course of the special visits made 
to Iran in 1992 and 1993 exemplified the new practice. ' 73 (Zak 2002: 10-11) 
Efforts to strengthen the IAEA's safeguards system crystallized into what became 
known as the agency's "Program 93+2" - the first number pointing to the year the 
program was launched and the second to the two-year period during which the program 
was supposed to be executed. The program identified two sets of measures that were 
believed to improve the IAEA's ability to detect clandestine nuclear activities. The first 
category of the measures included steps that could be immediately taken within the 
legal framework of the document INFCIRC/I53 (Corr. ), such as broader use of 
unannounced inspections and the employment of advanced technology to remotely 
monitor the movements of nuclear material. The implementation of these so-called Part 
I activities was accepted by the IAEA's board of governors in June 1995. (Rockwood 
2002: 125-126 and Zak 2002: 12) 
The second category of the measures, the so-called Part II measures, was composed 
of steps that fell outside the IAEA's mandate and whose implementation would require 
the adoption of additional legal obligations by the member states. A specific Model 
Additional Protocol - reproduced in the IAEA document INFCIRC/540 (Corr. ) - was 
prepared by the agency for the purpose. 174 By accepting the Additional Protocol, signed 
on a bilateral basis between the IAEA and the member states, NNWS would commit 
themselves to providing the agency with much more detailed information about their 
nuclear activities. Also, under the Additional Protocol, the number and the types of 
facilities subjected to IAEA inspections would substantially increase. Moreover, the 
parties to the protocol would be required to contribute to effective implementation of 
safeguards by streamlining inspection-related national administrative procedures. 
Finally, the Additional Protocol would give the IAEA the authority to collect 
environmental samples - which are capable of detecting minute traces of enriched 
uranium and plutonium - during its inspections both at declared and undeclared sites. 
175 
13 It is important to note that the IAEA's 1992 and 1993 visits to Iran were not special inspections as 
defined in INFCIRC/153 (Corr. ). As already noted above, the details of the inspections had been 
specifically agreed on beforehand, in addition to which the inspection team had not made use of all the 
IAEA's standard inspection measures. 
174 The secretariat of the IAEA introduced a draft Model Additional Protocol to the board of governors in 
June 1996. A special committee set by the board deliberated on the draft for almost a year. On 15 May 
1997, the board of governors officially approved the document. (Rockwood 2002: 126) 
175 This paragraph draws upon Arms Control Association Fact Sheet (2004); Rockwood (2002: 130-134) 
and Zak (2002: 14-16 and 26-27). 
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The Iranians - who were widely viewed as potentially seeking nuclear weapons and 
whose attitude towards the strengthening of the IAEA's safeguards system was 
therefore of major international interest - declared their support for the efforts to 
improve the agency's verification capabilities. 176 Given that transparency had always 
been a key element of the Islamic Republic's nuclear diplomacy, Iranian officials 
asserted, it was only logical that their country would support the reform of the IAEA's 
verification system and the strengthening of the NPT's effectiveness. 177 The fact that the 
IAEA had failed to detect Iraq's violations of the NPT had a major influence on Iran's 
approach to the issue of strengthened safeguards. In 1992, for example, Iranian 
authorities expressed their hope that the measures adopted by the agency to improve its 
regulatory capabilities would prevent further violations of IAEA safeguards in the 
Middle East. 178 (GC/39/OR. 3,1995: 21 and GC/XXXVI/OR. 352,1992: 18) 
Despite their general support to improved IAEA safeguards, however, the officials of 
the Islamic Republic made it clear that they had a number of reservations about the 
strengthening process. First of all, they posed the question that if some countries 
continued to question the relevance of the IAEA's safeguards system, even in its 
improved form, why should governments embark on the arduous strengthening process 
in the first place? In Iran's view, the process would serve its purpose only if states 
recognized that the strengthened safeguards would constitute the sole basis for drawing 
conclusions about NPT member states' compliance with their treaty obligations. 
Powerful countries, the Iranians demanded, should refrain from letting their own 
information sources and interpretations to undermine the credibility and the 
effectiveness of the IAEA's verification system. 179 (CD/PV. 659,1993: 5; 
NPT/CONF. 1995/32,1995: 313 and A/50/PV. 5,1995: 30-31) 
176 See GC/XXX V II/OR. 354 (1993: 27); NPT/CONF. 1995/MC. II/WP. 18 (1995: 371) and A/50/PV. 47 
(1995: 1). 
1" That the Islamic Republic had invited the IAEA to carry out 'anytime, anywhere' visits in Iran was 
referred to by the Iranians as a good example of their nuclear transparency (GC/XXXVII/OR. 354,1993: 
27). 
" Iran called on Middle Eastern states to support the regulatory functions of the IAEA "in a spirit of 
international co-operation, as a step towards the establishment of peace and security in the sensitive 
region of the Middle East" (GC/XXXVI/OR. 352,1992: 19). 
179 One reason for the diplomatic emphasis put by Iran on the role of the IAEA's verification system was 
that even though the Iranians definitely welcomed the post-Gulf conflict disarmament of Iraq, they had 
mixed feelings about the way in which Iraq's disarmament was being carried out. The Islamic Republic 
feared that ad hoc arrangements or "unconventional inspections" - such as those by UNSCOM and the 
IAEA's Iraq Action Team, both of which had been created by the major powers through the UN Security 
Council resolution 687 of April 1991 - would become generally accepted and begin to sideline the 
multilateral IAEA mechanism. (GC/XXXVIII'OR. 3,1994: 6-7) 
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Generally, the Islamic Republic insisted that the strengthened safeguards should be 
implemented in a non-discriminatory manner. ' 80 Iranian officials argued that the 
IAEA's improved verification system should not be used as a tool to exert additional 
pressure on, or to penalize, certain member states because of political reasons. Each 
country, the Iranians stressed, should be treated as an individual case and the violations 
of IAEA safeguards in the recent past should not influence the conclusions drawn about 
other member states' compliance with the NPT. All NPT member states, and not only 
NNWS, the representatives of the Islamic Republic pointed out, should commit 
themselves to the measures specified in Program 93+2. (GC/XXXV/OR. 334,1991: 30; 
GC/XXXVIII/OR. 3,1994: 6 and Zak 2002: 28-29) 
Like many other NNWS, Iran was worried about the effects of strengthened 
safeguards on the "sovereign rights of states. " In other words, it wanted to be sure that 
enhanced monitoring of the nuclear activities of NNWS would not compromise its 
commercial, industrial, technological, and military secrets. Similarly, the officials of the 
Islamic Republic insisted that the strengthening of the IAEA's verification machinery 
should not have a negative impact on NPT states parties' economic and technological 
development or on their legitimate right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. 181 
(Rockwood 2002: 129-130; GC/XXXVI/OR. 345,1992: 23-24 and GC/39/OR. 3,1995: 
20) 
Another stated Iranian worry was that the IAEA was increasingly turning into a 
regulatory body. In order to maintain the balance between the agency's regulatory and 
promotional functions, the officials of the Islamic Republic argued, the steps taken to 
extend the regulatory tasks of the IAEA had to be complemented with measures to 
improve developing countries' access to nuclear transfers. Even if not explicitly linking 
its support for strengthened IAEA safeguards with other issues, Iran did point out that in 
exchange for subjecting their nuclear activities to increased international scrunity, 
NNWS and developing countries, in particular, were entitled to assurances of nuclear 
transfers and international nuclear assistance. Such a diplomatic concession on the part 
of nuclear supplier countries, the Iranians stressed, would make the issue of 
180 The Islamic Republic's representative at the IAEA, for example, emphasized in September 1996 that 
the agency's ability to implement safeguards in an equitable manner was a "prerequisite for their 
widespread acceptance and survival" (GC/40/OR. 2,1996: 12). 
181 At the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, Iran's delegation asked the conference to declare 
that "once the safeguards system is strengthened, no nuclear-weapon State may attempt to impede or deny 
access by non-nuclear weapon States parties to the Treaty to nuclear materials, equipment and technology 
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strengthened safeguards more acceptable to the member states of the IAEA. ' 82 
(GC/XXXV/COM. 5/OR. 79,1991: 16; GC/XXXVII/OR. 354,1993: 29 and 
GC/39/OR. 3,1995: 20) 
Placing the international diplomatic debate on IAEA safeguards into a wider context, 
the Islamic Republic pointed out that from the viewpoint of nuclear disarmament, 
enhanced international monitoring of the nuclear activities of NNWS was ultimately a 
secondary issue (Nasseri 1995b: 242). According to Iranian officials, there were much 
more topical nuclear issues that needed immediate international attention. Vertical 
proliferation of nuclear armaments, the representatives of the Islamic Republic 
maintained, was one of such key issues. Regional nuclearization was another problem 
specifically referred to by the Iranians. 
5.2.5 Iran and regional nuclear disarmament 
5.2.5.1 The Iraq problem 
Iraq's use of chemical weapons against Iran during the 1980-1988 war had a 
significant effect on Iranian decision-makers' calculations about the factors that 
threatened their country's security. Iraq's crossing of the WMD threshold introduced a 
wholly new dimension into Iranian-Iraqi relations and forced Iran's policy-makers to 
seek solutions to the security challenges presented by Iraq's WMD even after the war 
between the two countries had ended. 
The state of Iraqi nuclear activities was one of the questions that continued to trouble 
Iranian authorities in the post-war era. While the Islamic Republic's bombing of Iraq's 
Osirak reactor on 30 September 1980 had already suggested that the Iranians had few, if 
any, doubts about the motives that steered Iraq's nuclear efforts, it is not clear to what 
extent the officials of the Islamic Republic were knowledgeable about the details of 
Iraq's nuclear activities. Whatever the case, prior to the 1990-1991 Gulf conflict Iran 
expressed its concern that "some states" in the Middle East either possessed nuclear 
for peaceful purposes unless non-compliance is verified and established by the IAEA" 
(NPT/CONF. 1995/32,1995: 352). 
182 According to the Islamic Republic, the execution of strengthened IAEA safeguards would enhance 
developing countries' demands that NWS implement the provisions of article IV of the NPT. If 
developing countries were expected to accept increasingly intrusive international inspections, Iranian 
officials stated, then NWS would have to reward those NNWS found to be in compliance with the NPT 
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armaments or were trying to acquire them (A/C. 1/44/PV. 13,1989: 11). 183 That the 
Islamic Republic was reluctant to explicitly name Iraq as a country seeking nuclear 
weapons was presumably related to Iran's desire not to burden its already inflammable 
relations with Iraq and not to provoke wider Arab sentiments. Instead, by putting the 
spotlight on Israel' 84 and simultaneously calling for the establishment of a NWFZ in the 
Middle East, the Islamic Republic pursued a policy which aimed at diplomatically 
killing two birds with one stone. 
As far as the uncertainty over Iraq's nuclear activities was concerned, the end result 
of the 1990-1991 Gulf conflict turned out to be a blessing to the Iranians. As part of the 
permanent cease-fire agreement that ended the brief war between the U. S. -led coalition 
forces and Iraq, the UN Security Council ordered Iraq to eliminate, under international 
supervision, its WMD programs. 185 Under the Security Council resolution 687 of April 
1991, the responsibility for uncovering the details of Iraq's nuclear efforts was given to 
the IAEA. Iran declared its full support for the agency's activities in Iraq. According to 
the officials of the Islamic Republic, their country would always support international 
measures taken against countries "misusing nuclear technology. " At the same time, 
however, the Iranians insisted, once again, that Iraq should be treated as an individual 
case and not "as grounds for a general penalizing of the developing countries. " 
(GC/XXXV/OR. 334,1991: 30 and GC/XXXVI/OR. 345,1992: 23) 
The IAEA Iraq Action Team's first inspection mission in the country began on 15 
May 1991. By the time the government of Saddam Hussein had refused, in December 
1998, to allow further international inspections to take place in Iraq, the IAEA had 
effectively uncovered and dismantled what had turned out to be an ambitious 
clandestine nuclear program. During its missions in Iraq, involving more than 500 site 
inspections, the agency supervised, among others, the destruction of more than 50,000 
square meters of factory floor space of nuclear program facilities and some 2,000 
by correspondingly increasing their nuclear assistance to NPT states parties from the Third World. 
(NPT/CONF. 1995/32,1995: 313,377) 
183 Also see Iran's CD pronouncement of 15 March 1990 in which foreign minister Vilayati stressed that 
the Islamic Republic shared "the concerns about proliferation of nuclear arms in our region" (CD/PV. 543, 
1990: 13). 
184 In September 1989, for example, the Iranian representative addressing the IAEA said that there could 
be no doubt that Israel represented the only nuclear threat in the Middle East. According to him, "no other 
State in the Middle East region could even remotely match Israel's nuclear capabilities. " 
(GC/XXXIII/OR. 321,1989: 6) 
185 In the course of the Gulf conflict, the Islamic Republic had expressed its concern over the intentionally 
ambiguous U. S. statements which were interpreted by many, Iranian officials included, to mean that the 
United States would use nuclear weapons in response to an Iraqi employment of WMD (CD/PV. 582, 
1991: 4 and Freedman and Karsh 1993: 289). 
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weapon-related items, in addition to which it arranged for the removal from Iraq of all 
weapons-usable nuclear material as well as accounted for and placed under its control 
all other known nuclear materials. 
186 (Dillon 2002: 41-42) 
The discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear program in 1991187 and the subsequent 
information about the program's magnitude sent shockwaves throughout the Middle 
East and raised serious questions about the capabilities of the major powers' 
intelligence services. The widely shared pre-Gulf conflict belief that, between Israel's 
June 1981 air raid against Osirak and the latter stages of the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam 
Hussein had done little to pursue his nuclear ambitions was proved fundamentally 
wrong by the IAEA's inspectors. As it turned out, Iraq had restarted its nuclear efforts 
in 1982. In parallel with the actual weapons program's initiation, the Iraqis had also 
begun to study techniques and methods on how to conceal and protect their WMD 
programs. Iraq's concealment efforts had reportedly been assisted by Soviet intelligence 
officials. '88 (Feldman 1997: 138; Spector 1993: 138-139 and Al-Marashi 2003) 
The advanced nature of Iraq's nuclear program, subsequently neutralized by the 
IAEA, assumably came as an unpleasant surprise to the Iranians as well. 189 There was a 
strong belief among Iranian officials that had the Iraqis managed to get hold of a nuclear 
weapon during the Iran-Iraq war, they would have probably used it against the Islamic 
Republic. 190 As a result of the UN-mandated disarmament of Iraq, however, the threat 
186 Most of the IAEA's activities pertaining to the destruction, removal, and rendering harmless of the 
components of Iraq's nuclear weapons program were completed by November 1992 (IAEA and Iraqi 
Nuclear Weapons 1998). It should be noted that some of Iraq's nuclear facilities had already been 
destroyed by the U. S. -led coalition forces during the January-February 1991 war in the Gulf. Still, most 
Iraqi nuclear facilities had not been detected at the time of the hostilities and were later found unharmed 
by IAEA inspectors. (Cordesman and Wagner 1996: 324-325 and 902-903) 
187 Iraqi officials admitted in October 1991 that work related to the development of nuclear weapons had 
been carried out in the country (IAEA and Iraqi Nuclear Weapons 1998). 
188 In the end, the Iraqis had managed to create a complex concealment apparatus -a network of 
government ministries, intelligence agencies, and military units - assigned to procure, hide, and defend 
the country's WMD. For a discussion of the concealment network and how it was employed by Iraqi 
officials to impede the post-Gulf conflict arms inspections of UNSCOM and the IAEA in the country, see 
Al-Marashi (2003) and IAEA and Iraqi Nuclear Weapons (1998). 
189 The IAEA Iraq Action Team's inspections revealed that, by January 1991, Iraq had procured and 
domestically produced significant amounts of natural uranium compounds as well as built and 
commissioned plants to convert such compounds to supply materials for production-scale enrichment 
processes. Iraq had studied several processes for uranium enrichment - including diffusion, centrifuge 
and electromagnetic enrichment - and made practical preparations for enrichment activities to take place. 
Iraq had also been equipping and commissioning a major facility for the production of nuclear weapons. 
Following the toppling of the regime of Saddam Hussein in April 2003, a former director-general of 
Iraq's nuclear program estimated that, before the start of the war between Iraq and the coalition forces in 
1991, Iraq had been three years away from producing a nuclear bomb. (Dillon 2002: 42 and IHT, 10 
March 2004) 
190 According to Baram (2001: 29), Iraq restarted its nuclear program after the June 1981 Osirak incident 
to create a counterforce to the Israeli nuclear arsenal and, probably primarily, to have a superior military 
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of Iraqi nuclear weapons transformed from a short-term Iranian problem into a more 
distant worry. 19' While the authorities of the Islamic Republic were well aware of the 
fact that Iraq had managed to develop dangerous expertise in the nuclear field and could 
resume its weapons activities at some future time, they felt comfortable enough to 
declare that following the 1990-1991 Gulf conflict, the threat of nuclear weapons and 
other WMD from within the Persian Gulf region had to a large extent been removed. 192 
(Hashim 1995: 63; Chubin 1995: 93-94 and CD/PV. 659,1993: 8) 
Iraq's nuclear activities halted and under the watchful eye of the IAEA, the Islamic 
Republic took advantage of the new circumstances in its security environment by 
directing its nuclear diplomacy more vehemently against Israel and its nuclear 
armaments. There was only one country in the Middle East, Iranian officials repeatedly 
pointed out, that possessed a nuclear weapons capability, and it was Israel that 
constituted the sole nuclear threat in the region. While carefully following international 
arms inspectors' activities in Iraq, Iranian authorities tried to score additional diplomatic 
points by accusing the West and the United States, in particular, of a discriminatory 
non-proliferation policy in the Middle East. Whereas Iraq, a Muslim country, the 
Iranians argued, had been subjected to stringent disarmament measures, Israel had been 
given a free hand to continue its nuclear activities that were driven by military and 
power political considerations. 193 (A/48/PV. 14,1993: 21; A/C. 1/49/PV. 22,1994: 1 and 
Mashhadi 1995: 81) 
tool available in the Iran-Iraq war. Also Chubin (1996: 147) speaks of the Iraqi effort to seek a "war- 
winning weapon against Iran. " 
19' Based on its findings in Iraq, the IAEA concluded that by December 1998, when the international 
inspections in the country came to a halt, Iraq had not managed to produce a nuclear weapon. Neither had 
Iraq produced more than few grams of weapons-usable nuclear material through its indigenous processes, 
in addition to which the Iraqis had not managed to otherwise acquire weapons-usable nuclear material. 
Finally, the IAEA was of the opinion that, following its inspections, Iraq had not been able to retain any 
physical capability for the production of amounts of weapons-usable nuclear material of any practical 
significance. (Dillon 2002: 42) 
192 Without going into details, Iranian officials maintained that although the "misguided policies of certain 
regimes" explained the existing proliferation concerns in the Middle East, industrialized countries had 
also contributed to such worries by "knowingly, or unwittingly, " assisting the development of clandestine 
WMD programs by those very same regimes (GC/XXXVI/OR. 345,1992: 23). 
193 In 1991, in the aftermath of the Gulf conflict, the U. S. administration of president George H. W. Bush 
made a broad arms control initiative which called, among others, for the creation of a ban on the 
production in, and the importation into, the Middle East of weapons-usable nuclear material. Given that 
the U. S. proposal dealt only with future production and transfers of fissile materials and did not address 
the already existing nuclear arsenal of Israel, the Islamic Republic rejected it outright and viewed it as yet 
another indication of outside powers' policy of double standard in the Middle East. As a diplomatic 
response to the so-called Bush initiative, the officials of the Islamic Republic underscored the need for an 
international ban on the transfer of all kinds of nuclear material to Israel. (Chubin 1994: 51 and 
NPT/CON F. 1995/MC. I/WP. 9.1995: 308) 
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5.2.5.2 The objective of a nuclear-weapon-free Middle East 
However, the Islamic Republic's references to Israel's nuclear weapons and to 
Western governments' more or less open acceptance of the Jewish state's nuclear status 
were not merely part of Iran's diplomatic posturing in the post-Gulf conflict era. They 
were also products of the Islamic Republic's general analysis of the security situation in 
the Middle East. According to Iranian officials, the region was highly volatile and 
typified, among others, by destabilizing conflicts and rivalries, expansionist state 
policies, and relentless arms-racing. On top of such characteristics, the Iranians asserted, 
the stability of the Middle East was seriously marred by the Israeli nuclear arsenal. 
(A/CN. I O/PV. 146,1990: 58; A/CN. 10/PV. 201,1996: 13 and G/40/OR. 2,1996: 9) 
In the Islamic Republic's official security thinking, Israel's nuclear weapons played, 
for the most part, a double role. On the one hand, they were defined by Iranian 
authorities as a factor that made the existing conflict constellations in the Middle East 
more dangerous by exponentially raising the potential costs of intra-regional armed 
hostilities. ' 94 Pointing to the destructive capacity of Israel's nuclear arsenal, estimated 
by the Iranians to total some 200 bombs, 195 the officials of the Islamic Republic 
maintained, on the other hand, that Israel's nuclear weapons also formed an independent 
security threat to the region. 
'96 
When speaking of Israel's nuclear weapons as an independent menace, Iranian 
officials stressed that Israel had the capability to destroy any Middle Eastern capital 
with its nuclear bombs. And while directly threatening the security of the regional 
states, the Iranians claimed, Israel's nuclear weapons jeopardized international peace 
and security as well. The authorities of the Islamic Republic were also worried that 
Israel might use its nuclear arsenal as a tool for political blackmailing. Finally, the 
Iranians warned that the existence of nuclear weapons in the Middle East subjected the 
194 For this argument, see Zarif (1995: 120); A/CN. 10/PV. 201 (1996: 13) and GC/40/OR. 2 (1996: 9). In 
the Iranian assessment, the outbreak of major armed hostilities in the Middle East itself would likely be 
caused by Israel's "expansionist" and "militarist" policies (The Islamic Republic of Iran and 
Disarmament 1994: 15-16 and NPT/CONF. 1995/32,1995: 99-100). 
195 This Iranian estimate, reported in Chubin (1994: 51), is from 1993. 
1% Take, for example, the following statement made by the Islamic Republic in December 1993 which is 
indicative of the Iranian way of treating Israel's nuclear weapons as an independent security threat and as 
equal to other fundamental security problems in the Middle East: "In our view, until the root causes of the 
current critical situation in the area [the Middle East] have been effectively dealt with and until the IAEA 
is able to bring all nuclear facilities in the Middle East under its verification system, every State in the 
region will perceive its national security to be at great risk" (A/48/PV. 68,1993: 17-18). 
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region to the spectre of accidental nuclear strikes. 197 (Ali 1996: 14; GC/XXXVIII/OR. 3, 
1994: 7-8 and Roshandel 1996b: 56) 
In the view of the Islamic Republic, Israel's nuclear weapons constituted a major 
obstacle to arms control and disarmament in the Middle East. By forcing the regional 
countries to defend themselves against an existential threat, Iranian officials argued, 
Israel's nuclear arsenal had turned the Middle East into an arena for massive military 
build-ups and, for example, prevented the major Arab countries from adhering to the 
CWC and the BTWC, two key international instruments dealing with WMD. Thus, 
Iranian authorities effectively blamed Israel's nuclear weapons not only for insecurity in 
the Middle East but also for the fact that Iran - which had not linked its policies in the 
area of chemical and biological disarmament to Israel's accession to the NPT - had to 
worry about Arab chemical and biological weapons, too. (NPT/CONF. IV/SR. 8,1990: 
149-150; NPT/CONF. 1995/32,1995: 100 and Mashhadi 1995: 82) 
By accepting Israel's de facto status as a nuclear power and by supporting its nuclear 
activities, Iranian officials added, extra-regional powers had substantially reduced the 
chances of Israel giving up its nuclear armaments and joining the NPT - thereby 
reinforcing the already disastrous regional implications of Israel's possession of nuclear 
weapons. 198 The authorities of the Islamic Republic categorically rejected the assertion 
that Israel, a country surrounded by hostile Arab countries, had a legitimate right to 
possess nuclear armaments in order to ensure its survival. 199 If Israel was allowed to 
refer to its geopolitical location as a justification for its nuclear arsenal, the Iranians 
summed up, then most countries in the world could rightfully use such an argument to 
197 It should be noted that Iran objected to Israel's nuclear activities also by referring to environmental 
considerations. By doing so, the Islamic Republic imitated the diplomatic argumentation of Arab 
governments, and particularly that of Egypt, which, in 1993, started to point to the dangers posed to plant 
and animal life by Israel's nuclear reactor in Dimona. Initially, the Arab countries' allusions to the 
environmental effects of Israel's nuclear program had been sparked by news reports, breaking out in mid- 
1993, about possible contamination of water and land in the vicinity of the Dimona reactor. (Feldman 
1997: 129,215-216). The Islamic Republic maintained that the reports about radioactive leaks at Dimona 
as well as about the hazards linked to the disposal of radioactive waste in the installation's vicinity had 
not received the international attention they deserved (GC/40/OR. 2,1996: 10). For other Iranian Dimona- 
related remarks, see GC/XXXVII/OR. 354 (1993: 27-28); A/49/PV. 34 (1994: 9) and A/50/PV. 47 (1995: 
2). 
198 Iran warned that outside powers' support of Israel acted as an incentive for the regional states to 
alleviate their security concerns through the acquisition of WMD (A/CN. 10/PV. 186,1994: 22; 
GC/XXXVIII/OR. 3,1994: 7-8 and A/C. 1/49/PV. 9,1994: 15). 
199 Israel - which has not officially declared that its possesses nuclear weapons - believes that its nuclear 
armaments serve three main purposes: they act as an equalizer in the arms race with the Arabs, as a 
weapon of last resort in a military confrontation that could put Israel's existence as a state into jeopardy, 
and finally, as a factor that could persuade Arab governments to accept the existence of the Jewish state 
and thereby clear the path for peace agreements between Israel and the Arabs. (Feldman 1997: 95-96 and 
Cohen 1998: 12-14) 
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acquire nuclear weapons. Frustrated with what they alluded to as outside powers' policy 
of "selective proliferation, " Iranian officials said that the application of diplomatic 
double standard in the Middle East had given rise to the belief that a "deliberate and 
conscious policy" of undermining the regional states' security was being pursued by the 
major powers in the region. (GC/39/OR. 3,1995: 21; Mashhadi 1995: 82 and Zarif 
1995: 121) 
The Islamic Republic repeatedly insisted that Israel should join the NPT and subject 
its nuclear facilities to IAEA full-scope safeguards. 200 In order to make Israel's NPT 
membership a reality, Iranian officials demanded, the major powers should end their 
discriminatory policies in the Middle East and pressure Israel to give up its nuclear 
armaments. Referring to the Middle East peace process between Israel, the Palestinians, 
and Arab governments initiated at the 1991 Madrid peace conference, the Islamic 
Republic rejected the process as another manifestation of the injustice imposed on the 
region and called on governments not to refrain from pressuring Israel to accede to the 
NPT for the fear of jeopardizing the on-going peace talks. 201 Similarly, the Iranians took 
a critical attitude towards the arms control and regional security discussions that were 
launched to complement the Middle East peace negotiations. As long as all the regional 
states had not acceded to international instruments banning WMD, Iranian officials 
noted, such discussions were pointless. In addition, the Iranians - who were not invited 
to participate in the ACRS meetings - said that no arms control initiative in the Middle 
East could succeed unless the security concerns of all the regional states were taken into 
account. (CD/PV. 690,1994: 11-12; Zarif 1995: 120-122,129-130 and A/47/PV. 5, 
1992: 51) 
While denouncing the ACRS discussions, however, the representatives of the Islamic 
Republic did comment the content of those talks. 202 Above all, Iranian officials 
criticized the Israeli stance according to which arms control and disarmament measures 
in the Middle East were possible only after a comprehensive peace in the region had 
been achieved. In the Iranian view, the linkage made by Israel was "irrational" because 
200 Iran stated on many occasions that if Israel did not agree to accede to the NPT before the 1995 NPT 
Extension and Review Conference, the treaty's extension could be in danger (A/49/PV. 5,1994: 39; The 
Islamic Republic of Iran and Disarmament 1994: 16 and Zarif 1995: 121). The Islamic Republic also 
continued to criticize the IAEA for its technical cooperation with Israel as well as to label the agency's 
item-specific safeguards arrangements with the Israelis as useless (A/49/PV. 34,1994: 9; A/50/PV. 47, 
1995: 2 and GC/XXXVI/OR. 345,1992: 24). 
201 See GC/XXXVI/OR. 351 (1992: 5). 
202 For the details of the ACRS talks and the role of the nuclear weapons question in them, see Feldman 
(1997: 7-15). 
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it was the Israeli nuclear arsenal and that country's refusal to join the NPT that stood in 
the way of a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East. The `nuclear weapons 
first' position of the Iranians, who also strongly criticized the Israeli policy of preferring 
regional arms control arrangements to multilateral international instruments, 203 was 
similar to the one advanced by Egypt in the course of the ACRS discussions: the 
creation of a nuclear-free Middle East was a prerequisite for a political solution to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. (Feldman 1997: 206,243-244; GC/39/OR. 10,1995: 14 and 
GC/XXXVIII/OR. 10,1994: 9) 
Calls for the establishment of a NWFZ and, more broadly, of a WMDFZ in the 
Middle East were another common theme of Iran's and Egypt's arms control operations. 
Whereas the Iranians had always guarded the idea of the creation of a NWFZ in the 
region - officially presented by the Shah administration in 1974 - as their own, the 
proposal for the creation of a WMDFZ in the Middle East became internationally 
known as the Mubarak initiative, named after the Egyptian president. The Mubarak 
initiative was launched on 8 April 1990 and contained three core points. First, it 
demanded that the possession of all kinds of WMD should be prohibited in the Middle 
East. Secondly, the initiative called on the regional states to make equal and reciprocal 
commitments in the area of WMD disarmament. Thirdly, the initiative called for the 
establishment of verification measures and modalities to ascertain the regional states' 
full compliance with the WMD prohibition. (Feldman 1997: 226,297-298) 
While supporting the transformation of the Middle East into a zone free of nuclear, 
chemical, and biological armaments, the Islamic Republic did not, as pointed out by 
Chubin (1994: 98), refer to the WMDFZ initiative as an Egyptian proposal. Iran's 
reluctance to diplomatically credit Egypt stemmed, among others, from the fact that the 
Islamic Republic had spoken of a WMD-free Middle East already before the official 
introduction of the Mubarak initiative. During the Iran-Iraq war, Iranian officials had 
raised the idea of a CWFZ in the Middle East, 204 and after the war, in 1989, they had 
made their first references to a Middle Eastern WMDFZ. 205 The Islamic Republic's 
unwillingness to identify itself with a proposal depicted by Egyptian authorities as a 
diplomatic concession and as a friendly gesture to Israel was another reason for Iran's 
203 Israeli authorities' suspicious attitude towards international arms control instruments stems mainly 
from the belief that the verification mechanisms of those arrangements are too weak and, hence, leave 
room for cheating (ibid.: 244). 
204 See above section 4.1.1.2 and section 4.1.1.3 (footnote 55). 
205 See above section 4.1.2.1. 
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reluctance to make allusions to a diplomatic initiative identified with the president of 
Egypt. 206 
Be that as it may, the Iranians nonetheless promoted the idea of a WMDFZ in the 
Middle East, lent their support to Egypt's and other Arab countries' efforts in the 
matter, 207 and expressed their readiness to consider any "constructive, comprehensive 
and non-discriminatory" proposal for the establishment of a NWFZ or a WMDFZ in the 
Middle East or any other part of the world. 208 Thus, for example, the Islamic Republic 
restated its support for the NWFZ in the South Pacific209 and in the Latin America and 
the Caribbean, 210 respectively, and called for the creation of a corresponding zone in 
South Asia. 211 Moreover, Iran expressed particular satisfaction with South Africa's 
joining of the NPT in July 1991 and with the revelations made by South Africa in 
March 1993 regarding the details of its nuclear weapons program, which cleared the 
way for the creation of a NWFZ in Africa. 212 The Treaty of Pelindaba establishing the 
African nuclear-weapon-free zone was opened for signature on 11 April 1996. 
206 Egyptian officials stressed that while addressing the issue of nuclear weapons in the Middle East, the 
Mubarak initiative simultaneously recognized Israel's concerns over chemical and biological capabilities 
in the region. As such, then, the Egyptians argued, the initiative aimed at building confidence between the 
Arabs and the Israelis. (Feldman 1997: 226,240). Cohen (2002: 196-197) sees the Mubarak initiative 
essentially as a diplomatic effort to support the Egyptian argument that as long as Israel possesses nuclear 
weapons, it is legitimate for Arab countries not to join international instruments banning chemical and 
biological weapons. 
207 Following the initiation of the Mubarak initiative in April 1991, Iran started to make fewer references 
to the creation of a NWFZ in the Middle East and spoke more broadly of the need for a regional 
WMDFZ. Even if not crediting Egypt for diplomatic initiative, Iran did recognize that Egypt was a key 
advocate of the idea of a WMDFZ in the Middle East. Note, for example, the following Iranian statement 
from 1995: "Iran has continuously supported the nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East and now 
stands with Egypt on the question of the Middle East as a zone free from weapons of mass destruction" 
(Zarif 1995: 129). 
208 See A/47/PV. 5 (1992: 51); A/C. 1/47/PV. 5 (1992: 57) and A/49/PV. 73 (1994: 19). 
209 See NPT/CONF. 1995/MC. II/WP. 18 (1995: 372). 
210 See A/C. 1/48/SR. 13 (1993: 9) and NPT/CONF. 1995/MC. II/WP. 18 (1995: 372). 
"' See A/C. 1/44/PV. 13 (1989: 11) and Mashhadi (1995: 81-82). While the establishment of a NWFZ in 
South Asia, which would necessitate the nuclear disarmament of both India and Pakistan, continued to 
remain a distant goal, on 15 December 1995, the countries of South-East Asia signed a multilateral 
instrument known as the Treaty of Bangkok which created a NWFZ in the region. For the details of the 
Treaty of Bangkok, which entered into force in March 1997, see Tulliu and Schmalberger (2001: 89-90). 
It should be further noted here that Iranian authorities also supported the idea of a permanently nuclear- 
free Central Asia (Mashhadi 1995: 81-82 and Roshandel 1996b: 56). 
212 See GC/XXXVII/OR. 362 (1993: 7); GC/39/OR. 3 (1995: 21) and A/C. 1 /50/PV. 11 (1995: 11). After 
the end of the Iran-Iraq war, the Islamic Republic had continued to accuse South Africa and Israel of 
extensive collaboration in the nuclear field and to call for the adoption of international measures putting 
an end to Israeli-South African nuclear cooperation (A/CN. 10/PV. 146,1990: 59; 
NPT/CONF. IV/MC. III/SR. 5,1990: 392 and NPT/CONF. IV/MC. I/SR. 6,1990: 276). Subsequently, 
Iranians officials lauded South Africa's decision to terminate its nuclear weapons program and 
maintained that the decision would "further isolate the usurper Israeli regime as a nuclear threat blatantly 
ignoring all international means of control and verification" (GC/XXXV/OR. 334,1991: 28). 
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In the view of the Islamic Republic, zones free of nuclear armaments and other WMD 
constituted an important step towards complete WMD disarmament. 213 As far as the 
Middle East was concerned, Iranian authorities named three specific threats that 
necessitated the establishment of a Middle Eastern WMDFZ. Most importantly, they 
said, such a zone was needed to eliminate the threat posed by Israel's nuclear 
armaments. 214 In addition, the Iranians argued that a Middle Eastern WMDFZ would 
prevent the other regional countries from acquiring nuclear arms215 as well as provide a 
solution to the problem of chemical and biological weapons in the Middle East 
(A/C. 1/46/PV. 5,1991: 36-37; The Islamic Republic of Iran and Disarmament 1994: 15 
and Zarif 1995: 120). 
In practical terms, then, Iranian officials believed that a WMDFZ in the Middle East 
would serve a dual purpose for their country: it would simultaneously address the Israeli 
nuclear threat as well as the issue of Arab WMD. As before, however, the Iranians did 
not elaborate on the modalities of a Middle Eastern NWFZ or WMDFZ. 216 Still, Israel's 
commitment to give up its nuclear weapons was declared by the Islamic Republic as the 
essential first step in the process towards a WMD-free Middle East. After a decision 
taken by Israel to join the NPT and to subject its nuclear facilities to IAEA full-scope 
safeguards, Iranian authorities envisaged, Arab governments would follow suit by 
giving up their chemical and biological capabilities. A WMDFZ in the region would 
then be in place. 217 (CD/PV. 625,1992: 6; CD/PV. 690,1994: 12 and A/C. 1/50/PV. 11, 
1995: 13) 
While putting the onus in the matter on Israel, Iranian authorities accused Western 
governments and especially the United States of supporting Israel's stance in the zone 
debate. As long as Western powers refrained from pressuring Israel to make the nuclear 
concession, the Iranian argument went, a WMD-free Middle East would remain a 
213 See A/45/PV. 5 (1990: 48-49); A/CN. 10/PV. 165 (1992: 51) and A/48/PV. 14 (1993: 23). 
21' See A/C. 1/46, PV. 5 (1991: 36-37); A/47/PV. 79 (1992: 73) and A/48/PV. 68 (1993: 17). The Iranians 
stated that, in their opinion, the creation of a WMDFZ in the Middle East was the "most desirable and 
attainable" way of neutralizing the threat posed by Israel's nuclear weapons (Roshandel 1996b: 58). 
215 The Islamic Republic argued that the creation of a nuclear-free Middle East would "contribute 
enormously to filling the gap caused by the absence of a collective security system" among the Islamic 
countries of the Middle East (A/C. 1/45/PV. 35,1990: 21). 
216 Of course, the dim prospects for the realization of such zones did not necessarily warrant detailed 
formulations on the part of the Iranians. 
2" The Islamic Republic strongly criticized Israel's approach to the idea of a Middle Eastern NWFZ or 
WMDFZ. By linking the creation of such zones to prior establishment of a "so-called peace" in the 
Middle East, the Iranians argued, Israel fuelled arms racing in the Middle East, "violated the principle of 
non-proliferation, " and "encouraged policies of threat and blackmail in international relations" 
444 
distant goal. As to extra-regional states' role in the diplomatic deliberations on a Middle 
Eastern NWFZ or WMDFZ, the representatives of the Islamic Republic called on NWS 
to back the regional countries' zone efforts and to declare that they would respect the 
non-nuclear status of a nuclear- or WMD-free Middle East by promising not to use or 
threaten to use nuclear armaments against the zonal states. Similarly, Iran demanded 
that nuclear supplier countries should make promises of increased cooperation with the 
Middle Eastern zone countries in the nuclear field. (GC/XXXVII/OR. 354,1993: 28; 
NPT/CONF. 1995/MC. II/WP. 18,1995: 372 and Mashhadi 1995: 86-87) 
Even though actively promoting the idea of a WMDFZ covering the entire Middle 
East, Iranian authorities simultaneously called for the creation of a similar zone in a 
more limited context, that is, in the Persian Gulf sub-region. Following the end of the 
Iran-Iraq war, references to a WMD-free Gulf region became an integral part of the 
Islamic Republic's diplomatic argumentation, 218 and as before, they were linked to 
Iranian officials' discussion of the objective of an indigenous Gulf security system. 
Pointing to the proposal put forth by their government in 1986 regarding the 
establishment of a collective security arrangement in the Gulf, 219 the representatives of 
the Islamic Republic maintained that the implementation of Iran's 1986 initiative would 
help the Gulf states to address the threat of WMD as well as the problem of foreign 
military presence in the region, two key factors that stood in the way of the Persian Gulf 
region's long-term security and tranquility. 220 (A/C. 1/45/PV. 46,1990: 27 -30; 
A/50/PV. 5,1995: 26 and Zarif 1995: 122-123) 
In spite of the emphasis it put on the objective of ridding the Persian Gulf region of 
all kinds of WMD, Iran's Gulf argumentation also treated nuclear weapons as an 
independent issue and called on the regional states to take steps in the area of nuclear 
disarmament. As the long-term nuclear disarmament objective, the Islamic Republic 
(GC/40/OR. 2,1996: 9-10). For a discussion of Israel's view of an acceptable NWFZ or WMDFZ in the 
Middle East, see Feldman (1997: 249-254). 
218 For Iranian calls for the creation of a WMDFZ in the Gulf, see CD/PV. 690 (1994: 13); The Islamic 
Republic of Iran and Disarmament (1994: 15); and Zarif (1995: 120). 
219 See above section 3.3.4. 
220 Moreover, the Iranians pointed out that the concept of a defensive security scheme, introduced by the 
Islamic Republic in 1994, also emphasized the importance of a WMD-free Persian Gulf (see above 
sections 3.7.1,3.7.2.1 and 5.2.1.1). One of the reasons the officials of the Islamic Republic gave for their 
strong opposition to foreign military presence in the Persian Gulf was that the major powers were 
stationing more and more of their nuclear armaments at sea. As a coastal state, the Iranians said, their 
country viewed the major powers' navies as a constant security threat. (A/C. 1/43/PV. 15,1988: 58; 
A/C. l/44/PV. 13,1989: 13 and A/C. 1/45/PV. 6,1990: 41). Iran pointed to the concern over the major 
powers' naval capabilities also when voicing its support for the effectively obsolete Indian Ocean Zone of 
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pointed to the establishment of a Gulf NWFZ that would simultaneously constitute a 
key component of the Iranian-visioned new regional security architecture. Pending the 
creation of such a NWFZ, Iranian officials proposed, all the regional countries should 
restate their rejection of nuclear armaments and those Gulf states that had not yet 
acceded to the NPT should promptly do so. 221 Moreover, the Islamic Republic called on 
the Gulf countries to exchange views on the NPT and IAEA safeguards. Iranian 
representatives referred to "coordinated regional implementation" of IAEA safeguards 
and raised the possibility of complementary verification mechanisms created by the 
Gulf states themselves. In addition, the Iranians called for regional cooperation in 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy and expressed the Islamic Republic's readiness to 
consider "any other positive initiative" dealing with nuclear matters in the Gulf 
context. 222 (CD/PV. 659,1993: 9; The Islamic Republic of Iran and Disarmament 1994: 
19 and CD/PV. 690,1994: 13) 
5.3 From the CTBT to the Iranian Signature of the IAEA Additional Protocol 
5.3.1 The Khatami administration and nuclear disarmament 
5.3.1.1 The ideological premises 
By the time of Muhammad Khatami's rise to the Iranian presidency in 1997, post- 
Pahlavi Iran had formulated and explicated its positions on the issues that dominated 
international deliberations on nuclear disarmament. Under the new Khatami 
administration, Iranian officials continued to rely on those stances. In terms of 
substance, then, the Khatami government's argumentation on nuclear disarmament did 
not basically differ from that of the preceding Rafsanjani administration. 
Despite the continuity in Iran's nuclear arms control operations, however, the distinct 
political language adopted and subsequently refined by the representatives of the 
Peace initiative (A/C. 1/44/PV. 13,1989: 12-13; A/C. 1/47/PV. 5,1992: 46 and A/C. 1/50/PV. 11,1995: 12- 
13). 
221 Iran's NPT accession call was effectively directed at the United Arab Emirates and Oman which did 
not accede to the NPT until in September 1995 and January 1997, respectively. Iraq had joined the treaty 
already in 1969, Saudi-Arabia and Bahrain in 1988, and Kuwait and Qatar in 1989. 
222 It should be noted that Iran alluded to the UN as the extra-regional actor that could help the Gulf 
countries in their joint nuclear disarmament efforts. References to the potential supporting role of the UN 
were also present in the Iranian argumentation on the creation of a WMDFZ in the Persian Gulf as well as 
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Khatami administration brought a new dimension to the Islamic Republic's nuclear 
diplomacy. The concepts and ideas presented by the Khatami government signalled 
Iran's desire to mend its fences with the rest of the world, and they also provided a new 
ideological framework within which the Iranians explained and promoted their positions 
on individual nuclear-related issues, whether or not those stances had already been part 
and parcel of Iran's arms control operations throughout the Islamic Republic's brief 
history. 
Accordingly, Iran's strong opposition to nuclear weapons was now characterized by 
the Iranians as a natural manifestation of the Islamic Republic's foreign policy which 
aimed for the realization of a world, a "global civil society, " that would meet the 
spiritual and material needs of humanity. Iranian officials defined security as one of 
such needs and maintained that the prevalent international security paradigm, based on 
zero-sum thinking in which one country's security could be enhanced only at the 
expense of others', was not capable of providing security for all nations. On the 
contrary, the Iranians claimed, states' constant quest for power increased insecurity in 
the world and fuelled coercion and cultural domination in international relations. The 
existence of nuclear weapons, widely regarded as a source of national power, the 
officials of the Islamic Republic emphasized, made the existing reality all the more 
dangerous. (A/52/PV. 6,1997: 23-24; Zarif 2002a and CD/PV. 783,1998: 11) 
The Iranians argued that the transformation of international relations was an urgent 
necessity not only because the current international system was incapable of ensuring 
the security of all nations. New conditions were also needed because states' focus on the 
concept of power was preventing them from finding solutions to contemporary security 
challenges that required cooperation and multilaterally formulated responses, and 
because, as president Khatami himself put it in September 2000, "the world community 
ultimately requires the emergence of a responsive moral society, precluding resort to 
force and coercion both in national and international disputes. " (CD/PV. 812,1999: 2; 
Khatami 2000 and Zarif 2002a) 
What kind of an international order the Khatami administration was then calling for? 
According to Iranian officials, a global civil society would have two basic 
characteristics. On the one hand, it would be based on the rule of law. Interaction 
between states would be guided by the "power of law" and not by the "law of power. " 
in the Islamic Republic's discussion of the Gulf security system. (CD/PV. 690,1994: 14; Zarif 1995: 123 
and The Islamic Republic of Iran and Disarmament 1994: 17-19) 
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On the other hand, the Iranians described, the laws and principles in a global civil 
society would be formulated on a multilateral basis, in a way that each and every 
country would have the right to participate in all stages of international decision-making 
and policy implementation. In the Iranian-envisioned international order, unilateralism 
and political expediency would have no place because, as underscored by the Iranians, 
the world belonged to all its inhabitants. (A/52/PV. 6,1997: 23-24; CD/PV. 783,1998: 
12 and Khatami 2000) 
As far as the subject of security was concerned, the members of the Khatami 
administration pointed out that in a transformed international system, states would 
accept the premise that all peoples and states have an equal right to survive and to 
guarantee peace and security for their citizens. The recognition of the fact that security 
is "global and indivisible, " the representatives of the Islamic Republic pointed out, 
would preserve and ensure the national security of each member of the international 
community. In a global civil society, the Iranians added, states would cooperate in 
security matters and focus on the "global common interest" instead of their narrow 
national objectives. (Danesh-Yazdi 1999; Zarif 2002a and CD/PV. 900,2002: 8,12) 
The representatives of the Khatami administration acknowledged that the transition 
from the old international order to the Iranian-envisioned global civil society would take 
time and face major obstacles. Nonetheless, they insisted that the international 
community should immediately start to take steps that would facilitate such a transition. 
Iranian officials pointed to "dialogue among civilizations, " the Khatami 
administration's key diplomatic catchword, as a means with the help of which states 
could gradually adopt a "new paradigm of inclusion and reform in international 
relations" and move towards the realization of a global civil society. And through 
"global security networking, " defined by the Iranians as dialogue among civilizations in 
the context of international security deliberations, states would be able to create 
peaceful and secure conditions for all nations. (A/52/PV. 6,1997: 23; Khatami 2000 and 
Kharrazi 2002b) 
According to the Khatami administration, the central objective of dialogue among 
civilizations and global security networking was to free the world from WMD and from 
nuclear weapons, in particular. In the Iranian opinion, nuclear weapons undermined the 
fundamental principle that all nations have an equal right to survive and inhibited 
confidence-building between states. Today, the representatives of the Islamic Republic 
declared, nuclear weapons served no other role than "to antagonize and to invite tension 
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and conflict: " they were instruments of intimidation and terror. Iranian officials 
categorically rejected the thesis that the acquisition of nuclear armaments increased 
states' national security. 
223 Moreover, they strongly criticized military doctrines that 
gave a role to nuclear weapons. Concepts and doctrines belonging to the realm of 
nuclear strategy, such as nuclear deterrence and the balance of terror, the Iranians 
argued, rested on theoretically questionable foundations and were "historically 
unsound. "224 (A/C. 1/53/PV. 6,1998: 11; A/CN. 10/PV. 227,1999: 3 and CD/PV. 812, 
1999: 3,6) 
Thus, the elimination of nuclear weapons was declared by the Khatami 
administration as a precondition for confidence-building between states and for the 
realization of a global civil society. The Islamic Republic vowed its commitment to 
nuclear disarmament and to the ultimate objective of a transformed world order. In its 
opinion, it was no longer either acceptable or practical to divide the international 
community into two groups: those "living behind the walls of fortresses of alliances and 
WMD" and those whose security concerns were completely neglected. The Iranians 
called for intensified international efforts in the area of nuclear disarmament and 
stressed that the elimination of nuclear weapons was the international community's 
highest arms control priority. (A/52/PV. 6,1997: 23-24; CD/PV. 812,1999: 3 and 
A/CN. 10/PV. 227,1999: 3) 
5.3.1.2 Iran and the nuclear non-proliferation regime 
As already noted, at the practical diplomatic level, beneath ideological deliberations, 
the Khatami administration's approach to nuclear disarmament followed a familiar 
Iranian course. 225 The officials of the Islamic Republic thus continued to tirelessly call 
on nuclear powers to end their reliance on nuclear weapons - armaments which, in the 
words of Iran and its NAM allies, posed "the greatest danger to mankind and to the 
survival of the civilization" (NPT/CONF. 2000/18,2000: 344) - and to give up their 
223 As argued by Iran's representative at the CD in June 1998, the belief that the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons increased security or national clout was simply a misperception (CD/PV. 798,1998). 
224 Iranian officials warned that "the challenge of the 21 S" century is not just loose nukes, not even nukes 
per se; the challenge is the mentality that believes any country whatsoever still needs nukes or can justify 
them or claim that they are safe in their arsenal" (CD/PV. 812,1999: 6). 
225 Due to the substantive continuity in the Islamic Republic's nuclear diplomacy, the subsequent 
discussion on Iran's nuclear arms control operations will go into details only insofar as the Khatami 
administration has modified the content of the Islamic Republic's traditional argumentation or 
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nuclear arsenals. 
226 Iran repeatedly called for immediate disarmament steps both on the 
bilateral U. S. -Russian track227 as well as on the multilateral diplomatic track. The grand 
Iranian objective was the conclusion, within a time-bound framework, of a universal 
Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) "prohibiting the development, production, 
testing, employment, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and 
providing for their elimination" (Dehghani 1999a). 228 
Recognizing that the elimination of nuclear weapons remained a distant scenario, the 
Khatami administration supported and endorsed partial diplomatic moves towards the 
goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world. Simultaneously, it called for international 
measures that would enhance non-nuclear states' security against the threat of nuclear 
weapons. As one potential measure, the Iranians alluded to the idea to ban the use or 
threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances. Using the 1925 Geneva 
Protocol as a model, they called for the creation of a special protocol, to be added to the 
NPT, for the purpose. But cognizant of the nuclear powers' strong opposition to the 
long-lived idea of a ban on the use of nuclear weapons - which stemmed from the 
simple fact that a non-use agreement would effectively equal to nuclear disarmament -, 
the Islamic Republic also called, more modestly, for the establishment, preferably 
within the NPT framework, of an international instrument that would provide NNWS 
developments in Iran's political and military environment have warranted diplomatic responses to 
changed circumstances. 
226 As before, the Islamic Republic criticized NWS for their efforts to qualitatively develop their nuclear 
arsenals and for the centrality of nuclear weapons in their military doctrines which, to the dismay of the 
Iranians, included war plans against non-nuclear threats (Kharrazi 2000b; CD/PV. 798,1998: 2 and 
Nejad-Hosseinian 2001). In 1999, for example, Iranian authorities expressed their concern over the 
reluctance of NATO, at its 50`x' anniversary summit, to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in its strategic 
posture (Dehghani 1999a and A/C. 1/54/PV. 12,1999: 28). Similarly, Russia's new military doctrine, 
made public in 1999 - the doctrine provided, among others, for the use of nuclear armaments in response 
to enemy use of conventional weapons - raised worries in Tehran (Sokov 1999 and Vaezi and Saghafi- 
Ameri 2000: 418). 
227 While of the view that bilateral nuclear arms control between the United States and Russia was 
progressing far too slowly, Iran did express its satisfaction over the positive developments in the bilateral 
negotiations. For example, the Islamic Republic welcomed the ratification of START II by the Russian 
Duma in April 2000 - the U. S. Senate had ratified the treaty in January 1996 - and called on the parties to 
M begin negotiations on a START III treaty (Kharrazi 2000b and NPT/CONF. 2000/18,2000: 344). 
28 As far as multilateral nuclear disarmament discussions were concerned, Iranian officials spoke of the 
need to improve the efficiency of the existing diplomatic processes. Hence, the Islamic Republic strongly 
welcomed the strengthening of the review process for the NPT - agreed upon at the 1995 NPT Review 
and Extension Conference - and started to actively participate in the work of the NPT Preparatory 
Committee which holds a meeting in each of the three years prior to the subsequent NPT review 
conference. Together with other NAM countries, Iran also called for the establishment of an "open-ended 
standing committee" that would work intersessionally to follow up the recommendations made by NPT 
review conferences on the treaty's implementation. (A/C. 1/52/PV. 11,1997: 19-20; NPT/CONF. 2000/18, 
2000: 341 and NPT/CONF. 2000/SR. 16,2000: 4). In regards to the Iranian-promoted NWC, the Islamic 
Republic named the CD as the only acceptable venue for the treaty negotiations (A; 'C. 1/53/PV. 28,1998: 
4). 
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with negative security assurances. (A/CN. 10/PV. 222,1998: 17; Goldblat 1994: 198, 
200 and Kharrazi 2000b) 
Moreover, under president Khatami, Iran continued to call on nuclear powers to 
provide information about their nuclear armaments. Nuclear transparency, the officials 
of the Islamic Republic stressed, would alleviate non-nuclear states' security concerns 
and constitute an important step towards nuclear disarmament. Iran regularly called for 
the expansion of the UN arms register's scope to cover WMD and was of the opinion 
that nuclear powers should provide detailed information not only about the quantitative 
and qualitative features of their nuclear arsenals and fissile materials, but also about 
their nuclear delivery systems, their plans to develop their nuclear capabilities, as well 
as about their nuclear warhead dismantlement activities. Nuclear powers' resistance to 
the expansion of the UN register's scope, Iranian representatives claimed, severely 
hampered the register's effective and successful operation. (CD/PV. 798,1998: 2; 
A/C. 1/53/PV. 24,1998: 4 and Zarif 2002a) 
The Islamic Republic also continued to express its support for an international treaty 
that would specifically deal with fissile materials. The Khatami administration 
welcomed the decision taken by the CD in August 1998 to establish an ad hoc 
committee for the purpose and to start negotiations on banning the production of fissile 
material for weapons purposes. With treaty talks in mind, Iranian officials repeated their 
government's core negotiation position according to which a fissile material treaty 
should concern both the future and the past production of those materials. However, as, 
in the end, the CD never managed to agree on a work plan for the negotiations, the 
diplomatic process in Geneva came quickly to a standstill. Thus, even though Iran was 
among the states calling for the early commencement of the treaty negotiations, the 
issue of fissile materials turned into a secondary subject in its nuclear arms control 
operations. (A/C. 1/53/PV. 6,1998: 12; CD/PV. 912,2002: 23 and A/C. 1/54/PV. 12, 
1999: 28) 
The opposite was true for the Islamic Republic's argumentation on nuclear testing. In 
the course of its first year in office, the Khatami administration witnessed a series of 
nuclear tests in Iran's immediate neighbourhood. Despite the fact the nuclear explosions 
carried out by India and Pakistan in May 1998 prompted immediate international 
condemnation, the Islamic Republic's initial reaction to them was somewhat 
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ambiguous. 229 After India's tests of 11 and 13 May, Iran expressed its serious concern 
over the explosions and stressed that they were against the general objective of nuclear 
disarmament. More specifically, Iran characterized the Indian tests as a move that 
eroded the nuclear non-proliferation regime and especially the recently concluded 
CTBT. In the Iranian view, India's tests had illustrated that there was an urgent need for 
a NWFZ in South Asia. (CD/PV. 792,1998: 31) 
After Pakistan responded to India's nuclear explosions by carrying out its own tests 
on 28 and 30 May, however, the Islamic Republic seemed to be willing to sacrifice its 
diplomatic consistency to ideological considerations. For a while, Iran brushed its long- 
lived diplomatic opposition to nuclear weapons aside and, instead, subscribed to the 
logic of nuclear deterrence which its officials had so consistently spoken against in the 
past. Thus, at first, under the lead of foreign minister Kamal Kharrazi, the Islamic 
Republic praised Pakistan for its nuclear tests and argued that Muslims throughout the 
world welcomed the fact that there was an Islamic country capable of making nuclear 
weapons. In particular, the Iranians maintained, Muslims were happy about the fact that 
Pakistan's nuclear capability now provided them with a counterweight and protection 
against Israel and its nuclear arsenal. (Cordesman 1999a: 266 and Farhi 2001: 42) 
Yet, Iran's flirtation with the notion of an 'Islamic bomb' - that is, a nuclear weapon 
viewed as collectively belonging to the whole of the Islamic community - proved short- 
lived. After the initial, ideological Iranian reaction, the Islamic Republic reverted to its 
old diplomatic course and expressed deep concern over Pakistan's nuclear explosions. 
Although Iranian authorities noted that the advances made in the nuclear field by India 
and Pakistan had not come as a surprise to them, 230 they pointed out that a nuclear arms 
race in Iran's neighbourhood would have major security implications for their country. 
According to the Islamic Republic's foreign minister, the decisions taken by India 
and Pakistan to reveal their nuclear capabilities to the whole world were a "giant 
mistake" that pushed the regions of South Asia and the Middle East to a situation of 
heightened alert and tension. In addition to pointing to the tests' adverse effects on 
regional status quo and stability, Iranian representatives argued that by fuelling nuclear 
229 For the details regarding the tests and for the reasons that led India and Pakistan to conduct the 
explosions, see Synnott (1999: 11-26). 
230 Iran stated after the May 1998 explosions that the nuclear capability of India or Pakistan - both of 
which were widely believed at the time to be in possession of nuclear weapons or, at least, to possess an 
ability to quickly produce them - had "never been a secret" (CD/PV. 796,1998: 2). That the nuclear tests 
of 1998 in South Asia did not fundamentally alter Iran's threat perceptions with respect to India and 
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proliferation and rivalry in international relations, the events in South Asia constituted a 
major danger to international peace and security as well. Moreover, the officials of the 
Islamic Republic emphasized that the developments in South Asia had badly damaged 
the credibility of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, including that of the CTBT, as 
well as posed a threat to the natural environment. 231 (CD/PV. 796,1998: 1-2; 
CD/PV. 795,1998: 8-9 and GC/42/OR. 3,1998: 21) 
Following the May 1998 explosions, governments throughout the world expressed 
their regret and concern over the situation in South Asia. In the end, however, only 
certain industrialized countries, mainly the United States and Japan, went beyond their 
verbal condemnations and took concrete sanction measures against India and 
Pakistan. 232 While noting that the nuclear tests had been a "misconduct" and that India 
and Pakistan would have to face the consequences of their actions, Iran belonged to the 
countries that called for a moderate international response to the matter. Instead of a 
heavy-handed approach, the representatives of the Islamic Republic recommended, the 
international community should focus on preventing further escalation of the crisis in 
South Asia and on helping the two parties to defuse the tensions between them. (Synnott 
1999: 27-29; CD/PV. 796,1998: 2 and Kharrazi 1998d) 
As far as its own diplomacy was concerned, soon after the nuclear tests in South Asia 
had ended the Islamic Republic sent a delegation, headed by foreign minister Kharrazi, 
to both India and Pakistan. In its consultations with Indian and Pakistani governments, 
as well as in subsequent diplomatic statements, Iran called on the two countries to cease 
their nuclear testing and to refrain from acts that might aggrevate the situation in the 
region. Also, Iranian officials underscored the urgency of a comprehensive Indian- 
Pakistani dialogue that would center around two sets of issues: the key political 
problems between the two states and nuclear matters. Moreover, the Islamic Republic 
called on Indian and Pakistani governments to implement mutual confidence-building 
measures as well as to ensure that no nuclear weapons-related material, equipment or 
technology would be exported out of their respective territories. Finally, Iran called on 
the two countries to expeditiously accede both to the NPT and the CTBT. (CD/PV. 796, 
1998: 1-3 and Kharrazi 1998d) 
Pakistan might partly explain why the Islamic Republic used the immediate aftermath of the Pakistani 
tests to show off its ideological credentials. 
231 It should be noted that Pakistan conducted its nuclear tests at an underground test site in the 
Baluchistan region, only some 30 kilometers from the Iranian border (Farhi 2001: 39). 
232 For details about international responses to the South Asian nuclear tests, see Synnott (1999: 27-37). 
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One of the features of Iran's diplomacy in this context was the Islamic Republic's 
reluctance to discuss the Indian-Pakistani political disputes that had contributed to the 
May 1998 events in the first place. Instead, after having initially 'Islamized' the test 
issue, the Iranians internationalized it by accusing NWS of being partly responsible for 
the nuclear crisis in South Asia. According to the Iranian interpretation, the nuclear 
powers' continuous unwillingness to take meaningful steps towards comprehensive 
nuclear disarmament, together with their disregard for the views and interests of 
NNWS, had prompted India and Pakistan to conclude that they needed nuclear weapon 
capabilities to guarantee their national security. (CD/PV. 796,1998: 1-2; Nejad- 
Hosseinian 1998 and A/C. 1/53/PV. 6,1998: 11) 
The representatives of the Islamic Republic also claimed that the events in South Asia 
had demonstrated that the existing nuclear non-proliferation regime was not capable of 
removing the threat of nuclear weapons. 233 To emphasize this point, and to take 
advantage of the international debate on the Indian-Pakistani tests for the promotion of 
the Islamic Republic's diplomatic objectives, the Iranians called for the establishment of 
NWFZ in South Asia and the Middle East. 234 Furthermore, by pointing specifically to 
the case of Israel, Iranian officials called on the international community to secure the 
universality of the NPT, 235 in addition to which they maintained that the removal of 
extra-NPT export controls would facilitate the accession of non-parties to the NPT. 236 
Ultimately, however, Iranians officials declared that the threat of nuclear weapons could 
be eliminated only through total nuclear disarmament. 237 
The developments in South Asia aside, the Khatami administration stressed that in 
spite of the serious built-in shortcomings of the CTBT, the Islamic Republic continued 
to support the treaty238 and the efforts aimed at establishing an international 
organization for its implementation. 239 The Iranians emphasized the importance of the 
CTBT's universality and called on the 44 states whose accession to the instrument is 
233 As stated by the Islamic Republic at the UN, the nuclear tests in South Asia had "revealed that the 
existing non-proliferation regime can no longer serve as the sole basis for guaranteeing a safe future for a 
world free from the fear of nuclear threat" (A/C. 1/53/PV. 6,1998: 11). 
234 See CD/PV. 795 (1998: 8-9); CD/PV. 798 (1998: 1) and Farhi (2001: 42). 
235 See CD/PV. 796 (1998: 3) and Kharrazi (1998d). '; 6 See ibid. 
237 In the Iranian view, the temptation and quest by some countries to acquire nuclear armaments would 
survive as long as states failed to "forge a new approach to security and particularly complete nuclear 
disarmament" (CD/PV. 812,1999: 2-3). 
238 See CD/PV. 792 (1998: 32); A/C. 1/54/PV. 25 (1999: 7) and Hosseini (2003: 2). 
2'9 For Iran's support for the Vienna-based Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- 
Ban Treaty Organization, established in November 1996, see A/C. 1/52/PV. II (1997: 19) and Hosseini 
(2003: 2). 
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necessary for its entry into force to finish their national ratification processes as soon as 
possible. 24° (GC/41/OR. 2,1997: 12; A/C. 1/53/PV. 6,1998: 12 and NPT/CONF. 2000/18, 
2000: 343) 
However, the Islamic Republic's calls for the CTBT's early entry into force suffered 
a major blow as a result of the decision made by the U. S. Senate in October 1999 not to 
ratify the treaty. 241 Iran strongly criticized the Senate's rejection of the CTBT and 
defined it as a major setback for international nuclear non-proliferation efforts. Also, 
Iranian officials warned that the U. S. decision could have a negative impact on the on- 
going ratification processes in other countries. For this reason, the representatives of the 
Islamic Republic demanded, the international community should express its concern 
over U. S. disregard of the test-ban treaty and call on the Americans to reverse their 
October 1999 decision. 242 (A/C. 1/54/PV. 12,1999: 28; A/C. 1/54/PV. 25,1999: 7 and 
NPT/CONF. 2000/18,2000: 344) 
Iran intensified its criticism of the United States' CTBT policy after the 
administration of George W. Bush had taken office in Washington in January 2001. 
According to Iranian officials, the Bush administration's declaration that it did not 
support the test-ban treaty and would not ask the Senate to reconsider approving the 
instrument testified to the U. S. administration's "dangerous mentality, " "unipolar vision 
of the world, " and its policy of "unilateral ism. , 243 
Another source of concern for the Iranians was the Bush government's classified 
Nuclear Posture Review that was prepared by the U. S. Department of Defense and 
244 publicly summarized by Pentagon officials in January 2002. In addition to generally 
240 The CTBT will enter into force 180 days after the date of deposit of the instruments of ratification by 
the following 44 states listed in the treaty's Annex 2: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, 
Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Columbia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 
Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, 
Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Republic of Korea, Russia, Slovakia, South 
Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, the United States, Vietnam, 
and Zaire. The list consists of countries that are members of the CD and in possession of nuclear power 
and/or research reactors. 
241 The Senate decision to reject the CTBT mainly based on concerns over the CTBT's effect on the 
safety, security, reliability, and credibility of the American nuclear stockpile. Also, the members of the 
Senate were not convinced, for example, that the treaty could substantially stop nuclear proliferation and 
that the states parties' compliance could be verified in a satisfactory manner. (Cambone 2000: 209-211, 
214-215) 
242 As pointed out by one representative of the Islamic Republic, the U. S. approach to the CTBT was 
another indication of the policy of double standard that "makes the credibility of U. S. policy questionable 
in the eyes of the Iranians" (IRNA, 18 March 2000). 
2'- See Soltanieh (2001 d: 1); Kharrazi (2002b) and Kharrazi (2002c). For the Bush administration's views 
of the CTBT, see Arms Control Today (December 2001) and Steinberg and Etengoff (2002: 51). 
24' The first newspaper to get hold of the document was The Los Angeles Times which began to report on 
it on 9 March 2002 (Arms Control Today, April 2002). 
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characterizing the review as a highly alarming document, 245 the officials of the Islamic 
Republic also discussed it from the standpoint of the CTBT. In the Iranian analysis, the 
Bush administration's posture document - which stated, among others, that nuclear 
weapons provided credible military options to deter a wide range of threats, including 
WMD and large-scale conventional military force, and that nuclear weapons could be 
employed against targets able to withstand non-nuclear attack, such as deep 
underground bunkers and biological weapons facilities - expanded nuclear weapons' 
role in the U. S. military doctrine to the extent that the Americans would have to test 
new nuclear-weapon systems and thus violate the legal obligations stemming from their 
signature of the CTBT in September 1996 and from the unilateral U. S. nuclear test 
moratorium declared in October 1992. (Arms Control Today, April 2002; Nejad- 
Hosseinian 2002a and Hosseini 2003: 2) 
Iran expressed its categorical opposition to any kind of development and qualitative 
improvement of nuclear weapons - including the potential construction by the United 
States of so-called small or mini-nuclear weapons capable of penetrating earth and 
destroying military targets in hardened and deeply buried bunkers246 - and repeatedly 
called on the Americans to ratify the CTBT. In the end, however, the officials of the 
Islamic Republic openly recognized that their calls would have very little, if any, effect 
on the Bush administration's policy on nuclear testing. As concluded by one Iranian 
representative in March 2002: "The rejection of the CTBT by a major nuclear-weapon 
State has blown hopes for its rapid entry into force and there does not seem to be any 
room for optimism towards a change of policy from that side. " (Hosseini 2003; Nejad- 
Hosseinian 2002a and CD/PV. 900,2002: 9) 
Iran's criticism of the Bush administration's policies was indicative of a more general 
undercurrent in the Islamic Republic's argumentation on nuclear testing, for despite its 
stated support for the CTBT, the Khatami administration often pointed to the treaty's 
defects and called for their correction. Above all, Iranian officials argued that the treaty 
should ban all kinds of nuclear tests, not only test explosions. Given that the scope of 
the CTBT had been limited to nuclear explosions, the Iranians maintained, the treaty 
had lost its comprehensive character and not prevented NWS from developing their 
245 The Islamic Republic's comments on the U. S. Nuclear Posture Review of 2002, which mentions Iran 
as one of the seven countries against whom the United States should be prepared to use nuclear weapons, 
will be discussed in greater detail below in the present chapter. 
246 For the issue of mini-nuclear weapons, see Ferguson (2002). 
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nuclear stockpiles and producing new and more complex types of nuclear armaments 
through non-explosive tests. (GC/41/OR. 2,1997: 12 and A/C. l/52/PV. 11,1997: 19) 
As regards the Islamic Republic's own ratification of the CTBT, Iranian officials 
stated in 1997 that their country was in the process of ratifying the treaty. In October 
1998, the Khatami administration declared that it intended to expedite the ratification 
process in the Majlis and submit Iran's instrument of ratification as soon as possible. 
Yet, the ratification decision continued to be deferred. Subsequently, the U. S. Senate's 
October 1999 declaration not to ratify the CTBT provided the authorities of the Islamic 
Republic with a good excuse to circumvent questions about the state of the ratification 
process in Iran. Accordingly, the Iranians - whose accession to the CTBT is a 
prerequisite for the treaty's entry into force - downplayed the relevance of their own 
actions in the matter and blamed the United States for all the problems pertaining to the 
CTBT's entry into force. (GC/41/OR. 2,1997: 13; A/C. 1/53/PV. 6,1998: 12 and Partrick 
2002: 4) 
At the same time, the political atmosphere within the Islamic Republic was not 
conducive to the treaty's smooth ratification. There were influential figures within the 
country's political, military, and academic circles who had serious doubts about the 
sense of Iranian ratification of the CTBT. These included those Iranians who, in the 
aftermath of the Indian-Pakistani nuclear tests of May 1998, increasingly questioned 
the adequacy of the Islamic Republic's military resources and openly flirted with the 
idea of a national nuclear weapons capability. 247 From their perspective, Iran's 
accession to yet another multilateral disarmament arrangement would be a mistake and 
an aberration from the real issue, namely, the need to seriously consider the possibility 
of a national nuclear weapons program. Iran's accession to the CTBT was objected to 
also on purely tactical political grounds. The view that Iran should use the CTBT 
ratification as a diplomatic trump card rested on the belief that the ratification issue 
could be manipulated to increase the Islamic Republic's regional and international 
bargaining power. (Par-trick 2002: 4; Farhi 2001: 39-41,48 and Farhi 2004: 34-35) 
247 The supporters of an Iranian nuclear weapons program justified their views, among others, by 
maintaining that Iran needed such weapons to have a deterrent against the WMD-armed states in its 
neighbourhood - that is, Iraq, Pakistan, India and Israel - as well as against the 
United States. Those 
advocating an Iranian military nuclear program further viewed nuclear armaments as a means to enhance 
the Islamic Republic's international status and influence. Some analysts have argued that Pakistan's 
nuclear tests of May 1998 constituted a major blow to Iranian authorities' national pride, for they had 
always viewed Pakistan as a culturally and historically inferior neighbour. (Farhi 2001: 35-36,41; Farhi 
2004: 35 and Perkovich 2003a: 4-5) 
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But even without such domestic intra-elite Iranian considerations, the U. S. reluctance 
to ratify the CTBT provided Iran with a time-out during which it was able to refrain 
from further international commitments and to blame other states for their inaction. In 
the end, it should be remembered that the Islamic Republic had signed the CTBT only 
after fierce diplomatic arm wrestling and only after having declared that it considered 
the document's final content as unsatisfactory. 
5.3.2 Iran and the control of ballistic missiles248 
5.3.2.1 The Shihab-3 program 
As the discussion in the following sections will demonstrate, the Khatami 
administration was forced to invest plenty of its diplomatic energies in efforts to 
convince the international community that the Islamic Republic's continuing interest in 
nuclear energy based on nothing but peaceful considerations. Related to such efforts, the 
Khatami administration was also forced to try to dispel the concern - existing 
particularly in the West and among Iran's neighbours - that the Islamic Republic's 
activities in the area of ballistic missiles were directly connected with Iran's WMD 
ambitions. 249 The inaccuracy of the ballistic missiles in the Islamic Republic's 
possession only strengthened the belief that they were intended as delivery vehicles for 
WMD and not for conventional warheads. (Kemp 2001: 2 and Strategic Comments 
2003b: 1-2) 
Prior to the Khatami era, Iranian officials had on several occasions assured that their 
country was only interested in short-range missiles with the reach of "a few hundred 
248 Although the missile-related statements made by the officials of the Islamic Republic have not always 
exclusively dealt with ballistic missiles - that is, with unmanned rocket-driven weapons which follow a 
ballistic trajectory towards their designated target (Navias 1993: 3) -, the discussion below will do so. 
The reason is that the Islamic Republic's post-Iran-Iraq war missile control argumentation has been, first 
and foremost, a response to international deliberations on the topic, which, in turn, have mainly arisen 
from increased concern over the proliferation of ballistic missiles in the developing world. From a 
military point of view, ballistic missiles appear attractive to developing countries because they are 
capable of circumventing sophisticated air defences and delivering their payload with near certainty. The 
penetration capability of ballistic missiles provides developing countries with an asset with the help of 
which they can seek to influence the behaviour of a militarily stronger adversary. Politically, ballistic 
missiles are often seen as symbols of national prestige and pride. Finally, some developing countries have 
viewed ballistic missiles also as an export article, a potential source of much-needed foreign currency. 
(Sheppard 2000: 1-8) 
249 The Israeli view that a potential WMDFZ arrangement in the Middle East should incorporate ballistic 
missiles is one example of the way in which ballistic missiles have been seen as a component of WMD 
activities (Feldman 1997: 253). 
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kilometers" and that Iran had no program to acquire either intermediate- or long-range 
delivery systems. 250 This assurance was repeated by the Khatami administration in 
October 1997251 only to be proved invalid some nine months later. On 22 July 1998 - at 
a time when the international community was closely monitoring whether the Khatami 
presidency would bring about changes in the Islamic Republic's armament policies -, 
Iran conducted its first flight test of the Shihab-3 ballistic missile which is estimated to 
have a range of 1,300-1,700 kilometers and be capable of carrying a 750-1,000 
kilogram warhead. Shihab-3 was test-fired for the second time on 15 July 2000, and 
further flight tests took place at least on 23 May 2002, in July 2002, and on 7 July 
2003.252 
Iran's missile tests and the advancement of the Shihab-3 program naturally fuelled 
international concern over the Islamic Republic's military intentions. An accompanying 
worry was the question of whether the Iranians were simultaneously working on more 
sophisticated intermediate-range or even on long-range ballistic missiles. Iran's 
response to such deliberations was twofold. On the one hand, the Islamic Republic 
labelled the critics of Iran's missile efforts, and especially those in the United States and 
250 See Kharrazi (1994: 127); Lotfian (1997: 202) and Arnett (1998a: 436). For the purposes of the present 
discussion, ballistic missiles are divided, according to their ranges, into the following categories: long- 
range missiles (which have ranges greater than 5,500 kilometers); intermediate-range missiles (between 
5,500 and 1,000 km); and short-range missiles (less than 1,000 km) (Navias 1993: 231). It should be 
noted that, in lieu of such a categorization, Iranian missile statements themselves have mostly alluded to 
undefined "short-range" and "long-range" missiles. 
251 See Zarif (1997). 
252 See Strategic Comments (2003b: 1). Shihab-3 is reportedly a derivative of North Korea's Nodong-1 
intermediate-range ballistic missile. Iran is believed to have been involved in North Korea's Nodong 
program, and some analysts assume that the Nodong and Shihab-3 programs were simultaneously 
established in the course of 1988 (<www. globalsecurity. org/wmd/world/iran/shahab-3. htm> and 
Bermudez 2000: 105). As already mentioned above in section 3.3.3, North Korea was one of the key 
suppliers of missiles to the Islamic Republic during the Iran-Iraq war. In 1994, following the post-war 
deepening of the missile ties between the Islamic Republic and North Korea, the North Koreans 
reportedly delivered either No-dong components or a small number of completed missiles to Iran. It is 
believed that, subsequently, a host of quality, technical, and production problems related to the Nodong 
program decreased North Korean Nodong shipments to Iran, delayed the introduction of the missile into 
Iranian service, and slowed the start-up of Iranian Nodong production. It is also assumed that, due to the 
same problems, technology, components, and expertise from Russian and possibly Chinese missile 
programs have flown into the Islamic Republic's Shihab-3 efforts. (Bermudez 2000: 106; Katzman 2001: 
15-16 and IHT, 12 August 2004 ). The number of Shihab-3 missiles in the Iranian arsenal is not known. 
One estimate from 2002 put the figure at ten missiles (IHT, 31 May 2002). In 2003, Israeli, U. S., and 
Russian intelligence sources estimated that Iran would be able to produce one-to-two Shihab-3s per 
month for the next few years. In July 2003, the Islamic Republic's supreme leader announced that the 
missile had been "inaugurated" into Iran's military forces. Although the exact meaning of the 
pronouncement remained unclear, the statement has been interpreted to indicate that the IRGC - whose 
air force reportedly formed five ballistic missile units in the summer of 2000 - has been equipped with 
Shihab-3 missiles. (Strategic Comments 2003b: 1-2; IHT, 12 August 2004 and Jane's Defence Weekly, 
12 July 2000). Shihab-3 was put on display for the first time on 22 September 2000 in a parade held on 
the occasion of the Iran-Iraq war anniversary (Mousavi 2001: 52). For details regarding the flight tests of 
Shihab-3, see <www. globalsecurity. org/wmd/world/iran/shahab-3. htm>. 
459 
Israel, as propagandists whose aim was, by coupling Iranian missiles with WMD, to 
make Iran's neighbours afraid and to create a regional arms race that would benefit their 
interests. 253 On the other hand, and for the most part, however, the officials of the 
Islamic Republic concentrated on assuring the international community of the defensive 
and conventional nature of their missiles. 
The Khatami administration repeatedly stated that the main purpose of the Shihab-3 
program was to strengthen Iran's defence by bolstering its deterrent capability. Iran's 
missiles, the representatives of the Islamic Republic assured, would not threaten any 
country and would not be used in initiating acts of aggression against other states. 254 In 
addition, the Iranians continued, the Islamic Republic was committed to a policy of not 
using missiles first. 255 
While maintaining that its missiles were intended for purely defensive purposes, Iran 
also made it clear that it considered ballistic missiles a legitimate component of its 
conventional weapons arsenal, and therefore, would continue to strengthen and improve 
its missile capabilities. 256 One implication of the fact that the Iranians defined their 
ballistic missiles as conventional weapons was that their discussion of the military uses 
of those armaments broke away from the mainstream international discourse which 
placed ballistic missiles in the context of WMD. Whereas before, in WMD-related 
discussions, Iranian officials had consistently rejected the concepts of deterrence and the 
balance of power, now the very same concepts were being used to explain Iran's drive 
to acquire ballistic missiles. 
The representatives of the Islamic Republic pointed out that the Iranians' efforts to 
deter, with the help of Shihab-3 missiles, their adversaries from launching military 
offences against their country was part of the Iranian objective of maintaining the 
253 See <http: //intelweb. janes. com/iwr/iv5n20501. html>. Following the first flight test of Shihab-3 in July 
1998, Iranian officials stated that it was telling that Israel was the only Middle Eastern country raising 
concern over the test. According to the Iranians, it was Israel's own WMD and missile activities that were 
the real source of concern in the Middle East. (A/C. 1/53/PV. 5,1998: 29) 
254 See CD/PV. 806 (1998: 7); A/C. 1/53/PV. 11 (1998: 19) and BBC Monitoring Middle East (30 
December 2000). 
255 See A/C. 1/53/PV. 5 (1998: 29); A/C. 1 /53/PV. 11 (1998: 19) and Foreign Ministry Viewpoints (2000a). 
Reportedly, the Islamic Republic grossly violated its unilateral missile control declarations in April 2001 
by launching tens of Scud-B surface-to-surface ballistic missiles at the bases of MKO in Iraq. Iranian 
officials defended their country's military operation by portraying it as a limited act of self-defence, 
permissible under article 51 of the UN Charter, against MKO's terrorist attacks on Iranian cities. For 
details, see Tarzi and Parliament (2001). 
256 See A/C. 1/53/PV. 5 (1998: 29); A/C. 1/53/PV. I1 (1998: 19) and A/C. 1/54/PV. 19 (1999: 20). 
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regional military balance of power. 
257 The Islamic Republic's ballistic missiles, the 
Iranian argument went, contributed to the stability of the Middle East by preventing 
regional actors from underestimating Iran's military power and challenging its position 
in the regional security equation. Iranian officials referred to the Iraqi decisions to 
invade Iran in September 1980 and Kuwait in August 1990 as prime examples of 
miscalculated efforts to alter the regional balance of power and of the disastrous 
ramifications of such endeavors. 258 
Even though the Islamic Republic's interest in ballistic missiles can largely be 
explained by the Iranians' experiences with the Iraqi missile use during the Iran-Iraq 
war, 259 Saddam Hussein's Iraq was not the only threat the Islamic Republic's missile 
arsenal was supposed to deter. In fact, in Iranian officials' argumentation, the threat of 
Israeli conventional or WMD strikes against the Islamic Republic served as a key 
justification for Iran's Shihab-3 program. 260 The efforts by the United States to 
undermine the Islamic Republic's security, together with Iran's security concerns over 
Turkey and the nuclear-armed Pakistan and India, were among other stated military 
motives for Iran's missile research and development activities. (Foreign Ministry 
Viewpoints 2000a; Steinberg and Etengoff 2002: 21 and BBC World, 27 November 
2000) 
Apart from security considerations, Iranian authorities maintained that they were 
investing in missile technology also because it offered enormous civilian applications in 
257 According to All Shamkhani, the Islamic Republic's defence minister, Iran's armament policies 
focused on weapons that provided the country with the greatest degree of deterrence. Shamkhani named 
ballistic missiles as a key category among such weapons. (BBC Monitoring Middle East, 30 December 
2000). As for the role envisaged for the Shihab-3s by the Iranians, the defence minister of the Islamic 
Republic characterized it as follows: "We have prepared ourselves to absorb the first strike so that it 
inflicts the least damage on us. We have, however, prepared a second strike which can decisively avenge 
the first one, while preventing a third strike against us" (cited in Eisenstadt 2004: 21). 
258 Defence minister Shamkhani clad the Iranian thinking in the following words: "The day that Iraq 
attacked Iran, it acted on the basis of a wrong analysis of the situation. Iraq felt that the balance of power 
was upset and that it was stronger than Iran. The day that Iraq attacked Kuwait, it felt that the balance of 
power had been overthrown because of the West's wrong analysis of the situation in Iraq. That was why 
Iraq attacked Kuwait. The balance of power should be kept steady and uniform. The day this balance is 
upset, clashes and acts of aggression begin in or outside this region [the Middle East]. Our defence 
industry and our armed forces have concentrated all their efforts on ensuring that the balance of power is 
preserved" (BBC Monitoring Middle East, 30 December 2000). 
59 For a discussion of the missile-related military lessons drawn by the Iranians from the Iran-Iraq war, 
see Chubin (1994: 20-23). 
260 As in the case of nuclear weapons, the purpose of the emphasis put by the Iranians on the threat of 
Israel, instead of Iraq, was to promote Iranian-Arab solidarity and relations. By making a linkage 
between their ballistic missiles and Israel, Iranian authorities also sought to underscore their Islamic 
credentials. This ideological effort led Iranian officials even to go so far as to claim that Shihab-3 was a 
tool for defending the whole of the Islamic community and the oppressed world. (Chubin 2002: 57-59, 
130) 
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such crucial areas as space exploration, telecommunications, and broadcasting. 
Therefore, the Iranians argued, one of the aims of the Shihab-3 program was to go past 
the phase of producing military missiles and to reach the stage of designing and 
manufacturing satellite launch vehicles. The representatives of the Islamic Republic 
pointed out that due to the various peaceful applications of missile technology, states 
were increasingly eager to enter into the field of missile technology. Iranian officials left 
no doubt that their country was planning to be among those states. (A/C. 1/54/PV. 19, 
1999: 20; A/55/116/Add. 1,2000: 2 and Mousavi 2001: 53) 
Accordingly, Iranian authorities strongly defended their country's right to use missile 
technology for both military and peaceful purposes. 261 But their pronouncements also 
indicated that the Islamic Republic viewed ballistic missiles as symbols of national 
prestige and status. Thus, in July 2000, for example, the commander of the IRGC stated 
that thanks to its Shihab-3 missiles, Iran had become a regional military power. Other 
Iranian officials included their country in the "exclusive club of missile technology 
possessors. " All the major powers in the world, the Iranians observed, had reserved a 
prominent role for missiles in their military planning. (Jane 's Defence Weekly, 12 July 
2000; A/55/116/Add. 1,2000: 2 and Fadaifard 2000) 
Following the July 1998 test of Shihab-3, Iran announced that its missile 
development program would include work on missiles with greater ranges and payloads 
than those of the Shihab-3. At the same time, however, the Iranians were careful to 
point out that the planned Shihab-4 and Shihab-5 missiles would only serve the Islamic 
Republic's civilian needs. 262 Iran's defence minister underscored this point in February 
1999 by declaring that Shihab-3 would remain the last military missile his country 
would produce. He added that Iran would continue the development of Shihab-4 but 
that the missile would be a peaceful, civilian satellite launch vehicle. (Chubin 2002: 56; 
Arms Control Today, January/February 1999 and Jane 's Defence Weekly, 26 July 2000) 
Yet in early 2002, the Islamic Republic's political and military leadership reportedly 
decided to stop the development of Shihab-4 so that Iran could not be accused of 
constituting a missile threat to Europe and the United States. In November 2003 - in the 
261 Take, for example, the following statement made by the spokesman of the Islamic Republic's defence 
ministry in July 2001: "Iran's missile plans are [... ] its natural right and in line with developing Iran's 
capabilities in the aerospace field" (cited in Savyon 2002). 
26. Experts have put the potential range of Shihab-4 and Shihab-5 at 2,000 and 5,000-10,000 kilometers, 
respectively. While Shihab-5 has been said to be more or less at the stage of a paper design, the Shihab-4 
missile is believed to be based on the Soviet SS-4 missile. Russian assistance is thus expected to play a 
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midst of the diplomatic confrontation, discussed below, between Iran and the IAEA 
over the Islamic Republic's nuclear program - Iranian authori ties officially announced 
that their country would indeed suspend the development of Shihab-4.263 However, as 
the Islamic Republic made it also known that it would continue to execute its Shihab-3 
program and reserve itself the right to develop a space launch vehicle, the diplomatic 
value of its November 2003 announcement diminished significantly. 264 For those 
concerned over Iranian missile activities, the Islamic Republic's pronouncements 
continued to follow too closely the argumentative pattern typical for countries involved 
in ballistic missile development. Karp characterizes the behaviour of such countries in 
the following way: "At first they may stress space launch capabilities or conventional 
warheads, later chemical and biological weapons, all the while waiting for nuclear 
requirements and technical opportunities to come together. , 265 (Savyon 2002; Strategic 
Comments 2003b: 1 and Karp 2000: 108) 
5.3.2.2 The international missile debate 
Iran's first flight test of Shihab-3 in July 1998 was not the only major ballistic 
missile-related experiment carried out that year. At the end of August 1998, North 
Korea conducted its first flight of the Taep'o-dong ballistic missile system, in addition 
to which the 1998 nuclear test crisis in South Asia included a ballistic missile test duel 
between India and Pakistan. And on top of these military experiments, international 
debate on ballistic missile proliferation was greatly influenced by the publication in the 
United States of the so-called Rumsfeld Commission Report. The report -which 
provided an evaluation of the ballistic missile threat to the United States - concluded 
that "rogue states" could threaten the United States in the future with long-range 
ballistic missiles armed with WMD. The report's conclusion significantly strengthened 
crucial role in future Iranian work on Shihab-4 and Shihab-5. (Eisenstadt 2001 a: 23; Eisenstadt 2001 b and 
Katzman 2001: 7) 
263 Iran's announcement that it was stopping its Shihab-4 project suggests that the authorities of the 
Islamic Republic view their missiles as a diplomatic trump card in international negotiations. Hadian 
(2004: 64) argues that Iran might be willing to permanently stop the development of long-range ballistic 
missiles and to limit the deployment of Shihab-3 if such moves would contribute to the conclusion of a 
comprehensive political deal between Iran and the United States. 
264 The problem with space launch vehicles is that they consist of many of the same components and 
technologies that are used in the manufacturing of military missiles. Therefore, civilian space launch 
vehicles can easily be converted into weapons. 
265 Karp (2000: 107) further argues that because international law allows states to acquire and possess 
ballistic missiles, countries like Iran have been able to use their missiles as symbols of a national WMD 
capability while simultaneously remaining committed to their arms control commitments. 
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the hand of those in the United States who advocated the creation of a national missile 
defence system that would act as a shield against the missiles of countries like Iran. 266 
(Rubin 2000: 83 and Karp 2000: 117) 
A year later, in October 1999, the members of the Missile Technology Control 
Regime, 267 the main international arrangement to limit the spread of missiles and 
missile technology, gathered to consider strengthened measures to control the 
proliferation of ballistic missiles. In the wake of the MTCR's meeting and the 
increasing international attention on ballistic missiles, Iran launched a diplomatic 
counterattack which seemingly aimed at taking the steam out of the diplomatic process 
led by the MTCR as well as at improving the Islamic Republic's international image 
and securing its interests in the missile issue. 
On 22 October 1999, at the 54th session of the UN General Assembly, the Islamic 
Republic introduced a draft resolution specifically dealing with the topic of missiles. 
The draft resolution requested the UN secretary-general to prepare a report - with the 
assistance of a panel of qualified governmental experts on the basis of equitable 
geographical distribution - on the issue of missiles in all its aspects for the 
consideration of the General Assembly at its 56th session. But as some delegations 
wanted to have more time to consider the Iranian proposal, it was not accepted until a 
year later. In its resolution of 20 November 2000, entitled "Missiles" and based on 
Iran's draft text of 31 October 2000, the General Assembly asked the secretary-general 
to prepare a report on the issue of missiles in all its aspects for the assembly's 
consideration at its 57th session in 2002. (A/C. 1/54/L. 12,1999; A/C. 1/55/L. 1/Rev. 1, 
2000 and 55/33 A, 2000) 
Elaborating on their country's UN proposal and its approach to missile control, the 
officials of the Islamic Republic acknowledged that the concerns over the proliferation 
of ballistic missiles and their development "beyond necessary national defence" were 
266 As such, the fact that the Rumsfeld Commission singled out Iran as one of the potential missile threats 
to the United States was nothing new. Iran had already been referred to in the United States, for example, 
as a justification for the country's theater missile defence (TMD) efforts which aimed to protect American 
troops, facilities, and allies overseas. Generally, states have three basic options to counter the threat of 
ballistic missiles. In the first place, they can try to defend themselves through the development of anti- 
ballistic missile systems. Secondly, they can rely on diplomacy by contributing to the establishment 
international arrangements for the halting and the prevention of missile proliferation. Finally, states may 
try to neutralize their adversaries' missiles by conducting pre-emptive military attacks. (Disarmament 
Diplomacy, November 1997 and Sheppard 2000: 9-11) 
267 The MTCR is an informal, non-treaty association of states which establishes a set of export control 
guidelines which are implemented by the participating countries according to their own national 
legislation. For information about the MTCR, see Ozga (1994) and the regime's own website at 
<www. mtcr. info>. 
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legitimate. Furthermore, the Iranians generally recognized that there was a linkage 
between missiles and WMD, even if they simultaneously stressed that the issue of 
missiles should by no means be viewed as an exclusively WMD-related matter. While 
expressing their readiness to take part in multilateral diplomatic deliberations on missile 
control, Iranian authorities called on governments to adopt a "comprehensive, balanced, 
and non-discriminatory" missile control approach that would take states' individual 
concerns and interests in consideration and address the issue of missile in all its 
aspects. 268 (A/C. l/54/PV. 12,1999: 29; Fadaifard 2000 and A/55/116/Add. 1,2000: 3) 
Due to the necessity of a truly international approch to the question of missiles, the 
Iranians concluded, international norms and guidelines on missiles could be credible 
and effective only if they were universally agreed on within the framework of the UN. 
In the view of the Islamic Republic, the export controls implemented by the MTCR and 
individual states were "discriminatory, " "narrowly-defined, " and therefore 
unacceptable. Like many other developing countries, Iran regarded such missile control 
arrangements as another outside effort to hamper its legitimate defence activities and 
scientific and technological development. (Fadaifard 2000; A/55/ 116/Add. 1,2000: 3 
and Soltanieh 2001b: 2) 
And yet, at the same time, Iran eagerly claimed that its missile programs were not 
dependent on foreign assistance. Iranian officials, defence minister Shamkhani included, 
went as far as alleging that the Islamic Republic had neither used nor needed foreign 
experts to develop and produce the missiles in its possession. For this reason, the 
Iranians argued, the efforts by the United States and other Western countries to pressure 
countries like Russia and China to end their arms dealings with the Islamic Republic 
had no impact whatsoever on Iran's missile activities. 269 (IHT, 27 May 2002 and Al- 
Jazeera, 5 February 2002) 
268 According to the Islamic Republic, its missile study proposal constituted a prerequisite and the start for 
a process to address missiles globally. As far as the content of the missile study carried out by the UN 
panel of governmental experts was concerned, the Khatami administration noted that the study could 
include a general assessment of (a) the overall programs for the development and production of various 
types of missiles worldwide; (b) the overall scientific and technical research for quantitative development 
of the missiles already deployed and the plans for the development of new generations of missiles; (c) the 
efforts by states or groups of states to address the question of missiles at the regional and the international 
level; (d) the military doctrines of states and the role of missiles therein as a deterrent or a threat 
perception; and (e) the views of the civil society on missiles. (A/C. 1/54/PV. 12,1999: 29; Fadaifard 2000 
and A/55/116/Add. 1,2000: 3) 
269 In January 1999, for example, the United States imposed sanctions against three Russian entities for 
assisting Iran in its missile efforts. The Islamic Republic responded to the U. S. move by stating that it had 
had merely scientific and industrial relations with the Russian companies and institutions subjected to 
U. S. sanctions (Disarmament Diplomacy, February 1999). 
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In order to promote its missile views, the Islamic Republic participated in the 
diplomatic discussions initiated by the MTCR which aimed at acquiring broad support 
for the MTCR's draft International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile 
Proliferation (ICOC). 270 In February 2002, Iran was among the 86 states that gathered in 
Paris to discuss the MTCR's ICOC proposal. Yet, it was clear right from the 
conference's start that the Islamic Republic viewed the ICOC as an unwanted 
alternative to its UN-based approach to missile control. Hence, instead of delving into 
the modalities of the draft proposal discussed by the participants of the Paris gathering, 
the Iranian delegation concentrated on stressing that the proper forum for "professional 
discussion on the issue of ballistic missiles and controlling policies to limit missile 
proliferation" was the UN. (Disarmament Diplomacy, March/April 2002) 
As far as the content of the draft ICOC was concerned, the document fought in many 
ways against the premises of Iran's missile approach. First of all, and unlike the Islamic 
Republic's diplomacy, it strongly emphasized the linkage between ballistic missiles and 
WMD, and as a consequence, was directed against states that were believed to be 
developing ballistic missiles for WMD purposes, 271 including Iran. Secondly, even 
though the draft code called on states to reduce, where possible, their national holdings 
of ballistic missiles capable of delivering WMD, 272 it did not offer any concrete benefits 
for countries willing to do so (Ahlström 2003: 755). Thus, it would have been highly 
optimistic, to say the least, to expect that the Iranians would have given serious thought 
to the idea of giving up a military asset defined by them as a crucial element of their 
country's defence in exchange for vague promises of international cooperation in 
peaceful uses of space. Similarly, it would have been unrealistic to assume that the 
Iranians would have been prepared to be among the first countries to subscribe to the 
270 The first draft of the code of conduct was presented at the MTCR's October 2000 plenary meeting in 
Helsinki. The ICOC proposal of the MTCR contained three basic objectives. In the first place, it sought to 
promote the prevention and curbing of the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering WMD, 
and secondly, to develop norms that would serve that purpose. In addition, the initiative sought to 
promote confidence between states with regard to missile and space launch vehicle activities. The code of 
conduct, which is only a politically binding document, was ultimately adopted at an international 
conference in The Hague - where it was also renamed as The Hague Code of Conduct - on 25 November 
2002. 
271 Note, for example, the paragraph 3(e) of the final code document which calls on the states subscribing 
to the ICOC "not to contribute to, support or assist any Ballistic Missile programme in countries which 
might be developing or acquiring weapons of mass destruction in contravention of norms established by, 
and of those countries' obligations under, international disarmament and non-proliferation treaties. " The 
final text of the ICOC is available at <http: //projects. sipri. se/expcon/hcocfinal. htm>. 
272 Paragraph of 3(c) of the final code document asks states to "exercise maximum possible restraint in the 
development, testing and deployment of Ballistic Missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass 
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transparency clauses of the draft code which, among others, called on the subscribing 
states to provide annual information on their ballistic missile policies and consider 
inviting international observers to their test-launch sites. 273 
In the light of these factors and the fact that, in the end, the ICOC initiative was 
meant to supplement the MTCR, it was no wonder that Iran neither attended the 
international conference held in Madrid in June 2002 to further discuss the code of 
conduct nor ever signed the final code of conduct document launched in The Hague in 
November 2002. Instead, Iranian officials praised the missile report prepared by the UN 
panel of governmental experts which was submitted to the General Assembly by the 
secretary-general on 23 July 2002. In the view of the Iranian government, whose 
representative had participated in the panel's deliberations, the expert group had 
meritoriously mapped out the various dimensions of the missile question. 274 Despite the 
general nature of the report's content, Iranian authorities added, the work of the expert 
group had prepared ground for more detailed and action-oriented recommendations in 
the area of missile control and should therefore be warmly welcomed. (Zarif 2002a; 
A/58/117/Add. 1,2003: 2 and A/C. 1/58/L. 4,2003: 2) 
In a draft resolution introduced by the Islamic Republic at the UN General Assembly 
in October 2003, which was co-sponsored by Egypt and Indonesia, Iran requested the 
UN secretary-general to establish a new panel of governmental experts to further 
explore the issue of missiles in all its aspects and to submit its conclusions to the 
General Assembly in 2004.275 The October 2003 proposal, like the previous missile 
draft resolutions put forth by Iran at the UN, did not get the support of the Western 
delegations. Most Western governments abstained from voting on the resolution - 
which ultimately backed the Iranian request for a second UN missile panel -, whereas 
destruction, including, where possible, to reduce national holdings of such missiles, in the interest of 
ýlobal and regional peace and security. " 
73 The transparency clauses of the ICOC are listed in its paragraph 4. For a detailed analysis of the 
MTCR code of conduct, see Ahlström (2003: 749-759). 
274 The UN panel consisted of representatives from 23 countries. The panel's report provided, first of all, 
an overview of the history, military role, and characteristics of missiles. It also discussed the various 
factors behind the development, acquisition, and use of missiles. Furthermore, it listed the international 
arrangements and treaties that have bearing on missile control. Finally, the document discussed the 
concerns that states have over missiles and their proliferation. The UN panel concluded, among others, 
that missile-related issues had ramifications for international peace and security and that states should 
further explore various approaches to the control of missiles. (A/57/229,2002: 1-20) 
275 Iran was of the opinion that the second panel of governmental experts should, first, "seek 
complementary measures to explore ways and means to secure the international community against the 
threats posed by some types of missiles, " secondly, "discuss and prepare specific recommendations with a 
view to dispelling the concerns of all States on the issue of missiles in all their aspects, " and thirdly, 
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the United States and Israel specifically voted against it. (A/C. 1/58/L. 4,2003: 2 and 
A/RES/58/37,2003) 
The Islamic Republic portrayed the Western opposition to its UN initiatives as an 
effort to protect the activities of the MTCR and to undermine the chances for the 
creation of a truly multilateral approach to missile control. By referring, among others, 
to the work carried out by the United States on NMD and TMD systems, 276 the Iranians 
also questioned the West's sincerity in the area of missile control. According to Iran, the 
fact that the majority of UN member states had supported the Islamic Republic's missile 
initiatives had testified to international community's desire to deal with the issue of 
missiles expressly within the framework of the world organization. (A/C. 1 /54/PV. 19, 
1999: 20-21; A/55/116/Add. 1,2000: 2 and IRNA, 13 November 1999). Underscoring 
the importance of inter-state dialogue as well as the participation of all countries in 
international missile deliberations, the Khatami administration called, in 2002, also on 
the Geneva-based CD to start to deal with the issue (Fadaifard 2000 and CD/PV. 893, 
2002: 14). 
In the final analysis, however, Iranian authorities were not necessarily dissatisfied 
with the fact that their initiatives encountered opposition at the UN. As a country that 
had heavily invested in ballistic missile development, Iran had no interest in quick and 
far-reaching missile control measures. Thus, while the Islamic Republic sought to 
portray itself as an active player in the international missile control debate, its 
pronouncements made no mention of measures that would limit states' missile-related 
research and development activities. It is telling that Islamic Iran, which had always 
stressed the importance of multilateral arrangements and treaties in regulating states' 
armament efforts, went on stating that as far as missiles were concerned, "it might not 
be necessary to automatically take the stereotypical path of negotiating a convention 
banning missile development and proliferation" (A/55/116/Add. 1: 2000: 3). 
5.3.2.3 The alleged Israel connection 
According to the Khatami administration, Iran's missile initiatives at the UN 
demonstrated that the Islamic Republic was seriously committed to a policy of 
"examine a specific mechanism to promote the peaceful uses of missiles, inter alia, in launching civil 
satellites and space vehicles. " (A/58/117/Add. 1,2003: 2) 
276 Iran's views on the U. S. missile defence efforts will be discussed below in the present chapter. 
468 
confidence-building. In the summer of 1999, newspaper reports emerged alleging that 
the Iranians were pursuing confidence-building with their stated archenemy in the 
Middle East - Israel. The reports claimed that Iran had approached Israel through the 
assistance of the British government and proposed security talks between the two 
countries. As for the content of the alleged talks, the Iranians had reportedly put forth 
three topics: (a) discussions about a declaration through which the countries of the 
Middle East would pledge not to use missiles in their possession for a first strike; (b) 
talks over an agreement that would prohibit the regional states from arming their 
missiles with WMD warheads; and finally (c) discussions about restrictions on missiles 
serving military purposes and having a range greater than 1,300 kilometers. 277 
(Steinberg 2000a; The Independent, 21 June 1999 and Financial Times, 21 June 1999) 
Whether or not Iran had in fact tried to open a secret discussion channel with Israel, 
the Khatami administration strongly denied the accuracy of the reports making such a 
claim. The officials of the Islamic Republic labelled the reports as a product of the 
"Zionist propaganda machine" which tried, in vain, to hurt the image of their country. 
Iranian representatives relied on similar type of argumentation in September 1999, after 
a new round of reporting on the alleged Iranian-Israeli connection had surfaced. 
According to the reports published in September 1999, which did not provide any new 
information about the content of the alleged Iranian proposals, Britain had continued to 
act as a conduit for confidence-building initiatives from Tehran to Tel Aviv. (BBC 
Monitoring Middle East, 21 June 1999; The Times, 30 September 1999 and BBC 
Monitoring Middle East, 30 September 1999) 
If ever made, Iran's missile dialogue initiatives amounted to a ground-breaking 
diplomatic move on the part of the Islamic Republic. Yet, as for their content, the 
reported Iranian proposals were strictly in line with the Islamic Republic's traditional 
arms control argumentation. First of all, following the July 1998 test flight of Shihab-3, 
the Iranians had already declared their unilateral commitment to a no-first use missile 
policy. A regional ban on missiles armed with WMD, on the other hand, would have 
signified a major WMD arms control step in the Middle East. Finally, Iran's call for a 
cap on the range of the region's ballistic missiles would have left Shihab-3s out of the 
arrangement's scope. Actually, a regional agreement on the range limit of 1,300 
277 In the mid-1990s, some Iranian officials had reportedly claimed that their government was pursuing a 
tacit policy of not developing ballistic missiles capable of reaching Israel. The purpose of such a policy, 
the Iranians had said, was not to provide the Israelis with a pretext for a pre-emptive military strike 
against their country. (Arnett 1998a: 439) 
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kilometers would have equalled to a tacit legitimization of the Islamic Republic's 
existing ballistic missile capabilities. 
Iran's alleged proposals to Israel would thus suggest that the authorities of the Islamic 
Republic sought to use the bilateral channel mainly to incite Israel to ease diplomatic 
pressure on their country and its weapons programs as well as to inhibit Israeli military 
strikes, whether carried out pre-emptively or in a crisis situation, against Iran. 278 
Interestingly, neither the Islamic Republic's alleged proposals - which may have 
simultaneously been intended to act as a gesture of reassurance and good will vis-a-vis 
Western governments - nor the Khatami administration's arms control pronouncements 
at large referred to Israel's TMD activities. In a similar manner, Iranian statements 
made no allusions to reports according to which other regional actors, such as Turkey 
and the GCC countries, were considering TMD systems as a defensive option against 
the Islamic Republic's ballistic missiles. Iran's silence on TMD may have stemmed 
from the Islamic Republic's belief that by strengthening and modernizing its ballistic 
missile inventory, it would, at the end of the day, be capable of penetrating Israel's 
TMD shield and that of other regional states. Whatever the ultimate explanation, should 
the Israelis - who have been working on their Arrow TMD program, with the help of 
the Americans, since 1988279 - or other regional actors manage to develop an efficient 
anti-ballistic missile system, it would undermine the credibility of the Iranian missile 
deterrent and set new requirements for potential arms control arrangements in the 
Middle East. 
5.3.3 The question of Iran's nuclear program 
Due to continuing international concern over the motives of Iran's nuclear activities, 
gaining additional momentum after India's and Pakistan's nuclear tests of May 1998, 
the Khatami administration was forced to pay increased diplomatic attention to 
defending the Islamic Republic's nuclear efforts. 280 As the substantive foundation for 
278 It should be noted that Israeli authorities had been openly speaking of the possibility of a pre-emptive 
military attack not only against the Islamic Republic's nuclear facilities but also against Iran's ballistic 
missile sites (Amirahmadi 1998: 3). 
279 For details, see <http: //www. fas. org/spp/starwars/program/arrow. htm>. 
280 As far as Iran's nuclear activities at the time were concerned, Eisenstadt (1998a: 81) lists three 
principal factors that were raising questions about the Islamic Republic's nuclear intentions. First of them 
was the fact that the Iranians were investigating various uranium enrichment techniques and gas 
centrifuge enrichment, in particular. Iran's interest in acquiring nuclear power plants and research 
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such a defence had already been built during the Rafsanjani presidency, the Khatami 
administration concentrated on repeating and refining the Iranian arguments. 
Thus, during the first years of the Khatami presidency, the officials of the Islamic 
Republic reaffirmed that Iran was not interested in nuclear armaments and that its 
nuclear program served only non-military purposes. 281 Iran, president Khatami and his 
lieutenants declared, was strictly observing its disarmament commitments and, as a 
victim of WMD use, had a strong interest in international arrangements controlling and 
banning those armaments. 282 Pointing to the IAEA's regular inspections in Iran and 
particularly to the IAEA special visits that were conducted in the country in 1992 and 
1993, and again in 1997 and 2000,283 the Iranians stressed that their country's 
compliance with the NPT had been repeatedly verified (GC/41/OR. 2,1997: 13; 
A/52/PV. 49,1997: 3 and IRNA, 17 May 2000). 
From 2001 onwards, however, the Islamic Republic's nuclear program fell under 
unparalleled international scrutiny. The new situation faced by the Iranians resulted, on 
the one hand, from the policies of the U. S. administration of president George W. Bush 
whose strong focus on the question of WMD proliferation put Iran under increased 
international pressure. On the other hand, the revelations in the course of 2003 by the 
IAEA that the Islamic Republic had violated its IAEA safeguards agreement on 
numerous occasions - above all, by secretly developing and testing the ability to 
produce fissile material - fuelled suspicions that the Islamic Republic was actively 
pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. 
5.3.3.1 Iran as part of the "axis of evil" 
Taking office in January 2001, the U. S. administration of president George W. Bush 
placed the issue of WMD high on its security and foreign policy agenda. In the view of 
reactors, together with its alleged efforts to obtain fissile material in the former Soviet Union, were the 
other main causes of international concern. 
281 In fact, as later revealed by Iranian officials, at the end of the 1990s, during the first term of the 
Khatami presidency, the Islamic Republic significantly boosted its nuclear activities. As noted by Hasan 
Ruhani, the secretary of the SNSC during Khatami's tenure of office: "We redoubled our [nuclear] efforts 
in the country and granted the AEOI authorities it did not have before. That is to say, we gave the agency 
a freer hand with new credits and a more liberal spending procedure, new facilities, and special 
regulations. This allowed them to become more active, without being forced to go through bureaucratic 
and regulatory labyrinths" (Ruhani 2005: 2). 
282 See A/52/PV. 6 (1997: 25): A/53/PV. 8 (1998: 7) and A/54/PV. 67 (1999: 25). 
283 The IAEA's third and fourth special visits to Iran took place in 1997 and 2000, respectively. After both 
visits, the agency once again concluded that nothing had suggested that Iran's nuclear activities were not 
in conformity with international regulations. (Zak 2002: 21-22) 
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the Bush administration, an attack against the United States by a "rogue state" resorting 
to WMD was a threat scenario that the Americans could not ignore. Emphasizing its 
commitment to tackling the threat of WMD-armed rogue states, the Bush government 
declared, from its inception, that it accorded a high priority to building a NMD system 
capable of protecting the U. S. mainland, together with America's allies and U. S. forces 
deployed abroad, from accidental missile launches and from ballistic missile attacks by 
countries such as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. (Landau 2001 and Landau 2003: 35) 
Despite the fact that the NMD plan was contradictory to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Treaty, which prohibited the United States and Russia from developing 
nationwide defences against ballistic missiles, the Bush administration was determined 
to go ahead with its NMD plan. 284 The Bush team's disregard for the ABM Treaty was 
indicative of its position according to which the United States would not let 
international organizations and agreements constrain its ability to guarantee its national 
security and vital interests. As the Bush administration viewed international arms 
control arrangements as incapable of satisfactorily tackling the threat of rogue states, it 
adopted a unilateral diplomatic course and, during its first months in office, declared the 
ABM Treaty anachronous, 285 rejected the CTBT, and blocked the adoption of an 
additional verification protocol to the BTWC. (Landau 2003: 36 and Jervis 2003: 374) 
No wonder, then, that from Iran's point of view the U. S. foreign policy under 
president Bush seemed disquieting. For one thing, the Islamic Republic was now 
included in the group of a handful of regimes that were openly named by U. S. policy- 
makers and military planners as one of the prime enemies of their country. For another, 
the Bush administration's disregard for multilateral arms control diplomacy 
significantly complicated the Iranians' efforts to convince the world of their opposition 
to nuclear arms and other WMD. Put another way: if the Islamic Republic's active 
participation in all the major international disarmament instruments was regarded as 
meaningless by the Americans, how could the Iranians ever put up an effective 
diplomatic defence against the accusations that they were pursuing WMD capabilities? 
If Iranian authorities found the task of convincing the world of the Islamic Republic's 
peaceful intentions difficult during the Bush administration's first months in office, it 
certainly did not become easier after the terrorist attacks of September 11,2001, in the 
284 For the details of the ABM Treaty, see Goldblat (1994: 55-56). 
285 The members of the Bush team characterized the ABM Treaty as a "relic" and "ancient history" 
(Landau 2001). 
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United States. The fact that the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the 
Pentagon in Washington had caused the death of some 3,000 civilians, damaged both 
the U. S. and global economy, and revealed how vulnerable the United States was to 
terrorist activities led the Bush administration to redefine the threats to U. S. national 
security and to formulate a new foreign policy orientation. The purpose of the new U. S. 
course of action - whose adoptation was facilitated by president Bush's and his 
advisers' general political outlook - was to confront and eliminate two primary national 
security threats: international terrorism and rogue states possessing or pursuing WMD 
capabilities. 
The post-September 11 foreign policy of the United States based on a set of beliefs or 
principles which subsequently became known as the Bush doctrine. The basic premise 
of the doctrine was that under the existing conditions of terrorism, rogue states, and 
WMD, the security of the United States necessitated an active American foreign policy 
that would boldly seek to eliminate terrorism- and WMD-related dangers before they 
would materialize into actual attacks. Thus, while continuing to protect the mainland 
United States, the Bush administration concluded, the Americans had to act globally 
and extend the fight against terrorism and WMD overseas. 286 (Posen 2003: 45 and 
Landau 2003: 36-37) 
The Bush doctrine's emphasis on the strategic concepts of preemption and prevention 
indicated that the Bush administration was not shying away from the use of military 
force if it was needed to support America's diplomatic efforts and to promote U. S. 
national interests. 287 If necessary, president Bush and his advisers stated, the United 
States would be prepared to preemptively resort to military force in order to undermine 
the effects of an imminent terrorist or military attack. In addition, by keeping the option 
of a preventive war open, the Bush administration made it also known that it was ready 
286 Following the events of September 11,2001, the Bush administration continued to promote its pet 
project, namely the NMD plan. In December 2001, president Bush announced that the United States 
would withdraw from the ABM Treaty because the document was preventing the Americans from 
developing defences against potential ballistic missile attacks by terrorists and rogue states. The U. S. 
withdrawal took effect on 13 June 2002. Six months later, in December 2002, the U. S. Department of 
Defense announced that it would begin deploying an initial ballistic missile defence system in 2004- 
2005. According to the Pentagon, the purpose of the deployment was to meet the near-term ballistic 
missile threat to the homeland, to deployed U. S. forces, as well as to the friends and allies of the United 
States. (The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty at a Glance 2003 and Kile 2003: 605-606) 
287 Inversely, the strong emphasis put on preemption and prevention showed that the Bush administration 
did not believe that military policies based on deterrence - the key strategic principle of the Cold War era 
- would be capable of containing the threats posed 
by international terrorism and rogue states (Evron 
2003: 24 and Jervis 2003: 369). 
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to destroy the military capabilities of the actors that were determined to attack America 
in the long term. (Evron 2003: 24-27) 
Indeed, it was the superior, unparalleled military strength of the United States which 
formed the cornerstone of the Bush government's post-September 11 campaign against 
international terrorism and rogue states. 288 As the United States was portrayed as being 
in the middle of a war, a "war on terror, " military force was defined by the Bush 
administration as a legitimate means to be used in defeating "terrorists and tyrants. " The 
Bush administration also believed that even if the rest of the world disapproved 
America's use of military force, or the way it wielded its political and economic 
influence to transform the world, the Americans would have to act unilaterally. In the 
view of president Bush and his advisers, the United States was the only power capable 
of creating a peaceful and stable world order. This being the case, the argument went, 
the United States would have to reshape the world and assert its hegemonic position in 
the international system. (Posen 2003: 6-7,45 and Jervis 2003: 373 -376) 
The belief that a state's foreign policy was determined by the nature of its domestic 
political system constituted another key component of the Bush doctrine. Authoritarian 
regimes, the representatives of the Bush administration maintained, were prone to 
aggressive and threatening behaviour, which also explained their interest in WMD. On 
the other hand, the Bush team argued, authoritarian regimes' mistreatment of their own 
citizens generated anger and frustration which served as a breeding ground for terrorist 
movements. These conclusions led the Bush administration to come up with the policy 
prescription that it was in the interest of America and other nations that the United 
States would embark upon strong measures to spread democracy throughout the world. 
(Jervis 2003: 365-368) 
For Iranian authorities, the post-September 11 shift in the Bush administration's 
foreign policy thinking represented a dangerous development. The fact that the Islamic 
Republic was viewed in Washington as a country that was interested in WMD, 
supported international terrorism, and oppressed its own people was nothing new in 
itself. Iran had already born the label of a rogue state for years. But whereas before 
September 11,2001, despite its hegemonic and unilateralist predispositions, 289 the Bush 
288 For a discussion of the various components of America's conventional military superiority - its 
command of the sea, space, and air -, see Posen (2003: 11-19). 289 According to Posen, by the late 1990s, the U. S. political elite had concluded that their country was by 
far the strongest power in the international system and needed to pursue a hegemonic foreign policy. 
What distinguished the Democrats and the Republicans from each other in this regard was the question of 
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administration had been pursuing a cautious foreign policy and been reluctant to 
intervene directly and militarily in international crises, 290 the post-September 11 U. S. 
approach posed serious challenges to Iranian decision-makers. Now the Iranians were 
confronted with an American administration that was speaking of the need to alter the 
status quo of international politics, was prepared to use military force to do that, had a 
strong domestic political backing, and was not willing to court the world opinion. 
The Bush administration's view that Islamic Iran was among the reasons why the 
United States had to revise its foreign policy was explicitly 'codified' in president 
Bush's state of the union address of 29 January 2002. In that speech, president Bush 
placed Iran - together with Iraq and North Korea - on an "axis of evil, " that is, among 
countries that were purportedly seeking WMD, exporting terror, and repressing their 
citizens. The three countries, the U. S. president warned, could provide WMD to 
terrorists or use such armaments to attack America's allies or to blackmail the United 
States. Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, president Bush claimed, posed a grave and a 
growing danger to the peace of the world. 291 
The state of the union address of January 2002 not only identified Iran as a country 
standing at the intersection of the United States' biggest security concerns, but it also 
implied that the Bush administration was determined to deal, in one way or the other, 
with the threat posed by the Islamic Republic and the other axis of evil countries. Thus, 
for the Iranians, the speech marked the beginning of a period during which Iran had to 
prepare itself for an imminent diplomatic or military confrontation with the United 
States. 
Following the January 2002 state of the union address, there were a number of 
developments that only intensified Iranian fears of a showdown with the Bush 
administration. In March 2002, the details of the new U. S. Nuclear Posture Review -a 
classified document mandated by the Congress to clarify U. S. nuclear deterrence policy 
and strategy for the next five to ten years - became available through the media. From 
the leaked portions of the review the authorities of the Islamic Republic learned that the 
Bush administration reserved itself the right to employ nuclear weapons in conflicts, 
irrespective of whether the adversaries of the United States had used WMD first. The 
how the United States would best promote its national interests. While the Democrats emphasized the 
importance of multilateral institutions in promoting American interests, the Republicans leant on a 
unilateral foreign policy orientation. (Posen 2003: 5-6) 
290 For a discussion of the Bush administration's pre-September 11 foreign policy, see Ben-Zvi (2003: 
15-17). 
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Iranians also learned that their country was listed in the posture document as one of the 
seven potential targets against which the United States should be prepared to use 
nuclear weapons. 292 (Arms Control Today, April 2002) 
On 17 September 2002, the Bush administration published The National Security 
Strategy of the United States, a compilation of statements and addresses made by 
president Bush which served as the official expression of the tenets of the Bush doctrine 
(Ben-Zvi 2003: 17). Later, in December 2002, the Bush administration released its 
National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction which elaborated on how 
the administration sought to stop and defend against the proliferation of chemical, 
biological, and nuclear weapons. The document spoke of a strategy based on three main 
pillars: counterproliferation, 293 non-proliferation, 294 and consequence management. 295 
The December 2002 document contained many of the elements the Bush 
administration had already raised in its prior statements and policy documents, 
including the principle that America would reserve itself the right to respond with all 
available military means to an attack carried out with nuclear, biological or chemical 
weapons against the United States, its forces abroad, or its friends and allies. The 
document also made mention of the concepts of preemption and prevention that were 
referred to by the Bush administration as potential counterproliferation measures. As far 
as the pillar of non-proliferation was concerned, the December 2002 document 
suggested that despite its skeptical view of the existing international arms control 
arrangements, the Bush team was willing to work within them and to contribute to their 
strengthening. 296 (National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction 2002: 3) 
291 The President's State of the Union Address (2002). 
292 Also see above the relevant passages in section 5.3.1.2. 
293 The counterproliferation pillar referred to measures to prevent the movement of WMD materials, 
technology, and expertise to hostile states and terrorist organizations. In addition, it referred to military 
and political tools that would be used to deter potential adversaries from seeking or using WMD. 
Furthermore, the concept of counterproliferation covered steps that would strengthen the ability of the 
United States to defend against WMD-armed adversaries and to mitigate the effects of WMD attacks 
against deployed American forces. For details, see National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (2002: 2-3). 
294 The non-proliferation pillar consisted of six elements: active non-proliferation diplomacy; multilateral 
regimes; non-proliferation and threat reduction cooperation; controls on nuclear materials; U. S. export 
controls; and non-proliferation sanctions. For details, see ibid. (3-5). 
295 Consequence management referred to the efforts by U. S. authorities to secure the preparedness of their 
country to respond to the consequences of WMD use on the American soil (ibid.: 5). 
2% Take, for example, the following excerpt from the December 2002 strategy document: "Existing 
nonproliferation and arms control regimes play an important role in our overall strategy. The United 
States will support those regimes that are currently in force, and work to improve the effectiveness of, and 
compliance with, those regimes. " As for nuclear arms control, the document stated that the U. S. 
diplomatic efforts aimed, among others, at the strengthening of the NPT and the IAEA, at promoting the 
ratification of an IAEA Additional Protocol by all NPT states parties, at negotiating a FMCT "that 
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Yet, the December 2002 document also made it clear that the Bush administration's 
arms control diplomacy would not solely rely on the existing multilateral arrangements. 
In addition to pointing to the importance of bilateral diplomatic measures, the paper 
emphasized that the United States would pursue "country-specific strategies" to deal 
with perceived WMD threats and "build coalitions" to support its diplomatic activities. 
Of course, the term "country-specific strategies" did not only refer to diplomatic 
measures, but also included the option of military force. In this sense, then, the 
December 2002 document served as another reminder of the Bush team's determination 
to act unilaterally and even to resort to military means if international cooperation did 
not contribute to the protection of America's vital security interests. 
Apart from the Bush administration's policy statements and documents - in which, as 
indicated above, Iran repeatedly played a central role as a threat -, the steps taken by the 
Bush team after September 11,2001, fundamentally transformed the Islamic Republic's 
security environment. Naturally, the U. S. military operations in Afghanistan and later in 
Iraq were the most significant developments in this respect. On 7 October 2001, after 
having quickly formed a broad international coalition with worldwide support, the 
Americans took preemptive military action against the ruling Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan and the Al-Qaida terrorists operating there. And on 19 March 2003, the 
U. S. military invaded Iraq in order to remove the regime of Saddam Hussein from 
power. While the toppling of the ruling regimes of Afghanistan and Iraq, two of Iran's 
major enemies at the time, served the Islamic Republic's immediate security interests, 
the Bush administration's military moves in Iran's neighbourhood posed a new dilemma 
for that country's leaders: Iran had become encircled by regimes with close political ties 
with Washington as well as by U. S. troops stationed on those countries' soil. 
advances U. S. security interests, " and at the strengthening of both the NSG and the Zangger Committee. 
(Ibid.: 4). The fact that the Bush team had coldshouldered many arms control arrangements and on-going 
multilateral diplomatic processes had led some observers to strongly criticize the administration's 
appoach to arms control diplomacy. Referring specifically to nuclear arms control, Perkovich (2003b: 8), 
for example, accused the Bush administration of diplomatic selectivity of three kinds. He characterized 
the Bush administration as follows: "It deems some states' nuclear weapons good, while others' are bad. 
It selects one treaty, the NPT, for enforcement while dismissing others. And it selects only some 
provisions of the NPT - the constraints on others - for enforcement. " However, as pointed out by Jervis 
(2003: 376), in the view of president Bush and his advisers the accusations of selectivity and political 
double standard ignored the fact that because of its role as the only country capable of securing world 
order, the United States could not always be bound by the same norms and rules as other nations. 
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5.3.3.2 The diplomatic showdown with the IAEA, 2002-2003 
The Bush doctrine and its call for an active and strong U. S. foreign policy raised 
concerns in many quarters of the world, not only in Tehran. Similarly, the Bush 
administration's way of dealing with the Islamic Republic and its nuclear program had 
its critics. Other major international players, such as the EU, Russia, and Japan, viewed 
the U. S. attempts to stigmatize and isolate Iran as undermining international efforts to 
induce the Iranians to abandon the worrying aspects of their policies. For the Islamic 
Republic, those powers' preference for engagement was a factor which enabled the 
Iranians to diplomatically circumvent, to some extent at least, the adverse effects of the 
U. S. diplomatic pressure. From autumn 2002 onwards, however, Iran's 
counterbalancing tactics began to lose their potency. This was due to the new 
revelations about the Islamic Republic's nuclear activities which raised serious 
questions about Iran's nuclear intentions and led the major powers to tighten their 
diplomatic ranks vis-a-vis Tehran. 
On 14 August 2002, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), the Paris- 
based political front of the MKO, released information indicating that the Islamic 
Republic was conducting secret nuclear activities at two sites previously unknown to 
the IAEA. One of the sites was told to be located near the city of Arak in western Iran, 
and as it became subsequently known, was a heavy water plant under construction. The 
second site, Natanz, was located near the city of Kashan and contained two facilities 
intended for the enrichment of uranium through the gas centrifuge enrichment 
technique. 
In September 2002, following the revelations by the NCRI, the head of the AEOI 
stated at the 46t 1 regular session of the IAEA's general conference that Iran was 
embarking on an ambitious long-term plan to construct nuclear power plants - the stated 
Iranian aim was to build a total reactor capacity of 6000 MW within two decades - and 
the associated technologies, including nuclear fuel-cycle facilities. More specifically, in 
September 2002, the Islamic Republic officially acknowledged to the IAEA that it was 
indeed building a heavy water production plant at Arak and a uranium enrichment 
facility at Natanz, 297 in addition to which the Iranians, caught off guard by the MKO's 
297 The information provided by the NCRI in August 2002 had suggested that the Iranians were building a 
nuclear fuel manufacturing plant at Natanz. Using satellite information and intelligence from its member 
states, however, the IAEA was able to conclude in September 2002 that Iran was actually constructing a 
uranium enrichment plant at the site. Subsequently, in March 2003, the United States revealed that it had 
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unexpected revelations, gave a positive response to the IAEA's request to visit the two 
sites later in the course of 2002. (Aghazadeh 2002: 3-4; GOV/2003/40,2003: 1-2 and 
Arms Control Today, April 2003) 
From a purely legal point of view, the Islamic Republic's construction activities at 
Arak and Natanz were consistent with its international disarmament commitments, for 
Iran's 1974 safeguards agreement with the IAEA did not obligate it to inform the 
agency of new nuclear facilities until six months before nuclear material was introduced 
into them. 298 In principle, thus, there was no legal obligation on the part of the Iranians 
to allow the IAEA to inspect the newly discovered sites. 299 In practice, however, the 
major international attention on the sites forced the Islamic Republic to respond to the 
IAEA's requests to visit Arak and Natanz and to answer IAEA officials' questions 
about the details of the Iranian nuclear program. (Albright and Hinderstein 2002 and 
Arms Control Today, January/February 2003) 
While under increasing international pressure, on 9 February 2003, president 
Khatami gave a landmark speech which indicated that Iran's nuclear activities were 
much more advanced than previously known. In his address, delivered during a meeting 
with Iranian university professors, Khatami stated that his country needed to control the 
entire nuclear fuel-cycle for the purpose of electricity production. He also made it clear 
that the Islamic Republic was determined to develop nuclear technology and that it was 
its legitimate right to do so. Furthermore, the Iranian president took the occasion to 
"assure all peace-loving individuals in the world that Iran's efforts in the field of nuclear 
provided information about Natanz to the IAEA but was not willing to specify when this had been done. 
(Albright and Hinderstein 2002; Albright 2003 and Arms Control Today, April 2003) 
298 According to U. S. officials, Iran was the only IAEA member state that still refrained from 
implementing the IAEA's request of 1992 - made as part of the efforts to strengthen the agency's 
verification capabilities - which called upon the member states to provide the IAEA with information 
about a new nuclear facility six months before the start of its construction (Arms Control Today, 
January/February 2003 and Albright and Hinderstein 2002). 
299 In order to refute the claim that their country was engaged in secret nuclear activities, Iranian officials 
subsequently referred not only to the content of its safeguards agreement with the IAEA but to other 
factors as well. For one thing, the Iranians maintained that their government's declaration in 2000 to the 
IAEA that it was planning to construct a uranium conversion facility in Isfahan had effectively amounted 
to an acknowledgement that it was interested in a uranium enrichment facility as well. Given that uranium 
hexafluoride, the conversion facility's main product, can only be used as the feedstock of a uranium 
enrichment project, the officials of the Islamic Republic asked how anybody could accuse Iran of being 
engaged in secret enrichment efforts. Also, the Iranians pointed out that they had informed the IAEA in 
June 2002 of their country's "involvement in the various fields of the fuel cycle. " Moreover, referring to 
the Arak heavy water production plant and to its "huge installations and distillation towers, " Iranian 
officials pointed out that such a construction could not be hidden from anyone. Finally, as far as the 
Natanz enrichment facility was concerned, the Iranians admitted that some structures at the Natanz 
facility had been built underground but emphasized that this was due to Iran's attempt to protect the 
facility from aerial attacks against it. (Memorandum from the Ambassador 2003: 1,3-4; Foreign Ministry 
Memorandum 2003: 3-4 and Aghazadeh 2003a: 8) 
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technology are focused on civilian application and nothing else. " (The New York Times, 
10 February 2003) 
In regards to the practical steps Iran was taking in the area of nuclear fuel-cycle, 
president Khatami pointed out that the Islamic Republic had started to mine uranium 
near the city of Yazd, was building a uranium oxide production facility, and had almost 
finished a uranium conversion facility in Isfahan. In addition, he acknowledged the 
existence of the enrichment plant at Natanz and made it known that Iran was also 
working on a nuclear fuel manufacturing plant. (Albright 2003 and Arms Control 
Today, March 2003) 
Referring to allegations that the Islamic Republic's nuclear fuel-cycle activities 
testified to Iran's interest in nuclear weapons, president Khatami emphasized that the 
Islamic Republic was cooperating with the IAEA and "welcomed international 
supervision to dispel the lies being fabricated against Iran. " Despite its initial promises 
to let the IAEA visit Arak and Natanz in the course of 2002, however, the Islamic 
Republic had cancelled, without giving a reason, the IAEA delegation's trip to Iran that 
had been planned for December 2002.30° In the end, an IAEA delegation led by 
Mohamed ElBaradei, the agency's director-general, visited the country on 21-22 
February 2003 and presented questions to the authorities of the Islamic Republic about 
the newly discovered Iranian sites and about Iran's plans for the use of nuclear power. 
(The New York Times, 10 February 2003; Albright and Hinderstein 2002 and Arms 
Control Today, January/February 2003) 
In many ways, the IAEA's February 2003 trip marked the beginning of the 
unwinding of the Iranian nuclear tangle. The information either confirmed or provided 
by the Islamic Republic during that visit not only formed the basis for the IAEA's 
subsequent inspections on the various aspects of the Iranian nuclear program, but it also 
increasingly tied Iran's authorities to a diplomatic process from which they could not 
have withdrawn without major international uproar. Following the February 2003 
encounter, thus, the IAEA was able to start to delve into Iran's nuclear activities and to 
ultimately shed a great deal of new light on the country's nuclear program. 
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The IAEA 's initial findings 
During the IAEA delegation's trip to Iran in February 2003, director-general 
ElBaradei called on Iran to follow a policy of transparency vis-a-vis the agency and to 
conclude an IAEA additional protocol in order to provide credible assurances that there 
were no undeclared nuclear activities in the country. The authorities of the Islamic 
Republic replied by emphasizing their commitment to nuclear transparency and by 
promising to "actively consider" the signing of the protocol. In addition, the Iranians 
informed the director-general of their readiness to amend their safeguards agreement 
according to the request made by the IAEA board of governors in 1992,301 and as a 
consequence, inform the IAEA of new nuclear facilities as well as of modifications to 
existing nuclear facilities as soon as a decision to construct, authoritize construction, or 
to carry out modifications had been taken. (Statements of the Director-General 2003 
and GOV/2003/40,2003: 2-4) 
At the same time, however, Iranian officials pointed out to the director-general that 
they were committed to developing the entire range of nuclear fuel-cycle facilities and 
that the NPT affirmed their right to do so. The Iranians also argued that the IAEA had a 
responsibility to help their country in obtaining civil nuclear assistance. Further 
implying that the Islamic Republic's future collaboration with the IAEA would not be 
unconditional, Iranian authorities expressed their hope that their cooperation with the 
agency would be concretely rewarded. (Albright and Hinderstein 2003a) 
Referring to its policy of openness, in February 2003, the Islamic Republic provided 
the IAEA with information about its fuel-cycle plans and allowed the agency to visit the 
Natanz uranium enrichment site. The site included a gas centrifuge pilot plant nearly 
ready for operation and a large commercial-scale fuel enrichment plant still under 
construction. The Iranians told the IAEA of their plan to install 1,000 centrifuges at the 
pilot plant by the end of 2003, and that the commercial-scale plant would ultimately 
contain over 50,000 centrifuges. 302 The officials of the Islamic Republic also stated that 
300 Originally, an IAEA visit to Iran had been scheduled for October 2002 (GOV/2003/40,2003: 2). 
301 Iran confirmed its acceptance of such an amendment to its safeguards agreement in a letter of 26 
February 2003 to the IAEA (ibid. ). 
'02 Based on this information, Albright and Hinderstein estimate that if tapped solely for military 
purposes, the Natanz facilities could annually produce some 500 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium. 
That amount would be enough for some 25-30 nuclear bombs per year. Albright and Hinderstein also 
point out that if deemed necessary, Iran could rapidly switch over from producing low enriched uranium 
for its nuclear reactors to making weapon-grade uranium at Natanz. The amount of enriched uranium 
needed for one nuclear weapon could be produced in a few days. (Albright and Hinderstein 2003b) 
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the pilot plant was scheduled to start enriching uranium in June 2003, whereas the work 
for the placement of centrifuges in the commercial-scale plant would commence in early 
2005.303 Furthermore, the IAEA learned that the Natanz site housed facilities devoted to 
the assembly and testing of centrifuges. (GOV/2003/40,2003: 2,5-6 and Albright and 
Hinderstein 2003a) 
At the time of the IAEA delegation's February 2003 tour at Natanz, there was no 
nuclear material in the centrifuges observed at the site. In fact, Iranian officials told the 
delegation that the activities related to the testing of individual centrifuges and to the 
development of an optimized centrifuge design prior to the pilot plant's construction 
had solely based on extensive modelling and simulation. 304 In short, Iran claimed that it 
had not theretofore enriched any uranium. Given the Natanz facilities' advanced 
state, 305 and the fact that centrifuge testing and design optimization would normally 
involve the enrichment of small amounts of uranium, the IAEA delegates found the 
Iranian explanation unconvincing. Thus, in order to answer the question of how the 
Islamic Republic's centrifuge program had reached its existing status without any tests 
involving the use of nuclear material, as well as to investigate the possibility that Iran 
had secretly enriched uranium at another location, the IAEA raised the issue with 
Iranian officials, and consequently, was also allowed to take environmental samples at 
the Natanz pilot plant. 306 (GOV/2003/40,2003: 2-3,6 and Albright and Hinderstein 
2003b) 
During their February 2003 meeting with the authorities of the Islamic Republic, the 
IAEA delegates raised the name of another Iranian facility that was believed to be 
303 The Iranians did not indicate when the commercial-scale Natanz plant was expected to be ready for 
operation (ibid. ). 
304 The Iranians also stated that the design and development work on their centrifuge enrichment program 
had commenced in 1997 (GOV/2003/63,2003: 6). As far as the source of origin of Iran's centrifuge 
equipment was concerned, the IAEA delegation was not able to draw definitive conclusions in the matter. 
However, there were suspicions at the time that contrary to the initial Iranian claim that its centrifuge 
program was entirely indigenous, the Islamic Republic had received centrifuge design and equipment 
assistance from Pakistan and that Iran's centrifuge design was similar to the one secretly obtained by 
Pakistan from the Netherlands in the mid-1970s. (Albright and Hinderstein 2003a and 2003b and Arms 
Control Today, September 2003) 
305 According to one report on the IAEA delegation's February 2003 visit to Natanz, the delegates were 
taken aback by the sophistication of the site's facilities (Arms Control Today, April 2003). Albright and 
Hinderstein (2003a) point out that the IAEA's February 2003 visit to the Islamic Republic confirmed the 
fact that Iran had become a member of an "exclusive club of some 10 nations that can build gas 
centrifuges. " 
306 To support their claim that the Islamic Republic had a nuclear weapons program, U. S. officials argued 
that the Islamic Republic would not have invested in a large and sophisticated uranium enrichment 
facility such as the one in Natanz without sufficient testing, that is, without having enriched uranium. The 
Americans also maintained that there was no precedent for testing centrifuges through simulations. (Arms 
Control Today, April 2003 and July/August 2003) 
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linked to Iran's gas centrifuge enrichment activities, namely that of the Kalaye Electric 
Company. Alluding to media reports suggesting that the company acted as the 
headquarters of Iran's centrifuge program and as the site for many of the program's 
research and development activities, the IAEA requested Iran to elaborate on the 
workshop's role in its nuclear program. Iranian officials responded by saying that the 
facility was a watch factory which had also been used to produce centrifuge 
components, but they strongly rejected the claim that uranium had been enriched at the 
site. (GOV/2003/40,2003: 2 and Albright and Hinderstein 2003a and 2003b) 
The IAEA delegates asked Iran's permission to visit the workshop as well as to take 
environmental samples there, but their request was declined. According to Iranian 
officials, the Islamic Republic was not obliged to allow visits to and environmental 
sampling at the site because it had not concluded the IAEA additional protocol. Later, in 
March 2003, however, the IAEA was permitted to visit limited parts of the site, 307 and 
in May 2003, the agency was given full access to the workshop. Nevertheless, Iran still 
refused to allow environmental sampling at the facility. (GOV/2003,40: 2003: 2-3) 
The acknowledgement by Iranian officials that they were in possession of an 
undeclared batch of natural uranium originating from China constituted another key 
finding of the IAEA's February 2003 visit to Iran. The Iranians, who disclosed the 
transaction only after Chinese officials had first confirmed it to the IAEA, said that they 
had received natural uranium in the form of uranium hexafluoride - the gaseous feed 
material for gas centrifuges -, uranium tetrafluoride, and uranium dioxide from the 
Chinese in 1991.308 The officials of the Islamic Republic told the IAEA that they had 
not processed any of the imported uranium hexafluoride and specifically emphasized 
that no enrichment, centrifuge, or other tests had been conducted with the material. In 
regards to the other nuclear materials imported from China, Iran informed the IAEA that 
most of the uranium tetrafluoride obtained had been converted to uranium metal and 
that some of the uranium dioxide had been used for the testing of uranium purification 
and conversion processes. (Ibid.: 2,4-5) 
307 During its March 2003 visit to the Kalaye site, the IAEA was denied access to two of the facility's 
rooms. It was claimed at the time that the rooms in question had initially contained centrifuges and that 
the limits set by the Iranians testified to the Islamic Republic's attempt to clear out any evidence of 
uranium enrichment at the site. Later, in 2004, the IAEA confirmed the validity of such claims. (Albright 
and Hinderstein 2003b and GOV/2004/83,2004: 7) 
308 The Islamic Republic confirmed the importation of natural uranium from China in a separate letter to 
the IAEA on 26 February 2003 (GOV/2003/40,2003: 2). 
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After having inspected the containers of the imported uranium hexafluoride in March 
2003, however, the IAEA concluded that a small amount of the material was missing. 
The Iranians responded to the finding by maintaining that two of the three cylinders 
containing the material had leaked. But given the possibility that the missing material 
had actually been used in connection with Iran's centrifuge enrichment program, the 
IAEA kept on investigating the matter. Also, the agency's inspectors were interested in 
the role of uranium metal in the Islamic Republic's fuel cycle efforts, for as neither 
Iran's light water reactors nor its planned heavy water reactor would require uranium 
metal as fuel, the production of uranium metal - which is suitable for the fabrication of 
nuclear weapons components - could have been indicative of a nuclear weapons effort 
making use of metallic forms of natural uranium or HEU. (Ibid.: 4-5 and Albright and 
Hinderstein 2003b) 
During their February 2003 meeting with the IAEA delegation in Iran, the officials of 
the Islamic Republic also reconfirmed that they were constructing a heavy water 
production plant at Arak. And in a letter dated 5 May 2003, the Iranians informed the 
IAEA for the first time of their plan to construct a heavy water research reactor at 
Arak. 309 According to Iranian authorities, the purpose of the 40 MW plant - which was 
named the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor, or the IR-40, and would use natural uranium 
dioxide fuel and heavy water both as a coolant and moderator - was to produce 
radioisotopes and to serve as a training facility. 310 The construction of the IR-40 was set 
out to start in 2004. Moreover, Iran made it known that apart from the planned heavy 
water production plant and research reactor, its heavy water reactor program would 
include the construction of a nuclear fuel manufacturing plant at Isfahan. Iranian 
authorities said that the construction of the Isfahan facility - whose stated purpose was 
to fabricate fuel assemblies for the IR-40 as well as for the Bushehr-1 light water reactor 
- was supposed to begin in 2003. Fuel production at Isfahan was planned to start in 
2007. (GOV/2003/40,2003: 2-3,6) 
309 Unauthorized technical assistance provided to the Islamic Republic by Russian nuclear experts and 
institutes played an important role in the Iranian projects to construct the Arak heavy water production 
plant and the Arak heavy water research reactor. In spite of the December 1995 Gore-Chernomyrdin 
agreement, which had placed a ban on Russian-Iranian nuclear cooperation outside the Bushehr project, 
individual Russian nuclear experts and institutes, especially since the late 1990s, had continued to provide 
highly valuable technical assistance to Iran's nuclear activities in a number of areas. (Iran's Strategic 
Weapons Programmes 2005: 13) 
310 Heavy water reactors - which use natural or non-enriched uranium as 
fuel - can produce significant 
amounts of plutonium. According to one estimate, a power plant such as the IR-40 could produce 8-10 
kilograms of plutonium each year, enough for one or two nuclear weapons (Bowen and Kidd 2004: 261). 
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Isfahan acted as the site for yet another Iranian nuclear facility, namely for the 
uranium conversion plant which president Khatami had referred to in his 9 February 
2003 speech. The purpose of the almost finished conversion facility - which had been 
officially declared to the IAEA already in the summer of 2000 - was to transform 
uranium ore concentrate into uranium dioxide, uranium tetrafluoride, and in particular, 
into uranium hexafluoride. 311 In the course of the IAEA's February 2003 visit to Iran, 
the officials of the Islamic Republic claimed that they had designed the facility without 
having operated any laboratory or pilot facilities using nuclear material to test the most 
difficult conversion processes, including the production of uranium hexafluoride. 
Doubtful of the accuracy of the Iranian claim, the IAEA posed additional questions to 
the Iranians on the matter and continued to investigate it. 312 (GOV/2003/40,2003: 5-6 
and Albright and Hinderstein 2003b) 
There were two other major questions related to Iran's nuclear fuel-cycle efforts that 
called for additional questioning and investigations on the part of the IAEA. For one 
thing, in 2003, the Islamic Republic acknowledged for the first time that it had a 
substantial research and development program on lasers. According to the Iranians, 
however, their laser program did not include any activities related to uranium 
enrichment. For another, in April 2003, Iranian authorities informed the IAEA that 
some of the uranium dioxide imported from China in 1991 had been used in 
experiments involving the production and irradiation of natural uranium targets. This 
information, combined with previous Iranian statements suggesting that the Islamic 
Republic was interested in the capability to reuse nuclear fuel from power reactors, gave 
rise to the concern that Iran was conducting research on plutonium separation. 
(GOV/2003/40,2003: 5 and Albright and Hinderstein 2003a and 2003b) 
311 The construction of the Isfahan uranium conversion facility had started in 1999. According to Iran, the 
plant had originally been based on a design provided by a foreign supplier - that is, China - in the mid- 
1990s. However, in 1997, due to strong U. S. pressure, China had cancelled its contract to build the 
Isfahan plant. Still, the Chinese had reportedly agreed to provide the Iranians with the blueprints needed 
for the facility's construction. Subsequently, Iranian officials confirmed the receipt of the blueprints to the 
IAEA, but they also maintained that all the parts and the equipment for the plant had been manufactured 
domestically based on detailed designs developed without outside assistance. (GOV/2003/75,2003, 
Annex 1: 1 and Gill 1998) 
312 IAEA experts' doubts over the accuracy of the Iranian claim stemmed from the fact that, normally, 
states first validate uranium conversion processes and carry out pilot scale production before proceeding 
to the final design and construction of a commercial conversion plant (GOV/2003/75,2003, Annex 1: 1). 
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The June 2003 meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors 
At the time of the publication of the IAEA director-general's June 2003 report on 
Iran, then, there were still many open questions about the content and purpose of the 
Islamic Republic's nuclear fuel cycle efforts. But even though the IAEA's work on Iran 
in the first half of 2003 had focused first and foremost on putting an investigation 
process in motion, by June 2003, the agency - whose inspectors, as mentioned above, 
had theretofore never found any of the Islamic Republic's nuclear activities to be in 
violation of its safeguards agreement - had been able to draw one definite conclusion 
about Iran's implementation of the agreement. As stated in the IAEA director-general's 
June 2003 report, by not informing the IAEA of its 1991 nuclear material imports from 
China, of the subsequent processing and use of those materials, as well as of the 
facilities where the materials were stored and processed, the Islamic Republic had 
"failed to meet its obligations" under its safeguards agreement. Even though the 
quantities of the nuclear materials in question had not been large, and although they 
would need further processing before being usable for military purposes, the director- 
general's report noted, Iran's reporting failures were "a matter of concern. , 313 
(GOV/2003/40,2003: 7) 
In its statement of 19 June 2003, the 35-member IAEA board of governors shared the 
concern expressed by the director-general over the Islamic Republic's failure to report 
nuclear materials, facilities, and activities as required by its safeguards obligations, as 
well as underscored the importance of resolving all the open questions concerning the 
Iranian nuclear program. The board called on Iran to rectify all the safeguards problems 
identified in the director-general's report, to cooperate fully with IAEA inspectors in 
their on-going work on the Islamic Republic's nuclear program, and to grant them "all 
access deemed necessary by the Agency in order to create the necessary confidence in 
the international community. " Specifically, the board asked Iranian authorities to allow 
313 In their letter of 26 February 2003 to the IAEA, Iranian authorities had stated that they had thought 
that the Islamic Republic had been under no obligation to declare the natural uranium shipment from 
China because the total amount of the nuclear materials imported had not exceeded one effective 
kilogram. As noted by the IAEA, however, the Iranian interpretation had based on an incorrect reading of 
the country's safeguards agreement. (GOV/2003/75,2003: 4). Iranian officials sought to downplay the 
relevance of their reporting failures by noting that IAEA member states' safeguards declarations to the 
agency were regularly tinged with minor deficiencies. Using the agency's safeguards implementation 
report of 2002 as an example, the Islamic Republic's IAEA representative said that the report clearly 
showed that "hardly any Member State can claim to be impeccable. " What really mattered, the Iranian 
representative underscored, was to see whether a member state was prepared to rectify its possible 
failures. (Salehi 2003b: 3) 
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environmental sampling at the Kalaye Electric Company, encouraged the Islamic 
Republic not to introduce nuclear material into the pilot enrichment plant at Natanz, as 
well as urged Iran to "promptly and unconditionally conclude and implement an 
additional protocol to its Safeguards Agreement. " In addition, the board asked the 
director-general to provide a follow-up report on Iran whenever appropriate. (IAEA 
Media Advisory 2003/72,2003) 
While being an amalgam of the various diplomatic positions taken by the individual 
members of the board of governors, the board's June 2003 statement was strongly 
influenced by the major powers' views about the case. Generally, the statement 
suggested that the major powers' attitudes towards Iran had approached each other. On 
the one hand, the United States, fully occupied with its invasion of Iraq, had made it 
known that it favoured a diplomatic solution to the Iran affair and supported the IAEA's 
central role in the matter. 314 On the other hand, EU states, Japan, and Russia - countries 
that had traditionally regarded U. S. assessments of the scope of Iran's nuclear program 
and of its nuclear intentions as too alarmist - had hardened their stance vis-a-vis the 
Islamic Republic by strictly emphasizing that the onus for proving that Iran was 
observing its NPT commitments was on the Iranians themselves. They had also 
requested the Islamic Republic to provide credible assurances regarding the peaceful 
nature of its nuclear activities without any preconditions. 315 
314 The U. S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, for example, stated in mid-May 2003 that the United States 
did not plan to take military action to stop the Islamic Republic's nuclear activities. Nonetheless, the 
United States made it also clear that, as stated by president Bush on 18 June 2003, it would "not tolerate 
the construction of a nuclear weapon" in Iran. (Reuters, 15 May 2003 and The New York Times, 19 June 
2003) 
315 Note, for example, EU foreign ministers' statement of 16 June 2003 which called on Iran to cooperate 
fully with the IAEA and to implement urgently and unconditionally the IAEA additional protocol, and 
which implied that the fate of the on-going talks on a trade and cooperation agreement between the EU 
and Iran was linked to the resolution of the nuclear issue (Albright and Hinderstein 2003b). It has been 
argued that the EU adopted a tougher approach to the Iranian nuclear program after the IAEA's February 
2003 findings concerning the Islamic Republic's nuclear fuel-cycle activities. In addition, it has been 
suggested that the Iran case provided a good opportunity for EU countries - and for many others that 
opposed the U. S. invasion of Iraq - to cooperate and warm up their relations with the Americans. 
(Dealing with Iran's Nuclear Program 2003: 24 and Shaffer 2003). As far as Russia, Iran's close nuclear 
partner, was concerned, the new information about the Islamic Republic's nuclear program had reportedly 
surprised Russian authorities, too. According to Russian officials, Iran had not informed them about its 
fuel-cycle activities. As a result, Russia had called on the Iranians to sign the IAEA additional protocol 
and to cooperate with the agency in resolving the unsettled issues related to their nuclear program. 
Simultaneously, however, the Russians had made it clear that even if the Iranians ultimately refused to 
accede to the additional protocol, they would not stop the execution of the Bushehr project. Japan, the 
Islamic Republic's most important export partner, had also called on Iranian authorities to sign the 
additional protocol and to answer all the questions posed by the IAEA. China, another key international 
player and trade partner of Iran, had adopted a cautious approach to the issue in order to secure its 
interests both vis-ä-vis the Islamic Republic and the countries that were putting diplomatic pressure on 
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Nevertheless, despite the shared concern that the Islamic Republic was moving 
towards obtaining a capability to produce HEU and separated plutonium for weapons 
purposes, the basic diplomatic gulf between the United States and other major powers 
regarding how to respond to the Iran issue remained. The Bush administration - 
convinced that the new information about the Islamic Republic's nuclear activities 
pointed to the existence of a nuclear weapons program316 - took the view that the 
Iranian nuclear problem should be solved by promoting regime change in that country. 
The call for a regime change based on the Bush administration's belief that a new 
Iranian regime would not necessarily be interested in nuclear weapons and especially 
not in using them to threaten the United States or its allies. By isolating the Islamic 
Republic internationally through unilateral and multilateral diplomatic means, the 
Americans asserted, the major powers could simultaneously advance the longer-term 
goal of a regime change in Tehran and the short-term objective of preventing Iran from 
importing and developing nuclear capabilities. (Shaffer 2003) 
In the context of the IAEA, the Bush administration translated its beliefs on Iran into 
a diplomatic line that sought to argue the agency into declaring that Iran had violated its 
obligations under the NPT. The purpose of the U. S. effort was to force the board of 
governors to report, in accordance with article XII of the IAEA statute, a case of non- 
compliance to the UN Security Council, which could then place the issue on its agenda 
and, if so decided, authorize sanctions or even military action against the Islamic 
Republic. Yet, the U. S. diplomatic approach was opposed by the other major powers as 
well as by the majority of the board members. The countries objecting to the U. S. 
approach wanted to influence Iran's behaviour by not only putting pressure on it, but 
also by engaging the Islamic Republic in a diplomatic process that would encourage the 
Iranians to cooperate with and consent to the wishes of the international community. 317 
(IHT, 8 May 2003 and AP, 9 May 2003) 
Iran, but in the end, had lent its support to the board of governors' June 2003 statement. (Albright and 
Hinderstein 2003a and 2003b and Dealing with Iran's Nuclear Program 2003: 25-26) 
316 The spokesman of the State Department, for example, had stated in December 2002 that the United 
States believed that the Iranian nuclear program was not peaceful and that the Islamic Republic was 
actively aiming for a nuclear weapons capability. Similarly, on 28 April 2003, the United States had 
declared that the Islamic Republic had an alarming, clandestine nuclear weapons program and that the 
Iranians were "going down the same path of denial and deception that handicapped international 
inspections in North Korea and Iraq. " (Arms Control Today, January/February 2003 and Reuters, 28 May 
2003) 
317 Prior to the IAEA board's June 2003 meeting, the Islamic Republic's IAEA representative had called 
on the board members not to use "the language of force and threat" in their statement on Iran, arguing that 
such language would be "futile and not conducive to the final achievement of our common goal. " 
Commenting on the board's Iran statement of 19 June 2003, the head of the AEOI stated the following: 
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The September 2003 meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors 
Following the June 2003 Iran report by the IAEA director-general and the meeting of 
the board of governors, the agency's inspectors continued their investigations of the 
Islamic Republic's nuclear fuel-cycle activities. By 26 August 2003, when the director- 
general published his follow-up report on Iran, they had managed to bring out new 
information about the Islamic Republic's nuclear program. A significant part of the new 
data concerned Iran's centrifuge enrichment efforts. In the first place, the IAEA had 
witnessed that contrary to the request made by the board of governors on 19 June 2003, 
the Iranians had begun to test centrifuges with nuclear material at the Natanz pilot plant. 
Six days after the board's request, on 25 June 2003, Iran had introduced uranium 
hexafluoride into the first centrifuge for the purpose of single machine testing. Then, on 
19 August 2003, it had started the testing of a small ten-machine cascade with uranium 
hexafluoride. (GOV/2003/63,2003: 7) 
At the time of the commencement of single machine testing at Natanz, the authorities 
of the Islamic Republic had still maintained that, prior to that date, no uranium had ever 
been enriched by them. However, the IAEA had found this Iranian claim increasingly 
questionable. There were two developments that had significantly contributed to IAEA 
inspectors' suspicions. For one thing, in June 2003, on the basis of their visit to Iran that 
month, IAEA officials had concluded that Iran would not have been able to develop 
enrichment technology to the level seen at Natanz without prior use of uranium 
hexafluoride for the purpose of centrifuge testing and design optimization. 318 For 
another, in June 2003, the IAEA had been able to confirm the discovery of HEU 
particles from its environmental samples taken at the Natanz plant in the spring of 
2003.319 (Ibid.: 6-7) 
Despite the IAEA's efforts, in June and early July 2003, to discuss the issue of 
centrifuge testing as well as the HEU discovery with Iranian authorities, the Islamic 
Republic had been unwilling to answer the IAEA's questions. In August 2003, however, 
"When we carefully consider the background, the extensive propaganda and many words from the U. S. 
for the past several months [... ] our correctness and the failure of the U. S. is clear. " In connection with 
the IAEA board's June 2003 meeting, the Iranians had expressed their deep gratitude to the members of 
the NAM for their solidarity and constructive deliberations, as well as for their diplomatic support for the 
Islamic Republic. (Salehi 2003b: 1,5 and IHT, 20 June 2003) 
318 In the wake of its investigations in Iran in June 2003, the IAEA had also come to the conclusion that 
the Iranian gas centrifuges at Natanz had been of early European design (GOV/2003/63,2003: 6). 
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the Iranians had ultimately agreed to provide their explanations for the IAEA's findings. 
As for the discovery of HEU, Iranian representatives had maintained that the enriched 
uranium detected at Natanz had ended up there on the centrifuge components they had 
obtained from abroad. They had also stressed that the HEU particles could not have 
originated from Iranian activities, for the Islamic Republic had never conducted any 
uranium enrichment activities prior to 25 June 2003, not even when testing centrifuges. 
Relatedly, the Iranians had kept on clinging to the argument that the missing uranium 
hexafluoride imported from China in 1991 had leaked from the cylinders containing the 
material. (Ibid.: 2-7) 
In addition to presenting its explanation for the discovery of the HEU particles as 
well as for the matter of centrifuge testing, in August 2003, Iran had also provided new 
information about its centrifuge enrichment program. The Iranians had told the IAEA 
that the program had been launched already in 1985 and not in 1997 as previously 
claimed. 320 During the program's first phase from 1985 until 1997, the Iranians had 
told, their activities had mainly taken place at AEOI premises in Tehran and included 
the importation of centrifuge components both by Iranian entities and through foreign 
intermediaries. 32 1 During this period, in 1987, the Iranians had added, the Islamic 
Republic had also received the drawings for its centrifuges from abroad. 322 Yet, Iranian 
319 The IAEA had relayed the sampling results to the Islamic Republic on 11 June 2003. Later, in August 
2003, the IAEA had confirmed to Iran that its inspectors had actually found two types of HEU from the 
environmental samples taken at Natanz. (Ibid.: 2,7) 
320 This revelation had also proved wrong the original Iranian assertion that due to international obstacles 
put in the way of Iranian nuclear technology imports, the Islamic Republic had started its uranium 
enrichment and heavy water reactor projects at the same time. According to the Iranians' initial 
explanation, the purpose of the simultaneous launch had been to ensure that at least one of the two 
projects would turn out to be successful. Iranian officials had claimed that their two-track approach had 
been "the only natural course that has been pursued by all other countries that have successfully 
developed their indigenous nuclear technology. " Given that, in the end, Iran had achieved a breakthrough 
in both areas, the officials of the Islamic Republic had explained, their government had made the decision 
to build both light and heavy water reactors. (Salehi 2003a: 3-4; Aghazadeh 2003a: 11-12 and 
Memorandum from the Ambassador 2003: 4) 
321 Also, in August 2003, Iran had agreed to provide the IAEA with all information about the centrifuge 
components and other contaminated equipment it had acquired from abroad, including their origin and the 
locations where they had been stored and used in Iran. Despite the IAEA's conclusion in June 2003 that 
the Iranian centrifuges were of an early European design, however, the question of the centrifuges' origin 
had remained open. France, for example, had maintained in May 2003 that the centrifuges were likely of 
Pakistani origin. (GOV/2003/63,2003: 9 and Arms Control Today, September 2003) 
322 As it later turned out, Iran had received the centrifuge components and drawings from the international 
nuclear smuggling network led by Abdul Qadir Khan, the assumed father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons. 
According to a one-page handwritten document shown to the IAEA by Iran in January 2005, the Khan 
network's 1987 assistance offer to Iran had included the following elements: a disassembled sample P-1 
centrifuge machine, drawing, specifications and calculations for a complete centrifuge plant, and 
materials for 2,000 P-1 centrifuge machines. In addition, the Iranians told the IAEA that the 1987 offer 
had also included vacuum and electric drive equipment used in a centrifuge plant and equipment to 
reduce uranium hexafluoride to metal and cast uranium metal - necessary to fabricate nuclear weapons 
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officials had pointed out that their country had not received any outside help to put the 
centrifuges together or to provide assembly-related training. In the course of the 
program's second phase, from 1997 through 2002, Iran had reportedly concentrated its 
activities at the Kalaye Electric Company and focused on the assembly and testing of 
centrifuges. 323 During the program's third phase, from 2002 onwards, the Iranians had 
moved their research and development activities to Natanz. 324 (Ibid.: 6-7) 
On 12 August 2003, after a series of rejections, the Islamic Republic had let the 
IAEA visit two further Iranian sites, Ramandih and Lashkarabad, 325 which had been 
suspected of being locations for not just centrifuge enrichment but for laser enrichment 
as well. The visits to the sites - the names of which had been publicly associated with 
the Iranian nuclear program in May 2003 by the NCRI - had indicated that the 
Ramandih site, even if belonging to the AEOI, had mainly been involved in agricultural 
studies unrelated to nuclear fuel-cycle activities. The Lashkarabad site, in turn, had been 
identified as a laser testing facility, but the inspectors of the IAEA had not found any 
enrichment activities being conducted there. Still, the IAEA had asked Iran to confirm 
that no activities related to uranium laser enrichment had taken place at Lashkarabad or 
at any other location in the country in the past. Furthermore, the IAEA had asked the 
Iranians for a permission to take environmental samples at Lashkarabad. (Ibid.: 2-3,8; 
Arms Control Today, September 2003 and Squassoni 2003: 2) 
As far as the Islamic Republic's heavy water reactor program was concerned, on 13 
July 2003 the Iranians had told the IAEA that they had opted for the construction of the 
IR-40 because their prior efforts to import a research reactor suitable for medical and 
industrial isotope production and for nuclear research and development had failed. In 
components. However, according to Iranian officials, the Islamic Republic had only purchased some of 
the equipment offered in 1987, such as a set of designs and sample components for the P-I centrifuge, but 
not the reduction and casting equipment, which it had not asked for. (Iran's Strategic Weapons 
Programme 2005: 46-47). For a general discussion of the Khan network's clients and activities, see 
Albright and Hinderstein (2005). 
323 After a number of specific requests made by the IAEA, in August 2003 Iran had allowed the agency to 
take environmental samples at the Kalaye Electric Company. Nonetheless, the Iranians had significantly 
modified the workshop's premises since the IAEA's first visit there in March 2003. Because of the 
modifications made at the site, the IAEA had warned that it might not be able to guarantee the accuracy 
of the samples taken there and the validity of its conclusions about the activities carried out at the site. 
Rejecting the claim that they had sanitized the workshop rooms before allowing environmental sampling 
to take place, Iranian officials had said that they had made the modifications in order to transform the 
workshop from a storage facility into a laboratory. (GOV/2003/63,2003: 2-3,7 and Albright and 
Hinderstein 2003b) 
324 Iran had started the construction of the pilot- and industrial-scale centrifuge facilities at Natanz around 
2000 (Iran 's Strategic Weapons Programmes 2005: 14). 
325 The villages of Ramandih and Lashkarabad are located near the city of Hashtgird in the Tehran 
province of Iran. 
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order to secure the continuation of such activities and to render the replacement of the 
old research reactor in Tehran possible, the Iranians had stated, they had not seen any 
other option than to build a heavy water reactor which could use domestically produced 
uranium dioxide and zirconium. Iranian officials had also informed the IAEA that the 
planned Arak reactor based on indigenous design and was now moving from the basic 
design phase to the detailed design phase. (GOV/2003/63,2003: 8) 
On 4 August 2003, Iran had provided the IAEA with additional information about its 
heavy water reactor program. Contrary to the IAEA's expectations, however, the 
information had made no mention of hot cells, that is, of facilities which are commonly 
used in isotope production but which can also be used in the separation of plutonium 
from spent nuclear reactor fuel. In the wake of the lack of Iranian references to hot cells 
and recent media reports that claimed that the Islamic Republic had been trying to 
procure equipment used in hot cells from abroad, the IAEA had asked Iranian officials 
to "further look into the matter. " (Ibid.: 8-9 and Arms Control Today, September 2003) 
In the summer of 2003, the IAEA had also kept on inquiring into the Islamic 
Republic's uranium conversion efforts. As a result of the IAEA's investigations, the 
Iranians had informed the agency, on 19 August 2003, that contrary to their earlier 
claim that their country had not conducted any conversion-related research and 
development using nuclear material, Iran had secretly conducted uranium tetrafluoride 
conversion experiments on a laboratory scale at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center in 
the early 1990s. (GOV/2003/63,2003: 4,9 and GOV/2003/75,2003: 5) 
Similarly, in the early 1990s, the Iranians had told the IAEA in July 2003, the Islamic 
Republic had carried out numerous experiments related to the production of uranium 
metal. Responding to the IAEA's question of why Iran needed uranium metal, Iranian 
officials had stated that the uranium metal was intended for the production of a material 
that shields against radiation in containers storing irradiated nuclear fuel or materials. 
Also, the Iranians had added, uranium metal experiments had been viewed in their 
country as a means to gain know-how in nuclear material production. The fact that the 
Islamic Republic had, on 24 August 2003, finally expressed its readiness to start 
negotiations with the IAEA for the conclusion of an additional protocol had improved 
the agency's chances to verify the correctness of Iran's uranium metal claims as well as 
to investigate the other issues concerning the Islamic Republic's nuclear program that 
had continued to remain open. (GOV/2003/63,2003: 3,5; GOV/2003/75,2003: 5 and 
Albright and Hinderstein 2003b) 
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In the light of what IAEA inspectors had learned and found in Iran since June 2003, 
the agency's director-general concluded in his August 2003 report on Iran that since his 
previous report, the authorities of the Islamic Republic had intensified their cooperation 
with the agency by providing increasing amounts of information about their nuclear 
activities, by allowing access to additional locations in Iran, and by assenting to the 
IAEA's requests to take environmental samples in the country. Also, the director- 
general expressed his satisfaction at Iran's decision to begin negotiations on an 
additional protocol with the agency. Alongside with the positive remarks, however, the 
director-general's report also pointed out that, at times, Iran had not just been slow and 
hesitant in providing information and access to the IAEA's inspectors, but that some of 
the information given by the Iranians had been in contrast to the data previously made 
available by them. In addition, the director-general stressed that there were still a 
number of important questions, particularly with regard to the Islamic Republic's 
centrifuge enrichment efforts, that required resolution. (GOV/2003/63,2003: 10) 
At the IAEA board of governors' meeting in Vienna in September 2003, the members 
of the board adopted a resolution in which they referred to the director-general's report 
and stated that the IAEA now had a better, although still an incomplete, picture and 
understanding of the Iranian nuclear program. While "recognising the basic and 
inalienable right of all Member States to develop atomic energy for peaceful purpose, " 
the board expressed its "grave concern" that more than one year after the IAEA's initial 
inquiries to the Islamic Republic about undeclared nuclear activities, the IAEA was still 
not able to conclude that all nuclear materials in Iran had been declared and submitted 
to IAEA safeguards and that there were no undeclared nuclear activities in the country. 
Consequently, the board called on the Iranians to provide accelerated cooperation and 
full transparency to allow the IAEA to rectify the situation at an early date. 326 
(GOV/2003/69,2003: 1-2) 
Although the board acknowledged Iran's decision to start negotiations for the 
conclusion of an IAEA additional protocol, it noted that such a decision had not met the 
board's request made in June 2003 that Iran would promptly and unconditionally sign 
and implement the protocol. Also, the board criticized the Islamic Republic for the slow 
and incremental provision of information and access to the IAEA, for the "significant 
and material changes" in some of the Iranian statements made to the IAEA, as well as 
326 In this connection, the board specifically called on Iran to provide the IAEA with a full history of its 
uranium enrichment program (GOV/2003/69,2003: 1). 
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for the fact that the number of outstanding issues between the two parties had only 
increased. Furthermore, the board members noted with concern that the IAEA had 
found two types of HEU from Natanz, that considerable modifications had been made 
to the premises of the Kalaye Electric Company prior to IAEA inspectors' 
environmental sampling at the facility in August 2003, and that in spite of the board's 
June 2003 statement, the Islamic Republic had introduced nuclear material into the 
Natanz pilot plant. The board reiterated its June 2003 call on Iran not to introduce 
nuclear material into Natanz and asked the Iranians to suspend all further activities 
related to uranium enrichment. In addition, the board called on Iranian authorities to 
suspend all activities related to the production of separated plutonium until the 
unconcluded matters concerning the Islamic Republic's nuclear program had been 
resolved and until Iran had applied the provisions of the additional protocol in a 
satisfactory manner. (Ibid.: 2) 
Moreover, the board set a deadline for the Islamic Republic by asking Iran to remedy 
all the failures related to the implementation of its safeguards agreement by the end of 
October 2003. The board members also listed a set of actions they hoped Iran would 
take by then. Most importantly, they requested the Iranians to (a) provide the IAEA 
with a full declaration of all imported materials and components relevant to the Islamic 
Republic's centrifuge enrichment program as well as to collaborate with the agency in 
identifying the sources of origin and the dates of receipt of such imports and the 
locations where the imports had been stored and used in Iran; (b) grant an unrestricted 
access, including environmental sampling, for IAEA inspectors to whatever locations 
they deem necessary for the purposes of verification of the correctness and 
completeness of the Islamic Republic's declarations; (c) pursue further discussions with 
the IAEA on the agency's conclusion that Iran could not have developed uranium 
enrichment technology to the level seen at Natanz without prior process testing on gas 
centrifuges; and (d) provide complete information regarding the conduct of uranium 
conversion experiments. Finally, the board requested Iranian authorities to work with 
the IAEA to "promptly and unconditionally sign, ratify, and fully implement the 
additional protocol, " and, as a confidence-building measure, henceforth act in 
accordance with the protocol. (Ibid.: 2-3) 
Even though the board's September 2003 resolution did not elaborate on the 
consequences to Iran of its non-compliance with the board's recommendations, the 
possibility that the Iran dossier would be sent to the UN Security Council and that the 
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council would decide on political, economic, and possibly even military sanctions 
against the Islamic Republic acted as an implicit threat to Iranian authorities. 327 As 
before, prior to the board of governors' September 2003 meeting, the United States had 
lobbied for a board decision to report the issue to the Security Council. 328 The Bush 
administration had also declared before the meeting's commencement that the Islamic 
Republic's conclusion of the additional protocol would not be enough to satisfy U. S. 
concerns over the Iranian nuclear program. 329 Given the broad opposition to U. S. 
diplomacy at the IAEA, however, the Americans had ultimately backed the board of 
governors' resolution of 12 September 2003.330 
While the strict formulations of the IAEA board's September 2003 resolution 
testified to the common features of the board members' Iran positions, the difference 
between the tough diplomatic approach advocated by the Americans and the softer 
course adopted by the majority of IAEA member states thus continued to color 
international deliberations on Iran. Given the Bush administration's failure to mobilize 
wide international support for a position focusing on punitive diplomatic action, and 
given its unwillingness to alter the course it had adopted, the diplomatic lead in the 
matter fell increasingly in the hands of other players, in particular Britain, France, and 
Germany, the leading EU countries that sought to influence Iranian actions through a 
combination of diplomatic sticks and carrots. 
Prior to the September 2003 Board meeting, the EU had clearly stated to Iran that 
unless the Islamic Republic would dispel the doubts about its nuclear efforts and fully 
cooperate with the IAEA, the EU would be prepared to suspend the on-going 
327 The Iranians themselves openly recognized the possibility that the issue would be taken to the Security 
Council. The Islamic Republic's IAEA representative, for example, had admitted at the end of July 2003 
that should Iran not join the additional protocol, there would be a real danger that the IAEA might decide 
at its September 2003 meeting to refer Iran's case to the UN Security Council. Foreign minister Kharrazi 
noted at the time of the IAEA board's September 2003 meeting that there was an apparent and deliberate 
attempt by some to "torpedo the process of cooperation" between Iran and the IAEA and to "remove the 
agency from the process. " (AFP, 31 July 2003 and IHT, 11 September 2003) 
328 According to the United States, the director-general's report of 26 August 2003 had provided further 
incriminating evidence of Iran's violations of its safeguards agreement (Arms Control Today, September 
2003). 
329 Ibid. 
330 The United States' IAEA representative characterized his government's decision as follows: "It is no 
secret [... ] that the United States believes the facts already established would fully justify an immediate 
finding of non-compliance by Iran with its safeguards violations. We have taken note, however, of the 
desire of other member states to give Iran a last chance to stop its evasions, and have agreed today to join 
in the call on Iran to take 'essential and urgent' actions to demonstrate that it has done so" (Brill 2003: 5). 
Especially NAM countries had made it clear that they were against the referral of the Iranian case to the 
Security Council. According to them, the matter should be resolved "peacefully" and through 
"constructive dialogue within the framework of the Agency" (Statement by the Non-Aligned Movement 
2003 a and 2003b). 
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negotiations on a trade and cooperation agreement between the two parties. But along 
with the pressure put on Iranian authorities, the EU had also offered them concrete 
benefits in exchange for diplomatic concessions. The letter of early August 2003 sent to 
Iran by Britain, France, and Germany had served as a prime example of the EU's 
diplomatic efforts to engage the Islamic Republic. In that letter, the three EU powers 
had offered Iran the prospect of technology sharing and cooperation if the Islamic 
Republic stopped its nuclear fuel enrichment program and concluded an IAEA 
33 additional protocol .1 (AP, 22 July 2003 and Reuters, 19 September 2003) 
In his response letter of 18 August 2003, president Khatami had pledged the EU 
powers that Iran would never divert its civilian nuclear program for military purposes. 
In addition, he had informed that the Iranians had decided to enter immediate talks on 
the additional protocol. Still, Khatami's letter had not committed Iran either to the 
signing or the ratification of the protocol. Ayatollah Khamenei, the supreme leader of 
the Islamic Republic, had given a more strict response to the EU initiative by stating, on 
19 August 2003, that outside calls on Iran to give up nuclear technology were 
unsuitable, unjust, and oppressive. Therefore, the supreme leader declared, his country 
would never accept such requests. (Reuters, 19 September 2003 and Saghafi-Ameri 
2004: 2) 
The November 2003 meeting of the IAEA board of governors 
Eventually, the demands made by the board of governors in September 2003 and the 
mounting international pressure on the Islamic Republic forced the Iranian leadership to 
yield to significant diplomatic concessions. At first, in the aftermath of the September 
2003 board meeting, however, Iranian officials had expressed their strong disapproval 
33' The letter sent by the EU trio had reportedly spoken only of technology cooperation in general and not 
specifically pledged assistance to Iran's nuclear program. The EU subsequently emphasized that the 
initiative made in August 2003 had not been about offering direct rewards to the Islamic Republic. As 
pointed out by Javier Solana, the EU foreign policy chief, in late August 2003: "Let me say this openly: 
no one should expect a reward for signing [the additional protocol]. The issue is not for bargaining; it is a 
matter of a friend advising another friend, and Iranian authorities are politically mature to hear a friend's 
advice" (The New York Times, 30 August 2003). From the perspective of the Bush administration, 
however, the EU was effectively appeasing Iran. The Americans had been strongly against the sending of 
the August 2003 letter, for they had feared that it would separate Europe and America on the Iran issue. 
Accordingly, the United States had attempted to dissuage Britain, France, and Germany from making the 
move. As for the Russians, who had also been briefed about the EU letter beforehand, they had reportedly 
found the letter's wording "too harsh" and approached the Iranians with a letter of their own in which 
they also called on Iran to abandon its enrichment efforts. (Reuters, 19 September 2003 and Ruhani 2005: 
6) 
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of the content of the board's resolution. In particular, the Iranians had rejected the 
deadline set by the board and viewed it as an affront to Iran's national dignity, for the 
resolution's "venomous language, " the representatives of the Islamic Republic had 
argued, had gone "beyond the words and spirit of the NPT and the IAEA Statutes, even 
beyond the provisions of the Additional Protocol. " (Salehi 2003d: 4; AFP, 28 
September 2003 and Aghazadeh 2003b: 1-2) 
In the Iranian analysis, the content of the IAEA board's September 2003 resolution 
had been a product of the United States' aggressive diplomacy. As put by the head of 
the AEOI, the Americans had resorted to "extreme unilateralism posed under a 
multilateralist cloak. " In addition, the Iranians had complained that the resolution had 
been "engineered in such a manner to guarantee its non- or half-implementation, " 
suggesting that Iran's fate in the matter had already been sealed in advance. Highly 
dissatisfied with the resolution, Iranian officials had warned that they might review and 
scale back their cooperation with the IAEA and even consider withdrawing from the 
NPT. 332 (Salehi 2003d: 3; Aghazadeh 2003b: 1-2 and AFP, 15 September 2003) 
Nevertheless, after the initial expressions of frustration, the Iranians had stated that 
even though their government did not formally accept the board resolution and consider 
itself bound to the 31 October 2003 deadline set in that document, the Islamic Republic 
still intended to continue its cooperation with the IAEA. 333 On 1 October 2003, in order 
to formulate a response to the IAEA board's latest demands, the Iranian leadership had 
appointed a five-member policy-making team to deal with the situation. The group was 
composed of foreign minister Kharrazi, defence minister Shamkhani, intelligence 
minister Yunisi, Hasan Ruhani, the secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security 
Council, and Ali Akbar Vilayati, the supreme leader's advisor for international affairs. 
(AFP, 15 September 2003; Dealing with Iran's Nuclear Program 2003: 20 and IRNA, 1 
October 2003) 
332 Already prior to the IAEA board's September 2003 meeting the Iranians had issued diplomatic 
warnings. Note, for example, the following statement made by foreign minister Kharrazi: "If the hawks 
gain the ground and ignore our legitimate rights for peaceful nuclear activities, we will be forced to 
review the state of play and the current level of cooperation with the IAEA" (IHT, 11 September 2003). 
The Islamic Republic's IAEA delegation, in turn, had voiced its hope that the board's conclusions would 
reflect the views of all of its members (Salehi 2003d: 1). 
3" As stated by the head of the AEOI at the IAEA on 15 September 2003: "We are here with the message 
of willingness to find ways and means that would salvage the process and maintain the issue within the 
framework of the relevant international body, under the direction of the Director General, taking into 
account the interpretations put forth by the majority of the Board members on the content of the [12 
September 2003] resolution" (Aghazadeh 2003b: 2-3). 
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On 16 October 2003, in the middle of major diplomatic arm wrestling between 
foreign governments and the Islamic Republic over Iran's response to the 31 October 
deadline set by the board of governors, the secretary of Iran's Supreme National 
Security Council assured the IAEA's director-general in Tehran that the Islamic 
Republic would accelerate its cooperation with the agency and, to that end, promptly 
provide the IAEA with information and clarifications on all outstanding questions 
regarding the Iranian nuclear program. According to Hasan Ruhani, a decision had been 
taken by the Islamic Republic to hand over a full disclosure of Iran's present and past 
nuclear activities to the IAEA. In addition, Ruhani informed the director-general that the 
Islamic Republic was now ready to conclude the additional protocol, and pending that 
document's entry into force, act in accordance with it and with a policy of full 
transparency. (GOV/2003/75,2003: 3-4) 
Five days later, after a crisis meeting with the foreign ministers of Britain, France, 
and Germany in Tehran, Iran - which viewed cooperation with the EU as a means to 
ensure that it would not be referred to the UN Security Council at the IAEA Board of 
Governors' November 2003 meeting334 - confirmed, in the so-called Tehran 
Declaration of 21 October 2003, the pledges made to the IAEA director-general and 
further announced that it had "decided voluntarily to suspend all uranium enrichment 
and processing activities as defined by the IAEA. "335 In exchange, the three EU powers 
recognized Iran's right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and stated that 
the additional protocol was "in no way intended to undermine the sovereignty, national 
dignity or national security of its state parties. " Moreover, they expressed their belief 
that should Iran fully implement its commitments, the board of governors should be 
able to find a solution to the "immediate situation" in the Iran-IAEA crisis, 336 and once 
international concerns related to Iranian nuclear activities would be fully resolved, "Iran 
334 Hasan Ruhani, the Islamic Republic's main nuclear negotiator at the time, later described Iran's talks 
with the EU trio as follows: "My basic discussion with the three European ministers was that if we 
presented a full picture of our nuclear program [... ] what would the Americans do, given that the 
Americans insist on taking us to the UN Security Council? If they were going to promise to resist the 
American pressure, we thought, we would cooperate. At that meeting, the Europeans promised us that if 
we presented a complete picture of the country's nuclear activities to the IAEA, as the [IAEA Board of 
Governors' September 2003] resolution called for, they would resist the American pressure to take us to 
the UN Security Council and would not allow that to happen" (Ruhani 2005: 8). 
335 According to the officials of the Islamic Republic, their government had decided to make such a 
voluntary gesture in order to show its good will, to create a new atmosphere of trust, and to develop Iran's 
relations with Europe and other industrialized countries (IHT, 22 October 2003). 
336 This formulation effectively meant that the EU trio would oppose efforts to refer the Islamic Republic 
to the UN Security Council as long as the Iranians fully implemented their commitments under the 
Tehran agreement (Iran 's Strategic Weapons Programmes 2005: 20). 
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could expect easier access to modern technology and supplies in a range of areas. " 
Finally, the foreign ministers of the three EU powers expressed their intent to cooperate 
with the Iranians in the promotion of security and stability in the Middle East, including 
in the establishment of a zone free from nuclear weapons and other WMD in the region. 
(Reuters, 21 October 2003) 
Following the Tehran Declaration, on 23 October 2003, the Islamic Republic 
provided the IAEA with a documented declaration of its nuclear program which, Iranian 
officials assured, presented a comprehesive and accurate picture of the Islamic 
Republic's past and on-going nuclear activities. 337 The documents indicated that 
contrary to the earlier Iranian claim that the Islamic Republic had not conducted any 
uranium enrichment activities prior to 25 June 2003, the Iranians had in fact carried out 
centrifuge tests using uranium hexafluoride at the Kalaye Electric Company in 1999 and 
2002.338 The uranium hexafluoride used in those tests had been among the nuclear 
materials imported from China in 1991 and indeed the same missing uranium 
hexafluoride that IAEA inspectors had shown interest in for months and the Iranians 
had claimed to have leaked from the cylinders containing the gas. (IAEA Media 
Advisory 2003/2310,2003 and GOV/2003/75,2003: 6) 
Prior to Iran's handing over of the declaration of its nuclear activities to the IAEA, on 
16 September 2003, the agency had informed Iranian authorities that it had found 
particles of HEU and low-enriched uranium from the environmental samples taken at 
the Kalaye site in August 2003 which were not consistent with the nuclear material in 
Iran's declared inventory. The Iranians responded to the IAEA's findings in November 
2003 by stating that all nuclear materials in the country had been declared to the agency 
and that Iran had never enriched uranium to the level of HEU. 339 Therefore, the officials 
of the Islamic Republic maintained, the only possible explanation for the HEU finding 
at the Kalaye site was that the particles had ended up there on contaminated centrifuge 
equipment obtained from abroad. This continued to be the Iranian explanation for the 
337 According to the head of the AEOI, Iran handed over the documents to the IAEA in order to remove 
any ambiguities and doubts about the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear activities and in order 
to commence a new phase of confidence and cooperation in the nuclear field at the international level. He 
also said that the Islamic Republic was prepared to provide any additional clarifications that the IAEA 
would deem necessary. (GOV/2003/75,2003: 4) 
338 According to Iran, it successfully started uranium hexafluoride tests with a single centrifuge in 1999 
and three years later, in 2002, fed nuclear material into 19 connected centrifuges (GOV/2004/83,2004: 
6). 
339 Iranian authorities maintained that they had never used their centrifuges to enrich uranium beyond 1.2 
% concentrations of U-235 (GOV/2003/75,2003: 7). 
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earlier HEU finding at Natanz as well. 340 Similarly, Iranian authorities continued to 
claim that they were not aware of the original sources of their centrifuge-related 
imports. According to the Iranians, the Islamic Republic had obtained its centrifuge 
drawings and components through middlemen and did not know the initial sources of 
the imported items. 341 (GOV/2003/75,2003: 3,7 and Albright and Hinderstein 2004) 
In its declaration of 23 October 2003 to the IAEA, the Islamic Republic had also 
revealed that it had pursued a secret laser enrichment program in the period of 1991- 
2000, in the course of which it had used 30 kilograms of uranium metal not previously 
declared to the agency. 342 As stated in the declaration, the laser enrichment activities 
had been conducted between October 2002 and January 2003.343 Furthermore, the 
Iranians had acknowledged that, starting in the mid-1970s, their country had had laser 
enrichment-related contacts with foreign entities from four different states. According to 
the authorities of the Islamic Republic, however, all equipment related to laser 
enrichment had been dismantled and transferred, together with the uranium metal used 
in the enrichment activities, from Lashkarabad to a storage facility in Karaj in May 
2003. (GOV/2003/75,2003: 4,7-8) 
As far as Iran's activities in the area of uranium conversion were concerned, on 9 
October 2003, the Islamic Republic had provided the IAEA with new information about 
its research on uranium conversion processes. The information showed that in contrast 
to earlier Iranian statements, the Islamic Republic's uranium conversion experiments - 
reportedly carried out between 1981 and 1993 - had in fact involved the production in 
laboratory and bench scale experiments of practically all the materials important to 
uranium conversion. In conducting their tests, the Iranians had used nuclear materials 
that had been imported in 1977 and in 1982 - some of which had been exempted from 
IAEA safeguards - as well as safeguarded nuclear material which had been declared to 
Sao On 5 October 2003, the IAEA had visited three locations at an industrial complex in Kulahduz in 
Tehran. The sites had been linked to uranium enrichment activities by the NCRI in July 2003. During its 
inspections, the IAEA had not seen any work carried out at the sites that could have directly been linked 
to uranium enrichment. Still, the agency had taken environmental samples at the locations. Subsequently, 
the IAEA informed that the results of the samples had not revealed any indications of activities involving 
the use of nuclear material. (Squassoni 2003: 2 and GOV/2004/83,2004: 21) 
341 In late November 2003, the IAEA director-general stated that five European and Asian countries had 
supplied Iran with centrifuge components and that the agency would further investigate the matter and 
discuss it with the countries in question (Arms Control Today, January/February 2004). 
342 The Iranians had thus admitted that contrary to their initial claim, the uranium metal in their possession 
had not been intended for the production of shielding material and the promotion of nuclear know-how 
alone, but for use in their country's laser enrichment efforts as well (GOV/2003/75,2003: 5). 
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the agency as a process loss. Also, the Iranians had made use of the materials that had 
been imported from China in 1991. On 1 November 2003, Iranian authorities told the 
IAEA that they had terminated domestic research and development on uranium 
tetrafluoride and uranium hexafluoride in 1993 because a foreign supplier - that is, 
China - had been involved in the design and construction of the Isfahan uranium 
conversion facility at the time. They also stated that the facilities used in those 
experiments had been dismantled and moved to a waste storage in Karaj. (Ibid.: 3,5 and 
GOV/2003/75,2003, Annex 1: 1-2) 
The Islamic Republic's admission that it had extracted small quantities of plutonium 
in a hot cell at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center between 1988 and 1992 had 
constituted another major disclosure of Iran's declaration of 23 October 2003 to the 
IAEA. As explained by Iranian authorities, the purpose of the laboratory scale 
plutonium separation experiments had been to learn about the nuclear fuel-cycle and to 
gain experience in reprocessing chemistry. According to the Iranians, their experiments 
had involved the use of a total of seven kilograms of depleted uranium dioxide targets, 
of which three kilograms had been irradiated and processed to separate plutonium. 344 
(GOV/2003/75,2003, Annex 1: 5) 
On 10 November 2003, the Islamic Republic's IAEA representative provided the 
agency with a letter in which Iran conveyed its acceptance of an IAEA additional 
protocol based on the agency's model additional protocol. 345 On the same day, the 
Islamic Republic informed the IAEA director-general that it had decided to suspend, 
with effect from 10 November 2003, all activities related to uranium enrichment and 
plutonium separation. Specifically, Iran stated that it would suspend all activities at the 
Natanz site, not produce feed material for enrichment processes, and not import any 
enrichment-related items. (GOV/2003/75,2003: 4) 
343 Later, during an IAEA visit to Iran between 27 October and 1 November 2003, Iranian officials 
informed the agency that a pilot plant for laser enrichment had been established at the Lashkarabad laser 
laboratory in 2000 (ibid.: 7). 
344 Subsequently, the representatives of the Islamic Republic sought to downplay the importance of the 
information about Iran's plutonium separation activities. President Khatami, for example, maintained that 
Iran had used the plutonium for manufacturing pharmaceuticals and that the experts of the IAEA 
themselves well knew that such a negligible amount of plutonium could not be used for making a nuclear 
bomb (Reuters, 12 November 2003 and IRNA, 12 November 2003). 
aas On the eve of the IAEA board's November 2003 meeting, however, Iran's representatives tried to use 
the protocol issue as a diplomatic trump card by stating that the Islamic Republic would not sign the 
protocol until there was an agreement on how strongly Iran would be condemned for its past nuclear 
actions by the board of governors (IHT, 21 November 2003). In the end, Iran signed the additional 
protocol on 18 December 2003. 
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While the Islamic Republic's diplomatic concessions and its increased nuclear 
transparency were welcomed by the international community, the new information 
about its nuclear program did not lessen the worries about Iran's nuclear intentions. 
Such concerns were sustained, above all, by the revelation that the Islamic Republic had 
been secretly developing a uranium centrifuge enrichment program for 18 years and a 
laser enrichment program for 12 years, as well as by the fact that Iran had managed to 
clandestinely enrich uranium and separate plutonium. 
That the Islamic Republic had taken a major step towards developing the capacity for 
large-scale production of fissile materials was recognized, among others, by the 
director-general of the IAEA whose report of 10 November 2003 on Iran contained the 
following observation: "Iran's nuclear programme, as the Agency currently understands 
it, consists of a practically complete front end of a nuclear fuel cycle, including uranium 
mining and milling, conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication, heavy water production, a 
light water reactor, a heavy water research reactor and associated research and 
development facilities" (ibid.: g). 346 
While pointing to Iran's wide-ranging nuclear infrastructure, however, the director- 
general also stated that in spite of the Islamic Republic's failure "in a number of 
instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations under its Safeguards 
Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material and its processing and use, 
as well as the declaration of facilities where such material has been processed and 
stored, " the IAEA had not theretofore found any evidence suggesting that Iran's nuclear 
activities had a military purpose. 347 On the other hand, he added that given the Islamic 
Republic's past efforts to conceal many aspects of its nuclear activities, it would take 
some time before the agency would be able to conclude the opposite, that is, that Iran's 
nuclear program was exclusively for peaceful purposes. 348 (Ibid.: 9-10) 
346 Activities related to the nuclear fuel-cycle are generally divided into so-called front-end and back-end 
steps. The mining and milling of uranium, together with uranium conversion, uranium enrichment, and 
the fabrication of nuclear fuel make up the front-end of the nuclear fuel-cycle. Steps such as the 
temporary storage, reprocessing and recycling of spent nuclear fuel constitute the back-end of the nuclear 
fuel-cycle. 
34' For a detailed listing of Iran's breaches of its safeguards agreement with the IAEA as identified by the 
agency in the period between the issuance of the director-general's Iran reports of 26 August 2003 and 10 
November 2003, see GOV/2003/75 (2003: 9). 
348 Iranian officials generally characterized the IAEA director-general's November 2003 report as 
satisfactory. In the view of president Khatami and foreign minister Kharrazi, for example, the report 
testified to the fact that the Islamic Republic did not have a nuclear weapons program and that Iran had 
been transparent in its dealings with the IAEA (Reuters, 12 November 2003 and IRNA, 12 November 
2003). 
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For their part, then, the conclusions presented by the director-general in November 
2003 illustrated that the IAEA was still far from being able to close the Iran dossier. The 
continuous need to find out whether the Islamic Republic was telling the truth about its 
nuclear efforts and whether there were nuclear activities in Iran of which the IAEA had 
not been informed in the first place led the agency's board of governors to adopt, on 26 
November 2003, a tough-worded resolution on Iran. In that resolution, the board 
strongly deplored the Islamic Republic's past failures and breaches of its obligation to 
comply with the provisions of its safeguards agreement. Specifically, the board 
members expressed their grave concern over the fact that Iran had enriched uranium and 
separated plutonium in undeclared facilities. 349 (GOV/2003/81,2003: 2-3) 
The board of governors urged the Islamic Republic to adhere strictly to its safeguards 
obligations in both letter and spirit and called on Iran to take all necessary corrective 
measures to urgently rectify its past actions and omissions. The board also called on the 
Iranians to pursue a policy of transparency and openness and to fully cooperate with the 
IAEA in order to enable the agency to conclude its work on the matter. 350 Should any 
further "serious Iranian failures" come to light, the board warned, it would immediately 
meet to consider "all options at its disposal, in accordance with the IAEA Statute and 
Iran's safeguards agreement. " While this threat formulation in the board's resolution of 
November 2003 was vaguely expressed and left room for various interpretations, it did 
imply that further "serious failures" -a definition open to interpretation itself - would 
bring the Islamic Republic before the UN Security Council. 351 (Ibid.: 3; Persbo 2003 
and Financial Times, 27 November 2003) 
349 On the balancing side, the board's resolution welcomed the Islamic Republic's assurances of 
cooperation and full transparency, its voluntary decision to suspend all enrichment-related and 
reprocessing activities, as well as Iran's decision to conclude an additional protocol to its safeguards 
agreement. The board also explicitly recognized "the inalienable right of States to the development and 
practical application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, including the production of electric power, 
with due consideration for the needs of developing countries. " (GOV/2003/81,2003: 1-3) 
350 Relatedly, the board members considered it essential that the Islamic Republic's declaration of 23 
October 2003 to the IAEA would provide a correct, complete, and final picture of Iran's past and present 
nuclear activities (GOV/2003/81,2003: 3). 
351 Iran dismissed the board resolution's operative paragraph 8 which included the threat formulation by 
stating that the paragraph had no value and contained nothing new. According to the secretary of Iran's 
Supreme National Security Council, "the U. S. tried to include a clause in the resolution which would have 
allowed Iran's nuclear dossier to be referred to the Security Council automatically, but we announced that 
it was a violation of the Tehran Declaration and it didn't happen. " Indeed, prior to the IAEA board's 
November 2003 meeting, the representatives of the Islamic Republic had put heavy pressure on Britain, 
France, and Germany not to include a reference to the Security Council in the board's resolution. 
Subsequently, Iranian officials characterized the board of governors' November 2003 resolution as a 
diplomatic victory for their country and as yet another expression of the fact that "Iran has followed its 
peaceful nuclear activities with transparency and truthfulness and that despite all the fuss made by some 
arrogant circles it was not trying to produce and obtain nuclear arms. " At the same time, however, they 
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In essence, the content of the board of governors' November 2003 resolution was a 
compromise between the positions of the United States and the EU trio of Britain, 
France, and Germany which had drafted the board resolution and taken the diplomatic 
lead in the Iran question. As before, the United States, convinced that the Islamic 
Republic had a nuclear weapons program, 352 had called for a board decision referring 
the Iran dossier to the UN Security Council. After having recognized that the European 
powers, following the diplomatic commitment made to Iran in the October 2003 Tehran 
declaration, would not agree to such a course of action, the Americans - together with 
the other board members who had supported the U. S. position, including Japan, Canada, 
and Australia - had lobbied for a strongly worded resolution and for the inclusion in the 
document of a trigger mechanism that would result in some kind of penalties should the 
Iranians eventually choose to ignore the board's wishes and recommendations. As 
demonstrated by the final text of the November 2003 resolution, the Europeans had 
ultimately given in to such demands, even though they had succeeded in rejecting the 
U. S. proposal according to which the identification of "serious Iranian failures" would 
have prompted the board to automatically report the matter to the Security Council. 
(Arms Control Today, December 2003; Financial Times, 26 November 2003 and 
Reuters, 26 November 2003) 
All in all, then, the board of governors' November 2003 resolution maintained the 
IAEA's central role in the international efforts to find a solution to the Iranian nuclear 
problem. At the same time, however, the resolution served as yet another reminder of 
the differences of opinion between the United States and the other major powers on how 
to bring the Iran case to a close. 
5.3.3.3 Iran's diplomatic response to the Bush administration 
In the wake of the fact that the Islamic Republic's nuclear program had become a 
central theme on the international arms control agenda, the Iranians were forced to step 
up their long-lived diplomatic efforts to refute the allegations that their nuclear program 
were dissatisfied that the resolution did not include an explicit reference to what the Iranians regarded as 
the most important conclusion of the IAEA director-general's report of 10 November 2003 on Iran, 
namely, that there was no evidence of an Iranian nuclear weapons program. (Persbo 2003; BBC, 26 
November 2003 and The New York Times, 27 November 2003) 
352 In the opinion of the Bush administration's undersecretary of state for arms control and international 
security, the conclusion - made by the IAEA director-general 
in his Iran report of 10 November 2003 - 
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had a military purpose and to defend their country's right to peaceful utilization of 
nuclear energy. In doing so, the representatives of the Islamic Republic focused, on the 
one hand, on dealing with the United States whose policies posed the greatest external 
threat to Iran's nuclear program and, as many Iranians believed, to the country's 
national security as well. On the other hand, the officials of the Islamic Republic sought 
to make their country's declared nuclear policies known to the world and to bring the 
diplomatic process with the IAEA to an end. 
As far as the Americans were concerned, Iranian authorities tried to undermine the 
credibility of U. S. views and demands on Iran by pointing to what the they 
characterized as the Bush administration's irrational foreign policy and dismal record in 
the area of arms control and disarmament. 353 That Iranian officials accused the 
Americans of a hegemonist, unilateralist, and militarist foreign policy added basically 
nothing new to the Islamic Republic's traditional argumentation on the United States. 354 
However, the latest Iranian characterizations of the United States did reflect an 
increased Iranian sense of anxiety and concern, for as claimed by Iranian authorities 
themselves, the Bush administration had placed an unprecedented emphasis on the 
dangerous traits of American foreign policy. 355 
Strongly objecting to what they called the Bush administration's "aggressive 
unilateralism, " the representatives of the Islamic Republic portrayed their country as an 
advocate of a world order built on the principle of "comprehensive multilateralism. "356 
that there was no evidence that the Islamic Republic was actively pursuing nuclear weapons was "simply 
impossible to believe" (IHT, 19 November 2003). 
353 See, for example, the statement issued by Iran's UN mission in New York in early February 2002 
which, in the aftermath of president Bush's State of the Union address of 29 January 2002, characterized 
American foreign policy as "self-centered, unilateral and naive. " According to the Iranian statement, the 
Bush administration's foreign policy was steered by the mentality of militarism and unilateralism as well 
as by "the logic of might makes right. " (Press Release 2002a) 
354 The Iranians themselves maintained that the Bush administration's foreign policy did not represent a 
fundamental departure from that of its predecessors. Foreign minister Kharrazi, for example, argued that 
since the end of the Cold War, American foreign policy had rested on the notion of "global and 
hegemonic leadership. " The claim, made by the Khatami administration in March 2000, that the United 
States was waging an "undeclared war" against Iran serves as another example of the unchanging nature 
of the Islamic Republic's official perception of the United States. (Kharrazi 2002b and IRNA, 18 March 
2000) 
ass Note, for example, the following statement made by Iran's foreign minister: "[The terrorist attacks of 
11 September 2001] changed the logic, discourse and language of the U. S. foreign policy. The 
international outcry against terrorism has been used by the U. S. to justify its military presence overseas, 
to garner support for military spending in the Congress, to coerce other countries to follow its line, and to 
grade or categorize other countries according to their adherence to self-fulfilling standards contrary to 
international norms and regulations" (Kharrazi 2002b). 
356 The conceptual division between "aggressive unilateralism" and "comprehensive multi lateral ism" was 
made by foreign minister Kharrazi in a speech he delivered at the New School University in New York in 
May 2002 (ibid. ). 
505 
In the Iranian view, the Bush administration's foreign policy not only fought against 
logic and rationalism - as well as against the rights and interests of other states, for that 
matter -, but it was also incapable of providing solutions to the numerous international 
problems that required urgent responses from the state community. U. S. attempts to 
define its national interests as global ones, together with the Bush government's 
contempt for international law, Iranian officials argued, made the formulation of such 
responses much more difficult and undermined international peace and security. For this 
reason, the Iranians demanded, there was an immediate need for a broad international 
front that would stand against U. S. policies and defend the cause of multilateralism and 
law-based international relations. That the Bush administration's foreign policies were 
criticized by the whole world and even by America's traditional allies, the officials of 
the Islamic Republic observed, was a promising development in this respect. 
(Aghazadeh 2003a: 2,14; Kharrazi 2002b and Salehi 2003a: 1-2) 
Ironically, then, Iran's opposition to the Bush administration's foreign policy, which 
openly aimed at changing many aspects of contemporary international relations, made 
the Islamic Republic -a long-standing critique of the prevailing international order -a 
supporter of international status quo. Iran's criticism of the Bush administration's arms 
control diplomacy merely reinforced such an impression. The Islamic Republic, whose 
focus had traditionally been on international arms control arrangements' deficiencies 
and discriminatory features, now represented itself as a staunch defender of those 
instruments and vigorously blamed the U. S. government for undermining them. 
Hence, in addition to pointing out that it was the Americans who had blocked the 
finalization of the BTWC Protocol, prevented the Fifth BTWC Review Conference 
from achieving any results, and systematically attempted to weaken the CWC and the 
OPCW, 357 the Iranians accused the Bush administration of undercutting international 
nuclear arms control efforts. On the one hand, Iranian authorities claimed that the 
credibility and efficiency of such efforts was eroded by the U. S. policy of allowing 
certain states to pursue nuclear armaments and overlooking the international 
community's disapproval of such weapons. As a case in point, Iranian representatives 
alluded to Israel. While erroneously accusing Iran of nuclear weapon ambitions, the 
officials of the Islamic Republic noted, the United States continued to ignore Israel's 
development of nuclear bombs and their delivery systems and even actively supported 
357 For Iranian references to U. S. diplomacy in the area of biological and chemical disarmament, see ibid.; 
Aghazadeh (2002: 3) and Salehi (2003a: 2). 
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the Israeli activities. 358 As another example, the Iranians referred to U. S. silence on 
India's and Pakistan's nuclear armaments. Instead of calling on the two South Asian 
states to give up their nuclear arsenals, Iranian representatives complained, the Bush 
administration had become fixated with Iran's peaceful nuclear activities. 359 
On the other hand, the officials of the Islamic Republic pointed to the Bush 
administration's own military and diplomatic activities to support the Iranian argument 
that the Americans pursued a harmful policy of double standard. In addition to actively 
developing nuclear weapons, the Iranians maintained, the Bush administration totally 
ignored the obligation, shared by other NWS as well, to get rid of its nuclear weapons 
arsenal. 360 The representatives of the Islamic Republic stressed that even the bilateral 
nuclear arms control processes of START II and START III had been practically 
terminated, for the former instrument had not been implemented and the negotiations on 
the latter had not even begun. 361 Similarly, the Iranians did not forget to regularly point 
out that the Bush administration had rejected the CTBT. 362 
Iran also strongly criticized the Bush administration's NMD plans. According to the 
Islamic Republic's authorities, the NMD project was another sign of the United States' 
dangerous "unipolar vision of the world" and of its effort to shake up the world's 
military balance for its own benefit. Iran - one of the countries the NMD system was 
targeted against - rejected the argument that the United States needed a missile defence 
shield in order to protect itself from attacks by terrorist groups or rogue states and 
labelled it as a mere excuse that was being used to hide the real motive behind the NMD 
scheme: the United States' desire to "dominate the world as the sole power. " (Soltanieh 
2001 d: 1; Kharrazi 2002b and Foreign Ministry Viewpoints 2001 a) 
Worried about the U. S. missile defence plans, the representatives of the Islamic 
Republic warned that such efforts could disturb the already fragile global strategic 
358 See Zarif (2003a); Salehi (2003d: 3) and A/58IPV. 12 (2003: 29). 359 President Khatami summarized the Islamic Republic's view of being gratuitously subjected to 
differentiated treatment by the United States as follows: "Currently, the Zionist regime, India and 
Pakistan, all in our region, have nuclear weapons, but surprisingly, it is Iran that is faced with much ado 
about nothing in that respect" (IRNA, 17 July 2003). 
360 See Press Release (2002a); Zamaninia (2003: 2-3) and A/58/PV. 12 (2003: 29). 
361 See Nejad-Hosseinian (2002a) and Zamaninia (2003: 2). What the Iranians did not mention was that, 
on 24 May 2002, the United States and Russia signed the so-called Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty 
(SORT) which obliges the parties to reduce the number of their strategic nuclear warheads to 1,700-2,200 
each by 31 December 2012. The reason for Iran's silence on SORT and the Islamic Republic's focus on 
the START II and START III processes - which were effectively replaced by the new U. S. -Russian treaty 
- presumably stemmed for the fact that SORT freed the Americans and the Russians from some of the 
arms control obligations that had been codified in START II and planned for START III. For a discussion 
of SORT, see Holum (2002). 
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balance and potentially trigger a nuclear arms race as other nuclear powers might seek 
to offset the U. S. missile defence advantage by increasing the number and 
sophistication of their nuclear weapons. The Iranians argued that such a development, 
combined with the possibility that other states could launch and speed up their own 
missile defence programs, would be disastrous for global peace and security and put 
international arms control efforts in serious jeopardy. 363 (Foreign Ministry Viewpoints 
2001b; CD/PV. 907,2002: 27 and Nejad-Hosseinian 2002a) 
Consequently, by underscoring the importance of the 1972 ABM Treaty which, in the 
Iranian view, had served as the "cornerstone of the global strategic stability, "364 the 
Islamic Republic - which had always expressed its objection to military doctrines that 
rely on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons - now basically called for the 
maintenance of a stable constellation of nuclear deterrence between the major nuclear 
powers. The eventual announcement by the United States that it would withdraw from 
the ABM Treaty sparked a strong Iranian condemnation. The unilateral U. S. withdrawal 
from the treaty, the officials of the Islamic Republic argued, showed once again that the 
Bush administration paid no heed to the will of the international community or to the 
considerations of global security. (Nejad-Hosseinian 2002a; Kharrazi 2002b and Salehi 
2003a: 2) 
Iran also vehemently condemned the Bush administration's doctrinal formulations in 
the area of security policy. One of the manifestations of the so-called Bush doctrine was 
the Bush government's Nuclear Posture Review which, the Islamic Republic argued, 
marked a change in U. S. attitude towards the use of nuclear weapons. According to the 
Iranians, the document not only prescribed the production and testing of new types of 
nuclear armaments, as well as the improvement of the existing U. S. nuclear arsenal, but 
it also critically lowered the threshold of nuclear weapons use by letting it be known 
362 See Aghazadeh (2002: 3); Salehi (2003a: 2) and Zamaninia (2003: 1). 
363 While Iran's discussion of the United States' NMD plans focused on the missile defence system's 
international implications, the officials of the Islamic Republic believed that the U. S. program would have 
regional ramifications as well. By sharing its NMD know-how with Israel, the Iranians warned, the 
United States would directly contribute to the improvement of Israel's missile defence activities, and 
thereby, help to bolster Israel's military capabilities (Ehteshami 2000b: 174-175). 
364 Iran had strongly defended the ABM Treaty already during the era of the U. S. administration of 
president Clinton. Note, for example, the Islamic Republic's statement at the UN General Assembly's 
First Committee in October 1999 which had characterized the treaty as "one of the main foundations of 
global security, " as an "essential element in maintaining stability and a global geostrategic balance" 
(A/C. l/54/PV. 24,1999: 7). For other Iranian ABM- and NMD-related remarks made during the Clinton 
presidency, see Kharrazi (2000); A/55/116/Add. 1 (2000) and IRNA (21 May 2000). 
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that the United States retained itself the option of using such arms in conflicts against 
non-nuclear states. (Kharrazi 2002a; Kharrazi 2002b and Nejad-Hosseinian 2002a) 
Furthermore, the representatives of the Islamic Republic argued that by broadening 
the role of nuclear arms in U. S. military planning and by transforming the role of those 
weapons from deterrents into operational weapons potentially employed in the 
battlefield against nuclear and non-nuclear states alike, the Bush administration had 
dramatically undermined international peace and security and put the arms control 
achievements of the international community at risk. 365 The reiteration of the Nuclear 
Posture Review's content in the U. S. National Security Strategy of September 2002, 
together with the Bush doctrine's emphasis on the military concepts preemption and 
prevention, the Iranians added, made the existing situation all the more alarming. 
(Nejad-Hosseinian 2002a; CD/PV. 900,2002: 9-10 and Zamaninia 2003: 2) 
Even though Iranian officials - whose country was one of the seven states explicitly 
mentioned in the Nuclear Posture Review as potential targets of U. S. nuclear 
weapons366 - insisted that they did not consider a U. S. nuclear attack against the Islamic 
Republic a topical threat, they maintained that the Bush administration's nuclear 
policies had alarmed the whole international community and non-nuclear-weapon states, 
in particular. In order to counter what they regarded as U. S. rejection of its legal and 
political arms control commitments, the Iranians repeated their long-standing call for 
the conclusion of a legally binding international treaty on NSA. (IHT, 11 March 2002; 
Kharrazi 2002b and CD/PV. 900,2002: 9-11) 
But even if the officials of the Islamic Republic considered the possibility of a 
nuclear strike on their country as remote, they did not rule out the prospect of a 
conventional U. S. military attack against Iran. Following the January 2002 State of the 
Union address by president Bush, which placed the Islamic Republic on the "axis of 
365 According to the Iranians, the Bush government's Nuclear Posture Review gravely violated the U. S. 
commitments under the NPT. Not only in contravention to article VI of the NPT, Iranian officials stated, 
the posture review conflicted with the international community's desire for nuclear disarmament. Such a 
desire, the representatives of the Islamic Republic pointed out, had been expressed in numerous 
diplomatic documents adopted over the years, for example, by the UN General Assembly and by NPT 
review conferences, as well as in the July 1996 advisory opinion of the ICJ. Moreover, the Iranians 
viewed the nuclear posture review as violating the United States' pledges of positive and negative 
security assurances. Iranian officials alluded specifically to the positive security assurances given by the 
Americans - together with the Soviet Union and United Kingdom - 
in 1968 in the form of UN Security 
Council resolution 255, to the U. S. NSA statement of 1978, as well as to the UN Security Council 
resolution 984 of April 1995. (Kharrazi 2002a; Nejad-Hosseinian 2002a and CD/PV. 900,2002: 10-11) 
366 It should be noted that Iran had become formally included in the U. S. military nuclear war plan as a 
key enemy of America already by the mid-1990s. The Islamic Republic had been elevated to the status of 
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evil, "367 and particularly following the U. S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003, Iranian 
decision-makers' uneasiness about America's military intentions vis-a-vis their country 
increased significantly. Outwardly, Iran's concern over U. S. military intentions 
manifested itself in the form of diplomatic statements making the case that the United 
States would never dare to attack the Islamic Republic. 368 On the other hand, some 
Iranian officials openly expressed the fear that the Bush government would carry out a 
military operation against the Islamic Republic, either in order to overthrow the ruling 
Iranian regime or to destroy the country's nuclear facilities. 369 
While declaring that their country was strong enough to deal with the U. S. threat, 370 
the Iranians depicted the Bush administration's rhetoric and actions against the Islamic 
Republic and its nuclear efforts as politically motivated. They claimed that the U. S. 
opposition to Iran's peaceful nuclear program was a pretext under which the Americans 
sought to pursue foreign policy objectives that had nothing to do with the nuclear issue 
itself. 371 As to what those U. S. objectives were, the Iranians offered a number of 
explanations, most of which alluded to U. S. asprirations in the Middle East. By making 
a potential target of U. S. nuclear forces after the end of the Cold War, during the presidency of George H. 
W. Bush. (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July 1995) 
367 The officials of the Islamic Republic naturally strongly rejected the characterization of Iran as an axis 
of evil country. President Khatami, for example, responded to the Bush administration in the following 
words: "The axis of evil is where there is bullying [... ]. The axis of evil is where people want to impose 
their demands on the world by acting unilaterally. The axis of evil is where we do not approve of anyone 
except ourselves" (BBC Monitoring Middle East, 30 October 2002). 
368 The pronouncements by the Islamic Republic's supreme leader focused on underscoring this point. 
According to Ayatollah Khamenei, the Americans understood that an attack against a nation which did 
not fear death and which was composed of a large population of young people would be futile. For these 
reasons, the Islamic Republic's supreme leader argued, the U. S. government would instead try to 
"infiltrate our ranks to discourage people and reinforce the currents that go against Islam and the Islamic 
revolution. " (Khamenei 2003 and IRNA, 22 November 2003) 
369 Note, for example, the following statement made by president Khatami in April 2003 in the aftermath 
of the U. S. invasion of Iraq: "They tell us that Syria is the next target, but according to our reports, Iran 
could well follow" (cited in Takeyh 2003: 23). According to the commander of the IRGC, the United 
States constituted a serious threat to Iran. Such an assessment, he said, "based on the official stand of the 
Islamic system" and had been "approved by the Supreme National Security Council as the official body 
to decide on state security. " Subsequently, Iranian officials admitted that the Islamic Republic had 
elevated its military forces' level of readiness in 2003 as the diplomatic crisis over the Iranian nuclear 
program had deepened. (IRMA, 11 May 2002, and Financial Times, 3 February 2005). With Iran's nuclear 
facilities in mind, the Khatami administration had, from its inception, continued to promote the long- 
standing Iranian diplomatic objective of a multilaterally negotiated international convention prohibiting 
armed attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities (A/CN. 10/PV. 222,1998: 17; Dehghani 1999a and 
NPT/CONF. 2000/MC. I I I/WP. 10,2000: 541). 
370 The commander of the naval forces of the IRGC, for example, asserted already in early 2002 that the 
unity and solidarity of the Iranian people, together with the country's "self-sufficiency in many military 
fields, " ensured the Islamic Republic's ability to successfully defend itself against the Americans (IRNA, 
22 March 2002). 
371 As stated by the spokesman of Iran's foreign ministry: "By spreading poisonous and worrying 
rumours, the United States is trying to clear the international climate for furthering its political and 
economic interests and policy of unilateralism" (Foreign Ministry Viewpoints 2003). 
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a fuss over the Islamic Republic's nuclear activities, Iranian officials asserted, the 
United States aimed at fuelling regional fears and tensions and using them, among 
others, to increase its arms sales to the region. Also, the Iranians asserted, their country 
was being denigrated for the purpose of diverting international attention away from 
Israel's nuclear arsenal and the threat it continued to pose both regionally and 
globally. 372 
Furthermore, the officials of the Islamic Republic claimed that the U. S. nuclear 
accusations against their country testified to the American attempt to use the nuclear 
issue as a means to pressure Iran to change its position on Israel and the Israeli- 
Palestinian peace efforts. In fact, in the opinion of many Iranian officials, the 
considerations pertaining to the Israeli-Palestinian context were the most important 
single factor explaining the U. S. campaign against the Islamic Republic's nuclear plans. 
Without Iran's criticism of Israel and its objection to the two-state solution to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and without the Islamic Republic's strong support for the 
Palestinian cause, the Iranians contended, the United States would have never raised 
such a diplomatic hue and cry against their country's nuclear program. 373 
Still, there were other, alternative Iranian analyses of the motives that made the 
United States accuse the Islamic Republic of nuclear weapon ambitions. Most of them 
based on the conclusion that by pointing their fingers at Iran, the Americans sought to 
undermine and, ultimately, overthrow Iran's Islamic regime. On the one hand, the 
Iranian argument went, the United States tried to weaken the Islamic Republic by 
keeping it in a state of scientific and technological "deprivation. "374 On the other hand, 
the Iranians claimed, the Americans resorted to nuclear weapons allegations in order to 
legitimize, in advance, the use of military force against the Islamic Republic. 375 
To support the argument that the U. S. approach to the Islamic Republic's nuclear 
program was driven by political motives and not by a genuine concern over the program 
372 See author's interview with an Iranian arms control official [D] who wishes to remain unidentified, 
summer 2002, and CNN (12 December 2002). 
373 This paragraph draws upon author's interview with Hassan Mashhadi, 8 July 2002, and author's 
interview with an Iranian arms control official [D] who wishes to remain unidentified, summer 2002. The 
argument that links U. S. opposition to Iran's nuclear program with the issue of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict has been made by Iranian scholars as well. Note, for example, the following conclusion drawn by 
Sariolghalam (2003: 70): "The underlying reality is that no matter what Iran does, unless its alters its 
attitude towards Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations, no fundamental policy change in 
Washington will occur. " 
374 In the words of the Islamic Republic's IAEA representative: "The U. S. intention [... ] is to make this 
deprivation final and eternal" (Salehi 2003d: 3). 
'" This interpretation of U. S. diplomacy was put forward, for example, by president Khatami in July 
2003 (AFP, 31 July 2003). 
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itself, Iranian officials pointed to the fact that, during the Shah's era, the Americans had 
actively supported Iran's nuclear plans. Alluding specifically to a declassified U. S. State 
Department memorandum from 20 October 1978, the representatives of the Islamic 
Republic noted that in the document, the U. S. government had not only encouraged the 
pro-American Shah to expand Iran's non-oil energy base, but it had also eagerly waited 
for the conclusion of the planned U. S. -Iran Nuclear Energy Agreement as well as for the 
participation of American companies in Iranian nuclear projects. Moreover, the officials 
of the Islamic Republic emphasized, the Shah's nuclear program had heavily relied on 
calculations and recommendations made by U. S. experts in 1974, especially on those of 
the Stanford Research Institute. 376 (Memorandum from the Ambassador 2003: 4; 
Aghazadeh 2003a: 12 and Salehi 2003a: 4) 
That the U. S stances on the Shah's and post-revolutionary Iran's nuclear programs 
were completely opposite, the representatives of the Islamic Republic bitterly asserted, 
acted as yet another manifestation of the political double standard in U. S. diplomacy. 
The Iranians complained that while the Americans had recognized the economic 
rationale for an Iranian nuclear program during the Shah's rule, the same justification 
was now being fundamentally questioned by them. 377 And curiously, the officials of the 
Islamic Republic added, the United States was arguing against its original position at a 
time when the demand for electricity in Iran was at a much higher level than in the 
1970s. 378 To underscore the claim that the U. S. government's opposition to Islamic 
376 The Iranians also pointed out that neither Germany, France, nor the United Kingdom had challenged 
Iran's nuclear plans during the Shah's time. As noted by the president of the AEOI, the three European 
states had uncritically accepted the justifications and the "unrestrained" pace of the Shah's nuclear 
program, as well as played a major part in the program's execution. It should be noted in this context that 
when discussing Iran's nuclear efforts under the Shah, the officials of the Islamic Republic continued to 
refrain from making any linkage between the Shah's nuclear activities and his military ambitions. The 
following statement from 2002 by an AEOI representative came closest to suggesting that the Shah had 
been pursuing nuclear weapons: "In 1979, the objectives and priorities of the AEOI became subject to 
thorough and fundamental revision. It underwent a complete reorganization with particular emphasis 
being placed on peaceful research and development. " (Aghazadeh 2003a: 12 and Ghannadi-Maragheh 
2002: 1) 
37 Note, for example, the statement made in September 2003 by Iran's IAEA representative who 
provocatively asked whether his country should follow the policy recommendations made by American 
energy experts prior to the Iranian revolution or the present-day "non-scientific, politically motivated, 
biased and interfering type of remarks" of U. S. politicians and diplomats (Salehi 2003a: 4). 
378 See author's interview with an Iranian arms control official [D] who wishes to remain unidentified, 
summer 2002, and . 4BC 
News (12 March 2003). The point that Iran's current, dramatically higher energy 
needs were not comparable to those of the pre-revolutionary period was also made by the Iranian scholars 
who defended their country's right to peaceful utilization of nuclear energy. Take, for example, the 
following question posed by Sahimi (2003): "Why is it that the U. S. and her allies believed, in the 1970s, 
that Iran needed nuclear reactors and nuclear energy, when Iran's population was less than half of the 
present and her oil production was much more than now, but they now argue that Iran does not need 
nuclear energy? " 
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Iran's nuclear efforts stemmed solely from political considerations, Iranian authorities 
welcomed U. S. companies to take part in the construction of their country's nuclear 
facilities. 379 
But while strongly condemning the U. S. attitude towards the Islamic Republic's 
nuclear program, Iranian authorities signalled, behind the scenes, their willingness to 
discuss the nuclear issue face-to-face with the Americans and to resume the informal 
bilateral talks that had taken place between the two parties following the terrorist attacks 
of September 11,2001. As a result of those discussions, which had not touched upon 
the issue of Iran's nuclear program, the Islamic Republic had, in spite of its declared 
opposition to the U. S. attack on Afghanistan in October 2001, agreed not to interfere in 
the war and even promised to cooperate with the Americans in certain, carefully limited 
areas. 380 Later, in December 2001, after the fall of the Taliban government in 
Afghanistan, Iran had significantly contributed to the success of the UN-sponsored 
conference in Bonn dealing with the formation of an interim Afghan government. 
(Pelletreau 2002; Sick 2003: 90 and Kemp 2004: 8,11) 
By the end of January 2002, however, the Bush administration had adopted a tougher 
diplomatic line vis-a-vis the Islamic Republic and placed Iran on the infamous axis of 
evil. 38' In late October 2002, as the international debate on the Islamic Republic's 
nuclear intentions was gaining momentum, the director-general of the IAEA met 
president Bush in Washington and reportedly told him of Iran's interest in opening a 
channel to discuss its nuclear program with the Americans. The director-general offered 
379 As stated by the spokesman of the Iranian foreign ministry in June 2003: "1 do not think America is 
worried about Iran's nuclear programs. If they are, we invite them to come and participate in these 
programs and construct the facilities" (IRNA, 2 June 2003). 
80 Iranian authorities had, among others, expressed their readiness to help U. S. pilots forced down in Iran 
or escaping the Afghan territory as well as to participate in the delivery of humanitarian assistance to 
Afghanistan (Pelletreau 2002). 
381 Pelletreau argues that there were three factors that collectively led the Bush administration to revise its 
Iran course. The first was the intercept and capture, in January 2002, by Israel of Karine-A, a ship 
belonging to the Palestinian Authority that was said to have been carrying some 50 tons of weapons and 
explosives from the Iranian island of Kish to Palestine. According to U. S. intelligence, IRGC forces had 
been directly involved in the delivery of the armaments originating from Iran. The Islamic Republic's 
meddling in Afghan affairs was the second contributing factor referred to by Pelletreau, for the Bush 
administration accused the Islamic Republic of the provision of arms and military training to the forces of 
the Afghan warlord Ismail Khan. Finally, the Bush government's adoption of a tougher stand on Iran had 
to do with U. S. intelligence reports which concluded that Iran continued its efforts to acquire WMD. 
(Pelletreau 2002). Naturally, the authorities of the Islamic Republic denied any involvement in the 
Karine-A event, in arms transfers to Afghanistan, and in WMD-related activities. As far as the Karine-A 
affair was concerned, Iranian and Palestinian officials alike denounced the incident as an Israeli plot to 
influence U. S. policies. According to Iran's defence minister, the whole incident was a "deception, " for 
the Islamic Republic "had no military relations with Arafat" and no Iranian organization had supplied 
armaments to occupied Palestinian territories. (Sick 2003: 90-91; Al-Jazeera, 5 February 2002, and IHT, 
25 March 2002) 
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his help to quietly bring the parties together, but the U. S. president did not warm to the 
Islamic Republic's diplomatic feeler. (The Washington Post, 26 October 2004) 
Similarly, the Bush administration dismissed Iran's remarkable diplomatic initiative 
of May 2003 which called on the two parties to discuss the nuclear issue in the context 
of a broader bilateral political arrangement, a "grand bargain, " aimed at resolving major 
U. S. -Iranian disagreements and leading to improved relations between the two 
countries. In its proposal, presented soon after the United States had invaded Iraq and 
swiftly defeated the armed forces of Saddam Hussein and delivered to Washington by 
Switzerland's ambassador to Tehran, the Iranian leadership382 offered to open up its 
nuclear program to intrusive international inspections in order to alleviate any outside 
fears of the Islamic Republic's nuclear intentions. Moreover, the Iranians expressed 
their readiness to sign the IAEA additional protocol and raised the possibility of 
extensive U. S. participation in the Islamic Republic's nuclear projects as a further 
guarantee of their peaceful nuclear aspirations. (Parsi 2007: 243-244) 
More broadly, in its May 2003 initiative, Iran further agreed to address U. S. concerns 
over terrorism, to coordinate policy on Iraq, as well as to consider the formal acceptance 
of a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 383 In return for their diplomatic 
concessions, the Iranians asked the United States to lift its sanctions against their 
country, to recognize Iran's right to full access to nuclear, chemical, and biological 
materials and technology, to recognize the Islamic Republic's security interests, and to 
abandon the stated objective of a regime change in Iran. 384 (Parsi 2007: 244-246; 
382 According to Parsi (2007: 243-244), only a small circle of Iranian decision-makers was aware of and 
involved in preparing the May 2003 offer. The group consisted of Ayatollah Khamenei, president 
Khatami, foreign minister Kharrazi, his nephew Sadiq Kharrazi, the Khatami government's ambassador 
to France and the drafter of the first version of the Iranian proposal, and Javad Zarif, Iran's representative 
at the United Nations in New York. 
383 Parsi (2007: 250-251,256) maintains that only a few weeks before Switzerland's ambassador to Iran 
delivered the Islamic Republic's package proposal to the Bush government, Iranian authorities, in the 
person of Muhsin Rizai, the former commander of the IRGC, signalled to Israel that Iran was interested in 
improving relations with the Jewish state. According to Parsi, Rizai implied that if Israel reversed its 
objection to a U. S-Iranian rapprochement and recognized Iran's role and spheres of influence in the 
Middle East, the Islamic Republic would moderate its stance on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and avoid 
confronting or challenging the Jewish state. In the end, Parsi writes, Israel rejected Iran's outreach 
because it saw it more as a tactical move to improve the Islamic Republic's standing in Washington than 
as a genuine attempt to improve Iran's relations with the Jewish state. 
; 84 Already before the start of the war in Iraq in March 2003, Iran's influential former president 
Rafsanjani had hinted - in an interview published 
later on 12 April 2003 - at the possibility of Iran 
restoring ties with the United States after a national referendum (Menashri 2003: 2). By the same token, 
according to Parsi (2007: 250), the Islamic Republic used its diplomatic representatives in Britain and 
Sweden to signal to the Americans that it was interested in negotiating a comprehensive political deal 
with the Bush government. 
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Washington Report on Middle East Affairs 2004 and The Washington Post, 26 October 
2004) 
In addition to rejecting the Iranian proposal, in May 2003 the Bush administration 
decided to end its informal exchanges with the Islamic Republic. The immediate reason 
for the decision was the Bush administration's belief that Iranian authorities were 
sheltering Al-Qaida terrorists suspected of involvement in suicide bombings carried out 
in Saudi Arabia on 12 May 2003. Thus, the suspension of U. S. -Iranian exchanges 
marked an end to 18 months of periodic discussions which had started after the terrorist 
attacks of September 11,2001, and taken primarily place in Geneva, under the aegis of 
a UN committee dealing with Afghanistan-related matters. At no stage, however, had 
the two parties discussed the question of Iran's nuclear program. This was due to 
president Bush's clear instruction to his representatives that the nuclear issue was off 
the table. (Sick 2003: 90-91 and The Washington Post, 26 October 2004) 
5.3.3.4 The Islamic Republic's defence of its nuclear activities 
Ruling out the nuclear weapons option 
As it started to become clear, from the fall of 2002 onwards, that the Iranian nuclear 
program was far more advanced than theretofore believed, the Islamic Republic 
intensified its diplomatic campaign to convince the world of its peaceful nuclear 
intentions. In substantive terms, however, Iran's defence of its nuclear program did not 
basically differ from the Islamic Republic's earlier nuclear argumentation. Thus, rather 
than involving the reappraisal of the premises of Islamic Iran's nuclear arms control 
operations, the reinforced Iranian campaign to defend the country's nuclear activities 
was a formal, tactical reaction to suddenly changed diplomatic circumstances. 
The claim that their country was not interested in nuclear armaments and would never 
embark on a nuclear weapons program continued to constitute the point of departure for 
Iranian officials' argumentation. 385 Similarly, the reasons given for Iran's objection to 
nuclear armaments remained the same. According to the authorities of the Islamic 
385 For the argument that Iran would never pursue nuclear armaments, see Reuters (14 December 2002); 
CD/PV. 938 (2003: 11) and A/58/PV. 12 (2003: 29). In the Tehran Declaration of 21 October 2003 - 
issued by the Islamic Republic and the EU trio of Britain, France, and Germany - Iran reaffirmed that 
nuclear weapons had no place in its defence doctrine and that its nuclear activities had been exclusively in 
the peaceful domain (Reuters, 21 October 2003). 
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Republic, their country was not trying to acquire nuclear weapons because Islam 
forbade their use and because the moral beliefs of the Iranian nation made the use of 
such armaments unimaginable. Having themselves been victims of WMD attacks, the 
representatives of the Islamic Republic added, the Iranian people understood the 
dangers of WMD and thereby wanted to ensure that nobody would have to relive their 
experiences with such armaments. (Aghazadeh 2003b: 1; CD/PV. 938,2003: 11 and 
A/58/PV. 12,2003: 29) 
Furthermore, Iranian officials maintained that irrespective of the religious, ethical, 
and historical factors that constrained their country's military behaviour, the Islamic 
Republic would not seek nuclear weapons simply because such weapons and other 
WMD could not guarantee states' national security. To make their point, the 
representatives of the Islamic Republic asked, for example, whether the U. S. nuclear 
arsenal had prevented terrorists from carrying out the attacks of September 11,2001 or 
whether Iraq's chemical and biological weapons had stopped the Americans from 
invading that country in March 2003. (A/58/PV. 12,2003: 29 and Aghazadeh 2003a: 13) 
Iranian authorities pointed out that the possession of nuclear armaments would 
undermine Iran's security because it would have a negative effect on Iran's relations 
with other countries - especially with its neighbours - and most probably trigger a 
regional arms race involving WMD. Aside from that, the Iranians added, Iran's 
possession of nuclear arms would subject the country to increased external politico- 
military pressure and make it a potential target for a nuclear strike. According to the 
officials of the Islamic Republic, the wisdom and the unity of the Iranian people, 
combined with their reliance on Islam, alone sufficed to ensure Iran's national security. 
(Zarif 2003c; Dealing with Iran's Nuclear Program 2003: 18 and Aghazadeh 2003a: 
14) 
In addition to officially placing no security value on nuclear weapons, the Iranians 
also rejected the argument that nuclear armaments served as a source of political power 
and influence. To support their viewpoint, Iranian representatives referred, among 
others, to the cases of India and Pakistan and noted that the nuclear tests carried out by 
the two countries in May 1998 had not improved their international standing, but 
instead, created diplomatic problems for them. In the same vein, the officials of the 
Islamic Republic pointed out that nuclear weapons had not saved the Soviet Union from 
dissolution. The real factors that increased states' domestic and international strength 
and clout, the Iranian argument went, consisted of nations' economic, scientific, and 
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industrial capabilities. As observed by president Khatami, "being strong means having 
knowledge and technology. " (Farhi 2004: 45; Aghazadeh 2003a: 9-10 and The 
Christian Science Monitor, 19 September 2003) 
According to Iranian authorities, there were numerous factors that testified to their 
country's anti-nuclear weapons stance. First of all, they noted that the Islamic Republic 
was a member of all major international conventions dealing with WMD and that it had 
always actively sought to promote regional and global nuclear disarmament. 386 
Moreover, the Iranians stressed that the Islamic Republic had always worked closely 
with international organizations involved in arms control and that it had never been 
found in contravention of its disarmament commitments. 387 And apart from being a 
staunch advocate of nuclear disarmament, Iranian representatives continued, the Islamic 
Republic's policy of not responding in kind to Iraq's chemical weapons use during the 
1980-1988 war had been another embodiment of Iran's responsible behaviour. 388 Also, 
the Iranians asked that if their country was pursuing nuclear weapons, why would it 
have so openly discussed its nuclear program in public and allowed international 
observers to visit its nuclear facilities? 389 Moreover: would a country working on 
nuclear arms have invited foreign powers to participate in its nuclear projects and would 
it have signed the CTBT and agreed to host test-monitoring stations on its soil? 390 
The internal Iranian debate on the Islamic Republic's nuclear policy 
In spite of the official Iranian claim that the Islamic Republic would never obtain 
nuclear arms, however, some Iranian representatives quietly acknowledged that, in 
theory, their country could, under article X of the NPT, legally withdraw from that 
treaty and then harness its existing nuclear know-how to serve military purposes. 391 In 
fact, as the nuclear crisis between Iran and the IAEA deepened, some elements within 
the Islamic Republic's political elite began to openly call on the Iranian government to 
do precisely that. 
386 See Salehi (2003a: 2); Memorandum from the Ambassador (2003: 1-2,6) and A/58/PV. 12 (2003: 29). 
387 See Salehi (2003a: 2); Memorandum from the Ambassador (2003: 1-2,6) and CD/PV. 938 (2003: 11). 
388 Note, for example, the statement made by Iran's IAEA representative to the agency's board of 
governors on 8 September 2003: "Iran is a responsible state and has demonstrated that during the imposed 
war. Despite its retaliatory capabilities, Iran never succumbed to reprisal and therefore never used the 
apalling chemical weapon" (Salehi 2003c: 2). 
39 See AFP (8 August 2002) and CNN (13 December 2002). 
39° See author's correspondence with an Iranian arms control official [D] who wishes to remain 
unidentified, November 2002. 
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The calls for Iran's withdrawal from the NPT became increasingly prevalent in the 
autumn of 2003 after the IAEA's board of governors had - in its resolution of 12 
September 2003 - presented a list of demands to the Islamic Republic and called on 
Iranian authorities to satisfy them by the end of October 2003. Outraged by the IAEA's 
ultimatum, some influential Iranian elite figures called on their government to ignore 
the board's demands and to resist what they regarded as Western efforts to weaken the 
Islamic Republic. While arguing that the immediate purpose of the diplomatic process 
between Iran and the IAEA was to force the Islamic Republic to give up its nuclear 
program, Iranian advocates of a tough, uncompromising diplomatic course claimed that 
outside powers' efforts would not end there. The ultimate goal of the West, the Iranian 
elite hardliners maintained, was to topple the country's Islamic regime. 392 (Financial 
Times, 12 September 2004; IHT, 8 September 2003 and Eurasia Insight, 2 October 
2003) 
In the opinion of the Iranian hardliners, the IAEA additional protocol was an 
instrument that was being used in the Western plot against their country. By providing 
international inspectors with an opportunity to carry out spying operations in Iran and to 
get their hands on the Islamic Republic's military secrets, the hardliners alleged, the 
protocol constituted a threat to Iranian national security. After the Islamic Republic had 
announced, in mid-October 2003, that it would sign the additional protocol, Iranian elite 
hardliners denounced - also in the form of orchestrated street demonstrations 
393 
- their 
government's diplomatic move. Iranian opponents of the instrument portrayed the 
protocol's acceptance as a disgraceful capitulation to Western demands and urged the 
Islamic Republic to withdraw from the NPT. 394 (Reuters, 19 September 2003; BBC, 22 
October 2003 and AP, 25 October 2003) 
391 See Dealing with Iran's Nuclear Program (2003: 23). 
392 According to the Iranian elite members who warned their government about external powers' 
intentions vis-ä-vis the Islamic Republic, there were plenty of historical evidence to substantiate Western 
governments' efforts to undermine Iran's Islamic government. The West's blessing of Iraq's invasion of 
Iran in 1980, Western chemical weapons shipments to Saddam Hussein during the 1980-1988 war, and 
Western governments' acceptance of and involvement in Israel's WMD programs were given by Iran's 
elite hardliners as recent examples of why they could not trust Western powers. (Financial Times, 12 
September 2004) 
393 On 24 October 2003, for example, some 1,500 hardline protestors gathered in the streets of Tehran to 
express their disapproval of the Islamic Republic's nuclear diplomacy (AP, 25 October 2003). 
394 Perhaps the most often cited pro-withdrawal statement by a member of the Islamic Republic's ruling 
elite was the one made by Ayatollah Jannati, the head of the Guardian Council, on 19 September 2003: 
"What is wrong with considering this treaty on nuclear energy [the NPT] and pulling out of it. North 
Korea pulled out of it and many countries have never entered it" (Reuters, 19 September 2003). 
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Although the Iranians who objected to their country's acceptance of the IAEA 
additional protocol could not self-evidently be designated as advocates of an Iranian 
nuclear weapons capability, many of them did support a national military nuclear 
program. The views of those elite members of the Islamic Republic who called for an 
Iranian nuclear weapons capability had first become public knowledge in the Islamic 
Republic in the aftermath of the Indian-Pakistani nuclear tests of May 1998. Spurred by 
the South Asian tests, as well as by the Khatami era's atmosphere of heated domestic 
political debate, the Iranian supporters of a national nuclear weapons program had 
called on their government to seriously contemplate the weapon option. 
In 2003, as Iran found itself in the middle of a diplomatic crisis over its nuclear 
program, the supporters of the nuclear weapon option voiced their position in an 
unprecedentedly forceful manner. 395 In the course of what turned out to be the second 
major round of public nuclear debate in the Islamic Republic, they challenged Iran's 
official nuclear diplomacy and deliberated on the reasons that purportedly made a 
military nuclear program a necessity for their country. The factors listed by the bomb 
enthusiasts were similar to those presented by them in connection with the Iranian 
nuclear debate of 1998.396 
On the one hand, the supporters of an Iranian nuclear weapon program argued that 
the Islamic Republic needed a nuclear deterrent against the threats in its highly unstable 
security environment, against U. S. machinations, and particularly against the nuclear 
armaments of Israel, India, and Pakistan. On the other hand, they maintained that 
nuclear weapons would enhance Iran's political power and influence internationally. 
Such a view was reinforced by the international community's half-hearted response to 
India's and Pakistan's 1998 nuclear tests. That the international criticism of the tests 
and the sanctions imposed on the two countries turned out to be short-lived were 
interpreted by some Iranian nuclear bomb advocates as a confirmation to the belief that, 
eventually, the state community could not diplomatically sideline and ignore a country 
395 Farhi (2004: 43-44) asserts that no foreign policy question in the Islamic Republic before had become 
so contentious publicly as the nuclear issue. According to an observation made by an Iranian official in 
September 2003, the nuclear weapon advocates' views had quickly gathered ground among Iranians 
(Dealing with Iran's Nuclear Program 2003: 18). Another Iranian representative observed that even 
though the nuclear hardliners were in minority in Iran, their voice was "becoming louder as the 
international pressure is increasing" (IHT, 8 September 2003). 
396 See above the relevant passages in section 5.3.1.2. It should be added here that ever since the time of 
the South Asian nuclear tests of 1998, some of the most ardent supporters of an Iranian nuclear weapons 
program have come from the country's academia (author's interview with an Iranian arms control official 
[D] who wishes to remain unidentified, summer 2002 and Dealing with Iran's Nuclear Program 2003: 
18). 
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that was equipped with nuclear weapons. 397 Finally, the spokesmen for an Iranian 
nuclear weapons program underscored the value of nuclear armaments as a source of 
national pride and unity. (The Washington Post, 11 March 2003; Dealing with Iran's 
Nuclear Program 2003: 18 and Farhi 2004: 35-37) 
In contrast to the Islamic Republic's hardcore nuclear weapon advocates, some 
members of the Iranian elite argued that even if actually never completing it, their 
country should nonetheless launch a nuclear arms program for tactical reasons. 398 Such 
a program, the argument went, would act as an indispensable diplomatic trump card that 
could be used for extracting major diplomatic concessions from Western powers. 
Iranian government's demonstrated readiness to review its nuclear policies in exchange 
for European and American rewards in the political and economic domain suggested 
that the logic of a trade-off was widely espoused by the members of the Islamic 
Republic's political elite. However, what distinguished Iranian supporters of a national 
nuclear weapons program from those members of the Islamic Republic's political elite 
who backed Iran's official diplomatic line was the view of the former that only a 
national nuclear arms program could decisively strengthen the Islamic Republic's 
bargaining position. 399 
Given that Iran's decisions on how to proceed in the diplomatic crisis with the IAEA 
would crucially define the state of its future relations with the outside world, it was no 
wonder that the nuclear issue engendered heated exchanges of words between the 
Islamic Republic's reformist and hardline forces. 400 And yet, the reformist-hardliner 
divide that coloured the public nuclear debate in Iran presumably played only a minor 
role in the formulation of Iran's official reactions to the crisis. This was due, first and 
foremost, to the fact that it was the Iranian elite's pragmatic conservatives that 
controlled the Islamic Republic's decision-making machinery in the nuclear matter. The 
shared preference of the Iranian leadership's pragmatic conservative and reformist 
397 Note, for example, the following remark made by an Iranian official in September 2003 which 
subscribed to the interpretation that India's and Pakistan's nuclear weapons had improved those states' 
international standing: "India and Pakistan have both acquired nuclear weapons, were softly reprimanded, 
and currently enjoy strong relations with the U. S. " (cited in Dealing with Iran's Nuclear Program 2003: 
15). 
398 See ibid. (2003: 18). 
399 One important factor that had contributed to the trade-off logic's popularity among the Iranians was 
the case of North Korea. The fact that the North Koreans had succeeded, since the early 1990s, in using 
their nuclear program as a diplomatic asset that brought the Americans to the negotiating table had 
convinced many in Tehran that the Islamic Republic should follow North Korea's example. (Farhi 2001: 
49; The Washington Post, 11 February 2003 and Takeyh 2003: 23) 
400 For a discussion of such exchanges, see Farhi (2004: 38-49). 
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forces for a cooperative nuclear diplomacy thus resulted in the nuclear hardliners' 
marginalization in the intra-elite Iranian debate on the Islamic Republic's nuclear 
policies. 40' 
In fact, the Islamic Republic tried to use Iranian nuclear hardliners' dissatisfaction 
with their country's nuclear policies as a tool to strengthen its diplomatic position in the 
international arena. Although the officials of the Islamic Republic made it regularly 
known that the hardliners' views did not represent Iran's official line, they nevertheless 
tried to convey the impression that Iranian government's diplomatic latitude was 
seriously limited by the critical voices within the country. 402 The Islamic Republic's 
resort to the public opinion card for the purpose of stalling the diplomatic processes 
dealing with Iran's nuclear program, and most importantly, for the purpose of 
persuading key international players to soften their demands on Iran became strikingly 
evident in the fall of 2003. Trying to influence the content of the IAEA board of 
governors' September 2003 resolution on Iran, the Islamic Republic's representative at 
the agency warned the board of further "politicizing the technical issue" of Iran's 
nuclear program. As the authorities of the Islamic Republic were "sitting on a very thin 
edge" politically, he argued, increased international pressure on Iran could easily 
produce a strong counterreaction within the country and thereby force the Iranian 
leadership to cut down its cooperation with the international community. 403 (IHT, 22 
July 2003; IHT, 9 September 2003 and Salehi 2003c: 1-4) 
Soon after the issuance of the October 2003 Tehran Declaration, Iranian officials 
tried to quell the nuclear debate in the country by making it clear that Iran's agreement 
with Britain, France, and Germany had been approved by the Islamic Republic's highest 
authorities, including the supreme leader. Defending the arrangement as a victory for 
401 In spite of their alliance with the pragmatic conservatives in the nuclear issue, however, the reformists 
of the Iranian elite did not uncritically accept the content of their country's nuclear diplomacy. In the 
opinion of some reformists, for example, the Islamic Republic's disinclination to seriously collaborate 
with the IAEA prior to the board of governors' September 2003 resolution had considerably limited Iran's 
diplomatic latitude and possibly even cost the Iranians the right to independently enrich uranium for their 
nuclear reactors (Daily Star, 1 November 2003). 
402 At times, the officials of the Islamic Republic seemed to suggest that opposition to Iranian 
government's cooperative nuclear diplomacy was widespread in the Iranian society and that it did not 
only involve hardline political forces but the general public as well. Take, for example, the call made to 
IAEA board of governors by the Islamic Republic's IAEA representative on 8 September 2003: "We need 
your support in maintaining a helpful international climate so that we will be able to convince our public 
opinion that our course of action is the correct course [... ]" (Salehi 2003c: 3). 
403 In a similar manner, Iranian representatives had used the public opinion card when discussing the Iran 
policy of the United States. If America continued to bring up unjust WMD accusations against the Islamic 
Republic, the Iranians asserted, their government's arms control diplomacy could take a less cooperative 
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their country, they stressed that, above all, the deal had prevented the referral of Iran's 
case to the UN Security Council and thereby probably saved the Islamic Republic from 
further economic sanctions and diplomatic ostracism. By emphasizing, among others, 
that the IAEA additional protocol would not give international inspectors an unlimited 
access to Iranian facilities, the officials of the Islamic Republic also sought to correct 
Iranian nuclear hardliners' depictions of the protocol's implications. (Farhi 2004: 40- 
41,48; Dealing with Iran's Nuclear Program 2003: 16-17 and Pollack and Takeyh 
2005) 
Iran's stated nuclear plans 
Notwithstanding their disagreements over Iran's nuclear activities, the members of 
the Islamic Republic's political elite were unanimous in their insistence on their 
country's right to have a full-scale nuclear program for peaceful purposes. Irrespective 
of whether such a program was ultimately seen by the elite members as a springboard 
for military nuclear efforts or not, Iranian authorities declared that nothing would make 
them give up that right, which, the Iranians stressed, also covered nuclear fuel-cycle 
activities. (IRNA, 24 June 2003; IHT, 29 September 2003 and AFP, 6 October 2003) 
Following the Tehran Declaration of October 2003, the officials of the Islamic 
Republic pointed out that Iran's agreement to suspend all activities related to uranium 
enrichment and processing was a temporary gesture and that Iran alone would decide 
how long the suspension would stay in force. The Iranians also strongly rejected the 
idea that Iran should agree to permanently halt its uranium enrichment activities. 
Alluding to the Tehran Declaration, the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic himself 
made it known that should the agreement with the EU powers harm Iran's national 
interests or values, it would not hesitate to terminate the diplomatic process with the 
Europeans. (Bowen and Kidd 2004: 270; Asia Times Online, 9 December 2003 and 
Eisenstadt 2004: 18) 
In order to demonstrate their determination to pursue a comprehensive nuclear power 
program as well as to get outside support for their nuclear diplomacy, in 2003, Iranian 
officials regularly met with their Russian counterparts to discuss future nuclear 
cooperation between the two parties. The construction of a second nuclear reactor at the 
direction (author's interviews with Iranian arms control officials [C] and [D] who wish to remain 
unidentified, summer 2002). 
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Bushehr site was a central topic in those discussions. 404 By the same token, Iran and 
Russia continued their long-lived talks on the terms of a deal under which the Russians 
would provide nuclear fuel for the Bushehr-1 reactor. But while the Iranians had already 
agreed to the fundamental Russian negotiating position which required Iran to return the 
spent fuel back to Russia for reprosessing and storage, 405 disagreements supposedly 
over financial and technical details kept the deal from being signed. (Arms Control 
Today, January/February 2003; Squassoni 2003: 5 and BBC, 26 February 2005) 
The construction of a second nuclear reactor at the Bushehr site was part of the 
Islamic Republic's long-term nuclear plans whose details became public knowledge 
during 2002 and 2003 as Iranian officials, in an unprecedentedly open manner, 
discussed them in various diplomatic contexts. Prior to the fall of 2002, the Islamic 
Republic had said very little about the specifics of its nuclear objectives. In the early 
1990s, the Iranians had expressed the hope that, in the future, nuclear energy would 
account for 10-20 percent of Iran's energy needs. In 1997, at the IAEA, the head of the 
AEOI had spoken about the Iranian intention to generate 20 percent of the country's 
electricity by nuclear power plants by the year 2017 (GC/41/OR. 2,1997: 13). 
From the autumn of 2002 onwards, however, the authorities of the Islamic Republic 
started to shed more light on their nuclear goals. As far as nuclear energy's share in 
Iran's total energy palette was concerned, the Iranian objective was clearly spelled out: 
by the year 2021,10 percent of Iran's electricity was to be supplied by nuclear reactors. 
The stated goal based on a calculation according to which Iran needed an electricity 
capacity of 70,000 MW by the target year. Iranian authorities thus aimed at a total 
nuclear power capacity of 7,000 MW. This included the 1,000 MW already accounted 
for by the Bushehr-1 plant, putting Iran's additional nuclear power needs at 6,000 
MW. 406 (Sahimi 2005: 43; Aghazadeh 2003a: 4 and A/58/PV. 12,2003: 29) 
The officials of the Islamic Republic emphasized that in order to achieve its nuclear 
energy goals, their country had to embark on the development of a vast nuclear 
infrastructure composed not only of nuclear reactors but also of fuel-cycle facilities as 
404 For the Iranian-Russian nuclear cooperation talks, see Itar-Tass (17 February 2003); IRNA (I I March 
2003) and AFP (2 July 2003). 
405 This Russian demand stemmed not only from proliferation concerns but also from financial 
considerations, for Russia viewed the importation of irradiated fuel as part of the nuclear services it was 
selling to Iran (Shaffer 2003). 
406 According to some news reports, Iran intended to build altogether six additional nuclear reactors at the 
Bushehr site. However, the accuracy of such reports was doubtful because the AEOI's vice president for 
nuclear fuel production, for example, stated in September 2003 that the Iranians were planning to 
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well as of capabilities related to nuclear safety and nuclear waste management. 407 In 
regards to the nuclear fuel-cycle activities that had put the Islamic Republic on a 
collision course with the international community, the Iranians said that they had had no 
other alternative but to develop an independent means of producing nuclear fuel for 
their power plants. Reliance on foreign suppliers' fuel, Iranian authorities' argument 
went, held the risk that political reasons could lead to the cancellation of fuel shipments 
to the Islamic Republic at any moment. 
Seeking to explain why their country could not rely on others and therefore needed to 
have independent fuel production capabilities, Iranian representatives pointed, above all, 
to the United States and said that, for years, the Americans had tried to cut off Iran's 
access to foreign nuclear assistance. In view of the constant pressure put on nuclear fuel 
suppliers by the United States, the Iranians noted, how could their country put itself at 
the mercy of political considerations and simultaneously succeed in running a 
meaningful nuclear program? Iranian authorities pointed out that European countries 
were among the states that were highly susceptible to U. S. influence and stressed that 
the Islamic Republic had already had bad experiences with European nuclear suppliers. 
Referring specifically to Iran's original 1974 Bushehr deal with the Germans, which had 
included an agreement over the supply of nuclear fuel to Iran, the officials of the Islamic 
Republic complained that their country had not managed to "recover its approximately 
100 tons enriched uranium and 390 tons tails uranium currently stored in Lingen, 
Germany. " (The Washington Post, 13 March 2003; Aghazadeh 2003a: 11-12 and 
Memorandum from the Ambassador 2003: 4) 
Responding to the argument that the Islamic Republic did not need to produce 
nuclear fuel domestically because it already had a fuel supply agreement with Russia, 
Iranian officials stressed that the deal concerned only the Bushehr-1 reactor and that 
Russia had made no other commitment to meet Iran's future nuclear fuel needs. And 
even in the Bushehr-1 arrangement, the Iranians specified, the Russians had committed 
themselves to providing supplies only for a limited period of time. According to Iranian 
representatives, this was yet another reason for their country's attempt to achieve self- 
construct nuclear power plants "in various parts of the country. " (IHT, 15 August 2003 and Ghannadi- 
Maragheh 2003: 1) 
407 For official Iranian descriptions of the steps the Islamic Republic had taken to build its nuclear 
infrastructure, see Aghazadeh (2003a: 4-6); Memorandum from the Ambassador (2003: 4-6) and 
Ghannadi-Maragheh (2003: 1-14). It should be stressed here that these descriptions - which for the most 
part repeated the developments already discussed above in section 5.3.3.2 - never revealed any details 
beyond what was already known by the IAEA at a given time. 
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sufficiency in nuclear fuel production by 2021. (Aghazadeh 2003a: 7-8 and 
Memorandum from the Ambassador 2003: 4) 
As noted by some analysts, Iran's objective of establishing self-sufficiency in the 
production of nuclear fuel did not necessarily make economic sense. 408 Indeed, by 
claiming that their nuclear fuel-cycle plans were shaped first and foremost by existing 
political realities, the Iranians themselves seemed to indirectly agree with this 
conclusion. But when it came to Iran's nuclear program in general, the officials of the 
Islamic Republic continued to justify it mainly on economic grounds. As before, they 
stressed that Iran had to meet its rapidly growing electricity needs and that the only 
prudent way to do so was to rely on nuclear power. 409 
The representatives of the Islamic Republic acknowledged that Iran already possessed 
enough resources to generate the additional electricity needed in the country. But in the 
long run, they emphasized, continued reliance on hydrocarbons in electricity production 
would undermine the welfare of the Iranian people. To make their case, the officials of 
the Islamic Republic relied on the long-standing Iranian argument that the country had 
to preserve its oil and gas reserves for export and for processing industries instead of 
burning those fuels to satisfy domestic electricity needs. Unless the Islamic Republic 
reexamined its energy policies, they stressed, Iran's future oil export earnings would 
dramatically fall and the country could end up becoming, within the next few decades, a 
net importer of crude oil and some of its by-products. According to Iranian authorities' 
calculations, a nuclear infrastructure covering 10 percent of the country's power needs 
would annually free some 190 million barrels of oil for export and processing purposes. 
The economic value of such savings was estimated to amount to over $5 billion per 
year . 
410 (Salehi 2003a: 4-5; Aghazadeh 2003a: 3-5 and Memorandum from the 
Ambassador 2003: 3) 
408 Albright and Hinderstein (2003 a), for example, argue that the Iranians "must recognize that overseas 
purchase of low-enriched uranium for fuel is more cost effective than domestic production" and add that 
"indigenous production is made even costlier by the perceived need to produce enriched uranium in 
heavily fortified underground facilities, which are significantly more expensive to build and operate than 
aboveground facilities. " 
409 According to the officials of the Islamic Republic, between 1977 and 2001, the consumption of 
electricity produced by fossil fuel plants had grown in Iran at an annual rate of about 8.8 percent, whereas 
the electricity production rate had registered an annual average growth of about 8.5 percent. During the 
same period, Iranian officials pointed out, the supply of primary energy in the country had remained at an 
average growth rate of about 6 percent. Iran's current electricity production capacity was put at above 
30,000 MW. (Memorandum from the Ambassador 2003: 3 and Salehi 2003a: 4) 
4W When talking about the economic benefits of their nuclear program, the officials of the Islamic 
Republic also noted that reduced reliance on hydrocarbons in the production of electricity would decrease 
the amount of subsidies their government was channelling to Iranian fossil fuel consumers (Aghazadeh 
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In addition to alluding to their responsibility to preserve their country's fossil fuel 
reserves for future Iranian generations, the officials of the Islamic Republic pointed out 
that increased utilization of fossil fuels for power generation would have adverse effects 
on the natural environment. In line with the international community's efforts to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, Iranian authorities maintained, the Islamic Republic regarded 
nuclear power as a means to scale down oil consumption's toll on the environment. The 
Iranians calculated that if their country produced 10 percent of its electricity by nuclear 
power plants, it would annually prevent the release into the atmosphere of over 157,000 
tons of carbon dioxide, 1,150 tons of suspending particles, 130 tons of sulphur, and 50 
tons of nitrous oxide. (Ghannadi-Maragheh 2002: 1; Aghazadeh 2003 a: 4-5 and 
Memorandum from the Ambassador 2003: 3-4) 
The Islamic Republic's statements on its nuclear plans also indicated, once again, that 
the Iranians viewed their nuclear program as a major milestone in the country's general 
development. In addition to referring, among others, to agricultural, medical, and 
industrial applications of nuclear science and technology, the Islamic Republic's 
authorities believed that the know-how obtained in the context of nuclear projects 
would have a spill-over effect and lead to progress in other scientific and technological 
fields as well. 41 In essence, the Iranians equated the mastery of nuclear science and 
technology with the status of an advanced state and did little to hide their satisfaction 
with the successes of their nuclear fuel-cycle efforts so far. Iran's capability to enrich 
uranium, in particular, was a major source of national pride in the country. 412 
From the Iranian point of view, then, the benefits of nuclear power were so manifold 
that the Islamic Republic could not seriously contemplate the option of not having a 
nuclear program. Iranian authorities dismissed out of hand the argument that Iran, a 
country rich with oil and gas, would not need a nuclear program and asked why those 
who made such a claim did not offer their advice to countries like the United States, 
2003a: 4). In consequence of such subsidies, the price for gasoline and other oil products in Iran had 
remained very low. In the early 1990s, for example, domestic fuel prices were reportedly held to 10 to 20 
percent of international prices. According to one estimate, subsidies on oil products, gas, and electricity 
cost the Iranian economy annually some $11 billion (Kanovsky 1997: 21 and 1998: 59). 
a1' See Ghannadi-Maragheh (2002: 1,10); IRNA (17 July 2003) and Dealing with Iran's Nuclear 
Program (2003: 15). 
412 In August 2003, for example, the Islamic Republic's supreme leader proudly declared that thanks to its 
Islamic system, Iran had become one of the ten countries in the world that had managed to develop an 
independent nuclear fuel cycle (Saghafi-Ameri 2004: 2-3). The secretary of the Islamic Republic's 
Supreme National Security Council, in turn, stated in November 2003 that "uranium enrichment is an 
important achievement, and it is a source of national pride for us, and we should continue it" (cited in 
Persbo 2003). 
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Russia, and the United Kingdom, all rich with hydrocarbons and still possessing 
massive nuclear infrastructures. And in the end, the officials of the Islamic Republic 
noted, Iran had already invested so much human and financial resources in its nuclear 
projects that it was simply too late to consider their cancellation. In order to reassure 
those worried about their nuclear intentions, Iranian authorities invited all 
technologically advanced member states of the IAEA to participate in their "ambitious 
plan for the construction of nuclear power plants and the associated technologies such 
as the fuel cycle, safety and waste management techniques. " (Salehi 2003a: 4; 
Aghazadeh 2003a: 12-13 and Aghazadeh 2002: 3-4) 
As to why the Islamic Republic had pursued many aspects of its nuclear program in 
secret, Iranian officials stressed that due to Western governments' and particularly the 
United States' fierce efforts to block Iran's access to nuclear technology, they had not 
had any other option than to act covertly. 413 In October 2003, when the Iranian 
government provided the IAEA with a documented declaration of the Islamic 
Republic's nuclear program, it expressed its expectation that the agency would take 
cognizance of Iran's concerns and constraints with regard to the full disclosure of 
detailed information about its nuclear activities in the past and notably of the Iranian 
concern about the "expansion of illegal sanctions to prevent Iran from exercising its 
inalienable right to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes stipulated in article IV of 
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" (GOV/2003/75,2003: 4). 
The call for full access to nuclear transfers 
Following the diplomatic footsteps of its predecessor, the Khatami administration 
forcefully condemned the nuclear export controls targeted against Iran and emphasized 
413 The Islamic Republic's IAEA representative characterized his country's predicament by stating, in 
September 2003, that for the past 24 years, Iran's attempts to procure nuclear technology had been 
"chased rigorously and suppressed violently. " And "the hunt, " he continued, "goes on unabated today. " In 
the light of the export restrictions applied by Western countries against Iran, the fact that Russia had 
agreed to cooperate with the Islamic Republic in the nuclear field gave Iranian officials at least partial 
satisfaction. In December 2000, in connection with the visit of Russia's defence minister in Tehran, for 
example, the Islamic Republic's defence minister had declared that the visit had put a "nail in the coffin 
of the December 1995 Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement. " The U. S. -Russian agreement alluded to by 
defence minister Shamkhani - dealing with Russia's conventional arms trade with 
Iran and with Russian 
missile and nuclear technology transfers to the Islamic Republic - had originally included an 
understanding that Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran would be limited to the construction of the 
Bushehr-1 plant. By the year 2000, however, Russia had renounced such a constraint and declared its 
right to provide the Iranians with additional nuclear power reactors. (Salehi 2003d: 3; BBC Monitoring 
Middle East, 30 December 2000 and Dealing with Iran's Nuclear Program 2003: 21-22) 
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that international rules regulating nuclear transfers should be multilaterally agreed upon. 
Iranian officials noted that negotiations on such transfer guidelines could be conducted, 
for example, at the IAEA, and that they should include all concerned parties - both the 
supplier and the recipient countries. 414 Moreover, the Khatami administration repeatedly 
stressed that nothing should be done to undermine the IAEA's role as the only 
competent authority to verify NPT member states' compliance with their treaty 
obligations. Underlining the IAEA's central role in nuclear verification, the officials of 
the Islamic Republic noted that any concerns over the NPT parties' compliance with 
their safeguards agreements should be directed to the agency. The countries that pointed 
to a potential case of non-compliance, Iranian officials continued, should validate their 
suspicions by providing the IAEA with supporting evidence and information. Only then, 
the Iranians added, should the agency "consider, investigate, draw conclusion and 
decide on necessary action in accordance with its mandate. " (Aghazadeh 2003a: 11; 
Statement by the Islamic Republic of Iran 2003: 3 and CD/PV. 940,2003: 17) 
The representatives of the Islamic Republic maintained that, theretofore, the 
safeguards system of the IAEA - characterized by them as a "fundamental pillar of the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime" - had functioned successfully and significantly 
contributed to the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation. Therefore, because of 
"strategic considerations, " the Iranians explained, their country fully supported the 
measures that aimed to improve the IAEA's verification machinery. Still, and as already 
indicated above, Iran committed itself to those measures only after strong international 
pressure. (IRNA, 5 February 2003; Shakerian 2003: 1 and Aghazadeh 2003b: 2) 
As far as the IAEA additional protocol - the main component of the effort to 
strengthen the agency's verification capabilities - was concerned, Iran had, since the 
acceptance of the Model Additional Protocol by the IAEA's board of governors in May 
1997, constantly voiced its support for the document. Simultaneously, however, it had 
carefully delineated the circumstances under which it would be ready to seriously 
414 Disapproval of the international restrictions on nuclear technology exports to NPT member states had 
been a key component of the Khatami administration's nuclear arms control operations right from the 
start. The Khatami government had portrayed such restrictions as a major obstacle to developing 
countries' development efforts and called for their swift removal. Note, for example, Iran's following 
statement at the sixth NPT review conference in April 2000: "One cannot but express dismay over the 
systematic denial of transfer of [nuclear] technology to developing non-nuclear weapon States Parties to 
the NPT and restrictive export control policies exercised by the nuclear suppliers. The ad hoc parallel and 
non-transparent [export control] regimes, acting in defiance of the letter and spirit of the Treaty, continue 
to pursue subjective, arbitrary and discriminatory policies. The main objective of these regimes, disguised 
under the pretext of non-proliferation, is to secure the dominance and exclusive possession of nuclear 
technology by developed countries. The situation should be redressed" (Kharrazi 2000b). 
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consider the protocol's adoption. While occasionally trying to evade the question 
altogether by raising concerns over secondary issues, such as the protocol's impact on 
IAEA member states' bureaucratic burden, or by calling for the document's universal 
adoption by NWS and NNWS alike, Iranian representatives had suggested that there 
were two fundamental conditions for the Islamic Republic's conclusion of the 
document. Should there be indications that the protocol was being used as a political 
tool to endanger the Islamic Republic's national security, and unless the existing 
restrictions on nuclear transfers to Iran were lifted, the Iranians had signalled, their 
country would not be interested in the protocol. (Zak 2002: 28-29; A/52/PV. 49,1997: 4 
and GC/44/OR. 2,2000: 11) 
In the course of 2003 - as the international community was stepping up its pressure 
on Iran to conclude the additional protocol - the twin considerations of national security 
and access to nuclear transfers started to play an increasingly important role in Iran's 
nuclear arms control operations415 and, as discussed above, also became the key topics 
around which the domestic nuclear debate in the Islamic Republic centered. In the 
Tehran Declaration of October 2003, Iran obtained the EU trio's recognition of its right 
to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in addition to which Britain, France, 
and Germany explicitly stated that the IAEA additional protocol was in no way intended 
to undermine the signatories' national security. In regards to the issue of nuclear 
transfers, however, the Tehran declaration, which only promised Iran an "easier access 
to modern technology in a range of areas, " clearly fell short of corresponding to the 
Islamic Republic's wishes. 
At the end of the day, the demand for a full access to nuclear transfers made by the 
Islamic Republic to the European powers was just another expression of a long-lived 
Iranian diplomatic objective in the area of nuclear arms control. Prior to the Iran-EU 
nuclear talks of 2003, the Khatami administration had regularly raised the access issue 
in various international contexts and called for the provision of an international access 
guarantee to all those NPT parties that had placed their nuclear facilities under IAEA 
full-scope safeguards and subjected their nuclear activities to international inspections. 
The Iranians had insisted that the acceptance of IAEA full-scope safeguards was the 
only legitimate criterion for determining whether a state would be entitled to nuclear 
'15 For Iranian statements, made in 2003, that linked the Islamic Republic's conclusion of the additional 
protocol to international recognition of Iran's security interests and to guarantees of access to foreign 
nuclear technology, see Memorandum from the Foreign Minister (2003); IRNA (6 July 2003) and AP (8 
October 2003). 
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transfers or not. Not even the stipulations of national legislation, the representatives of 
the Islamic Republic had added, should be allowed to play a role in such decisions 
because state responsibilities under international law always superseded those 
emanating from national legislation. 416 (A/53/PV. 51,1998: 5-6; Dehghani 1999a and 
NPT/CONF. 2000/MC. III/WP. 10,2000: 540) 
Moreover, the Khatami administration had restated the Iranian position that 
developing countries which had concluded the NPT ought to enjoy a preferential 
treatment as far as technology transfers were concerned417 and that nuclear transfers to 
non-NPT states should be terminated. 418 Furthermore, the Khatami government had 
called on the IAEA to defend NPT parties' right to nuclear imports and to ensure that its 
member states would not be unwarrantedly subjected to nuclear export controls. Should 
the IAEA fail to do so, the Iranians had concluded, the agency would compromise its 
credibility and contribute to the erosion of the NPT regime. 419 
Before the Islamic Republic's nuclear efforts had turned into an urgent international 
matter in 2003, Iran had acknowledged that extra-NPT export control arrangements 
could not be abolished overnight and adopted a less rigid position on them. Instead of 
dismissing extra-NPT export controls outright, Iranian officials had called on the NSG 
and the Zangger Committee to operate more transparently and to embark on a process of 
dialogue and cooperation with "all interested states parties to the NPT. , 420 Pending the 
abolishment of extra-NPT export controls, the representatives of the Islamic Republic 
had specifically addressed the NSG - which, in the Iranian view, increasingly saw itself 
as the supreme international definer of whether NPT members complied with their 
treaty obligations or not - and asked the group to take measures to promote the causes 
416 Iranian officials had also stressed that a "non-selective and non-discriminatory" approach to nuclear 
transfers should become an element of the process of economic globalization (GC/43/OR. 2,1999: 9 and 
Kharrazi 2002c). 
417 See A/53/PV. 51 (1998: 5) and NPT/CONF. 2000/MC. III/WP. 10 (2000: 541). 
418 See NPT/CONF. 2000/PC. I1I/55 (1999: 75); NPT/CONF. 2000/18 (2000: 341-342) and Zamaninia 
(2003: 3). 
419 See A/52/PV. 49 (1997: 3); GC/41/OR. 2 (1997: 13-14) and Kharrazi (2000). The Khatami government 
had also repeated Islamic Iran's traditional call for the increase of the IAEA's resources earmarked for 
technical cooperation with the developing world and called on the agency to maintain a careful balance 
between its verification and promotional responsibilities (GC/43/OR. 2,1999: 10; 
NPT/CONF. 2000/MC. III/WP. 10,2000: 540-541 and Statement by the Islamic Republic of Iran 2003: 2). 
420 In this connection, the Iranians had backed their demands by referring to provision 17 of the 
"Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" document which had been 
adopted by NPT member states at the treaty's 1995 review and extension conference. According to that 
provision, "transparency in nuclear-related export controls should be promoted within the framework of 
dialogue and cooperation among all interested States parties to the [nuclear non-proliferation] Treaty" 
(NPT/CONF. 1995/32,1995: 12). 
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of nuclear transparency, dialogue, and cooperation. (GC/43/OR. 2,1999: 10; Dehghani 
1999a and Nasseri 1999: 56) 
The Iranians had thanked the NSG for the international seminars - dealing with the 
role of export controls in nuclear non-proliferation - it had organized in 1997 and 
1999,421 as well as argued that such seminars should become part of the group's regular 
activities. Moreover, the officials of the Islamic Republic had called on the NSG to 
share information with non-members on the group's structure, organization, program of 
work, and modes of operation. Also, they had asked the NSG to put in motion a process 
of consultations with countries that were seeking nuclear imports. In such consultations, 
the Iranians had specified, the NSG should explain to the interested states why a nuclear 
transfer would or would not take place, and in the case of an export denial, give detailed 
reasons for such a denial and explain under what conditions the NSG would be prepared 
to reverse a negative answer. Finally, the Islamic Republic's representatives had called 
on the NSG to ask the IAEA to verify the accuracy of the nuclear proliferation concerns 
that the group members might have when contemplating a nuclear transfer decision. 
Should the IAEA find no evidence of NPT non-compliance by the treaty member 
interested in nuclear imports, the Iranian argument went, the NSG should automatically 
give a positive answer to that state's export requests. (Dehghani 1999a and 1999b and 
Nasseri 1999: 57-58) 
The aforementioned Iranian calls aside, the Khatami administration had urged the 
NSG to adopt a policy of providing the NPT countries concluding the IAEA additional 
protocol with a full access to nuclear transfers. Also, the Iranians had called on the NSG 
to devise a mechanism under which those NPT parties whose export requests had been 
turned down by an individual NSG member state or by the group as a whole could voice 
their opinions about such rejections. Moreover, the representatives of the Islamic 
Republic had argued that the NSG should allow interested NPT member states to 
participate in the group's meetings as observers and with all the rights normally 
associated with a diplomatic observer status. (Dehghani 1999a and 1999b and Nasseri 
1999: 58) 
421 In accordance with provision 17 of the 1995 principles and objectives document, the purpose of the 
1997 and 1999 NSG seminars had been to provide an opportunity for governments and NGO, both within 
and outside the group, to discuss and exchange views on nuclear export controls. Iran had taken part in 
both gatherings. The first meeting had been attended by the Islamic Republic's IAEA representative and 
the second by foreign minister Kharrazi's arms control advisor. For the statements made by the Iranians at 
the 1997 and 1999 NSG seminars, see Ayatollahi (1997) and Nasseri (1999). 
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In 2003, as the nuclear crisis between Iran and the international community 
intensified, the Khatami administration once again expressed the Islamic Republic's 
readiness to cooperate with the NSG. This time, however, Iran's cooperation-related 
pronouncements were essentially part of its campaign to convince the world of the 
peaceful nature of its nuclear program. Thus, on 18 June 2003, for example, the Islamic 
Republic's IAEA representative told the agency's board of governors that his country 
would welcome the NSG's help in the enforcement of Iranian laws and regulations 
concerning the control of nuclear materials and equipment. The Islamic Republic's 
original request for the NSG's assistance in drafting Iranian nuclear export control 
regulations had been made in September 2002. (Salehi 2003b: 5 and 2003a: 5) 
In the end, however, the subtle change that had taken place in the Iranian stance on 
extra-NPT export controls at the end of the 1990s lost its relevance in the latter part of 
2003 as the diplomatic crisis over Iran's nuclear program intensified. After having 
ended up in the negotiating table with Britain, Germany, and France, Iranian authorities 
demanded a full and immediate access to Western nuclear transfers in exchange for 
their own diplomatic concessions. In short, the Islamic Republic was no longer 
interested in making compromises over the issue of nuclear export controls. 
5.3.4 Iran, WMD terrorism, and regional nuclear disarmament 
5.3.4.1 The issue of WMD terrorism 
In his state of the union address of January 2002, the president of the United States 
designated Iran as a country that not only pursued nuclear weapons and sponsored 
terrorism, but also as a state that could some day provide a nuclear bomb to a terrorist 
group. Such portrayal of Iran by the Bush administration meant that the Islamic 
Republic's defence of its nuclear activities had to include a two-pronged argument: Iran 
posed neither a direct nor an indirect nuclear threat to the world. 
While trying to convince the international community of their country's disinterest in 
nuclear weapons, thus, Iranian officials simultaneously sought to refute the suggestions 
that the Islamic Republic was involved in terrorism and could potentially act as a 
sponsor of nuclear terrorism. According to the Iranians, the Islamic Republic had never 
supported terrorism in any part of the world nor harbored terrorists in Iran. On the 
contrary, the representatives of the Islamic Republic stressed that Iran itself had been a 
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victim of both terrorism and the use of WMD. Portraying themselves as defenders of 
Islam, Iranian officials also stated that Islam was a peaceful religion and that the efforts 
to link international terrorism to Islam or Muslim countries were factually inaccurate, 
politically motivated, and therefore totally unacceptable. 422 (Press Release 2002b and 
IRMA, 30 and 31 January 2002) 
In the view of Iranian authorities, the terrorist attacks of September 11,2001, in the 
United States had dramatically demonstrated the way in which all nations, even the 
most powerful ones, were threatened by terrorism. 423 More specifically, the Iranians 
added, the events of September 11,2001, had illustrated that the world was vulnerable, 
more than ever before, to WMD attacks carried out by non-state actors. Since nuclear 
weapons were the most dangerous weapons available, Iranian officials maintained, 
states' policies against WMD terrorism should focus on nuclear arms and on ensuring 
that terrorists would not get their hands on them. The Iranians underscored the IAEA's 
centrality in the fight against nuclear terrorism and pointed out that complete nuclear 
disarmament was ultimately the most effective way of preventing terrorists from 
obtaining nuclear weapons. 
424 
Beside nuclear terrorism, the representatives of the Islamic Republic also discussed 
the issues of biological and chemical terrorism. Following the October 2001 anthrax 
attacks in the United States - that is, the sending of letters that contained bacteria 
causing anthrax by an unidentified perpetrator425 -, Iranian officials declared that 
422 The leaders of the Islamic Republic strongly condemned the Iran remarks made by president Bush in 
his January 2002 speech. President Khatami characterized them as "intervening and war-mongering" and 
as "truly insulting towards the Iranian nation. " The Islamic Republic's supreme leader, in turn, stated that 
the U. S. government itself was the "greatest evil" and that Iran was "proud of having come under the rage 
and wrath of the greatest Satan. " In Iran's analysis, the Bush administration had linked the Islamic 
Republic with terrorism in order to serve its interests in the domestic political arena as well as to promote 
its "militaristic" foreign policy. (IRNA, 30 and 31 January 2002 and Press Release 2002a) 
423 Following the attacks of September 11,2001, Iran had condemned the terrorist acts carried out by Al- 
Qaida and offered its official condolences to the American people (Soltanieh 2001c: 1; IRNA 30 January 
2002 and Sick 2003: 90). To balance their statements of condolence, however, some Iranian officials had 
also implied that "the wrong U. S. policies and the inappropriate stands adopted by U. S. politicians in the 
rast" had contributed to the attacks (IRNA, 30 January 2002). 
24 This paragraph draws upon Nejad-Hosseinian (2001); author's 'interview with A. A. Soltanieh, 
Geneva, 22 July 2002 and Zarif (2002a). Of course, the issue of nuclear terrorism had been on the 
international arms control agenda long before the events of September 11,2001. Thus, for example, 
already the Shah's Iran had pointed to the dangers of nuclear terrorism and called for international 
measures ensuring the security of nuclear materials (NPT/CONF. SR. 4,1975: 15). The authorities of post- 
Pahlavi Iran had started to bring up the issue of nuclear terrorism in the course of the Iran-Iraq war. By 
referring to the possibility of terrorist attacks against states' nuclear facilities, they had primarily sought 
to draw international attention to Iraq's war-time attacks against the Bushehr site. (GC/SPL. I/OR. 4,1986: 
20; GC/XXXI/OR. 296,1987: 6-7 and GC/XXXI/COM. 5/OR. 55,1987: 10) 
425 For a discussion of the anthrax attacks in the United States and U. S. authorities' response to them, see 
Heyman (2002: 1-4). 
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bioterrorism was "no science fiction anymore. " They called for the conclusion of the 
BTWC protocol and maintained that the planned international organization charged 
with the task of overseeing the implementation of the protocol should lead international 
efforts against bioterrorism. As it became clear that the conclusion of the protocol 
would be blocked by the United States, Iran referred to an alternative diplomatic 
framework for international measures against bioterrorism, namely, to the formation of 
an international coalition that would fight bioterrorism under the aegis of the UN. And 
after the BTWC protocol would be finalized and the Organization for the Prohibition of 
Biological Weapons (OPBW) would be in place, the Iranians envisioned, the OPBW 
would take over the UN coalition's bioterrorism-related responsibilities. (Nejad- 
Hosseinian 2001; Soltanieh 2001c: 1-2 and BWC/CONF. V/COW/WP. 28,2001: 2) 
As far as chemical terrorism was concerned, the officials of the Islamic Republic had 
first raised the issue during the Iran-Iraq war. Desperately seeking for international 
support for its diplomatic campaign against Iraq's chemical warfare, the Iranians had 
pointed out that indifference to Iraq's chemical attacks against their country would 
increase the possibility of future use of chemical armaments not only by states but by 
terrorist groups as well. In 1995, after the members of Aum Shinrikyo - the Japanese 
religious sect - had released sarin gas in the Tokyo subway system, the Islamic 
Republic had condemned the attack and called on the international community to 
redouble its efforts to finalize the CWC and to establish the OPCW. 426 (CD/PV. 417, 
1987: 11; Zarif 1995: 128 and Nasseri 1995a: 4) 
The events of September 11,2001, led Iranian representatives also to declare that the 
use of chemical weapons by terrorists constituted a serious threat to global security and 
that the OPCW should act as the focal point for international measures against chemical 
terrorism. When asked about the threat of chemical terrorism to their own country, 
Iran's officials named two principal dangers: Iraq and Afghanistan. First, the Iranians 
stressed that Saddam Hussein could use terrorist groups - such as the Iraq-based MKO 
- as proxies to conduct chemical attacks against their country. Secondly, they claimed 
the Taliban regime together with other anti-Shi'a and anti-Iranian Sunni actors 
operating in Afghanistan, including Al-Qaida, could launch a chemical attack against 
Iran. Finally, the Iranians emphasized that the possibility that these very same groups 
426 In subsequent investigations, it became known that Aum Shinrikyo had managed to build biological 
weapons as well and even tried to construct a nuclear weapon. For details, see Allison (2004: 40-42). 
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might, at some point in the future, carry out a biological or even a nuclear attack against 
the Islamic Republic could not be ruled out, either. 427 
The Islamic Republic's emphasis on the role of international organizations in the 
execution of preventive measures against WMD terrorism was indicative of Iranian 
authorities' preference for multilateral diplomatic approaches to terrorism prevention. In 
the post-September 2001 world, the Iranians argued, governments had to forge a joint 
response to international terrorism. On the one hand, Iranian officials noted that no state 
possessed the capabilities to unilaterally uproot terrorism. On the other hand, they 
stressed that the international steps taken against terrorism should be built on the 
interests of all nations. (Khatami 2001; CD/PV. 900,2002: 12 and Press Release 2002a) 
Given the weight put by the Islamic Republic on multilateralism, or what it called a 
"law-based counterterrorism strategy, " it was no wonder that Iran strongly rejected the 
Bush administration's unilateral approach to terrorism prevention. According to the 
Iranians, the Bush government's belief that unilateral military measures would succeed 
in containing terrorism was both naive and counterproductive. In the long run, Iranian 
officials argued, the use of violence would only breed more discontent and terrorism in 
various parts of the world. Therefore, governments should identify and focus on the root 
causes of international terrorism and try to find solutions to the fundamental problems 
generating terrorism. As summarized by the Iranian representative before the UN 
Security Council in October 2002, terrorism was "a response, however perverted and 
barbaric, to injustice, exclusion and frustration arising from powerlessness. " (Kharrazi 
2002c; Nejad-Hosseinian 2002b and Zarif 2002b) 
Furthermore, the officials of the Islamic Republic argued that apart from 
concentrating on the root causes of terrorism, governments should agree, within the UN, 
on an objective definition of the concept of terrorism. 428 In Iran's opinion, there should 
be a single set of standards according to which terrorist groups would be identified. 
Arbitrary, politically motivated uses of the label of terrorism, the Iranians warned, 
would seriously hamper the fight against international terrorism. The officials of the 
Islamic Republic asserted that the built-in bias in the United States' use of the label of 
terrorism was a prime example of why an objective definition of the concept of 
427 This paragraph draws upon author's interview with A. A. Soltanieh, Geneva, 22 July 2002 and 
author's interviews with Iranian arms control officials (A) and (D) who wish to remain unidentified, 
summer 2002. 
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terrorism was badly needed. While, for example, turning a blind eye on Israel's state 
terrorism, the Iranians argued, the United States regarded the Palestinian groups that 
were rightfully fighting against occupation and oppression as terrorists. Restating their 
political support for anti-Israeli Palestinian groups, such as Hamas and the Islamic 
Jihad, as well as to the Lebanon-based Hizbollah, the authorities of the Islamic Republic 
called on the UN to formulate a definition of terrorism that would draw a conceptual 
distinction between terrorists and those who belonged to national resistance and 
liberation movements. 429 (Nejad-Hosseinian 2002b; Press Release 2002a and IRNA, 2 
April 2002) 
Of course, Iran's own definitions of terrorism were far from being politically neutral. 
According to the representatives of the Islamic Republic, their country had been a 
victim of terrorism ever since the 1979 revolution. Therefore, the Iranians claimed, the 
Islamic Republic had always understood the dangers of terrorism and regarded the fight 
against terrorism as a top national priority. 430 Following the events of September 11, 
2001, Iran announced its intention to be in the forefront of the fight against international 
terrorism and urged world leaders to convene a "global summit" that would create a 
"coalition of peace" aiming to find practical ways to tackle terrorism and promote 
international peace and security. This proposal made by the Khatami administration was 
accompanied, not unexpectedly, by Iranian calls for a paradigm change in international 
relations. Unless states would change their way of seeing international relations in zero- 
sum terms and resort to diplomatic tools such as "dialogue among civilizations, de- 
escalation of tension, and confidence-building, " the representatives of the Khatami 
government asserted, the fundamental causes of terrorism could never be completely 
uprooted. (BBC Monitoring Middle East, 28 September 2001; Khatami 2001 and 
Kharrazi 2002c) 
428 For a discussion of the problems related to the formulation of a universally accepted definition of 
terrorism - which arise from the fact that the term is used not only for descriptive but for normative 
purposes as well - and for the various definitions of terrorism, see Onwudiwe (2001: 28-50). 429 It should be noted here that Iran's leaders had vocally reserved their country the right to support such 
national resistance and liberation movements ever since the inception of the Islamic Republic 
(A/41/PV. 19,1986: 123; The Islamic Republic of Iran: Myth and Realittiy 1994: 246 and Chubin 2002: 
89). 
430 In a speech delivered on 26 September 2001, the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic noted that 
fighting terrorism was a religious responsibility of all Muslims - an essential fight, a "jihad. " Ayatollah 
Khamenei further stressed that his country would not participate in any U. S. -led campaigns against 
international terrorism. "We are not with you and we are not on the side of the terrorists, either, " 
Khamenei declared to the U. S. government. (Voice of the IRI Radio 1,26 September 2001 and 
A/56/PV. 15,2001: 7) 
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5.3.4.2 The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq 
Iran and Operation Enduring Freedom 
In addition to insisting that the United States divided terrorists into good and bad 
according to its own needs, the officials of the Islamic Republic claimed that the Bush 
administration used the fight against international terrorism as a diplomatic smoke- 
screen behind which it pursued foreign policy objectives that had nothing to do with the 
containment of terrorism. The theory of a U. S. "hidden agenda, " popular in other parts 
of the Muslim world as well, 431 was applied by the Iranians, among others, to the 
analysis of the U. S. -led military intervention in Afghanistan in October 2001.432 While 
making no effort to hide their dislike of the Taliban regime, Iranian authorities accused 
the Bush administration of using the September 11,2001 terrorist attacks, the Taliban, 
and Al-Qaida as pretexts under which it aimed to create an American political and 
economic hegemony in Central Asia. 433 Ironically, the officials of the Islamic Republic 
argued, it was the United States that had appeased the Taliban regime in the past and 
contributed to the creation of Al-Qaida by encouraging young Muslim fighters to go to 
Afghanistan in the 1980s to fight the Soviet troops stationed there. 434 
Islamic Iran, trying to make the best of the new situation in its neighbouring country, 
adopted a twofold approach to the U. S. -led military campaign in Afghanistan. On the 
one hand, Iranian authorities, who could not help pointing out that they had been 
warning the world about the Taliban for a long time, 435 declared their country's 
objection to the campaign, stated that Iran would not join the U. S. -led war coalition, and 
43 'For a discussion of the Muslim world's views on terrorism, see Al-Sayyid (2002). 
432 The United States, together with the United Kingdom, began military actions against Afghanistan on 7 
October 2001. The military campaign in Afghanistan, which became known as Operation Enduring 
Freedom, started after the Taliban regime's refusal - in the aftermath of the September 11,2001 terrorist 
attacks - to hand over the leaders of Al-Qaida to U. S. authorities and to close down the terrorist camps 
located on Afghan soil. Other states that were involved in the military campaign included Australia, 
which furnished the U. S. -led coalition with combat troops, in addition to which ground and air support 
forces were provided or promised by the following states: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Jordan, 
the Netherlands, Poland, Russia, and Turkey (Cottey 2003: 167). 
433 See Voice of the IRI Radio 1 (26 September 2001) and IRNA (30 January 2002; 11 May 2002 and 11 
January 2003). 
''' Note, for example, the statement issued by Iran's UN mission in New York following president Bush's 
axis of evil speech: "While some, even in the current U. S. administration, were appeasing the Taliban at 
the time even when Bin Laden was harbored by them, we resolutely opposed their harsh and repressive 
policy against the Afghan people and their harboring of terrorists on Afghan soil from the beginning" 
(Press Release 2002b). 
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stressed the necessity of UN participation in any Afghanistan-related international 
action (Chubin 2002: 97). 
Yet, on the other hand, and as already noted above, Iran refrained from interfering in 
the military operation in Afghanistan and quietly cooperated with the United States in 
its execution. While not agreeing to let the coalition use Iran's air space and territory for 
military purposes, 436 the Islamic Republic did agree to the use of its air space for rescue 
missions, promised to help U. S. soldiers in distress on Iranian territory, and expressed 
its readiness to take part in humanitarian activities. In addition, Iran showed active 
diplomatic interest in peace-building in post-Taliban Afghanistan. According to the 
Iranians, they wished to see a future Afghan society that would reject violence and 
manage to form a national government representing all the segments of the Afghan 
population. Moreover, Iranian officials expressed their hope to develop close 
cooperation with the new Afghan authorities, among others, in the areas of crime and 
terrorism prevention. (Al-Jazeera, 5 February 2002 and Kharrazi 2002c) 
Iran's two-pronged response to the war in Afghanistan testified to the Islamic 
Republic's conflicting interests vis-a-vis its eastern neighbour. For one thing, the 
Iranians had a clear interest in the demise of the Taliban regime which, since its rise to 
power in 1996, had expressed its hostility towards Iran both in words and deeds. In 
addition to having been heavily involved in drug trafficking into Iran and having posed 
a constant security threat to Iranian border towns, the officials of the Islamic Republic 
stressed, the Taliban and its Al-Qaida allies had killed nine Iranian diplomats and 
journalists in the Afghan city of Mazar-i Sharif in August 1998.437 (Al-Jazeera, 5 
February 2002 and Zarif 2003c) 
aas According to the officials of the Islamic Republic, "Iran was the first country to recognize and warn 
the international community against the threat of terrorism and narcotic trafficking emanating from 
Taliban-controlled Afghanistan" (ibid. ). 
436 As pointed out by the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic, Iranians did not want to legitimize the 
U. S. aggression by helping the American military. Ayatollah Khamenei also pointed to his country's 
unwillingness to participate in what he called the "butchering and massacring of the Muslim Afghan 
nation. " Apart from the concern over the fate of Iran's Muslim brethren in Afghanistan, Khamenei's 
references to the plight of Afghan civilians testified to Iranian authorities' fear that a humanitarian crisis 
in Afghanistan could lead to yet another influx of refugees from Afghanistan to Iran, already a home for 
more than 2 million Afghan refugees. (Voice of the IRI Radio 1,26 September 2001 and 30 October 
2001) 
437 In the wake of the crisis sparked by the killings of its citizens in Mazar-i Sharif in August 1998, Iran 
had deployed units of its armed forces along the Afghan border. On 15 September 1998, Ayatollah 
Khamenei had declared a general troop mobilization, and by the end of that month, some 200,000 Iranian 
soldiers had been massed along the country's border with Afghanistan. For a discussion of the 1998 Iran- 
Taliban crisis, which ultimately did not lead to military hostilities, see Buchta (2000: 146-148). 
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For another thing, however, the U. S. military presence in Afghanistan was regarded 
in Tehran as a major security threat to the Islamic Republic. Feeling increasingly 
encircled by American military forces, and unsure about the Bush administration's 
intentions regarding Iran, the authorities of the Islamic Republic pointed out that foreign 
military presence in Afghanistan jeopardized the interests of the Afghan people and 
those of Iranians, in addition to which Iranian officials declared the military intervention 
in Afghanistan as a threat to regional security. Politically, the leaders of the Islamic 
Republic feared that the strong foreign presence in Afghanistan would lead to the 
formation of an Afghan government that would not seek good relations with its western 
neighbour. (Al-Jazeera, 5 February 2002 and IRNA, 11 and 29 May 2002) 
Yet the actual materialization of Iran's objectives in Afghanistan remained another 
matter. In September 2003, for example, the foreign minister of the Islamic Republic 
expressed his country's concern over the fact that the remnants of the Taliban and Al- 
Qaida had managed to regroup and continue their fight against the forces of the U. S. -led 
coalition (A/58/PV. 12,2003: 28). Thus, even if the collapse of the Taliban regime 
during November-December 2001 had clearly contributed to Iran's national security, 
the possibility of a WMD terrorist attack against the Islamic Republic by the Taliban or 
by an anti-Iranian terrorist group, however probable, had still to be taken into account 
by the Islamic Republic's political and military leaders. 
Iran and Operation Iraqi Freedom 
Whereas the possibility of a WMD attack originating from Afghanistan was not ruled 
out by the authorities of the Islamic Republic, it was clear that Saddam Hussein's Iraq 
remained the Iranians' main WMD preoccupation. And as emphasized by Iranian 
representatives, their country was not only concerned about Saddam's chemical and 
biological capabilities but also about Iraq's ambitions in the nuclear field. 438 Although 
the IAEA's Iraq Action Team had managed to effectively neutralize the Iraqi nuclear 
weapons program by the end of 1992, Iranian authorities feared that Iraq would be able 
to rebuild the program in a short period of time. This Iranian concern had become 
438 See author's interview with A. A. Soltanieh, Geneva, 22 July, 2002 and author's interview with an 
Iranian arms control official (D) who wishes to remain unidentified, summer 2002. 
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increasingly topical after December 1998, when Saddam Hussein had declared that the 
arms inspectors of the UN would not be allowed to enter Iraq anymore. 439 
After taking office in January 2001, the U. S. administration of president George W. 
Bush had placed Iraq high on its foreign policy agenda. The Bush administration had 
characterized the post-December 1998 standstill in the Iraq disarmament process as 
unacceptable and, as a consequence, tried to find ways to put the process back on track. 
While at this initial stage the Bush government had focused on planning diplomatic 
steps that could be taken to resolve the arms inspections crisis - including the 
application of so-called smart sanctions against Saddam Hussein and his regime -, the 
terrorist attacks of September 11,2001 had marked the beginning of a new phase in the 
Bush administration's Iraq policy. In the course of 2002, the Americans had placed Iraq 
on the axis of evil and, following the premises of the so-called Bush doctrine, let it be 
known that the United States would be prepared to use military force, even unilaterally 
if needed, to enforce the disarmament of Iraq's WMD capabilities. (Ben-Zvi 2003: 17; 
Jervis 2003: 372 and Arms Control Today, October 2002) 
On 8 November 2002, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1441 which 
required Iraq to allow UNMOVIC and IAEA inspectors to carry out investigations in 
the country as well as to provide the world organization with an accurate, full, and 
complete declaration of its WMD-related activities. In addition, the Security Council 
strengthened international inspectors' powers in Iraq and explicitly warned that 
resolution 1441 was the Iraqi government's final opportunity to comply with its 
disarmament commitments. Subject to intense international pressure, Iraq accepted the 
resolution on 13 November and agreed to submit a declaration of its prohibited weapons 
programs to the UN by 8 December 2002. Instead of helping to defuse the arms 
inspections crisis, however, the Iraqi government's declaration of 7 December 2002 
merely worsened the situation. The 12,000-page Iraqi declaration, which left many 
important questions about that country's weapons activities unanswered, prompted the 
Bush administration to conclude that the declaration contained false statements and 
omissions and thereby amounted to a breach of the Security Council resolution 1441. 
439 For the Khatami administration's expressions of concern over the state of arms inspections in Iraq, see 
S/1998/165 (1998: 2) and Zarif and Alborzi (1999: 512). Of course, the Iranians were not alone with their 
concern over Iraq's WMD plans. The participants of the sixth NPT review conference, for example, had 
noted in the conference's final document in May 2000 that since the cessation of IAEA inspections in Iraq 
in December 1998, the agency had not been in a position to provide any assurance of Iraq's compliance 
with its obligations under the UN Security Council resolution 687 of April 1991 (NPT/CONF. 2000/28. 
2000: 18). 
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As the members of the Security Council did not manage to agree on their next step vis- 
ä-vis Iraq, and as the Bush administration had become convinced that diplomatic means 
in the matter had been exhausted, the United States eventually started a war against Iraq 
on 19 March 2003,440 
By the time the U. S. armed forces launched Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Bush 
administration had justified its recourse to military power by not only referring to the 
threat posed to the world by Iraq's WMD capabilities, as well as to the possibility that 
Saddam Hussein could transfer WMD to terrorists, but also by underscoring the 
necessity of a regime change in Iraq and the introduction of democracy to that 
country. 44' In Iran - Iraq's eastern neighbour and designated companion on the axis of 
evil - the U. S. justifications for war were officially declared as pretexts under which the 
Bush administration aimed at destroying Islam, dominating the Middle East, and getting 
its hands on Iraq's hydrocarbon reserves. 442 From Tehran's perspective, then, the U. S. 
military campaign in Iraq was a logical continuation of the process that had been started 
with the war in Afghanistan: it was another major manifestation of the effort to realize 
the Bush administration's hidden agenda. 
Accordingly, during the months that had ultimately led to Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
Iran had been among the countries that had objected to the use of military force to 
resolve the arms inspections crisis in Iraq. Even if the UN Security Council decided to 
give a mandate to a military operation in Iraq, the Islamic Republic had stressed, it 
would continue to express its disapproval of the military option. Advocating a peaceful 
solution to the crisis, the Iranians had argued that the question of Iraq should be handled 
within the framework of the UN and relevant Security Council resolutions. A unilateral 
military operation by the United States in Iraq, Iran's representatives had warned, would 
gravely undermine international law, multilateral diplomacy in the area of WMD 
disarmament, and most importantly, the security of the Middle East. (IRMA, 29 October 
2002; Kharrazi 2002c and Zarif 2002c) 
One of Iranian authorities' fears had been that a U. S. attack on Iraq would set a 
precedent and lower the threshold for the policies of regime change and coercive 
disarmament. As a target of the Bush administration's verbal attacks and as a country 
440 For a discussion of the Iraq-related diplomatic deliberations at the UN in 2002-2003, see Blix (2004: 
11-24 and 75-289). 
a" For the U. S. war objectives in Iraq, see Evron (2003: 27); Gordon (2003: 155-159) and Jervis (2003: 
367,386). 
442 See IRNA (11 March 2003); Salehi (2003d: 2) and IRNA (22 November 2003). 
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whose nuclear efforts had become a major topic on the international diplomatic agenda, 
Iran had had good reasons to strongly reject such policies and to call for a diplomatic 
resolution of the Iraq crisis. Yet at the same time, and as pointed out by the officials of 
the Islamic Republic themselves, Iran, a victim of Iraqi use of WMD, had also had a 
major interest in Iraq's disarmament. Therefore, the Iranians had called on the 
government of Saddam Hussein to fully comply with the UN demands and to allow 
international inspectors to complete their job in Iraq. On the other hand, the Islamic 
Republic had also emphasized that a successful completion of the disarmament process 
should lead to the lifting of international sanctions against Iraq. (Kharrazi 2002c; BBC 
Monitoring Middle East, 30 October 2002 and Zarif 2003 a) 
Beyond merely explicating their government's stance on the Iraq crisis, Iranian 
officials had used the heated international debate on the matter to restate their 
disapproval of what they viewed as Western governments' hypocritical approach to 
WMD disarmament in the Middle East. Pointing to Israel's WMD capabilities, the 
authorities of the Islamic Republic had asked why Iraq was being defined as a regional 
and global threat, whereas Israel's tools of mass murder continued to be left alone. Also, 
the Iranians had asked why Iraq's use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq war 
had not prompted a strong international reaction. Answering their own question, and 
airing their disapproval of the West's political double standard, the representatives of 
the Islamic Republic had maintained that the Iraqi WMD capabilities now causing 
anxiety among Western countries had initially been obtained by Iraq with the help of 
those very same governments. 443 (IRNA, 7 March 2003; Zarif 2003a and Salehi 2003a: 
2-3) 
After the start of the war in Iraq, Iran strongly condemned the U. S. -led military 
campaign and argued that the operation flagrantly broke international law. According to 
the Islamic Republic, there had been no legal justifications whatsoever for the use of 
military force in Iraq. The unilateral invasion of Iraq, Iranian officials specified, had not 
been a response to an Iraqi armed attack and neither had the operation been authorized 
by the UN Security Council. The Iranians noted that it was true that the regime of 
Saddam Hussein had not lived up to its disarmament obligations under the relevant 
." Not coincidentally, in February 2003, in the context of a legal case which originated from 1992 and 
dealt with Iran's claim that the United States had destroyed three Iranian oil platforms in the Persian Gulf 
in 1987-1988, the representatives of the Islamic Republic had argued to the Hague-based International 
Court of Justice that the United States had transferred chemical agents and deadly viruses to Iraq during 
the Iran-Iraq war (Der Spiegel Online, 24 February 2003). 
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Security Council resolutions, but added that it would have been the Security Council's 
task and responsibility to decide on how to make Iraq to act on those obligations. Also, 
the representatives of the Islamic Republic noted that the Bush administration's 
objective of a regime change in Iraq and the disarmament of that country through a pre- 
emptive military campaign seriously fought against international norms on state 
behaviour. (Zarif 2003b and Aghazadeh 2003a: 2) 
While objecting to the use of military force in Iraq - and maintaining that not "even 
by any stretch of imagination" could Iraq, after 12 years of comprehensive sanctions, 
have been considered an imminent threat to the national security of the countries of the 
so-called coalition of the willing444 -, the Islamic Republic made it known that it would 
stay impartial in the conflict and not interfere in Iraq's internal affairs. 445 
Simultaneously, however, there was considerable anxiety in Iran about the war's 
consequences. First and foremost, the authorities of the Islamic Republic were 
concerned over U. S. military presence in Iraq. Worried that, at some point in the future, 
Iran's ruling elite could experience the same fate as the regime of Saddam Hussein, 
Iranian authorities called on the coalition forces to quickly leave Iraq and to allow the 
Iraqi people, through the establishment of a broad-based national government, to take 
their destiny into their own hands. 446 (IRNA, 26 March 2003 and 12 April 2003 and 
Zarif 2003c) 
444 According to information released by the U. S. state department on 18 March 2003, there were 30 
countries that were willing to be publicly associated with the U. S. military campaign against Iraq. This 
"coalition of the willing" consisted of the following countries: Afghanistan, Albania, Australia, 
Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, 
Georgia, Hungary, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, 
the Phillippines, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and Uzbekistan. In the 
Khatami administration's view, it was an illusion to believe that the views of the coalition of the willing 
on Iraq represented those of the international community. What the world really needed, president 
Khatami himself argued, was an international "coalition for peace" that would bring justice to and remove 
violence, terror, and war from the world. (BBC, 18 March 2003; Salehi 2003a: 2 and IRNA, 15 February 
2003) 
445 Prior to the Iraq war, president Khatami had emphasized that his country's opposition to the use of 
military force against Iraq should not be interpreted as a sign of support for the regime of Saddam 
Hussein. It should also be noted here that prior to the Iraq war, in the summer and fall of 2002, American 
officials had secretly met with their Iranian counterparts and asked the Islamic Republic not to interfere in 
a possible military operation in Iraq. (IRNA, 7 March 2003 and Kemp 2004: 8) 
as Naturally, Iran had a major interest in the direction of Iraq's domestic politics in the post-Saddam era. 
As noted by Ehteshami (2004: 189), there were three fundamental issues that occupied Iranian leaders' 
minds in this regard: the future character of the Iraqi state, the role of the Shi'a community in post- 
Saddam Iraq's political system, and finally, the impact of Iraqi politics on the political scene in the 
Islamic Republic itself. Both before and after the start of the Iraq war in March 2003, Iranian 
representatives had also expressed their concern over the war's humanitarian implications (IRNA, 14 
January 2003 and Zarif 2003a and 2003b). 
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Apart from the dangers and challenges that the U. S. -led invasion of Iraq posed to the 
Islamic Republic - whether related to post-Saddam Iraq's domestic developments or to 
its future foreign policy orientation -, the fall of the regime of Saddam Hussein 
benefited the Iranians in a number of ways. The fact that the Islamic Republic was now 
able, after two decades, to feel secure from the scourge of Iraq's WMD capabilities was 
indisputably among the most significant Iranian gains. While prior to the Iraq war the 
international community had been divided over the gravity of the threat posed to 
regional and international security by Iraq and its WMD capabilities, at no stage had the 
authorities of the Islamic Republic claimed that Iraq did not possess WMD. Quite to the 
contrary, the Iranians had not only made repeated references to Iraq's WMD, but also 
let it be known that their country had prepared itself for the eventuality that Saddam 
Hussein's military would use such weapons against occupying American forces, 
potentially with adverse effects on the Iranian people living in the border region (AP, 5 
February 2003 and IRNA, 26 March 2003), 447 
In the end, then, as it started to become clear, in the aftermath of the fall of Baghdad, 
that the fears over Iraq's WMD capabilities had largely been unnecessary, 448 Iranian 
authorities were able to revise their Iraq-related threat perceptions. That the U. S. -led 
invasion of Iraq also effectively neutralized the hypothetical threat of a WMD attack 
against the Islamic Republic by the anti-Tehran MKO was another welcome 
development to the Iranians. 449 The capture of Saddam Hussein by the U. S. military in 
December 2003 and the Islamic Republic's subsequent announcement that it planned to 
file a criminal suit against Saddam Hussein for his regime's chemical warfare in the 
aal It should be noted that Iran's concern over Iraq's WMD capabilities did not prevent it from criticizing 
the U. S. intelligence on Iraq's arms efforts in order to gain support for its opposition to American 
employment of military force against Iraq as well as to defend the Islamic Republic's own nuclear 
program. On 17 March 2003, for example, the Islamic Republic's IAEA representative had referred to the 
"Niger scandal" as a reminder of how Western governments should be very careful when discussing other 
countries' nuclear programs. The so-called Niger scandal alluded to by the Iranian representative had 
centered around the Bush administration's claim - made repeatedly in early 2003 and soon found to be 
based on false documents - that the Iraqis had tried to obtain uranium for their nuclear weapons program 
from Niger after they had declared, in 1998, that UN arms inspectors would no longer be allowed to enter 
their country. (Salehi 2003a: I and Arms Control Today, September 2003) 
448 The Pentagon, for example, had started, in late May 2003, to publicly suggest that Iraq may have 
destroyed its chemical and biological weapons before the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
The final official account of the U. S. -led investigations of Iraq's suspected WMD programs was released 
on 25 April 2005 by the Central Intelligence Agency. It reconfirmed the finding already made by U. S. 
arms investigators that by the time of the U. S. invasion of Iraq, the Iraqis had destroyed their WMD 
capabilities and not restarted any WMD-related programs after the 1990-1991 Gulf conflict. (IHT. 29 
May 2003 and Arms Control Today, June 2005) 
449 The U. S. forces in Iraq signed a cease-fire agreement with the Iraq-based MKO on 15 April 2003 and 
subsequently disarmed the organization (1HT, 29 April 2003 and The Los Angeles Times, 19 March 
2005). 
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Iran-Iraq war was a dramatic manifestation of the way in which the war in Iraq had 
rendered that country's WMD a secondary concern to the Iranians. 450 
5.3.4.3 The call for a WMD-free Middle East 
As already noted above, in the Tehran declaration of 21 October 2003, Iran and the 
EU trio of Britain, Germany, and France agreed to work together towards the 
establishment of a zone free from nuclear arms and other WMD in the Middle East. 
Given that the issue of a WMD-free Middle East had already been an integral part of 
Iran's arms control operations, the European powers' recorded commitment to the idea 
offered the Iranians an additional diplomatic avenue to express their demand for the 
creation of such a zone. And indeed, following the October 2003 declaration, the 
Islamic Republic began to call on the three European powers to keep their promise and 
to actively promote the realization of the zone initiative (IRNA, 17 November 2003). 
Since its inception, the Khatami administration had continued to present Iran's 
traditional case for a NWFZ in the Middle East as well as to voice the Islamic 
Republic's support for a regional arrangement that would remove all kinds of WMD 
from the Middle East. 451 As before, the Iranians had maintained that the establishment 
of a NWFZ or a WMDFZ in the region was necessitated, first and foremost, by the 
imminent threat posed to the regional peace and security by Israel's nuclear weapons. 
Israel's possession of nuclear armaments, the Khatami government had emphasized, 
was a major source of instability in the Middle East because it fuelled regional arms 
racing both in the area of conventional and non-conventional weapons. Therefore, 
Iranian officials had concluded, Israel's rejection of nuclear weapons should constitute 
the first and fundamental step in any effort to turn the Middle East into a WMD-free 
region. (CD/PV. 798,1998: 3; A/CN. 10/PV. 222,1998: 17 and A/C. 1/57/PV. 15,2002: 4) 
450 The Islamic Republic characterized the capture of Saddam Hussein as "happy news for everybody" 
and particularly for the Iranian and Iraqi people who had suffered most from the dictator's policies. As far 
as Iran's planned criminal suit against the former Iraqi leader was concerned, Iranian foreign ministry 
representatives spoke of a trial at an international court, whereas the Iranian judiciary wanted to try 
Saddam Hussein on Iranian territory for war crimes committed during the Iran-Iraq war. (IRNA, 15 
December 2003) 
asp Under Khatami, the Islamic Republic had continued to express its support for the creation of NWFZ or 
WMDFZ in other parts of the world as well. Following India's and Pakistan's 1998 nuclear tests, for 
example, Iranian officials had stepped up their calls for the establishment of a NWFZ in South Asia. As 
far as the negotiations on the creation of a NWFZ in Central Asia, launched in 1997, were concerned, the 
Islamic Republic had expressed its support for the talks and welcomed the agreement, achieved in 
September 2002, on the content of the treaty establishing a Central Asian NWFZ. (A/C. 1/52/PV. 11,1997: 
20; CD/PV. 792,1998: 31 and Zarif 2002a) 
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Moreover, under Khatami, Iran had continued to point out that "the so-called peace 
process" between Israel and the Palestinians should not be linked to the question of a 
nuclear- or WMD-free Middle East. The representatives of the Islamic Republic had 
stressed that the zone initiatives were independent issues and should not be made 
dependent on the outcome of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations or on any other 
precondition, for that matter. Thus, the Islamic Republic had once again rejected Israel's 
stance that it would not take any major arms control steps before the attainment of a 
broad political settlement in the Middle East. (A/C. 1/52/PV. 18,1997: 5; 
A/C. 1/53/PV. 26,1998: 3 and A/CN. I O/PV. 227,1999: 4) 
As a result of Israel's unwillingness to back down on its position, the Khatami 
administration had continued to call on the international community and particularly on 
NWS to pressure Israel to join the NPT and to accept the full-scope safeguards of the 
IAEA. In this context, Iranian officials had also expressed their discontent with the 
implementation of the Middle East-related resolution that had been adopted at the 1995 
NPT review and extension conference. The resolution in question - whose purpose had 
been to address Middle Eastern states' concerns over Israel's nuclear weapons as well 
as to obtain those countries' acquiescence to the indefinite extension of the NPT452 - 
had endorsed the idea of a Middle Eastern zone that would free the region of nuclear 
arms and other WMD, asked the regional states to take practical steps towards the 
establishment of such a zone, as well as called especially on NWS to contribute to the 
creation of a WMDFZ in the Middle East. In addition, the 1995 NPT resolution had 
noted with concern the continued existence in the region of unsafeguarded nuclear 
facilities and called on all Middle Eastern states that had not yet acceded to the treaty 
and placed their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards to do so. 
(GC/42/OR. 3,1998: 22; Nejad-Hosseinian 2002a and NPT/CONF. 1995/32,1995: 13- 
14) 
Stressing the necessity of the 1995 NPT resolution's prompt implementation, the 
Khatami government had pointed out that the NPT review conference of 2000 had 
reaffirmed the importance of that resolution and recognized that the document would 
452 For a discussion of the Arab position on the extension of the NPT, see Feldman (1997: 216-224). 
Although Iran had referred to the issue of Israel's NPT accession as a factor that would have a major 
impact on the Islamic Republic's final stance on the treaty's extension, Iranian officials had never 
stressed the diplomatic linkage between Israel's behaviour and the NPT's future as fiercely as their Arab 
counterparts. As already mentioned above, before ultimately going along with the 1995 NPT conference's 
decision to indefinitely extend the treaty, Iran had belonged to those states parties that had called for the 
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remain valid until its objectives were achieved. 453 Also, the Khatami administration had 
emphasized that Israel was now the only state in the Middle East that had not acceded to 
the NPT. 454 (Naziri 2003: 1 and A/C. 1/57/PV. 15,2002: 4) 
The NPT context aside, Iran had promoted the idea of a WMD-free Middle East in 
other diplomatic arenas, too, including at the meetings of the NAM '455 the OIC, 
456 as 
well as in bilateral talks, for example, with Russia457 and the Gulf Arab sheikhdoms. In 
addition to making joint calls with the Gulf Arab states for the establishment of a 
WMDFZ in the Middle East, the Islamic Republic had continued to call for creation of a 
sub-regional WMDFZ in the Persian Gulf. As before, such Iranian calls had been tightly 
linked to Iran's initiative of the creation of an indigenous security system in the Gulf. 458 
The Khatami administration had claimed that the need for the establishment of a Gulf 
WMDFZ had been necessitated, for example, by the potential threat that the U. S. 
warships patrolling the Persian Gulf were carrying nuclear armaments aboard. (Vaezi 
and Saghafi-Ameri 2000: 447; Kharrazi 1997: 465 and Eisenstadt 1998a: 75) 
Although the Islamic Republic had represented itself as a staunch advocate of a 
WMD-free Middle East, it had recognized that the odds of Israel giving up its nuclear 
weapons were not high, at least not in the short run. Thus, the representatives of the 
Khatami administration had suggested that pending the creation of a Middle Eastern 
NWFZ or WMDFZ, no state in the region should "develop, produce, test or otherwise 
acquire nuclear weapons or permit the stationing on their territories, or territories under 
their control, of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. " At the same time, the 
adoption of a formula where the NPT would be extended for a series of fixed periods after which the 
aquestion 
of indefinite extension could be revisited again. (NPT/CONF. 1995/32,1995: 100-10 1) 
3 At the 2000 NPT review conference, the Islamic Republic had supported the ultimately unsuccessful 
Egyptian initiative which had called for the creation of a NPT mechanism, a special committee, to 
monitor the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East (Steinberg and Etengoff 2002: 38). 
454 After heated diplomatic consultations at the NPT review conference of 2000, Israel's status as the only 
Middle Eastern non-party to the treaty had been written down in the conference's final document. 
According to Iranian officials, the explicit reference to Israel - together with the final document's 
reaffirmation of the importance of Israel's accession to the NPT and its allusion to the importance of a 
full-scope safeguards agreement between Israel and the IAEA - had constituted a diplomatic victory for 
the Islamic Republic. (IRMA, 21 May 2000 and Foreign Ministry Viewpoints 2000b) 
ass See A/C. 1/53/PV. 6 (1998: 12-13); A/CN. 10/PV. 227 (1999: 4) and IRNA (9 April 2000). 
456 See BBC Monitoring Middle East (2 October 1999). 
457 In July 1998, for example, Iran and Russia had issued a joint statement calling for the establishment of 
a NWFZ in the Middle East (A/C. l/53/PV. 6,1998: 12). 
ass Note, for example, the following remarks made by the Islamic Republic's UN representative in the 
aftermath of the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq: "We [... ] believe that it is time to finally 
establish an indigenous and internationally guaranteed regional security arrangement under United 
Nations auspices. The momentum created by the removal of Saddam should be used to replace mistrust 
and the arms race with mutual security and transparency. As the region's largest and most populuous 
country, Iran has a great stake in discouraging a renewed arms race, especially one involving 
unconventional weapons" (Zarif 2003c). 
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Iranians had demanded that the countries of the Middle East should refrain from 
activities that would run against the letter and spirit of the NPT as well as against the 
multilateral diplomatic documents dealing with the establishment of a NWFZ in the 
region. (Naziri 2003: 1) 
Under president Khatami, the Islamic Republic's statements on Middle Eastern 
security had continued to contain strong verbal attacks against Israel. Not only a direct 
danger to the region and to the whole world, Iranian officials had asserted, Israel's 
nuclear weapons were a political instrument that could be used by Israeli authorities at 
any time to threaten other Middle Eastern countries. While calling on extra-regional 
powers to apply pressure on Israel to give up its WMD capabilities, the officials of the 
Islamic Republic had demanded that those same powers - and the five NWS, in 
particular - should refrain from transferring nuclear materials, equipment, and know- 
how to Israel. 459 (Chubin 2002: 40; GC/43/OR. 10,1999: 14 and 
NPT/CONF. 2000/PC. III/55,1999: 75) 
Moreover, Iran had kept on strongly rejecting the Israeli claim that the Islamic 
Republic itself was pursuing nuclear bombs and related delivery systems. The Khatami 
administration had found it "ironic" to hear such allegations from a country that ignored 
international disarmament efforts and actively worked on nuclear, chemical, and 
biological weapons as well as on long-range missiles. Israel, the Iranians had observed, 
was making its false Iran accusations in order to divert international attention from its 
"endless hunger for armaments, in particular WMD, " and from its "militaristic policies" 
and "state terrorism. "460 (A/C. 1/52/PV. 10,1997: 24; Kharrazi 2000b and Rafsanjani 
2001) 
In 2003, after Iran's nuclear program had turned into a major international issue, the 
verbal exchanges between Iran and Israel had become harsher. On the one side, Israeli 
officials had gone so far as to describe the Iranian program as the biggest threat to 
Israel's existence since its creation in 1948. The Israelis had emphasized that Iran's 
possession of nuclear weapons would be an intolerable threat to their country and made 
it clear that should the Iranian nuclear program not be stopped, Israel would be prepared 
459 Furthermore, to back their diplomatic demands, Iranian officials had continued to refer to Israel's 
Dimona nuclear reactor as a threat to the people and the natural environment of the Middle East. 
According to Iran, the "structural cracks" in the Dimona reactor had made the risk of transboundary 
radioactive contamination in the region highly topical (GC/42/OR. 10,1998: 38). 
460 In early 2002, for example, Iran's defence minister Ali Shamkhani had characterized Israel as a 
"university of terrorism" and that country's prime minister Ariel Sharon as the "professor of terrorism in 
Israel" (A1-Ja-eera, 5 February 2002). 
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to take unilateral pre-emptive military action against the Islamic Republic. 461 Iranian 
nuclear weapons, Israeli authorities had warned, would pose a serious threat to the 
Middle East and to Europe and Russia as well. (IHT, 18 November 2003; The Scotsman, 
23 November 2003 and Helsingin Sanomat, 22 July 2003) 
On the other side, Iranian officials had warned Israel of the consequences of military 
action against their country. An attack on the Islamic Republic's nuclear facilities or any 
other target in Iran, the officials of the Islamic Republic had emphasized, would be 
considered a declaration of war by the Islamic Republic and result, as put by one IRGC 
commander, in a "crushing response. "462 Given that Israel had already resorted to a pre- 
emptive military strike at a nuclear facility in Iraq in 1981, Iranian authorities took 
Israel's threats seriously. Iran's concerns over Israel's military plans had intensified 
after Israel and Turkey had concluded a bilateral military cooperation agreement in 
1996. In that agreement, the two parties had agreed to cooperate, among others, in 
intelligence sharing, military training, and anti-terrorism activities. From Tehran's 
perspective, the 1996 agreement had strengthened Israel's espionage and intelligence 
capabilities and thereby the Israeli ability to carry out a military operation against Iran. 
Accordingly, the Islamic Republic had strongly condemned the 1996 agreement and 
defined it as an Israeli effort to divide the Muslim world. Iran had also condemned 
Turkey for its decision to cooperate militarily with Israel and argued that the agreement 
had increased instability in the Middle East. (Boutwell 2003: 4; El-Shazly and 
Hinnebusch 2002: 78-79,89 and Foreign Ministry viewpoints 2002) 
Furthermore, during 2003, the Islamic Republic had claimed that Israel and the pro- 
Israeli lobbies in Washington had been responsible for the mobilization of the IAEA 
and the international community against Iran's peaceful nuclear program. Even though 
Iran had exaggerated Israel's impact on the Bush administration's Iran diplomacy, the 
Israelis had nevertheless tried to actively influence the U. S. responses to the Iran 
crisis. 463 Much to Iran's satisfaction, however, the Islamic Republic's diplomacy at the 
IAEA had been supported by Arab governments who, in their effort to use the Iran case 
461 The debate on pre-emptive Israeli military action against Iran had focused on a potential Israeli attack 
against Iran's nuclear facilities. Nevertheless, as noted by Kemp (2004: 27), Israeli officials had also 
implied that they might alternatively try to affect the Islamic Republic's nuclear behaviour by striking at 
other Iranian targets, particularly at the country's highly vulnerable oil infrastructure. 
462 See AFP (28 September 2003). 
463 The issue of Israel's influence on the Bush administration's diplomatic approach to Iran's nuclear 
program has been a matter of debate among scholars. Brom (2003: 141), for example, has gone so far as 
to claim that the U. S. effort to have the IAEA declare that the Islamic Republic had violated the NPT had 
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as a diplomatic weapon against Israel, had criticized the IAEA for singling out Iran for 
its alleged nuclear arms program while ignoring Israel's WMD. (Daily Star, 1 
November 2003; IHT, 8 May 2003 and BBC Monitoring Middle East, 30 September 
2003) 
originally been an Israeli initiative. Be that as it may, U. S. officials have acknowledged that Israel had 
strongly pressed the Bush administration to take the Iran problem seriously (IHT, 8 May 2003). 
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6 TAKING STOCK OF ISLAMIC IRAN'S ARMS CONTROL POLICY 
The purpose of this closing chapter is to, first of all, sum up what has been said in the 
preceding chapters about post-revolutionary Iran's arms control operations. Secondly, 
and more importantly, however, this chapter seeks to identify the individual objectives 
that have presumably guided the Islamic Republic's activities in the four different 
thematic areas of its arms control policy during the 1979-2003 period and to connect 
the objectives with the fundamental Iranian foreign policy goals which they have 
stemmed from. Finally, what follows includes a brief, tentative discussion about change 
and stability in the Islamic Republic's arms control operations. The focus of the analysis 
will be on the content, objectives, means, and the level of effort of the Iranian 
operations. 
6.1 Conventional Arms Control: Objectives, Actions, and Means 
6.1.1 The pre-war period, 1979-1980 
Following the 1979 Iranian revolution, the country's new decision-makers started to 
formulate and execute policies that corresponded with their revolutionary ideals in 
domestic and foreign affairs. While the political turbulence in post-revolutionary Iran 
prolonged the transformation of the national policies, the various domestic forces that 
had joined hands to overthrow the Pahlavi regime shared a basic set of views and 
interests that enabled Iran's policy-makers to start to develop a new political identity for 
their country. 
The Islamic Republic's arms control operations following the revolution testified, for 
their part, to the pattern in which the adoption of broad policy guidelines preceeded the 
formulation of detailed courses of action. Accordingly, Iranian leaders' first post- 
revolutionary policy objective in the area of arms control was to position the Islamic 
Republic diplomatically. The steps taken to realize this objective focused, first, on 
distancing the new Iranian regime and its policies from the Pahlavi monarchy and, 
secondly, on introducing the ideological building blocks on which the Islamic 
Republic's future arms control operations would rest. 
As far as the deposed Shah was concerned. post-Pahlavi Iran's arms control officials 
- at this stage still including many individuals who had initially been named to their 
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posts by the Shah's government - used international diplomatic fora to harshly criticize 
the ousted monarch's ambitious armament programs and the heavy investments made 
by his regime in the development of Iran's armed forces. According to the 
representatives of the Islamic Republic, the policies of the Shah had amounted to 
terrible waste of Iran's national wealth, relied on false priorities, and totally ignored the 
real needs of the Iranian people. For the Shah, the officials of the Islamic Republic 
added, arms control diplomacy had been an instrument with the help of which the 
Pahlavi regime had sought to conceal its true, aggressive military intentions. 
The intentions Iranian officials referred to were defined as inseparable from those of 
the great powers. Indeed, the leaders of post-revolutionary Iran portrayed the Shah as 
nothing but a puppet of "great power imperialists" and the United States, in particular - 
even if, at this early post-revolutionary stage, Iranian diplomats, still taking instructions 
from the provisional government of Mihdi Bazargan, refrained from launching outright 
verbal attacks against the Americans. The linkage drawn between the Shah and 
"imperialistic powers" meant that in order to distance itself from the policies of the 
Shah, the post-Pahlavi Iranian regime had to simultaneously distance itself from the 
great powers as well. 
The officials of the Islamic Republic did that willingly. They emphasized that it was 
the major powers that had armed the Shah to the teeth and claimed that the weapons 
transfers to the Iranian monarch had served exploitative purposes. In the Iranian 
analysis, foreign arms shipments to the Shah's Iran had been a means for the major 
powers to extract the wealth of the Iranian nation and to militarize the Iranian society so 
that the Shah, who had ingratiated himself with foreign powers in order to secure the 
interests of Iran's corrupt monarchical elite, would be powerful enough to act as the 
regional proxy of foreign powers. 
Accordingly, the representatives of the Islamic Republic not only indirectly criticized 
the role that the Shah's Iran had adopted and played in the United States' so-called 
Twin Pillar strategy in the 1970s, but also openly challenged what they saw as the great 
powers' general policy of exploiting Third World countries and harnessing them to fight 
civil and regional wars on their behalf. Iranian authorities claimed that major power 
imperialism and the great power policy of using Third World states as proxies explained 
the constant increases in military expenses both in the developed and the developing 
world. The Iranians offered the same explanation when discussing the reasons for Third 
World countries' dramatic societal problems. 
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Iranian representatives declared that the Islamic Republic's military and security 
policies would be in total contrast with those of Pahlavi Iran. Unlike the Shah, the 
Islamic Republic would harbor no military ambitions, and nor would it ignore the needs 
and wishes of Iran's "liberated masses. " Moreover, Islamic Iran would pursue a policy 
of peace and genuinely commit itself to arms control. In order to show the world that 
they were going to live up to their word, the leaders of the Islamic Republic reinforced 
their diplomatic message by unilaterally cancelling orders placed by the Shah for U. S. 
weaponry and for armaments from Iran's secondary arms suppliers. Moreover, the 
Islamic Republic made it known that it would be ready to resell the armaments the Shah 
had received shortly before the revolution to interested countries. 
Expressing their objection to what they alluded to as the imperialistic policies of the 
major powers, the representatives of the Islamic Republic also questioned the existing 
conditions in international relations and declared their country's strong opposition not 
only to military alliances, arms racing, and the use of weapons transfers as a foreign 
policy tool, but also to the deployment of military troops and the establishment of 
military bases in foreign countries. Here, again, Islamic Iran supplemented its 
diplomatic argumentation with a set of unilateral arms control measures. The Iranians 
withdrew their troops from Oman and their country's membership in CENTO, closed 
down the United States' intelligence gathering sites in Iran, and cancelled their bilateral 
defence agreements with the Americans and the Soviet Union. 
While voicing its disappointment at the marginal role that arms control played in 
inter-state relations, the officials of the Islamic Republic nevertheless also expressed 
their belief that through national and international measures, led by the United Nations, 
states would be able to change the unjust world around them. The Iranians portrayed 
themselves as major advocates of arms control and maintained that the experiences of 
the Iranian people as victims of the Shah's and the great powers' senseless, brutal, and 
imperialistic policies lend great moral credibility to Islamic Iran's diplomatic actions in 
the area of arms control. 
Post-Pahlavi Iran's initial, pre-Iran-Iraq war remarks on arms control served a 
number of fundamental foreign policy goals. By distancing itself from the policies of 
the Pahlavi monarchy and by openly denouncing the major powers' - and particularly 
the Cold War superpowers' - dominance of the international system, Iran wanted to 
gain diplomatic recognition, respect. and status and to internationally regain what the 
representatives of the Islamic Republic viewed as the lost honor and self-respect of the 
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Iranian people. Moreover, Islamic Iran used international arms control arenas to present 
the elementary ideological elements of its foreign policy thinking and to introduce itself 
as a new ideological force in international relations. Still, at this at this early phase of 
the Islamic Republic's arms control operations, the ideological message put forward by 
Iranian officials was heavily influenced by Third Worldism' and less by Islam which, in 
the Iranian view, provided the ultimate guidelines for virtuous state behaviour. 
Iranian officials' diplomatic argumentation also served the objective of protecting the 
revolution and Iran's Islamic regime. 2 The representatives of the Islamic Republic 
believed that the restoration and defence of Iran's political independence would 
necessitate, both in word and deed, a diplomatic course that would challenge the great 
powers. Given that the leaders of post-Pahlavi Iran defined the great powers - and the 
United States, in particular - as actors that had projected their power and dangerous 
influence not only into Iran but into all other corners of the world as well, the statements 
made by Iranian officials contained an in-built constellation, at the ideological level, of 
a confrontation between Iran and the major powers. 
While in the immediate aftermath of the Iranian revolution this confrontation still 
remained more or less a theoretical issue, it soon transformed into a concrete fact. 
Finding itself in direct conflict with the United States over the seizure of the American 
embassy in Tehran in November 1979, the Islamic Republic started to rely on arms 
control diplomacy in order to deal with immediate threats to its security. Thus, Iranian 
officials interpreted the United States' increasing military presence in the Persian Gulf 
as a direct move against their country and strongly condemned the build-up of U. S. 
military power in the region. In a similar manner, the Islamic Republic used 
international arms control fora to denounce the failed U. S. military operation of April 
1980 to rescue the American embassy hostages as a military aggression against Iran. 
Given that the hostage crisis and the radical rhetoric emanating from Tehran - which 
did not hide the Islamic Republic's intention to spread its revolutionary message to 
other countries - had already severely damaged Iran's international image, however, 
Iranian officials' diplomatic attempts to draw international attention on what they 
portrayed as great power hostility against their country effectively fell on deaf ears. 
1 The term 'Third Worldism' is used here to refer to the idea of a Third World collective identity and the 
corresponding belief in its common interests (Korany 1986: 1). 
`' The unilateral arms control steps taken by the Islamic Republic soon after the revolution were also 
partially intended for advancing this objective, for in the view of post-Pahlavi Iran's leaders, who equated 
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6.1.2 The war years, 1980-1988 
Iraq's invasion of Iran on 22 September 1980, only some 19 months after the Iranian 
revolution, put the leaders of the Islamic Republic in a difficult situation. What was at 
stake now was not only the fate of the Iranian revolution and the country's Islamic 
regime, but Iran's survival as an independent state as well. Diplomatically, the officials 
of the Islamic Republic responded to the start of the Iran-Iraq war by depicting the 
conflict as a foreign conspiracy against their country. In the official Iranian view, the 
war was essentially an effort by imperialistic powers - and the United States, in 
particular - to eliminate the threat that the Islamic Republic posed to their interests in 
the Persian Gulf and elsewhere. The role of Saddam Hussein's Iraq was to do the dirty 
work for the foreign powers and try to destroy Iran's revolution and its Islamic system 
of government. 
The representatives of the Islamic Republic maintained that Saddam Hussein would 
never have been able to attack their country without outside support. Accordingly, 
Iranian officials' key war-time objective in the area of conventional arms control was to 
forestall foreign military assistance to Iraq. The Iranians, concerned over the impact of 
foreign assistance on the course of the war, sought to realize their objective by using 
international arms control fora to single out and strongly criticize the main supporters of 
the Iraqi war effort. In addition to pointing to the role of the United States, the Soviet 
Union, and France in arming Iraq's military, the Iranians condemned the Gulf Arab 
sheikhdoms' - and especially Kuwait's and Saudi Arabia's - bankrolling of Saddam 
Hussein's arms purchases and verbally attacked Iraq's other Arab supporters, mainly 
Egypt and Jordan, too. 
Strikingly, however, the references made by the Islamic Republic's arms control 
officials to the governments backing Saddam Hussein were only sporadic and did not 
discuss in detail the content of the war-time cooperation between Iraq and its foreign 
supporters. Perhaps not wanting to take their criticism of the foreign governments 
indirectly involved in the war too far, the Iranians focused instead on discussing the 
state of global conventional arms control at large and thereby tried to influence the 
developments in the war through general diplomatic argumentation. Accordingly. 
Iranian officials strongly criticized the lack of meaningful international instruments to 
the Shah's military policies with selling out Iran to foreign interests, their country needed to withdraw 
from the military commitments of the Pahlavi era in order to regain its true sovereignty. 
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control conventional weaponry and stressed that their country's fate as a victim of 
military aggression demonstrated, for its part, that states could not rely on arms control 
to protect themselves from organized armed violence. The imperialistic aspirations and 
policies of the great powers - and especially those of the United States and the Soviet 
Union - were defined by the Iranians as the main cause for the sorry state of affairs in 
global arms control. 
Still, in spite of their gloomy analysis of international politics in general and 
international arms control in particular, the Iranians argued that there was a way out of 
the existing circumstances in inter-state relations. In the long run, the representatives of 
the Islamic Republic claimed, efforts in the area of arms control would bear fruit only if 
they were made in a transformed international order in which inter-state relations would 
be built on morality and justice, not on mistrust and rivalries. In the short run, the 
officials of the Islamic Republic stressed, the states of the Third World should follow 
the example of the Iranian revolution by adopting a moral foreign policy course, by 
standing against the hegemonic policies of the great powers, and by taking the lead in 
international arms control. 
Iran also asserted that conventional arms control was as important as the control of 
WMD and called on governments to take immediate steps to sharply reduce the world's 
military expenditures, to allocate the resources reserved for military procurement to the 
economic and social development of the Third World, to limit the production of 
conventional armaments, and to change the rules of the global arms trade. Furthermore, 
the officials of the Islamic Republic proposed the creation of zones free from 
superpower conventional armaments and called on states to refrain from using 
conventional weapons first. 
The emphasis placed by the Iranians on the analysis of the state of global 
conventional arms control suggests that Iran tried to use its macro-level diplomatic 
argumentation not only to undermine foreign powers' support for Iraq's war machinery, 
but also to propagate the Islamic Republic's views on international relations in general 
and arms control in particular. Through such propagation, Iranian representatives 
hoped to gain diplomatic recognition, status, and respect for their country as well as to 
further the Islamic Republic's ideological aspirations. Considering their country a 
vanguard state whose Islamic ideology offered a way out of the existing, unjust 
international order. the Iranians, strongly believing that the alteration of social and 
political conditions in other countries was part of the Islamic Republic's revolutionary 
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mission, eagerly tried to spread their anti-hegemonic and anti-status quo message of 
world affairs. 3 
The effort to justify and legitimize Iran's war policies constituted yet another feature 
of the Iranian conventional arms control diplomacy during the Iran-Iraq conflict. 
Accordingly, to answer the question why a country advocating arms control was itself 
fighting a war and unwilling to accept a peaceful solution to the bloody conflict, the 
officials of the Islamic Republic responded by stressing that as an innocent victim of 
external aggression, their country had been forced to take up arms. In other words, it 
was the conspiratorial foreign powers' intention to destroy the Islamic Republic that had 
compelled Iran to resort to the use of military force. 
The primary purpose of Iranian officials' attempts to justify and legitimize Iran's 
actions in the war was to secure the Islamic Republic 's ability to wage the war and to 
protect Iran's ideological credentials at the time of crisis. In the first place, the Iranians 
needed to try to fend off the diplomatic pressures that were building up due to Iran's 
uncompromising war policy that openly aimed at punishing and overthrowing the 
regime of Saddam Hussein. This security-related Iranian consideration aside, the 
officials of the Islamic Republic also had to pay attention to the credibility of their 
ideological message, for as the war between Iran and Iraq dragged on, the risk that the 
Islamic Republic's stated ideological aspirations - which, Iranian officials asserted, 
separated their country from other states and gave the Islamic Republic its moral high 
ground in world affairs - would clash with Iran's short-term war needs increased 
correspondingly. 
Yet it was not only what Iranian representatives said and did in the context of 
multilateral diplomatic deliberations on conventional arms control that served the 
Iranian attempts to secure the Islamic Republic's ability to conduct the war and to 
sustain the image of a country that lived up to its ideological principles. What the 
Iranians did not do or say played an equally important role. Thus, for example, probably 
in the hope that their country would manage to get an access to badly needed U. S. 
military hardware and thereby maintain its war-fighting capabilities, Iran's arms control 
diplomats did not openly criticize the American diplomatic effort - known as Operation 
The claim put forward by Iranian officials that, as a result of the oppressive policies of the Pahlavi 
monarchy and the war that had been imposed on the Islamic Republic by imperialistic powers, their 
country had come to possess special understanding of the workings of international affairs was indicative 
of the Iranian tendency to exaggerate the Islamic Republic's uniqueness as a political actor. This Iranian 
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Staunch - that was launched launched in 1983 to curb foreign arms sales to the Islamic 
Republic. In a similar manner, the Iranians made no issue of the decisions taken in early 
1984 by the U. S. administration of president Reagan to impose, as an anti-terrorism 
measure, arms export sanctions on Iran (Alikhani 2000: 154). 
Iran's diplomatic silence was even more overwhelming when it came to the Islamic 
Republic's secret arms dealings with the United States in 1985-1986. As a result of the 
so-called Iran-Contra affair - in which the Reagan administration sold armaments to 
Iran in exchange for the release of American hostages held in Lebanon by the Hizballah 
organization and used the proceeds to fund the Contra rebel movement in Nicaragua - 
the Islamic Republic received significant amounts of weapons, together with 
intelligence information about the Iraqi military, from the Americans. The military 
hardware received by the Islamic Republic included 2,000 TOW anti-tank missiles, 18 
HAWK surface-to-air missiles, and several planeloads of parts for other HAWK 
missiles that Iran had bought under the Shah but which had become inoperative because 
of poor maintenance (Pollack 2004: 213). 
Another major war-time development that was in dramatic contrast to Iranian leaders' 
declared ideological posture, and naturally absent from the Islamic Republic's arms 
control agrumentation, was Iran's clandestine arms dealings with Israel, a state whose 
right to existence was openly challenged by the Iranians. The arms dealings between the 
Jewish state and the Islamic Republic had started in March or April 1980 and picked up 
steam after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war. For the Iranians, the war-time arms 
dealings with Israel were a tactical necessity dictated by the Islamic Republic's 
desperate need for armaments at a time when diplomatic hurdles prevented Iran from 
buying weapons from Western sources. As far as the Israelis were concerned, they saw 
the arms relationship with Iran first and foremost as a way to undermine Iraq which they 
believed to constitute the single greatest regional threat to their country's security. (Sick 
1991: 71 and Parsi 2007: 105-107,113) 
The ease with which post-Pahlavi Iran distanced itself from its ideological aspirations 
and opened arms relationships with the United States and Israel. two countries which 
the Iranian leadership had declared as arch-enemies of Islam, demonstrated the length to 
which the Iranians were prepared to go in order to guarantee the security of their 
country and its Islamic system of government. And as regards the goal of security itself, 
characteristic is a national version of what Halliday (2005: 10) refers to in the Middle Eastern context as 
"regional narcissism, " the belief that the Middle East is the center of world politics and attention. 
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the Islamic Republic's conventional arms control operations in the course of the war 
were illustrative of the Iranian belief that it was military power, and not diplomatic 
efforts, that made the ultimate difference in the conflict between Iran and Iraq. Still, the 
Iranians simultaneously believed that it was worth trying to influence the developments 
and the military balance in the war by means of arms control diplomacy. 
Iranian arms control officials' efforts to prevent Iraq from launching SSM attacks 
against Iranian targets were a case in point in this respect. Unable to militarily deter 
Iraq from carrying out SSM attacks against military and civilian targets in Iran, the 
Islamic Republic called on the international community to intervene in Iraq's missile 
warfare and to take immediate measures to control global production and transfers of 
SSM. Iranian representatives labelled Iraq's missile attacks as "barbaric and inhumane, " 
accused Iraq of having broken the UN-mediated June 1984 bilateral moratorium on the 
bombing civilian areas, and stressed that their own country, following the principles of 
Islam and the instructions of Ayatollah Khomeini, would never conduct military 
operations against Iraqi civilians. 
As the security costs of Iraq's missile attacks increased and the international 
community showed no serious interest in Iran's missile control calls, the representatives 
of the Islamic Republic directed strong criticism at foreign governments by accusing 
them of arming Saddam Hussein and allowing Iraq to continue its missile warfare 
against Iranians. Then, after the Islamic Republic had managed to create a SSM force of 
its own, Iran's missile-related arms control operations started to focus on justifying the 
SSM attacks of the Islamic Republic. According to Iranian officials, their country had 
been forced to strike back at Iraq because nothing short of in-kind retaliations would 
have deterred Iraq from continuing its missile warfare. 
Iran's desire to eliminate foreign military presence in the Persian Gulf region was the 
sixth major conventional arms control objective of the Islamic Republic during the 
Iran-Iraq conflict. In the Iranian opinion, such presence, which had increased as the war 
in the Gulf had dragged on, seriously undermined the stability and security of the 
region. Arguing that foreign military presence in the Gulf - and more broadly, the 
Indian Ocean - only served foreign powers' imperialistic designs, Iranian officials 
demanded the withdrawal of foreign forces from the Gulf and the closing of all foreign 
military bases in the region. And just like the Shah's Iran had done, the Islamic 
Republic supported the implementation of the Indian Ocean zone of peace plan as a way 
to deal with the issue of foreign military presence in the Gulf. Actually, the 
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representatives of the Islamic Republic even took a step further by insisting on the 
elimination of great power military presence and rivalries from all other regions of the 
world as well. 
Iran's war-time criticism of foreign military presence in the Gulf included verbal 
attacks against the Gulf Arab states that had militarily cooperated with extra-regional 
powers and the United States, in particular. Not infrequently, Iranian officials resorted 
to outright threats to weaken the Gulf Arab sheikhdoms' willingness to cooperate with 
foreign governments and let it be known that their country was prepared to take drastic 
military measures - for example, close the Strait of Hormuz - should its vital interests 
in the Gulf be threatened. Often, however, the Iranians balanced their statements with 
conciliatory remarks which stressed the Islamic Republic's peaceful intentions as well 
as the Gulf countries' shared security interests and responsibility to safeguard the 
region's security through cooperation and without foreign interference. 
Iran's most significant policy opening to its Gulf neighbours in this regard was the 
1986 initiative for the establishment of an indigenous Gulf security arrangement. 
Iranian officials called for the creation of a Gulf security order that would respect the 
regional states' sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity, and which 
would prevent extra-regional states from interfering with the regional states' internal 
affairs and lead foreign powers to adopt neutrality in the Iran-Iraq war. Even though the 
Iranian plan never materialized, the representatives of the Islamic Republic continued to 
raise the issue in their war-time talks with individual Gulf Arab governments. 
Iran's opposition to foreign military presence emanated from two main sets of 
considerations. The first had to do with the Islamic Republic's security concerns. The 
Iranians viewed the foreign military forces in the Gulf as a direct threat to the security 
of their country and its Islamic regime and feared that extra-regional powers would use 
their military power to help Iraq to win the war. The second set of the Iranian 
considerations consisted of power calculations, for a regional order without foreign 
military presence would have increased Iran's influence in Gulf affairs and thereby also 
its room of manoeuvre in the war against Iraq. 
` 
The Islamic Republic's final major war-time objective in the area of conventional 
arms control, that of forestalling Iraq 's aerial military operations in the maritime 
theater of the Iran-Iraq war, stemmed, above all, from security concerns. Fearing that 
Self-evidently, foreign military presence in the Gulf also dramatically clashed with the Islamic 
Republic's ideological premises. 
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Iraq's attacks against Iran's vital economic targets in the Gulf would weaken their 
country's ability to wage war, the officials of the Islamic Republic used international 
arms control arenas to portray Iraq's attacks as a threat to regional and international 
security and to the stability of the world economy, to strongly condemn the Iraqi strikes, 
and to call for international measures to end the Iraqi operations. That the calls made by 
the Iranians elicited no international response resulted, not least, from the fact the 
Islamic Republic itself did not refrain from military operations in the Persian Gulf. Of 
course, here again, Iran's arms control officials - strongly criticizing foreign 
governments for their inaction on Iraq's aerial attacks - either kept silent about their 
own country's military activities or sought to diplomatically justify them. 
6.1.3 From the cease-fire to the Gulf conflict 
After having accepted the UN Security Council resolution 598 which established a 
cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war, the leaders of the Islamic Republic were faced with the 
massive task of post-war reconstruction. In the area of foreign policy, the reconstruction 
imperative required Iran to adopt a more conciliatory diplomatic course and to improve 
its relations with foreign governments. At the same time, the authorities of the Islamic 
Republic had to focus on ensuring that the vulnerabilities of the Iranian state in the 
aftermath of a long and costly war would not invite foreign powers to challenge Iran's 
national security. Although the Islamic Republic sought to safeguard its post-war 
security primarily by launching a rearmament program, it also kept relying on arms 
control diplomacy as a means to promote its security interests. 
Iran's diplomatic effort to persuade Iraq to agree to a final peace settlement 
satisfactory to the Islamic Republic was illustrative of Iran's utilization of international 
arms control arenas for the advancement of its security interests. Hoping to draw 
international attention to what they depicted as Saddam Hussein's dangerous 
intransigence in the bilateral peace talks - which, the Iranians claimed, was encouraged 
by the UN Security Council's reluctance to guarantee Iraq's compliance with the 
resolution 598 - Iranian representatives 
focused, in particular, on pointing to Iraq's 
refusal to withdraw its forces from occupied Iranian territory. The officials of the 
Islamic Republic warned that Iraq's occupation of Iranian territory was a source of 
tension and a factor that could trigger renewed hostilities between the two states. 
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Iraq played a role also in the Iranian efforts to create security cooperation between 
the Islamic Republic and the Gulf Arab sheikhdoms. While declaring that their country 
wanted to establish firm and good neighbourly relations with GCC states and that it 
harboured no ambitions to dominate the Gulf region, Iranian authorities believed that 
fence-mending with the Gulf Arab sheikhdoms could induce those countries to put 
pressure on Iraq to alter its behaviour in the peace talks with their government. On the 
other hand, through multilateral and bilateral diplomacy, Iran sought to foster better 
relations with GCC governments in order to create a counterforce to contain Iraq and to 
prevent it from militarily challenging the post-war security order in the region. 
Iran's diplomatic argumentation on Gulf security included the assertion that the 
Islamic Republic's 1986 initiative on the establishment of an indigenous regional 
security system free from extra-regional influence offered a means to ensure the long- 
term security of the Persian Gulf. But while regularly referring to their governments 
1986 initiative, which effectively ruled out the participation of Saddam Hussein's Iraq 
in the proposed security arrangement, the representatives of the Islamic Republic argued 
that Iran and GCC states should start their security cooperation by engaging in a 
security dialogue that would deal, for example, with the regional states' threat 
perceptions. After such initial CBM, the Iranians continued, the parties could move to 
discussing and adopting more ambitious arms control measures. 
Iran's calls for a regional security arrangement were closely linked to the Iranian 
objective of driving foreign powers out of the Persian Gulf. Yet, whereas the 
establishment of an indigenous security system was seen by the Iranians as a longer- 
term aspiration, the withdrawal of foreign military forces from the region was 
something the Islamic Republic wanted to occur immediately. According to Iranian 
officials, the presence of foreign military forces in the Gulf not only posed a threat to 
the regional states' physical security and political independence, but it created tension 
and discord between the Gulf countries as well. While the Iranian demand for 
instantaneous exit of foreign military forces from the Persian Gulf stemmed, first and 
foremost, from concerns over the United States' military plans vis-ä-vis the Islamic 
Republic, what Iranian officials remained silent about was the fact that foreign military 
presence in the Gulf was also an impediment to post-war Iranian plans and influence in 
the region. In this sense, then, the Islamic Republic's opposition to the presence of 
foreign forces in the Gulf, just as its security cooperation proposals to the Gulf Arab 
sheikhdoms, went beyond mere security considerations and reflected Iran's desire to 
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wield regional influence free from outside constraints and to promote the goal of post- 
war economic development. 
Iran's deliberations on the issue of foreign military presence in the Gulf included 
criticism of the Gulf Arab sheikhdoms' security policies that relied on Western and 
primarily U. S. military support. In the Iranian opinion, such reliance, as put by president 
Rafsanjani, was "not in accordance with the spirit of Islam and freedom-loving people. " 
The representatives of the Islamic Republic warned Gulf governments of foreign efforts 
to dominate the oil-rich and strategically important region and of extra-regional powers' 
readiness to use intimidation and even military force to secure their interests in the area. 
Also, the Iranians reminded the Gulf Arab sheikhdoms that those countries' security 
cooperation with Western powers put a heavy economic burden on them. 
Strongly pointing out that the security of the Persian Gulf was the exclusive 
responsibility of the regional states, the officials of the Islamic Republic maintained that 
as a result of the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988 and the Soviet withdrawal from 
Afghanistan in early 1989, there were no pretexts left for Western powers to retain their 
military presence in the Gulf. Consequently, the Iranians called for the application of 
naval arms control measures in the region and specifically referred to the Indian Ocean 
zone of peace plan as an already existing instrument for the purpose. 
Security, power, and economic considerations also explained the Iranian arms control 
objective of forestalling Western arms transfers to GCC countries. In the first place, the 
Islamic Republic's demand that major arms-producing countries should limit their arms 
transfers to the Persian Gulf region and to the whole of the Middle East stemmed from 
the fear that the Gulf Arab sheikhdoms' - and especially Saudi Arabia's - purchases of 
state-of-the-art conventional weaponry from the West would open up a technological 
gap between Iran's military hardware and that of its Gulf Arab neighbours and thereby 
alter the regional military balance to the detriment of the Islamic Republic which did not 
have an access to such leading-edge arms technology. 
In addition to viewing the Gulf Arab sheikhdoms' military acquisitions as a challenge 
to Iran's security and regional influence, the Iranians worried that GCC governments' 
arms purchases would increasingly anchor Western and particularly U. S. military 
presence in the Gulf - an eventuality that would 
impose significant constraints on Iran's 
post-war foreign and security policy aspirations. The arms purchases of Iran's Gulf 
Arab neighbours posed a major problem for the Iranian leadership in economic terms, 
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too, for they only sharpened the Iranian dilemma of choosing between the Islamic 
Republic's post-war security and economic needs. 
Finally, Iranian officials' use of international arms control fora to influence the arms 
policies of ' the major powers reflected, above all, the prestige- and ideology-related 
aspirations of the Islamic Republic which, in spite of its consciously toned-down post- 
war ideological prolife, continued to consider itself an important player on the global 
diplomatic stage. While strongly welcoming the positive developments that took place 
in international politics in the late 1980s, and while pointing out that the improved 
international political climate should be transformed into concrete arms control 
measures both at the global and the regional level, the representatives of the Islamic 
Republic continued to blame the major powers for the increase in the number and 
sophistication of the world's conventional armaments. In the Iranian analysis, the 
"domineering policies" of the great powers were the reason for global conventional 
arms racing and for chronic insecurity in the Third World. 5 
6.1.4 The Gulf conflict and beyond 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 and the subsequent Gulf conflict of 
1990-1991 was a watershed event with major political ramifications in the Persian Gulf 
and the wider Middle East. For Iran, the conflict was a mixed blessing. On the one 
hand, it led Saddam Hussein to yield to the Islamic Republic's demands in the peace 
negotiations with Iraq, constituted a huge blow to Iraq's military might, and enabled the 
Iranians to show that they were seriously trying to improve their relations with GCC 
governments. On the other hand, however, the Gulf conflict brought about a massive 
influx of foreign military forces into the region, a development that was detrimental to 
the Islamic Republic's security interests and its power aspirations. 
Having been more or less bystanders when it came to the developments in the Gulf 
conflict, Iran's leaders concentrated on using multilateral and bilateral diplomacy to 
ensure that the Islamic Republic would occupy a central place in the post-conflict Gulf 
security order. In the area of arms control, Iran's efforts translated into the twin 
` Alternatively, or in fact additionally, Iran's criticism of the major powers' arms policies can also be seen 
as testifying to Iranian authorities' attempt to divert international attention away from the Islamic 
Republic's post-war rearmament efforts and hence facilitate the Islamic Republic's attempts to procure 
conventional armaments and military technology from abroad and to build up its own arms production 
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objectives of driving foreign military forces out of the Persian Gulf and establishing an 
indigenous security system in the region. In order to pursue the first objective, the 
representatives of the Islamic Republic called for the adoption of naval arms control 
measures both at the international and the regional level and continued to view the 
Indian Ocean zone of peace initiative as a suitable instrument for dealing with the 
situation in the Gulf. 
As for the second objective, the officials of the Islamic Republic - who strongly 
objected to any extra-regional participation in the post-conflict Gulf security order - 
pointed to the religious, cultural, and economic bonds between the Persian Gulf states 
and argued that those ties would help the regional countries to create a security order 
free from foreign interference. The Iranians noted that the UN Security Council 
resolution 598 would provide the necessary institutional framework for the Gulf 
countries' security discussions and envisioned a role for the UN in supporting the 
process. Also, Iranian officials stressed that the establishment of an indigenous Gulf 
security system should go hand-in-hand with concrete arms control steps taken, for 
example, for dealing with the build-up of state-of-the-art conventional weaponry in the 
region. In fact, by arguing that the Iranian-proposed Gulf security arrangement would 
stop arms racing in the region and free up resources from military spending for 
investments in the regional countries' economic, scientific, and technological 
development, the representatives of the Islamic Republic suggested that the 
establishment of an indigenous Gulf security architecture would amount to an arms 
control measure in itself. 
As it subsequently turned out, Iran's GCC neighbours chose, to the great 
disappointment of the Islamic Republic, to safeguard their security in the post-Gulf 
conflict era with the help of external powers. Still wary of Iran's political and military 
aspirations in the region, and eager to find powerful allies to contain the threat of Iraq, 
the Gulf Arab sheikhdoms saw no alternative to alleviating their security concerns 
through bilateral defence agreements with Western powers and, above all, with the 
United States, now by far the strongest military power in the world. For the Islamic 
Republic, the strengthened Western military presence in the Gulf, Iran's hinterland and 
most important sphere of influence, posed a direct threat to its security and regional 
infrastructure. This objective was linked not only to Iran's security considerations, but also to its 
calculations regarding the balance of power in the Persian Gulf. 
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power. 6 The Islamic Republic's feeling of insecurity and diplomatic isolation was only 
heightened by post-Gulf conflict political developments in the wider Middle East. The 
U. S. -led efforts to create a new political order in the Middle East, centering around an 
Arab-Israeli peace, led to a situation where Iran, which opposed the peace process, 
found itself in confrontation with a bloc consisting of the United States, Israel, and most 
of the Arab governments, including those of the GCC. In short, the Islamic Republic 
was on the defensive not only in the Persian Gulf but in the wider Middle East as well. 
Iranian leaders' response to what they perceived as a threat to the Islamic Republic's 
security and regional influence - and secondarily to its welfare and ideological interests 
- was threefold. First, in the broad Middle Eastern arena, the Iranians adopted a policy 
which actively sought to undermine and sabotage the efforts towards an Arab-Israeli 
peace and the planned new Middle Eastern regional order. Secondly, the Islamic 
Republic tried to signal, through military manoeuvres and targeted arms purchases, 
especially in the naval area, that if challenged, its armed forces would be able to inflict 
harm on the United States in the Persian Gulf and to shut down oil shipments through 
that region. Thirdly, the Iranians sought to drive a wedge into the security relations 
between the Gulf Arab sheikhdoms and the United States by expressing the Islamic 
Republic's continued interest in security cooperation with GCC governments and by 
calling on those governments to join hands with Iran for driving foreign powers out of 
the Gulf and for establishing an indigenous security system in the region. 
The arms control officials of the Islamic Republic played a central role in Iran's 
attempts to convince the Gulf Arab sheikhdoms of the need to create an alternative to 
the U. S. -dominated post-Gulf conflict security order in the region. Accordingly, even 
though the Iranians were highly critical of GCC states' security cooperation with 
Western governments, dismissed extra-regional Middle East- and Gulf-related arms 
control proposals, and rejected the ACRS talks, which were a component of the Arab- 
Israeli peace process, the officials of the Islamic Republic invested a lot of diplomatic 
effort in trying to improve their country's security relations with GCC countries. But 
whereas in the course of the Gulf conflict Iran had hoped that its diplomatic openings 
towards the Gulf Arab sheikhdoms would have induced those states to turn away from 
6 Iran's concerns over foreign military presence in the Gulf included an economic dimension as well, for 
the authorities of the Islamic Republic feared that Western powers - and the United States, in particular - 
would try to use their strong influence in the region to undermine Iran's trade relations with the regional 
countries. And of course, as before, major power military presence in the Gulf was in tangible 
contradiction with Iranian leaders' ideological aspirations. 
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extra-regional powers, now the leaders of the Islamic Republic recognized that Western 
powers were not going to leave the region anytime soon. 
Accordingly, while regularly referring to the need to drive foreign military forces 
from the Gulf and to establish an indigenous security system in the region, Iranian 
officials focused on the shorter-term objective of undermining the security relations 
between GCC states and Western powers. The Iranians sought to pursue their objective 
primarily by calling, both bilaterally and multilaterally, for the implementation of CBM 
between the Islamic Republic and its GCC neighbours. Throughout the Rafsanjani 
presidency, the Iranians proposed the establishment of a forum where the Gulf states 
could discuss security issues - such as their threat perceptions and military doctrines - 
and agree on concrete CBM, even if the Iranians also pointed out that the existence of 
such a forum should not be considered a precondition for the application of CBM in the 
region. As far as the CBM put forward for implementation by the representatives of the 
Islamic Republic were concerned, they included the following: exchange of reports on 
national military holdings, prior notification and explanation of national weapons 
acquisitions, advance notification and observation of troop movements and military 
manoeuvres, promotion of contacts between the Gulf militaries, and transparency in 
armaments in the context of the United Nations' conventional arms register. 
The post-Gulf conflict offers made by Iran to conduct joint military exercises, either 
on a bilateral or multilateral basis, with GCC countries were also intended for fostering 
confidence-building and security cooperation between the Islamic Republic and the 
Gulf Arab sheikhdoms. And even though most GCC states had no serious interest in 
security relations with Iran, the Islamic Republic did manage to take preliminary 
security cooperation steps - that is, naval CBM - with Qatar and Oman. 
Apart from their CBM calls, the Iranians also put forth a number of more ambitious 
arms control initiatives. Thus, the Rafsanjani administration voiced Iran's readiness to 
sign non-aggression pacts with GCC governments and raised the option of bilateral 
defence treaties as well. The efforts by the Islamic Republic to promote security 
cooperation in the Gulf included references to the concept of non-offensive defence - 
that is, to the idea that the regional states should organize their national security in ways 
which would not pose threats to other Gulf countries - and coined the term 'defensive 
security scheme' in order to make the case that all states' military forces should serve 
only defensive purposes. 
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In addition, in the post-Gulf conflict years, Iran's arms control officials tried, in order 
to protect the Islamic Republic's security and power interests, to limit arms shipments 
from the West to the Gulf Arab sheikhdoms. While effectively powerless to stop those 
transfers, which formed a central element of the post-Gulf conflict security 
collaboration between Western and GCC governments, the Iranians nevertheless tried to 
pursue their objective through diplomatic means. Hence, Iran's calls for the reduction of 
the Gulf states' military budgets and weapons procurement, for the channeling of the 
resources reserved for military purposes to the development of both the Gulf region and 
the poor countries of the Third World, and for the conversion of military production 
facilities into civilian ones can be seen as responses to the arms cooperation between 
individual GCC states and Western powers. 
The Islamic Republic's approach to the UN Conventional Arms Register was 
strongly influenced by Iran's Gulf-related considerations. While supporting the 
existence of the register and defining it as a component of Iran's defensive security 
scheme initiative, the representatives of the Islamic Republic critically pointed out that 
the register had not managed to limit the destabilizing accumulation of conventional 
armaments in various parts of the world. Also, the Iranians stressed that the register had 
not succeeded in preventing major arms-producing countries from transferring huge 
amounts of military hardware all over the world. In the Iranian opinion, the poor 
performance of the arms register testified to the major powers' politically and 
commercially driven effort to obstruct progress in the area of global conventional arms 
control. 
Explicitly referring to developments in the Persian Gulf region, Iranian officials 
regretted that the Gulf Arab sheikhdoms had not provided any information about their 
national arms acquisitions to the UN register. The Islamic Republic's disappointment at 
GCC states' reluctance to submit annual register reports may have stemmed from Iran's 
initial hope that it could have used such reports to fish out information about the details 
of the arms dealings between Western and GCC governments. On the other hand, 
Iranian officials may have calculated that such open information would have helped 
their country to make a stronger diplomatic case against the close security collaboration 
between the West and the Gulf Arab sheikhdoms. Both considerations seem to have 
also explained, partially at least, why the Islamic Republic lent its support for the 
broadening of the UN registers' original definition of the term 'major conventional 
weapons' and why the Iranians repeatedly stressed that national military holdings, 
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together with all conventional armaments deployed in foreign countries, should be 
included in the register's scope, too. 
The Islamic Republic's own readiness to submit information to the UN register was 
reflective of the Iranian attempt to assuage outside fears, especially in the Gulf region, 
about Iran's military intentions and to improve the country's international image. 
However, Iranian authorities - who noted that unilateral transparency could be 
dangerous because it might "invite aggression" - themselves undermined Iran's register 
diplomacy by providing their annual returns late, by revealing data that had already 
become public through other channels, and, as it is widely believed, by omitting 
information about their country's arms acquisitions. Moreover, Iran's register 
diplomacy illustrated, for its part, that the Islamic Republic viewed conventional arms 
control as secondary in importance to WMD arms control. 
Iranian authorities were also of the view that, at the end of the day, the security and 
political benefits of transparency in armaments were meager at best and that states 
should immediately take more serious steps to control conventional weaponry. The 
officials of the Islamic Republic accused major arms-producing countries of supplying 
weapons to every corner of the world and especially to regions suffering from armed 
conflicts. Once again, the Iranians referred to the situation in the Persian Gulf and 
claimed that the major powers not only induced and compelled GCC states to buy huge 
amounts of military hardware, but also pressed those governments to ignore and even 
torpedo international arms control initiatives. Furthermore, Iran's representatives 
claimed that the major powers fuelled regional tensions and created imaginary enemies 
in order to promote their arms sales and to extend their political and military influence. 
According to the officials of the Islamic Republic, Iran was one of the countries 
demonized by the major powers for manipulative purposes. Strongly pointing out that 
Iran's weapons acquisitions were markedly moderate and illustrative of purely 
defensive military planning, and that they had been necessitated by the Islamic 
Republic's equipment losses in the Iran-Iraq war and by the Islamic Republic's 
turbulent security environment, Iranian authorities maintained that developing countries 
like their own were not responsible for world-wide proliferation and build-up of 
conventional armaments. 
While pointing out that the international community should actually help Third 
World states to produce conventional weapons domestically so that they would be able 
to independently defend themselves, the representatives of the Islamic Republic also 
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called for the adoption of international supply-side arms control measures that would be 
directed at the major powers' weapons production and export activities. Apart from 
seeking to influence the major powers' arms policies - an objective emanating not only 
from the Islamic Republic's security considerations but from its ideology- and prestige- 
related calculations as well - Iranian authorities continued to call for global reduction of 
military budgets and weapons procurement. 
6.1.5 The Khatami presidency 
The election of Muhammad Khatami as the fifth Iranian president in May 1997 led 
the Islamic Republic to review its foreign policy. Under the leadership of its reformist, 
domestically highly popular president, Iran took a further step towards improving its 
relations with the outside world. President Khatami and his lieutenants believed that 
their country's reintegration into the community of states would not succeed without a 
conciliatory diplomacy convincing the international community of the Islamic 
Republic's willingness to distance itself from a confrontational foreign policy course. 
The revision of the Islamic Republic's approach to foreign affairs was thus regarded by 
the Iranian reformists as a key to strengthening their country's security and prestige and 
to advancing its political, economic, and ideological interests. 
The Khatami administration's determination to calibrate Iran's foreign policy 
orientation crystallized in the diplomatic catchword of "dialogue among civilizations. " 
With this diplomatic slogan, the Iranians signalled that they wanted to change 
international circumstances by embarking on a dialogue with foreign governments and 
other international actors rather than by categorically rejecting and actively objecting to 
what they considered antithetical to the interests and the ideological outlook of the 
Islamic Republic. Yet, at the same time, the Khatami administration also made it known 
that its conciliatory approach to foreign policy did not mean that Iran's reformist 
government would compromise the dignity, wisdom, and interests of the Iranian nation. 
The Islamic Republic's new argumentation extended its influence to all sectors of the 
Iranian foreign policy, including the country's arms control diplomacy. The 
introduction of the concept of "global security networking" was illustrative of the 
Khatami administration's effort to propagate its reformist rhetoric in support of the 
realization of the Islamic Republic's arms control objectives. Iranian representatives 
referred to the concept as the "security interpretation of the concept of dialogue among 
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civilizations" and argued that global security networking would promote inter-state 
cooperation and ensure that all states would have a chance to safeguard their national 
security. 
Although the Khatami administration's arms control operations relied on a diplomatic 
message that stressed the importance of cooperation and collective action among 
governments, in the end, the notion of global security networking was yet another 
Iranian response to what the leaders of the Islamic Republic viewed as the major 
powers' unjust domination of the international system. The Khatami administration's 
commitment to opposing such domination became evident from the manner in which it 
repeated the Islamic Republic's traditional conventional arms control demands - driven 
by a combination of security, power, and ideological considerations - which aimed at 
imposing limits on states' and especially the major powers' military expenditures, arms 
arsenals, weapons transfers, and arms production. 7 And while expressing Iran's 
continuing support for the UN Conventional Arms Register, which the Iranians 
considered a preliminary international mechanism towards the substantive conventional 
arms control measures they were calling for, the Khatami government did not refrain 
from criticizing the register's inability to restrain the major powers' conventional arms 
transfers or from arguing that the register's scope should include WMD as well. 
As far as the Persian Gulf region was concerned, the Khatami government recognized 
that the Rafsanjani administration's post-Iran-Iraq war efforts to improve the ties 
between their country and the Gulf Arab sheikhdoms had not produced the results 
hoped for. Therefore, in order to satisfy its security, power, economic, and ideological 
aspirations in the Gulf region, the Khatami government actively signalled its desire to 
enter a new phase in Iranian-GCC relations. Here, too, the Islamic Republic's reformists 
believed that conciliatory diplomatic signals coming out of Tehran would open the door 
for increased inter-state communication and interaction in the Persian Gulf. 
Given that mutual security concerns continued to constitute the biggest obstacle to 
improved Iranian-GCC relations, the Khatami government considered arms control 
diplomacy an indispensable element of its Gulf strategy. And instead of focusing on 
undermining the security relations between GCC states and Western powers, as Iran had 
done after the 1990-1991 Gulf conflict, the representatives of the Khatami 
7 The global elements of Iran's argumentation on conventional arms control under president Khatami can 
also been seen as a manifestation of the Islamic Republic's effort to deflect diplomatic pressure from the 
foreign governments worried about Iran's conventional weapons programs which were regarded 
in 
Tehran as essential to Iran's security and regional influence. 
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administration concentrated on promoting security cooperation with the Gulf Arab 
sheikhdoms. In other words, Iran wanted to portray itself as a constructive actor in the 
region and to distance itself from the role of a regional spoiler taking every opportunity 
to challenge prevailing political and security circumstances in the Persian Gulf. 
To be sure, the Islamic Republic's arms control operations continued to rest on the 
premise and demand that foreign military forces should withdraw from the Persian Gulf 
and that the regional states alone should carry the responsibility for safeguarding Gulf 
security. The Khatami administration criticized the close security cooperation between 
GCC states and Western goverments, called on the Gulf states to cut their military 
spending, underlined the necessity of the creation of an indigenous regional security 
system, and expressed Iran's interest in signing defence pacts with GCC countries. 
Simultaneously, however, Iranian authorities openly recognized that the transformation 
of the existing security order in the Persian Gulf would most probably take place only 
gradually. Consequently, by seeking to build on the rudimentary security cooperation 
steps taken by Iran and GCC states during the Rafsanjani presidency, the Khatami 
government tried to reshape the regional order in an incremental manner. 
At a general level, Iranian officials used multilateral arms control fora and bilateral 
talks with the Gulf Arab sheikhdoms to point out that their country was willing to 
develop security relations with their Arab neighbours. The Iranians asserted that the 
Islamic Republic had no military ambitions in the region and that Iran's weapons 
acquisitions served only defensive purposes. The representatives of the Islamic 
Republic also declared that their government would warmly welcome and consider any 
initiative put forward by the regional states to strengthen peace and security in the 
Persian Gulf. 
Apart from these general Iranian remarks, the Khatami administration attempted to 
use CBM as a means to overcome the prevailing distrust between the Islamic Republic 
and its Gulf Arab neighbours and thereby to lay the foundation for strengthening 
Iranian-GCC security relations. Iran's efforts yielded mixed results. On the one hand, 
the Islamic Republic made strides in developing security cooperation with Oman, 
Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. Oman remained the most fertile ground for Iran's diplomatic 
overtures, and the two countries implemented a set of mutual CBM, including naval 
port visits and the observation of military exercises. The security talks between Iran and 
Kuwait, in turn, centered, to the disappointment of the Islamic Republic, around low- 
security issues and resulted in the signing, in October 2000, of a bilateral agreement 
572 
dealing with drug trafficking and other forms of organized crime. The Islamic Republic 
and Saudi Arabia signed a corresponding agreement in April 2001, in addition to which 
the security talks between the two states resulted in the application of mutual CBM, 
such as naval port visits and the exchange of military delegations and attaches. 
On the other hand, the Khatami administration's security interaction with Qatar, 
Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates was confined merely to bilateral talks. None of 
the three GCC states responded to Iran's calls for concrete security cooperation, and 
even those GCC governments that agreed to implement joint security measures with the 
Islamic Republic declined Iranian offers for steps that would have gone beyond CBM. 
Thus, for example, no GCC government was interested in joint military training and 
exercises with the Iranians who changed the code-names of their naval war games in 
order to signal their peaceful military intentions and who argued that joint Iranian-GCC 
military exercises would have proven wrong the perception, fuelled by the enemies of 
the Islamic Republic, that Iran was a threat to the security and stability of the Persian 
Gulf. Similarly, GCC governments ignored the Islamic Republic's calls for full regional 
participation in the UN Conventional Arms Register. Ultimately, however, the mere fact 
that GCC states - and especially Saudi Arabia, the leading GCC power - were ready to 
engage in security cooperation, however limited, with the Islamic Republic marked a 
small victory for the Khatami government's arms control operations. 
6.1.6 The issue of micro-disarmament 
The rise of the question of micro-disarmament - that is, the control of anti-personnel 
mines and other types of small arms - on the international diplomatic agenda after the 
end of the Cold War was a prime example of an arms control issue that was imposed on 
Iran by external actors and circumstances. The shift in the nature of warfare in the post- 
Cold War world from inter-state to internal conflicts, and the consequential desire of the 
international community to prevent or at least ameliorate the devastating humanitarian 
consequences of the organized violence taking place within states, forced countries like 
Iran, fully occupied with their own domestic problems, to forge diplomatic positions on 
issues that were of secondary interest to them. 
As expected, then, the Islamic Republic's initial reaction to the subject of micro- 
disarmament was one of indifference. But as the question continued to gain 
international momentum in the course of the 1990s, Iranian authorities understood that 
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they had to be more proactive in order to be able to defend their interests in the matter. 
There were three main sets of objectives - combined with the general Iranian position 
that the control of conventional weaponry was inferior in importance to WMD arms 
control - that eventually guided the Islamic Republic's diplomatic approach to micro- 
disarmament. First, as a producer and exporter of APM and other kinds of small arms, 
Iran was determined to try to torpedo any international measure that would set limits to 
the activities of its arms industry. Secondly, Iran's arms control officials attempted to 
ensure that no international steps would be taken to limit states' right to produce and 
use small arms for the maintenance of their security, whether external or internal. 
Finally, given that Iran's leaders viewed small arms transfers as a way to advance their 
foreign policy objectives, the representatives of the Islamic Republic sought to hamper 
any international effort that would limit its ability to influence political developments 
outside its borders through arms transfers. 8 
As a consequence, when it came to the issue of APM, Iranian officials - while 
acknowledging the dire humanitarian consequences of uncleared landmines and calling 
for the implementation of international mine-clearance projects in the contaminated 
regions of the world - refrained from acceding to diplomatic instruments that would 
have controlled the use, production, and transfer of such weapons. Thus, the Islamic 
Republic did not join the Mine-Ban Treaty of December 1997 and neither did it become 
a party to Protocol II of the Inhumane Weapons Convention of 1981 or to that treaty's 
Amended Protocol II, both of which were designed to protect civilians from landmines 
in international armed conflicts and not to ban the use of APM in itself. 
Iran defended its mine stands in international fora by stressing that beside the obvious 
humanitarian aspect, there was a military dimension to the landmine issue as well. The 
representatives of the Islamic Republic noted that numerous states viewed APM as 
indispensable to their national security and reserved their own country the right to use 
landmines until the emergence of a military technology that would provide a serious 
alternative to such weapons or until governments would manage to draft a universally 
acceptable instrument banning APM. In addition to maintaining that Iran's long borders 
and its unstable external security environment forced their country to rely on landmines, 
the officials of the Islamic Republic also noted that Iran needed landmines to tackle the 
problem of drug trafficking from neighbouring Afghanistan and Pakistan. Of course, 
8 Naturally, Iranian officials did not publicly subscribe to this objective which was in stark contrast with 
the Islamic Republic's general argumentation on conventional arms control. 
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what the Iranians left unsaid was that the same APM used for crime control 
simultaneously served as a tool to stop illegal immigration to Iran as well as to prevent 
those individuals determined to undermine the central government in Tehran from 
entering the country. 
Nevertheless, in an attempt to divert international attention away from its diplomacy 
of procrastination, its production of APM, as well as from its use of such weapons for 
military and foreign policy purposes, the Islamic Republic took unilateral arms control 
steps that pertained to its production and exportation of APM. First, the Iranians 
declared their intention to halt the production of such weapons and, secondly, they 
announced, in November 1998, that their country had imposed a moratorium on the 
export of Iranian-manufactured anti-personnel mines. Yet the fact that mines produced 
in the Islamic Republic continued to be detected outside Iranian borders seriously 
undermined the credibility of the Islamic Republic's diplomatic steps and suggested that 
the Iranian declarations had essentially been cosmetic efforts to court the international 
opinion. 
While seeking to safeguard its security, power, and economic interests in the mine 
issue by means of a defensive diplomacy, the Islamic Republic also tried to make the 
most out of the international mine debate, in which it only reluctantly participated, by 
seeking to reap at least some benefits from the multilateral diplomatic activities around 
the issue. In practice, the officials of the Islamic Republic pursued the objective of 
obtaining international assistance to relieve the landmine problem in Iran, first of all, 
by using multilateral diplomatic fora to discuss and present the characteristics and the 
consequences of the Iranian mine problem which was mainly confined to the western 
parts of the country, that is, to the regions that had served as theaters of war in the 
1980-1988 Iran-Iraq conflict. 
Secondly, the Iranians used the same diplomatic arenas to call on the international 
community to help Iran and other developing states in mine-detection and mine- 
clearance. On the one hand, the officials of the Islamic Republic argued that countries 
that had laid landmines in foreign territories had a responsibility to provide maps, 
records, and other relevant documentation to mine-infested states as well as to the UN 
so that the affected countries could implement national mine-clearance programs. On 
the other hand, Iranian officials were highly critical of international restrictions that 
prevented mine-infected states from acquiring modern mine-clearance technology - 
which, of course, could be used for military purposes as well - from developed 
575 
countries. The Islamic Republic condemned such controls as "discriminatory and 
unjustified" and called for their abolition and for international technological and 
financial assistance to countries suffering from mine contamination. 
Finally, Iran took preliminary steps with international partners to alleviate the 
country's landmine problem and welcomed any additional help in this respect from the 
UN, individual governments, and NGO. Simultaneously, however, the representatives 
of the Islamic Republic stressed that because mine-clearance was a humanitarian 
enterprise, mine-related collaboration between foreign parties and mine-infested states 
should not be made dependent on preconditions or commitments required from the 
latter and that such cooperation should not be used as a pretext to interfere with mine- 
infested countries' internal affairs. 
Following the footsteps of the Islamic Republic's mine diplomacy, Iran's activities in 
the area of small arms control similarly focused on ensuring that the Islamic Republic's 
ability to produce, export, transfer, and use such weapons would not be undermined by 
an on-going international arms control debate. Hence, even though the Iranians soon 
distanced themselves from their initially critical position on small arms control - which 
stressed that small arms control should not divert governments' attention away from the 
fact that WMD arms control was the most important theme on the international arms 
control agenda - and participated in the UN-led efforts to tackle the problem of small 
arms, the Islamic Republic - like many other countries, for that matter - defined the 
problem as essentially consisting of illicit small arms trading. That the Iranians showed 
no interest in the planned UN Firearms Protocol - an instrument which was adopted in 
May 2001 and which would have complicated Iran's efforts to pursue its foreign policy 
objectives through small arms transfers to non-state actors - illustrated, for its part, that 
the Islamic Republic strictly avoided any diplomatic arrangements in the area of small 
arms control that would have conflicted with its interests. 
When discussing the issue of illicit small arms trade, Iranian representatives used the 
situation in neighbouring Afghanistan as a textbook example of the dire consequences 
of such trade and further stressed that illicit small arms trading was inseparably linked 
with the phenomena of drug trafficking and terrorism. Noting that Iran, too, had 
suffered from the use of illicit small arms, especially by drug traffickers operating in the 
eastern border regions of the country. the officials of the Islamic Republic called for 
diplomatic measures against illicit small arms trade both at the international and the 
regional level. 
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6.2 Chemical Arms Control: Objectives, Actions, and Means 
6.2.1 The war years 
Iraq's use of chemical weapons in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war was a crucial factor 
in leading post-revolutionary Iran to adopt an active diplomatic course in the area of 
arms control. For one thing, Iran's powerlessness in the face of Iraq's chemical warfare 
prompted the leaders of the Islamic Republic to shift their focus from ideologically 
coloured foreign policy objectives to issues that concretely threatened the interests of 
their country and to recognize that the securing of those interests required Iranian 
participation in multilateral diplomacy. For another, Iran's war-time experience as a 
victim of chemical warfare convinced the already security-obsessed leaders of the 
Islamic Republic that the use of both conventional armaments and WMD by foreign 
powers posed a constant threat to Iran's national security as well as to the country's 
Islamic regime. Therefore, Iran's leaders recognized that the steps taken by the Islamic 
Republic to strengthen its military preparedness needed to be complemented with an 
active arms control diplomacy. 
Iraq's first major use of chemical weapons against Iran took place in the summer of 
1983, and the number of Iraq's chemical attacks increased during the rest of that year. 
Militarily unable to prevent Iraq from waging chemical warfare against their country, 
the authorities of the Islamic Republic, concerned over the security implications of 
Iraq's chemical attacks, launched a major diplomatic effort, lasting the whole of the war 
period, to persuade the international community to stop Iraq 's use of chemical 
weapons. In the course of 1983, Iranian officials tried to pursue this objective by 
bringing Iraq's chemical attacks to the attention of the UN Security Council and the 
world organization's secretary-general. The Iranians called on the secretary-general to 
verify the accuracy of the Iranian reports and declared their readiness to provide 
evidence of Iraq's chemical warfare to his representatives. 
The fact that the UN more or less ignored the Islamic Republic's diplomatic actions 
and pleas was a major source of frustration for Iranian authorities. The Iranians vented 
their anger especially at the Security Council and maintained that the council's inaction 
with regard to Iraq's chemical warfare testified to a pro-Iraqi bias and made the council 
partially responsible for Iraq's actions. The Islamic Republic also directly accused the 
Soviet Union and France - two key supporters of Saddam Hussein and two of the 
five 
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permanent members of the Security Council - of supplying Iraq with chemical 
armaments. 
In the course of 1984, following Iraq's escalation of its chemical weapons use, Iran 
was forced to intensify its diplomatic efforts against Iraq's chemical attacks. The 
representatives of the Islamic Republic continued to publicize detailed information 
about Iraq's attacks on international fora and hoped that such information would prompt 
the international community to react to the Iraqi breaches of international law. The 
Iranians also continued to call on the UN secretary-general to validate their claims of 
Iraq's chemical warfare. In March 1984, responding to a formal request made by the 
Islamic Republic, the secretary-general finally sent a specialist group on a fact-finding 
mission to Iran. Even though the UN experts, to Iran's great disappointment, failed to 
establish Iraq's culpability for the use of chemical weapons, the fact that the expert 
group had at least verified the use of mustard gas and tabun in the areas inspected in 
Iran provided diplomatic ammunition for the Islamic Republic's subsequent arms 
control operations. 
In a further attempt to mobilize world opinion against Iraq's chemical crimes, Iranian 
officials regularly pointed to the dire humanitarian implications of Iraq's chemical 
attacks. Stressing that it was their religious duty to expose the humanitarian 
consequences of Iraq's criminal behaviour, the representatives of the Islamic Republic 
published and distributed information about Iranian chemical fatalities as well as about 
the physical and psychological symptoms suffered by Iran's chemical casualties. Also, 
the Iranians provided opportunities for foreign observers - diplomats, journalists, and 
medical experts - to meet Iranian chemical warfare victims both in Iran and abroad. 
The argument that the credibility of international law and particularly that of the 1925 
Geneva Protocol was seriously threatened by Iraq's chemical crimes constituted a 
central theme in Iran's chemical diplomacy. The representatives of the Islamic Republic 
warned that governments' reluctance to put an end to Iraq's actions would increase the 
risk that other states, too, would start to disregard the stipulations of the Geneva 
Protocol and ignore the distinction between chemical and conventional armaments. And 
even more dangerously, the Iranians added. international inaction with respect to Iraq 
could lower the threshold for the employment of nuclear weapons in future conflicts. 
The fact that Iran's diplomatic calls continued to evoke little reaction from foreign 
governments and especially from the major powers, which viewed Iraq's chemical 
crimes as a lesser evil than the radical Iranian regime's advances on the war 
front, led 
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the Islamic Republic to declare that it was faced with an international "conspiracy of 
silence. " Iranian officials criticized above all the UN Security Council's inaction in the 
Iraq case and maintained that the council's permanent members had effectively 
encouraged the Iraqis to continue their chemical assaults. 
By the same token, Iranian authorities categorically rejected the notion linking the 
international curtailment of Iraq's use of chemical weapons to Iran's willingness to end 
the war. According to the Islamic Republic, the acceptance of such a linkage would 
signal that the use of WMD did not constitute a serious enough matter to be dealt with 
independently and that it was acceptable for states to try to extract political concessions 
through the use of WMD. The officials of the Islamic Republic accused countries like 
the Soviet Union, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States of having 
supplied and promoted Iraq's chemical weapons program and called for immediate 
international measures to stop the transfers of chemical armaments and technology to 
Iraq. Also, the Iranians asked the UN secretary-general to conduct a detailed 
investigation to determine which governments had contributed to Iraq's chemical 
weapons program. 
The Islamic Republic's criticism of the state of international chemical arms control 
extended to the Iranian argumentation on the planned international treaty to prohibit the 
development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical armaments. In the Iranian 
view, the diplomatic deliberations on the CWC were a smokescreen behind which the 
major powers kept building up their chemical weapons arsenals and tried to advance 
their military and foreign policy interests. Still, the Iranians recognized that the 
diplomatic negotiations on the treaty would furnish them with a highly valuable arena to 
pursue the Iraq issue and, consequently, used the talks first and foremost as an 
instrument in their diplomatic campaign against Iraq's chemical warfare. Thus, for 
example, the officials of the Islamic Republic argued that in order to safeguard the 
success of the planned international instrument, states needed to jointly rectify the harm 
done to international chemical disarmament by Iraq's gas warfare. 
In the early stages of the CWC talks, Iran's negotiators focused on stressing that the 
planned treaty should result in the destruction of all existing chemical weapons 
stockpiles and production facilities and that it should include an efficient verification 
mechanism. In addition, the Iranians were of the opinion that the CWC should contain a 
procedure for the collective punishment of those states that would violate the provisions 
of the treaty and further noted that the document should also include a system for 
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helping the victims of chemical warfare. Finally, the Islamic Republic's negotiators put 
forward the idea of the creation of a permanent CWC fact-finding team that could be 
mobilized at a short notice to investigate suspected cases of chemical weapons use. 
In the course of 1985, Iranian officials continued to bring details of Iraq's chemical 
attacks to international attention and to call on states to take immediate measures to stop 
Iraq's chemical warfare. The Islamic Republic accused governments of "catastrophic 
and conspiratorial indifference" to Iraq's WMD use and pointed out that the application 
of international law could not be made conditional upon a cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq 
war. The Iranians also called for the establishment of an international mechanism 
ensuring that states respect their obligations under international law and, more 
concretely, asked the UN, in the end unsuccesfully, to send a permanent expert mission 
to Tehran to investigate Iraq's use of chemical weapons. And while acknowledging the 
importance of the CWC, the officials of the Islamic Republic declared it to be 
astonishing that the same governments that were busy planning a future ban on 
chemical weapons did nothing to respond to Iraq's real-time gas warfare. 
As a result of Iraq's large-scale employment of chemical weapons during 1986, 
Iranian officials continued to use international arms control fora to meticulously report 
on Iraq's chemical attacks and their consequences. The Iranians repeated their call for 
an immediate international intervention to stop Iraq's chemical warfare, maintained that 
Iraq's attacks were fuelled by "irresponsible attitudes on the part of certain countries, " 
and emphasized that the Iraqi breaches of the Geneva Protocol seriously threatened the 
credibility of international law. 
In March 1986, the Islamic Republic managed to score a minor diplomatic victory as 
the group of specialists appointed by the UN secretary-general concluded, after a visit to 
Iran, that Iraq had used chemical weapons against Iranian troops. The Islamic 
Republic's satisfaction with the fact that Iraq had been identified as culpable of the use 
of chemical armaments increased after the UN Security Council, on 21 March, issued a 
declaration in which it finally named and strongly condemned Iraq for violating the 
Geneva Protocol. 
Still, at the end of the day, the Security Council's declaration had no impact on Iraq's 
behaviour on the battlefield. Faced with Iraq's poison gas attacks, the representatives of 
the Islamic Republic had to keep exploring diplomatic means to stop Iraq's chemical 
operations. In doing so, the Iranians called on foreign governments to put diplomatic 
pressure on Saddam Hussein and to impose a total ban on chemical exports to Iraq. The 
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Islamic Republic also renewed its demand for a UN investigation to identify the parties 
that had transferred chemical weapons and technology to Iraq as well as for the creation 
of a mechanism in which the UN secretary-general would dispatch an expert team to 
investigate Iraq's chemical weapons use whenever requested by the Iranian government. 
In addition, the Islamic Republic insisted that all states should declare chemical 
weapons use a war crime, proclaim their commitment to the Geneva Protocol and to the 
principle of non-first use of chemical weapons, and devote their diplomatic energies to 
the establishment of chemical-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world. 
The issue of Iraq continued to heavily influence Iran's argumentation on the planned 
CWC, too. As before, the representatives of the Islamic Republic noted that it was more 
important for states to defend existing international regulations dealing with chemical 
weapons than to focus on the creation of a future ban on such armaments. 
Simultaneously, however, the Iranians called on governments to speed up the CWC 
negotiations so that the chemical treaty would be in place as soon as possible. As far as 
the individual CWC-related issues discussed in the negotiations were concerned, the 
representatives of the Islamic Republic mainly focused on questions that pertained to 
treaty compliance and verification. 
During the final two years of the war, the content of Iran's chemical arms control 
operations remained essentially unchanged. In 1987, Iran's diplomatic argumentation 
was heavily influenced by Iraq's chemical attack, on 28 June, against the Iranian 
Kurdish town of Sardasht. The Islamic Republic used the Sardasht attack to point out 
that Iraq had intensified its chemical warfare both in quantitative and qualitative terms 
and that Iraq's conscious chemical targeting of civilian areas constituted the most 
worrying new aspect of its chemical operations. Outraged by the Sardasht incident, 
Iranian officials compared the Iraqi assault with the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki during World War II and maintained that the events in Sardasht had revealed, 
in a tragic manner, the international community's shameful indifference towards Iraq's 
chemical crimes. According to Iran, Iraq's attack against Sardasht was without 
precedent in the history of contemporary warfare and, in fact, the first time in the 
history of mankind that a populated town had been attacked with chemical weapons. 
In the course of 1988, Iranian leaders' concerns over Iraq's gas warfare only 
deepened. Iraq's massive use of poison gas to support its ground offensives, together 
with the Iraqi regime's threat to launch chemical missile attacks against Iranian cities 
and its use of chemical weapons against its own citizens in the Kurdish town of Halabja 
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in March 1988, prompted Iranian authorities' to intensify their arms control operations 
against Iraq's chemical warfare. Relying on the whole repertoire of their earlier 
chemical diplomacy and seeking to maximize the propaganda value of the dramatic 
events in Halabja, the officials of the Islamic Republic tried to persuade the 
international community to take preventive and punitive measures against the regime of 
Saddam Hussein. 
During the final year of the Iran-Iraq war, the Islamic Republic also intensified its 
diplomacy in the CWC talks and called for the conclusion of the negotiations at the 
earliest possible time. Just like during the earlier phases of the talks, Iranian 
representatives mainly focused on compliance- and verification-related treaty issues, in 
addition to which they maintained that due to the exceptional importance of the planned 
chemical treaty, governments should make their utmost to secure its universality. For 
the same reason, the officials of the Islamic Republic argued that states should waive, in 
the case of the CWC, their traditional right to withdraw from international agreements. 
The fact that Iran pursued its own chemical weapons program during the 1980-1988 
war suggests that apart from the effort to stop Iraq's gas warfare, Iran's chemical arms 
control operations may have had a secondary objective at the time as well, namely, that 
of legitimizing the Islamic Republic's own potential use of chemical weapons against 
Iraq. In other words, it is possible that Iran's active diplomatic reporting on Iraq's 
chemical activities and its strong criticism of the international community's indifference 
in the face of Iraq's gas warfare were partly intended for preparing the diplomatic 
ground for the Islamic Republic's own subsequent use of chemical armaments. 
It is true that the Iranians did not manage to develop a militarily significant arsenal of 
chemical weapons during the 1980-1988 war. However, when launching their chemical 
weapons program in response to Iraq's gas warfare in the early 1980s, the leaders of the 
Islamic Republic did not know how long the war would last or what ultimate role 
chemical armaments would play in the war equation. Therefore, the Iranians, who 
occasionally warned of the possibility of in-kind retaliations against Iraq's chemical 
strikes, may have concluded that they needed to take anticipatory measures to reduce 
the negative diplomatic implications that would arise should the Islamic Republic 
manage to create a chemical weapons capability matching that of Iraq's and should 
it 
decide to make use of such a capability on the battlefield. 
The issue of Iran's use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq conflict itself 
is 
controversial. Even though Iraq and some other countries - including the United 
States. 
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Israel, and Egypt - accused Iran of the use of poison gas during the war, 
9 an accusation 
that has always been categorically denied by Iranian authorities, the existing research 
literature on the subject has not confirmed the accuracy of such claims. Hiltermann 
(2007: 156), for example, argues that there is no convincing evidence that the Iranians, 
who explained their commitment to non-use of chemical weapons mainly by references 
to religious and humanitarian considerations, ever used chemical warfare agents in the 
war. And even the scholars who maintain that Iran did resort to chemical warfare during 
the 1980-1988 conflict agree that the Islamic Republic's use of poison gas was both 
rare and highly limited in scope. According to such observers, the chemical weapons 
employed by the Islamic Republic included artillery rounds and mortar shells captured 
from Iraq and probably also some Iranian-made weapons. As far as the date of Iran's 
first alleged employment of chemical warfare agents against Iraq is concerned, analysts 
provide conflicting information. Whereas some place the date at 1984 or 1985, others 
believe that Iran first resorted to the use of poison gas only in the latter phases of the 
war, that is, in 1987 or 1988. (Cordesman and Al-Rodhan 2006: 27-28; Karsh 1993: 40 
and Eisenstadt 1998: 2) 
6.2.2 The immediate post-war period 
In many respects, Iraq's use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war was a dramatic 
experience for the Islamic Republic. Iraq's chemical warfare not only caused major 
problems for Iran on the battlefield, but it also significantly contributed to the Iranian 
leadership's bitter decision to accept a cease-fire in July 1988. And even after the end of 
the war, Iraq's chemical capabilities continued to be viewed in Tehran as a pressing 
threat to Iran's national security. The thousands of Iranian war veterans still suffering 
from the health consequences of Iraq's chemical warfare acted as a constant reminder of 
the danger posed by the Iraqi capabilities. 
Following the war, then, Iran most probably continued to improve its own chemical 
weapons capabilities in order to deter future uses of such armaments against the Islamic 
Republic. But even though the authorities of the Islamic Republic felt that their country 
had been left alone in the face of Iraq's war-time WMD use and that governments, 
by 
9 Iranian Kurdish rebels have also been among those who have accused the 
Islamic Republic of chemical 
weapons use during the Iran-Iraq conflict. According to various rebel sources, 
Iran employed poison gas 
against its Kurdish insurgents in 1982,1983, and again in 1987. 
However. the validity of such claims 
remains questionable. (Hiltermann 2007: 162-16-5) 
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favouring Saddam Hussein, had sacrificed international law for political expediency, 
they did not abandon their resolute multilateral diplomacy in the area of chemical arms 
control. On the contrary, in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war, the Islamic Republic 
actively sought to neutralize the Iraqi chemical threat through diplomatic means. 
Iran's post-war arms control operations against Iraq's chemical weapons consisted of 
four elements. First of all, the Iranians continued to level criticism at governments' war- 
time indifference towards Iraq's gas warfare. The representatives of the Islamic 
Republic argued that the international inaction had fuelled Iraq's chemical attacks, 
resulted in immense humanitarian suffering, and dramatically increased the threat of 
chemical weapons to international and regional security. The Iranians also stressed that 
there were no longer any excuses left for governments not to deal with the danger posed 
by Iraq's chemical capabilities. Secondly, the officials of the Islamic Republic called on 
governments to take steps to achieve the global elimination of chemical weapons and, 
pending the completion of the CWC, implement a set of substitutive measures, such as 
mandating an impartial international study on chemical warfare in the Iran-Iraq war, 
pledging that they would not use chemical weapons under any circumstances, and 
banning transfers of chemical materials and technology for the production of chemical 
armaments. In addition, the Iranians demanded that the international community should 
develop a capacity to rapidly act upon any allegation of chemical weapons use and 
apply punitive measures against states resorting to gas warfare. 
The third element of Iran's post-war diplomatic campaign against Iraq's chemical 
weapons consisted of the Islamic Republic's argumentation in the CWC negotiations. 
Iranian officials called for the creation of a strong international instrument that would 
include an intrusive verification mechanism, be of unlimited duration, and leave no 
room for differing interpretations. The Iranians, who constantly stressed the importance 
of the planned treaty's universality, dismissed out of hand the proposal that states 
possessing chemical weapons should be allowed to retain a small part of their arsenal 
until all countries capable of producing chemical armaments would become parties to 
the CWC. In the same vein, the Islamic Republic objected to the idea that the treaty 
members in possession of chemical armaments should be given a transition period of 10 
years to destroy their weapons. The Iranians were also of the opinion that the 
destruction of the world's chemical weapons arsenals ought to be started by the 
countries with the largest stockpiles and by the states with a record of chemical 
weapons use. 
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Moreover, Iran's CWC negotiators emphasized that the convention should include a 
mechanism to punish states that resort to the use of toxic weapons as well as a 
mechanism to help the countries that are victims of chemical warfare or subject to the 
threat of chemical weapons use. In both cases, the representatives of the Islamic 
Republic pointed out, the treaty mechanisms should be activated automatically without 
any prior consultations or political calculations. After the end of the Iran-Iraq was, 
Iran's CWC negotiators also started to devote attention to article XI of the draft treaty 
which dealt with the economic and technological development of the states parties as 
well as with international cooperation in the field of non-military chemical activities. 
Reflective of the Islamic Republic's post-war reconstruction efforts, and most probably 
also of the Iranian intention to gain a better access to the technology, equipment, and 
materials needed for the production of chemical weapons, the Iranians argued that the 
planned treaty should facilitate economic and technological cooperation between 
developed and developing countries and lead to the abolishment of all controls on 
chemical transfers that have not been agreed on within the CWC framework. 
Finally, the Islamic Republic's concern over Iraq's chemical capabilities manifested 
itself in Iranian argumentation on chemical arms control in the regional context. The 
Iranians, though fully aware of the hurdles before the materialization of such a 
development, called for a broad Middle Eastern participation in the planned CWC. 
Unlike the great majority of the Arab governments, Iran did not link its participation in 
the chemical treaty with Israel's relinquishing of its nuclear weapons arsenal, and 
neither did Iran define Iraq's CWC membership as a prerequisite to its own treaty 
accession. Furthermore, the officials of the Islamic Republic argued that pending the 
completion of the CWC and Middle Eastern countries' full participation in the future 
convention, the regional states should scrupulously observe the 1925 Geneva Protocol. 
Iranian representatives also referred to the establishment of a chemical-weapon-free 
zone and, more broadly, of a zone free of all WMD in the Middle East as a solution to 
the problems caused by the region's WMD. 
As far as the Gulf sub-region was concerned, the Iranians called for regional 
consultations, under the umbrella of the UN Security Council resolution 598, on 
measures to enhance Gulf security. Yet, the officials of the Islamic Republic also 
pointed out that, at the time being, the establishment of a regional security system in the 
region was subordinate to the more urgent objective of chemical disarmament in the 
Gulf. The Iranians stressed that their own country continued to be committed to that 
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objective and maintained that although Iran had possessed all the means to produce 
chemical weapons on a large scale and to use them extensively in retaliation in the 
course of the war, it had never resorted to the use of poison gas. The officials of the 
Islamic Republic declared that Iran's post-war policy against chemical weapons was 
based on diplomacy, and especially on the planned CWC, and not on a national 
chemical weapons arsenal. 
6.2.3 From the Gulf conflict to the signing of the CWC 
As a result of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and its subsequent defeat in 
the brief war of January-February 1991 with the U. S. -led coalition forces, Iraq's 
chemical weapons ceased to be an urgent matter in Iran's arms control diplomacy. The 
creation, in April 1991, of UNSCOM to verify the post-Gulf conflict destruction of 
Iraq's chemical weapons capabilities enabled Iranian officials to place added emphasis 
on the CWC negotiations and to approach the talks from a perspective not dictated by 
the concrete Iraqi threat. Nevertheless, Iranian authorities' war-time experiences 
continued to heavily steer their approach to the planned chemical treaty. Thus, the 
Iranians sought to achieve a carefully defined convention which would lead to rapid 
disarmament of chemical weapons and oblige the member states to immediately 
respond to future cases of chemical weapons use. 
In their effort to realize this objective, which was driven above all by Iranian security 
considerations, the officials of the Islamic Republic called, in the first place, for the 
creation of a convention which would have a universal membership and whose 
provisions would not enable the states parties to reach conflicting conclusions about the 
treaty's content. Security calculations also led the Islamic Republic to express its 
dissatisfaction with article II of the draft convention which, Iranian negotiators pointed 
out, lacked a clear definition of the munitions, devices, and equipment regarded as 
chemical weapons, excluded herbicides as a means of warfare, and failed to sufficiently 
limit the employment of riot control chemical agents to domestic use only. Similarly, 
Iran expressed its dissatisfaction with articles IV and V of the draft convention because 
they allowed for the possible extension of the duration of the chemical weapons 
destruction period and the conversion of chemical weapons production facilities without 
identifying a qualitative order of destruction. 
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Furthermore, the Iranians were unhappy about the fact that under article X of the 
draft treaty, dealing with international assistance and protection against chemical 
weapons, the coordination and delivery of protection to the states parties would not take 
place automatically but would leave room for what the Iranians characterized as 
"political misuse. " The Islamic Republic's CWC negotiators referred to the lack of the 
principle of automaticity also in connection with treaty discussions that concerned the 
measures that would be taken, under article XII of the CWC, by the Conference of the 
States Parties of the OPCW to ensure compliance with the convention and to redress 
and remedy a situation that contravened the treaty's provisions. 
As before, Iran continued to support the creation of an efficient verification 
mechanism for the CWC. After the Gulf conflict, however, the Islamic Republic's 
argumentation on CWC verification became increasingly tinged with reservations. 
Iran's representatives objected to what they referred to as "excessive verification" and 
maintained that undue interference in routine chemical industry activities would reduce 
the states parties' confidence in the convention. The Iranians also insisted that the 
CWC's verification system should not be used for malicious purposes, that is, for 
exposing the. states parties' military or commercial secrets. Finally, Iranian officials 
stressed the importance of a cost-effective verification mechanism that would not 
financially burden the member states. 
The Islamic Republic's worries about undue interference in peaceful chemical 
activities was indicative of the Iranian authorities' effort to achieve a CWC which would 
also advance chemical industry activities in their country. The negotiators of the 
Islamic Republic pursued this second major Iranian CWC-related diplomatic objective 
by arguing that the future convention should in no way impede the states parties' 
economic and technological development. Instead, the Iranians argued, the states 
parties' participation in the treaty should be rewarded in the form of international aid 
and assistance in the field of peaceful chemical activities. The officials of the Islamic 
Republic also demanded that there should be no "discriminatory restrictions" on 
chemical trade and technology transfers between the member states. The Iranians 
expressly referred to the export controls of the Australia Group and called for their 
abolition once the CWC had entered into force. Just like the Islamic Republic's overall 
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argumentation on article XI of the planned treaty, this Iranian stand primarily stemmed 
from welfare considerations, from the desire to develop Iran's post-war economy. 10 
The Islamic Republic's post-Gulf conflict statements on chemical arms control in the 
regional Middle Eastern context followed a familiar Iranian line of argumentation. 
Iranian officials stressed the importance of all Middle Eastern countries' participation in 
the planned CWC and called on the international community to address the regional 
states' security concerns so that they would accede to the treaty. The Iranians argued 
that Israel constituted the biggest obstacle to Middle Eastern governments' treaty 
accession and maintained that unless Israel adhered to the NPT, put its nuclear facilities 
under full-scope IAEA safeguards, and joined the BTWC, major Arab states would not 
join the CWC. However, unlike the Arab governments, the Islamic Republic continued 
to refrain from categorically coupling the issue of Israel's nuclear weapons to regional 
chemical arms control. 
Apart from using its chemical diplomacy to pursue the objective of broad Middle 
Eastern participation in the CWC, the Iranians - who defined the CWC as a milestone 
towards a Middle Eastern WMDFZ and had an obvious security, as well as a power- 
political, interest in calling for Middle Eastern states' WMD disarmament il - argued 
that, in the aftermath of the 1990-1991 Gulf conflict, there was an urgent need for the 
Persian Gulf countries to take joint steps in the control of chemical armaments and other 
WMD. The Islamic Republic's attempts to promote chemical arms control-related 
cooperation between the regional governments were linked with the general Iranian 
effort to further security cooperation between the Gulf countries and to undermine 
foreign powers' military and political presence in the region. 
The final draft of the CWC was adopted by the CD on 3 September 1992. Iran 
delayed the treaty's adoption by linking its acceptance of the document to the issue of 
the composition of the OPCW's Executive Council, the 41-member organ responsible 
for the promotion of the execution of, and compliance with, the convention. In the 
Islamic Republic's view, the draft treaty's provisions dealing with the council's 
composition, based on the division of the member states into geographical groupings as 
10 Of course, it is possible, as discussed below, that Iran's argumentation on matters pertaining to article 
Xl of the CWC also stemmed from security considerations, namely, from the Islamic Republic's attempt 
to use the CWC as a tool to promote its chemical ii capons program. 
'' Iranian officials themselves like to point out that thanks to their country's geography, vast natural 
resources, and large population, Iran's security would generally benefit from a Middle Eastern military 
scene without WMD (author's interviews with Iranian arms control officials [C] and [D] who wish to 
remain unidentified, summer 2002). 
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well as on the principle of rotating membership, discriminated against states like Iran 
that belonged to the group of Asian countries with a large membership. 
The Islamic Republic's concern over its chances to influence the work of the 
Executive Council also explained why Iranian negotiators objected to the treaty 
provision stating that four of the Asian group countries chosen to the council should be 
states parties with the most significant national chemical industry in the region. 
According to the Iranians, the application of such a criterion would create a 
discriminatory system of priviledged or quasi-permanent seats in the council. In the end, 
however, the Islamic Republic agreed to the existing treaty provisions on the Executive 
Council, but only on the condition that the issue would be discussed again in the future. 
As one of the original signatories of the CWC, Iran signed the treaty on 13 January 
1993. 
6.2.4 The implementation of the CWC 
After the completion of the CWC, hailed by the Iranians as a major diplomatic 
achievement, the Islamic Republic's chemical arms control operations focused, first of 
all, on pursuing changes in what Iranian authorities viewed as the deficiencies of the 
CWC treaty text. There were a number of issues that were raised by the Islamic 
Republic's representatives in this context. For example, the Iranians used international 
arms control fora to express their worry that the expenses resulting from CWC 
verification would be transferred into the prices of chemical industry products and 
thereby increase the costs of developing countries' chemical imports. Similarly, the 
officials of the Islamic Republic voiced their concern over the OPCW's financial ability 
to help, under article X of the CWC, the member states to protect themselves against 
chemical weapons. 
These Iranian economic and security concerns aside, Iran's representatives, hoping to 
secure their country's participation in the work of the OPCW's Executive Council, 
continued to criticize and demand a change in the "unbalanced and discriminatory" way 
in which the council's members were chosen. In addition to pointing out that it was 
comparatively harder for the Asian states parties to obtain a seat in the council, the 
Iranians objected to the industry principle which provided a priviledged status to the 
member states with major chemical industries. In the Iranian view, it was the countries 
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whose security depended on the CWC that needed an ensured representation in the 
council. 
Iran also continued to call for a detailed definition of what constituted a chemical 
weapon under article II of the treaty. The Iranians' diplomatic activity in the matter was 
motivated, on the one hand, by the concern that a vague definition would open up the 
possibility of CWC inspections being used to obtain information about the member 
states' military secrets. On the other hand, Iran sought to ensure that its post-Iran-Iraq 
war missile programs would not be challenged by the claim that the existence of Iranian 
conventional missiles that possessed a technical capability to carry chemical payloads 
automatically violated article II of the CWC. 
Moreover, Iranian representatives were active in discussing matters pertaining to the 
implementation of article XI of the CWC. The Islamic Republic made strong calls for 
the abolition of the export controls of the Australia Group upon the entry into the force 
of the CWC by arguing that those controls violated the spirit and stipulations of the 
chemical treaty and seriously hampered economic, technological, and scientific 
development in the Third World. Iranian officials warned that the policies of the AG not 
only discouraged developing countries to sign the CWC, but also reduced the readiness 
of some CWC signatories to ratify the convention. In addition to implying that their 
own country's ratification of the CWC was dependent on the fate of the AG restrictions, 
the Iranians maintained that the members of the group had in fact agreed to do away 
with their export controls during the CWC negotiations. It was this agreement, the 
Iranians stressed, that had made the completion of the convention possible in the first 
place. 
Furthermore, the Islamic Republic argued that because the CWC obliged developed 
states to promote economic, scientific, and technological cooperation with developing 
countries, they should accept binding commitments to transfer chemical materials and 
technology, together with relevant scientific information, to the Third World. Iranian 
officials added that such transfers should be accompanied with financial and technical 
assistance to those member states of the CWC that were experiencing problems with the 
convention's practical implementation. 
Seeking to present a solution to the controversy over AG export controls, the Islamic 
Republic proposed that the matter ought to be settled among the CWC states parties. 
Iran called for the establishment of an international arrangement under the convention to 
debate matters that pertained to the transfer of chemical materials, equipment, and 
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scientific information, and to the proliferation of chemical armaments. According to the 
Iranians, the proposed arrangement should guarantee that all CWC member states have 
an equal access to chemical imports. On the other hand, the officials of the Islamic 
Republic said that the states parties could agree on the application of export controls 
among themselves. However, such restrictions, the Iranians added, should apply only to 
states that were not members of the CWC. In the Iranian view, the comprehensive 
verification mechanism outlined in the CWC was effective enough to ensure that the 
states parties would respect their treaty obligations. 
The Islamic Republic's argumentation on article XI testified to Iran's effort to use the 
treaty to gain a better access to chemical imports and thereby to improve its chemical 
industry capabilities. In addition to the peaceful economic motive, the Islamic 
Republic's arms control operations with regard to article XI may have had a military 
objective as well. The Iranians may have viewed the CWC as a means to procure 
chemical materials, equipment, and technology for their chemical weapons program. 12 
While it is difficult to imagine that Iran would have unilaterally destructed its chemical 
weapons capabilities before the 1990-1991 Gulf conflict and even prior to the 
conclusion of the CWC, 13 the information in the research literature about the Islamic 
Republic's post-CWC activities in the field of chemical armaments is scarce, highly 
speculative, and almost exclusively based on U. S. intelligence reports. 
According to the data suggesting that Iran was trying to conceal an active chemical 
weapons program in the 1990s, the Islamic Republic possessed a large undeclared 
stockpile of chemical armaments - in the form of chemical-filled artillery shells, bombs, 
and possibly ballistic missile warheads - and a substantial capability to produce such 
weapons. Iran is believed to have resolutely sought to improve its chemical weapons 
capability, both quantitatively and qualitatively, through the acquisition of technical 
knowledge, precursor chemicals, and process equipment from foreign suppliers. 
Throughout the 1990s, China reportedly acted as Iran's principal source of chemical 
12 At the time, Iran observers often referred to the following statement made to a group of Iranian soldiers 
by president Rafsanjani in October 1988 as evidence of the Islamic Republic's interest in chemical 
weapons and other WMD: "We should fully equip ourselves with both in the offensive and defensive use 
of chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons. From now on you should make use of the 
opportunity and perform this task" (cited in Spector 1993: 143). 
1; It is reminded here that Iran admitted - in its classified declarations to the 
OPCW in November 1998 - 
to having pursued a chemical weapons program during the "last years" of the Iran-Iraq war. According to 
Iranian officials. their country terminated its program soon after the end of the war. 
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precursors and weapons production technology. The chemical warfare agents in Iran's 
possession reportedly consisted of blister, choking, blood, and possibly nerve agents. '4 
Whatever the actual nature and content of the Islamic Republic's post-CWC chemical 
activities, 15 the Iranians themselves categorically denied any interest in pursuing 
chemical weapons. Claiming that religious and humanitarian considerations prevented 
Iran from producing chemical weapons, the officials of the Islamic Republic also 
warned that baseless accusations against countries that strongly supported international 
arms control instruments could reduce those states' willingness to ratify the CWC. 
As far as regional chemical arms control was concerned, Iranian officials, driven by 
security and power calculations, kept advocating the objective of comprehensive 
chemical arms control in the Middle East. As before, the Islamic Republic's diplomatic 
argumentation focused on Israel and named that country's policies, together with its 
WMD arsenal and especially its nuclear weapons, as the main obstacle to the 
materialization of the Iranian objective. Although it was not only Israel's WMD but the 
Arab WMD capabilities, too, that were the real target of Iran's chemical arms control 
operations, the Iranians concentrated on Israel because they believed that such an 
approach would bring them additional foreign policy benefits in the short run. For one 
thing, the Islamic Republic's criticism of Israel and its foreign allies were part of the 
Iranian effort to sustain its ideological credentials and to gain prestige in the Arab 
world, particularly among the Arab populations. For another thing, the Iranians hoped 
that their definition of Israel and its WMD as the common threat to the interests of the 
Islamic world would deflect Arab fears over the Islamic Republic's WMD intentions 
and also undermine the U. S. -led post-Gulf conflict efforts to achieve an Arab-Israeli 
peace and to create a new political order in the Middle East. 
As for the Persian Gulf sub-region, the Iranians continued to try to promote chemical 
arms control-related cooperation between the Gulf states and raised specifically the 
14 This paragraph relies on Binder (2008); Cordesman and Al-Rodhan (2006); Carus (2000); Jane's 
Sentinel (1999) and Eisenstadt (1998). 
15 Of course, based on the existing information available to analysts, the possibility that Iran, as 
subsequently alleged by the authorities of the Islamic Republic, destroyed its chemical weapons 
capabilities after the end of the Iran-Iraq war cannot be completely ruled out. Similarly, it is possible that, 
instead of an active weapons program. Iran merely sought to retain, under the terms of the CWC, a 
breakout capacity within its chemical industry to produce chemical warfare agents in the case of an 
emergency. It should be stressed here that the analysis of the Islamic Republic's WMD activities is 
beyond the scope of this study. By referring to existing research data on Iran's activities in the area of 
WMD, the present work only suggests that the Islamic Republic has probably used arms control 
diplomacy for protecting and advancing its WMD programs -a possibility which is privately 
acknowledged by Iranian arms control diplomats themselves (author's interview with an Iranian arms 
control official (C) who wishes to remain unidentified, summer 2002). 
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possibility of joint regional measures in the implementation and ratification of the 
CWC. In order to advance the Islamic Republic's security and power interests in the 
Gulf, Iranian officials also put forward the idea of gradual development of joint steps in 
the area of verification with the help of the UN. Iran's argumentation on regional 
chemical arms control, both in the Gulf and the broader Middle Eastern context, was 
accompanied with calls for the creation of a regional or sub-regional WMDFZ. 
6.2.5 The ratification of the CWC and beyond 
Iran's ratification of the CWC took place in July 1997. Although the ratification was 
a logical culmination of years of Iranian diplomacy against chemical weapons, there 
were forces within the Islamic Republic's political elite that objected to Iran's accession 
to the convention. According to the opponents of Iran's treaty membership, the CWC 
set dangerous limits on the Islamic Republic's military freedom of action. Arguing that 
Iran was surrounded by regional powers that were pursuing WMD capabilities, pointing 
to the dangers posed to their country by the major powers' WMD, and questioning the 
chemical convention's value in crisis situations, the Iranian opponents of the CWC 
concluded that the treaty would not serve the interests of the Islamic Republic. 
Yet, it was the Iranian elite members who considered the treaty a beneficial 
instrument whose views were decisive in Iranian deliberations on CWC ratification. In 
Iranian CWC supporters' opinion, by prohibiting the production, stockpiling, and use of 
one category of WMD and by creating a mechanism to help the victims of chemical 
warfare, the treaty would bring major security benefits to the Islamic Republic. And in 
the end, Iranian supporters of the CWC argued, their country had no real alternative to 
CWC accession. In the first place, chemical weapons and other WMD were inhumane, 
against the laws of Islam, and thereby contrary to the religious convictions of the 
Iranian people. Secondly, the supporters of the CWC maintained, Iran's possession of 
chemical weapons and other WMD would make the country vulnerable to other states' 
military attacks as well as to international sanctions. Thirdly, by staying outside the 
CWC, Iran would lose an access to highly needed chemical imports and to the rights 
granted to the states parties under article XI of the treaty. Finally, Iranian supporters of 
the CWC pointed out that the Islamic Republic's treaty accession would help 
it to 
improve its international image by sending a strong signal to foreign governments that 
Iran was not pursuing chemical weapons. 
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According to the officials of the Islamic Republic, there were a number of reasons 
why it took nearly five years for Iran to ratify the CWC. These included the bureaucratic 
workload, the need to convince the sceptics within the Iranian elite of the treaty's 
benefits, as well as the fate of the United States' and Russia's national ratifications. 
However, it seems that, before all else, the Islamic Republic delayed its treaty 
ratification in order to use the issue as a trump card in its CWC diplomacy. The same 
motive most probably steered the Islamic Republic's behaviour in the context of its 
actual ratification decision, too. In its attempt to increase its influence in C WC-related 
diplomatic deliberations, Iran tried to create the perception that it could withdraw from 
the CWC should its concerns over the treaty and its implementation be ignored in the 
future. 
The main tool used by the authorities of the Islamic Republic to achieve this 
objective was the Iranian parliament's declaration which was attached to Iran's CWC 
ratification instrument and which listed the conditions under which the Islamic Republic 
would reserve itself the right to withdraw, under article XVI of the CWC, from the 
convention. In the Majlis declaration, the Islamic Republic made it known that it would 
consider withdrawal from the treaty if the principle of equal treatment of all the states 
parties in the implementation of the convention would be violated, if confidential 
information provided to the OPCW would be disclosed contrary to the provisions of the 
CWC, and if restrictions incompatible with the obligations under the convention would 
be imposed upon the states parties. ' 6 
After depositing its CWC ratification instrument in November 1997, Iran was 
obliged, under article III of the CWC, to submit, within two months, its so-called initial 
declarations to the OPWC. And yet, the Iranian submission did not take place until 
November 1998. While the Iranians mainly argued that the delay had resulted from 
bureaucratic difficulties, it seems that the Islamic Republic wanted to use the issue as a 
way to signal its dissatisfaction with the CWC's implementation. It may also be that the 
delay was caused by intra-elite arm-wrestling over the content of the Iranian 
declarations. 17 
16 It should be noted here that apart from acting as a tool to strengthen Iran's diplomatic hand in 
international talks on chemical arms control, the Iranian parliament's CWC declaration could - 
theoretically at least - also serve as a legal escape hatch for the Iranians in case it would be established or 
Iranian authorities themselves would declare - for one reason or another - to be in possession of chemical 
armaments. 
1' Note in this connection, for example, the following oft-quoted comment - reported in the Iranian press 
in April 1998 and cited in Byman et al. (2001: 96-97) - made by the commander of the IRGC who 
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Whatever the case, Iran admitted in its classified declarations that it had pursued a 
chemical weapons program during the "last years" of the Iran-Iraq war. According to 
Iranian authorities, their country had possessed two chemical weapons production 
facilities which had provided Iranian armed forces with a "strictly limited" chemical 
weapons capability. The Iranians maintained that even though Iraq's readiness to 
escalate its chemical warfare to major Iranian population centers, together with the 
international community's disinterest in Iraq's war-time chemical weapons use, had 
forced the Islamic Republic to launch a chemical weapons program, their country had 
never actually used such armaments. The Iranians added that given that their country 
had never resorted to chemical warfare, it had been easy for them to give up the 
chemical weapons option soon after the Iran-Iraq war had ended. Although Iranian 
authorities did not, publicly at least, elaborate on when, where, and how they had 
destroyed the chemical weapons developed in the war period, they did officially declare 
to the OPCW, in November 1998, that Iran no longer was in possession of chemical 
armaments. 
The OPCW's first inspection mission in the Islamic Republic was completed in 
February 1999. During the visit, which led the OPCW to conclude that Iran was in full 
compliance with its CWC obligations, Iran had destroyed its declared chemical 
weapons production plants in the presence of the inspectors, even though under article 
V of the CWC, it would have had ten years after the convention's entry into force to 
destroy the facilities. The officials of the Islamic Republic maintained that their country 
had made this gesture of good will in order to underscore its commitment to the CWC 
and to a policy of transparency. 
The content of Iran's initial declarations and the Islamic Republic's actions during 
the OPCW's initial inspection suggest that they were part of an Iranian effort to 
convince the international community that, in spite of persistent claims to the contrary, 
the Islamic Republic did not possess chemical weapons. Iranian authorities categorically 
denied the validity of such claims and maintained, as they had done in their initial 
declarations to the OPCW, that their country had decided not to seek or produce 
chemical weapons in the future. As evidence of their country's peaceful intentions, the 
Iranians referred to the Islamic Republic's active chemical arms control diplomacy, to 
himself gave a negative answer to the question he posed: "Is it possible to save the 
Islamic Republic from 
threat of the U. S. and international Zionism by concluding agreements 
for prohibiting chemical and 
nuclear weapons and international conventions? " 
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its declaration of past possession of chemical weapons, as well as to the destruction of 
its chemical weapons production facilities far before the deadline set in the CWC and in 
the presence of international inspectors. 
The question whether Iran's chemical arms control operations in this context were 
indicative of an attempt to reduce the security and economic costs resulting from the 
suspicions that the Islamic Republic had a chemical weapons program or actually of a 
conscious effort to cover an on-going chemical weapons program remains 
controversial. 18 The observers believing that the latter was the case refer to information 
according which Iran continued to seek foreign imports of chemical materials, expertise, 
and weapons production technology in order to create a more advanced and a self- 
sufficient chemical warfare infrastructure. 19 As before, most of the information 
incriminating the Islamic Republic is based on U. S. intelligence sources, even if the 
intelligence agencies of some other Western countries, such as Germany and the United 
Kingdom, have agreed with the U. S. conclusions. 20 
The efforts by the Iranian government, now led by the reformist president 
Muhammad Khatami, to convince the world of the Islamic Republic's commitment to 
the CWC consisted of traditional references to the Iranian stance that chemical weapons 
and other WMD were immoral and against Islamic law as well as of the Khatami 
administration's allusions to the notion of "global security networking. " According to 
Iranian representatives, diplomatic cooperation based on that principle would pave the 
way for the adoption of a new, cooperative paradigm in international relations and 
thereby eliminate the need for chemical armaments and other WMD. 
Moreover, the Iranian government pointed out that it would have nothing to hide 
should a CWC member state decide to launch a CWC challenge inspection against their 
country. On the contrary, Iranian authorities said, they would welcome any OPCW 
inspector to the Islamic Republic. At the same time, however, the Iranians stressed that 
the fact that no country had theretofore resorted to the CWC's challenge mechanism 
illustrated, in its own right, that those accusing Iran of WMD development had nothing 
to base their allegations on. Similarly, the Khatami government found it very unlikely 
18 It is obviously also possible that the Iranians were pursuing the two objectives simultaneously. 
19 For data suggesting that Iran continued to pursue a chemical weapons program, see Eisenstadt (1998: 
1-3 and 2001: 22) and Cordesman and Al-Rodhan (2006: 29-30,32-36,38). 
20 Of course, the validity of Western intelligence information cannot be verified by scholars who rely on 
open sources. It should be noted here that, since 2003, the United States has reduced the scope and 
certainty of its claims regarding Iran's chemical weapons program. In addition, 
U. S. officials have made 
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that the governments accusing Iran of chemical weapons possession would initiate a 
challenge process against it because such a process would deprive those governments of 
the opportunity to make "baseless and politically motivated allegations" against the 
Islamic Republic. 
Generally, the Islamic Republic was of the view that the chemical treaty's challenge 
mechanism of the CWC should be used with utmost diplomatic care, that is, only when 
all other means offered by the CWC to alleviate non-compliance concerns had been 
utilized and only in the context of cases that posed a major threat to the convention's 
objectives. With this in mind, the Khatami administration responded, in the course of 
2001-2002, to U. S. and British requests of clarification on the content of the Islamic 
Republic's chemical activities. Both governments held the Iranian clarifications 
insufficient. 
Apart from seeking to refute the allegations that it had a chemical weapons program, 
the Khatami government's chemical arms control diplomacy focused on the issue of 
chemical arms control in the Middle East, on the application of article XI of the CWC, 
and on the role and future of the OPCW. As far as chemical arms control in the Middle 
East was concerned, the Iranians continued to promote the objective of comprehensive 
chemical arms control in the region and to refer to Israel's nuclear weapons as the 
biggest obstacle to the materialization of the Iranian objective. Sympathizing with the 
Arab position that made a strong linkage between chemical and nuclear disarmament in 
the Middle East, the officials of the Islamic Republic accused Western powers and 
especially the United States of a policy of double standard in the region and called on 
the major powers to pressure Israel to join the NPT and to stop its WMD programs. 
As before, however, the Islamic Republic did not consider the nuclear and chemical 
issues inseparably interlinked. The Khatami administration maintained that the 
objective of a WMD-free Middle East could be pursued through the division of the 
regional WMD problem into smaller separate issues dealt with independently. The 
Khatami government's suggestion that the major powers should give security 
guarantees to those Middle Eastern states whose threat perceptions kept them from 
acceding to the CWC was another manifestation of the Iranian approach calling for 
partial measures to deal with the region's WMD. 
fewer allusions to the existence of such a program. The ultimate reasons for the changes in the U. S. 
estimates are not known. (Binder 2008) 
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Due to the fact that all GCC states had acceded to the CWC in the time period 
between February 1995 and November 2000, Iran no longer paid much attention to the 
issue of chemical arms control in the context of Iranian-GCC relations. Instead, the 
officials of the Islamic Republic concentrated on promoting confidence-building 
measures between their country and its Gulf Arab neighbours. The Khatami 
administration's CBM openings in the Gulf, together with its criticism of Western 
military presence in the region, were aimed at opening the path for the realization of 
more ambitious Iranian objectives, such as the creation of a WMDFZ or an indigenous 
security system in the Persian Gulf. 
If the issue of chemical arms control was losing urgency in the Iranian-GCC context, 
the opposite was the case when it came to Iraq. The diplomatic crisis that erupted 
between Baghdad and the international community in 1998 over UNSCOM arms 
inspections in Iraq fuelled concerns in Tehran over Saddam Hussein's WMD 
aspirations. Resultantly, Iranian representatives, determined to prevent the resurgence of 
the Iraqi chemical threat, used international diplomatic fora to stress the importance of 
continued implementation of the relevant Iraq-related resolutions of the UN Security 
Council and the complete elimination of Iraq's WMD capabilities. Worried about the 
standstill in weapons inspection activities in Iraq, the officials of the Islamic Republic 
also gave their full support for UNMOVIC, the successor body of UNSCOM created in 
February 1999, to continue the UN-mandated inspections in Iraq. Finally, the 
international diplomatic debate on Iraq's WMD intentions sparked renewed Iranian 
criticism of foreign governments' inaction with regard to Iraq's employment of 
chemical armaments during the Iran-Iraq conflict. The Islamic Republic's historical 
grievances over Iraq's chemical warfare notwithstanding, the criticism levelled by the 
Iranians was a diplomatic means to keep Iraq's WMD ambitions in the diplomatic 
limelight and under international control. 
Following the Iranian ratification of the CWC in July 1997, Iran's discontent with 
international implementation of article XI of the treaty became the dominant hallmark 
of its chemical arms control operations. The Islamic Republic, often together with other 
developing countries, continued to express its strong disapproval of the AG export 
restrictions and aimed for the removal of extra-CWC export controls. According to 
Iranian officials - whose actions in this context were 
driven by economic, ideological, 
and possibly also by military considerations - the provisions of article 
XI were as 
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important as those of article I of the CWC prohibiting the states parties from 
developing, producing, possessing, using, or transferring chemical armaments. 
Iranian representatives maintained that the CWC provided the states parties with the 
necessary - and the only legitimate - means to address non-compliance concerns and 
claimed that the narrow implementation of article XI increased the risk that some 
member states would start to overlook their treaty obligations and that non-members 
would decide to permanently reject the convention. Seeking to further strengthen their 
diplomatic hand, the officials of the Islamic Republic pointed specifically to their own 
country and warned that the problems with the execution of article XI bolstered the 
position of those members of the Iranian political elite who wanted to see their country 
withdraw from the CWC. 
Iran's efforts to break the impass in the diplomatic debate on article XI included the 
May 2001 initiative in which the Iranians called for the creation of an international 
cooperation committee that would represent the interests of all CWC member states and 
facilitate the implementation of article XI. The fact that the Iranian initiative was 
rejected by the members of the AG did not discourage the Iranians from further steps in 
the issue export controls, for the Khatami administration subsequently signalled that the 
Islamic Republic would be ready to accept the existence of the group and its export 
restrictions if they were exclusively targeted at CWC non-members. 
Following Iran's ratification of the CWC and the entry into force of the treaty in 
1997, the officials of the Islamic Republic, concerned over their country's future 
influence in international deliberations on chemical arms control, also sought to prevent 
the weakening of the role of the OPCW as the central actor in international chemical 
arms control diplomacy. Accordingly, the Islamic Republic, a member of the OPCW's 
Executive Council since May 1998, accused the United States of using financial and 
diplomatic means to control the organization and strongly objected to the OPCW 
diplomacy of the U. S. administration of president George W. Bush. Iran's opposition to 
U. S. policies manifested itself, among others, in the so-called Bustani affair, the 
diplomatic chain of events initiated by the Bush government which led to the dismissal 
of Jose Mauricio Bustani, the first director-general of the OPCW, in April 2002. 
In the view of Iranian representatives, who lent their support to Bustani in the 
process, the United States' diplomatic campaign against the OPCW's director-general 
testified to a hostile American attitude towards international arms control as well as to a 
dangerous U. S. policy of unilateralism. In essence, the officials of the Islamic Republic 
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argued, the United States' diplomatic campaign violated the CWC, which stressed the 
independent nature of the OPCW director-general's position, and the international 
character of his responsibilities. Moreover, the Iranians - whose practical contribution 
to the OPCW's work mostly revolved around issues dealing with assistance and 
protection against chemical weapons - added that by sidelining the relevant organs of 
the OPCW in the Bustani affair, the United States had breached the rule of law and 
violated the diplomatic principles of transparency and equality between the CWC states 
parties. 
6.3 Biological Arms Control: Objectives, Actions, and Means 
6.3.1 From the revolution to the cease-fire 
Prior to the onset of the Iran-Iraq war in September 1980, the objective of the Islamic 
Republic's biological arms control operations was to maintain continuity in Iranian 
diplomacy in the aftermath of the 1979 revolution. As the post-revolutionary Iranian 
government did not decide to withdraw Iran's membership in the BTWC, which had 
been ratified by the Majlis in August 1973, the officials of the Islamic Republic - many 
of whom were remnants from the Shah's administration and whose main consideration, 
in terms of policy, was to manage the transition from one Iranian regime to another and 
thereby sustain Iran's position and influence in a specific area of arms control 
diplomacy - founded their biological arms control operations on the guidelines set 
during the Shah era and took part in the BTWC's first review conference in March 
1980. 
At the conference, Iran supported the diplomatic efforts, led by Sweden, to create a 
permanent BTWC consultative committee to carry out fact-finding missions whenever a 
suspicion of a treaty violation would arise. The purpose of the committee initiative was 
to undermine the power bestowed on the permanent members of the UN Security 
Council by the BTWC to determine whether a non-compliance concern would be 
addressed or not. Apart from supporting the ultimately unsuccessful Swedish proposal, 
Iran called on the treaty members to implement the provisions of the preamble and 
article IX of the BTWC which obliged them to negotiate in good faith to complete a 
chemical weapons convention. Finally, the Iranians, who called for measures that would 
contribute to the universality of the BTWC. were of the opinion that the members of the 
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treaty should hold review conferences at regular intervals or as required in order to 
review the functioning of the convention and to keep it up to date with changing 
conditions. 
Following Iraq's invasion of Iran and the start of Iraq's chemical warfare, the nature 
of the Islamic Republic's biological arms control operations changed. The reactive post- 
revolutionary diplomacy found a new purpose and focused on supporting Iran's efforts 
to stop Iraq 's use of chemical weapons. On the one hand, Iranian officials, guided by 
Iran's immediate security needs, used Iraq's employment of chemical weapons as an 
argumentative launching pad for the extended claim - retracted after the war by the 
authorities of the Islamic Republic - that Iraq employed biological warfare agents in the 
war as well. On the other hand, the Iranians used the BTWC and the multilateral 
diplomatic debates on the treaty to draw international attention to Iraq's chemical 
warfare. 
Thus, for example, the Islamic Republic's argumentation at the second review 
conference of the BTWC in September 1986 almost totally concentrated on Iraq's use 
of chemical weapons. Iranian representatives stressed that Iraq's chemical warfare 
violated the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the BTWC - which, in its preamble and 
article VIII, emphasizes the significance of the principles and objectives of the protocol 
and calls on all states to comply with them - and called for the creation of an 
international mechanism that would ensure that states respect their obligations under the 
Geneva Protocol. Noting that the international community's indifference towards Iraq's 
chemical crimes only encouraged the Iraqis to continue their WMD use, the officials of 
the Islamic Republic called on governments to pressure Iraq to stop its chemical attacks 
and to ban the export of chemical materials and technology to that country. Moreover, 
the Iranians insisted that the conference participants should declare the use of chemical 
armaments a war crime. 
Although the review conference ultimately refrained from taking the Iraq-related 
measures called for by the officials of the Islamic Republic, the Iranians continued, 
during the rest of the war period, to use international meetings dealing with biological 
arms control as a venue to discuss Iraq's continuing chemical warfare. Above all, the 
Iranians, who called on all states to join the BTWC without delay, warned that 
international inaction vis-a-vis Iraq's chemical attacks could irreparably undermine the 
credibility of the Geneva Protocol and increase the risk that states would start to use 
biological warfare agents as well. 
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6.3.2 From the cease-fire to the Ad Hoc Group negotiations 
The Iran-Iraq war continued to have a major influence on the Islamic Republic's 
biological arms control operations even after the hostilities between the two countries 
had ended in the summer of 1988. The war experience, together with Iran's post-war 
concern that Iraq had developed and stockpiled significant amounts of chemical and 
biological armaments, prompted the Islamic Republic to devote more attention to the 
issue of biological weapons. However, the focus of Iran's biological arms control 
operations changed after Iraq's defeat in the January-February 1991 war with the U. S. - 
led coalition forces. The disappearance of the immediate Iraqi threat and the post-Gulf 
conflict weapons inspections of UNSCOM - which confirmed that Iraq had been 
capable of researching, producing, testing, and storing biological warfare agents - 
enabled Iran to adopt an active general diplomatic course in the area of biological arms 
control and to support the efforts by the international community to improve the 
BTWC. As a result, Iran's participation in the debate on the strengthening of the treaty 
came to dominate the content of the Islamic Republic's biological arms control 
operations during the Rafsanjani and Khatami presidencies. 
Iran formulated and presented the central elements of its invigorated approach to 
biological arms control in the course of the time period between the September 1991 
review conference of the BTWC and the establishment, in September 1994, of the 
BTWC Ad Hoc Group which was mandated by the states parties to "consider 
appropriate measures, including possible verification measures, and draft proposals to 
strengthen the Convention, to be included, as appropriate, in a legally binding 
instrument. "21 While the Iranian government recognized the security benefits of a 
BTWC verification system and basically backed the multilateral diplomatic efforts to 
create such an instrument, it specifically tried to achieve a cost-effective verification 
mechanism that could not be used as a tool to uncover Iranian military secrets or to 
hamper Iran's peaceful biological activities. 
Accordingly, Iranian officials regularly pointed out that the BTWC's verification 
system should not undermine the states parties' national security. Fearing that 
verification activities could be used as a cover for espionage, the Iranians called 
for the 
21 During this time period, Iran's biological arms control operations 
included active participation in the 
work of the 1991 BTWC review conference, in the 1992-1993 
VEREX process, as well as in the work of 
the BTWC special conference of September 1994. 
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creation of a non-intrusive inspection system - relying on non-intrusive verification 
methods - that would concentrate on verifying compliance rather than on looking for 
treaty violators. With security considerations in mind, the representatives of the Islamic 
Republic also alluded to the importance of the verification activities' objectivity and 
maintained that international responses to individual violations of the BTWC should 
vary according to the severity of the violations in question. 
Welfare considerations constituted the second main factor that guided Iran's 
argumentation on BTWC verification. For one thing, Iranian officials stressed that the 
verification arrangement should not interfere with the states parties' legitimate 
biological activities and jeopardize their commercial secrets. For another thing, the 
Iranians were worried about the direct financial costs resulting from the running of the 
verification system and also feared that in order to compensate for the costs stemming 
from BTWC verification, developed countries' biological industries might increase the 
prices of their exports to the developing world. As a consequence, the Islamic Republic 
called for the creation of a cost-effective verification mechanism for the BTWC and 
argued that there was no need for the creation of an international verification agency for 
the treaty. The Iranians noted that the verification responsibilities under the BTWC 
could be assumed by an already existing international body, such as the World Health 
Organization. 
The Islamic Republic's attempts to improve international implementation of article X 
of the BTWC constituted an another central objective in Iran's biological arms control 
operations. The Islamic Republic used international arms control fora to point out - 
both independently and together with other developing countries - that the diplomatic 
efforts to create a verification system for the BTWC should go hand in hand with full 
and comprehensive implementation of article X of the convention. The officials of the 
Islamic Republic - trying to defend their country's economic interests, maintain their 
ideological credentials, and possibly also to get an access to imports and expertise 
needed for an Iranian biological weapons program - strongly objected to the application 
of exports controls - and particularly of those of the AG which 
included biological 
agents and manufacturing equipment in its control list in June 1993 - against the states 
parties and said that the only export controls their country would accept would be the 
ones jointly agreed upon by the states parties and exclusively targeted against non- 
members of the BTWC. Moreover, the Iranians warned that unlike in earlier 
international arms control treaty negotiations, such as those of the CWC. developing 
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countries would no longer support developed states' verification plans unless they were 
assured that the creation of the BTWC verification system would result in the 
elimination of all restrictions on the transfers, for peaceful purposes, of biological 
materials, equipment, and scientific and technological information. 
While calling for the abolition of extra-BTWC export controls, the Islamic Republic 
also called on developed countries to facilitate and accelerate biological transfers to the 
Third World. Iranian representatives pointed out that the medical, agricultural, and 
environmental problems suffered by developing countries not only seriously 
undermined Third World countries' economic development and their domestic stability, 
but posed an indirect threat to the developed world's security as well. According to the 
Iranians, the access to biological transfers was a central incentive for Third World 
countries to accede to the BTWC and to comply with their obligations under the treaty. 
Other BTWC-related issues regularly raised by the officials of the Islamic Republic 
prior to the beginning of the AHG negotiations included the fact that the convention did 
not contain an explicit prohibition on the use of biological weapons. Iran maintained 
that the lack of such a prohibition, together with the retaliation reservations made to the 
1925 Geneva Protocol by parties to that document, created a dangerous legal loophole 
that could be exploited by governments to support the claim that biological warfare was 
not illegal under international law. In their security-motivated effort to correct the legal 
ambiguity surrounding the issue of biological weapons use, and speaking of the 
existence of a "serious potential danger to international peace and security, " Iranian 
representatives asked BTWC states parties to find a way to fix the problem. In addition, 
the Iranians called on all non-members of the Geneva Protocol to immediately join that 
instrument without reservations and on all countries that still retained protocol 
reservations which did not exclude the possiblity of in-kind retaliation to cancel such 
reservations. 
Security concerns also explained the Islamic Republic's efforts to improve the 
assistance clauses of the BTWC. Iran's representatives expressed their dissatisfaction 
with the fact that article VII of the BTWC did not lay out concrete mechanisms for the 
provision of international assistance to victims of biological warfare. The Iranians 
proposed that the UN and its specialized agencies could assume the responsibility to 
devise such mechanisms and also put forward the idea of the creation of an international 
fund for the financing of article VII-related activities. Moreover. Iran was of the opinion 
that the UN should develop a capability to automatically dispatch - that is, without the 
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express authorization of the UN Security Council, as prescribed in article VII of the 
BTWC -a fact-finding team to investigate suspected cases of biological weapons use. 
Finally, the Iranians called on BTWC member states to create an assistance mechanism 
that would be activated whenever a member state would become a victim of biological 
warfare. 
As far as the BTWC confidence-building mechanism - launched at the second 
BTWC review conference and extended at the third review conference - was concerned, 
the Iranians, cautiously supporting mechanism, tried to use it to obtain information 
about other states' biological capabilities. Thus, recognizing that transparency - in the 
form of exchange of scientific and medical data and information about past military- 
related biological activities - between the member states would strengthen the BTWC 
and furnish Iran with a new source of information - and consequently advance Iran's 
security interests - the representatives of the Islamic Republic called on governments 
not only to partake in BTWC-related data exchange, but also to formulate detailed legal 
definitions for the terms "microbial or other biological agents, " "toxins, " and "peaceful 
purposes" mentioned in article I of the BTWC. 
According to the Iranians, the terms needed to be precisely defined so that the BTWC 
states parties' responsibilities under the treaty could be widened to include the 
obligation to declare what biological and toxin agents they possessed in their territory or 
under their control or jurisdiction and to disclose the total quantities of the agents in 
national possession and the purposes the agents were serving. At the same time, 
however, the Iranians themselves - perhaps because of their attempt, 
driven primarily 
by the concern over Iraq's WMD capabilities, to maintain ambiguity about the nature of 
the Islamic Republic's own biological activities - had not theretofore taken part 
in the 
BTWC's transparency measures. 
The view that the Middle East should be free from biological armaments and other 
WMD formed the starting point for the Islamic Republic's argumentation on regional 
biological arms control. With the security objective of comprehensive biological arms 
control in the Middle East in mind, Iranian officials asserted that Israel's refusal to give 
up its nuclear weapons by joining the NPT, together with its reluctance to accede to the 
BTWC, was a source of tension in the region and a factor that prevented the major 
Arab 
states from becoming parties to the biological treaty. 
The Iranians also maintained that Israel's accession to the NPT and the BTWC would 
increase the popularity of the notion of a BTWC verification system among the 
Arab 
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states which had already joined the BTWC but adopted a skeptical attitude towards the 
planned verification mechanism. More fundamentally, Iranian representatives argued 
that Israel's participation in the NPT and BTWC would contribute to diplomatic efforts 
to find a comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and to establish a WMDFZ 
in the Middle East. Still, in the end, the Islamic Republic, unlike certain Arab states, did 
not link its BTWC-related behaviour to Israel's arms control policies. 
In the Iranian analysis, extra-regional governments' diplomatic support for Israel was 
a central reason for Israel's unwillingness to listen to the other regional countries' arms 
control concerns. The representatives of the Islamic Republic claimed that extra- 
regional states' diplomatic double standard in the Middle East was evident also in the 
manner in which they refrained from criticizing Israel's WMD programs and, instead, 
called on Arab governments to participate in international arms control instruments and 
baselessly accused certain regional countries of pursuing biological weapons programs. 
The fact that Iran was one of the states suspected of biological weapons activities forced 
the officials of the Islamic Republic, who denounced biological weapons as immoral, to 
actively seek to convince the international community that the Islamic Republic did not 
possess biological weapons. As it will be discussed below, it is not clear whether Iran's 
arms control operations in this respect stemmed from a concern over the security and 
economic costs of such suspicions or from a deliberate diplomatic attempt to cover an 
actual weapons program - or from both. 
The Islamic Republic's diplomatic efforts to promote biological arms control 
cooperation in the Persian Gulf sub-region, which was seen by the Iranians as a way to 
strengthen their country's security and influence in the Gulf, centered around Iranian 
proposals, made since 1991, for joint measures in the area of BTWC verification. In 
1994, after having introduced the notion of a defensive security scheme, Iranian 
officials started to refer to the "formulation of complementary regional verification 
mechanisms" as an integral component of the security scheme initiative and as a 
regional contribution to the broader international debate on the BTWC's verification 
system. 
6.3.3 The Ad Hoc Group years 
Between 1995-2001, the time period during which international diplomatic efforts in 
the area of biological arms control centered around the AHG negotiations, the content of 
606 
Iran's biological arms control argumentation remained essentially unchanged. In the 
AHG talks, the representatives of the Islamic Republic tried, above all, to ensure that 
the diplomatic process of improving the BTWC would lead to full international 
implementation of the treaty's article X. 22 The Iranians, driven by welfare-related 
considerations, continued to stress the importance of article X-related issues to their 
country and to developing countries in general and warned that insensitivity to Third 
World states' negotiation objectives in the AHG could prompt those countries either to 
block the creation of the BTWC verification mechanism or to stay out of the planned 
legally binding instrument to strengthen the treaty. 
Together with a number of other NAM states - such as China, India, Pakistan, and 
Brazil - Iran emphasized that the efforts to improve the BTWC and to create a 
verification mechanism for the treaty would have to include a promise to the Third 
World states parties of full access to biological imports. The officials of the Islamic 
Republic urged developed countries to ensure the BTWC's "effective and full 
implementation" and to conclude bilateral, regional, and multilateral cooperation 
agreements with developing countries in the area of disease prevention. In addition, 
Iran's AHG negotiators called on advanced industrialized nations to help developing 
countries to establish research institutes so that Third World states would have the 
necessary infrastructural means to make advances in the application of biology and 
biotechnology. In the Iranian view, such measures would not only legitimately reward 
those states that respected the BTWC and intended to adhere to the legally binding 
BTWC protocol, but they would also enable developed countries to monitor that 
developing countries' biological activities stay within the boundaries of international 
law. 
22 Article-X related issues were at the core of Iran's diplomatic argumentation also at the Fourth Review 
Conference of the BTWC in November-December 1996. As for other issues discussed by Iranian 
representatives at the 1996 BTWC conference, the Iranians, motivated by security considerations, 
continued their efforts to improve the assistance clauses of the biological treaty. Moreover, the officials 
of the Islamic Republic, defending their country's security interests and diplomatic influence, sought to 
promote multilateralism in the application of the problem-solving and compliance procedures of the 
BTWC. Accordingly, on the one hand, the Iranians argued that article V of the treaty provided an 
appropriate framework for resolving any problems which may arise between the states parties "in relation 
to the objective, or in the application, of the provisions of the Convention. 
" On the other hand, the 
officials of the Islamic Republic stressed that the states parties should refrain 
from taking unilateral action 
in resolving any concerns with regard to the implementation of the BTWC and noted, 
in respect to article 
VI of the biological treaty, that although the complaint mechanism of the 
BTWC revolved around the UN 
Security Council, all member states ought to have the opportunity to participate 
in the discussions and 
decision-making on cases of treaty non-compliance and other violations of the 
BTWC. 
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As before, the representatives of the Islamic Republic strongly criticized extra- 
BTWC export controls and especially those of the AG. Noting that extra-BTWC export 
restrictions hampered economic and social development in Iran and other developing 
countries, the officials of the Islamic Republic argued that the AG should be resolved 
immediately after the BTWC protocol's entry into force and after the international 
agency charged with the responsibility to implement that instrument would be in place. 
As a replacement to the AG, Iran envisioned the establishment of a BTWC-based 
arrangement where the states parties would agree on "multilaterally negotiated, non- 
discriminatory, and legally binding" transfer guidelines and explicitly include them in 
the treaty protocol. The Iranians added that an agreement on transfer guidelines should 
create a legal obligation for the states parties to harmonize their national export control 
policies and to render their export regulations consistent with the objectives of the 
BTWC. More concretely, the representatives of the Islamic Republic spoke of a system 
that would rely on end-user certificates and replace existing extra-BTWC transfer 
regulations upon the treaty protocol's entry into force. 
In the Iranian-supported system, the recipients of biological transfers would assure 
that the items procured by them would be used only for peaceful purposes and not be re- 
transferred to a third country without the authorization of the original supplier. The end- 
user certificates would also contain the names and the addresses of the end-users as well 
as information about the types and quantities of the received items and about the 
purposes for which the items were procured in the first place. As far as biological 
transfers between the members and the non-members of the BTWC were concerned, the 
Islamic Republic called for the formulation of a separate set of guidelines to regulate 
such interactions. 
Like many other NAM countries, Iran pointed out in the AHG negotiations that a 
BTWC-based export regulation arrangement should include a mechanism to settle 
transfer-related disputes among the states parties. In essence, the representatives of the 
Islamic Republic noted that if a state party was denied a biological transfer for a reason 
which it found to be inconsistent with the provisions of the BTWC and with the planned 
treaty protocol's article VII, the country in question would have the right to seek the 
annulment of the denial through certain procedures. Bilateral consultations 
between the 
party that had made the transfer request and the party that 
had refused to carry out the 
transfer were referred to by the Iranians as the principal 
dispute-settling mechanism. 
Yet, the officials of the Islamic Republic also envisioned a situation where such 
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consultations would end in an impasse. The Iranians argued that in such a case, the 
complainant would have the right to rely on a set of institutional steps which, if not 
bringing about a change in the other party's stance, would ultimately lead to the 
imposition of punitive measures on that country. 
The Islamic Republic's AHG negotiators, supported by their NAM colleagues, were 
also of the opinion that the BTWC protocol ought to contain a mechanism under which 
the states parties would be obliged to submit annual reports on the measures taken by 
them to implement the provisions of article X of the BTWC. In the Iranian model, the 
reports submitted by the member states would be examined in accordance to a certain 
procedure, after which recommendations pertaining to the execution of article X would 
be made to the states parties. Under the Iranian-promoted reporting mechanism, the 
states parties would also have the right to submit declarations on any restrictions on the 
transfers of biological materials, equipment, and technology identified by them. 
Furthermore, and again together with other NAM delegations, the Islamic Republic's 
AHG negotiators called for the creation of a cooperation committee that would act as 
one of the BTWC protocol's subsidiary organs and carry the responsibility for ensuring 
that the states parties fully implement the provisions of article X of the BTWC and 
article VII of the treaty protocol. In the NAM plan of January 1999, co-sponsored by the 
Islamic Republic, the NAM negotiators argued that the concrete tasks of the proposed 
committee would include the review of the functioning of the voluntary fund that would 
be created to finance technological and scientific cooperation between the states parties. 
The committee would also be charged with the responsibility to facilitate cooperation 
between the states parties in exchange of biological materials, equipment, and 
technology for peaceful purposes as well as to promote the publication and distribution 
of relevant research data among the member states. In the NAM initiative, the 
cooperation committee would submit an annual report of its activities to the Conference 
of the States Parties, the main decision-making organ of the planned international body 
responsible for the BTWC protocol's execution. The report would contain the 
committee's proposals and recommendations on how to improve the execution of article 
X of the BTWC. 
During the AHG negotiations, Iran, seeking to promote its security and welfare 
interests, also continued to pursue its diplomatic objective of achieving a cost-effective 
verification mechanism that could not be used as a tool to uncover Iranian military 
secrets or to hamper Iran 's peaceful biological activities. While emphasizing the 
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importance of the planned verification mechanism and lending its full support to the 
AHG's work in the matter, however, Iranian representatives had a clear conception of 
what the future system should look like. The Iranians insisted that all the states parties 
would have to be equally and objectively treated in connection with verification and that 
they should all be granted the opportunity to take part in verification-related decision- 
making. In a similar fashion, the Islamic Republic called for a verification system that 
would rely on strict and carefully detailed procedures that would be uniformly applied 
to all cases. Finally, Iranian officials - who stressed that the BTWC and the planned 
treaty protocol constituted a sufficient and the only legitimate international framework 
for addressing BTWC-related compliance issues - pointed out that the steps taken under 
the verification mechanism should respect the states parties' commercial proprietary 
information and, first and foremost, their national security interests. 
The central role played by security considerations in the Islamic Republic's 
argumentation on BTWC verification manifested itself in a number of ways. First of all, 
Iranian officials, together with their NAM colleagues, drew a conceptual distinction 
between natural and unusual outbreaks of disease and, fearing that international 
investigations of natural disease outbreaks could be used as a shield for espionage, 
maintained that the investigation and control of the former were the exclusive 
responsibility of national governments. 
Secondly, although recognizing that unusual disease outbreaks could be illustrative of 
biological weapons use and that each state party to the BTWC protocol should have the 
right to request the investigation of such incidents, the Islamic Republic's AHG 
negotiators argued, jointly with their NAM counterparts, that an investigation request 
made by a member state should explicitly articulate why the party in question believed 
that an unusual disease outbreak had occurred and that the requesting state should 
substantiate its claim by providing detailed evidence and other necessary information to 
the Executive Council of the planned BTWC organization. 
Thirdly, security considerations explained the Iranian view that national declarations 
submitted to the BTWC organization should form the backbone of the agency's 
verification activities. In other words, the Iranians were of the opinion that BTWC 
inspectors' work should focus on verifying the accuracy of the information provided 
by 
individual governments and that the inspectors would be allowed to resort to more 
intrusive verification measures only when non-compliance concerns could not 
be 
alleviated through other means. 
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In the AHG, as well as at the fourth BTWC review conference, Iran also continued to 
pursue the objective of correcting the legal ambiguity surrounding the issue of 
biological weapons use. At the 1996 review conference, the Islamic Republic tabled a 
proposal - supported by a number of other NAM states, such as India, Pakistan, and 
Mexico - in which it called for the insertion of the word 'use' in the title and article I of 
the BTWC. According to the Iranians - who expressed their particular concern over the 
possibility that states with retaliation reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol could 
maintain that, as far as they were concerned, only the first use of biological weapons 
was prohibited under international law - the treaty amendments could be adopted at a 
BTWC special conference. 
In the end, however, most delegations at the review conference argued that a 
reaffirmation in the conference's final declaration that the BTWC forbids the use of 
biological armaments would be an adequate step in the matter for the time being. The 
stand taken by the majority of the BTWC states parties effectively foiled further Iranian 
diplomatic efforts in the definitional issue concerning biological weapons use. Still, Iran 
raised the question again in the AHG talks and called for the inclusion of a text 
provision explicitly banning biological weapons use in the BTWC protocol. In spite of 
the diplomatic support Iran received from other NAM countries in the matter, however, 
most AHG delegations saw no need for the Iranian-promoted text amendment. 
Between the time period of 1995-2001, the officials of the Islamic Republic also kept 
referring to comprehensive biological arms control in the Middle East as the main 
objective of their biological diplomacy in the regional context. Calling for the creation 
of a WMDFZ in the Middle East, Iranian representatives viewed biological arms control 
as part of that wider effort and called on all the regional governments to accede to the 
BTWC and to the planned treaty protocol. Once again, the Iranians named Israel as the 
biggest obstacle to biological arms control and, more broadly, to the establishment of a 
WMDFZ in the Middle East. According to the Islamic Republic, Israel's policies of 
"aggression, occupation, and expansionism, " together with its nuclear weapons and its 
reluctance to join international arms control instruments, were the main cause for arms 
proliferation in the Middle East and for the lack of progress in WMD arms control in 
the region. 
In addition to blaming Israel for the poor security situation of the Middle 
East, 
Iranian authorities declared extra-regional powers' - and especially the 
United States' - 
support for Israel's policies as a factor that worsened the circumstances 
in the region. 
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As a consequence, the Iranians called on those powers to end their support for Israel's 
WMD policies and to adopt a non-selective and non-discriminatory diplomatic course in 
the Middle East. 
Another Middle Eastern government that was singled out in Iran's argumentation on 
regional biological arms control was Iraq. Trying to use diplomatic means to keep 
Iraq 's biological weapons ambitions in check, the officials of the Islamic Republic 
maintained that due to its possession of WMD, Iraq, together with Israel, had to be 
among the Middle Eastern countries joining the planned BTWC protocol upon that 
instrument's entry into force. The Iranians argued that while they did not have detailed 
information about Iraq's activities in the area of biological weapons, Iraq most 
definitely continued to pose a WMD threat to their country. Accordingly, the Islamic 
Republic stressed that any setback in the efforts of the UN to eliminate Iraq's WMD 
capabilities amounted to an alarming development and necessitated a resolute response 
from the international community. 
As far as the Persian Gulf sub-region was concerned, the representatives of the 
Islamic Republic continued to seek to promote biological arms control-related 
cooperation between Iran and its GCC neighbours. Stressing their readiness to engage 
in a serious diplomatic dialogue with their Gulf Arab neighbours and maintaining that 
there were immediate possibilities for Iranian-GCC cooperation in the area of arms 
control, the authorities of the Islamic Republic reintroduced the idea of joint regional 
verification measures to complement those planned for the BTWC. In this connection, 
the Iranians also pointed out that their country wanted to work for the creation of a 
WMDFZ in the Gulf and did not harbour any aggressive intentions in the region. 
The objective of convincing foreign governments that the Islamic Republic did not 
possess biological weapons was part of Iran's biological arms control operations not 
only in the Persian Gulf but in the wider international diplomatic context as well. 
Hoping to reduce the economic and political costs resulting to their country from such 
allegations, Iranian representatives dismissed all suggestions that their government was 
pursuing a biological weapons program and declared such claims to be indicative of a 
political campaign against the Islamic Republic. The Iranians stressed that, based on 
Islamic principles, their country considered biological armaments and all other types of 
WMD inhumane and illegitimate. 
Apart from alluding to the immorality of biological armaments as a proof of Iran's 
disinterest in biological weapons. the officials of the Islamic Republic pointed out that 
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their country had always strictly complied with its obligations under the BTWC, 
actively taken part in multilateral diplomatic discussions on biological arms control, 
supported the establishment of a verification system for the BTWC, and tried to 
promote biological arms control in the regional Middle Eastern context. Yet, at the same 
time, the Iranians stressed that their country had every right to utilize the advances made 
in biology and biotechnology for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of the Iranian 
people. 
On the basis of the fact that there exists very little public information about Iranian 
activities in the area of biological weapons, the question of whether the Islamic 
Republic used its biological diplomacy as a shield to cover a weapons program remains 
a matter of speculation. 23 The governments and observers accusing Iran of biological 
weapons development maintain that the Islamic Republic launched a weapons program 
under the control of the IRGC in the course of the Iran-Iraq war in the early 1980s. 
According to the U. S. government, the main source of information relied on by Iran 
observers, by the end of the 1990s and the early 2000s, Iran had managed to establish a 
growing biotechnology industry, to gain significant pharmaceutical experience, and to 
create the overall infrastructure to support its biological weapons program. The 
Americans also believe that the Islamic Republic had used Iranian university-affiliated 
research institutes and state-owned scientific establishments as procurement fronts for 
its weapons program and that the Islamic Republic had integrated its military effort into 
Iran's civilian pharmaceutical industry. 24 (Eisenstadt 1998: 2-3 and Cordesman and Al- 
Rodhan 2006: 49-5 1) 
Furthermore, U. S. government sources note that in the early 2000s, Iran's biological 
weapons program was for the most part still in a research and development phase, but 
that the Iranians had possibly already managed to produce small quantities of biological 
warfare agents. 25 The agents most often linked to the Iranian weapons program, as 
23 As pointed out by Cordesman and Al-Rodhan (2006: 49), "any analysis of Iran's biological weapons 
effort must be even more speculative than analysis of its chemical weapons standing. " Of course, there 
are factors other than Iran's weapons-related activities that can be used for analyzing that country's 
military intentions. Note here, for example, the observation made by Jones (1998: 48) that some officials 
of the Islamic Republic strongly believe that the security benefits of the BTWC to Iran are as insignificant 
as those of the 1925 Geneva Protocol during the Iran-Iraq war. 
24 According to Iranian opposition groups, the Islamic Republic's research activities on biological 
weapons have mainly taken place at the Karaj-based Razi Vaccine and 
Serum Research Institute whose 
representatives, as noted above in chapter 4, have been closely 
involved in the formulation and execution 
of the Islamic Republic's biological arms control diplomacy (Jane's Sentinel 
1999: 95). 
25 Some U. S. intelligence sources suggest that the Islamic Republic had perhaps also succeeded 
in 
actually weaponizing and producing a small number of 
biological weapons (Eisenstadt 1998: 2 and 
Cordesman and Al-Rodhan 2006: 51-5 3). 
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referred to in the research literature, consist of anthrax, botulinum toxin, and 
mycotoxins. The Islamic Republic's potential delivery systems for biological 
armaments include artillery shells, rockets, various kinds of missiles, helicopters, and 
fighter aircraft. As far as the sources of the Islamic Republic's biological imports and 
expertise are concerned, the Russians have acted as Iran's key partner in the 
development of the Islamic Republic's biological infrastructure. Additionally, the 
Islamic Republic's biological activities have reportedly included cooperation with 
European, Chinese, Indian, and possibly also with North Korean firms and entities. 26 
(Cordesman and Al-Rodhan 2006: 49-54,56 and Eisenstadt 1998: 2-3 and Carus 2000: 
6-7) 
6.3.4 Iran and the demise of the Ad Hoc Group 
The election of George W. Bush as the president of the United States in 2000 came to 
have a major influence on the content of Islamic Iran's biological arms control 
operations. On the one hand, the Bush administration's announcement, made on 25 July 
2001 at the 24th session of the AHG, that the United States would withdraw its support 
for the planned BTWC protocol -a diplomatic move that effectively stopped the 
protocol talks - prompted Iranian authorities to forcefully pursue the objective of saving 
the AHG process. On the other hand, the fact that the Bush administration explicitly 
accused the Islamic Republic of operating a clandestine biological weapons program 
resulted in an Iranian diplomatic effort to refute the US. accusations and to discredit 
the policies of the Bush government. 
As far as the objective of saving the AHG process was concerned, Iran strongly 
condemned the U. S. rejection of the BTWC protocol and maintained that the Americans 
had tried to obstruct the protocol talks throughout the negotiations. According to the 
Islamic Republic - which feared that the Bush administration's diplomacy would 
jeopardize Iran's biological arms control objectives - the decision taken by the United 
States not only seriously damaged international disarmament efforts but also 
undermined the role of arms control as a means to improve regional security. Pointing 
26 Iranian officials openly recognize their country's cooperation with foreign entities and experts in the 
biological field - for example, with Russians experts and 
Western companies - but emphasize that such 
cooperation has been exclusively for peaceful purposes (author's interview with A. A. Soltanieh, Geneva, 
22 July 2002). Of course, the problem with the Iranian claims is that the very same biological materials, 
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to the Middle Eastern arena, Iranian officials claimed that the U. S. rejection of the 
BTWC protocol enabled Israel and Iraq to continue their biological weapons programs 
without any serious international restrictions and made the establishment of a Middle 
Eastern WMDFZ a more distant scenario. Disheartened by the sudden turn in the 
protocol talks, the Iranians also called, ultimately unsuccessfully, on the AHG to 
expressly state, in the final document of the group's 24th session, that the United States 
had "killed" the BTWC protocol or to at least include the United States' rejection 
announcement of July 2001 in the final document as an appendix. 
Following the Bush administration's rejection of the protocol negotiations, which had 
led to the adjournment of the AHG's 24th session without the adoption of a final 
document, the Islamic Republic, with the support of other NAM countries, began to 
point out that the mandate of the AHG was still valid and that the protocol negotiations 
should be restarted without the Americans. At the fifth review conference of the BTWC 
in November-December 2001, Iranian delegates argued that the negotiations should 
continue after the conference and that the protocol could be finalized within a time 
period of one year. 27 In the Iranian opinion, the text of the final protocol should be 
adopted by a special BTWC conference prior to the treaty's sixth review conference 
taking place in 2006. 
Strongly objecting to the idea that the AHG negotiations would be abandoned or 
substituted by an alternative diplomatic process, the delegates of the Islamic Republic, 
who made it clear that their support for the review conference's final declaration would 
be dependent on the steps taken by the states parties with regard to the future of the 
AHG, categorically rejected the call made by the U. S. delegation at the final hours of 
the fifth review conference for an explicit termination of the AHG's mandate and for a 
diplomatic process that would replace the AHG talks. The Iranians were not alone in 
objecting to the U. S. initiative, for other conference delegations, too, rejected the 
American proposal. As a result of the diplomatic deadlock that ensued, the review 
conference failed to complete its work and agreed to convene in a resumed session in 
November 2002. 
equipment, and know-how that are fundamental to legitimate industries and research laboratories can be 
utilized for military purposes, too. 
2' It should be reminded here that, at the November-December 2001 session of the fifth review 
conference of the BTWC, the Islamic Republic also focused on calling for measures that would promote 
the universality of the biological treaty, on discussing the fact that the BTWC did not expressly ban the 
use of biological weapons, and on advocating its views on article X of the convention. 
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In spite of its vehement diplomatic defence of the AHG process as the only effective 
avenue to strengthen the BTWC and to tackle the future challenges posed by biological 
armaments, however, by the time of the fifth BTWC review conference's resumed 
session, Iran had recognized that the restart of the AHG negotiations would not 
materialize in the near future. Consequently, the Islamic Republic reluctantly agreed to 
the diplomatic formula put forward by the chairman of the fifth review conference in 
which the states parties would seek to improve the BTWC through annual one-week 
meetings. Each of the annual gatherings, as referred to in the follow-up mechanism 
presented by the chairman which also included the idea of preparatory expert meetings 
preceding the states parties' annual meetings, would focus on a specific subject with the 
aim of executing and strengthening the biological treaty. 
Following the acceptance of the chairman's proposal on 14 November 2002, Iran and 
its NAM allies expressly criticized the fact that the states parties had failed to strengthen 
the BTWC through a legally binding instrument. Moreover, they stressed that their 
acceptance of the follow-up mechanism rested, among others, on the understanding that 
the states parties of the BTWC could at any time decide on additional treaty-related 
diplomatic measures, that the sixth review conference would decide on further action in 
the area of biological disarmament, and that any steps taken to improve the BTWC 
should take all the aspects of the treaty into consideration. 
Their disappointment at the collapse of the AHG process notwithstanding, the Islamic 
Republic and its NAM allies maintained that, on the positive side, the end result of the 
fifth BTWC review conference had illustrated that they had managed to prevent any 
attempt to foreclose the option that the treaty members would take "more meaningful" 
steps in the area of biological disarmament in the future. Furthermore, Iran and its NAM 
allies asserted that they had succeeded in "preserving multilateralism as the only vehicle 
for preventing the reprehensible use of disease as instruments of terror and war in a 
sustainable way. " In other words, the NAM governments believed that they had 
managed to keep the diplomatic spotlight on the AHG and to make sure that the 
diplomatic follow-up mechanism, as agreed at the fifth review conference, could not be 
interpreted as replacing the AHG process. As argued by Iranian officials, the group's 
1994 mandate remained intact and there was no time limit to it. 
As for the accusations made by the United States that Iran was pursuing biological 
weapons and thereby violating its obligations under the BTWC, the officials of the 
Islamic Republic categorically rejected such allegations. The Iranians argued that their 
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country viewed biological weapons as inhumane, immoral, and illegal, and that, 
therefore, such armaments had no place in the Islamic Republic's defence doctrine. 
Moreover, Iranian representatives stressed that their country's membership in 
multilateral WMD arms control treaties, its full cooperation with international agencies 
involved in arms control, its active role in the AHG process, and its participation in the 
confidence-building mechanism of the BTWC28 testified to Iran's peaceful intentions 
and to its commitment to biological arms control and international law. 
Iranian officials - who threatened, at the fifth review conference of the BTWC, to 
block the adoption of a final conference document should the United States continue to 
make false allegations against other states parties - asserted that it was the Americans 
themselves who were violating the provisions of the biological treaty. First of all, the 
Iranians maintained that the United States had shipped "deadly biological agents" to 
Israel as well as to its other allies despite those countries' disregard for international 
arms control accords. Secondly, by referring to news reports published in September 
2001 revealing that the U. S. government had undertaken secret research into biological 
armaments, the representatives of the Islamic Republic accused the Americans of 
researching and developing biological weapons. Finally, the Iranians extended their 
criticism of the United States to a general diplomatic attack against the policies of the 
U. S. administration of president George W. Bush. According to Iranian officials, the 
Bush government's NMD program, its diplomatic efforts to have the ABM Treaty 
revised, together with its non-accession to the CTBT, demonstrated, for their part, that 
the Americans were obstructing multilateral diplomatic efforts and undermining 
international peace and security. 
Indeed, the emphasis placed by the Bush administration on unilateralism was a key 
factor behind Iran's diplomatic counterattacks against the Americans. Fearing that the 
Bush government might take unilateral diplomatic and military action against the 
Islamic Republic, Iranian authorities vehemently defended the role of multilateral ism, 
arms control, and international law in inter-state relations. Iranian concerns over the 
United States' intentions vis-ä-vis the Islamic Republic became also evident from Iran's 
argumentation at the fifth BTWC review conference on articles V and VI of the treaty. 
On the one hand, the delegates of the Islamic Republic, referring to article V of the 
BTWC, noted that existing provisions of that article provided an appropriate framework 
28 The government of president Khatami provided information to the UN concerning the confidence- 
building measures A, B. and G in 1998,1999, and again in 2002. 
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for resolving any problems that might arise between the member states and called on the 
states parties to "refrain from unilateral and discriminatory action" in resolving any 
concerns pertaining to the execution of the BTWC. On the other hand, the Iranians 
alluded to article VI of the treaty, which contains the BTWC's complaint procedure, and 
pointed out that the states parties should refrain from baseless non-compliance 
accusations against each other. According to the delegates of the Islamic Republic, any 
non-compliance complaint should be based on factual evidence confirming the 
complaint's validity. 
Although Iranian officials did not miss an opportunity to also remind the Americans 
that they had caused the collapse of the AHG talks, by the time of the United States' 
rejection announcement of July 2001, the Islamic Republic itself had not yet expressed 
an unreserved support for the so-called composite protocol text which had been 
presented by the chairman of the AHG in March 2001 to serve as the basis for the final 
negotiations on the BTWC protocol. After their initial objection to the whole idea of a 
composite text, Iranian officials had focused their criticism on the fact that the 
composite text, contrary to the wishes of Iran and its NAM allies, made no references to 
the abolition of extra-BTWC export controls between the treaty members. Arguing that 
the composite text did not strike an acceptable balance between the disarmament and 
development aspects of the planned BTWC protocol, Iranian representatives had even 
pointed out that their country's participation in the BTWC protocol would depend on 
the fate of the issue of export controls in the final AHG negotiations. 
In addition, the Iranians had expressed their dissatisfaction with the entry into force 
provisions of the composite text which, the officials Islamic Republic argued, failed to 
make the EIF of the planned BTWC protocol conditional on the participation in the 
instrument of all the states with advanced biological and biotechnological sectors. 
Putting forward their own formula, which made the protocol's EIF dependent on the 
accession to the instrument of 50 states with advanced biological capabilities and 
technologies, Iranian representatives had argued that it would be better to have a 
universal and effective treaty protocol in place than to allow proliferators to opt out of 
that instrument. Expressly referring to Israel and Iraq, the Iranians had also noted that 
the participation of the two Middle Eastern countries in the protocol was of utmost 
importance to the Islamic Republic. 
Still, at the end of the day, it seems that Iran would have accepted the composite text 
even if its negotiation objectives in the final AHG talks would not have materialized. 
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Iranian representatives themselves subsequently said that this would have been case had 
the United States not stopped the AHG process. In short, the Islamic Republic's security 
and welfare stakes in the BTWC protocol were such that probably only extraordinary 
events would have led the Iranians to object to the creation of a new international legal 
instrument in the area of biological arms control. 
6.4 Nuclear Arms Control: Objectives, Actions, and Means 
6.4.1 From the revolution to the cease-fire 
One of the first steps taken by the new Iranian government in the area of nuclear 
diplomacy after the 1979 revolution was to terminate the nuclear deals made by the 
Shah's government with foreign suppliers, especially with the Americans, the French, 
and the Germans. And while unilaterally relieving their country from the Shah's nuclear 
commitments, Iran's officials used international diplomatic fora to level strong criticism 
at the dethroned Shah's nuclear ambitions. According to the authorities of the Islamic 
Republic, the Iranian monarch had embarked on an excessive nuclear power program 
that had not only ignored the real needs of the Iranian people and deepened Iran's 
already dramatic dependence on foreign powers, but also overlooked the difficulties and 
dangers pertaining to the execution of a massive program in a country prone to 
earthquakes and with an insufficient technical infrastructure. 
Yet, despite the fact that it was widely believed at the time that the Shah's nuclear 
efforts had aimed at developing a nuclear weapons capability for Iran, the officials of 
the Islamic Republic refrained from referring to the military dimension of the ousted 
Iranian monarch's nuclear program. Thus, the Islamic Republic's representatives treated 
the Shah's program purely as a civilian project and, as a result, as an issue that was 
outside the purview of arms control. But after the Islamic Republic expressed its interest 
in nuclear science and research and declared its intention to pursue a peaceful nuclear 
power program, Iran's nuclear activities soon turned into a question that was heavily 
present in the Islamic Republic's arms control argumentation. 
On the one hand, this was the result of post-revolutionary Iran's image as a 
destructive force in international politics which led many governments, and especially 
the United States, to define the Islamic Republic's nuclear activities as militarily 
motivated. Accordingly, Iranian authorities relied on arms control diplomacy to counter 
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the accusations that their country was interested in nuclear weapons and to state their 
commitment to nuclear disarmament. On the other hand, Iranian officials used 
international arms control fora to strongly defend their country's right, under article IV 
of the NPT, to pursue nuclear activities for peaceful purposes. 
6.4.1.1 The objectives 
The starting point for Islamic Iran's nuclear arms control operations was its stated 
categorical objection to nuclear weapons. According to Iranian authorities, no country 
in the world should be allowed to be in possession of weapons capable of jeopardizing 
the survival of humanity. Calling for universal elimination of nuclear armaments, the 
officials of the Islamic Republic criticized the poor state of international nuclear arms 
control and blamed the NPT-defined NWS for the continuance of the nuclear arms race. 
As a consequence, a major part of the Islamic Republic's nuclear arms control 
operations between the 1979 Iranian revolution and the August 1988 cease-fire in the 
Iran-Iraq war focused on drawing international attention to the reluctance of NWS to 
give up their nuclear weapons. 
Iran argued that while, under the NPT, NWS carried the main responsibility for 
ridding the world from the scourge of nuclear armaments, they showed no real interest 
in stopping the nuclear arms race, the quantitative and qualitative development of their 
nuclear arsenals, and the deployment of nuclear armaments to the soil of non-nuclear- 
weapon states. Pointing out that the NPT was intended for blocking not only the 
horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons but the vertical proliferation of such 
armaments, too, Iranian officials strongly denounced military policies that based on the 
strategic concepts of nuclear deterrence, MAD, and limited nuclear war. Also, the 
representatives of the Islamic Republic expressed their country's objection to individual 
efforts made by the nuclear powers to improve their military capabilities. Thus, for 
example, the Iranians denounced the United States' Strategic Defence Initiative - and 
consequently called for the creation of an international treaty that would ban the use of 
outer space for all kinds of military purposes - as well as NATO's deployment, from 
1983 onwards, of Pershing-II intermediate-range nuclear missiles in West Germany. 
Although the officials of the Islamic Republic - who called on the nuclear powers to 
adopt, as an arms control measure, the principle of no-first-use of nuclear armaments in 
their military postures - welcomed the Cold War superpowers' 
bilateral negotiations on 
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controlling their nuclear arsenals, the Iranians essentially regarded such talks as another 
way for the United States and the Soviet Union to try to get the upper hand of each 
other and as a means to score propaganda points before international and domestic 
audiences. In a similar manner, the Islamic Republic accused the superpowers of 
viewing their nuclear armaments as an instrument to politically pressure and blackmail 
developing countries, the "oppressed" of the world. Rejecting the superpowers' nuclear 
policies as morally appalling and enormously dangerous, Iranian representatives also 
warned that the superpowers were even prepared to use nuclear weapons against Third 
World countries if that was necessary for securing their world dominance and 
"imperialistic" objectives. 
However, while arguing that the nuclear policies of the major powers were driving 
non-nuclear states to seek a nuclear weapons capability of their own in order to defend 
their security and sovereignty, the officials of the Islamic Republic stressed that it was 
all nations' moral duty to refrain from the possession of nuclear arms. Aiming to 
mobilize non-nuclear states to oppose the nuclear policies of the major powers, the 
Iranians, denouncing the view that nuclear weapons acted as a symbol of national 
prestige, called on Third World states to take the lead in multilateral nuclear arms 
control diplomacy and equated efforts to rid the world from nuclear weapons with the 
fight against colonialism. In this connection, the officials of the Islamic Republic put 
forth the idea of an "international police force" composed of developing countries that 
would "control the atomic arsenals of the East and the West" under the supervision of 
the IAEA. More generally, the Iranians called on opponents of nuclear weapons 
worldwide to strive for a moral transformation in international relations so that the 
military mind-sets placing importance on nuclear weapons could be undermined. 
The Islamic Republic's effort to promote the establishment of a comprehensive 
international ban on nuclear weapon testing was one manifestation of the post- 
revolutionary Iranian regime's stated objection to nuclear armaments. Adopting the 
diplomatic position already presented by the Shah's government, the Iranians argued 
that a CTB would obstruct both the nuclear weapon states' attempts to develop new 
types of nuclear armaments and the nuclear weapon aspirants' military programs and, 
consequently, mark an important step towards total nuclear disarmament. To strengthen 
their case against nuclear testing, the officials of the Islamic Republic 
further noted that 
nuclear weapon tests constituted a threat not only to international, regional, and national 
security, but more straightforwardly to human health and the natural environment as 
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well. Finally, the Iranians maintained that while occupied with diplomatic talks to create 
an international nuclear test-ban treaty, states should immediately commit themselves, 
as an interim measure, to a nuclear test moratorium. 
Iran's efforts to obtain positive and negative security assurances from the nuclear 
powers was another diplomatic objective that testified to the Islamic Republic's concern 
over nuclear armaments. Iranian officials stressed that it was the right of non-nuclear 
states to receive security assurances from NWS in return for having given up their 
access to nuclear armaments by joining the NPT as NNWS. According to the Iranians, 
NNWS urgently needed such assurances - and especially NSA - for the protection of 
their national security. In addition, Iranian representatives noted that legally binding 
security assurances would make the NPT more equitable as well as more attractive to 
treaty non-members. The Islamic Republic expressly emphasized that the security 
assurances given by NWS would have to be legally binding, contain no interpretative 
loopholes, and be codified into a legal document, either into the NPT or a separate 
instrument created for the purpose. In the Iranian view, the security assurances 
theretofore granted by the nuclear powers had been too weak or limited and, therefore, 
not meaningfully contributed to the security of NNWS. 
The post-revolutionary Iranian regime's diplomacy on regional nuclear arms control 
mainly centered around the objective of the creation of NWFZ in various parts of the 
world and particularly in the Middle East. The Islamic Republic expressed its support 
for the existing and for future NWFZ in the world and quickly adopted the Shah 
government's 1974 initiative for the formation of a Middle Eastern NWFZ as a central 
element of its nuclear arms control operations. However, the Islamic Republic's NWFZ 
diplomacy, even when it dealt with the Middle Eastern nuclear-free zone, refrained from 
detailed discussions about what future NWFZ should look like in practice. The same 
applied to Iran's war-time call, made in 1986, for a nuclear-weapon-free Persian Gulf 
sub-region, an objective that was closely related to the Islamic Republic's objection to 
extra-regional military presence in the Gulf and to Iran's idea of an indigenous security 
system in the region. In addition to advocating the creation of NWFZ, the officials of 
the Islamic Republic also sought to advance the establishment of zones of peace in 
various parts of the world and the Indian Ocean region, in particular. 
The Islamic Republic's argumentation on regional nuclear arms control included 
specific attacks against Israel and South Africa. two countries with whom the post- 
revolutionary Iranian regime had cut off all official relations. The authorities of the 
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Islamic Republic named Israel and South Africa as "racist and aggressive powers" that 
possessed nuclear weapons, cooperated with each other in the nuclear field, and tried to 
use their status as nuclear powers for the purpose of "territorial expansion, " 
"hegemony, " and political blackmail. Warning that Israel's and South Africa's nuclear 
weapon programs posed a serious threat to international and regional security and 
increased the possibility of nuclear arms racing both in Africa and the Middle East, the 
Islamic Republic used international arms control fora to draw attention to Israeli and 
South African nuclear capabilities and to achieve their immediate dismantlement. 
So that the international community could realize this objective, Iranian officials 
maintained, the major powers should, as a preliminary step, diplomatically release all 
the data they had on Israel's and South Africa's nuclear weapons programs. Such 
information, the Iranians stressed, would enable multilateral diplomatic talks on those 
programs to be conducted based on comprehensive information. Also, the Islamic 
Republic called on governments to stop all nuclear cooperation with the two countries 
unless they agreed to join the NPT and accept full-scope IAEA safeguards. Finally, in a 
more dramatic manner, Iranian officials questioned the legitimacy Israel's and South 
Africa's existence as states and called for the expulsion of the two countries from 
international organizations. The Iranians even went so far as to couple their acceptance 
of the IAEA's safeguards budget with the placing of Israeli and South African nuclear 
activities under the agency's full-scope safeguards. The fact that, ultimately, the Islamic 
Republic's diplomatic actions against Israel and South Africa remained unsuccessful led 
Iranian officials to vent their frustration at Western governments and especially at the 
United States which, the Iranians claimed, acted as the guardian of Israel and South 
Africa and of those regimes' military programs. 
As far as the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88 was concerned, the only nuclear arms control 
topic directly related to the conflict concerned the war-time military strikes carried out 
against nuclear facilities in both Iran and Iraq. Not surprisingly, the arms control 
officials of the Islamic Republic remained silent about the fact that, on 30 September 
1980, only about a week after the start of the war, their country conducted an air raid 
against Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor located near Baghdad. However, when the Israeli 
air force carried out a bombing mission at the same nuclear site in June 1981 and fully 
destroyed the Iraqi reactor, Iranian authorities used international arms control arenas to 
initiate a vehement diplomatic campaign against Israel. 
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By seeking to rally the international community to strongly condemn the Israeli 
operation and to impose international sanctions on that country, the Iranians portrayed 
themselves, above all, as defenders of the Muslim world and defined the Israeli attack as 
a crime against the Islamic community as a whole. According to the officials of the 
Islamic Republic, who pointed out that their activities in the matter were about fulfilling 
a religious duty, Israel had violated Iraq's "Islamic airspace, " damaged the property of 
all Muslims, and committed an offense against all Islamic nations. The Islamic Republic 
stressed that the fact that the target of Israel's attack had been a country which had 
invaded Iran and committed various kinds of crimes in the Iran-Iraq war did not 
influence its approach to the Osirak case which based on Islamic ideology and the 
principle of justice. Ideological considerations aside, the Iranians emphasized that the 
Israeli operation had also constituted a blatant breach against the basic norms of 
international law and that Israel's operation against Osirak could not be legitimized 
under any circumstances. 
The Islamic Republic argued that, in the light of the Israeli attack and the possibility 
that the "Zionist regime" might take similar action in the future, the international 
community should impose severe diplomatic sanctions on that country. Seeking to 
confront the United States' diplomacy in the Osirak case - which, despite the U. S. 
government's open criticism of the Israeli operation, tried to moderate the international 
community's response to the incident - Iranian reprsentatives pointed out that the 
Americans would not be able divide the ranks of Muslim governments in the matter. At 
the IAEA, for example, the Iranians - calling for Israel's expulsion from the agency and 
even claiming, for the sake of the argument, that the Iraqi reactor had been serving only 
peaceful purposes - declared that should the United States try to use its financial 
contributions to the IAEA as a tool to prevent Israel's expulsion from the agency, their 
government would be prepared to cover the possible short-term losses of U. S. financial 
support to the organization. In addition, referring to a proposal made by Iran's president 
Ali Khamenei, the representatives of the Islamic Republic called for the establishment 
of a special NAM fund that would allocate money to the IAEA and hence free the 
agency from "imperialist domination. " 
Whereas Iran's approach to the Osirak incident stemmed, above all, from the Islamic 
Republic's desire to display and strengthen its ideological credentials, its effort to 
mobilize the international community to stop Iraq 's air attacks against the Bushehr 
nuclear site resulted from an urgent war-time problem or vvulnerability. Iranian officials. 
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who used the IAEA as the main diplomatic arena for pursuing the Bushehr case, 
strongly condemned the Iraqi actions and called them as deplorable as Israel's June 
1981 attack against Osirak. The Iranians asserted that the international community's 
tame response to the Osirak incident had in fact encouraged Iraq to carry out its military 
operations against Bushehr and, in 1985, against Iran's nuclear research facilities in 
Tehran. 
The Islamic Republic called on governments to express their unambiguous 
condemnation of the Iraqi actions and to take diplomatic steps against the regime of 
Saddam Hussein so that Iraq would not repeat its attacks. More generally, Iran urged 
governments to agree on international regulations that would prohibit armed attacks on 
nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes and called for the creation of an 
international convention for the purpose. Furthermore, at the 1985 NPT review 
conference, the Islamic Republic asked the members of the treaty to provide Iran with 
technical assistance so that its peaceful nuclear program could go ahead and the 
damages done to the Bushehr site be repaired. At the conference, Iranian delegates also 
unsuccessfully threatened to block the adoption of a final conference declaration in case 
the member states should fail to include an explicit reference to Iraq's Bushehr attacks 
in that document. 
As for Iran's diplomacy at the IAEA, the officials of the Islamic Republic, in addition 
to calling for Iraq's expulsion from the agency, regularly requested the organization to 
dispatch fact-finding teams, together with nuclear safety experts, to Iran to verify the 
Iraqi attacks. The IAEA, however, declined the requests by noting that because the two 
Iranian reactors at Bushehr were still under construction and did not contain radioactive 
material, the facilities were not under IAEA safeguards and therefore did not fall under 
the agency's competence. Infuriated by the IAEA's position, and by the international 
community's general disinterest in the Bushehr issue, the representatives of the Islamic 
Republic countered by arguing that had foreign governments not obstructed the 
execution of their country's peaceful nuclear program, the work on the Bushehr-1 
reactor would have already been finished. Finally, in early 1987, in an effort to pressure 
the IAEA, Iran transferred nuclear material to Bushehr, a move that led the agency to 
signal, in late 1987, its preparedness to get involved in the matter. By then, however, 
Iraq had already managed to inflict significant damage on the Bushehr facilities and to 
slow down the Islamic Republic's nuclear program. 
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Despite the fact that, following the revolution, the authorities of post-Pahlavi Iran 
strongly criticized the content of the ousted Shah government's nuclear program, it did 
not take long for the Islamic Republic itself to declare that it was committed to studying 
and pursuing peaceful applications of nuclear energy. Using the same core 
rationalization as the Shah's government, the representatives of the post-revolutionary 
Iranian regime argued that their country needed nuclear energy in order to diversify its 
energy sources and to save its hydrocarbon riches for export. Moreover, the Iranians 
underscored the importance of nuclear science to their country's medical, agricultural, 
and industrial activities. 
In order to distance post-Pahlavi Iran's nuclear activities from those of the Shah's 
government, the Islamic Republic also pointed out that unlike the pre-revolutionary 
Iranian regime, it would build its nuclear projects on locally acquired know-how. In 
addition, Iranian authorities expressed their willingness to share their nuclear resources 
with other interested states, especially with those of the developing world. Self- 
sufficiency was a key word in Islamic Iran's nuclear argumentation. 
During the first half of the 1980s, the Islamic Republic's declared nuclear activities 
revolved around three areas: nuclear research, natural uranium exploration, and the 
completion of the two Bushehr nuclear reactors. Still, the agenda of the AEOI 
envisioned a whole range of Iranian nuclear projects, including nuclear fuel-cycle- 
related activities. Accordingly, between the Iranian revolution and the August 1988 
cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war, the nuclear arms control operations of the Islamic 
Republic placed a lot of emphasis on supporting the advancement of Iran's nuclear 
program. 
In pursuing this objective, the arms control officials of the Islamic Republic focused, 
first of all, on categorically rejecting the claim that their government had nuclear 
weapons ambitions. Pointing out that Iran was strictly following the doctrines and 
principles of Islam, they maintained that their country was interested only in peaceful 
applications of nuclear energy. As a Muslim country, the representatives of the Islamic 
Republic underscored, Iran recognized the importance of science but also understood 
that scientific activities had to rely on virtue and morality. Otherwise, science could be 
misused for "anti-humanitarian" purposes. 
Secondly, the arms control officials of the Islamic Republic dealt with the concrete 
problems that were hampering Iran's nuclear activities. Thus, for example, Iranian 
representatives used international arms control fora to voice their strong objection to the 
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diplomatic measures taken, above all, by the United States to obstruct Iran's efforts to 
finish the Bushehr reactors. Similarly, the Iranians voiced their condemnation of the 
nuclear supply policies of the West German government which, concerned about Iran's 
nuclear intentions, did not allow German firms to continue work at the Bushehr site. 
Finally, the officials of the Islamic Republic maintained that France's nuclear policies, 
too, pointedly illustrated how Iran and other developing countries were subjected to 
arbitrary and unjust treatment by the major nuclear supplier countries. To support this 
claim, the Iranians pointed to the French government's reluctance to transfer enriched 
uranium to Iran in spite of the fact that the Iranians actually owned a 10-percent share of 
the Eurodif enrichment facility. Also, the Iranians pointed out that France was unwilling 
to pay either principal or interest for the money lent to Eurodif by the ousted Shah in 
1974. 
More broadly, and in line with its objective of profiling the Islamic Republic as a 
champion of developing countries' nuclear rights, Iran sought to diplomatically support 
its nuclear activities also by maintaining that NWS had neglected their responsibility, 
under the NPT, to facilitate and promote the efforts by NNWS to apply nuclear energy 
for peaceful purposes. In addition to its criticism of what it viewed as the inadequate 
implementation of article IV of the NPT, the Islamic Republic strongly denounced the 
application of nuclear export controls outside the NPT framework. By greatly 
hampering the ability of NNWS to execute national nuclear projects, Iranian authorities 
asserted, extra-NPT export controls, such as those of the NSG, undermined the 
independence and sovereignty of NNWS and, therefore, were illegal and totally 
unacceptable. In the Iranian view, NNWS were entitled to a guaranteed access to 
nuclear materials, science, and technology. 
The Iranians - according to whom the major powers' nuclear export controls testified 
to those countries' attempt to keep the developing world in a backward state and under 
their domination - further stressed that the safeguards system of the IAEA was effective 
enough, and indeed the only legitimate international arrangement, for ensuring that 
NNWS respect their legal obligation not to acquire nuclear armaments. The officials of 
the Islamic Republic pointed out that their government would be ready to discuss the 
application of additional nuclear verification measures if called for by other members of 
the NPT, but only on the condition that any such measures would stem from a 
consensus decision made by all the states parties and that they would be incorporated 
into the IAEA system. As far as the existing verification activities of the IAEA were 
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concerned, the Islamic Republic noted that they imposed too heavy a financial burden 
on countries with modest nuclear activities and failed to make a contribution to the 
prevention of vertical nuclear weapons proliferation. In addition, Iran stressed that states 
from the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa should have a better representation in the 
agency and particularly in its Board of Governors. 
As the discussion above already suggests, the Islamic Republic's nuclear arms 
control operations during this period also aimed at improving Iran's access to foreign 
nuclear assistance. Thus, the Iranian representatives, again building their argumentation 
principally on article IV of the NPT, called on nuclear supplier countries as well as the 
IAEA - which the Iranians criticized for being more interested in regulating developing 
countries' nuclear activities than in facilitating them - to help Third World countries to 
improve their scientific and technical capabilities in the nuclear field. The officials of 
the Islamic Republic spoke, among others, of international assistance to developing 
countries' educational efforts and of the sharing of nuclear research results with the 
Third World. Furthermore, the Iranians asked developed states to help developing 
countries in financing nuclear projects - for instance, through the establishment of a 
special IAEA fund for the purpose - and to create an international nuclear fuel bank that 
would ensure that Third World states have a secure long-term access to nuclear fuel 
supplies. 
In addition to calling on developed countries to assist Third World states in the 
nuclear field, the Islamic Republic also took other steps to support and promote its 
nuclear program. Thus, for example, Iran allied itself with those developing countries 
that requested the director-general of the IAEA to annually report to the agency's 
general conference on the measures the member states had taken to promote peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy and international nuclear cooperation. In a more dramatic step, 
the Islamic Republic also implied that should the execution of article IV of the NPT 
remain inadequate, it might not be willing to support the planned extension of the 
NPT's duration in 1995. 
6.4.1.2 Objectives vs. goals 
During the period between the Iranian revolution and the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 
August 1988. the objectives of Iran's nuclear arms control operations testified to the 
Islamic Republic's systematic reliance on nuclear arms control diplomacy for the 
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promotion of its security interests. To begin with, security considerations guided Iran's 
diplomatic efforts against the major powers' nuclear weapons policies. As 
representatives of a revolutionary regime which positioned itself in opposition to the 
major powers and the existing international order, and which declared its intention to 
free Iran from what it portrayed as the shackles of foreign domination and exploitation, 
the authorities of the Islamic Republic did not rule out the possibility that the major 
powers could use nuclear weapons against their country. 
The concern over nuclear weapons use against the Islamic Republic, whether 
intentional or accidental, also explained the attempts made by Iranian officials to create 
a diplomatic front composed of Third World states to call for international measures 
that would prevent vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear armaments and 
ultimately eliminate such weapons. The same applied for the fact that the Iranians 
supported international efforts to establish a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests. The 
officials of the Islamic Republic believed that such a ban would not only hamper the 
existing nuclear powers' attempts to improve their nuclear arsenals, but possibly also 
prevent countries in Iran's neighbourhood, both in the Middle East and South Asia, 
from obtaining nuclear armaments. 
Moreover, the Islamic Republic's security concerns manifested themselves in Iran's 
diplomatic calls on NWS for the provision of positive and negative security assurances 
to NNWS, in the Islamic Republic's support for the creation of NWFZ and zones of 
peace in various parts of the world, particularly in the Middle East and the Indian 
Ocean, and in the strong diplomatic criticism levelled at Israel's de facto status as a 
nuclear weapon state and at the Jewish state's use of military force against Iraq's Osirak 
nuclear facility. Still, in the final analysis, the only urgent Iranian security problem to 
which the Islamic Republic tried to respond through nuclear arms control diplomacy 
concerned Iraq's war-time attacks on the Bushehr nuclear reactor site. 
While during the Islamic Republic's first decade Iran's nuclear arms control 
operations were mainly steered by security calculations, there were also other interests 
that Iranian leaders sought to advance by means of nuclear arms control diplomacy. 
Indeed, the Islamic Republic's diplomatic actions against the major powers' nuclear 
weapons policies, its calls for the creation of NWFZ and zones of peace, together with 
its diplomatic attacks against Israel's nuclear armaments, can all be seen as attempts to 
improve Iran's power position in the international arena. Viewing nuclear weapons as a 
source of national power, transformable into concrete influence 
in international politics, 
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the Islamic Republic had an interest in at least trying to take that source of influence 
away from its adversaries and competitors. 
There was an ideological dimension in Iran's nuclear arms control operations, too. 
For one thing, Iran's nuclear diplomacy was partly guided by the Islamic Republic's 
ideological objection to a class of weaponry capable of inflicting incomprehensible 
damage and of even threatening the survival of humanity. For another thing, the Islamic 
Republic saw nuclear weapons as instruments that helped to maintain the status quo in 
international relations and enabled the major powers - and the Cold War superpowers, 
in particular - and other states, such as Israel, to pursue destructive military and foreign 
policies. From the perspective of the Islamic Republic's black and white worldview, 
then, nuclear armaments were an anathema to Iran's leaders. 
In a similar manner, Iran's vehement diplomatic criticism of Israel's and South 
Africa's nuclear activities had a strong ideological element in it, 29 and the same can be 
said about the Islamic Republic's rejection of the export controls placed on nuclear 
transfers to the developing world. At the same time, Iranian authorities regarded an 
active nuclear arms control diplomacy, identifying itself with the interests of the Islamic 
world and the Third World at large, as a way to advance post-revolutionary Iran's 
prestige and influence among developing countries. 
As already demonstrated above, the Islamic Republic used international arms control 
fora also to defend and promote its nuclear program which it defined as an exclusively 
peaceful national effort to serve Iran's economic and other welfare needs. In this sense, 
then, Iran's nuclear arms control operations during the Islamic Republic's first decade 
partly stemmed from an attempt to improve the prosperity, economic development, and 
well-being of the Iranian people. However, the most recent information about the 
Islamic Republic's nuclear activities in the 1980s - which Iranian authorities were 
forced to reveal to the IAEA in the course of the post-2002 diplomatic crisis over the 
Islamic Republic's nuclear program - strongly suggests that Iran pursued a nuclear 
power program for military reasons as well. 
The fact that the Islamic Republic launched a uranium enrichment program in 1985 - 
at a time when it was unable to make progress in the construction of the Bushehr 
29 Of course, when the practical needs of the Iranian regime so dictated, the authorities of the 
Islamic 
Republic were prepared to quietly put their ideological principles aside. Note 
here, for example, the fact 
that in 1982, the Islamic Republic purchased 531 tons ý ellowcake from South Africa. The Iranians 
reported this transaction to the IAEA eight years later in 1990. (Iran's Strategic Weapons 
Programmes 
2005: 38) 
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reactors, the only Iranian facilities that could have potentially needed nuclear reactor 
fuel - greatly undermines the official Iranian explanation according to which its secret 
activities in the area uranium enrichment were solely for peaceful purposes. 30 Thus, on 
the basis of Iran's undeclared enrichment program - which, even if it was only 
rudimentary in nature, points to an intention to produce HEU for nuclear armaments - 
as well as on the basis of other secret Iranian nuclear activities, it can be concluded that 
the Islamic Republic resorted, most likely, to arms control diplomacy also in order to 
conceal and draw attention away from its nuclear weapons ambitions. This specific 
Iranian objective suggests that the efforts made by Iranian officials in the 1980s to 
defend and promote their country's nuclear projects through arms control diplomacy 
stemmed not only from welfare-related considerations but from military calculations as 
31 well l 
6.4.2 From the cease-fire to the CTBT 
6.4.2.1 The objectives 
Although, in many ways, post-revolutionary Iran's nuclear arms control operations 
during the Islamic Republic's first decade had been a reaction to the ideological, 
political, and military competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, the 
30 As pointed out by a former deputy director-general of the IAEA, Iranian authorities have not been able 
to credibly explain why they had decided to pursue a uranium enrichment program when there was no 
short- or medium-term need to fuel any electrical nuclear power plant in the country (IHT, 14 September 
2005). 
31 Such a conclusion can be further supported, among others, by the statements made by Iran's leaders in 
the course of the 1980s. Note in this connection, for example, the remarks reportedly made in a speech at 
the AEOI in February 1987 by Ali Khamenei, the Islamic Republic's president at the time: "Regarding 
atomic energy, we need it now [... ]. Our nation has always been threatened from outside. The 
least we 
can do to face this danger is to let our enemies know that we can defend ourselves. Therefore, every step 
you take here is in defence of your country and your revolution. With this in mind, you should work 
hard 
and at great speed" (cited in Spector 1993: 142-143). To give an another example of the 
fact that the 
possession of nuclear weapons was hardly a distant idea to the Iranian leadership, at the end of 
September 
2006, an Iranian news agency published an 18-year-old letter on its website which 
indicated that Muhsin 
Rizai, the then commander of the IRGC, was of the opinion that the Islamic 
Republic would need "a 
considerable number of laser and nuclear weapons" in order to be able to confront 
Iraq's attacks in the 
war. Within hours after the letter's appearance, the news agency was ordered 
by the SNSC to edit the text 
and to remove the word 'nuclear' from the letter (1HT, 5 October 
2006). It is beyond the scope of the 
present discussion to elaborate on the factors behind Iran's presumed 
interest in nuclear armaments. 
Basically, however, such factors can be reduced to the same fundamental 
foreign policy goals which have 
guided the Islamic Republic's nuclear arms control operations. Of course, considerations pertaining 
to 
domestic politics have also played a role in Iran's nuclear activities. 
Chubin (2006: 8,12), for example, 
stresses this point by arguing that Iranian authorities have used their nuclear projects as an 
instrument to 
rally nationalist sentiment and to legitimate the countr\''s 
Islamic regime. 
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unravelling of the Cold War international system revealed that there was a strong 
element of continuity in Islamic Iran's nuclear arms control diplomacy. 
Accordingly, following the end of Iran's eight-year war against Iraq and of the Cold 
War between the two superpowers, the Islamic Republic continued to actively promote 
the objective of universal and total nuclear disarmament. Pointing to the dangers posed 
by nuclear weapons and defining the mere existence of such armaments as spiritually 
and morally unacceptable, Iranian officials declared that the elimination of nuclear 
armaments was the most important issue on the post-Cold War international arms 
control agenda. While recognizing and welcoming the achievements made in the area of 
nuclear arms control in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the Islamic Republic 
criticized the major powers for the fact that even though dramatic changes had taken 
place in the international system, the military policies of those powers continued to be 
anchored in the possession of nuclear armaments. 
In the Iranian analysis, the nuclear powers' persistent reluctance to revise their 
military policies testified to those states' false belief that nuclear armaments served as a 
source of political power and national prestige. The officials of the Islamic Republic 
also maintained that the post-Cold War emphasis placed by the major powers on the 
concept of nuclear non-proliferation, and not on nuclear arms control, was a diplomatic 
attempt to divert international attention away from their own nuclear weapons arsenals. 
Strongly objecting to the major powers' continuing reliance on nuclear armaments, 
Iranian officials warned that the nuclear policies of the major powers fuelled nuclear 
arms racing and emboldened regional powers to pursue their own nuclear capabilities. 
Moreover, the Iranians argued that nuclear weapons were not capable of providing 
solutions to the security problems of the post-Cold War world or even acting as credible 
deterrents against conventional, chemical, or biological weapons. 
As states had no rational and certainly no moral basis for their possession of nuclear 
armaments, the representatives of the Islamic Republic noted, the world needed a new 
security order in which nuclear arms would play no role. As an alternative to the 
military notions of deterrence and balance of power, the Islamic Republic introduced, in 
September 1994, the concept of a "defensive security scheme" which was explained by 
the Iranians to capture the idea of an international order free from nuclear armaments 
and other kinds of WMD and in which states' armed forces would serve only 
defensive 
purposes. More concretely, the Iranians called on governments to start negotiations on a 
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"comprehensive, universal and non-discriminatory" international convention that would 
ban nuclear weapons. 
While using international diplomatic fora to advance the creation of a universal 
nuclear weapons treaty, the officials of the Islamic Republic called for the adoption of a 
set of international measures that would pave the ground for the materialization of the 
nuclear ban and address non-nuclear states' topical nuclear weapons-related concerns. 
The question of security assurances was among the arms control issues raised in this 
connection by the Iranians. Seeking - together with other non-nuclear states - to obtain 
positive and negative security assurances from NWS, Iranian officials kept pointing out 
that NNWS were entitled to such assurances in return for their acceptance of the NPT. 
According to the Iranians, the assurances would not only strengthen the security of 
NNWS, but also reduce the possibility that non-nuclear states would try to acquire 
nuclear weapons capabilities for themselves. 
As far as PSA were concerned, the Islamic Republic welcomed the UN Security 
Council's resolution 984 of April 1995 in which each of the five NWS and permanent 
members of the Security Council promised to immediately act in accordance with the 
relevant provisions of the UN Charter in case any of NNWS would become a victim of 
the use or threat of use of nuclear armaments. At the same time, however, Iran 
expressed its dissatisfaction with the fact that the resolution did not legally require the 
council to automatically respond to the use or threat of use of such weapons. In 
addition, the Islamic Republic had hoped that any use or threat of use of nuclear 
armaments would have been explicitly defined as a threat to international peace and 
security and, resultantly, automatically obliged NWS to "use all necessary means in 
defence of the victims in accordance with the UN Charter. " 
Yet, at the end of the day, Iran's diplomacy placed more importance on the issue of 
NSA. Iran's approach to the subject centered on the demand that NWS should agree to 
the establishment of a legally binding international instrument which would oblige them 
to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear arms. As one option for such an 
international arrangement, Iranian officials promoted the idea of a special protocol that 
would be attached to the NPT. In an alternative scenario, the Iranians alluded to the 
creation of a separate international convention for the purpose. 
In Iran's view, the Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco - which 
had 
created a NWFZ in Latin America and the Caribbean and 
in which NWS had given 
NSA to the members of that treaty - acted as a model 
for a comprehensive international 
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arrangement. The officials of the Islamic Republic referred to Protocol II of the 
Rarotonga Treaty - which had established a NWFZ in the South Pacific and in which 
NWS had committed themselves not to use or threaten to use nuclear explosive devices 
against any treaty member or against each other's territories within the region - as 
another existing model for international deliberations on NSA. In order to strengthen its 
diplomatic position in the matter, the Islamic Republic, together with a host of other 
NAM countries, drew a linkage between its acceptance of the extension of the NPT's 
duration and the progress made in the diplomatic talks on NSA. 
Given the diplomatic emphasis placed by Iran on the creation of a legally binding 
international NSA instrument, the Islamic Republic adopted a critical view towards the 
unilateral NSA declarations that were made by NWS in 1995. The Iranians expressed 
their disappointment at the fact that the statements were only politically binding and, 
above all, at the fact that, of the five NWS, only China presented a declaration which 
made no conditions or reservations to the application of NSA. Iran's NSA diplomacy 
also included active participation in the legal process that led the ICJ to declare, in July 
1996, as an advisory ruling, that the use or threat of use of nuclear armaments would 
generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict. Not 
unexpectedly, the Islamic Republic hailed the ICJ's ruling as a victory for its nuclear 
diplomacy. 
Closely related to its activities on the issue of security assurances, Iran also sought to 
advance the creation of international mechanisms that would increase nuclear 
transparency. According to the representatives of the Islamic Republic, such 
mechanisms would generate confidence in inter-state relations and reassure non-nuclear 
states of the nuclear powers' peaceful military intentions. With these considerations in 
mind, the Iranians insisted on the inclusion of the category of nuclear weapons and 
other WMD in the United Nations' arms register. Iran's understanding of the definition 
of nuclear weapons encompassed not only states' actual nuclear armaments but their 
fissile material stockpiles as well. 
Yet, on multilateral arms control fora, the control of fissile materials was already 
being discussed as an independent subject. Iran supported the UN General Assembly's 
December 1993 resolution in which the member states called for the creation of a non- 
discriminatory, multilateral, and internationally and effectively veriable treaty banning 
the production of fissile material for nuclear armaments and other nuclear explosive 
devices. But as the diplomatic consultations on the mandate of the treaty negotiations 
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started, it became clear that Iran's views on the content of the planned convention 
differed from those of many other states. Iran belonged to a small minority of countries 
which insisted that the treaty should not only ban the future production of fissile 
materials for military purposes but control the existing fissile material stockpiles as 
well. 
While calling on governments to negotiate a comprehensive fissile ban treaty, the 
representatives of the Islamic Republic also put forward an alternative diplomatic 
mechanism in which states would create a fissile ban through a treaty amendment to the 
NPT. Moreover, prior to the 1995 NPT review conference, which was charged with the 
task of making a decision on the extension of the NPT's duration, Iran noted that it 
would support "limited renewal" of the NPT only if "careful attention" was paid at the 
conference to the views of the delegations that called for a ban on the production, 
development, and stockpiling of fissile material for weapons purposes. 
As it ultimately turned out, neither avenue of the Islamic Republic's two-pronged 
approach to the fissile ban question had the chance of becoming accepted by the 
majority of the parties involved in the diplomatic deliberations on the matter. Actually, 
even though the members of the CD - the body that had been designated as the 
negotiating forum for fissile ban talks - managed to agree, in March 1995, on a mandate 
for the treaty negotiations, the talks in Geneva soon drifted into a deadlock. Regardless 
of the stalemate, the officials of the Islamic Republic remained committed to promoting 
the establishment of an international fissile ban dealing with past and future production 
of fissile material. 
Iran's arms control operations around the issue of nuclear testing constituted yet 
another major element in the diplomatic Iranian effort to pave the ground for universal 
and total elimination of nuclear armaments. In the Islamic Republic's opinion, the world 
needed a global treaty to ban nuclear weapon tests for two reasons: primarily for 
preventing the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear armaments and, 
secondarily, for putting an end to the adverse health and environmental effects resulting 
from the test explosions. Referring to technological advances that enabled the detection 
of underground nuclear tests with a high degree of certainty and to the dramatically 
improved political climate in international relations, Iran maintained that the time was 
ripe for an immediate establishment of a CTBT. 
The Islamic Republic's response to the initiative made by five non-nuclear states at 
the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 1963 PTBT in 1988 was indicative of 
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the Iranian diplomatic approach to the issue of nuclear testing. The initiative, which 
called for the organization of a PTBT amendment conference deliberating the 
conversion of the PTBT into a CTBT, was strongly supported by the Islamic Republic. 
Similarly, together with other NAM delegations, Iranian representatives used the 1990 
NPT review conference to pressure NWS to agree on the creation of a CTBT. And after 
the eventual failure of the PTBT amendment conference of January 1991, the Islamic 
Republic called for the adoption of a CTBT before the 1995 NPT review and extension 
conference. In fact, Iranian officials hardened their position on the CTBT issue by 
explicitly declaring that their government's support for the NPT's extension was 
dependent on the progress made in the test ban matter. 
In the end, in the face of mounting international and domestic pressure, NWS agreed 
to take part in international negotiations on a CTBT. Consequently, in January 1994, the 
CD adopted a mandate for the CTBT negotiations, and Iran's nuclear arms control 
operations correspondingly began to advocate the creation of a CTBT which would ban 
explosive and non-explosive testing of nuclear weapons and not hamper the states 
parties' peaceful nuclear activities or undermine their national security. In the initial 
stages of the deliberations at the CD, Iran's negotiators criticized the nuclear powers for 
their effort to set the terms of the negotiations without any regard to the interests of non- 
nuclear states. Above all, the Iranians emphasized that in addition to being considered 
an instrument against horizontal nuclear proliferation, the planned treaty should also - 
in fact, primarily - be viewed as a tool to control nuclear powers' weapons 
development 
- as a move towards complete nuclear disarmament. 
As far as the content of the CTBT was concerned, the Iranians - who were of the 
opinion that the negotiations should be brought to an end before the 1995 NPT 
conference and who linked their support for a limited extension of the NPT with 
developments in the CTBT talks - emphasized that the treaty should 
lead to a general 
and complete cessation of nuclear tests by "all states in all environments for all time. " 
Thus, the negotiators of the Islamic Republic wanted to ban both explosive and non- 
explosive testing of nuclear weapons. Still, at the initial stages of the negotiations, the 
Iranians did not object to the idea, strongly advocated by China, that states would 
be 
allowed, under the CTBT, to conduct PNE for civilian purposes. This Iranian stance 
stemmed from the Islamic Republic's general attempt to eliminate from the treaty any 
provisions that could be later legally exploited for obstructing states' peaceful nuclear 
activities. 
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What the Iranians did object to was the U. S. negotiation position that would have 
allowed NWS to carry out nuclear explosions of very low yield for the sake of keeping 
their nuclear weapons safe and reliable. By the same token, the Islamic Republic 
opposed the French and British delegates' attempts to reserve their countries the right to 
conduct, in exceptional circumstances, nuclear explosions without limitations on yield 
in order to ensure the safety of their weapons arsenals. In the Iranian view, the 
exemption proposals put forward by the nuclear powers were unacceptable because they 
could potentially be activated to conceal weapons development activities. 
As for the proposal, presented by some delegations during the CTBT talks, that the 
future treaty should impose a ban both on the conduct of nuclear explosions and on 
preparations for such explosions, Iran expressed its basic support for the initiative but 
simultaneously pointed out that defining what constituted test preparations would be a 
difficult task. Above all, the negotiators of the Islamic Republic were concerned over 
the possibility that a treaty provision referring to test preparations could be exploited by 
those who wished, for political reasons, to baselessly accuse certain countries of laying 
groundwork for a nuclear weapon test. Yet, on a related issue, Iran was unambiguous in 
calling for a treaty provision that would oblige nuclear powers to shut down all sites 
hitherto used for nuclear testing. The Islamic Republic also demanded that all 
equipment specifically designed for nuclear test purposes should be destroyed. 
As regards the subject of the CTBT's verification mechanism, a question which self- 
evidently played a central role in the treaty negotiations, the representatives of the 
Islamic Republic called for a universal, non-discriminatory, technically effective, and 
internationally supervised verification system. The Iranians expressed the view that 
verification activities under the CTBT should rely first and foremost on the application 
of seismic technologies and on OSI. Iran did not rule out the introduction of other 
verification measures into the planned system, but added that such complementary steps 
should be cost-effective, not affect states' ability to pursue peaceful nuclear activities, 
and be taken only under multilateral diplomatic control and supervision. 
In a similar manner, the Islamic Republic did not adopt a strict approach to the 
question of which international body should be charged with the task of implementing 
the CTBT and conducting the verification actitivities under the treaty. Iranian 
negotiators noted that should the task be given to the IAEA, the agency's technical 
capabilities would have to be strengthened and the IAEA's decision-making structures 
revised. On the other hand, the Iranians said that if governments would 
decide to 
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establish an independent agency for the CTBT, the organization should remain slim and 
cost-effective. Also, the Islamic Republic stressed that the planned CTBTO should have 
the ability to independently analyze verification information and to disseminate it to 
individual member states. Finally, in support of an initiative tabled by Japan, Iran 
argued that the CTBTO would need only one major decision-making organ which 
would comprise all the states parties, each with one vote. 
In regards to the planned test-ban treaty's EIF, the Islamic Republic was of the 
opinion that the CTBT should enter into force only after all NWS and threshold nuclear 
states had joined it. Simultaneously, however, the Iranians recognized that the treaty's 
EIF should not remain hostage to a few states' refusal to join the instrument. As a result, 
the Islamic Republic stressed that incentives should be offered to states that hesitated to 
join the CTBT and, conversely, countries that planned to stay outside the treaty should 
be subjected to international "punitive measures. " 
On the issue of treaty withdrawal, Iran took a uncompromising stand: the withdrawal 
of "nuclear-weapon states and other nuclear advanced countries" from the CTBT should 
not be allowed because any other decision would compromise the treaty's fundamental 
purpose. Relatedly, the officials of the Islamic Republic demanded that the final text of 
the CTBT should include clear provisions on how to deal with countries that would 
decide to withdraw from the treaty. The Iranians themselves alluded, once again, to the 
application international sanctions and also emphasized that each case of withdrawal 
should be treated with uniform criteria, without political calculations. 
After the end of the first year of the CTBT negotiations, during which the national 
delegations had presented their initial positions on the planned treaty, governments 
intensified their bargaining over the content of the CTBT and, in April-May 1995, 
gathered to the NPT review and extension conference. At the conference, Iran belonged 
to a group of 14 non-aligned countries that objected to the indefinite extension of the 
NPT and wanted the treaty to be extended for rolling fixed periods of 25 years, each 
extension being dependent on the achievement of certain treaty-related objectives. The 
conclusion of the CTBT was one of the objectives expressly referred to by the group. 
Even though Iran and its conference allies failed to achieve the objective of the NPT's 
limited extension, they nevertheless managed to obtain, in return for their support of the 
NPT's indefinite extension, a politically binding commitment from NWS that the 
CTBT 
would be finished no later than in 1996. 
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Soon after the NPT conference in June 1995, however, the government of France 
announced that before signing the CTBT, it would conduct a final series of underground 
nuclear tests by May 1996. The Iranians strongly criticized France's decision and 
portrayed it as an indication of the reluctance of NWS to accept limitations to their 
nuclear activities. With China already having conducted a nuclear test in May 1995. the 
Islamic Republic condemned what it alluded to as the "nuclear test race" and insisted 
that pending the conclusion of the CTBT, nuclear powers should refrain from further 
nuclear testing. 
After the start of the final round of CTBT negotiations, on 22 February 1996, Iranian 
negotiators presented a draft or model CTBT to the national delegations for 
consideration -a significant sign of the Iranians' active role in the talks and of their 
intention to secure the Islamic Republic's CTBT-related interests. In the draft treaty and 
in subsequent bargaining over the content of the final test ban document, Iran's 
negotiators continued to point out that the CTBT should ban nuclear tests at any place 
and of any yield - even if, at the same time, the Iranians expressed their acceptance of 
the idea of PNE for civilian purposes, if they were to be carried out under strictly 
defined conditions. 
As far as the question of nuclear test sites was concerned, the Islamic Republic's 
position remained essentially unchanged. Apart from insisting that CTBT member states 
should be obliged to close down all tests sites and to destroy all equipment used for 
nuclear tests, Iranian negotiators called on governments to provide, in an act of 
transparency and confidence-building, the future CTBTO - by now designated as the 
international agency responsible for implementing the test-ban treaty - with detailed 
information about their past nuclear tests. For the same reason, the Iranians added, the 
states parties should also be required to notify the CTBTO of "any explosion using 300 
tonnes or greater of TNT-equivalent blasting material detonated as a single explosion 
anywhere on its territory, or at any place under its jurisdiction or control. " 
On the question of verification, Iranian negotiators lent their support for a verification 
system built on the IMS. Under the IMS - consisting of a global, two-tier seismic 
system, supported by hydroacoustic, radionuclide, and infrasound networks - the 
Islamic Republic agreed to run one primary seismological station, two auxiliary 
seismological stations, one radionuclide station, and an infrasound station on 
Iranian 
soil. 
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In contrast, the Islamic Republic's negotiators, who maintained that the IMS provided 
a sufficient basis to verify state compliance under the CTBT in an efficient and reliable 
manner, had major reservations on the use of data derived from NTM - that is, from 
intelligence sources in verification. While they ultimately had no choice but to accept 
the fact that NTM would play a role in the implementation of the CTBT, the Iranians. 
however, insisted that NTM-generated information would have to be viewed as 
secondary to the data produced by the IMS. Specifically, the representatives of the 
Islamic Republic demanded that information obtained through espionage and human 
intelligence should be completely excluded from the definition of NTM. In addition, the 
Iranians insisted that the states parties should be allowed to rely only on IMS data when 
making a request for an on-site inspection in the territory of another member state. 
Furthermore, Iran's negotiators stressed that the data transmitted by the IMS to the 
IDC, a CTBTO unit, should be processed, analyzed, and reported on by the center, in 
addition to which all the states parties should have an access not only to all information 
made available to IDC, but also to all data obtained by the CTBTO through its 
verification activities. While the Iranians supported OSI as a means of CTBT 
verification, they nonetheless noted that before resorting to such inspections, the states 
parties should make every effort to clarify and resolve among themselves any matter 
causing concern over treaty compliance. Only if such consultations were to prove 
unsuccessful, the representatives of the Islamic Republic underscored, should the 
mechanism of OSI be activated. And even then, the Iranians continued, the application 
of the most intrusive verification methods should be left as the last resort. 
Given the central role reserved for the CTBTO's Executive Council in the 
organization's decision-making, it was not surprising that the national delegations 
taking part in the CTBT talks held heated debates on the council's future composition. 
As for the Iranians, they called for the creation of a 65-member council that would be 
elected by the CTBT's Conference of the States Parties and be composed of five 
regional groupings. Iran's officials emphasized that each state party should have the 
right to serve, on the basis of the principle of rotation, in the council and condemned the 
efforts by NWS and some other countries to secure permanent seats in it. 
Still, the Iranians did not rule out the possibility that a single country from a regional 
group could be repeatedly prevented from serving in the council. They argued that it 
was the regional groups' prerogative to determine which countries were designated to 
the council. Iran's stance stemmed, above all, from the fact that most of the national 
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delegations were of the opinion that Israel belonged to the regional grouping of Middle 
Eastern and South Asian countries, whereas the Islamic Republic viewed Israel's 
membership in that group as a recipe for permanent "political problems" that would 
seriously complicate the process of selecting the members of the Executive Council. 
Yet, Iran had to eventually accept that the final treaty text placed Israel into the group 
of Middle Eastern and South Asian states. In a similar manner, the Islamic Republic had 
to recognize that its negotiation objectives with regard to the role of NTM information 
in CTBT verification failed to materialize, for governments ultimately agreed on the 
possibility of an OSI launched on the basis of NTM information. The third major 
diplomatic defeat experienced by Iran during the CTBT talks concerned the proposal 
put forward by the Islamic Republic and a host of other NAM countries which called on 
the NWS to commit themselves - through an explicit text provision included in the 
preamble of the CTBT - to the notion of complete nuclear disarmament within a time- 
bound framework. 
Disappointments in these three thematic areas led the Islamic Republic to declare that 
it would not be ready to accept the final draft of the CTBT. Together with India - whose 
negotiators had blocked the adoption of the final text of the CTBT by consensus and 
prevented the text from being attached to the final report of the CD's test-ban committee 
- Iran refused to allow the CD to transmit the test-ban committee's final report to the 
UN General Assembly. The Islamic Republic explained its diplomatic behaviour by 
noting that the treaty had failed to meet the expectations of the majority of the 
negotiating states and that the final treaty text had "grossly tilted towards the position of 
a few nuclear-weapon states and their allies. " Also, Iranian authorities accused the 
nuclear powers of having dictated the course of the negotiations and of having pressured 
other states to accept their demands. 
Yet, in the end, diplomatic obstructionism brought no benefits for the Islamic 
Republic. Thus, as the UN General Assembly, on 10 September 1996, voted for the 
adoption of the CTBT, Iran was among the 158 countries expressing their support for 
the treaty. While arguing that it was better to have a flawed test-ban treaty than no treaty 
at all, the Islamic Republic nonetheless subsequently recorded its dissatisfaction with 
the CTBT's preamble, with the composition of the CTBTO's Executive 
Council, and 
with the role of NTM data in verification to the declarations 
it attached to its CTBT 
signature document of 24 September 1996. 
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Although Iran's nuclear arms control operations during the first half of the 1990s 
heavily focused on the CTBT negotiations, on the creation of a new international arms 
control treaty, the officials of the Islamic Republic also kept promoting other foreign 
policy objectives through nuclear arms control diplomacy. First of all, thus, the Iranians 
continued their effort to diplomatically support the advancement of the Islamic 
Republic's nuclear program. Iran's representatives used international arms control fora 
to dispel the suspicions and deny the outright accusations that their country was trying 
to develop nuclear weapons. According to them, the false accusations made against 
Iran, particularly by the United States and Israel, were part of a long-lived political 
campaign against the Islamic Republic. 
As before, the Islamic Republic asserted that religious, moral, and humanitarian 
considerations explained its aversion to nuclear weapons. Iran's experience as the latest 
victim of the use of WMD, the officials of the Islamic Republic added, had only 
strengthened their country's opposition to such armaments. Iranian representatives also 
asserted that nuclear weapons were military useless to Iran and that their country simply 
did not possess the financial means and technological capabilities for a nuclear weapons 
program. 
And as before, the Iranians claimed that the Islamic Republic pursued a peaceful 
nuclear program in order to satisfy its electricity needs and to save its hydrogarbon 
resources for export. In addition, the officials of the Islamic Republic noted that their 
country's nuclear power program was part of the general national effort to improve 
Iran's scientific, technical, and industrical infrastructures. Lastly, the Iranians stressed 
that their government viewed nuclear power as an environmentally friendly alternative 
to fossil fuels and that it had already invested so much in the country's nuclear program 
that it would be imprudent to put an end to it. 
According to the officials of the Islamic Republic, the accusations claiming that Iran 
was seeking nuclear weapons had greatly damaged Iran's ability to execute its nuclear 
program. As a result, the Islamic Republic continued to resort to nuclear arms control 
diplomacy as a means to improve its access to nuclear materials and nuclear power 
technology. Strongly criticizing Western powers' and especially the United 
States' 
attempts to hamper their country's nuclear efforts - which Iranian authorities 
labelled as 
policies of "nuclear apartheid" or "new colonialism" - the representatives of the 
Islamic 
Republic accused nuclear supplier countries of political 
double standard and of violating 
article IV of the NPT. 
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In the Iranian view, all extra-NPT export control arrangements were illegal and 
should therefore be dismantled. Still, the authorities of the Islamic Republic expressed 
their readiness to discuss the issue of export controls if such deliberations would 
alleviate nuclear supplier countries' proliferation concerns. Accordingly, Iran called for 
the establishment of a diplomatic forum composed of all NPT states parties that would 
decide on the application nuclear export controls. At the 1995 NPT review and 
extension conference, the Islamic Republic asked the states parties to create a NPT ad 
hoc committee responsible for formulating export control guidelines that would replace 
those of the existing extra-NPT arrangements. 
Iranian representatives argued that such a committee should also be given the task of 
ensuring that the non-nuclear parties to the NPT would have a full and unhindered 
access to nuclear materials and technology. Moreover, the Iranians noted that the 
goverments participating in the committee's work ought to refrain from nuclear 
relations with states that had not joined the NPT and not accepted IAEA full-scope 
safeguards, and that the committee could discuss measures to strengthen the verification 
system of the NPT as well as any other matter pertaining to the implementation of the 
treaty's article IV. 
The Islamic Republic's diplomatic argumentation on article IV of the NPT also 
included calls for increased nuclear assistance from the developed world to developing 
states. Iranian officials called on nuclear supplier countries to share their nuclear know- 
how with Third World countries and to financially help developing countries to execute 
peaceful nuclear programs. According to Iran, such assistance would help to bridge the 
welfare gap between the North and the South and to promote peace and stability in the 
post-Cold War world. The Islamic Republic also specifically called on the IAEA to 
increase its technical and financial assistance to Third World governments as well as to 
prevent nuclear suppliers from baselessly building barriers to developing countries' 
procurement of nuclear materials and technology from the international market. Overall, 
the strong third-worldist element in Iran's argumentation on matters pertaining to 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy testified not only to the Islamic Republic's persistent 
attempt to defend its right to pursue a nuclear program and to improve its access to 
nuclear imports and assistance, but also to Iran's diplomatic objective of portraying the 
Islamic Republic as a defender of developing countries' nuclear rights. 
As far as the IAEA was concerned, the Islamic Republic continued to use 
it as a 
central arena to promote the establishment of an international treaty 
banning armed 
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attacks against nuclear facilities, whether in operation or under construction. Iran 
stressed that the treaty should contain a mechanism to punish the aggressors and named 
the UN Security Council as the body responsible for deciding on the punitive measures 
taken against them. Under the Iranian-promoted treaty, the IAEA would be charged 
with the task of helping the victim states with radiation protection and other necessary 
assistance. 
Although the Islamic Republic viewed the IAEA as an international organization 
whose main responsibility was to support and promote the member states' peaceful 
nuclear activities, it was the regulatory aspect of the agency's mandate which came to 
dominate Iran's relations with the IAEA. On the one hand, in an effort to clear up 
suspicions about its nuclear program, the Islamic Republic declared in 1991 that apart 
from the routine agency inspections, it would allow the IAEA to visit any location in 
Iran in order to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in the country. The 
inspections carried out by the agency pursuant to the Iranian declaration - both of which 
found the Islamic Republic in compliance with the NPT, a fact which was thereafter 
actively referred to by Iranian authorities - took place in February 1992 and November 
1993. 
On the other hand, the international consensus emerging in the early 1990s that there 
was an urgent need to improve the IAEA's verification capabilities led the Islamic 
Republic to adopt a diplomatic course aiming to secure that the strengthening process 
would not undermine its security or hamper its peaceful nuclear activities. 
Consequently, while expressing their support for the international efforts to improve the 
verification capabilities of the IAEA and calling on governments to back the agency's 
regulatory activities, Iran's officials refrained from presenting detailed stands on the 
individual steps adopted to strengthen the IAEA's verification system and, instead, 
focused on discussing the pitfalls of such steps. 
Given that the international debate on improved IAEA safeguards was essentially 
targeted against countries like Iran, believed to be pursuing nuclear armaments, the 
representatives of the Islamic Republic demanded, in the first place, that the additional 
verification measures agreed on by the international community should prompt all 
governments to finally recognize that the IAEA was the only legitimate body to verify 
non-nuclear NPT parties' treaty compliance. Secondly, the Iranians emphasized that the 
improved verification system of the IAEA should not be exploited as a political tool 
to 
exert diplomatic pressure on or to penalize individual countries. 
By the same token, 
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Iranian authorities noted that enhanced monitoring of the nuclear activities of NNWS 
should not jeopardize those countries' legitimate state secrets. 
Furthermore, the Islamic Republic stressed that the strengthening of IAEA safeguards 
should not have a negative impact on NPT states parties' economic and technological 
development. In fact, Iran's authorities were of the opinion that in exchange for 
agreeing to put their nuclear activities under increased international scrutiny, NNWS - 
and developing countries, in particular - were entitled to guarantees of nuclear transfers 
and international nuclear assistance from nuclear supplier countries. In yet another 
effort to couple its diplomatic argumentation on strengthened IAEA safeguards with its 
other nuclear arms control objectives, the Islamic Republic pointed out that from the 
viewpoint of nuclear disarmament, enhanced international monitoring of non-nuclear 
states' nuclear activities was only a secondary issue: vertical proliferation of nuclear 
weapons continued to be the main problem for the international community. 
As far as Islamic Iran's nuclear arms control operations in the regional context were 
concerned, Iran's effort to prevent Iraq from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability 
was a key objective for the Islamic Republic's post-Iran-Iraq war nuclear diplomacy. 
Yet, because it did not want to burden its already tense post-war relations with Iraq or to 
diplomatically provoke other Arab governments, Iran refrained from an aggressive 
diplomacy in the matter. Instead, it made general warnings about the threat of nuclear 
weapons in its neighbourhood and referred to the urgent need to create a NWFZ in the 
Middle East. In addition, the Islamic Republic's regular allusions to Israel's nuclear 
weapons acted as a diplomatically convenient way for Iranian authorities to draw 
international attention to its adversaries' nuclear capabilities. 
After the 1990-1991 Gulf conflict, however, the scenario of Iraq getting hold of a 
nuclear bomb stopped being an urgent concern for the Iranian government. The steps 
taken by the IAEA to neutralize Iraq's nuclear capabilities - which were unequivocally 
supported by the Islamic Republic, even if Iranian officials did express their displeasure 
with the "unconventional" Iraq-related weapons inspection mechanism created 
by the 
major powers through the UN Security Council resolution 687 - allowed 
Iran to shift 
the focus of its diplomatic argumentation on regional nuclear arms control to 
Israel. 
The Islamic Republic's diplomatic efforts to achieve the nuclear disarmament of 
Israel based on the argument that the Jewish state's de facto status as a nuclear-weapon 
state posed a dual threat to regional security. For one thing. the officials of 
the Islamic 
Republic maintained, Israel's nuclear armaments constituted a 
highly dangerous 
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element in the already inflammable conflict constellations of the Middle East. For 
another thing, the Iranians added, Israel's nuclear weapons constituted an independent 
threat to the regional countries. 
According to Iranian officials - who also expressed their concern over the possibility 
of Israel using its nuclear weapons as a tool for political blackmail and over the 
damages caused to human health and the natural environment by Israel's nuclear 
activities - acted as a major obstacle to arms control and disarmament in the Middle 
East. Because of Israel's nuclear weapon arsenal, the Iranians claimed, the governments 
of the region had been forced to launch military build-up programs - both in the area of 
conventional armaments and WMD - which, in turn, had plunged the Middle East into a 
cycle of arms racing. The Islamic Republic strongly criticized Western powers and the 
United States, in particular, for their acceptance of Israel's nuclear status and held them 
responsible for the region's poor security situation. 
Thus, Iran was highly critical of the extra-regional diplomatic initiatives made in the 
aftermath of the 1990-1991 Gulf conflict to control WMD in the Middle East, for it 
viewed them as one-sidedly benefiting the Jewish state. For example, the Islamic 
Republic rejected the so-called Bush initiative of 1991 which, among others, called for 
the creation of a ban on the production in, and the importation into, the region of 
weapons-usable nuclear material and which effectively left Israel's existing fissile 
material stocks out of the initiative's purview. In a similar manner, the Islamic Republic 
rejected the ACRS talks that formed a part of the Middle East peace negotiations. 
Iranian officials argued that as long as all the regional countries had not acceded to 
multilateral arms control instruments banning WMD, and as long as the security 
concerns of one or more Middle Eastern countries continued to be ignored, the ACRS 
talks remained meaningless. 
Yet, at the same time, Iran, which was not invited to take part in the ACRS 
discussions in the first place, took the opportunity to criticize Israel for the arms control 
stances it adopted at the talks. Above all, the Islamic Republic rejected the Israeli 
position according to which arms control measures in the Middle East would be 
possible only after a comprehensive peace in the region had been achieved. In the 
Iranian view, Israel's position was "irrational" because it was Israel's nuclear arsenal 
and the Jewish state's refusal to join the NPT that stood in the way of a comprehensive 
peace settlement in the region. Accordingly. Iranian authorities, 
for whom the creation 
of a nuclear-free Middle East was a prerequisite 
for a political solution to the Arab- 
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Israeli conflict, called on the major powers to cut their nuclear relations with Israel and 
to pressure the Jewish state to join the NPT and to subject its nuclear facilities to the 
full-scope safeguards of the IAEA. 
While the Islamic Republic's attempts to advance the establishment of a NWFZ or a 
WMDFZ in the Middle East were tightly linked to its diplomatic efforts vis-ä-vis Iraq 
and Israel, Iran's calls for the creation of such zones also acted as a diplomatically safe 
way for Iran to draw international attention to other Middle Eastern countries' WMD 
capabilities. In the Islamic Republic's WMDFZ argumentation, Israel's elimination of 
its nuclear weapons was defined as the necessary first step towards the creation of a 
Middle Eastern WMDFZ, followed by Arab governments' abandonment of their 
chemical and biological weapons capabilities. Iran called on the major powers to 
support Middle Eastern countries' NWFZ and WMDFZ efforts, to promise that they 
would not use or threaten to use nuclear armaments against the states comprising such 
zones, and to commit themselves to increased peaceful nuclear cooperation with the 
regional governments agreeing to relinquish their WMD capabilities. 
The Islamic Republic also continued to advocate the establishment of a NWFZ or a 
WMDFZ in the Persian Gulf sub-region. As to the Iranian-envisioned NWFZ, the 
Islamic Republic called on the Gulf countries to begin regional cooperation in the area 
of nuclear arms control and, this way, pave the way for the creation of a NWFZ in the 
Persian Gulf. Iranian officials stressed that, as a start, all Gulf countries should declare 
their rejection of nuclear armaments and that the regional states which were not 
members of the NPT should promptly join the treaty. The Iranians also called on the 
Gulf states to exchange views on the NPT and IAEA safeguards. In addition to speaking 
of "coordinated regional implementation" of IAEA safeguards, they raised the idea of 
complementary verification arrangements agreed on by the Gulf states. Moreover, the 
officials of the Islamic Republic called for regional cooperation in peaceful uses nuclear 
energy and expressed their country's readiness to consider "any other positive 
initiative" dealing with nuclear matters in the Persian Gulf context. 
However, in the post-Iran-Iraq war period, the Islamic Republic's diplomatic 
argumentation on a nuclear-free Gulf region began to increasingly center around the 
idea of a Gulf WMDFZ. And more often than not, Iran linked its calls 
for the 
establishment of such a zone with calls for the creation of a new, indigenous security 
arrangement in the region. Underscoring their country's willingness to see an 
indigenous Gulf security system in place, the representatives of the Islamic 
Republic 
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pointed to the fact that their country had made a proposal for the establishment of a 
collective security arrangement in the Gulf already in 1986. The Iranians argued that the 
implementation of the 1986 initiative would help the Gulf states to address the threat of 
WMD as well as the problem of foreign military presence in the region. By the same 
token, the officials of the Islamic Republic alluded to the concept of a "defensive 
security scheme, " introduced by their government in 1994, and said that that concept, 
too, stressed the importance of a WMD-free Persian Gulf region. 
Finally, Iran continued to advocate the establishment of NWFZ and WMDFZ in other 
parts of the world as well. Thus, for example, it restated its support for the NWFZ in the 
South Pacific and in the Latin America and the Caribbean, respectively, and called for 
the creation of a similar zone in South Asia. In addition, the Islamic Republic welcomed 
South Africa's joining of the NPT in July 1991 and the subsequent agreement reached, 
in the form of the 1996 Treaty of Pelindaba, on the formation of a NWFZ in Africa. 
6.4.2.2 Objectives vs. goals 
As was the case during the Islamic Republic's first decade, Iran's nuclear arms 
control operations in the post-Iran-Iraq war period served multiple foreign policy goals. 
Primarily, Iran's diplomatic operations aimed at addressing the Islamic Republic's 
security needs. Iranian officials' desire to reduce the threat, however distant, posed to 
their country by the nuclear capabilities of the major powers and Iran's regional 
neighbours was the central factor behind the Islamic Republic's nuclear arms control 
objectives. Islamic Iran's diplomatic actions on the question of universal nuclear 
disarmament, and at a more concrete level, on security assurances, nuclear transparency, 
the fissile ban treaty, the CTBT, the improvement of the IAEA's verification system, 
the nuclear disarmament of Israel and Iraq, as well as on the establishment of NWFZ or 
WMDFZ in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf region, and in other parts of the world 
were strongly guided by security considerations. 
Closely linked with such considerations were the Islamic Republic's attempts to use 
nuclear arms control diplomacy for influencing the power relations between Iran and the 
states striving for or already possessing nuclear weapons. Hence, the aforementioned 
Iranian diplomatic objectives can also be viewed as partially stemming from the Iranian 
concern that the Islamic Republic could be subjected to direct or indirect nuclear 
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blackmail in a future diplomatic or military confrontation with foreign powers. 32 Iranian 
leadership's diplomatic actions against Israel's nuclear weapons provide an excellent 
example of how the Islamic Republic tried to use nuclear arms control as an instrument 
to undermine the power and influence of an adversary and to internationally improve its 
own power position. 
Of course, the Israel-related actions of the Iranians cannot be solely attributed to the 
Islamic Republic's security and power calculations. As a revolutionary regime whose 
domestic and - in some respects - international legitimacy largely depended on its 
adherence to an ideological foreign policy course, the Islamic Republic's Israel 
diplomacy included an ideological element as well. Apart from making use of 
international arms control arenas to condemn the Jewish state's and other international 
actors' possession of nuclear weapons on the grounds that such armaments functioned 
as symbols and tools of oppressive foreign and military policies, the authorities of the 
Islamic Republic kept pointing out that the mere existence of nuclear arms itself was 
spiritually and morally unacceptable. In a similar fashion, some of Islamic Iran's 
nuclear arms control objectives were illustrative of its prestige aspirations. Portraying 
itself as an opponent of the major powers' and regional states' nuclear weapons 
activities and as a defender of Third World countries' nuclear rights, the Islamic 
Republic hoped to win recognition, respect, and status both regionally and 
internationally. 
Iranian officials' post-Iran-Iraq war diplomatic attempts to defend their country's 
right to a peaceful nuclear program and to improve the Islamic Republic's access to 
nuclear materials and technology, in turn, testified, first of all, to Iranian authorities' 
welfare-related considerations. Defining their nuclear activities as a factor contributing 
to future economic development and prosperity of their country and to the well-being of 
the Iranian people, the leaders of the Islamic Republic mobilized Iran's arms control 
diplomacy for the promotion of their welfare-related interests. Thus, while containing a 
prestige and an ideological element as well, Iran's diplomatic defence of Third World 
countries' nuclear rights partially stemmed from Iran's welfare aspirations. Similarly, 
Iran's calls for the creation of an international treaty banning armed attacks against 
nuclear facilities was indicative not only of the Islamic Republic's security interests but 
also of its welfare-related concern over the future of the Iranian nuclear program. 
The 
32 Conversely, of course, Iran may have been worried that the possession of nuclear weapons 
by its 
adversaries could reduce the Islamic Republic's influence on those countries. 
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same can be said of the Iranian nuclear arms control operations - for example, in the 
context of the diplomatic debate on the strengthening of the IAEA's verification 
capabilities - which stressed that the arms control measures agreed on by the 
international community should not hamper or jeopardize NPT states parties' peaceful 
nuclear activities. 
On the other hand, the Islamic Republic's diplomatic defence of its own and other 
developing countries' nuclear rights and activities - and, indeed, many other aspects of 
Iran's nuclear arms control policy as well - can also be interpreted as being part of an 
Iranian diplomatic effort to cover and protect the Islamic Republic's attempts to develop 
a nuclear weapons capability. As already discussed in chapter 5, during the Rafsanjani 
presidency, the leaders of the Islamic Republic continued to stress the importance of a 
civilian nuclear power program to their country and expanded their overt nuclear 
activities. And yet at the same time, as it later turned out, the Iranians also intensified 
their secret, undeclared nuclear experiments in the area of uranium conversion, uranium 
enrichment, and plutonium separation. 33 In short, the Islamic Republic was pursuing a 
national nuclear program with both civilian and military applications. 
6.4.3 From the CTBT to the signing of the Additional Protocol 
6.4.3.1 The objectives 
The presidency of Muhammad Khatami, though introducing a new ideological 
language and a conciliatory tone to the Islamic Republic's foreign policy, did not bring 
about a significant substantive change in Iran's nuclear arms control operations. Under 
33 Most significantly, during the Rafsanjani presidency, the Islamic Republic took a further step in 
improving its uranium enrichment capabilities. According to the officials of the Islamic Republic, in 
1993, the international nuclear smuggling network led by Abdul Qadir Khan approached a company in 
their country with an offer to sell uranium enrichment technology. The offer was subsequently pursued by 
the AEOI which - between 1994 and 1996 - received 500 sets of P-l centrifuge components from the 
network. Most of the items related to the 1993 offer had originally been ordered by Libya. The authorities 
of the Islamic Republic have also revealed that they received a full set of general P-2 centrifuge drawings 
from the Khan network in a meeting held in Dubai in 1996. Yet, according to the Iranians, no actual work 
on P-2 centrifuges - whose annual enrichment output is about two and half times higher than that of P-1 
centrifuges - was carried out in their country prior to 2002. The Islamic Republic first acknowledged that 
it had received P-2 centrifuge drawings from foreign sources in January 2004. For statements made by 
Iranian officials during the Rafsanjani presidency implying that the Islamic Republic had an interest in 
nuclear weapons, note, for example, the remark made in 1991 by Ataullah Muhajirani, Iran's then vice- 
president for parliamentary affairs: "All Muslims must reach a high level [of expertise] in the nuclear 
realm, so they can face the Israeli nuclear challenge. The Muslims must act to obtain a nuclear capability 
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its reformist president, thus, Iran continued to use international arms control fora to 
voice its categorical opposition to nuclear weapons and to promote the objective of 
universal nuclear disarmament. Claiming that nuclear weapons and the military 
doctrines based on such armaments increased international insecurity and arguing that 
the elimination of nuclear weapons was the most important issue on the international 
arms control agenda, the Khatami administration called for the creation, at the CD, of a 
NWC, an international treaty that would ban nuclear armaments. 
At the same time, however, the Iranians recognized that the objective of a nuclear- 
weapon-free world could not be achieved in the near future. As a result, the Islamic 
Republic welcomed and kept calling for partial arms control measures, both in bilateral 
and multilateral contexts, to deal with the problem of nuclear weapons. In the first 
place, by referring to the 1925 Geneva Protocol as a model, the Khatami administration 
advocated the adoption of an international ban on the use or threat of use of nuclear 
arms. Iran also continued its efforts, made together with other non-nuclear states, to 
achieve the establishment of an international instrument providing NNWS with negative 
security assurances and kept advancing the creation of international mechanisms that 
would increase nuclear transparency and thereby disclose information about nuclear 
powers' weapons arsenals, fissile materials, nuclear delivery systems, plans to develop 
nuclear capabilities, and nuclear warhead dismantlement activities. In addition, the 
representatives of the Islamic Republic continued to promote the establishment of an 
international fissile material treaty dealing with past and future production of fissile 
materials. 
As far as the issue of nuclear testing was concerned, in May 1998, the Islamic 
Republic was faced with the diplomatic challenge posed by India's and Pakistan's 
nuclear tests. The government of president Khatami - in spite of its initial ideological 
flirting with the idea of an Islamic bomb possessed by Pakistan34 - responded to the 
developments in Iran's immediate neighbourhood by seeking to convince the parties of 
the necessity of refraining from further tests and by seeking to prevent the escalation of 
the crisis in South Asia. On the one hand, Iran pursued these objectives by expressing its 
that would strengthen them. " (GOV/2004/83,2004: 6,10; GOV/2007/58,2007: 4 and Feldman 1997: 
137) 
As a sidenote, it is interesting to speculate to what extent Iran's initial supportive reaction to Pakistan's 
nuclear tests was influenced by the fact that the Islamic Republic's efforts to develop its uranium 
enrichment capabilities at the time were dependent on the help provided by the Abdul 
Qadir Khan 
network whose activities would hardly have been possible without the tacit approval of 
Pakistan's highest 
powerholders. 
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deep concern over the situation in the region and by noting that the test explosions had 
seriously undermined regional and international security as well as international arms 
control efforts, especially the CTBT. The Khatami government also noted that the 
nuclear tests in South Asia had been "a giant mistake" and that the two countries would 
have to face the diplomatic consequences of their actions. 
Yet, at the same time, the Islamic Republic argued that instead of imposing heavy 
international sanctions on India and Pakistan, governments should help the parties to 
defuse the existing tensions in their relations. Acting on its own advice, Iran resorted to 
bilateral diplomacy and sent its foreign minister to visit both India and Pakistan to 
discuss the on-going crisis. In its talks with Indian and Pakistani authorities, the Islamic 
Republic called on the two countries to stop nuclear testing, to refrain from acts that 
could aggrevate the situation, and to launch a dialogue for solving the political and 
nuclear-related problems between them. Also, Iran called on India and Pakistan to 
implement bilateral confidence-building measures, to expeditiously accede to the NPT 
and the CTBT, and to make sure that no nuclear weapons-related materials, equipment, 
or technology would be transferred out from their respective territories. 
The conciliatory side of Iran's diplomatic approach to the crisis in South Asia 
included the claim that NWS were partly responsible for the tensions in the region. 
According to Iranian officials, the nuclear powers' reluctance to take meaningful steps 
towards comprehensive nuclear disarmament, together with their general disregard for 
the interests of NNWS, had led India and Pakistan to conclude that they needed nuclear 
weapons to guarantee their national security. Iranian authorities also argued that the 
nuclear tests in South Asia had showed, for their part, that universal nuclear 
disarmament, in contrast to mere nuclear non-proliferation measures, was the only way 
to rid the world of the problem of nuclear weapons. 
While arguing that the nuclear tests in South Asia had badly damaged the CTBT and 
seriously undermined the treaty's objective of blocking vertical and horizontal 
proliferation of nuclear armaments, the Islamic Republic continued, despite its repeated 
remarks that the CTBT contained major shortcomings, to promote the early EIF and 
execution of the treaty. Thus, the decision taken by the U. S. Senate in October 1999 not 
to ratify the treaty prompted a strong reaction from Tehran. Iranian authorities 
condemned the decision and argued that it could adversely affect the ratification 
processes in other countries. The Iranians also called on the international community 
to 
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express its concern over the Senate's rejection of the CTBT and to call on the 
Americans to reverse their decision. 
Iran's criticism of the United States' stance on the CTBT intensified after the 
administration of president George W. Bush declared, in 2001, that it objected to the 
treaty and would not ask the Senate to reconsider approving the CTBT. Iran declared 
that the Bush administration's decision was an indication of the U. S. government's 
"dangerous mentality" and "unipolar vision of the world. " A year later, after the Bush 
administration had released information about the latest U. S. Nuclear Posture Review, 
the Islamic Republic dismissed the document and argued that the new U. S. posture 
would strengthen the role of nuclear weapons and thereby also the role of nuclear 
testing in U. S. military planning. 
Iran voiced its categorical opposition to any kind of development and qualitative 
improvement of nuclear arms - including the potential construction by the United States 
of so-called small or mini-nuclear weapons capable of penetrating earth and destroying 
military targets in hardened and deeply-buried bunkers - and while recognizing that, 
under the Bush administration, the United States would not alter its policy on nuclear 
testing, it nevertheless regularly called on the Americans to ratify the CTBT. 
Of course, Iran's CTBT argumentation was overshadowed by the fact that the Islamic 
Republic itself had not ratified the treaty. Despite the declaration made by the Khatami 
administration in October 1999 that Iran would speed up the ratification process in the 
Majlis and submit its ratification instrument as soon as possible, the Islamic Republic 
never ratified the treaty. There were three main reasons for this: key countries had not 
acceded to the treaty, there was opposition to CTBT ratification within Iran's political 
elite, and the Iranians wanted, as long as they could, to retain the ratification issue as a 
trump card for future diplomatic bargaining. 
One of the new features of Iran's arms control operations during the Khatami 
presidency was the Islamic Republic's active effort to diplomatically support the 
advancement of its ballistic missile programs. Following Iran's first flight test of the 
Shihab-3 missile in July 1998, Iran mobilized its arms control officials to convince the 
world that the Islamic Republic's missile activities served only defensive purposes and 
that they were not linked to any WMD, and especially nuclear weapons, ambitions. 
On 
the one hand, Iran's response to outside concerns over its missile intentions consisted of 
strong criticism of the countries - first and foremost Israel and the 
United States - 
openly accusing the Islamic Republic of WMD aspirations. 
Iranian authorities defined 
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such accusations as efforts to create tension between Iran and its neighbours and as 
attempts to generate a regional arms race that would serve the interests of extra-regional 
states. 
For the most part, however, the Islamic Republic focused on reassuring the 
international community of the defensive and conventional nature of its missiles. Thus, 
the Khatami administration insisted that Iran would not use its missiles to threaten other 
states or to initiate acts of aggression against them. In addition, Iranian representatives 
declared that their government was committed to a policy of not using missiles first. 35 
Simultaneously, however, the Islamic Republic stressed that it had every right to 
strengthen and improve its missile capabilities as part of its defence efforts and its 
conventional weapons programs. 
Security motives aside, the officials of the Islamic Republic argued that their 
country's interest in missile technology stemmed from civilian considerations as well. 
Alluding to civilian applications of missile technology in areas such as space 
exploration, telecommunications, and broadcasting, the Iranians pointed out that their 
country's work on missiles with greater ranges and payloads than those of the Shihab-3 
would serve purely non-military purposes. In early 2002, the Islamic Republic 
reportedly decided to stop the development of the Shihab-4 intermediate-range missile 
so that it could not be accused of constituting a missile threat to Europe and the United 
States. In November 2003, in the midst of the diplomatic crisis over its nuclear program, 
Iran officially declared that it would suspend the development of the Shihab-4. Yet the 
arms control value of this unilateral Iranian declaration was significantly undermined by 
the Islamic Republic's announcement that it would still continue the execution of the 
Shihab-3 program and that it would reserve itself the right to develop a space launch 
vehicle. 
Iran's attempts to defend its missile activities included a diplomatic counterattack 
against the efforts of the MTCR to adopt strengthened international measures to control 
the proliferation of ballistic missiles. Using the UN as the key forum for 
its missile 
diplomacy, in October 1999, at the UN General Assembly's 54th session, the Islamic 
Republic introduced a draft resolution specifically dealing with the question of missiles. 
The Iranian draft resolution requested the secretary-general of the world organization to 
`S Of course, as already noted above in section 5.3.2.1, the credibility of the unilateral 
Iranian declarations 
was greatly undermined by the Islamic Republic's missile attacks on the 
MKO based in neighbouring Iraq 
in April 2001. 
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prepare a report on the issue of missiles in all its aspects for the consideration of the 
General Assembly at its 56th session. As some governments wanted to have more time 
to consider the Islamic Republic's proposal, it was not until a year later that the Iranian 
initiative was accepted. In November 2000, the General Assembly asked the secretary- 
general to prepare a report on missiles for the assembly's consideration at its 57`h 
session in 2002. 
The Islamic Republic's multilateral missile diplomacy was guided by the premise that 
while there was an undeniable linkage between the issues of missiles and WMD, 
governments should also recognize that missiles constituted a legitimate element of 
states' national defence. Iranian officials emphasized that international arms control 
deliberations on missiles should always take individual countries' concerns and interests 
into account and that all decisions on international steps to control missiles should be 
collectively taken within the framework of the UN. Relatedly, the Iranians strongly 
denounced the missile-related export controls of the MTCR which they viewed as 
"narrowly-defined" and "discriminatory. " In Iran's opinion, MTCR export controls 
were yet another outside attempt to hamper the Islamic Republic's and other developing 
countries' legitimate defence and development plans. 
Consequently, Iran rejected the MTCR's diplomatic efforts to obtain support for its 
initiative on the adoption of an International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile 
Proliferation. To undermine the ICOC initiative, seen by the Iranians as an unwanted 
alternative to its UN-based missile approach, the Islamic Republic stressed the world 
organization's centrality in the missile debate and continued to pursue the matter at the 
UN. While refraining from joining the MTCR code of conduct, ultimately signed in The 
Hague in November 2002, Iran hailed the UN secretary-general's July 2002 report on 
the issue of missiles and, in October 2003, together with Egypt and Indonesia, requested 
the secretary-general to submit a follow-up report for the General Assembly by 2004. 
Also, the Islamic Republic called on the Geneva-based CD to start to deal with the 
question of missile control. 
The fact that most Western countries withheld their support for the UN's missile 
studies was portrayed by Iranian officials as a sign of those states' intention to block the 
adoption of a truly multilateral approach to missile arms control. Yet, 
in the final 
analysis, Iran's own diplomacy suggested that the Islamic Republic, heavily 
investing in 
missile programs, had little interest in far-reaching 
international missile control 
measures. That Iran's missile-related diplomatic statements made no references 
to 
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international steps limiting states' missile-related research and development activities 
testified to such disinterest. Untypically for the Islamic Republic, whose arms control 
diplomacy had always placed heavy emphasis on multilateral legal arrangements, it also 
argued that as far as international missile arms control measures were concerned, "it 
might not be necessary to automatically take the stereotypical path of negotiating a 
convention banning missile development and proliferation. " 
The Khatami government's attempts to use arms control diplomacy for defending 
Iran's ballistic missile programs may have also explained the reports, emerging in 1999, 
that the Islamic Republic had approached Israel that year through British intermediaries 
and proposed security talks between the two countries. Iran's diplomatic feeler to Israel 
- presumably intended for inducing the Jewish state to ease diplomatic pressure on the 
Islamic Republic and its weapons programs and for inhibiting preventive Israeli military 
strikes against Iran - had reportedly called for bilateral discussions on a declaration 
through which the countries of the Middle East would pledge not to use missiles for a 
first strike, on an agreement that would prevent the regional states from arming their 
missiles with WMD warheads, and on restrictions on missiles serving military purposes 
and having a range greater than 1,300 kilometers. Whatever the accuracy of the reports 
suggesting that the Islamic Republic had tried to open a secret discussion channel with 
Israel, the Khatami administration maintained that it had never made such a move and 
rejected the news reports claiming the opposite as products of the "Zionist propaganda 
machine. " 
Whereas, under president Khatami, the substance of the Islamic Republic's nuclear 
arms control operations remained highly identical with that of the Iranian policies of the 
Rafsanjani era, in the early 2000s, the diplomatic and military context of Iran's arms 
control policy changed dramatically. The foreign policy of the U. S. administration of 
president George W. Bush, especially after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, 
and the new information about Iran's nuclear program, revealed in 2002-2003, forced 
the Khatami administration to launch a major diplomatic campaign to protect the 
Islamic Republic's ability to pursue a comprehensive nuclear program. Arguably, the 
realization of this objective posed the biggest challenge ever to Islamic Iran's anus 
control policy. 
The Islamic Republic's efforts to defend and protect its nuclear program consisted of 
diplomatic activities on two separate fronts. On the one hand, Iran's leaders 
launched a 
vehement diplomatic counterattack against the Bush administration 
in order to 
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undermine the credibility of the U. S. claim that Iran was pursuing nuclear weapons. On 
the other hand, the authorities of the Islamic Republic were forced to try to limit the 
damages caused to their nuclear activities by the 2002-2003 revelations about their 
nuclear program. The second diplomatic front mainly consisted of Iran's interaction 
with the IAEA. 
As far as Iran's diplomacy vis-a-vis the United States was concerned, the officials of 
the Islamic Republic asserted that the Bush administration's opposition to Iran's 
peaceful nuclear program, together with the U. S. claim that Iran was interested in 
nuclear arms, stemmed from a number of considerations that had nothing to do with the 
nuclear issue itself but with the Bush government's foreign policy aspirations. First of 
all, the Iranians argued that the Bush administration used Iran and its nuclear program 
as a tool to fuel fear and tension in the Middle East so that it could, among others, 
increase its arms sales to the region. Secondly, Iranian representatives maintained that 
the United States' hostile policy against the Islamic Republic and its nuclear efforts was 
linked to an attempt to divert international attention away from Israel's nuclear arsenal 
and the threat it posed to regional and global security. Thirdly, the Iranians asserted that 
the Bush government's nuclear weapon accusations testified to an effort to pressure the 
Islamic Republic to change its policy on Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
Finally, the officials of the Islamic Republic concluded that the United States also 
aimed at weakening Iran by trying to keep it in a state of scientific and technological 
"deprivation" and that, in the end, the Bush government's ultimate objective was to 
overthrow Iran's Islamic regime. 
According to the leaders of the Islamic Republic, the Bush administration had 
embarked upon a hegemonist, unilateral, and militarist foreign policy course that 
showed contempt for international law and the rights and interests of other nations. The 
Iranians maintained that the United States' dangerous and arrogant foreign policy 
manifested itself in a number of ways. Referring specifically to the Bush 
administration's arms control record, the representatives of the Islamic Republic noted 
that the Bush government had blocked the finalization of the BTWC protocol, prevented 
the fifth BTWC review conference from achieving results, and undermined the CWC 
and the activities of the OPCW. 
Furthermore, the Iranians maintained that the United States' inaction in the area of 
nuclear arms control was similarly indicative of that country's disastrous policies. 
In the 
first place, the officials of the Islamic Republic criticized the 
Americans of letting 
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certain states to pursue nuclear armaments despite the international community's 
disapproval of such weapons. The Iranians alluded to Israel as the case in point. Iranian 
representatives accused the United States of allowing the Jewish state to develop 
nuclear bombs and delivery systems and of actively supporting the Israeli activities. The 
Iranians also asked why the United States did not call on India and Pakistan to give up 
their nuclear weapons. Apart from pointing to the double standard in the Bush 
government's nuclear arms control policy - of which the United States' active support 
for Iran's nuclear program during the Shah's era was referred to as a further piece of 
evidence - the officials of the Islamic Republic argued that the Bush administration had 
totally ignored the United States' obligation to reduce its nuclear weapons and to move 
towards complete nuclear disarmament. By the same token, the Iranians pointed to the 
Bush government's rejection of the CTBT and also claimed that the Americans had 
effectively terminated their bilateral nuclear arms control talks with Russia. 
In Iran's view, the United States' intention to create a NMD system was yet another 
sign of the Bush administration's hegemonist aspirations. The authorities of the Islamic 
Republic viewed the United States' NMD plans as a severe threat to the ABM Treaty of 
1972 which was characterized by the Iranians as the "cornerstone of global strategic 
stability. " Eventually, Iran strongly condemned the Bush administration's decision, 
made public in December 2001, to withdraw from the treaty. In a similar manner, the 
Islamic Republic was highly critical of the Bush government's Nuclear Posture Review 
in which the United States reserved itself the right to resort to nuclear weapons in future 
conflicts and in which Iran was named as one of the seven potential targets against 
which the United States should be prepared to use nuclear arms. Finally, Iranian 
authorities repeatedly denounced the individual components of the so-called Bush 
doctrine which were officially codified into the U. S. National Security Strategy of 
September 2002. 
But while actively objecting to the policies of the Bush administration and stressing 
the importance of existing international arms control arrangements, and while calling 
for the creation of a broad international front to stand against the U. S. policies and to 
defend the cause of multilateralism and law-based international relations, the authorities 
of the Islamic Republic also sought - out of their concern over the Bush 
administration's diplomatic and military intentions vis-a-vis Tehran - to discuss their 
country's nuclear program face-to-face with the Americans. Thus. 
in addition to 
welcoming U. S. companies to take part in the construction of Iran's nuclear 
facilities, 
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the Iranians mandated the IAEA director-general to inform, in October 2002, president 
Bush of the Islamic Republic's interest in opening a direct discussion channel with the 
U. S. government. 
More importantly, in May 2003, Iran made a remarkable offer for a comprehensive 
political agreement between the Islamic Republic and the United States, which had only 
recently invaded Iraq. In its proposal, Iran offered to open up its nuclear activities to 
instrusive international inspections, to sign the IAEA additional protocol, and raised the 
possibility of extensive U. S. involvement in the Islamic Republic's nuclear projects. 
Moreover, in its May 2003 offer, Iran agreed to address U. S. concerns over terrorism, to 
coordinate policy on Iraq, as well as to consider the formal acceptance of a two-state 
solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In return, the Iranians called on the United 
States to lift sanctions against their country, recognize Iran's right to full access to 
nuclear, chemical, and biological materials and technology, recognize the Islamic 
Republic's security interests, and abandon the stated objective of a regime change in 
Iran. In the end, both Iranian initiatives were rejected by the Bush government. 
As for the Islamic Republic's diplomacy with the IAEA - which, from the summer of 
2002 onwards, sought to unravel the details of the Iranian nuclear program in order to 
determine whether the Islamic Republic had breached its safeguards obligations, 
whether Iran's nuclear program was exclusively for peaceful purposes, and whether 
there were secret nuclear activities taking place in that country - it consisted of two 
main features. On the one hand, in order to alleviate international concerns over its 
nuclear program and to avert international countermeasures that could hamper the 
execution of its nuclear projects - and, in the worst case scenario, lead to military action 
against Iran - the Islamic Republic had no choice but to cooperate with the 
IAEA, 
acquiesce to a rigorous investigation of its nuclear program, and make diplomatic 
concessions to the major powers, the key members of the IAEA's Board of Governors. 
Yet, on the other hand, Iran's attempts to defend and protect its nuclear activities also 
contained a confrontational aspect, for Iranian authorities were not prepared to 
relinquish what they viewed as their fundamental NPT-based right to pursue a 
comprehensive nuclear program for peaceful purposes. Neither did Iranian officials. 
in 
their dealings with the IAEA and the major powers, shun away from making threats, 
concealing facts, presenting outright lies, making counterdemands. and resorting to 
diplomatic procrastination. Often by means of the aforementioned methods, 
Iranian 
representatives also tried their best to drive a diplomatic wedge 
between the 
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governments that took a hard approach to the Islamic Republic's nuclear program and 
the ones showing understanding to Iran's nuclear aspirations. 
All in all, then, the cooperative and confrontational aspects of Iran's nuclear 
diplomacy lived side by side in the Islamic Republic's nuclear arms control operations 
of 2002-2003. The cooperative element manifested itself, first of all, in the fact that 
after the August 2002 revelation about Iran's secret nuclear activities at two sites 
previously unknown to the IAEA, the Islamic Republic admitted, in September 2002, 
that it was indeed involved in building a heavy water production plant in Arak and a 
uranium enrichment facility in Natanz. In addition, Iran agreed to the IAEA's request to 
visit the two sites later that year, even if, due to Iran's procrastination, the visit did not 
materialize until February 2003. 
During the IAEA's February 2003 visit to Iran, the authorities of the Islamic 
Republic expressed their readiness to cooperate with the agency and welcomed 
international supervision "to dispel the lies being fabricated against Iran. " Similarly, the 
Islamic Republic emphasized its commitment to nuclear transparency, agreed to 
incorporate subsidiary arrangements into its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and 
pledged to "actively consider" the signing of the IAEA additional protocol. 
Simultaneously, however, Iranian authorities pointed out to the agency's delegates that 
they were committed to developing the entire range of nuclear fuel-cycle facilities for 
their country and that it was their irrevocable right to do so. Moreover, the Iranians 
maintained that the agency had a responsibility to help their country to obtain civil 
nuclear assistance and noted that their cooperation with the IAEA ought to be 
concretely rewarded. 
Referring to its policy of transparency, the Islamic Republic subsequently provided 
the IAEA with information about its nuclear fuel-cycle plans and allowed the agency to 
visit the Natanz uranium enrichment facility. In this connection, the Iranians also tried 
to deceive the IAEA by untruthfully maintaining that the design and development work 
on their centrifuge enrichment program had started in 1997 - the Iranians later admitted 
that the program had already begun in 1985 - and by asserting that Iran's testing of 
individual centrifuges and its development of an optimized centrifuge design had 
exclusively relied on modelling and simulation and not on the enrichment of small 
amounts of uranium as normally is the case. Indeed, the authorities of the 
Islamic 
Republic claimed that their country had so far never enriched uranium. 
Unconvinced of 
the explanation, the IAEA eventually successfully persuaded the 
Iranians to allow 
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environmental sampling at the Natanz pilot enrichment plant. As a result, in June 2003, 
the IAEA was able to confirm the discovery of particles of HEU at Natanz. 36 
Another untruth told by Iranian officials during the IAEA's February 2003 Iran visit 
concerned the Kalaye Electric Company that was believed by the IAEA to be linked to 
Iran's gas centrifuge enrichment activities. Iran responded to the agency's questions 
about the facility by stating that it was a watch factory that had also been used to 
produce centrifuge components, but that no uranium had ever been enriched at the site. 
Of course, as the authorities of the Islamic Republic themselves later acknowledged, 
between 1997-2002, the Kalaye facility had acted as the main venue for Iran's uranium 
enrichment efforts, the activities at the site having included the assembly of centrifuges 
and, more importantly, the testing of centrifuges with uranium hexafluoride in 1999 and 
2002. 
In February 2003, the IAEA also asked Iran's permission to visit the Kalaye facility 
and to take environmental samples there, but both requests were rejected by the Islamic 
Republic on grounds of the fact that Iran had not acceded to the IAEA additional 
protocol and therefore was under no obligation to agree to the steps called for by the 
agency. One month later, however, the Iranians allowed the IAEA to visit limited parts 
of the Kalaye facility, although the agency was denied access to two of the facility's 
rooms because, as it later turned out, they had contained centrifuges and the Iranians 
had tried to clear out any evidence of uranium enrichment at the site. Ultimately, in May 
2003, the IAEA got an access to the whole facility, but the Iranians continued to rule 
out the possibility of environmental sampling at the site. In August 2003, the authorities 
of the Islamic Republic changed their stance and showed green light to environmental 
sampling at Kalaye, although by that time, they had significantly modified the 
workshop's premises. The Iranians rejected the accusation that they had deliberately 
sanitized the workshop rooms and maintained that the modifications had been made to 
transform the workshop from a storage facility into a laboratory. Because of the 
modifications conducted at Kalaye, the IAEA made it known that it might not be able to 
guarantee the accuracy of the samples taken there. 
37 
36 The IAEA subsequently concluded that "it seems plausible" that, as claimed 
by the Iranians, the HEU 
contamination found at Natanz had not resulted from uranium enrichment at the site 
but from 
contaminated centrifuge components (GOV/2004/83,2004: 10). 
37 On 16 September 2003, the IAEA informed Iranian authorities that it had found particles of HEU and 
low-enriched uranium from the samples taken at the Kalaye site. 
The Iranians responded by saying that as 
they had never enriched uranium to the level of HEU, the only possible explanation 
for the finding was 
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The Islamic Republic practiced diplomatic deception also when it came to the 
undeclared batch of natural uranium that Iran had obtained from China in 1991. While 
disclosing the transaction to the IAEA in February 2003 only after Chinese authorities 
had first confirmed the shipment to the agency, Iran's officials untruthfully asserted that 
they had not processed any of the uranium hexafluoride imported from the Chinese and 
specifically stressed that the compound had not been used in any enrichment, centrifuge, 
or other tests. But as eventually admitted by the Iranians in October 2003, the uranium 
hexafluoride used in the centrifuge tests carried out at the Kalaye Electric Company in 
1999 and 2002 had indeed been among the nuclear materials imported from China in 
1991. 
Neither did the Iranian claim made to the IAEA in February 2003 that the Islamic 
Republic had designed the almost finished uranium conversion facility in Isfahan - 
whose existence had been declared to the IAEA in 2000 - without having operated any 
laboratory or pilot facilities using nuclear material to test the most difficult conversion 
processes, including the production of uranium hexafluoride, hold water. After the 
IAEA's inquiries on the matter, Iranian officials admitted, in August 2003, that they had 
secretly conducted uranium tetrafluoride conversion experiments on a laboratory scale 
at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center in the early 1990s. 
Moreover, the Iranian assertion that its substantial research and development program 
on lasers, whose existence was revealed by the Iranians to the IAEA in May 2003,38 had 
not included any activities pertaining to uranium enrichment turned out likewise to be 
incorrect. Here again, Iranian authorities eventually acknowledged that, between 1991- 
2000, their country had pursued a laser enrichment program in the course of which it 
had used 30 kilograms of uranium metal that had not been previously declared to the 
nuclear agency. 
Responding to the IAEA director-general's report of 6 June 2003 on the 
developments in the Iran case, the 35-member IAEA Board of Governors released its 
own statement on Iran on 19 June 2003. In that statement, the board expressed its 
concern over the Islamic Republic's failure to report nuclear materials, 
facilities, and 
that the HEU particles had ended up there on contaminated centrifuge equipment obtained 
from abroad. 
The IAEA eventually concluded that the Iranian explanation seemed credible 
(ibid. ) 
38 In May 2003, Iran also informed the IAEA for the first time of its plan to construct a 
heavy water 
research reactor at Arak. Despite the Iranian assurances that the purpose of 
the Arak reactor would be to 
produce radioisotopes and to serve as a nuclear training 
facility. Iran's May 2003 declaration raised 
immediate concerns that the Islamic Republic might try to utilize the planned 
heavy water reactor for the 
production of plutonium for military purposes. 
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activities as required by its safeguards obligations. The board also called on Iran, among 
others, to rectify all the existing safeguards problems, to fully cooperate with the IAEA 
in the on-going inspections, not to introduce nuclear material into the pilot uranium 
enrichment plant at Natanz, and to "promptly and unconditionally conclude and 
implement an additional protocol to its Safeguards Agreement. " 
Prior to the Board of Governors' June 2003 meeting, Iran had called on the board 
members not to use the "language of force and threat" in their statement, arguing that 
such language would be futile and not contribute to the resolution of the matter. After 
the issuance of the board statement, in turn, the Islamic Republic declared the statement 
as a diplomatic victory for Iran and a defeat for the United States whose aim was to 
have the Iran dossier referred to the UN Security Council which could authorize 
sanctions against the Islamic Republic. Iran also expressed its gratitude to the members 
of the NAM for their solidarity and constructive deliberations at the IAEA, as well as 
for their diplomatic support for the Islamic Republic. 
Iran's determination to continue its nuclear program in spite of the diplomatic arm 
wrestling with the IAEA and the major powers manifested itself in the fact that, on 25 
June 2003, only six days after the IAEA board's Iran statement, the Iranians began, 
against the IAEA board's express wish, to test centrifuges by feeding uranium 
hexaflouride into a single machine at the Natanz pilot plant. Later, on 19 August 2003, 
the Islamic Republic started the testing of a small ten-machine cascade with uranium 
hexafluoride. Yet, at the same time, in August 2003, the Iranians revealed information 
about the history and the details of their enrichment program to the IAEA and also 
allowed, after earlier rejections, the agency to visit two sites in Iran that had been 
suspected of being locations for centrifuge and laser enrichment. 
The first of the sites, Ramandih, turned out to be involved in agricultural studies 
unrelated to nuclear fuel-cycle activities. Also at the Lashkarabad site, though identified 
as a laser testing facility, the IAEA found no signs of uranium enrichment activities. In 
October 2003, however, the Islamic Republic revealed that as part of a laser enrichment 
program operated between 1991-2000, during which Iran had used 30 kilograms of 
uranium metal not previously declared to the IAEA, Lashkarabad had served as a site 
for enrichment experiments carried out between October 2002 and January 2003. 
The 
Iranians also stated that they had dismantled all equipment related to 
laser enrichment in 
May 2003. 
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Based on the IAEA director-general's Iran report of August 2003, in September 
2003, the nuclear agency's Board of Governors issued a resolution in which it, among 
others, expressed its grave concern over the fact that more than one year after the 
IAEA's initial inquiries to the Islamic Republic about undeclared nuclear activities, the 
agency was still not able to conclude that all nuclear materials in Iran had been declared 
and submitted to IAEA safeguards and that there were no undeclared nuclear activities 
in that country. Also, though acknowledging Iran's decision, made public on 24 August 
2003, to start negotiations with the IAEA on the conclusion of the additional protocol, 
the board noted that the Iranian decision had not met the board's June 2003 request that 
Iran would promptly and unconditionally sign and implement the protocol. In addition, 
the board called on the Islamic Republic not to introduce nuclear material into Natanz, 
to suspend all further activities related to uranium enrichment, and to suspend all 
activities related to the production of separated plutonium until the unconcluded matters 
pertaining to Iran's nuclear program had been resolved and until the Islamic Republic 
had applied the provisions of the additional protocol in a satisfactory manner. 
Even more damagingly for the Islamic Republic, the IAEA board also set a deadline 
for Iran in which it called on the Iranians to remedy all the failures related to the 
implementation of their safeguards agreement and to intensify their cooperation with the 
IAEA, among others, by supplying the agency with a full declaration of all imported 
materials and components relevant to the Iranian centrifuge enrichment program by the 
end of October 2003. Although the IAEA board's September 2003 resolution did not 
elaborate on the consequences to Iran of possible non-compliance with the resolution, 
the chance that the Iran file would be sent to the UN Security Council acted as a major 
diplomatic deterrent to the Islamic Republic. 
Although Iranian authorities strongly rejected the IAEA board's resolution and even 
threatened to scale back the Islamic Republic's cooperation with the agency and to 
consider withdrawing from the NPT, the Iranians - concerned over diplomatic, 
economic, and even military sanctions against their country - eventually agreed to 
intensify their cooperation with the IAEA and to promptly provide the agency with 
information and clarifications on all outstanding questions pertaining to the Islamic 
Republic's nuclear program. On 16 October 2003, the secretary of Iran's SNSC 
informed the IAEA's director-general in Tehran that his country was prepared to hand 
over a full disclosure of Iran's present and past nuclear activities to the nuclear agency. 
Also, Iran made it known that it was now ready to conclude the IAEA additional 
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protocol, and pending that document's entry into force, act in accordance with the 
protocol and a policy of full nuclear transparency. 
Shortly thereafter, on 21 October 2003, Iran and the EU trio of Britain, France, and 
Germany agreed on the so-called Tehran declaration which outlined a diplomatic plan 
for the parties to mitigate the international crisis over the Islamic Republic's nuclear 
program. In that document, Iran - which viewed its cooperation with the EU states as a 
means to prevent the UN Security Council's involvement in the nuclear matter - 
restated the diplomatic pledges already made to the IAEA director-general, in addition 
to which Iran's authorities agreed to voluntarily "suspend all uranium enrichment and 
processing activities as defined by the IAEA. " In exchange, the EU powers recognized 
the Islamic Republic's right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, promised 
to block Iran's referral to the UN Security Council at the IAEA board's November 2003 
meeting, and stated, among others, that once international concerns over Iran's nuclear 
activities would be fully resolved, "Iran could expect easier access to modern 
technology and supplies in a range of areas. "39 
Following the Tehran Declaration, on 23 October 2003, the Islamic Republic 
provided the IAEA with a documented declaration of its nuclear program which, Iranian 
officials assured, presented a comprehensive and accurate picture of Iran's past and on- 
going nuclear activities. In essence, the Iranian declaration revealed that the Islamic 
Republic had secretly been developing a uranium centrifuge enrichment program for 18 
years and a laser enrichment program for 12 years and that the Islamic Republic had 
also succeeded in clandestinely enriching uranium and separating plutonium. 40 Then, on 
10 November 2003, Iran's IAEA representative provided the agency with a letter in 
which the Islamic Republic expressed its acceptance of the additional protocol - Iran 
ultimately signed the document on 18 December 2003. On 10 November 2003, the 
Islamic Republic also informed the IAEA of its decision to immediately suspend all 
39 As disucssed above in chapter 5, the EU trio had already approached Iran in early August 2003 with a 
letter in which the three powers had offered the Islamic Republic the prospect of technology sharing and 
cooperation in exchange for Iran's decision to stop its nuclear fuel enrichment efforts and to conclude the 
IAEA additional protocol. President Khatami had responded to the EU letter by stressing that his country 
would never divert its civilian nuclear program for military purposes and by noting that Iran had decided 
to enter immediate talks on the additional protocol. The supreme leader of the Islamic Republic, in turn, 
had given a more strict response to the EU powers' initiative by stating that outside calls on his country to 
give up nuclear technology were unsuitable, unjust, and oppressive, and that the Islamic Republic would 
never accept such requests. 
40 In its October 2003 declaration to the IAEA, the Islamic Republic admitted, among others, that it had 
extracted small quantities of plutonium in a hot cell at the Tehran Nuclear Research 
Center between 1988 
and 1992. 
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Iranian activities related to uranium enrichment and plutonium separation. Specifically, 
Iran stated that it would suspend all activities at the Natanz site, refrain from producing 
feed material for enrichment processes, and not import any enrichment-related items. 
Alarmed by the information in Iran's October 2003 declaration to the IAEA, on 26 
November 2003, the agency's Board of Governors adopted a tough-worded resolution 
in which it strongly deplored the Islamic Republic's past failures and breaches of its 
obligation to comply with the provisions of its IAEA safeguards agreement. 
Specifically, the board expressed its grave concern over the fact that Iran had enriched 
uranium and separated plutonium in undeclared facilities. The board, which called on 
the Islamic Republic to strictly adhere to its safeguards obligations and to urgently take 
all necessary corrective measures to rectify its past actions and omissions, also called on 
the Iranians to pursue a policy of nuclear transparency and to fully cooperate with the 
IAEA so that the agency would be able to close the Iran file. 
Moreover, the board warned the Islamic Republic that should further "serious Iranian 
failures" come to light, it would respond by immediately gathering to consider "all 
options at its disposal, in accordance with the IAEA Statute and Iran's safeguards 
agreement. " The board thus implied that should the Islamic Republic seriously fail to 
implement its IAEA safeguards agreement, the Iran dossier would be sent to the UN 
Security Council. The authorities of the Islamic Republic - who, prior to the IAEA 
board's November 2003 meeting, had strongly called on Britain, France, and Germany 
not to include a reference to the Security Council in the board's resolution - dismissed 
the IAEA board's strong language but, at the end of the day, hailed the IAEA board's 
November 2003 meeting as a diplomatic victory for their country, for, contrary to the 
wishes of the United States - and a number of other countries, such as 
Japan and 
Canada - the Iran issue had not been placed on the Security Council's agenda. 
In the course of 2002-2003, Iranian officials tried to defend and protect their 
country's nuclear program also by intensifying their diplomatic argumentation on why 
the Islamic Republic was not pursuing nuclear weapons and on the objectives of their 
nuclear program. According to the Iranians, their country was not interested in acquiring 
nuclear arms because the use of such weapons was against the teachings of 
Islam. 
because nuclear armaments were morally reprehensible, and because the 
Iranian people 
had concretely experienced the disastrous humanitarian consequences of 
WMD use. 
Furthermore, the representatives of the Islamic Republic stressed that the possession 
of nuclear weapons would undermine Iran's national security, 
in addition to which they 
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rejected the notion that nuclear armaments would increase the Islamic Republic's 
international status and influence. As evidence of their country's rejection of such arms, 
Iranian officials referred, among others, to the fact that the Islamic Republic was a 
member of all the major international arms control treaties dealing with WMD, to Irans 
active diplomacy calling for regional and global nuclear disarmament, as well as to 
Iran's policy of not responding in kind to Iraq's chemical attacks during the 1980-1988 
war. 
As far as the motives of the Iranian nuclear program were concerned, the 
representatives of the Islamic Republic continued to maintain that their country's 
nuclear projects served the purpose of increased electricity production as well as the 
Iranian efforts to preserve the country's hydrocarbon reserves for export and processing 
industries, to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and to make use of the agricultural, 
medical, and industrial applications of nuclear science and technology. In addition, the 
Iranians expressed their belief that the know-how obtained in the nuclear field would 
have a positive spill-over effect and hence improve Iran's scientific and technological 
capabilities in other areas as well. 
In 2002-2003, as part of the diplomatic defence of its nuclear program, Iranian 
representatives also revealed new information about their nuclear plans and emphasized 
that their country would under no circumstances give up its right to pursue a 
comprehensive nuclear program for peaceful purposes. Thus, after committing itself to 
the October 2003 Tehran Declaration, for example, the Islamic Republic stressed that its 
agreement to halt its uranium enrichment and processing activities constituted a 
temporary good-will gesture and that it strongly rejected the idea that Iran would have 
to permanently stop those nuclear activities. 
The fact that the Islamic Republic tried to execute its nuclear plans despite being in 
the middle of an international crisis over its nuclear program was demonstrated not only 
by its nuclear cooperation talks with nuclear suppliers, above all with Russia, but also 
by Iranian arms control officials' continuous efforts to improve their country's access to 
nuclear imports. The Iranians complained that due to political considerations, nuclear 
supplier countries, such as the United States and Germany, had over the years seriously 
hampered Iran's peaceful nuclear activities and thereby driven their country to covertly 
develop an indigenous nuclear fuel production capability. According to the authorities 
of the Islamic Republic, the ever present risk of political discrimination also explained 
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why their country could not base its nuclear program on reliance on nuclear fuel 
produced abroad. 
While inviting all technologically advanced member states of the IAEA to take part 
in their country's nuclear projects, Iranian officials strongly condemned the nuclear 
export controls targeted against Iran and called for their immediate removal. The 
Islamic Republic was of the opinion that international rules and guidelines dealing with 
nuclear export controls should be agreed on jointly by the nuclear supplier and recipient 
countries. Iranian authorities also stressed that the IAEA was the only competent and 
legitimate authority to verify the NPT states parties' compliance with their treaty 
obligations. 
Consequently, the Iranians continued to express their support for the improvement of 
the IAEA's verification capabilities and noted that the acceptance of IAEA full-scope 
safeguards was the only legitimate criterion for determining whether a state was entitled 
to nuclear transfers. In the Iranian view, the developing countries that had joined the 
NPT should enjoy a preferential treatment in nuclear transfers and that such transfers to 
non-members of the NPT should be stopped altogether. Although the government of 
president Khatami had initially called on nuclear supplier countries to engage in a 
process of transparency, dialogue, and cooperation with countries seeking nuclear 
imports, as well as argued that the NPT member states acceding to the IAEA additional 
protocol should be granted a full access to nuclear transfers, by the time of the 
deepening of the nuclear crisis between Iran and the international community in 2003, 
the Khatami government no longer showed interest in step-by-step removal of extra- 
NPT export controls. For the Islamic Republic, immediate and full access to nuclear 
imports constituted a core discussion point in any diplomatic talks over its nuclear 
program. 
Both before and during the crisis over Iran's nuclear activities, the Islamic Republic 
also continued to pursue its regional nuclear arms control objectives. Iran's arms control 
operations in this context built on the Islamic Republic's long-lived stances and 
simultaneously sought to respond to the dramatic changes that took place in Iran's 
security environment in the early 2000s. To begin with, following the terrorist attacks of 
11 September 2001, the representatives of the Islamic Republic used international arms 
control fora to voice their government's views on the topical 
issue of WMD terrorism 
and to advance the formulation of multilateral international measures against 
the threat 
of nuclear terrorism. Although basically a topic of global relevance, 
the subject of 
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nuclear terrorism closely touched upon the Islamic Republic's regional interests, for in 
the international debate on the issue, the potential sources of nuclear terrorism were 
placed almost exclusively in the Middle East. 41 
Iranian officials fiercely maintained that the Islamic Republic had never supported 
terrorism in any part of the world nor harboured terrorists on Iranian soil. On the 
contrary, the Iranians stressed that their country itself had been a victim of terrorism and 
the use of WMD. Portraying themselves as defenders of Islam, the authorities of the 
Islamic Republic emphasized that Islam was a peaceful religion and that attempts to link 
international terrorism to Islam or individual Muslim countries were factually inaccurate 
and politically motivated. Finally, pointing out that the steps against WMD terrorism 
should take into account the root causes of terrorism and rely on an objective definition 
of the concept of terrorism, the Iranians argued that international measures against 
nuclear terrorism should be led by the IAEA42 and that nuclear disarmament constituted 
the most effective means to prevent terrorists from obtaining nuclear weapons. 
Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, Iran also had to formulate its 
diplomatic position on the U. S. plan to launch a military operation against the Taliban 
regime in Afghanistan. In its diplomatic effort to promote a UN-led international 
response to the question of Afghanistan, 43 the officials of the Islamic Republic 
expressed their government's objection to a U. S. -led military campaign and claimed 
that the Bush government's real intention was to establish a U. S. political and economic 
hegemony in Central Asia. 
Then, after the U. S. -led military campaign in Afghanistan started on 7 October 2001, 
the Islamic Republic, trying to make the best out of the new situation in its immediate 
neighbourhood, quietly cooperated with the United States in the execution of Operation 
Enduring Freedom by agreeing to the use of its air space for rescue missions, by 
promising to help U. S. soldiers in distress on Iranian territory, and by expressing its 
Of course, Iran actively participated in the international diplomatic debate on nuclear, and more broadly 
WMD, terrorism also because it was often mentioned especially by the U. S. government as one of states 
that could some day provide a nuclear weapon or another kind of a WMD to a terrorist organization. For 
this reason, the Islamic Republic's arms control operations pertaining to the topic of nuclear terrorism 
were also closely related to the defence of its nuclear activities. 
42 The Islamic Republic's emphasis on multilateralism was evident also in its argumentation on chemical 
and biological terrorism. Iran named the OPCW as the central international actor against chemical 
terrorism and noted that pending the creation of the planned treaty organization for the BTWC, the UN 
should lead international efforts against biological terrorism. 
43 Strictly speaking, this Iranian objective does not fall under the purview of the Islamic Republic's 
nuclear arms control diplomacy. Due to the linkage between the question of Afghanistan and terrorism, 
WMD terrorism included, however, it is referred to here, for the purposes of the present discussion, as an 
independent Iranian diplomatic objective. 
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readiness to take part in humanitarian activities. At the same time, however, the 
authorities of the Islamic Republic launched a diplomatic effort to prevent long-term 
foreign military presence in Afghanistan. 44 
Soon after the start of international military action in Afghanistan, Iran also had to 
start to take into consideration the possibility that the United States might launch a 
military attack against Iraq as well. Prior to the eventual start, in March 2003, of the war 
in another country bordering Iran, the Islamic Republic had attempted to contribute to 
the defusing of the Iraq arms inspection crisis through peaceful means and under the 
umbrella of the UN. Iranian officials had strongly objected to the use of military force 
against Iraq and argued that a unilateral military campaign by the United States would 
gravely undermine international law, multilateral WMD arms control efforts, and the 
security of the Middle East. On the other hand, the Iranians repeatedly called on the 
government of Saddam Hussein to fully comply with UN demands and to allow 
international arms inspectors to finish their work in Iraq. 
After the beginning of the Iraq war, the officials of the Islamic Republic condemned 
the war as illegal and declared that it would stay impartial in the conflict and not 
interfere in Iraq's internal affairs. Worried about the war's consequences, and especially 
about the possibility that the United States might extend the military campaign in Iraq 
against their own country and its Islamic regime, Iranian authorities quickly adopted the 
ending of US. military presence in Iraq as a key Iranian foreign policy objective that 
was actively pursued also by the Islamic Republic's arms control officials. 45 This was 
the case especially after it had started to become clear that the pre-war international 
worries about Saddam Hussein's WMD capabilities had largely been needless. 
The military events in Afghanistan and Iraq aside, during the Khatami presidency, the 
Islamic Republic also continued to pursue its long-standing objectives of advancing the 
establishment of zones free from nuclear weapons and other WMD in the Middle East, 
the Persian Gulf, and in other regions of the world. As before, Iranian officials claimed 
that Israel's nuclear arsenal acted as a major source of instability in the Middle East and 
as the main obstacle to the creation of a zone free from nuclear weapons and other 
" Neither does this Iranian objective directly fall under the purview of Islamic Iran's nuclear arms control 
operations. Due to the fact that Iranian officials often claimed that the U. S. military forces stationed 
in 
Iran's neighbourhood were armed with WMD, however, the prevention of 
foreign military presence in 
post-October 2001 Afghanistan is mentioned here as an independent Iranian objective. 
as In the final analysis, the ending of the post-March 2003 U. S. military presence 
in Iraq did not constitute 
a specific objective of Iran's nuclear arms control diplomacy. However, given that 
Iranian authorities 
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WMD in the region. The representatives of the Islamic Republic stressed that the idea of 
WMD-free Middle East was an independent initiative that should not be coupled with 
developments on the Israeli-Palestinian front or with any other precondition. 
While Iran called - among others, in the meetings of the members of the NPT, NAM, 
and OIC, as well as in bilateral talks with foreign states, such as Russia and the Gulf 
Arab sheikhdoms - on governments to refrain from nuclear transfers to Israel and to 
pressure the Jewish state to give up its nuclear weapons by joining the NPT and 
accepting the full-scope safeguards of the IAEA, the Israel-related arms control 
diplomacy of the Islamic Republic - which continued to pursue the specific objective of 
the Jewish state's nuclear disarmament - included a vehement rejection of the Israeli 
accusation that the Islamic Republic was trying to acquire nuclear weapons. According 
to Iranian authorities, the purpose of the untruthful Israeli assertion was to divert 
international attention from the Jewish state's own WMD armament activities, its 
"militaristic policies, " and its "state terrorism. " 
In 2003, after Iran's nuclear program had turned into a major international issue, the 
verbal attacks between the Islamic Republic and Israel only intensified. Fearing that 
Israel's authorities - who declared that Iran's nuclear program posed the biggest threat 
to the Jewish state's existence since its establishment in 1948 - would rely on military 
action in order to stop the Iranian program, the representatives of the Islamic Republic 
warned Israel of the consequences of possible military action against their country. 
Moreover, the Iranians claimed that it was the Jewish state and the pro-Israeli lobby in 
the United States that had ultimately been responsible for the diplomatic mobilization of 
the IAEA and the international community against Iran's peaceful nuclear program. 
6.4.3.2 Objectives vs. goals 
All in all, then, under president Khatami, security continued to constitute the main 
foreign policy goal steering Islamic Iran's nuclear arms control operations. The concern 
over potential - deliberate or unintentional - use of nuclear weapons against their 
country led Iranian officials to promote the objective of universal nuclear disarmament, 
to advocate the adoption of an international ban on the use or threat of use of nuclear 
arms, to call for the establishment of an international instrument providing NNWS with 
often maintained that the U. S. military forces operating in Iran's neighbourhood were armed with 
\V MD, 
it, too, is referred to here, for the purposes of the present discussion, as an 
independent Iranian objective. 
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NSA, and to demand the creation of international mechanisms increasing nuclear 
transparency. 
In the same vein, security considerations explained the Khatami government's 
diplomatic support for the establishment of an international fissile ban treaty controlling 
both the past and future production of those materials, as well as Iran's attempts to 
promote the early EIF and execution of the CTBT, the formulation of multilateral 
international measures against the threat of nuclear terrorism, 46 and the solving of the 
post-1998 Iraq arms inspection problem through peaceful means and under the umbrella 
of the UN. 
The goal of security played a major role also in Iranian nuclear arms control 
operations that were intended for addressing the Islamic Republic's regional concerns 
and aspirations. As a consequence, the Khatami government's diplomatic attempts to 
defuse the 1998 nuclear test crisis in South Asia, to promote a UN-led international 
response to the question of Afghanistan in 2001, and subsequently to prevent long-term 
foreign military presence in that country, were all indicative of Islamic Iran's security 
calculations. Furthermore, Iranian authorities sought to protect the Islamic Republic's 
security interests by calling for the ending of the post-March 2003 military presence of 
the United States in Iraq, by advancing the establishment of zones free from nuclear 
weapons and other WMD in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf sub-region, and in other 
regions of the world, and by underscoring the need for Israel's nuclear disarmament. 
Iran's diplomatic defence of its ballistic missile programs also primarily stemmed 
from security calculations. Viewing its missiles as a necessary component of its 
conventional weapons arsenal, and probably also as a key element of its WMD 
programs, Iranian authorities resorted to arms control diplomacy in order to defend their 
right to build missiles - and thereby strengthen their national security - and in order to 
draw international attention away from Iran's activities in that field. 47 And if one 
concludes that the Islamic Republic's nuclear program had not only a civilian welfare 
dimension but a military dimension as well, then Iran's efforts to protect its ability to 
46 When it came to the issue of nuclear terrorism, Iran's security interests in the matter were twofold. On 
the one hand, the authorities of the Islamic Republic recognized the possibility that Iran might be targeted 
by a terrorist organization equipped with a nuclear weapon. On the other hand, given that Iran itself was 
often mentioned as a country supporting terrorism, the leaders of the Islamic Republic tried to ensure that 
the international debate on terrorism would not result in diplomatic or, more importantly, military action 
against their own country. 
" By extension, if one concludes that the Islamic Republic's missile programs were additionally 
driven 
by an effort to increase Iran's clout and status internationally, then the Islamic 
Republic's defence of its 
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pursue a comprehensive nuclear program by means of arms control diplomacy, too, 
were partially - probably even primarily -a product of Iranian security calculations. 48 
Indeed, the information revealed in 2002-2003 about the content of Iran's nuclear 
program supports the conclusion that, during the Khatami presidency, one of the 
objectives of the Islamic Republic's nuclear arms control operations was to specifically 
cover and protect Iran's efforts to develop a nuclear weapons capability. It is not clear 
whether the Islamic Republic had by then already decided to actually build a nuclear 
weapon, but what seems indisputable is that the Iranians were at least pursuing a nuclear 
weapons option under the cover of their civilian nuclear program. 49 What the Iranians 
were likely striving for was to create a nuclear infrastructure that could be quickly, in 
the matter of weeks or months, geared, for whatever reason, to producing nuclear 
weapons. 50 
Of course, Iranian authorities fiercely rejected the claim that their nuclear program 
had a military dimension and stressed that their nuclear activities served only peaceful 
purposes. Be that as it may, the civilian aspects of the Iranian nuclear program 
suggested that the Islamic Republic's diplomatic defence of its nuclear program was 
partially also aimed at protecting the advancement of the welfare objectives set for the 
Iranian nuclear projects. The same motive was also strongly behind the specific Iranian 
diplomatic objective of improving the Islamic Republic's access to nuclear imports. 51 
There were also other Iranian nuclear arms control objectives that were partially 
driven by other than security-related foreign policy goals. Given that the officials of the 
Islamic Republic, despite their occasional claims to the contrary, viewed nuclear 
weapons as a source of national power and prestige, Iran's calls for universal and 
missile activities through arms control diplomacy also partially stemmed from an attempt to protect the 
promotion of the foreign policy goals of prestige and power. 
48 If the Islamic Republic's nuclear program is viewed as being additionally driven by an effort to 
increase Iran's international clout and status, then the Islamic Republic's defence of its nuclear program 
through arms control diplomacy also partially stemmed from an attempt to protect the promotion of the 
foreign policy goals of prestige and power. The same line of reasoning can also be applied to Iranian 
diplomatic attempts to improve the Islamic Republic's access to nuclear imports - an objective which can 
also be stronly linked to the security-driven Iranian effort to develop a national nuclear weapons 
capability. 
49 By the end of 2003, it became clear that the Islamic Republic had a long history of past IAEA 
safeguards violations. These violations, already discussed above in the present study, cemented a 
consensus among observers that Iran was at least seeking a nuclear weapons option. 
50 Generally, a state that manages to produce fissile material for weapons use is also believed to be 
capable of mastering the technical challenges pertaining to the manufacturing of an actual nuclear bomb. 
51 The presumed military motive notwithstanding, this Iranian objective included an ideological element 
as well, for from the Islamic Republic's point of view, outside attempts to control Iran's and other 
developing countries' access to nuclear materials, technology, and know-how were manifestations of the 
prevailing injustice in international relations. 
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regional nuclear disarmament and its support for, and advocacy of, various partial 
nuclear arms control measures were linked to the Islamic Republics prestige and power 
calculations. 
Thus, on the one hand, the Iranians believed that an active nuclear arms control 
diplomacy would bring their country recognition and status especially among other 
developing countries. On the other hand, and more importantly, the Islamic Republic 
attempted to improve its power and influence vis-ä-vis other states and particularly its 
adversaries through international steps that would affect those countries' military 
capabilities and behaviour. 52 And as before, Islamic Iran's nuclear arms control 
operations also included an ideological element, for under president Khatami, even if in 
a modified and more moderate form, Iran continued to define itself as a revolutionary 
state opposed to existing circumstances in international relations. To the authorities of 
the Islamic Republic, the division of the international system into states equipped with 
nuclear weapons - armaments that were defined by the Iranians as ideologically 
unacceptable in their own right - and non-nuclear countries was a symptom of the 
unjust conditions in inter-state relations. 
6.5 Stability and Change in Islamic Iran's Arms Control Policy 
6.5.1 Conventional arms control 
A discussion of stability and change in Iran's arms control operations needs to start 
from the recognition that the Islamic Republic's arms control policy, like that of any 
other country, consists of actions that are indicative of long-term national policies and 
of actions that concern issues or events that are - or, in retrospect, turn out to be - of 
temporary interest. While Iran's responses to such short-term issues or developments 
can reveal patterns of continuity or change in its general arms control behaviour, an 
analysis of stability and change in Iran's operations in the four individual areas of arms 
control between the 1979-2003 period obviously necessitates a certain permanence 
in 
`-) Note here, for example, the Khatami administration's objective of preventing 
long-term foreign 
military presence in Afghanistan after the start of Operation 
Enduring Freedom, the Islamic Republic's 
efforts to contribute to the solving of the Iraq arms inspection crisis through peaceful means and under 
the 
UN umbrella, Iran's diplomatic actions against the post-March 
2003 military presence of the United 
States in Iraq, the Islamic Republic's interest in the creation of NIAFZ 
in the Middle East, the Persian 
Gulf, and in other regions of the world, as well as 
Iran's categorical objection to Israel's nuclear ýýeapons. 
674 
the questions and phenomena that have invited or forced the Islamic Republic to launch 
arms control operations in the first place. 
When it comes to the Islamic Republic's conventional arms control operations, there 
were a number of Iranian policy objectives that were formulated to address specific 
situations or circumstances originating either from the domestic Iranian political arena 
or from Iran's international environment. First of all, thus, the leaders of the Islamic 
Republic, as part of the steps taken to alter Iran's foreign policy orientation in the 
aftermath of the 1979 revolution, resorted to arms control in order to distance the new 
Iranian regime from the policies of the Pahlavi era, to introduce the fundaments and 
priorities of post-revolutionary Iran's foreign and security policies to the world, and to 
protect the country's Islamic system from perceived outside threats. 
Secondly, the 1980-1988 war between Iran and Iraq forced the Islamic Republic to 
resort to arms control as a means to defend its interests in the face of an unexpected 
external development. During the war, the objectives of Iran's conventional arms 
control operations mostly testified to the Islamic Republic's attempt to influence various 
aspects of Iraq's military behaviour and capabilities, as well as to Iran's effort to sustain 
and improve its military ability to realize the objectives it had set for itself in the war. 
And in the immediate aftermath of the costly conflict, the authorities of the Islamic 
Republic used arms control diplomacy as a means to persuade Iraq to agree to a final 
peace settlement satisfactory to the Iranian leadership. 
In contrast to the Iranian objectives that were pursued with regard to more or less 
short-term issues and developments, the Islamic Republic's conventional arms control 
operations also tried to achieve objectives that remained constant during all the three 
periods of Iran's foreign policy discussed in the present study. Accordingly, there was a 
marked continuity in the Islamic Republic's use of international arms control fora as a 
venue to legitimize and defend its own military behaviour and armament policies. 
Similarly, Iran constantly resorted to arms control diplomacy for the purpose of 
challenging the existing power relations in international affairs as well as, relatedly, for 
the purpose of demanding controls to the major powers' military behaviour and 
armament policies. 
In particular, the leaders of the Islamic Republic strongly 
disapproved the major 
powers' security cooperation with the Gulf Arab states and those powers' 
direct military 
presence in Iran's neighbourhood in the Persian Gulf. As a consequence, 
Iran's attempts 
to create and develop security collaboration with 
GCC states were often subordinated to 
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the pursuance of diplomatic objectives that pertained to Iran's relations with the major 
powers and especially with the United States. From this it followed that despite the Gulf 
arena's central role in the Islamic Republic's conventional arms control operations. 
post-Pahlavi Iran's efforts to foster security cooperation with the Gulf Arab sheikhdoms 
- especially after the Iran-Iraq war, during and in the immediate aftermath of the 1990 - 
1991 Gulf conflict, and later during the Khatami presidency - failed to turn into 
permanent features of the Iranian operations of 1979-2003.53 
The fact that many of the objectives of Iran's conventional arms control operations 
were formulated to address temporary Iranian needs would suggest that the content of 
Iran's conventional arms control argumentation correspondingly varied in terms of 
whether the issues or developments in question concerned short-term or long-lasting 
policy concerns. However, this was not the case, for there was a remarkable substantive 
continuity in Iran's argumentation. Irrespective of the nature of the conventional arms 
control-related issue at hand, the Iranians as a rule built their argumentation on the same 
substantive foundation. 
The Islamic Republic's focus on the major powers was one of such persistent 
elements. From Khomeini to Khatami, the leaders of Islamic Iran - though softening the 
tone, but not the core message, of their political language along the way - declared the 
major powers responsible for global arms racing and for the lack of significant 
conventional arms control among states. In the Iranian analysis, it was the foreign, 
military, and armament policies of the major powers - aiming to promote those powers' 
objectives at the expense of other states' interests and especially those of the developing 
world - that explained the conflictual state of international relations and the build-up of 
conventional armaments and military technology all over the world. 
The Islamic Republic's focus on the Persian Gulf region was another constant feature 
of its conventional arms control argumentation. 54 Naturally, the Iran-Iraq war and the 
53 As far as substantive continuity in post-revolutionary Iran's conventional arms control operations was 
concerned, it should be further reminded here that during the Rafsanjani and Khatami presidencies, Iran 
adopted an essentially unchanged policy towards the UN conventional arms register. As discussed in 
detail in chapter 3, under Rafsanjani and Khatami, the Islamic Republic also had to formulate a national 
approach to the issue of micro-disarmament, a question which Iranian authorities had little interest in but 
which they could not ignore because of the potential ramifications of international micro-disarmament 
measures on the Islamic Republic's arms industry and military activities. Although 
it was not until the 
presidency of Muhammad Khatami that the topic of micro-disarmament became a 
fixed part of Iran's 
conventional arms control diplomacy. it is highly unlikely that the Iranians will change their 
initial issue 
positions on the matter in the foreseeable future. 
° It is striking that although the Islamic Republic viewed 
itself as a Middle Eastern power with interests 
in the region as a whole, its conventional arms control operations, contrary to 
the Islamic Republic's 
military activities, concentrated almost exclusively on the Persian 
Gulf sub-region or zone of conflict. 
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poor post-war relations between the two countries left a lasting mark not only on the 
Islamic Republic's conventional arms control operations but also on its arms control 
policy in general. There was also a marked continuity in Iran's characterizations of its 
own military, armament, and arms control policies. Portraying itself as a revolutionary 
state determined to challenge the major powers' dominance of the international system, 
the Islamic Republic continuously called for a fundamental change in world politics and 
viewed arms control as an important tool against the destructive policies of the major 
powers. The Iranians also stressed the importance of multilateralism in arms control 
diplomacy and called on Third World countries to act as a bloc that leads international 
arms control efforts. 
Furthermore, while emphasizing the moral credentials of their own country's policies 
and its commitment to arms control, the leaders of the Islamic Republic strongly 
defended their right to use military power for Iran's defence and did not hesitate to 
deviate from their arms control prescriptions when that was needed to secure Tehran's 
interests. Thus, Iranian arms control officials made constant attempts to portray their 
government's military activities and armament policies as purely defensive measures 
that were necessitated by other states' actions and not by Iran's own military or power 
aspirations. Essentially, then, Iran tried to have it both ways: to influence other states' 
military behaviour and capabilities, while simultaneously protecting its own policies 
and capabilities from outside limitations - an effort which, of course, is far from 
untypical for other countries as well. 
The Islamic Republic's need to continuously defend its military intentions and 
armament policies in multilateral arms control fora stemmed from both domestic and 
international reasons. On the one hand, given that Iran's leaders were reluctant to revise 
their policies, they sought to reduce the diplomatic and other international costs of their 
actions through arms control diplomacy. On the other hand, the Iranians resorted to 
arms control diplomacy in order to protect the freedom of action, as well as the 
capabilities, of their armed forces - both in times of peace and war - against perceived 
and real external threats. 
The continuity in Iran's diplomatic opposition to the foreign, military, and armament 
policies of the major powers, in turn, was sustained, first of all, 
by ideological factors. 
Although the role of the ideological factor in the Islamic 
Republic's diplomatic 
argumentation and objective-setting diminished in the course of time, 
it never 
disappeared from Iran's arms control policy. More importantly. however, the continuity 
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in the Islamic Republic's conventional arms control operations vis-ä-vis the major 
powers was primarily maintained by the unchanging conditions in Iran's international 
environment. Despite the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union - 
developments that, to some extent, took the edge out of the Iranian leaders' black-and- 
white worldview - the Islamic Republic continued to feel that its interests were directly 
threatened by the policies of the major powers and the United States, in particular. 
Nowhere did external developments have such a great impact on Iran's conventional 
arms control operations than in the Persian Gulf. The Iran-Iraq war, the 1990-1991 
Gulf conflict, persistent uncertainty about Saddam Hussein's military plans, together 
with the close diplomatic and security cooperation that developed between Western 
powers - especially the United States - and the Gulf Arab sheikhdoms after the Gulf 
conflict, all testified to the chronic instability in the Islamic Republic's immediate 
neighbourhood and primarily explained why the Gulf played such a central role in the 
Islamic Republic's conventional arms control diplomacy. 55 
As far as the means of Islamic Iran's conventional arms control operations were 
concerned, they mainly consisted of multilateral diplomatic actions, but included 
bilateral diplomatic and unilateral arms control steps, too. The most significant 
unilateral measures taken by the Iranians were direct results of the regime change that 
occurred in Iran and emblematic of the Islamic Republic's determination to change the 
country's foreign policy orientation after the revolution. In fact, the only other unilateral 
conventional arms control step taken by the Islamic Republic during the period 
considered in this study occurred in November 1998, as Iran declared that it had 
imposed a moratorium on the export of APM. 56 However, it is not clear to what extent, 
if at all, the Iranians actually implemented the moratorium. 
Diplomatic argumentation obviously constituted the main instrument of Iran's 
conventional arms control operations. Still, both in multilateral and bilateral contexts, 
the Islamic Republic also took part in formal arms control arrangements that were 
created to regulate the participants' military behaviour and armament policies. Thus, 
during the Iran-Iraq war - more accurately, in June 1984 - the warring parties agreed 
ss In a similar manner, unchanging conditions in Iran's international environment explained the 
consistency in the Islamic Republic's policy towards the UN's conventional arms register. From the 
Iranian point of view, the register arrangement remained basically irrelevant because it failed to prevent 
destabilizing accumulations of conventional armaments in various parts of the world and because it did 
not cover WMD. 
56 Of course, the Islamic Republic's bitter acceptance, in the summer of 1988, of the cease-fire in the 
Iran-Iraq war can also be categorized as a unilateral arms control step. 
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on a UN-brokered moratorium on shelling and bombing of civilian areas. Later, in the 
post-war period, the Islamic Republic implemented, during the presidency of Rafsanjani 
and especially that of Khatami, limited CBM with GCC countries. In the course of the 
Rafsanjani and Khatami presidencies, Iran also hesitantly submitted national reports to 
the UN's conventional arms register, the only global conventional arms control 
arrangement the Iranians participated in. 
While exhibiting a distinct trend of continuity in terms of content, objectives, and 
means, the Islamic Republic's conventional arms control operations were characterized 
by at least two features that clearly linked the Iranian operations to the self-correcting 
changes that were made to Iran's foreign policy orientation in the 1979-2003 period. 
The diminishing importance of ideological considerations in the Islamic Republic's 
objective-setting was the first feature. While playing a crucial guiding role in Iran's 
conventional arms control operations in the course of the Islamic Republic's first 
decade, after the Iran-Iraq war, the ideological factor was increasingly pushed into the 
background in the Iranian operations, as postulated by the so-called three-era thesis 
discussed in chapter 2. 
And if the role of ideological considerations in Iran's conventional arms control 
objectives decreased as the post-Pahlavi Iranian regime matured, the same applied to the 
ideological element in Iran's diplomatic language. The trend of moderation and 
increased dissociation from the Khomeini era's ideological legacy was recognizable in 
Iran's conventional arms control argumentation as well. This trend - the second main 
feature that tied the Islamic Republic's conventional arms control policy to the shifts in 
post-Pahlavi Iran's foreign policy orientation - was not interrupted by the Khatami 
government's emphasis on ideology, for the ideological message of the reformist 
Iranian president, with its non-confrontational approach to international affairs, merely 
reinforced the processes of moderation and deradicalization that had started during the 
Rafsanjani presidency. 
6.5.2 Chemical disarmament 
In many ways, post-revolutionary Iran's chemical arms control diplomacy can 
be 
seen as the product of one phenomenon: Iraq's war-time use of chemical weapons 
against the Islamic Republic in the 1980s. The chemical issue not only dominated 
Iran's 
arms control policy in the course of the 1980-1988 , gar, but the 
Iraq experience also 
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strongly guided its post-war diplomacy in the area of chemical arms control. Overall, 
then, there was a significant continuity in terms of the objectives and the content of 
Iran's chemical arms control operations during the time period considered in this study. 
Iran's attempts to diplomatically address the Iraqi chemical threat extended from the 
war years all the way to the Khatami presidency. The only period when the Islamic 
Republic was able to take a breathing spell with regard to its Arab neighbour was in the 
years after the 1990-1991 Gulf conflict, as Iraq's chemical weapons capabilities were 
eliminated in accordance to the UN Security Council resolution 687 of April 1991. 
Even then, the Iraq question was indirectly present in Iran's diplomatic attempts to 
achieve a CWC that would rapidly lead to universal chemical disarmament and oblige 
the states parties to immediately respond to future cases of chemical warfare. Similarly, 
the Islamic Republic's specific interest in chemical arms control in the Middle Eastern 
context was, above all, a reflection of the war-time experience with Iraq's chemical 
warfare. 
Another constant element in the objective-setting of post-Pahlavi Iran's chemical 
arms control operations was the emphasis that was placed on the Islamic Republic's 
own chemical activities. During the war years, Iranians leaders most probably used arms 
control diplomacy as an instrument to support their military preparations for possible 
retaliatory chemical warfare against Iraq. And after the war, they presumably 
considered the CWC, and specifically the provisions of article XI of that treaty, an 
avenue to obtain access to chemical imports that were crucial for their weapons 
program. Moreover, the arms control officials of the Islamic Republic continuously 
sought to discredit the - possibly accurate - claim that their country continued to 
possess chemical weapons. At the same time, however, post-war Iran, faced with the 
challenge of economic reconstruction, had a strong non-military interest in chemical 
imports, too. As a result, the representatives of the Islamic Republic saw their CWC- 
related arms control operations as a means to promote their country's peaceful chemical 
activities as well. 
There was also a strong element of continuity in Iran's diplomatic objective-setting 
when it came to the Islamic Republic's approach to the issue of chemical arms control 
in the multilateral Middle Eastern context. Especially after the end of the Iran-Iraq war, 
the Islamic Republic steadily called - partly of course because of the Iraq 
factor but 
partly also because of other reasons - on Middle Eastern governments, 
including those 
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of the Persian Gulf, to take steps in the area of chemical arms control and, above all. to 
accede to the CWC. 
57 
Not unexpectedly, the permanence in Iran's objective-setting translated into a marked 
continuity in the content of the Islamic Republic's diplomatic argumentation. The 
overarching theme in the Iranian argumentation was the call for universal chemical 
disarmament. Following the start of Iraq's chemical warfare, the officials of the Islamic 
Republic turned into vehement proponents of universal chemical disarmament, and both 
during the Iran-Iraq war and afterwards, repeatedly stressed the need for the creation of 
international instruments that would prevent the use of chemical armaments and oblige 
the international community to unconditionally come to the assistance of the victim 
states should such weapons nevertheless be used. These core Iranian demands were 
strongly present also in the Iranian approach to the individual provisions of the CWC. 
States' right to pursue peaceful chemical activities without undue outside interference 
constituted the second persistent theme in Iran's chemical arms control argumentation. 
The subject of peaceful chemical activities was incorporated into the Islamic Republic's 
arms control diplomacy after the Iran-Iraq war and it strongly coloured Iranian 
statements during the CWC negotiations. The key demand of the Iranian representatives 
was that the implementation of the chemical treaty should in no way impede the states 
parties' peaceful chemical activities and, by extension, their economic and technological 
development. On the contrary, the Iranians pointed out, the CWC should reward the 
states parties by concretely contributing to those countries' peaceful chemical activities. 
Following the establishment of the CWC, issues related to article XI of the treaty, as 
already demonstrated above in chapter 4, began to occupy an increasingly prevalent role 
in Iran's chemical arms control operations. 
Iran's diplomacy on chemical arms control in the Middle East was similarly 
characterized by argumentative consistency. While identifying Israel's WMD and 
especially its nuclear weapons as the main obstacle to chemical arms control in the 
region, and hence sympathizing with the Arab position which saw chemical and nuclear 
arms control as indivisibly interconnected, the Islamic Republic at no stage viewed 
those areas of arms control as inseparably intertwined. Quite the opposite, Iran's 
officials repeatedly spoke of chemical arms control as an autonomous area of 
diplomatic 
57 The Iranian chemical arms control objectives, pursued by the Islamic 
Republic after the establishment 
of the CWC and already presented earlier in this chapter, which 
do not directly fit into the aspect of 
continuity discussed here can be seen as individual manifestations of 
Iran's specific attempt to secure its 
CWC-related interests. 
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activity. In the Gulf sub-region, too, Iran referred to chemical weapons as an 
independent problem and consistently called on the regional governments to take steps 
in chemical arms control, both individually and jointly. 
As far as the means of the Islamic Republic's chemical arms control operations were 
concerned, during the war years, in their effort to persuade the international community 
to stop Iraq's chemical warfare, Iran's officials resorted first and foremost to diplomatic 
argumentation in various multilateral arms control fora. In addition, the Iranians 
publicized detailed information about the Iraqi attacks and their consequences and 
provided evidence of the Iraqi attacks to foreign goverments and other relevant 
international actors. Also, the Islamic Republic tried to keep the Iraq issue alive 
diplomatically by organizing international medical gatherings dealing with the problem 
of chemical weapons. Finally, from 1984 onwards, though initially rather 
unenthusiastically, Iran participated in the multilateral negotiations on the CWC at the 
Geneva-based CD. 
After the war, the Islamic Republic continued its diplomatic argumentation against 
chemical armaments in international arms control fora and placed increased emphasis 
on the CWC talks. Following the eventual establishment of a formal international 
chemical disarmament treaty, Iran's chemical arms control diplomacy centered, at first, 
around the activities of the Preparatory Commission of the OPCW and later around the 
international agency itself. The process of the ratification of the chemical treaty in Iran 
was completed in November 1997 and included the formulation of a Majlis declaration 
in which the Islamic Republic listed the circumstances under which it would consider 
withdrawing from the CWC. 
Then in November 1998, Iran submitted its initial declarations to the OPCW and 
revealed in this context that it had pursued chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq war. 
Later, in connection with the OPCW's first inspection visit to Iran, the officials of the 
Islamic Republic took the unilateral step of destroying, far before the CWC-regulated 
deadline, the two chemical facilities in which Iran's war-time weapons program had 
reportedly taken place. 
This summarization of the means of Iran's chemical arms control operations 
illustrates that the Iranians relied on a wide variety of instruments in their chemical arms 
control-related activities. The variety of the means used in post-Pahlavi Iran's chemical 
arms control operations was not only illustrative of the fact that the 
issue of chemical 
weapons played a very important role in the Islamic Republic's arms control policy at 
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large, but it also testified to the fact that chemical disarmament was one of the few areas 
of arms control where the post-Cold War international community managed to move 
forward and achieve significant results. 
Moreover, the means used by the Iranians illustrated, for their part, that Iran's 
chemical arms control operations were by and large autonomous of the general features 
that characterized the Islamic Republic's foreign policy orientation during the three 
distinct periods identified by the proponents of the three-era thesis. In fact, Iraq's use of 
chemical armaments during the 1980-1988 war was one of the key factors that forced 
Iranian leaders to set in motion the process of moderating and deradicalizing their 
foreign policy. Iran's active diplomacy at the UN, its references to the importance of 
international law - and the Geneva Protocol of 1925, in particular - together with its 
participation in the CWC negotiations were concrete examples of the fact that already 
during the Islamic Republic's first decade, Iranian representatives operated within the 
same international legal and institutional frameworks that their rejected at the 
ideological level. 
After the war, the Islamic Republic continued to actively pursue its chemical arms 
control objectives in multilateral diplomatic fora and in the context of the CWC talks. 
And as before, ideological objectives practically played no role in the Islamic 
Republic's chemical arms control operations. Instead, it was first and foremost the goal 
of security that guided the Iranian actions. In a similar manner, Iran's diplomatic 
language essentially continued to lack the ideological characteristics that were common 
to the Islamic Republic's foreign policy argumentation in many other contexts. In short, 
post-revolutionary Iran's chemical arms control operations developed an autonomous 
dynamic that was created and maintained by the Islamic Republic's experience with 
Iraq's chemical warfare, by the security threats in Iran's external environment, and by 
the domestic Iranian considerations that pertained to the Islamic Republic's military and 
peaceful chemical activities. 
6.5.3 Biological disarmament 
Post-revolutionary Iran's biological arms control operations started with an effort to 
maintain continuity in Iranian diplomacy in the face of the country's 
domestic turmoil 
and soon transformed into an instrument in the Islamic Republic's 
diplomatic campaign 
against Iraq's chemical warfare. Thus, it was the war which gave the real purpose 
for 
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Iran's biological arms control operations during the Islamic Republic's first decade. 
And following the 1980-1988 conflict, it was the experience of Iraq's chemical warfare 
that primarily guided the Islamic Republic's approach to biological arms control and 
especially to the multilateral talks on the strengthening of the BTWC. 58 
During the time period starting from the cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war and ending in 
the collapse of the AHG process in July 2001, the Islamic Republic's biological arms 
control operations mostly centered around the BTWC and showed a marked continuity 
both in terms of the objectives of the Iranian operations and the content of Iran's 
diplomatic argumentation. As for the objectives, the officials of the Islamic Republic's 
focused, first of all, on supporting the establishment of a verification mechanism for the 
BTWC, on promoting a BTWC treaty amendment that would explicitly ban the use of 
biological weapons, and on working for the creation of a detailed BTWC-based 
assistance mechanism that would be activated in cases where a state party has become a 
victim of biological weapons use. Moreover, Iranian officials focused on advancing 
biological arms control in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf sub-region. 
The second constant element in the Islamic Republic's objective-setting concerned 
Iran's own biological activities. On the one hand, Iranian officials sought to improve 
international implementation of article X of the BTWC in order to promote their 
country's peaceful biological activities. In addition, the Islamic Republic tried to ensure 
that the creation of a BTWC verification mechanism would not impede those activities. 
On the other hand, Iran's arms control diplomacy simultaneously aimed at proving 
wrong the claim that the Islamic Republic pursued biological armaments and possibly 
also at protecting and covering an Iranian biological weapons program. 59 Finally, Iran's 
diplomatic course was characterized by a constant effort to sustain the primacy of 
multilateralism in international deliberations on biological arms control. 
As was the case with the Islamic Republic's chemical diplomacy, the content of 
Iran's biological arms control argumentation was characterized by a marked continuity. 
Given that the post-revolutionary Iranian regime inherited - and eventually decided to 
maintain - Iran's membership in the BTWC, the Islamic Republic's biological arms 
control operations mostly revolved around the individual aspects of the biological treaty 
58 In this sense, then, the development of post-revolutionary Iran's biological arms control diplomacy 
shows, to use Tibi's (1998: 9) observation, that the consequences of a war are often more important than 
the war itself. 
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and were not guided by an overarching argumentative theme. At the same time, 
however, there was a remarkable continuity in initial Iranian issue positions when it 
came both to post-Pahlavi Iran's global or BTWC-related arms control argumentation 
and to its views on biological arms control in the regional Middle Eastern context. This 
substantive consistency was essentially maintained by the static political and security 
conditions in Iran's international environment as well as by the unchanging domestic 
Iranian interests during the time period under consideration. 
The fact that Iran's biological arms control operations more or less centered around 
the BTWC demonstrated that the means of the Iranian operations primarily consisted of 
formal multilateral diplomacy, that is, of diplomatic activities that focused on reviewing 
and improving an already existing legal instrument. The primacy of formal multilateral 
diplomacy alone implied that Iran's biological arms control operations, just like those in 
the area of chemical arms control, were largely unaffected by the macro-level changes 
that took place in the Islamic Republic's foreign policy orientation between 1979 and 
2003. 
Operating within the confines of a single international treaty dealing with a specific 
area of arms control, the Iranians involved in biological arms control were occupied 
with practical treaty-related issues and technicalities and thereby left the advancement 
of ideological aspirations to their other colleagues. Therefore, not only did ideological 
considerations play an almost non-existent role in the objective-setting and 
argumentation of Iran's biological arms control diplomacy, but because of the relative 
absence of ideological factors from the Iranian operations, it is also hard to identify a 
clear trend of moderation and deradicalization in the Iranian diplomacy over the years. 
In short, the Islamic Republic's biological arms control operations produced patterns of 
continuity that were peculiar to a narrow area of Iranian foreign policy and remained 
largely immune to the self-correcting changes that were made to post-Pahlavi Iran's 
foreign policy orientation. 
59 It should be reminded here that Iran's militarily motivated diplomatic actions 
included the effort to use 
the BTWC's confidence-building mechanism as a means to obtain 
information about other states' 
biological capabilities. 
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6.5.4 Nuclear disarmament 
Stability was also the hallmark of Iranian nuclear arms control operations. The 
objectives set for Iran's nuclear arms control diplomacy in the course of the Islamic 
Republic's first decade continued to heavily steer the Iranian operations during the rest 
of the 1979-2003 period. As a consequence, there were only about a dozen of Iranian 
objectives in those years that turned out to be of temporary interest to the Islamic 
Republic. 
In the course of the Iran-Iraq war, there were three of such short-term Iranian 
objectives. The first of them consisted of the Islamic Republic's diplomatic attempt to 
draw international attention to South Africa's nuclear capabilities and to achieve their 
dismantlement. The second dealt with the Islamic Republic's effort to rally the 
international community to condemn and punish Israel for its air attack against Iraq's 
Osirak nuclear research reactor in June 1981. The third temporary war-time nuclear 
arms control objective was directly linked to the developments in the war, more 
accurately, to Iran's attempt to mobilize governments to stop Iraq's air raids against the 
Bushehr nuclear site. 
In the post-war era, the Islamic Republic's temporary nuclear arms control objectives 
consisted, among others, of the Iranian effort to prevent the escalation of the May 1998 
nuclear test crisis in South Asia, of Iran's attempt to support the advancement of its 
ballistic missiles programs by means of arms control diplomacy, 60 and of Iranian 
activities to promote the formulation of multilateral international measures against the 
threat of nuclear terrorism. Other temporary Iranian diplomatic objectives formulated 
during the Khatami presidency included the promotion, in the aftermath of the terrorist 
attacks of 11 September 2001, of a UN-led international response to the question of 
Afghanistan, the prevention of long-term foreign military presence in that country, and 
the ending of U. S. military presence in post-Saddam Iraq. 
61 
Yet, at the end of the day, Iran's reactions to short-term developments in its external 
environment were exceptions to the remarkable continuity in its diplomatic objective- 
setting in the area of nuclear arms control. In the first place, throughout the 1979-2003 
60 This objective is classified here among the temporary Iranian objectives 
because the Islamic Republic 
placed the issue of missiles on its arms control agenda as late as the end of the 
1990s, that is, not long 
before 2003, this study's cut-off year for analysis. 
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period, the leaders of the Islamic Republic consistently sought to influence the major 
powers' nuclear weapons policies by diplomatic means. While declaring universal 
nuclear disarmament as the ultimate Iranian diplomatic objective, the Iranians also 
aimed, more modestly, at limiting the nuclear powers' ability to use or threaten to use 
their nuclear weapons and called for the creation of international mechanisms that 
would oblige the nuclear powers to provide information about their nuclear weapons 
arsenals. 
Moreover, Iran's nuclear arms control operations focused on pursuing diplomatic 
objectives that sought to prevent the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. Islamic Iran's efforts to promote the establishment - and later, the execution - 
of a comprehensive international ban on nuclear weapons testing and the creation of a 
FMT dealing with states' past and future production of fissile materials, together with 
Iran's emphasis on the need to set up NWFZ or WMDFZ in various parts of the world, 62 
including the Middle East and the Persian Gulf sub-region, all testified to the Islamic 
Republic's consistent diplomatic campaign against nuclear proliferation. 
Stability also coloured Iran's objective-setting when it came to its own nuclear 
activities. The defence and promotion of the Islamic Republic's nuclear program 
constituted an inseparable part of Iranian nuclear diplomacy from the early 1980s and, 
from August 2002 onwards, undoubtedly became the most important endeavour of 
Iran's arms control policy as a whole. In the light of the existing evidence, it is highly 
probable that the leaders of the Islamic Republic - from Khomeini to Khatami - viewed 
nuclear arms control diplomacy not only as a means to protect and advance Iran's 
civilian nuclear projects but also as an instrument to cover and safeguard their attempts 
to obtain at least a nuclear weapons capability for their country. And while seeking to 
secure the Islamic Republic's own interests in the nuclear field, Iranian officials 
regularly portrayed their government as a defender of other developing countries' 
nuclear rights as well. 
In the regional Middle Eastern context, there were two states that played a central 
role in the objective-setting of Islamic Iran's nuclear diplomacy. On the one hand, 
basically throughout 1979-2003, Iranian arms control officials were forced to 
61 Here, too, the distinction between continuity and stability in Iran's objective-setting is artificial in the 
sense that it is based on the mere fact that, from the present study's perspective, the 
issues of post- 
September II Afghanistan and post-Saddam Iraq appeared late on the Iranian agenda. 
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concentrate on the potential threat posed to their country by Iraq's nuclear weapons 
aspirations. On the other hand, during that same period, the Iranians actively sought to 
draw international attention to the issue of Israel's nuclear weapons and constantly 
demanded the Jewish state's immediate accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear state. 
The stability in the objective-setting of Iran's nuclear arms control operations was 
accompanied by a marked substantive continuity in the Islamic Republic's diplomatic 
argumentation. Iran's call for universal nuclear disarmament formed the overarching 
theme in the Iranian diplomatic language. The officials of the Islamic Republic 
constantly referred to the immorality of nuclear weapons and to the dangers posed by 
such armaments. Furthermore, Iranian authorities strongly rejected the major powers' 
nuclear policies and, both at the conceptional and the practical level, the military 
notions and doctrines dealing with nuclear weapons. And while the Iranians persistently 
emphasized the need for a world order free of nuclear armaments, their issue positions 
on partial nuclear arms control measures in global and regional contexts - ranging from 
questions such as nuclear testing and security assurances to NWFZ, the FMT, and 
Israel's nuclear weaponry - remained remarkably stable as well. 
Another central characteristic of Iran's nuclear arms control argumentation was the 
division drawn between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear countries. In the Iranian 
view, the problem of nuclear weapons was caused by the major powers who sought to 
use their nuclear arsenals as instruments for the advancement of military and foreign 
policy objectives. While pointing out that such efforts merely fuelled nuclear arms 
racing and proliferation, the officials of the Islamic Republic also found it totally 
unacceptable that the very same countries that were constantly aiming to improve their 
nuclear weapons both in quantitative and qualitative terms tried to obstruct non-nuclear- 
weapon states' efforts to benefit from peaceful applications of nuclear energy. 
Using article IV of the NPT as the centerpiece of their diplomatic argumentation, the 
Iranians vehemently defended developing countries' right to pursue comprehensive 
nuclear programs for peaceful purposes and regularly pointed out that the NPT actually 
obliged developed countries to assist Third World states, both technically and 
financially, to implement national nuclear projects. Finally, the authorities of the 
62 As already discussed above, the authorities of post-Pahlavi 
Iran also adopted the notion of zones of 
peace - and especially the 
idea of the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian 
Ocean - as part of 
their nuclear arms control objective-setting. 
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Islamic Republic repeatedly accused the major powers of pursuing a policy of double 
standard in the area of nuclear arms control. 
As for Iran's own nuclear program, throughout 1979-2003, the Islamic Republic's 
nuclear arms control diplomacy rested on two key argumentative pillars. For one thing, 
Iranian representatives stressed that their country's nuclear intentions were purely 
peaceful. Alluding to religious, moral, and humanitarian factors, the Iranians assured 
that their country would never pursue nuclear weapons. For another thing, the 
authorities of the Islamic Republic strongly condemned the international control 
measures that stood in the way of Iranian nuclear projects' smooth execution. Iranian 
officials portrayed such measures as manifestations of the injustice that characterized 
international relations and, more narrowly, of the injustice in the area of nuclear arms 
control between the nuclear-haves and the nuclear have-nots. 
The continuity in the Islamic Republic's objective-setting and diplomatic 
argumentation was maintained, above all, by the nuclear status quo in Iran's external 
environment. In the global arena, the major powers, even after the end of the Cold War 
and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, continued to be uninterested in giving up their 
nuclear armaments which they viewed as important protectors of their security and 
foreign policy influence. Accordingly, in the time period under consideration, 
achievements in global nuclear arms control remained limited and the issues on the 
international nuclear arms control agenda continued to be characterized by a long life- 
cycle. 
Regionally, the Islamic Republic was surrounded by states that already possessed 
nuclear arms or aspired to acquire them. In addition, the persistent instability and 
insecurity in Iran's regional environment created a reality in which there were dim 
prospects for regional nuclear arms control arrangements. Naturally, the continuity in 
Islamic Iran's objective-setting and diplomatic argumentation was sustained by 
domestic Iranian considerations as well. Thus, the lessons drawn from the Iran-Iraq 
war, the Islamic Republic's determination to pursue a comprehensive national nuclear 
program, together with the Iranian leaders' military and foreign policy aspirations, also 
played a significant role in maintaining stability and continuity in Islamic Iran's nuclear 
arms control operations. 
As for the means of the Iranian operations, they mostly consisted of participation 
in 
multilateral diplomatic deliberations on nuclear arms control. Given that in many cases 
dormancy was the key feature of such deliberations, formal 
diplomacy played a 
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secondary role in the Islamic Republic's diplomatic activities. However, it was not 
totally absent from Iran's nuclear arms control operations. Thus, the Islamic Republic 
took actively part in the negotiations on the CTBT and signed the treaty in September 
1996. The Iranians were also actively involved in the multilateral talks on the creation 
of an international convention controlling fissile materials which, nonetheless, soon ran 
into a diplomatic cul-de-sac. And in 2003, in the course of the diplomatic crisis over the 
Islamic Republic's nuclear program, Iran yielded to the IAEA's request to amend its 
safeguards agreement with the agency, agreed on the so-called Tehran Declaration with 
the EU trio of France, Germany, and Britain, and signed the IAEA additional protocol. 
Iran's nuclear arms control operations relied on unilateral measures and bilateral 
diplomacy as well. As for the former, in 1991 the Islamic Republic declared that it 
would allow the IAEA to visit any location in Iran in order to verify the absence of 
undeclared nuclear activities. 63 And as already demonstrated above, the Islamic 
Republic resorted to unilateral declarations and initiatives also in the context of its 
missile policy and in connection with its diplomatic arm-wrestling with the U. S. 
administration of president George W. Bush over the Iranian nuclear program. 
Furthermore, throughout the 1979-2003 period, Iran tried to pursue its nuclear arms 
control objectives through bilateral diplomacy with individual governments and with 
the IAEA. 
The means employed by the Islamic Republic in its nuclear arms control operations 
show that the radicalism-pragmatism dichotomy put forth by the proponents of the three 
era thesis is more or less useless in the analysis of the methods employed by Iran in its 
nuclear arms control operations - as well as in the other three thematic areas of its arms 
control policy. Right from the start, the leaders of post-Pahlavi Iran pursued their arms 
control objectives first and foremost within the existing international arms control 
arenas and instruments. In addition, when Tehran's needs so dictated, Iranian officials 
showed great flexibility in selecting the means by which to advance the Islamic 
Republic's nuclear interests. 
At the same time, however, the radicalism-pragmatism dichotomy is of some 
relevance when it comes to post-revolutionary Iran's nuclear arms control 
argumentation and objectives. As for the former, there was a recognizable trend of 
moderation in the Islamic Republic's diplomatic language between 1979-2003. 
During 
the Islamic Republic's first decade, certain aspects of Iran's nuclear arms control 
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operations were characterized by a radical, ideologically laden diplomatic language 
which, however, lost its edge as the Islamic Republic moved into the post-war era. The 
presidency of Muhammad Khatami reinforced the trend of moderation in Islamic Iran's 
diplomatic language, even if, overall, the changes in the Islamic Republic's nuclear 
argumentation were minor and had no impact on the remarkable continuity in the 
substantive core of that argumentation. 
As far as role of ideological considerations in Iran's objective-setting in the area of 
nuclear arms control was concerned, the ideological element, too, reached its peak in 
importance during the Khomeini years, as suggested by the three era thesis. From the 
Rafsanjani presidency onwards, however, the role of the ideological element remained 
basically constant and concerned certain individual Iranian objectives that exhibited 
major continuity in the 1979-2003 period. In this sense, then, the explanatory power of 
the three era thesis remained low. 
6.5.5 Final remarks 
An analysis of stability and change in the level of effort in post-revolutionary Iran's 
arms control operations can focus, on the one hand, on Iranian activities within a single 
thematic area of arms control and, on the other hand, on the Islamic Republic's arms 
control policy as a whole. When it comes to Iran's activities in the specific field of 
conventional arms control, it is difficult to identify significant changes in the level of 
effort in the Iranian actions. Minor nuances aside, post-revolutionary Iran's 
conventional arms control policy was characterized by stability in this respect as well. 
During the Islamic Republic's first decade, Iranian officials were occupied with the 
formulation of new policies for their country and with the dangers and challenges posed 
by the conflict with Iraq. The fact that the end of the Iran-Iraq war did not result in a 
peace treaty sustained a dangerous constellation between the two countries in the post- 
war era, which, in turn, together with the question of foreign military presence in the 
Persian Gulf, had a direct impact on Iran's conventional arms control operations. 
The Gulf conflict of 1990-1991 and its consequences also strongly influenced the 
Islamic Republic's conventional arms control diplomacy in the post-Iran-Iraq war 
period. Similarly, under the Rafsanjani presidency, Iranian authorities had to deal with 
the ramifications of the end of the Cold War and with increased multilateral diplomatic 
63 Consequently, the nuclear agency conducted special visits to Iran in 1992,1993.1997, and 
2000 
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activities in the area of conventional arms control. The Islamic Republic maintained an 
active diplomatic course also during the Khatami administration which laid strong 
emphasis on detente and confidence-building in the Persian Gulf and additionally had to 
respond to the ascendancy of the micro-disarmament debate which started to heavily 
color multilateral conventional arms control deliberations from the mid-1990s onwards. 
In contrast to the Islamic Republic's conventional arms control diplomacy. there was 
a clear pattern of change in the level of effort in post-Pahlavi Iran's chemical arms 
control operations. Understandably, the Iranian operations were at their most intense 
during the Iran-Iraq war. After the war, the intensity of Iran's chemical diplomacy 
cooled down, but Iranian officials remained still highly active. for the leaders of the 
Islamic Republic continued to be concerned over Iraq's chemical weapons and hoped to 
see the creation of the planned CWC. The opening of the convention for signature in 
January 1993, preceded by the UN-sanctioned chemical disarmament of Iraq following 
the 1990-1991 Gulf conflict, marked the beginning of the third, a more relaxed phase in 
post-revolutionary Iran's chemical arms control operations. Iraq disarmed and a 
landmark international arms control agreement in place, the officials of the Islamic 
Republic focused on promoting Tehran's interests within the CWC framework. 
There was an identifiable pattern of change in the level of effort of post-Pahlavi 
Iran's biological arms control operations, too. During the Islamic Republic's first 
decade, biological arms control played a marginal role in Iranian diplomacy. 
Essentially, the function of Iran's biological arms control operations in that period was 
to support the Islamic Republic's diplomatic campaign against Iraq's chemical warfare. 
But following the war, Iran's biological arms control diplomacy started to find its own 
identity. The September 1991 BTWC review conference, taking place after the 
momentous 1990-1991 Gulf conflict, constituted an important watershed in this respect. 
The conference started a new phase in multilateral diplomatic efforts against biological 
weapons and thereby also intensified Iranian operations in the area of biological arms 
control. 
This distinctly active period of the Islamic Republic's biological diplomacy included 
Iranian participation in the work of VEREX, in the 
September 1994 BTWC special 
conference, in the BTWC review conference of 1996, and, most 
importantly, in the 
AHG process of 1995-2001. However, as the 
U. S. government of George W. Bush 
rejected the planned BTWC protocol in July 2001, multilateral 
diplomatic efforts in the 
area of biological arms control suffered a 
dramatic setback. The diplomatic paralysis 
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that ensued had a direct impact on Iran's biological arms control operations. A new 
phase, tinged with by stagnation and anticipation. entered the Iranian diplomacy. 
As was the case with the Islamic Republic's conventional arms control operations, in 
terms of the level of effort, Iran's nuclear diplomacy was markedly stable. Given the 
tremendous destructive power of nuclear weapons and the role they played in the major 
powers' military and foreign policies, and given the fact that post-revolutionary Iran 
soon found itself in a war against Iraq and that the leaders of post-Pahlavi Iran decided 
to pursue a national nuclear power program. the issue of nuclear armaments was heavily 
present in Iranian diplomacy already during the Islamic Republic's first decade. 
Iranian officials were closely involved in multilateral deliberations on nuclear arms 
control also in the post-war era. Under the Rafsanjani and Khatami presidencies. Iran 
sought to promote its interests in a broad range of issues and diplomatic processes. 
Ultimately, however. the stability in the Islamic Republic's nuclear arms control 
operations was dramatically shaken by the crisis that developed between Iran and the 
international community over the Iranian nuclear program in 2003. As a result of the 
new circumstances faced by the leaders of the Islamic Republic, Iranian officials were 
forced to step up their already active nuclear arms control operations. In fact, the 
urgency and the importance of the nuclear issue produced a situation in which one 
sector of Iranian diplomacy - arms control and expressely nuclear arms control - came 
to dominate the Islamic Republic's foreign policy as a whole. 
Generally speaking, it can be concluded that when it came to the level of effort of 
Iran's arms control operations. it was the issue of chemical weapons that dominated the 
Iranian operations during the post-Pahlavi Iran's first decade. The Iranians invested a lot 
of diplomatic resources also in the promotion of conventional arms control and, to a 
lesser degree, nuclear arms control objectives that specifically concerned the 1980-1988 
war. Biological arms control, in turn, played only a marginal role in Iran's diplomacy in 
this period. 
In the post-war era, chemical arms control continued to maintain 
its central position 
in the Iranian diplomacy, but following the 1990-1991 Gulf conflict and creation of the 
CWC, nuclear issues started to occupy a leading place 
in the Islamic Republic's arms 
control policy. Of course. this development reached 
its pinnacle in 2003 as Iran's 
nuclear program turned into a major issue on the 
international arms control agenda. In 
the post-Iran-Iraq war years, the Islamic Republic also placed 
increased emphasis on 
biological arms control. As for Irans conventional arms control operations. 
their role 
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may have decreased in relation to the other areas of the Islamic Republic's arms control 
diplomacy during the Rafsanjani and Khatami presidencies, but still remained a fixed 
part of Iran's foreign policy. 
If there was a single theme that united the four individual areas of post-Pahlavi Iran's 
arms control policy, it was the Islamic Republic's dissatisfaction with the existing 
international reality. From Khomeini to Khatami, Iran's leaders viewed international 
politics as consisting of unjust and unequal relations between countries that wielded 
power and dominated the international scene and those which were the targets and 
victims of the major powers' foreign and military policies. In Iranian leaders' 
perception, the Islamic Republic was among the countries that were persistently on the 
defensive, that is, forced to defend themselves from the constant dangers and problems 
emanating from their external environments. 
On the other hand, Iran's arms control operations of 1979-2003 also demonstrated 
that Iranian leaders were simultaneously seeking to bring about changes to the 
international reality they were so critical of. Although, in the final analysis, this aspect 
of Islamic Iran's arms control policy was overwhelmed by the uninterrupted flow of 
events and issues that required practical responses from the Iranians, the representatives 
of post-revolutionary Iran never ceased to challenge the existing international order. Not 
infrequently, the fusion of the reactive and proactive elements of the Islamic Republic's 
arms control policy led to situations where there was a gaping discrepancy between 
stated and actual Iranian policies. 
But here, too, it was the unjust nature of international relations that explained 
everything. Even in the rare moments when Iranian representatives acknowledged that 
the Islamic Republic had not practiced what it had preached, they blamed other actors 
and external circumstances for their country's behaviour. Thus, the discontent that 
characterized post-Pahlavi Iran's arms control operations also conveniently transformed 
into an instrument to rationalize and legitimize the policies of the Islamic Republic. 
This was the other face of the Iranian diplomacy of discontent. 
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